Transhumanism and the Meaning of Life

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Transhumanism and the Meaning of Life
Anders Sandberg
Preprint of chapter in Transhumanism and Religion: Moving into an Unknown
Future , eds. Tracy Trothen and Calvin Mercer, Praeger 2014

Transhumanism, broadly speaking ,1 is the view that the human condit ion is not
unchanging and that it can and should be questioned . Further, the human condition
can and should be changed using applied reason .2 As Max More explained,
transhumanism includes life philosophies that seek the evolution of intelligent life
beyon d its current human form and limitations using science and technology .3
Nick Bostrom emphas izes the importance to transhumanism of explor ing
transhuman and posthuman modes of existence . 4 This exploration is desirable since
there are reasons to believe som e states in this realm hold great value, nearly
regardless of the value theory to which one subscribes .5 Transhumanism, in his
conception, has this exploration as its core value and then derives other values from
it.
Sebastian Seung, an outsider to transh umanism , described it as having
accepted the post -Enlightenment critique of reason, yet not giv ing up on using
reason to achieve grand ends that could give meaning to li fe individually or
collectively :
The “meaning of life” includes both universal and per sonal dimensions. We
can ask both “Are we here for a reason?” and “Am I here for a reason?”
Transhumanism answers these questions as follows. First, it’s the destiny of
humankind to transcend the human condition. This is not merely what will
happen, but wh at should happen. Second, it can be a personal goal to sign up
for Alcor6, dream about uploading, or use technology to otherwise improve
oneself. In both of these ways, transhumanism lends meaning to lives that
were robbed of it by science.
The bible said that God made man in his own image. The German
philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach said that man made God in his own image.
The transhumanists say that humanity will make itself into God.7
Is this view correct? In what follows, I will show that Seung ne atly summe d up three
strands of transhumanism: transhumanism as a way of improving one’s own life
(what I call “individual transhumanism”), transhumanism as a project dedicated to
the betterment of humanity (“terrestrial transhumanism”), and transhumanism as a
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proje ct with the purpose of achieving the potential of life in the universe (“cosmist
transhumanism”).
By considering the possibility of creating or becoming something
superhuman , transhumanism forces meaning of li fe questions to the foreground as
engineering t argets .8 This leads to an interesting intersection between
transhumanism and questions concerning universal value s: how is the meaning of
life understood in transhumanist thought ? In the following , I survey thinkers in the
three strands that I have identif ied and examine how they approach questions of
meaning. In particular, I am concerned with how meaning can be constructed when
the human condition, life or even the universe itself may become a cultural artefact .
Individual Transhumanism
The individual tra nshumanist story is typically described as ambition to live a
life supported by enhancements in order to achieve better health and mental
capacity, refined emotions, new abilities, longevity , and perhaps becom e a
posthuman. People differ on w hether this is merely about overcom ing everyday
limitations , becoming something akin to a Greek god, or an ambition to totally
escape the human condition .
When informally asking self -described transhumanists on the extropy -chat
mailing list9 about their views on the mea ning of life , the answers I received were for
the most part firmly in a naturalistic subjectivist camp . For these transhumanists
there was no supernatural world imbuing meaning to existence, but all believed that
thinking beings can experience meaningful s tates – if only meaningful to themselves.
In fact, many of the respondents were clearly existentialist in outlook. Some sample
comments illustrate this point :
OR: “We give our own meaning to life in the context of ourselves and our
surroundings. ”
BZ: “The meaning of life is... You decide. ”
GP: “The question "what's the meaning of life?" assumes that there is a unique
answer valid for everyone. But I don't think there is one. It's up to everyone to
give meaning to their life. ”
 Some were more theoretical, pl acing the question within a larger narrative .
One respondent explained that the meaning of human life is to decide on actions
based on perceived value. But there is a choice to improve this human decision -
making function, which might be called acquiring wi sdom :
KA: “Now, if acquiring wisdom is the meaning of human life, then in
transhumanism the goal could be stated as "acquire more wisdom than is
currently humanly possible. ”
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However, the respondents also clearly expressed many things they experienced as
meaningful:
GP: “I find meaning in being a small part of something very big -
humanity on its way to become [sic] a cosmic civilization that will achieve
the dreams of Fedorov and Tiple r…”
One respondent privately pointed out that he regarded the greatest ch allenge in life
as com ing to terms with the limitations of life, including its finitude. He saw
transhumanism, at least in its most radical forms, as an attempt to retreat from this
existential challenge. This is not an uncommon criticism of transhumanism from
outside , but it is worth noting that it also exists within the transhumanist
community.

Religious Transhumanism
The naturalism of the se responses is not surprising. A World Transhumanist
Association (now named Humanity+) survey of member s10 found that 87% of
respondents agree d that their “concept of ‘the meaning of life ’ [was] derived from
human responsibility and opportunity rather than divine revelation” and 93%
agree d that they “expect [ed] human progress to result from human accomplishment
rather t han divine intervention, grace, or redemption .” The majority (64%) of survey
respondents were secular but there were notable religious minorities subscribing to
transhumanism , including Buddhists, Christians and various self -described spiritual
members.
Transhumanism is sometimes described as a religion but while it overlaps
with religion in being concerned with escaping the current human condition for a
more transcendent condition11 and can share many metaphysical, soteriological and
eschatological intere sts,12 there are clear divergences both in practices (for example,
the lack of transhumanist prayer) and underlying theory. Indeed, transhumanism in
general may lack key parts of a belief system. Transhumanism might simply be in
favour of a set of instrumen tal methods of achieving ambitious aims, but not provide
any real value theory or purpose . While the more existentialist or postmodern
transhumanists might regard this as a merit (since they are sceptical about objective
values) , many people see value as n ecessary for being able to live a meaningful life .
Hopkins points out :
If we take it as essential to religion that it provides some sort of ultimate
answer for the meaning of life, as the World Transhumanist Association
seems to in its statement, then tran shumanism still isn’t a religion.
Transhumanists argue for the right to attempt to surpass the current
limitations of human biology. They do not argue that this is a goal in itself,
only that it is a condition under which other goals and experiences might be
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even more widely, permanently, or expansively pursued. Without some other
meaning, goal, or belief, even a posthuman could sit around bored,
depressed, or awash in angst.
Transhumanism can, however, be combined with a religious belief that hold s
its ow n values . For example, in a provocative essay13 Micah Redding expresses a
Christian transhumanist view that “Christianity is transhumanism. It’s not just that
they are compatible. Christianity is a distinctly transhumanist viewpoint that sprung
up in the fi rst century, and set out to reshape both the world and human nature. ”
Humanity being divinely created for a purpose gives a meaning to human life: to do
the works of God. In this perspective Christianity is a form of transhumanism that
believes that divine power and grace are necessary ‘tech nologies’ of human
empowerment and transcendence ; the Christian transhumanist merely sees
naturalistic technology as a useful complement .
Deliberately constructed transhumanist religious systems also exist. For
example, the Terasem movement claims to be a ‘transreligion ’: “a movement which
can be combined with any existing religion, without having to leave a previous
religion.” This is similar to the view that transhumanism can be combined with
many value systems; althou gh just as for transhumanism there might be some
compatibility problems . In fact, the Terasem core belief that “god is technological”
and a future human -created entity makes it incompatible with most mainstream
religions. From a meaning perspective it is e xplicit: “Life is purposeful: the purpose
of life is to create diversity, unity and joyful immortality everywhere.” Various
technological projects are motivated from these core beliefs .14
While a meaning provided by an external system of belief might be
emotionally satisfying, the potential arbitrariness is not philosophically satisfying.
Hence some transhumanists dissatisfied with both subjectivism and traditional
meanings have attempted to construct pure transhumanist concepts of meaning.
Extropianism
The ideas developed and spread by the Extropy Institute in the early 1990s
influenced much of contemporary transhumanism. The Extropian P rinciples 2.5
state :15
Extropy: A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality, experience,
diversity, opportuni ty, and growth. Extropianism: The philosophy that seeks
to increase extropy.
According to Max More , Extropianism aimed to provide “an inspiring and uplifting
meaning and direction to our lives, while remaining flexible and firmly founded in
science, reason , and the boundless search for improvement.”16 Note the
psychological rather than ethical or teleological use of the word ‘meaning’: it is not a
moral meaning derived from somehow breaching the is -ought boundary, but a sense
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of meaning compatible with what is. This is very much in line with Seung’s
diagnosis .
However, further down in the manifesto this meaning becomes linked to a
more explicit notion of global progress:
Extropians recognize the unique place of our species, and our opportunity to
advance natu re's evolution to new peaks. Beginning as mindless matter, parts
of nature developed in a slow evolutionary ascendence, leading to
progressively more powerful brains. Chemical reactions generated tropistic
behavior, which was superseded by instinctual and Skinnerian stimulus -
response behavior, and then by conscious learning and experimentation. With
the advent of the conceptual awareness of humankind, the rate of
advancement sharply accelerated as intelligence, technology, and the
scientific method were app lied to our condition. We seek to sustain and
quicken this evolutionary process of expanding extropy, transcending
biological and psycholo gical limits into posthumanity.
The reasons w hy this is desirable depends on one ’s interpretation of extropy. If one
sees evolution as a meaningful and value -creating process, then supporting it is
desirable. Even if evolution is not itself meaningful it may create things or states of
value, and hence amplifying this ability to evolve would be meaningful and enable
deeper exploration of the posthuman realm.
While the above section speaks to progress on a species level, the Extropian
Principles largely dealt with individu al growth and societal progress .17 Extropianism
as described in the principles does not include an expli cit notion of the meaning of
life, but its clear emphasis on intelligence, wisdom, effectiveness, creativity, removal
of limits to self -actualisation and autonomy is not far from a naturalist objectivist or
hybrid account of meaning .

Enhancements and the Meaning of Life
Most of the bioethical debate about human enhancement has not centred on
meanings of life. Instead , it has focused on the permissibility or desirability of
enhancement s using bioethic al principles of autonomy, justice, welfare and risk of
harms. As often noted the term ‘enhancement’ implies some kind of value scale, but
a value scale is itself not enough to provide meaning. Top-down arguments from a
meaning of life to enhancement permissibility/desirability are rare, perhaps because
of the reluctance of postmodern academia to engage with “great stories” that
provide an overarching explanation of life or give universal moral principles . The
closest the debate gets to meaning is usually considerations about human dignity
and discussions of under what conditions enhancement could rob a human life of
meaning .18
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One area where enhancement discussions run in parallel with meaning of life
discussions is life extension. Arguments that immortality would make life
meaningless often hinge on the fact th at the finitude of life somehow imbues it with
meaning .19 Besides causing problems for theis ts hoping for everlasting life ,20 they
have problems with the arbitrariness of the length. While one can argue that certain
lifespans are too short or too long, the a ctual length does not matter for the finitude
argument. That means that even eon -long lifespans can be meaningful, since they are
still finite. In fact, our current understanding of the universe does not allow for tru ly
indefinitely long lifespans : even a non-ageing entity with multiple dispersed
backup -copies will eventually have to face the heat -death of the universe or a case of
bad luck.
A somewhat related argument is that indefinite lifespans would become
boring. This is used both in bioethics and in discussions about the meaning of life .21
However, leaving aside the empirical question whether this has to be the case for all
people, it is not clear that a boring life is meaningless. There is a host of arguments
that happiness may not be the necessary or sufficient condition for a meaningful life
(consider Nozick’s experience machine). Similarly a boring life might still be
meaningful. Many important tasks are dull yet ought to be done: some such tasks
might even be of indefinite duration .
Conversely the re is Leo Tolstoy’s argument22 that in order for life to be
meaningful there must be something worth doing, but actions with impermanent
effects on the world do not eventually matter, so for life to have meaning it requires
some ability to have permanent ef fects . This is sometimes seen as an argument for an
immortal soul (or God’s eternal remembrance ).23 However, transhumanism can
claim that the argument merely shows that we should aim for an infinite lifespan:
souls may not be needed. Indeed, one could see i t as an argument for why we must
strive for vastly extended lifespans and expanding into the universe for our lives to
have any meaning. Transhumanism might be what enables us to lead truly
meaningf ul lives in a physical universe .24
Terrestrial Transhumani sm
The terrestrial transhumanism story is a story about humanity, or perhaps our
own current civilization. A typical version is expressed as a story of technological
progress, either occurring automatically or as a result of deliberate effort, leading to
a series of human condition -changing technologies , e.g., life extension, cognitive
enhancement, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, brain -computer symbiosis,
whole brain e mulation, space colonization . In any case, the new technological
capabilities ena ble humans to become enhanced transhumans and eventually
posthumans, beings largely liberated from the constraints imposed by natural
evolution. Ray Kurzweil25 and Hans Moravec26 are well -known ex ponent s of this
form of transhumanism. In the following I will look at three thinkers influential
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inside transhumanism and how they approach the meaning of life from the species
level.
 In Man into Superman R.C.W. Ettinger, the father of cryonics , argues for
human enhancement and faith in technological progress, but almost as an aside
delivers a theory of the meaning of li fe:27
At last one of the central questions can be dealt with: What is the purpose of
life? Answer: To discover the purpose of life. This is not a play on words, but
a recognition of the obvious truth that since ultimate answers are not within
view we must make do, for the foreseeable future, with uncovering and
pursuing a succession of intermediate goals, and that this requires a program
of growth and development.
Given the need for long -term empirical research and the likelihood that mere human
intelligence is not enough, we need to develop human enhancement just to do our
proper work.
This view is echoed in some of Nick Bostrom’s work. Basically, the deep
problems of philosophy have shown themselves to be very hard to solve, and we
should expect that they will remain unsolved for a long time (requiring life extension
if we are keen on learning the answer s) or they will not yield at all until we can
develop minds (posthuman or artificial) smart enough to handle them. In either case,
we should focus on earlier and perhaps lesser problems that allow us to get to this
state, such as life extension or cognitive enhancement, but also reducing existential
risk so that we have a future where they can be solved . In this case transhumanism is
merely instrumental for finding out what the real, non -instrumental values are.
 David Pearce takes a strong hedonistic and negative utilitarian stance,
arguing that pleasure is the real (multidimensional) value and pain th e real -disvalue.
Focusing on reducing pain, his abolitionist project aims at eventually eradicating
aversive experience – first from humans, later from all sentient life. This requires a
fairly deep neural restructuring of the motivation system, but is int ensely
worthwhile . The very nature of pain makes it something to avoid, and intelligent
beings have the power to save themselves from pain as well as a moral obligati on to
save other organisms too .28 The abolitionist approach exemplifies the species -
indepe ndence of much philosophical transhumanism. What matters is the lives of
sentient beings, not what kind of beings they are or what relationship they hold with
humanity.
Pearce does not , however, speak of this project as conveying a meaning of life.
In his writings meaning is very much a non -propositional feeling, and hence also
amenable to e nhancement like other feelings :29 “Authentic happiness" doesn't need
to be strived for. Like a sense of meaning and purpose, it can be innate. ” He notes
that depressive a nd unmotivated “healthy” people find life meaningless, absurd or
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futile, while hyperthymic or hypomanic people tend to find life intensely
meaningful. By enhancing happiness we can enhance meaning: “ If our happiness is
taken care of - whether genetically, pharmacologically, or electrosurgically - then the
meaning of life seems to take care of itself. ”
 Elizer Yudkowsky is a n interesting case of a n influential transhumanist
whose thinking about meaning has strongly evolved over time. Starting from I.J.
Good’s “intelligence explosion” idea ,30 Yudkowsky became a strong proponent for
technological singularity and the benefit of constructing AI (artificial intelligence ) to
reach it as soon as possible . In his earliest writings the motivation for striving
towards the singularity is to solve the world problems (including rising existential
risks) through supe rintelligence .31
Seeing the situation as the practical engineering problem of triggering an
intelligence explosion , he set out to discover a solution and promote the approach.
This soon led to a version of the discovery motivation for enhancement, the “the
interim meaning of life” being to create superhuman AI. He developed a formal
argument that even an artificial intelligence with no given goals would also deduc e
the desirability of finding out what was meaningful to do .32
However, at this point the project of pursuing powerful AI began to run into
trouble. A superintelligent entity is supremely able to achieve its goals, but there is
no guarantee that it will hav e human -friendly or even sane goals .33 Yudkowsky
recognized that designing AI is hence not just a matter of achieving great intelligence
that can grow, but also inserting goals or values that make it safe and human -
friendly .
The “friendly AI” project can b e seen as an attempt to figure out how to
design a “god” that has positive properties. It turns theist assumptions around: not
only would god be created in the image of human s, but the values it embodies
would be defined by human s. As contributors to the research ha ve found, this leads
to profound ethical and logical problems. Indeed, his lasting legacy may be to have
open a fruitful field between ethics and theoretical computer science.
When Ray Kurzweil suggests solving the problem by teaching AI the go lden
rule,34 he assumes that this will unfold into a proper morality rather than the AI
choosing to interpret it simplemindedly like a child would. However, as the
frien dliness researchers have shown , converting human -type values and instructions
into code or instructions is exceedingly hard . Even a correct moral system might
have a flawed implementation , and we should not be too confident that we even
have the right starting point .35
As “friendliness” was explored it became increasingly clear that one of t he
key problems was that human value is complex, fragile and hard to articulate , let
alone formalize. At present Eliezer’s tentative conclusion about meaning is “fun
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theory” ,36 essentially a sprawling analysis of human value and enjoyment . We know
many thi ngs about what makes lives generally go well, yet formalizing all of it into a
computable package is troublesome. At its core the theory is utilitarian, but
acknowledging the possibility that neat , compact theories of value might be
impossible .
Meaning for Posthumans
Does a posthuman have the same meaning of its life as a human? We might
impute that posthumans might have experiences and modes of cognition that we
cannot conceive of, yet bear on a meaning of life for them. Either (1) humans have
reached some form of philosophical, cognitive or emotional threshold to experience
or perceive the meaning of life and posthumans will also agree on this meaning, (2)
posthumans will have a different kind of meaning of their lives than humans, or (3)
only posthumans ( but not humans) are able to live truly meaningful lives.
 If posthumans have a different kind of meaning than humans , then there may
be no human meaning -related reason for humans to want to become posthumans. If
only posthumans have meaning , then the best humans can aspire to in terms of
meaning is to become posthuman enough to perceive for what they then need to
strive.
It is worth remarking here on the contested links between Nietzsche and
transhumanism. Nick Bostrom explicitly rejected any deeper conne ction t han found
in superficial quotation .37 However, while there are differences between Nietzsche’s
philosophy and transhumanism, Stefan Sorgner showed significant overlap between
them .38 Max More explained how Nietzsche had influenced his o wn development of
extropianism .39 The eternal return is very different from the progressive view of
transhumanism, and Nietzsche would not have approved of the utilitarian branches
of transhumanism. But as Sorgner points out, Nietzsche can also provide a meaning
to tran shumanism through his concept of the overhuman:
The overhuman represents the meaning of the earth. The overhuman is
supposed to represent the meaning -giving concept within Nietzsche’s
worldview which is supposed to replace the basically Christian worldvie w. It
is in the interest of higher humans to permanently overcome themselves. The
ultimate kind of overcoming can be seen in the overcoming of the human
species, and whoever has been keen on permanently overcoming himself can
regard himself as an ancestor of the overhuman. In this way, the overhuman
is supposed to give meaning to human beings. It is not a transcendent
meaning but an earthy, immanent one which is appropriate for scientifically
minded people who have abandoned their belief in an after world.
If one identifies the overhuman and posthuman with each other, then a Nietzschean
transhumanist would indeed find meaning in life by aiming to become at least the
ancestor of the overhuman/posthuman. Loeb has argued that this requires affirming
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eternal rec urrence (which also provides a peculiar solution to how to achieve infinite
consequences and hence meaning)40, while Sorgner and More seem open to a more
selective reading. This can be contrasted with Bostrom’s neutral definition of
transhumanism as merely a chance to explore the posthuman realm . While there
might be gre at value ‘out there’, it does not necessarily produce a strong individual
obligatio n to explore it .41 A utilitarian ethics is still needed to make a search
meaningful.
Existential Risk
While often seen by outsiders as naively optimistic , many transhumanists
tend to emphasize that the future may be more extreme than is commonly thought .
While there might be posthuman states of great value, there are also potential
existential risks threatenin g futures with no or extremely negative value. Insofar as
we can influence what future we might reach, we may have a far greater moral
responsibility than is commonly envisioned because the stakes are higher .42
The existential risk issue is not so much an issue about the meaning of life as
it is an issue about the preventi on of the loss of meaning. If humanity becom es
extinct, at the very least the loss is equivalent to the loss of all living individuals and
the thwarting of their individual goals . But t he loss would likely be far greater :
extinction means the loss of all future generations (even modest assumptions lead to
an astro nomical number of future lives43), all the value they might have been able to
create, and maybe the meaning generated by past gene rations as well . But it is also
possible to argue that value requires a valuer . If consciousness or intelligence is lost,
it might mean that value itself becomes absent from the universe.
The immortality discussion earlier in this chapter can be applied here
regarding the mortality of the human species. On one hand , the Tolstoy argument
suggests that unless our species persists indefinitely (perhaps evolving into new
things) there is no meaning to its current existence. Species matter because they are
parts of the tree of life, leading to new forms. Pro-finitude arguments would on the
other hand lead us to not wish to prolong the stay of our species on Earth. However,
when applied to humanity as a whole the counterpart to boredom would be
stagnation, and t he counterpart to giving space for new people would be to leave
space for new species . These arguments merely show that we should wish for more
evolution and eventual replacement, not that our lineage ends .
The Simulation Argument
Nick Bostrom’s simulati on argument is that unless the human species goes
extinct before becoming posthuman, there will emerge capabilities to run enormous
numbers of historical simulations including virtual people. So unless posthuman
civilizations are extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations (either
because of impossibility or some extremely strong and unlikely consistent
unwillingness) , there will be a vast number of simulated people, far greater than the
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number of real people. So we are almost certainly going to be living in a computer
simulation , at least given common transhumanist assumptions .44 How does
extensive simulation affect the meaning of life?
Simulation may give a purpose to our world , but that does not necessarily
give a purpose to individual life. Only simulations created for the purpose of having
inhabitants with lives worth living can be said to give some purpose to their lives.
But in this case the simulated lives only have the same meaning (i.e. to have a life
worth living) as lives in the outside universe.
Mere t eleology may not always give meaning, just as noted in the
philosophical debate about what objective factors would give human life meaning.
The hybrid view of meaning argues that meaning arises when one does projects that
are judge d to be worthwhile and actually are worthwhile .45 Caring about things that
are not worthwhile or failing to see the importance of what one is doing can
preclude meaning in one’s life. A worthwhile simulation does not mean that
simulated lives have meaning . They did not have a choice to participate, they do not
know about it, and the value of the simulation might only relate to something
existing outside it .
How would thinking we live in a simulation impact us? Hanson suggests
that, given typical human des ires, we would live more for today (since the world
could be shut down at any moment), care less for other people , aim to be
entertaining and praiseworthy, mingle with famous people, and participate in
pivotal events .46 If we had a better idea of what the c reator wanted to achieve , other
behaviours might be more appropriate. Insofar that the creator of a simulation is
morally responsible for the behaviour of the beings inside , there is a moral obligation
for the creator to give the right information to the s imulated people in order for them
to behave well and to minimize their suffering. Running simulations with sentient
inhabitants poses significant ethical problems .47 In a sense this is a theodicy problem,
but there is no assumption in the simulation argumen t the creator is omniscient or
benevolent.
A directly theological take on the simulation argument is offered by Eric
Steinhart .48 In his somewhat neoplatonic approach , Steinhart suggests that the
ultimate simulator of a set of nested simulations should be regarded as God who
acts as the ground of being. He posits an aesthetic theodicy , where the suffering and
evil in side the simulations is vindicated by the overall creative aim :
Why are we being simulated? And why are there any simulations rather than
none? We have three answers: at every level, the designers are interested in
the evolution of complexity; in knowledge; and in dramatic beauty.
Obviously, these three concepts overlap. They share a common core. It’s
reasonable to refer to this common core as interestingness . … At the risk of
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sounding circular, the simulationist can say that we are being simulated
because every creative intelligence is interested in interestingness .
Evolution of complexity, knowledge and dramatic beauty sounds suspiciously
simila r to extropy. In this case the goal of the whole project is worthwhile
interestingness, and all intelligent entities should both find the whole worthwhile
and experience interest in their own worlds and the simulations they run , so here
there would indeed be a meaning of life .
Cosmist Transhumanism
The cosmist transhumanist story occurs at the largest scale : first life, then
intelligence, emerges on E arth. Intelligence becomes technological, masters the
natural world, and event ually begins to colonize spac e. As intelligence spreads it
converts resources in its environment into things of value to it : both instrumentally
useful tools for further expansion and protection (spacecraft, backups) , and also
intrinsically valuable things , such as biospheres, culture s, or minds .
The expansion is essentially unlimited. A civilization that has learned to use
standard astronomical resources has a vast amount of material available . If it is able
to make the jump over interplanetary and interstellar distances once, it can repeat it .
Even inter galactic jumps are likely feasible to a civilization that can spread between
the stars .49 There is likely no intrinsic limitation on the scales of activities of
technological civilisations beyond those imposed by the laws of nature and available
resources.
The cosmist view is about physics . Dead matter is metastable and can , under
the right conditions , convert to a different organisation (i.e., life/intelligence ). Just as
super -cooled water freezes outward from a seed ice crystal , if intelligent life emerges
anywhere it is likely to nucleate a “technosphere” bubble where matter is
reorganised according to the dictates of mind.
The cosmist story has multiple endings. One ending is that the entire universe
becomes intelligent, i.e., “wake s up” as per Kurzweil.50 Another scenario envisions
intelligence becom ing increasingly interconnected and coordinated, ending in a
single super -mind or super -social organisation .51 In either case the intelligence -
dominated universe will be filled with minds protecting life and intelligence,
controlling the contents of the universe in order to survive or reach unification.
 Mere matter lacks inherent value and meaning , whereas life and mind have
potential for meaning. The expansion of life into the universe an d the gradual
conversion of matter into mind can be a way of providing the universe with
meaning .52 Is spreading life meaningful? While there are theories of value where in
objects have intrinsic value even when never observed, value is typically assumed to
require someone or something that values. While human observers are the usual
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example, it is not hard to imagine that at least some form of valuing is done by other
life forms . In the future , software and other artificial systems m ay also be valuers.
Most of these entities do not simply passively measure value but are agents ; their
actions can be best described as attempts to increase value as they understand it.
Some systems have enough internal degrees of freedom to learn and change their
value estimates and action patterns, in some cases as deliberate internal actions (in
which case we may even call them moral agents). In this account, systems are able to
experience value and act to increase it. If there is some true value and these systems
converge towar ds seeking it, they would increase true value in the world. If value is
agent -relative or instrumental, agents could potentially (but not necessarily) increase
the amount of subjective value . Conversely, a universe with fewer valuers has less
potential for a drive towards more value (unless the value lies in no deliberate
change). So there seem to be at least some prima facie reasons to believe a universe
rich in life and mind to have more value.
Beside s the potential for adding value, there is the potentia l for creating
diversity. Living beings are foremost contingent, individual and shaped by a unique
life story (and evolutionary path) that make them impossible to recreate if they are
lost. As expressed by Ramez Naam53:
We are, if we choose to be, the seed from which wondrous new kinds of life
can grow. We are the prospective parents of new and unimaginable creatures.
We are the tiny metazoan from which a new Cambrian can spring. I can think
of no more beautiful destiny for any species, no more privileged pl ace in
history, than to be the initiators of this new genesis.
Cosmist expansion is a way of responding to our apparent insignificance .54 We may
be small and contingent, yet potentially important by triggering the great Cambrian
explosion of future species .
Edward Abbey famously wrote “Growth for the sake of growth is the
ideology of the cancer cell. ”55 Might not this focus on growth and progress lead to
devaluation of what we have, and destabilization of the natural world? Even if
interstellar expansion i s begun for the best reasons, evolutionary pressures might
promote a mode of expansion where nearly all resources are devoted to rapid
expansion rather than creating value .56 But g rowth is also the ideology of the orchid.
Replicating and evolving systems t end to fill their niches, use the available resources
and constantly poke the edges. The problem with growth is when it causes loss of
value, typically seen as loss of diversity, intrinsic harmony or long -term
sustainability. So spreading life into the un iverse could be a great boon . The vast
scales in space, time and environment types lead to diversity, and interstellar life
would have a chance to outlast the inevitable end of Earth’s biosphere.
Our real stewardship might be in avoiding early existentia l risk that threaten s
the cosmic blossoming, and in preventing pathologies from burning away value .
14

Both would require coordination before we leave our earthly seed site, turning the
cosmist possibilities and risks into an issue for present generations. As Yudkowsky
put it57:
If you occupy the incredibly rare and leverage -privileged position of being
born into Ancient Earth, the origin of all life… Your most fundamental
responsibility as a Homo sapiens is to the process whereby the reachable
universe is con verted into QALYs58.

Universal Immortalism
Nikolai Fedorov ranks as one of the pioneering and perhaps most original
forerunner of transhumanism. A Russian philosopher, he formulated a bold
worldview based on slavophilia, orthodox Christianity and belief i n science .59 In his
system the core problem is the disunity and lack of love among people. His solution
is the doctrine of kinship ; we must strive to reach the kind of unity a loving family
(and the trinity) embodies. This includes not just brotherhood with our present
peers, but also lineage kinship where parents care for their descendants , and they in
turn acknowledge their debt and gratitude. In order to unite human kind a great
project is needed, the “Common Task” that all people can agree on. This invol ves
regulating nature and perfecting it, the colonization (“spiritualization”) of the
universe, improving the human body, and the eventual resurrection of the dead .
This is a task of completing creation entrusted t o humanity by God .60
Fedorov’s cosmism app ears to have influenced many notable intellectuals,
including Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Tsiolkovsky .61 Tsiolkovsky founded the space
movement, contributing to the shedding of its theological components and to it
becoming a manifest destiny of spreading life and intelligence across the universe.
Hans Moravec speculated about future computers being powerful enough to
generate history simulations (partially motivating the simulation argument) that
could be used to reconstruct past people62: “Resurrecting one sma ll planet should be
child’s play long before our civilization has colonized its first galaxy.” The
computational requirements do appear feasible given known physics63, although
they would require computing on a literally planetary scale. In addition to
resu rrecting historical people, possible people would (and maybe should) also be
given the gift of life.
Several transhumanists , such as Mike Perry , have gone from possibility to
ought . Since life, lived well, is an end in itself , it should be extended .64 He outlines a
moral case for life extension, cryonics and universal immortalism. This is a naturalist
objectivist concept of a meaning of life , but clearly aligned with Fedorov’s Common
Task65: “The immortalization of humans and other life -forms is seen as a g reat moral
15

project and labor of love that will unite us in a common cause and provide a
meaningful destiny. ”
Omega Points
Many transhumanists consider the possibility of God or gods emerging
through a naturalistic process. Superintelligent AI or posthumans may appear god -
like to humans, but where is the upper limit? Ray Kurzweil suggests that intelligence
will spread and awaken the universe, producing something akin to a pantheistic
deity in the future .66
The most extreme form of both universal immortalism and life taking control
of the universe is represented by the Omega Point cosmology of Frank J. Tipler ,67
who borrowed the term from Teilhard de Chardin.68 Tipler describes a scenario
where intelligence expands across the universe, gains control over most ma tter and
energy, and during a future phase of cosmological implosion exploit s these to
maintain its order and structure , ultimately achieving infinite information and
processing power .
In its original form69 this was an exercise along the lines of Freeman D yson’s
classical 1979 paper70 that laid the groundwork for ‘physical eschatology ,’ i.e., the
study of the future evolution of the universe based on known physics. Physical
eschatology looks at the long -term survival of structure and analysis of what role s
life and intelligence may play in the various large -scale scenarios .71
Tipler’s scenario soon took on a distinctly theological character. The Omega
Point moved beyond a limit ed state of infinite information and processing power
and took on the character of God. Tipler argued that the Omega Point will be a
benevolent time in which all the dead are resurrected , producing an endless virtual
afterlife. The Omega Point was also defined , in his physical theology , as the
boundary condition of space -time . In a very real sense it was understood as the
future physical cause of the universe. While individual beings had free will their
actions would eventually lead to the emergence of the Omega Point . Universes
where this failed would be self -contradictory and hence ha ve zero probability of
occurring . Acting to bring about the Omega Point is the meaning of the world.
Omega Point theology has been rather cool ly received among physicists and
theologians , in some cases leading them to take the whole physical eschatology
program to task for Tipler’s excesses . For example, why does the boundary condition
have to be benevolent infinite information rather than (say) zero information ? The
theory also had the fatal problem of requiring a closed universe ; observations have
now demonstrated an accelerating open universe where this particular model of
infinite information processing will not work. Nevertheless, the Omega Point, while
not something many transhumanists believe in, could be something we might
eventually aspire to at le ast approximate .
16

Conclusion
Transhumanism does not have a unified theory of the meaning of life, but
certain themes recur again and again , linked to the different strands .
While individual respondents tended towards subjectivism, transhumanist
theorists have often approached meaning from a hybrid view : there are objective
values or goals that can make transhuman life meaningful, and there is a great deal
of individual subjective choice in setting goals and determining how to reach them.
Typical objectives are r educing suffering and unnecessary limitations and achieving
well -being, wisdom, life, diversity and an open future . While not unique to the
strand, this is the most common approach within individual transhumanism.
The idea of “doing God’s work” in p erfecting creation or humanity shows up
repeatedly, both in an explicit theist context and in secular versions. The secular
versions recognize how nature has produced value -experiencing beings that are now
beginning to be free and powerful enough to direct further change in a value -
creating direction. The scepticism of transhumanism both towards traditional
philosophy and our ability to solve problems with merely human reason also lends
itself to the interim goal of becoming able to fully discover meaning b y creating
greater forms of intelligence. This provides a meaning for the ambitions of terrestrial
transhumanism.
Finally, in the cosmist strand, t he Tolstoy argument about infinite lasting
consequences can be applied to posthumanity: if we can bring abou t the enormous
future envisioned, our lives will at least instrumentally have meaning. Even if this
future is finite it may be immeasurably larger than any ordinary future , and this still
make s the pursuit meaningful. The transhumanist, whether secular or theistic, is
embedded in a meaningful worldview unique because of its enormous ambition and
scope. It attempts to link our current microscopic state with the grandness of the
universe unveiled by modern science . As the universe becomes vaster, the
transhu manist will experience meaning as increasing rather than decreasing.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank the participants on the extropy -chat mailing list for responding to my
queries – and once upon a time , in the early 1990s , setting me on the path toward s
philosophy.

1 Transhumanism is not a doctrinal movement or philosophy. In this chapter I will hence use
transh umanism in a broad sense of thinkers that agree on the changeability of the current
human condition, rather than in the narrow sense of people calling themselves
transhumanists.
17

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