Vol.:(0123456789)1 3AI and Ethics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00065-0
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Moral consideration of nonhumans in the ethics of artificial
intelligence
Andrea Owe1  · Seth D. Baum1
Received: 23 February 2021 / Accepted: 26 May 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
Abstract
This paper argues that the field of artificial intelligence (AI) ethics needs to give more attention to the values and interests
of nonhumans such as other biological species and the AI itself. It documents the extent of current attention to nonhumans
in AI ethics as found in academic research, statements of ethics principles, and select projects to design, build, apply, and
govern AI. It finds that the field of AI ethics gives limited and inconsistent attention to nonhumans, with the main activity
being a line of research on the moral status of AI. The paper argues that nonhumans merit moral consideration, meaning that
they should be actively valued for their own sake and not ignored or valued just for how they might benefit humans. Finally,
it explains implications of moral consideration of nonhumans for AI ethics research and practice, including for the content of
AI ethics principles, the selection of AI projects, the accounting of inadvertent effects of AI systems such as via their resource
and energy consumption and potentially certain algorithmic biases, and the research challenge of incorporating nonhuman
interests and values into AI system design. The paper does not take positions on which nonhumans to morally consider or
how to balance the interests and values of humans vs. nonhumans. Instead, the paper makes the more basic argument that the
field of AI ethics should move from its current state of affairs, in which nonhumans are usually ignored, to a state in which
nonhumans are given more consistent and extensive moral consideration.
Keywords Ethics · Nonhumans · Environmental ethics · Artificial intelligence · Intrinsic value · Anthropocentrism
1 Introduction
The growing role of artificial intelligence (AI) technology
raises important ethical questions about how AI systems
should be designed and used. To date, initiatives for ethical
AI have largely focused on human interests and values, such
as in projects on “AI4People” [1 ] and “human-compatible
AI” [2 ], two different initiatives on “AI for Humanity” [3 ,
4], the Partnership on AI (PAI) tenet “We will seek to ensure
that AI technologies benefit and empower as many people
as possible” [ 5], and governmental efforts such as a Chi -
nese government report stating “The goal of AI development
should be to promote the well-being of humankind” [6 ].
This paper advances the proposition that AI ethics should
also consider the interests and values of nonhumans, includ-
ing (but not necessarily limited to) nonhuman animals, the natural environment, and the AI itself. We do not argue that
AI ethics should only consider nonhumans. Clearly, humans
are also worthy of moral consideration. We also do not argue
that all nonhumans merit moral consideration. Which par -
ticular nonhuman entities deserve moral consideration and
how to weight humans vs. nonhumans are important ques -
tions, but they are also complex and controversial. Given
that nonhumans have thus far gotten relatively limited atten -
tion in AI ethics, we believe it is a constructive first step to
address the more basic proposition that nonhuman entities
merit some nonzero, nontrivial moral consideration, includ-
ing in areas of AI ethics that currently give no moral con-
sideration to nonhumans. By this we mean enough moral
consideration to potentially merit some meaningful activ -
ity, and not a minuscule moral consideration so far down
in the decimal points that it could simply be ignored. We
believe this to be a widely acceptable proposition. It also
sets the stage for the more difficult questions of how exactly
to operationalize consideration of nonhumans in AI ethics,
a matter that we leave for future work. \* Andrea Owe
 andrea.owe@gcrinstitute.org
1 Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, PO Box 40364,
Washington, DC 20016, USA
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Moral consideration of nonhumans is an important topic in
theoretical ethics, but it is also a practical issue for real-world
AI systems. There are several matters at stake. First, AI can
be applied for the advancement of nonhuman entities, such as
for environmental protection. In a world of limited resources,
there are decisions to be made about how much to invest in AI
projects that benefit nonhumans. Second, AI can inadvertently
harm the nonhuman world, such as via its considerable energy
consumption or potentially via certain algorithmic biases.
Arguably, where AI activities harm the nonhuman world, these
impacts should be balanced against the benefits of AI. Third,
the long-term prospect of strong AI or artificial general intel-
ligence (AGI) may radically transform the world for humans
and everything else. How an AGI should be designed and built
could depend on the particulars of the moral consideration of
humans as well as nonhumans, with potentially catastrophic
implications for the wrong AGI design or build. This paper
does not determine how exactly these various matters should
be resolved. Instead, we seek to establish that these are matters
that need to be resolved.
Some prior literature on AI ethics has considered nonhu-
man entities. A primary line of scholarship discusses the moral
value of the AI itself and other computer systems [7 –10].
Additionally, several studies applying Indigenous perspectives
to AI ethics give moral consideration for nonhuman animals,
the natural environment, and the AI itself [11– 13]. Other rel-
evant work discusses the role of AI in suffering endured by
both humans and nonhumans [14] and in the design of AI
systems with ethics frameworks based on ethical views held
by both humans and nonhumans [15].
Whereas the literature referenced above addresses specific
ethical issues and perspectives related to nonhumans, this
paper addresses the more general question of the overall role
of nonhumans within AI ethics. In other words, the original
contribution of this paper is to provide a broad analysis of
the role of nonhumans in AI ethics. The paper also informs
discussions of the overarching ethical principles that should
guide AI development and use. In recent years, many groups
have published statements of AI ethics principles; a survey
by Jobin et al. [ 16] identifies 84. This paper examines these
and other statements of AI ethics principles in terms of their
moral consideration for nonhumans. The paper also presents
an argument for moral consideration for nonhumans in AI eth-
ics, drawing on prior moral philosophy of nonhumans, espe-
cially from the field of environmental ethics, which has given
extensive prior attention to the ethics of nonhumans [17].
Before turning to these matters, the paper first clarifies what
we mean by moral consideration for nonhumans.2 The concept of moral consideration
for nonhumans
We use the term moral consideration to refer to the act of
assigning intrinsic moral value or significance. The term
moral consideration has been used in this way in prior
literature, including on the ethics of AI and robotics [8 ]
and the environment [18 ]. Intrinsic value is defined as that
which is valuable for its own sake and not in reference to
anything else [19]. It is contrasted with extrinsic value:
that which is valuable for some other reason [20, 21]. One
important type of extrinsic value is instrumental value:
that which is valuable because it advances some intrinsic
value. Often, intrinsic and instrumental value are treated
as opposites and as the two main types of value in ethical
discussion.
We define “nonhuman” as anything that is not human,
though in doing so we do not mean to claim that all nonhu-
mans merit moral consideration. Prior studies have argued
for the intrinsic value of nonhuman animals [22, 23], liv -
ing organisms [ 24, 25], including extraterrestrial life [ 26],
ecosystems [24, 27, 28], abiotic nature, including in outer
space [29, 30], technologically enhanced “posthumans”
[31], relationships between sufficiently advanced moral
agents, including advanced robots [8 ], AI [32], especially
sentient AI [33, 34], information [35], and the universe
itself [36]. The concept of “posthuman” speaks to fuzzi-
ness of the boundary between human and nonhuman: there
is no definitive point at which an entity is sufficiently post-
human to no longer classify as human. As noted above, it
is not our interest in this paper to adjudicate between these
various arguments about which nonhumans are intrinsi-
cally valuable. We present a more general argument for
intrinsically valuing nonhumans in Sect.  4.
The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental
value is central for the ethics of nonhumans. Nonhuman
entities may be considered valuable for their own sake or
because they are valuable to humans. Clearly, nonhuman
entities are instrumentally valuable to humans. Humans
depend on natural environments for survival, such as for
air, water, and food. Artifacts such as computers are also
of obvious usefulness to humans. If humans are intrinsi-
cally valuable, then some nonhuman entities are instru-
mentally valuable. That is without question. The question
is whether any nonhuman entities are also intrinsically
valuable. This is perhaps the most fundamental question
in the ethics of nonhumans.
Another important distinction is between interests and
values. An entity’s interests are that which is good for the
entity. An entity’s values are that which the entity consid-
ers to be good. Unless the entity is completely selfish, its
interests and values diverge. For example, someone might
AI and Ethics
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personally enjoy and be able to afford a life of leisure, but
they nonetheless work hard to address important issues
because they believe that is the right thing to do. Value
systems can involve chains of moral agents valuing the
values of other agents: agent 1 values the values of agent
2, who values the values of agent 3, and so on. Such chains
can theoretically persist ad infinitum, though in practice
they typically end with some valuation of interests.
Moral consideration of nonhumans can come from plac-
ing weight on nonhumans’ values and/or interests. Likewise,
AI systems can morally consider nonhumans in several
ways. First, they can be preprogrammed to account for the
values and/or interests of nonhumans. Second, they can learn
to follow the values of humans who give moral consideration
to nonhumans. This is consistent with certain conceptions
of “value alignment” or “human compatibility” developed
in the AI ethics literature [2 ], though the literature does not
generally examine the role of nonhumans, a notable excep-
tion being [15]. Third, they can learn to follow the values
held by any nonhumans that are sufficiently intelligent that
they hold moral values. Potential examples include intel-
ligent nonhuman animals, extraterrestrials, and advanced
AI systems. This could also classify as “value alignment”,
though it may require different computational methods than
can be used to align AI systems to human values.
3 Prior attention (or lack thereof)
to nonhumans in AI ethics
With the conceptual background of the previous section in
mind, we can now take a closer look at treatments of non -
humans in AI ethics. We begin by reviewing two system -
atic studies of statements of AI ethics: the Jobin et al. [16]
survey of AI ethics guidelines and the Baum [37] survey of
the goals of AGI research and development projects. These
surveys permit a more quantitative assessment of the extent
of attention to nonhumans in AI ethics. We then dive into
some of the data points, taking a closer look at a few notable
treatments of AI ethics in academia, industry, and govern-
ment, followed by a discussion of AI ethics research. Though
not comprehensive, the overarching trend observed is that
the field of AI ethics gives extensive moral consideration of
humans and a much smaller moral consideration of nonhu-
mans. (The field also gives extensive attention to issues that
are not specific to either humans or nonhumans, such as the
trustworthiness of an AI system.)
3.1 AI ethics principles
Jobin et al. [16] present a systematic search of AI ethics
guidelines, identifying 84. Jobin et al. [16] classified the
guidelines in terms of the principles they contain. They report 11 types of principles: transparency (found in 73
guidelines), justice and fairness (68), non-maleficence (60),
responsibility (60), privacy (47), beneficence (41), freedom
and autonomy (34), trust (28), sustainability (14), dignity
(13), and solidarity (6).
Some of the principles do not involve moral consideration
for either humans or nonhumans. Guidelines for transpar -
ency mainly concern the usage of AI, such as in the need for
trust, interpretability, and oversight of AI systems. Respon-
sibility concerns matters of integrity, liability, and general
attention to ethics by those involved in AI development and
use. Trust concerns whether AI systems and the organi-
zations that provide them can be counted on to behave as
expected. These conceptions of transparency, responsibility,
and trust involve a special role for humans as the users of AI
systems, but they are compatible with moral consideration
for both humans and nonhumans because humans can use
the AI systems in ways consistent with ethical frameworks
that give moral consideration to either humans or nonhu-
mans. For example, a human using an AI system to protect
biodiversity would want to be able to trust that the AI system
is, in fact, accomplishing this goal.
All of the other principles included in Jobin et al. [16]
are applicable to moral consideration for both humans and
nonhumans, though specific treatments of the principles
commonly neglect nonhumans. For example, principles of
justice and fairness have been mainly (perhaps exclusively)
applied to human issues such as bias and discrimination
among humans, but there are also important issues of jus-
tice for nonhumans [38, 39]. Principles of non-maleficence
have been mainly applied to domains associated with human
interests, such as cyberwarfare and economic loss, but AI
can also be used to harm nonhumans. Principles of privacy
may be less relevant to nonhumans, except perhaps if the
AI itself merits moral status such that its privacy should be
respected. Treatments of freedom and autonomy emphasize
matters such as empowerment, self-determination, and free-
dom from surveillance and manipulation; these matters can
be highly relevant to nonhumans, such as if AI is involved in
the treatment of nonhuman animals held in captivity. Treat-
ments of dignity call for AI to enhance, or at least not dimin-
ish, human dignity; the same could be said for the dignity
of nonhumans. Finally, treatments of solidarity emphasize
labor disruption, such as in technological unemployment;
this is perhaps less applicable to nonhumans, though one
can speak of, for example, solidarity between human and AI
laborers, or solidarity among biological organisms against
the potential future threat of AI takeover.
The two principles in which nonhumans have gotten at
least some moral consideration are beneficence and sustain -
ability. Jobin et al. [16] observe that AI ethics guidelines
typically do not define benefit. When they do, the definitions
are mostly in terms of humanity, society, or other concepts
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specific to humans. However, five guidelines call for benefits
to something distinctly nonhuman: the planet (2 guidelines),
the environment (2), or all sentient creatures (1). Others are
ambiguous, such as the six calls for AI to benefit “everyone.”
Regarding sustainability, five AI guidelines call for sustain-
ing the AI itself, its data, and the applicability of the insights
it produces. These principles do not give moral considera-
tion to either humans or nonhumans and are compatible with
both. Moral consideration for humans is apparent in calls for
fair and equal societies (1 guideline), peace (1), and account-
ability with respect to potential job losses (1). Moral consid-
eration for nonhumans is possible in calls for environmental
protection (3 guidelines), improving ecosystems and biodi-
versity (1), and reducing the environmental impact of AI
systems (1). However, it is unclear whether these guidelines
value nonhumans intrinsically or instrumentally.
To summarize, the Jobin et al. [16] data indicate that
only a small portion of AI ethics guidelines give moral
consideration to nonhumans. Five guidelines call for ben-
efits to nonhumans. Five also call for some form of envi-
ronmental sustainability, though these principles do not
clearly distinguish between the intrinsic and instrumental
value of the environment. There are two points of overlap
between the two sets of five, so eight total guidelines
give explicit consideration to nonhumans. The other 76
guidelines have no attention to nonhumans. Attention to
humans is extensive.
3.2 AGI projects
Baum [37] presents a systematic search of AGI research
and development projects, identifying 45. AGI does not
yet exist and remains a long-term research challenge, but
there are active groups working on AGI, as documented
by Baum [37]. Baum classifies the projects according to
several attributes including their stated goals. The cat-
egories of goals map neatly to this paper’s treatment of
moral consideration. 23 projects state intellectual goals,
either “the intellectual accomplishment of the AGI
itself” or “using the AGI to pursue intellectual goals”;
these are not specific to either humans or nonhumans.
20 projects stated the goal of benefiting humanity. Other
goals include benefiting ecosystems (three projects), ani -
mal welfare (two projects), generating profit for the AGI
builders (two projects), and benefiting sentient beings and
robots (one project). Note that some projects stated multi-
ple types of goals. A more recent survey of AGI projects
by Fitzgerald et al. [40] finds similar trends. These data
are similar to the Jobin et al. [16] data: many AGI projects
give moral consideration to humans, and only a small
minority give moral consideration to nonhumans.3.3 Select notable examples of the treatment
of nonhumans in AI ethics
This subsection analyzes select AI ethics statements, with
emphasis on statements that are in some way important or
insightful to the paper’s theme of nonhumans. The selection
cuts across academia, industry, and government, with some
statements including contributions from multiple sectors.
Two recent academic works are explicitly calling for
human-centric AI. The initiative “AI4People” [1 ] is, as it
is mainly oriented toward human concerns. However, it
also calls for “use of AI technologies within the EU that
are socially preferable (not merely acceptable) and envi-
ronmentally friendly (not merely sustainable but favourable
to the environment)” [1, p.704]. The emphasis on favoring
the environment strongly suggests it intrinsically values the
environment. In contrast, the concept of “human-compat-
ible AI” developed by Russell [2 ] gives no explicit moral
consideration to nonhumans. Instead, it calls for AI whose
“only objective is to maximize the realization of human pref -
erences” [2, p.173]. The reference to preferences is about
human values, not human interests, and so the AI could give
moral consideration to nonhumans to the extent that human
preferences do the same, but Russell [2 ] does not explicitly
consider this prospect or the prospect of accounting for the
preferences of nonhumans.
Among AI companies, moral consideration for humans
is typical. Google’s AI ethics principles state, for example,
“We will seek to avoid unjust impacts on people” [41]. Ope-
nAI writes that it pursues AI that “leads to a good outcome
for humans” and “Our mission is to ensure that artificial gen-
eral intelligence benefits all of humanity” [42]. Microsoft’s
AI ethics principles state, for example, “AI systems should
treat all people fairly” and “AI systems should empower
everyone and engage people” [43 ]. Microsoft CEO Satya
Nadella [44] has also published principles and goals for
AI, including “AI must be designed to assist humanity.”
Nadella also states that human empathy “will be valuable in
the human–A.I. world,” which might imply empathy for AI
systems, though a more likely interpretation is empathy for
other humans while developing and using AI systems. None
of the above ethics principles give explicit moral considera-
tion to nonhumans.
Microsoft does have an initiative that appears to be rooted
in part in moral consideration for nonhumans. Its “AI for
Earth” initiative supports a variety of environmental man-
agement projects [45]. Some projects are rooted in the envi-
ronment’s instrumental value for humans, such as Agri-
metrics, which aims “to help create a more productive and
sustainable food system” [46]. Other projects appear more
rooted in the intrinsic value of the environment and nonhu-
mans, such as Wild Me, which seeks to avoid the extinction
of nonhuman species [ 47]. Microsoft’s support for Wild Me
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is strongly suggestive of it giving some moral consideration
to nonhumans. The nonprofit AI for Good is another excep-
tion which seems rooted in both instrumental and intrinsic
values of the environment and nonhumans, with its focus on
AI and the UN Sustainable Development Goals [48].
The same trend is observed in recent government reports
on AI governance. A Chinese report states, “The goal of
AI development should be to promote the well-being of
humankind” and that AI “should conform to human values
and ethical principles (…) and serve the progress of human
civilization.” The phrase “serve the progress of human
civilization” appears to express human interests, whereas
the phrase “human values and ethical principles” is clearly
about human values. That can include human values that
give moral consideration to nonhumans, though this is not
explicit in the report. A European Parliament report calls
for AI risk assessment in terms of “human safety, health
and security” and transparency on AI input in decisions
impacting “one or more persons’ lives.” A French national
AI strategy initiative is called “AI for Humanity”; its report
includes attention to environmental issues, though it is
unclear whether this has any motivation in the intrinsic value
of the environment [3 ]. Finally, a United States report from
the Obama administration calls for responsible AI to “benefit
society,” “improve people’s lives,” and advance the “public
good.” Interestingly, its discussion of “applications of AI
for public good” includes applications for environmental
protection, some of which appear to be motivated by moral
consideration for nonhumans, such as “habitat preservation
strategies to maximize the genetic diversity of endangered
populations.” Typically, “public good” refers to good for the
human public; the Obama administration appears to have
used a broader definition that includes nonhumans.
Finally, there are professional societies and multistake-
holder entities that produce consensus statements on AI
ethics. These entities can represent significant portions of
the overall field of AI, and so their statements are worth
considering more closely.
The Partnership on AI (PAI) is a multistakeholder
consortium with members from industry, academia, and
nonprofits. It has published a list of ethics tenets [5 ].
Some tenets give moral consideration to humans, such as
“We will seek to ensure that AI technologies benefit and
empower as many people as possible.” The only reference
to nonhumans is the preamble, which states “We believe
that artificial intelligence technologies hold great promise
for raising the quality of people’s lives and can be lever -
aged to help humanity address important global challenges
such as climate change, food, inequality, health, and edu-
cation.” Climate change is a threat to both humans and
nonhumans, so concern about it is consistent with intrin-
sically valuing humans and/or nonhumans. Likewise, it
cannot be determined whether the preamble gives moral consideration to nonhumans. Strictly speaking, the same
holds for the other challenges listed: nonhuman animals
also eat food; there are inequities that cut across species;
members of other species can also struggle with health;
and human education can be used to advance the inter -
ests of nonhumans. Nonetheless, when people speak of
the issues of food, inequality, health, and education, they
typically do so with reference to human interests, and it
is likely that PAI intended its statement in this way. The
reference to climate change is more ambiguous given its
status as a signature environmental issue.
The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence has
published Ethical Guidelines [ 49]. The guidelines give
frequent moral consideration to humans. For example, its
preamble states the aim “To ensure that AI research and
development remains beneficial to human society.” Its first
principle states “Members of the JSAI will contribute to
the peace, safety, welfare, and public interest of humanity.”
The guidelines contain nothing that is at all suggestive of
moral consideration for nonhumans.
The conference Beneficial AI 2017 produced a set of AI
ethics principles [50]. The principles give moral consid-
eration to humans such as by stating “AI should provide
a shared benefit for as many people as possible” and “AI
technologies should benefit and empower as many people
as possible.” There is no explicit attention to nonhumans.
However, the principles call for AI “to align with human
values” and “to accomplish human-chosen objectives.”
As discussed throughout this paper, some human values/
objectives give moral consideration to nonhumans. It can-
not be determined whether the reference to human values/
objectives intended to include or exclude moral considera-
tion for nonhumans.
Finally, the Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM) is an academic and professional society for com-
puter science and adjacent fields. It has published a Code
of Ethics and Professional Conduct [51]. Though not spe-
cific to AI, the ACM Code is nonetheless applicable. Much
of the code grants moral consideration only to humans,
such as its first principle, that “a computing professional
should contribute to society and human well-being,
acknowledging that all people are stakeholders in com-
puting.” In some places, it recognizes nonhumans, such as
its affirmation “an obligation of computing professionals,
both individually and collectively, to use their skills for
the benefit of society, its members, and the environment
surrounding them.” This phrasing appears to intrinsically
value the nonhuman environment. On the other hand, the
code also states “human well-being requires a safe natural
environment” as a reason for computing professionals to
“promote environmental stability.” This phrasing clearly
articulates the environment as an instrumental value.
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3.4 AI ethics research
The AI ethics research literature is of course an important
part of the overall field of AI ethics. Although it is too vast
to systematically analyze within the space of this paper.
Instead, we make some more anecdotal observations, draw -
ing on two recent collections, and discuss the potential
role of nonhumans in select issues addressed in AI ethics
research.
Our primary observation is that AI ethics research
includes a significant line of research giving moral consider -
ation to the AI itself, but it generally neglects other types of
nonhumans. That is apparent from the literature surveyed in
the Introduction, which, for brevity, only references a small
fraction of the literature on the moral status of the AI itself.
It is also apparent from two recent collections, the Oxford
Handbook of Ethics of AI [52] (henceforth “the Handbook”)
and Ethics of Artificial Intelligence edited by Liao (hence-
forth “Liao”) [53]. 5 of the Handbook’s 44 chapters and 2 of
Liao’s 17 chapters have the moral value of AI as a significant
theme. None of the chapters have other types of nonhumans
as a significant theme, though some give brief mention of
moral consideration of other nonhumans: the collections
each have 3 chapters mentioning nonhuman animals and 1
chapter mentioning nature. While these two works are not
necessarily representative of the field of AI ethics research,
their contents reinforce the observation that the field has a
significant line of research on the moral value of the AI itself
with much less on other types of nonhumans.
A lot of AI ethics research is on specific issues raised by
AI technology. Some of these issues are uniquely human
issues, such that it would not make sense to consider non-
humans. Other issues also concern nonhumans, such that
they could be addressed in the research. To illustrate this,
we discuss two examples: algorithmic bias and autonomous
weapons.
Algorithmic bias occurs when AI systems cause unfair
biases, often by reproducing existing human biases found
in data sets used to train the AI systems. Algorithmic bias
research sometimes addresses issues in which nonhumans
play no significant role, such as in algorithms used to evalu-
ate job applications that are biased in favor of men over
women [54]. Nonhumans do not apply for these jobs, so
the bias is not relevant to nonhumans. In other issues, non-
humans are more significant. For example, research on
language processing algorithms has found biases pertain -
ing to human race and gender [ 55, 56]. Linguistic biases
can also involve nonhumans, as documented in the field of
ecolinguistics [57, 58]. A simple example is the conven-
tion of using “animal” to refer exclusively to nonhuman
animals, when in fact humans are members of the animal
kingdom. This can worsen the unfortunate tendencies for
ontological and ethical anthropocentrism (Sects.  4.2–4.3). Another example is the word “game”, defined as animals
hunted for food. It implies that nonhuman animals are good
to the extent that they can be murdered for human benefit.
Furthermore, “game” is an uncountable noun—one speaks
of “game” in general, not “games” plural—which dimin-
ishes the individuality of the nonhuman animals classified
as “game” [59]. These and other examples suggest that there
could be algorithmic bias involving nonhumans. Likewise,
there could be nonhuman algorithmic bias research, perhaps
drawing on theories of justice for nonhumans [38, 39] simi-
larly to human algorithmic bias research drawing on theories
of social justice [ 56]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no AI ethics research has explored this issue, despite the
proliferation of research on human-related algorithmic bias.
It would appear that the study of algorithmic bias itself has
a human-centric bias.
Autonomous weapons are systems that can make their
own decisions of which targets to pursue and when and
how to fire on them. Autonomous weapons are an impor -
tant emerging issue in AI and military ethics. Autonomous
weapons are generally targeted at humans and/or military
infrastructure. They likewise mostly raise ethical issues that
are specific to humans, such as questions of whether use of
autonomous weapons violates human dignity [60]. Autono-
mous weapons may not raise significant issues regarding
the natural environment. They do have some environmental
impact, but so do other weapons technologies, and making
a weapon autonomous may not significantly change its envi-
ronmental impact. If there are any more distinctive issues
raised, it may be if the AI in autonomous weapons is suf-
ficiently advanced that the AI itself merits moral considera-
tion. The possibility of moral consideration for a weapon
system may be a novel issue for military ethics. Research on
this possibility could operate at the interface of the literature
on autonomous weapons and robot rights.
To sum up Sect.  3, only a small minority of current treat-
ments of AI ethics give any moral consideration to nonhu-
mans, mainly research on the moral status of AI. It is not
needed to build nonhumans into all work on AI ethics, but
there is a clear role for nonhumans in a lot of work where it
is currently neglected.
4 The case for moral consideration
of nonhumans in AI ethics
Thus far, we have explained what it means to give moral con-
sideration to nonhumans and described the extent of moral
consideration for nonhumans in existing work on AI ethics.
In this section, we present an argument for why nonhumans
merit moral consideration. We start with the example of bio-
diversity conservation, which is an especially clear case of
nonhumans being intrinsically valued. We then argue against
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ontological anthropocentrism, which is the idea that humans
are distinct from nature. We argue that humans are part of
nature. Finally, we discuss different conceptions of ethical
anthropocentrism, which is the idea that humans are better
than nonhumans. We argue that nonhumans have greater-
than-zero intrinsic value and therefore merit moral consid-
eration. We do not attempt to answer more difficult questions
of the relative intrinsic value of humans and nonhumans.
4.1 A preliminary example: biodiversity
conservation
The issue of biodiversity conservation is a good place to
start because it is one in which moral consideration for
nonhumans is already widespread. Biodiversity can have
instrumental value to humans, such as for pharmaceuticals,
plant breeding, and wildlife recreation [61]. However, recent
research on the moral psychology of biodiversity conserva-
tion finds that people tend to care less about the instrumental
value of biodiversity and more about its intrinsic value [62,
63]. Likewise, the Convention on Biological Diversity, an
international treaty that entered into force in 1993, articu-
lates both instrumental and intrinsic value of biodiversity. At
the root of this is the moral intuition that it is fundamentally
bad for another species to go extinct, even if the species is
not important for humans. Those who might reject moral
consideration for nonhumans should consider: do they think
the extinction of a nonhuman species is unimportant unless
it affects humans?
There are at least two ways that the intrinsic value of
biodiversity can enter into AI ethics. One is via explicit
articulations of this intrinsic value, such as in a principle
“AI projects should work toward the goal of biodiversity
conservation.” Such projects could resemble the Wild Me
project supported by the Microsoft AI for Earth program.
The other is to call for AI activities to follow human values.
Given that humans commonly value biodiversity for its own
sake, this could, indirectly, give moral consideration to bio-
diversity. However, this indirect approach is less reliable.
Not all humans intrinsically value biodiversity, and those
who do typically also intrinsically value other things. AI
activities can follow other human values and neglect bio -
diversity conservation. If biodiversity is to be intrinsically
valued, it may be more effective to make this explicit.
In some cases, the intrinsic/instrumental value distinc-
tion is not important for biodiversity conservation. It can be
worth conserving biodiversity because of its instrumental
value for humans, regardless of whether it is of any intrin-
sic value. However, in other cases, the distinction matters.
This can occur when something is of intrinsic value to
humans but not to nonhumans, such that it is only worth
pursuing if nonhumans are intrinsically valued. It can also
occur when there are tradeoffs, i.e. something would be of intrinsic benefit to humans and intrinsic harm to nonhumans,
or vice versa. For example, biodiversity conservation initia-
tives sometimes result in human populations being forcibly
removed from a parcel of land to better protect the biodiver -
sity [64]. These situations are complex, for example, because
the populations residing in that area are not the only humans
affected. But setting these complexities aside, it follows that
if biodiversity is only instrumentally valued, then such con-
servation initiatives would not be allowed, even if the harm
to humans was just a minor inconvenience and the biodiver -
sity conserved was enormous. Instead, arguably there should
be a balance between humans and biodiversity, such that if
enough biodiversity would be conserved, the conservation
should proceed.
4.2 Against ontological anthropocentrism: humans
are part of nature
Scholarship in environmental ethics often focuses on a mat-
ter that is ultimately about the nature of the world, i.e. how
it is and not how it should be. This scholarship critiques the
idea that humans are distinct from nature. This idea, known
as ontological anthropocentrism or human/nature dualism,
is seen as being at the heart of human mistreatment of nature
[17, 24, 27, 65, 66]. It manifests as a failure to adequately
value nature in both intrinsic and instrumental terms. By
embracing the dualism, humans can damage nature in ways
that ultimately hurt themselves.
Ontological anthropocentrism has a long history in
human thought and has been particularly dominant in the
West since the Enlightenment, and it remains prevalent
today, but it lacks scientific basis. Ontological anthropo-
centrism can be found, for example, in beliefs that Earth is
the center of the universe1 and that humans are above the
animals. These beliefs have deep cultural, theological, and
linguistic roots (Sect.  3.4), but they do not survive scientific
scrutiny. Modern science is unambiguous in documenting
that Earth revolves around the Sun (or, more precisely, the
two revolve around the Sun-Earth center of mass, which is
below the surface of the Sun) and that humans are members
of the animal kingdom, composed of the same atoms and
molecules as everything else. The evidence clearly implies
that we humans are not “non-natural” or “super-natural.”
Even unresolved scientific questions, such as on the nature
of consciousness, do not point to ontological anthropocen-
trism. At least some nonhuman animals are likely to also
be conscious, such as our primate cousins. Ongoing cogni-
tive science research characterizes forms of consciousness
1 In isolation, this belief is strictly speaking geocentric, not anthropo-
centric. However, as the idea manifests, it relates strongly to ontologi-
cal anthropocentrism.
 AI and Ethics
1 3
that may exist across a diverse range of animal species [67].
Other nonhuman entities, including AIs, may be capable of
consciousness as well.
None of this is to deny the important differences between
humans and other entities. Humans are an outlier species, at
least for this period of life on Earth. Human activity has had
an outsized impact on global climate, biodiversity, land sur -
face usage, mineral deposits, and much more, such that some
environmental scientists refer to this era of Earth’s geologi-
cal and biological history as the Anthropocene. Human
technology is also without parallel on Earth. Chimpanzees,
dolphins, and corvids may be highly intelligent, but they are
not developing AI. Perhaps there are more intelligent and
capable species elsewhere in the universe, and perhaps there
could be more intelligent and capable species in future peri-
ods of Earth, or more intelligent artificial entities (i.e., AI
systems), but for this period of Earth, humans are an outlier.
4.3 Ethical anthropocentrism: the moral
significance of being human
Related to the idea that humans are inherently distinct from
nature is the idea that humans are inherently better than
nature. The former is about ontology, or the ways in which
things can exist. The latter is about ethics, or the intrinsic
value of different things that do or could exist. Even if one
accepts that humans are part of nature, one could still argue
that only humans are intrinsically valuable, or that humans
are more (or less) intrinsically valuable than other entities.
Ethical anthropocentrism is specifically the idea that
humans are more intrinsically valuable because they are
humans. There are other reasons why one might ethically
favor humans, such as because humans are more intelligent
than other entities, or if one considers humans as more capa-
ble of experiencing happiness than other entities. These rea-
sons are not anthropocentric. This is apparent from consider -
ing hypothetical nonhuman entities that are more advanced
than humans in these attributes (smarter, happier, etc.), such
as an advanced AI or an extraterrestrial species. If humans
are favored in the real world because of these attributes, then
the AI or extraterrestrial should be favored in the hypotheti-
cal world [68]. If the human is still favored in the hypotheti-
cal world, then the underlying ethics are anthropocentric.
Ethical anthropocentrism is related to ontological
anthropocentrism. Both maintain that humans are categori-
cally distinct, and both provide reasons for morally favor -
ing humans. But they are different reasons. If humans are
ontologically distinct, then they could be morally favored
due to them being ontologically distinct. This is not ethical
anthropocentrism: anything else that is also ontologically
distinct (perhaps an advanced AI or extraterrestrial) would
also be morally favored. In contrast, ethical anthropocen-
trism would favor humans even if humans are ontologically unremarkable. Ethical anthropocentrism favors humans
because they are human, not because humans are ontologi-
cally special.
Literature on ethical anthropocentrism sometimes distin-
guishes between strong and weak forms [17]. Strong ethical
anthropocentrism maintains that humans are the sole thing
of intrinsic value. Weak ethical anthropocentrism places
some intrinsic value on nonhumans, but still values humans
more because they are human. Strong ethical anthropocen-
trism rejects moral consideration of nonhumans; weak ethi-
cal anthropocentrism does not.
Anthropocentrism and moral consideration touch on
related but ultimately different aspects of valuation. Anthro-
pocentrism is about bias in values that a moral agent holds.
Moral consideration is about whether a moral agent gives
any attention to something in the first place. Throughout this
paper, we have emphasized moral consideration instead of
anthropocentrism because the defining feature of work in
AI ethics is the absence of attention to the intrinsic value of
nonhumans. There is very little AI ethics work that explicitly
argues against intrinsically valuing nonhumans. Given the
evidence presented in this paper, it is entirely possible that
AI ethicists generally reject strong ethical anthropocentrism
and just have not yet thought to include nonhumans or taken
the effort to do so.
Three major arguments against ethical anthropocentrism
can be made. The first argument centers on the idea that
species membership is morally irrelevant. Instead, intrinsic
moral value should be rooted in other attributes such as sub-
jective emotion (e.g., pleasure and pain), cognitive ability, or
biological complexity. As long as some nonhumans possess
these attributes, strong ethical anthropocentrism is mistaken,
and those who favor strong ethical anthropocentrism should
“expand their moral circle” to include the nonhumans that
possess these attributes [22, 23]. Furthermore, if these attrib-
utes are the only sources of intrinsic value, then there is
no reason to favor humans in any way, and so weak ethical
anthropocentrism is also mistaken.
The second argument centers on the idea that intrinsic
value should not be defined in terms of individuals of any
type, human or otherwise. Instead, intrinsic value should be
defined in terms of the holistic systems that individuals are
part of, such as ecosystems. This perspective sees intrinsic
value in the interdependent relations between members of
the system and in the system itself. Because humans are
at most one element of such systems, it follows that some
nonhumans must also be intrinsically valuable, and therefore
strong ethical anthropocentrism must be mistaken [24, 28].
Whether to adopt holistic conceptions of intrinsic value is
a matter of philosophical debate. The problem with strong
ethical anthropocentrism is that it requires that one rejects
the holistic conceptions without even considering their mer -
its. Furthermore, one can argue that humans have no special
AI and Ethics
1 3
place within holistic systems, in which case, if such sys -
tems are the only source of intrinsic value, then weak ethical
anthropocentrism is also mistaken.
The third argument pertains to social choice ethical
frameworks in which moral views are derived from some
aggregate of society’s moral views. For example, democratic
societies derive moral views from an aggregate of the views
of voting citizens and often also their elected representa-
tives. Likewise, AI ethics sometimes calls for AI systems
to be “aligned” with or “extrapolated” from human values
[2, 15]. Humans may not be the only beings to hold values,
in which case the first argument above implies that the val-
ues of nonhumans should also be included. A social choice
framework that gives equal consideration to all who hold
values, human or otherwise, would go against weak ethi-
cal anthropocentrism. However, even if only human values
are included, the derived moral view can still give moral
consideration to nonhumans if some humans do. Indeed,
moral psychology research finds that it is quite common
for humans to intrinsically value nonhumans. Studies have
found humans to place significant intrinsic value on non-
human animals [69], wildlife [70], biodiversity [62, 63],
and ecosystems [71], and there is some evidence that some
humans also intrinsically value AI and robots [72, 73]. To
insist upon strong anthropocentrism requires privileging
the moral views of strong ethical anthropocentrists over the
views of everyone else. However, common arguments for
using an aggregate of society’s moral views emphasize that
everyone’s views should be included, in which case strong
ethical anthropocentrism must be rejected.
A case for ethical anthropocentrism posits that the fact
that we are human gives us special relations with other
humans and moral reasons to favor humans over other spe-
cies. Strong ethical anthropocentrism requires that we privi-
lege human relations over all other factors, including other
types of relations. Weak anthropocentrism only requires that
we recognize human relations as one morally significant fac-
tor, potentially alongside other factors.
The merits of weak ethical anthropocentrism are a more
difficult matter and outside the scope of this paper. Our cen-
tral argument in this paper is that nonhumans merit at least
some nonzero, nontrivial moral consideration. This argu-
ment is consistent with either weak ethical anthropocentrism
or ethical non-anthropocentrism, so we do not need to assess
the merits of weak ethical anthropocentrism. As a point of
information, we, the authors of this paper, reject weak ethi-
cal anthropocentrism, but it is not necessary for others to
share this view to accept the arguments in this paper.
We do, for purposes of this paper, argue against strong
ethical anthropocentrism. It is one thing to claim that being
human gives us reason to favor humans. It is another thing
to claim that being human gives us reason to not intrinsically
value anything else. Each of us is more than just human. We are also members of, among other things, our families, our
countries, our taxonomic kingdom (animals) and domain
(eukaryotes), and our planet. Strong ethical anthropocen-
trism requires us to (1) privilege our species membership
over our other memberships, especially our memberships
in classes broader than species such as kingdom, domain,
and planet, (2) reject holistic conceptions of intrinsic value
without even considering the merits of such views, and
(3) exclude the views of people who are not strong ethical
anthropocentrists from aggregates of society’s moral views.
We can think of no good reason for doing these things, and
so we reject strong ethical anthropocentrism.
As long as ontological anthropocentrism and strong ethi-
cal anthropocentrism are rejected, then nonhumans merit at
least some nonzero, nontrivial moral consideration.
5 Implications of moral consideration
of nonhumans for AI ethics
The precise implications of moral consideration of nonhu-
mans for AI ethics depend on exactly what moral consid-
eration is given. That includes which nonhumans get con-
sideration. It also includes how to assess the importance of
nonhumans relative to each other and relative to humans.
As alluded to above, different ethical theories point in dif-
ferent directions on these matters, and there can be reason-
able disagreement on them. Indeed, we, the authors of this
paper, disagree amongst ourselves on these matters. How
they should be resolved merits more attention than we are
able to provide in this paper, and so we leave it for future
work. Instead, here we outline some more general implica-
tions for AI ethics.
First, AI ethics research needs a robust study of the moral
consideration of nonhumans. The field has thus far done
little aside from the line of research on the moral status of
the AI itself. One major need is to address the question of
how to balance between humans and nonhumans. Another
major need is to study the handling of the natural nonhuman
world, including nonhuman animals and ecosystems. This
has been a major blind spot in AI ethics. These topics are not
unique to AI ethics, but AI technology does create distinc-
tive challenges of how to operationalize the ethical issues
in AI systems. A third major need is to consider the role of
nonhumans in major AI ethics issues, such as algorithmic
bias. Nonhumans could factor significantly in these issues
in ways that existing research has not adequately considered,
to the extent that it has considered it at all.
Second, statements of AI ethics principles should give
explicit attention to the intrinsic value of nonhumans. It
is not enough to refer to human values on the grounds that
some humans intrinsically value nonhumans. That leaves
too much room for the intrinsic value of nonhumans being
 AI and Ethics
1 3
ignored, especially given how little attention nonhumans
currently get in AI ethics. Exactly how to include nonhu-
mans in the principles depends on which nonhumans are
valued and how they are valued. For example, the Mon-
tréal Declaration for the Responsible Development of Arti-
ficial Intelligence includes the principle “The development
and use of artificial intelligence systems (AIS) must permit
the growth of the well-being of all sentient beings.” This
is a good example of a statement that clearly indicates
the intrinsic value of sentient beings, which includes both
humans and nonhumans. For illustration, an even stronger
principle would be: “The main objective of development
and use of AIS must be to enhance the wellbeing and flour -
ishing of all sentient life and the natural environment, now
and in the future.”
Third, when selecting which AI projects to pursue, pro-
jects to advance the interests and values of nonhumans
should be among the projects considered. That does not
mean that those projects should always be selected. The
balance of projects for humans vs. for nonhumans depends
on the relative moral weight assigned to humans and non-
humans, but projects for nonhumans should sometimes be
selected. The Microsoft AI for Earth program, and in par -
ticular its support of nonhuman-oriented projects like Wild
Me, is a good example of how to operationalize moral
consideration for nonhumans in AI project selection.
Fourth, when making decisions about which AI sys-
tems to develop and use, their inadvertent implications
for nonhumans should be accounted for. This includes the
material resource consumption of computer hardware and
the energy needed to run AI systems. State-of-the-art AI
techniques, such as deep learning, require large amounts of
computing power, which in turn require large amounts of
energy. Despite the growing emphasis on energy sources
with low greenhouse gas emissions (mainly wind and
solar, and to a lesser extent other renewables and nuclear),
energy continues to come mainly from high-emission fos-
sil fuel sources [74]. This drives global warming, which
harms nonhumans. Recent attempts to quantify and raise
awareness about AI energy consumption are construc-
tive steps [75, 76]. Assessing the implications of energy
consumption on nonhumans—and, for that matter, on
humans—is a major undertaking. AI analysts should not
take this on themselves, but instead should leverage exist-
ing work and expertise from fields such as environmental
economics. AI groups should acknowledge that, in some
circumstances, the resource and energy usage of an AI
system may cause sufficient harm that it would be bet-
ter to not use the AI system in the first place. Particular
circumstances should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
depending on the extent of resource and energy usage and
other factors, and the extent of the benefits from the opera-
tion of the AI system.Fifth, AI research should investigate how to incorporate
nonhuman interests and values into AI system designs. How
to incorporate human values is currently a major subject of
study in AI, but some of the proposed techniques do not
apply to nonhumans. For example, Russell [2 ] proposes for
AI systems to derive human values from human behavior.
Setting aside long-recognized problems with this approach
even within the human context [ 77], it is clear that the
approach does not straightforwardly apply for nonhumans
that do not “behave” in the same sense as humans, such as
ecosystems, inorganic matter, or inanimate human artifacts.
Here lie compelling and challenging research questions at
the intersection of philosophy, environmental science, and
computer science.
AI ethics design is of particular importance for certain
long-term AI scenarios in which an AGI takes a major or
dominant position within human society, the world at large,
and even broader portions of outer space. Even the most
well-designed AGI could be catastrophic for some nonhu-
mans if it is designed to advance the interests of humans or
other nonhumans. Furthermore, an AGI or other sufficiently
advanced AI may merit moral consideration in ways com-
parable to humans, raising profound questions of how to
balance the interests and values of humans and AIs. AGI
projects should think especially carefully about which non-
humans to include in the AGI’s value system, how to balance
concern for humans and nonhumans, and how to operation-
alize these values in the AGI technology.
6 Conclusion
AI technology is important in many ways, including to both
human society and nonhumans. Whereas some prior work
in AI ethics has considered specific topics related to nonhu-
mans, this paper lays out more general considerations and
calls for the whole field to move toward moral considera-
tion for nonhumans. As AI becomes increasingly impactful
across society, the extent to which AI ethics includes the
nonhuman world will be important. Nonhumans merit moral
consideration across all stages of the AI system life cycle,
from data collection to design, deployment, and use. Further
work is needed to explore which particular consideration
to give nonhumans: which to include and how to include
them. Some of this can draw on prior scholarship in moral
philosophy, including on environmental ethics and computer
ethics. However, AI ethics will need to do original work on
how to value the AI itself and how to incorporate all of this
into AI system design. Given the high stakes, this is impor -
tant work to pursue.
Acknowledgements Robert de Neufville, Tony Barrett, Migle Laukyte,
Scott David, Kaj Sotala, Karim Jebari, and participants in a dialog
AI and Ethics
1 3
hosted by the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute provided helpful feed-
back on an earlier version of this paper. McKenna Fitzgerald provided
assistance in formatting the manuscript. Any remaining errors are the
authors’ alone. The views expressed here are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Global Catastrophic Risk
Institute.
Funding The research presented here was funded by a generous grant
from the Gordon Irlam Charitable Foundation. The funder had no role
in study design; in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data;
in the writing of the report; in the selection of additional researchers;
and in the decision to submit the article for publication.
Data availability Not applicable.
Code availability Not applicable.
Declarations
Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author
states that there is no conflict of interest.
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