Headline or Trend Line?

August 2021
AUTHORS
Margarita Konaev
Andrew Imbrie
Ryan Fedasiuk
Emily Weinstein
Katerina Sedova
Jame s Dunham

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 1 Executive Summary
China and Russia have declared 2020 and 2021 as years of
scientific and technological innovation cooperation, focusing on
biotech, artificial intelligence, and robotics.1 Both countries view AI
as critical to their respective domestic and foreign policy
objectives, and they are ramping up investments in AI -related
research and development, though China’s investments far
outweigh Russia’s. U.S. observers are watching this convergence
between America’s two key competitors with increasing concern, if
not alarm. Some worry that alignment between Beijing and
Moscow, especially in the areas of science and technology, could
accelerate the development o f surveillance tools to enhance
authoritarian control of domestic populations. Others warn that
deepening Sino -Russian cooperation will dilute the effects of
sanctions on Russia. Still others fear that the strengthening
partnership between China and Russia will undermine U.S.
strategic interests and those of its democratic allies in Europe and
Asia.2
Chinese and Russian sources are keen to publicize their
“comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new
era,” potentially underscoring the seriousness of their joint
ambitions.3 Yet the scale and scope of this emerging partnership
deserve closer scrutiny, particularly in the field of AI. To what
extent are China and Russia following up on their declared
intentions to foster joint research, development, and
commercialization of AI -related technologies? In other words, how
do we separate headlines from trend lines?
This issue brief analyzes the scope of cooperation and relative
trends between China and Russia in two key metric s of AI
development: research publications and investment. Our key
findings are as follows:
Scope:
●Research: Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese and Russian
researchers collaborated on 296 English -language, AI -
related papers. This figure accounts for less than 0.1
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 2 percent of China’s and about 2 percent of Russia’s overall
AI-related publication output over the same time period.
●Investment : Between 2016 and 2019, private AI investment
between China and Russia totaled $879 million across 12
deals; Beijing and Mosc ow concluded five additional AI
investment deals of undisclosed value.
Trends:
●Research: In 2019, there were 14 times as many AI-related
publications co -authored by Chinese and Russian
researchers as there were in 2010, with collaboration
notably increasing since 2016.
●Investment : From 2016 to 2021, the level of Chinese -
Russian AI investment increased, but the majority of fundi ng
flowed from Russia to China.
Key Areas:
●Research: The top AI -related fields for joint research by
Chinese and Russian scientists are pattern recognition,
algorithm development , computer vision, machine learning,
remote sensing, data mining, control engineering, and
natural language processing.
●Investment: Chinese AI investments in Russia focus on
internet services, telecommunications, robotics, and facial
recognition. Russian AI investments into China focus on e -
commerce, autonomous driving technology, and medical
services/robotics.
Chinese-Russian AI Collaboration in Perspective:
●Research: Between 2010 and 2019, collaboration between
U.S. and Chinese researchers produced nearly 129 times
more AI -related publications than collaborations between
Chinese and Russian researchers and 52 times more AI -
related p ublications than collaborations between U.S. and
Russian researchers. AI -related research collaborations
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 3 between the United States and Russia declined in 2019,
which may reflect the impact of sanctions. While the
number of U.S. -China AI -related research pu blications
continued to increase through 2019, given the heightened
tensions, data from 2020 and 2021 could show different
trends.
●Investment: China -Russia AI investment levels are higher
than U.S. -Russia AI investment, but much lower than U.S. -
China AI investments. Recent trends, however, show
declining levels of U.S. AI investment in both China and
Russia over the 2018 –2020 period , while Russian -Chinese
AI investment has increased relative to 2016 levels. U.S.
investment in China declined from $13 billion in 2017 to
$1.3 billion in 2020; meanwhile, the United States invested
a negligible amount in Russia. China -Russia investment
increased from $182 million dollars in 2016 to $517 million
in 2017, but then declined to $100 million in 2018 and $80
million in 2019. While 2020 saw no disclosed AI
investment between China and Russia, investment levels
already topped $300 million by January 2021.
Our findings both confirm assessments of the expanding
partnership between China and Russia and add an importan t
caveat with regards to its scope and limitations. There has been a
steady increase in AI -related research collaboration between the
two nations and an even steeper rise since 2016. This upward
trend mirrors the global expansion of AI research, propelled by
increased computing power and the availability of large datasets.
The overall number of joint Chinese -Russian AI -related
publications, however, remains relatively low —whether as a share
of each country’s scholarly output or compared with the number of
papers researchers from China and Russia co -authored with
researchers from the United States over the same period of time.
The AI -related investment data tell a similar story —an upward
trend in Chinese -Russian investment deals over the past five
years, but the overall value remains relatively low. Russia seems
to be investing more in private AI companies in China than China
invests in the Russian AI ecosystem. Yet the United States remains

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 4 Russia’s primary destination for AI investment, and the value of
U.S.-China AI investments is much greater than the sum of
Chinese -Russian deals.
Two caveats are worth underscoring. First, these metrics provide
insights only into specific aspects of a much broader relationship.
Second, t he time frame of our analysis and d ata limitations
preclude definitive judgements. By focusing on collaborative
research and AI -related investments, we seek to develop useful
indicators for tracking progress in the Chinese -Russian high -tech
partnership. Our findings expose gaps between Chin ese and
Russian aspirations and the reality on the ground, bringing greater
accuracy and nuance to current assessments of Sino -Russian
cooperation.
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 5 Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................ ................................ ......................... 1
Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 6
Chinese -Russian Collaboration in AI -Related Research ................. 11
Methodology and Scope ................................ ................................ ..................... 12
Chinese -Russian AI -Related, English -Language Research
Collaboration: Output, T rends, and Institutions ................................ ......... 14
Huawei’s AI -Related Activities and Partnerships in Russia ........................... 20
Chinese -Russian AI -Related Publications in Chinese .............................. 22
Comparing Chinese -Russian, U.S. -Chinese, and U.S. -Russian AI -
Related Research Collaborations ................................ ................................ .... 24
Chinese -Russian AI -Related Investments ................................ ............ 28
Methodology and Scope ................................ ................................ ..................... 28
Comparing U.S., Chinese, and Russian AI Investment Activity ............. 30
Evaluating Known Chinese -Russian AI Inve stments ................................ 32
The Russia -China Investment Fund and Megvii ................................ ................. 33
Alibaba’s Joint Venture in 2019 with Mail.ru Group ................................ ......... 35
Other Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments with Unknown Value ............. 36
Other Forms of Cooperation ................................ ................................ .............. 38
Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 40
Authors ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 45
Acknowledgements ................................ ................................ ..................... 45
Appendix ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 46
Endnotes ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 47
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 6 Introduction
Shared antipathy toward the United States and convergent
political, security, and economic interests are propelling what the
U.S. intelligence community described in its most recent annual
Threat Assessment as “increasing cooperation” between China
and Russia.4 Signs of a burgeoning partnership are multiplying.
The two countries conduct joint training and military exercises and
sell weapons to one another . Collaboration extends to space,
where China and Russia plan to build a new lunar scientific
research station . Both countries vote in the United Nations Security
Council to shield one another from international scrutiny of human
rights abuses . To deepen economic ties , Russia furnishes
specialized expertise in such fields as mathematics and computer
science and supplies raw materials in the form of oil, gas, and
precious metals ; China provides capital, resources, and access to
its large market . Beijing and Moscow also exchange talent, know -
how, and investments to spur innovation , monitor and control their
populations, and extend their influence globally.5
In a recent editorial, China’s state -owned Global Times proclaimed
that “China -Russia cooperation has no upper limits.”6 Given the
long, fraught, and at times contentious relationship between China
and Russia, such declaratio ns are ahistorical at best. Memories of
the Sino -Soviet border clash in 1969 are distant but still keenly
felt in some quarters. The asymmetry in power between Beijing
and Moscow will likely grow in the coming years, as China’s
economy surges ahead.7 Cultural disparities, protectionist instincts,
and lingering distrust continue to hamper the relationship, despite
myriad intergovernmental contacts and personal ties between
Chinese president Xi Jinping and Russian president Vladimir Putin.8
Indeed, concerns over the theft of intellectual property, industrial
espionage, and persistent cyber threats will set upper limits to
Sino -Russian cooperation, notwithstanding public signaling to the
contrary.9
Perhaps nowhere is the test case for Sino -Russian cooperati on
more consequential or more speculative in its claims than in
artificial intelligence. President Xi sees AI as a “strategic handhold

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 7 for China to gain the initiative in global science and technology
competition,” and the Chinese government reportedly spe nds
billions each year on AI research.10 Though Russia lags behind
China in AI capability, President Putin grasps its importance for
Russia’s economic and strategic future.11 In October 2019, Russia
released its national AI strategy. While the strategy’s d etails and
enforcement mechanisms remain unclear, the Russian government
aims to boost research and development (R&D) efforts and
overcome barriers related to data, talent, and computing power. It
has since allocated more than $200 million in AI subsidies through
government -backed R&D centers for 2021 -2023.12
When analyzing the evolving AI partnership between China and
Russia, it is important to distinguish the signals from the noise.
Both governments have trumpeted a series of high -tech initiatives,
joint research centers, technology parks, and cooperative
agreements.13 Based on public statements, the Russian and
Chinese Academies of Sciences collaborate on AI -related research.
Chinese and Russian companies are stepping up cooperation on
joint development of AI products, such as autonomous vehicles,
medical robotics, and facial recognition software. While some of
these initiatives seem to be bearing fruit, many have yet to move
past the exploratory or even the declaratory phase.
The mutuality of Chinese an d Russian interests shapes and
constrains their partnership in AI. Even as both countries invest in
emerging technologies to advance their domestic and foreign
policy goals, they also seek to preserve sovereignty, limit the flow
of data across their border s, and protect national industries.14 The
prominent role afforded to Chinese and Russian state -owned
enterprises (SOE) in the execution of national AI priorities may
further complicate the prospects for cooperation.15 The ability of
China and Russia to bal ance these competing imperatives will
determine whether their rhetoric matches reality in the years to
come.
This issue brief presents an assessment of Chinese and Russian
collaboration in two key areas for advancement in AI: research
output and investmen t. For our examination of Chinese -Russian AI
research ties, we analyze the number of AI -related research

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 8 papers authored jointly by Chinese and Russian scientists between
2010 and 2019, as well as key topics, trends over time, and
institutions leading thes e collaborative efforts. We present data on
AI-related research papers published in English and Chinese,
amounting to a comprehensive assessment of research output. For
the analysis of investment ties between China and Russia, we
examine activity in the co mmercial sector by measuring Chinese
and Russian equity investments in privately held AI companies.
We draw on leading databases of private -sector AI transactions to
gather data on Chinese investments in Russian firms and Russian
investments in Chinese fir ms. As a baseline for comparison, we
also assess U.S. -Russia and U.S. -China collaboration in AI
research and investments over time.
To an extent, our findings corroborate existing assessments of
Chinese -Russian collaboration: the two nations are growing c loser.
Over the past decade, and especially since 2016, Chinese -Russian
research collaboration in AI -related fields has steadily increased.
Collaborations between authors from institutions affiliated with
the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Russian Aca demy of
Sciences were among the most prolific joint research endeavors,
while other notable research collaborations include those between
Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology and Hangzhou
Dianzi University; Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technol ogy
and East China University of Science and Technology; and ITMO
University and Hangzhou Dianzi University. The Chinese telecom
giant Huawei has also been ramping up its AI -related activities
and partnerships with Russian universities and research
institu tions.
AI-related investment is also on the rise. Looking at 12 AI -related
deals involving the two countries since 2016 and up to 2020 ,
China has made $324 million in private AI investments into Russia,
while Russia has made $555 million in private AI inv estments into
China. Half of the value of overall Russian -Chinese AI investment
is concentrated in two deals: the Russia -China Investment Fund
(RCIF) investment in the Chinese AI company Megvii in 2017 and
Alibaba’s joint venture with the Russian internet company Mail.ru
Group in 2019. In addition to the aforementioned 12 deals, Russia

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 9 and China concluded five AI investment deals of undisclosed
value.
These trends notwithstanding, our findings suggest that the extent
and scope of Chinese -Russian collabora tion in AI may be
overstated by both Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S.
observers. AI-related publications co -authored by Chinese and
Russian researchers constitute only a fraction of each country’s
overall AI -related research output in English -language journals .
From a comparative standpoint, research collaboration in AI -
related fields between these two counties is also less frequent and
productive than AI -related research collaboration between the
United States and Russia and, especially, between the United
States and China . Similar observations emerge from the analysis of
investment data —between 2010 and 2020, the combined value of
U.S. investment in private AI companies in China and Chinese
investment in private AI companies in the U nited States amount ed
to $35 billion, dwarfing the $879 million worth of Chinese -
Russian AI investment deals, which only trace back to 2016.16
Notably, the $670 million overall value of U.S. -Russia AI
investments is smaller than that of Chinese -Russian investment
deal s at $879 million. The United States, however, remains
Russia’s largest destination for AI investment.
It is important to set these research and investment trends in their
proper context. Tensions between the two countries aside, when
accounting for fund ing levels and the volume and impact of
published work, U.S. and Chinese AI researchers have far more
incentives to cooperate with each other than to co -author with
Russian researchers. Between 2010 and 2019, researchers from
China have published 457,248 English -language AI-related
papers, making China the world leader in AI -related research
output. Researchers from the United States published 300,602
papers over the same period, coming in second worldwide. Russia,
meanwhile, ranked 22nd in terms of overall research output , with
15,032 AI -related publications, trailing behind countries such as
Iran, Malaysia, and Poland. Academic institutions publish the
majority of AI -related research papers, and the United States is
home to many of the world’s leading universities.17 Chinese

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 10 universities do not have the same global reputation for excellence
as U.S. institutions , but the Chinese government is pouring a
massive amount of resources into STEM education and science and
technology R&D, outpacing both government and private sector
investments in Russia’s academic and research institutions, in
absolute as well as relative terms.
The United States and China similarly dominate the private AI
investment market. In 2019, the United States accounted for 64
percent of the total dis closed investment value, with China a
distant second at 1 2.9 percent of the global AI investment
market.18 By contrast, Russia comprises only 0. 04 percent of
disclosed AI equity investment globally. The size, value, and
dynamism of private AI markets lend perspective to assessments
of trends in the field. While the data covered in this report
suggest s a growing but relatively limited partnership on AI
between China and Russia, the trends can shift markedly with the
appearance of new research collaborations or large AI investment
deals. Analysts should assess ongoing trends with respect to the
health of the overall research ecosystem and private investment
markets in AI, both at the national and international levels.
It remains to be seen what impact sanctio ns, trade disputes, export
controls, and growing tensions with the United States will have on
Chinese -Russian collaboration in AI as well as on the research and
investment ties between the United States and China and the
United States and Russia. Thus far, our findings show mixed
results.
Despite the worsening relationship between the United States and
China , AI-related research collaboration continued to increase
through 2019. China’s AI investment into private AI companies in
the United States has risen steadily from $181 million in 2014 to
$2 billion in 2020. Yet U.S. investment into private AI companies in
China is declining, from a peak of $13 billion in 2017 to $1 .3
billion in 2020. When considering the U.S. -Russia dyad,
collaborations between U.S. an d Russian AI scholars dropped in
2019. Russian investment into private AI companies in the United
States has declined, from a peak of $393 million in 2018 to $164
million in 2020. U.S. investment into private AI companies in

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 11 Russia , meanwhile, has remained flat, with a peak of $3 million in
2018.19
In the remainder of this brief, we first assess the AI -related
research ties between China and Russia and then examine AI -
related investments between the two countries. While our findings
indicate that AI -relate d collaboration between China and Russia in
research and investment remains relatively limited in scope, we
offer preliminary indicators and areas to watch for growing
convergence that may undermine U.S. interests and those of U.S.
democratic allies and pa rtners.
Chinese -Russian Collaboration in AI -Related Research
International research collaboration drives scientific progress and
tends to benefit all parties by producing more impactful
publications and expanding networks. According to 2018 N ational
Science Foundation (NSF) data, for example, among the 15 largest
producers of science and engineering scholarly articles, most have
high rates of international collaboration. The United States has a
collaboration rate of 39 percent, which is slightly below th e
average collaboration rate for the largest 15 producers. China’s
and Russia’s collaboration rates are lower, at 22 percent and 23
percent, respectively.20
While recent political developments and growing tensions with
the United States may be pushing Ch ina and Russia closer,
scholarly collaboration between these two countries has been
growing steadily over the past decade. According to data from
Elsevier’s Scopus database, the number of co -authored
publications involving Chinese and Russian academics inc reased
by 95.5 percent between 2013 and 2017.21 Previously, another
study showed that between the years 2006 and 2015, Russia was
also one of China’s top research collaborators among the One Belt
One Road Initiative countries, second only to Singapore. The key
areas for Chinese -Russian scholarly collaboration include physics,
chemistry, geosciences, and plant and animal sciences; in physics,
the citation impact and the percentage of highly cited papers co -
authored by Chinese and Russian researchers was very high.22

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 12 These trends aside , China and Russia have not generally been
important scientific partners for one another. The aforementioned
95.5 percent increase in the number of co -authored publications
reflects the wider surge in Chinese research output and indicates a
relatively low baseline for collaboration. Based on 2015 data on
the number of joint publications in the Scopus dataset, for
example, nearly half of Russia’s joint publications were with
scientists from the United States and Germany, while wor k with
Chinese scientists accounted for less than 9 percent. For China,
these patterns are even more stark: research collaborations with
scientists in the United States represented 44 percent of China’s
total joint publications, while collaborations with R ussian scientists
accounted for just 1.5 percent.23
Recent research from CSET shows that despite the rapid growth of
Chinese research publications over the past 20 years, China’s rate
of international collaboration has remained flat . Countries such as
the United States and Australia , on the other hand, have seen a
significant rise in their rates of international collaboration.24 As
China’s research output continues to climb, its international
collaboration rate may increase as well. Alternativel y, China may
be following a deliberate strategy designed to limit collaboration
in certain areas until the country has achieved a strong
international position.25 These broader patterns provide the
context for assessing Chinese -Russian research collaborati on in
AI-related fields, as well as trends in collaboration between U.S.
researchers and their Chinese and Russian counterparts.
Methodology and Scope
The following analysis draws on publications data covering
collaborative Chinese -Russian AI -related rese arch papers
published between 2010 and 2019 in English and Chinese. For
English -language publications, we identified collaborations
between Chinese and Russian scholars by analyzing the
institutional affiliations they reported in publications and pre -
prints. If the affiliations of a paper’s authors included an
organization in each country, we included the paper in our analysis.
We searched for such collaborations across three sources of

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 13 scientific literature: Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science
Dimens ions, and Clarivate Web of Science.26 For publications in
Chinese, we relied on the China National Knowledge
Infrastructure.27 Because CNKI does not sort by country of
publication, we instead identified Chinese -Russian collaborations
by searching for organ izations with “Russia” and a number of
major Russian cities in their name, since CNKI often includes the
country or city name in Chinese for a foreign institution.
This report discusses joint Chinese -language publications
separately from joint English -language publications because the
two types of collaborations seem substantively different: the
former is a joint research endeavor conducted in a language that is
native to one side of the co -authorship while the latter is a
research collaboration undertaken in a language foreign to both.
As we discuss later in the report, English -language publications
data and CNKI data on Chinese language publications also show
different trends in Chinese -Russian collaborations.
To restrict our analysis to the developme nt and application of AI,
we applied the same classification method used in an earlier CSET
report, “Russian AI Research 2010 -2018.”28 Rather than
developing keyword -based queries or explicit criteria for AI -
relevant research, we inferred a functional defi nition from papers
in the arXiv.org repository, training a model to predict the
categories that authors and editors assign to the site’s papers.
Applying it to our broader corpus, we identified as AI -relevant the
papers that would be likely to receive an A I-relevant
categorization if uploaded to arXiv.org.29
To complement this methodology, we attempted to collect data on
Chinese -Russian AI -relevant research publications in Russian. We
developed a set of Russian -language keywords that included a
broad ran ge of research approaches, models, techniques,
applications, systems, and functions related to AI, and executed a
query across Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science
Dimensions, and Clarivate Web of Science. Our search, however,
surfaced only one AI -relevant research paper published jointly by
Chinese and Russian authors in Russian between 2010 and 2019.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 14 As such, we limit our discussion to collaborative AI -related
publications in English and Chinese.
Finally, the results from the analysis of the scientific literature are
current as of February 19, 2021. Analyses conducted at different
points in time will yield slightly different results because the
aforementioned sources of scientific literature acquire publica tions
data after some delay. For example, articles published in the
second half of 2019 may not appear in the data until 2020. We
focus our analysis on the period between 2010 and 2019 to
minimize the effect of this phenomenon.
Chinese -Russian AI -Relate d, English -Language Research
Collaboration: Output, Trends, and Institutions
Between 2010 and 2019, we identified 296 English -language, AI -
related research papers co -authored by at least one Chinese and
at least one Russian author. This figure accounts for about 2
percent of total Russian AI -related publications and less than 0.1
percent of Chinese AI -related publications for the same time
period. In other words, Chinese -Russian collaboration in AI -related
fields constitutes only a fraction of each country’ s overall research
output in English -language journals.
There are a number of explanations for this relatively low number
of joint Chinese -Russian AI -related research publications. Most
basically, research conducted and published in English requires
both s ides to work in a language other than their native tongue.
Scientists from non -English speaking countries also generally have
a harder time publishing in English -language journals. While
China has recently outpaced the United States in the number of
AI-related research papers, Russia is significantly behind due to a
combination of factors, including lower spending on R&D,
problems in developing, attracting, and retaining talent, and a
range of bureaucratic hurdles to international research
collaboration and publishing.30 Although Russia has been
implementing a series of reforms and initiatives , such as Project 5 -
100, designed to increase its scientific scholarly output in
international journals, buttress international collaboration, and

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 15 raise the global rank ings of its top universities, the aforementioned
challenges persist.31 Finally, as previously noted, China and Russia
have not traditionally been important research partners for one
another; Russian scientists have predominantly collaborated with
European counterparts, while Chinese scientists have primarily
looked toward the United States for joint research opportunities.
Despite the relatively low overall number of publications produced
jointly by Chinese and Russian researchers, as Figure 1 shows,
there has been an increase in collaborations over the past decade,
and especially since 2016. More specifically, in 2019, ther e were
14 times more AI -related publications co-authored by Chinese and
Russian researchers than there were in 2010 .
Figure 1: Chinese -Russian AI -Related Research Publications in
English, 2010 -2019 .

Source : Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science Dime nsions, and Clarivate
Web of Science .
In terms of key areas of focus, Chinese and Russian researchers
have produced joint papers in pattern recognition, algorithm
development, computer vision, machine learning, remote sensing,
data mining, control engineer ing, and natural language

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 16 processing.\* Table 1 shows the top 10 AI -related research fields
for joint Chinese -Russian publications, as well as Chinese and
Russian research output individually.
Table 1: Top AI -Related Research Fields: Chinese -Russian,
Chinese, and Russian .
Chinese -
Russian Top
Collab. Fields No. of
Papers Top Fields:
China No. of
Papers Top Fields:
Russia No. of
Papers
Pattern
recognition 29 Pattern
recognition 38,315 Linguistics 1,021
Computer
vision 20 Computer
vision 37,996 Computer
vision 884
Algorithm
development 20 Algorithm
development 28,497 Algorithm
development 804
Control theory 14 Data mining 21,311 Pattern
recognition 674
Machine
learning 14 Control
theory 14,841 Machine
learning 499
Remote
sensing 11 Machine
learning 14,400 Control
theory 494
Data mining 9 Math.
optimization 10,878 Data mining 474
Control
engineering 7 Control
engineering 8,266 Control
engineering 440
NLP 6 Simulation 8,127 NLP 402
Other AI
research 69 Other AI
research 98,620 Other AI
research 3,222
Source : Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science Dimensions, Clarivate Web
of Science, and CNKI .
The top collaborative fields are similar to the top 10 fields for
research by Russian scientists , except for remote sensing, which is
on the list for collaborative papers but not on the list of Russian

\* “Other AI research” refers to the “Artificial Intelligence” subject field denoted
by Microsoft Academic Graph. Publications in this field represent AI research not
otherwise classified. This could include basic research that does not fall into a
different field because it is not application -specific (e.g., not computer vision
research) , theoretical work related to AI , or applied research in a subfield too
small to result in the creation of a distinct, comparable Microsoft Academic
Graph field.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 17 papers; and linguistics, which is on the list of Russian papers but
not in the top 10 areas for collaborative research.32 These areas
are also similar to the top areas of focus for Chinese researchers,
except for remote sensing and natural language processing, which
appear among the top areas for collaborative research but not the
top areas on the Chinese publications list , and mathematical
optimization and simulation, which appear in the top 10 areas for
Chinese publications but not on the collaborative list. Natural
language processing is a joint area of research and a top area of
Russian research but not a top 10 area for Chinese researchers.
Remote sensing is the one area where Chinese and Russian
researchers have published together that does not appear in either
China’s or Russia’s top 10 areas for AI -related publications
individually. As a whole, countries with more satellites tend to
produce more articles on remote sensing.33 The United States and
China, for instance, operate the most satellites in orbit and were
ranked first and second, respectively, in the number of remote
sensing publications according to data from 1991 to 2015.34 While
Russia has the third largest arsenal of satellites in the world, it has
been far less productive than the United States or China in terms
of remote sensing research publications. The collaboration in AI -
related remote sensing research between China and Russia could
also be an artifact of shared borders and , in turn, shared interest in
land cover and use, vegetation, and climate change in these border
regions.
In addition to trends and topics, we also identified the key
institutions that Chinese and Russian researchers listed as their
affiliation on this set of 296 collaborative AI -related publications.
Table 2 presents the top 10 of the most prolific collaborative
institution pairs by publication count.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 18 Table 2: Top 10 Chinese -Russian Institutional Collaborations in
AI-Related Research 2010 -2019 .35
Russian Entity Chinese Entity No. of
Papers
Russian Academy of
Sciences Chinese Academy of Sciences 15
Skolkovo Institute of
Science and Technology Hangzhou Dianzi University 12
Skolkovo Institute of
Science and Technology East China University of Science and
Technology 12
ITMO University Hangzhou Dianzi University 11
Kazan Federal University Shanghai Jiao Tong University 10
Moscow State University Zhejiang University 9
Don State Technical
University Beijing Jiaotong University 9
National Research
Centre - Kurchatov
Institute Chinese Academy of Sciences 9
Russian Academy of
Sciences China Aero Geophysical Survey and
Remote Sensing for Land a nd
Resources 8
Skolkovo Institute of
Science and Technology Guangdong University of Technology 8
Source : Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science Dimensions, Clarivate Web
of Science, and CNKI .
As Table 2 illustrates, collaborations between authors listing an
affiliation to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Russian
Academy of Sciences have yielded the highest number of AI -
related joint research papers between the years 2010 -2019. The
Russian Academy of Sciences oversees 550 scientific institutions
and research centers and reportedly employs more than 55,000
researchers.36 Previous CSET research shows that RAS also
produces the most AI -related publications in Russia.37 The Chinese
Academy of Sciences oversees 12 branches, more than 100
research institutions, three universities, more than 130 state key
laboratories, and over 270 research observation stations in the
field. It houses more than 71,000 formal employees as well as
over 64,000 postgraduate researchers.38
Given the number of researchers and research institutions
affiliated with both CAS and RAS and considering that researchers

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 19 often have more than one affiliation, there is no straightforward
way to track the formal collaborative agreements between the two
academies that led to the AI -related publications we identified —if
such formal agreements even exist in the first place. It is , however,
notable that CAS and RAS have signed a 2018 agreement to
strengthen science and technology cooperation in the fields of
physics, astrophysics, chemistry, biological sciences,
nanotechnology, medicine, and agriculture, as well as a 2019
agreement to deepen cooperation on polar research, laser science,
deep -sea research, space science, geophysics, the ecological
environment, neuroscience, and more .39 While these agreements
do not directly reference collaboration on AI, research related to AI
can be conducted in each of the aforementioned disciplines and
fields.
Another noteworthy relationship that has led to joint AI -related
research publications is between ITMO University and Hangzhou
Dianzi University. The partnership between these two instituti ons
includes student and staff visits and a joint summer school that
also features Alibaba Cloud Academy courses.40 In 2018, the two
universities also established the Hangzhou Dianzi University -ITMO
Joint Institute in Hangzhou, China. The joint institute r uns two
undergraduate programs, one in automation and another in
computer science and technology, as well as two Masters
programs, one in control engineering and another in computer
technology.41 In 2020, the National Natural Science Foundation of
China fu nded two joint projects between Hangzhou Dianzi
University and ITMO University: Project #234: “Research on
Trajectory Control and Autonomous Navigation in Multi -robot
Formations,” and Project #232: “Artificial Intelligence Methods for
the Agile Development of Industrial Robots.”42
In addition to collaborations between Chinese and Russian
universities, there are also AI -related research publications linked
to private companies , such as Huawei. For example, among the
296 English -language AI -related research papers we identified,
authors affiliated with Huawei Technologies were part of 17
collaborations that included researchers from Huawei
Technologies, Russia ( five); Skolkovo Institute of Science and

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 20 Technology ( four); Russian Academy of Sciences ( two); St.
Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation (an RAS
institution) ( two); Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
(two); and National Research University -Higher School of
Economics ( two). Below, we take a closer look at Huawei’s
presence in Russia , focusing specifically on its AI -related activities
and partnerships with Russian universities and RAS research
institutions.
Huawei’s AI-Related Activities and Partnerships in Russia
Huawei has been operating in Russia since 1996, setting up its
first local joint venture with Beto Konzern and Russia Telecom in
1997.43 Despite initially struggling to establish itself, by 2003,
Huawei supplied more than 50 percent of the broadband products
market in Russia.44 Over the past few years, in response to
growing tensions between the United States and China, and
especially following its addition to the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Entity List in 2019, Huawei has been expanding its
presence in Russia.45 The Russian government seems to welcome
this expansion, arguing that Huawei’s training programs, local
research centers, and promises to jointly develop or share
emerging technologies will help Russia avoid a brain drain and
promote local innovation.46
In 2001, Huawei opened its first research training program in
Russia in collaboration with the Moscow Technical University of
Communication s and Informatics, establishing its first R&D center
in Moscow the following year. Today, Huawei reportedly maintain s
eight R&D centers across Russia —five in Moscow, and one in each
of Saint Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and Novosibirsk.47 These
R&D centers appear to be hiring locally, as the majority of job
postings are in Russian, not Chinese.48
According to the Huawei website, the company has 15 Russian
partner universities.49 The main areas for cooperation with these
and other universities include: deve lopment of algorithms for 5G
communication networks; development of algorithms for image,
video and sound processing; development of algorithms to support
the evolving direction of the Internet of Things; development of

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 21 artificial intelligence algorithms; big data processing algorithms;
and distributed computing and data storage algorithms.50
One of the pathways to collaboration with universities is through
the establishment of joint labs. In 2020, the Moscow Institute of
Physics and Technology established a joint laboratory with
Huawei Russian Research Institute, focusing on “research and
development in the field of artificial intelligence and deep
learning.”51 The Skoltech -Huawei Innovation Joint Lab is another
example, which was set up in 2018 to focus on “artificial
intelligence including machine learning, neuron networks,
computer vision, language processing, and recommendation
systems.”52 The Skoltech Master of Science in Internet of Things
and Wireless Technologies is also associated with the joint
Skoltech -Huawei lab.53 While seemingly separate from the joint
lab, the Skoltech Laboratory for Quantum Information Processing
also claims to have ongoing multi -year collaboration agreements
with Huawei.54
In addition to its partnerships with Russian univers ities, Huawei
touts joint projects with Russian Academy of Sciences institutions,
including the Institute for Information Transmission Problems
(IITP), the Institute for System Programming, and the Marchuk
Institute of Numerical Mathematics.55 The collabor ation with RAS
IITP seems to be focused on 5G, including “designing and studying
innovative algorithms for cellular networks” that improve network
efficiency.56
Huawei is also one of the international tech companies to establish
a presence in Siberia’s Ak ademgorodok —an “academic town”
known as one of the key science and technology hubs in Russia
and home to Novosibirsk State University and the Siberian Branch
of RAS .57 In 2020, Novosibirsk State University announced that the
three RAS Institutes of the Siberian Branch —the Sobolev Institute
of Mathematics, the Institute of Computational Mathematics and
Mathematical Geophysics, and the A.P. Ershov Institute of
Informatics Systems —signed a memorandum of understanding
with Huawei -Russia and the Mathematical Center in
Akademgorodok. The agreement aims to promote cooperation in

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 22 science, research , and education in the areas of math, AI, big data,
and high -performance computing.58
Huawei’s ties to this region reflect the shifting focus to technology
innovation in the mid -2000s. Since the Russian government began
reinvesting in Akademgorodok and the region’s network of
academic and research institutions, international tech compan ies
have also sought to expand their presence and capitalize on the
high concentration on talent, relative intellectual freedom, and
openness to international collaboration.
Huawei’s partnerships with Russian universities and research
institutes are likel y to bring an influx of funds to these institutions.
Russian science is chronically underfunded by the state, while
research and development investments from the business sector
are even scarcer. But with funding comes influence.59 It is therefore
possible that increased R&D investment from Huawei and
potentially other Chinese companies would allow them to set the
agenda for the partnerships with Russian universities and research
institutions, and leverage the outputs of collaborative research to
advance Ch ina’s broader goals in AI.60
Chinese -Russian AI -Related Publications in Chinese
In addition to the English -language papers, our search of CNKI
also identified 43 AI -relevant papers co -authored by Chinese and
Russian researchers and published in Chinese b etween 2005 and
2020. Figure 2 shows the annual distribution of these Chinese -
language papers.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 23 Figure 2: Chinese -Russian AI -Related Research Publications in
Chinese, 2005 -2020 .

Source : CNKI .
While the previously discussed English -language publications
data show s a steady increase in collaborative research between
Chinese and Russian scientists, the Chinese language publications
data shows no consistent upward or downward trajectory, aside
from the uptick in joint publicatio ns after 2018. With respect to key
institutions involved in collaborative work, 16 papers (37 percent)
were co -authored by researchers affiliated with the Russian
Academy of Sciences.61 Only three papers ( 7 percent) were written
by researchers at the Chine se Academy of Sciences, in contrast to
our English language data in which CAS is the top Chinese
contributor.
It is also worth noting that five papers were co -authored by
Chinese researchers affiliated with organizations on the U.S.
Department of Commerce ’s Entity List, including Beihang
University, Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), Harbin
Engineering University (HEU), and Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications. Beihang, HIT, and HEU are three of China’s
Seven Sons of National Defense, and Beijing University of Posts
and Telecommunications was deemed by the U.S. government to

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 24 directly participate in advanced weapons and systems research for
China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA).62 Two of these five papers
were written by the same co -authors from Beihang University and
the Moscow Aviation Institute and focus on control engineering
and modeling of pilot behavior.63 Although these papers were both
written in 2010, the two organizations appear to maintain close
ties. In 2020, the schools launche d a joint professional MA
program in aeronautical engineering.64
Several papers also include information about the agencies
funding the research. Eleven of the 43 CNKI papers were funded
by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC),
which is subordinate to China’s Ministry of Science and
Technology.65 This arrangement is not surprising, considering that
NSFC is a massive foundation that funds more than 18,000
research projects each year and has a budget of $4.9 billion.66
Three additional projects were funded by China’s 973 Project,
otherwise known as the “National Basic Research Program,” which
aims to improve China’s capacity for basic research and indigenous
innovation.67
Comparing Chinese -Russian, U.S. -Chinese, and U.S. -Russian AI -
Related Research Collaborations
Chinese and Russian researchers coll aborate with U.S. researchers
much more frequently than they do with each other. Between
2010 and 2019, we identified approximately 38,153 AI -related
publications co -authored by U.S. and Chinese researchers,
compared with 736 publications co -authored by U. S. and Russian
researchers, and the aforementioned 296 English -language papers
co-authored by Chinese and Russian researchers. In other words,
collaboration between U.S. and Chinese researchers produced
nearly 129 times more AI -related publications than co llaborations
between Russian and Chinese researchers and 52 times more AI -
related publications than collaborations between U.S. and Russian
researchers.
When looking at trends over time, AI -related collaborations
between Chinese and Russian scientists (Fi gure 1), U.S. and

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 25 Chinese scientists (Figure 3), and U.S. and Russian scientists
(Figure 4) have all increased since 2010, and especially since
2016. As previously noted, in 2019, there were 14 times more AI -
related publications co -authored by Chinese and Russian
researchers than there were in 2010. This upward trajectory
notwithstanding, t he baseline number of joint publications for
China and Russia was smaller than the number of papers co -
authored by researchers from the United States and Russia and
only a fraction of the number of joint papers produced by
researchers from the United States and China. The United States
and China publish significantly more AI -related research papers
than Russia. It is therefore important to contextualize trends in
collabora tive output in terms of the broader publications
landscape, both baseline numbers for each dyad and overall
publication output for each of the three countries.
Figure 3: U.S. -Chinese AI -Related Research Publications, 2010 -
2019.

Source : Microsoft Academi c Graph, Digital Science Dimensions, and Clarivate
Web of Science .
As Figure 3 shows, AI-related research collaboration between U.S.
and Chinese researchers has been growing at a steady pace since
2010, with a notable increase since 2016. In 2010, U.S. and
Chinese researchers co -authored 1,975 AI -related papers. Over

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 26 the past decade, this number has more than quadrupled, reaching
8,138 joint publications in 2019. Despite tensions between the
United States and China and rising concerns about research
securit y, there has been no drop in collaborative research output in
2018 or 2019, although data from 2020 and 2021 could indicate
otherwise.
Figure 4: U.S. -Russian AI -Related Research Publications, 2010 -
2019.

Source : Microsoft Academic Graph, Digital Science Dimensions, and Clarivate
Web of Science .
The number of AI -related research publications co -authored by
U.S. and Russian scientists has increased more than sevenfold,
from 21 joint papers in 2010 to 151 papers in 2019. As Figure 4
illustrates, since 2010, there has also been a steady increase in AI -
related collaborative publications produced by U.S. and Russian
researchers, with notable growth between 2016 and 2018, and a

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 27 drop in 2019, perhaps signifying the impact of sanctions or the
deterioration of relations between the two countries.\*
These patterns in collaboration on AI -related topics reflect broader
trends in scientific research and co -authorships among the United
States, China , and Russia . Based on 2018 NSF data, Chinese and
Russian researchers co -authored 2,457 publications in science and
engineering. This total is significantly less than the 55,382
publications co -authored by U.S. and Chinese researchers, and the
4,881 publications co -authored by U.S. and Russian researchers
that ye ar. According to a recent study of U.S. -China research ties,
“from the years 2014 to 2018, there has been a continuous rise of
co-authored science and engineering journal publications that
include U.S. and China co -authors, with an all -time high in … 2018,
with 175,665 articles. This number represents roughly 10 percent
of all U.S. and 9 percent of all China science and engineering
article publications from 2014 to 2018.”68 NSF data from 2018
also shows that nearly 44 percent of China’s internationally co -
authored articles in science and engineering were with a U.S. co -
author.69 Meanwhile, in terms of U.S. -Russia research ties, while
the United States seems to be one of Russia’s top research
collaborators, Russia is not one of the top countries for research
collaboration for the United States.
While statements from high -level representatives from China and
Russia , media reports, and expert analysis all point to the
establishment of new scientific partnerships and expansion of
academic ties, assessing the sco pe and output of collaborative
research is a more complicated task. Bibliometric data is not a
perfect indicator of collaborative research —it does not capture
classified research or joint research that does not yield publications
in journals and conference proceedings. That said, the culture of AI
research is generally open and collaborative, with researchers
often sharing their data, algorithms, and results on open web
platforms such as GitHub and arXiv.org . Our analysis , therefore,

\* As previou sly noted, because of the delay in the collection of publications data,
publication counts for 2019 may increase slightly over time.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 28 offer s a comprehensive assessment of AI -related research output ,
and as whole, publications data in both English and Chinese
suggests that AI -related research collaboration between China
and Russia has been relatively scarce over the past decade. The
situation , however, could c hange if the two nations commit
resources and talent to this area ; in the conclusion, we outline
potential developments that may signal closer collaboration .
Chinese -Russian AI -Related Investments
Since the turn of the century, the private sector has bee n the
primary source of innovation in AI.70 Governments that harness the
fruits of this innovation are more likely to prosper economically
and benefit strategically. The United States boasts a vibrant
innovation ecosystem and the world’s largest investment market
in privately held AI companies. U.S. AI companies attracted 64
percent of disclosed investment in 2019, with China a distant
second at 1 2.9 percent. Meanwhile, private Russian AI companies
attracted only 0. 04 percent of global disclosed investment value.71
China’s AI market declined over the 2018 -2020 period but
remains significantly ahead of the Russian AI market in terms of
venture capital investments, deal counts, and transaction value.72
To better understand the evolving partnership on AI betwe en
China and Russia, we analyzed activity in the commercial sector by
measuring Chinese and Russian equity investments in privately
held AI companies. As a baseline comparison, we also measured
U.S. investment into private AI companies in China and Russia, and
Chinese and Russian investment into private AI companies in the
United States.
Methodology and Scope
Our estimates rely on prior CSET research into AI investment
trends globally and information from Crunchbase, a leading
private investment data aggre gator.73 We supplemented this
approach by compiling popular lists of the top 25 Chinese and
Russian AI startups. We performed keyword searches in English,
Chinese, and Russian to track news coverage, press releases, and

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 29 joint announcements of Sino -Russian investme nts in these
startups.
While this methodology offers a baseline for comparison, our
findings confront several limitations. Crunchbase is an English -
language service and likely undercount s Chinese - and Russian -
bound investments. Many Chinese and Russian in vestment deals
are concluded under the auspices of state -owned enterprises and
lack publicly disclosed values. Public data on Chinese and Russian
AI investment flows are therefore incomplete and uneven. In
addition, our formal analysis ends in 2020 and may not capture
recent developments in the growing AI partnership between China
and Russia.
Despite these limitations, our findings provide a reasonable
starting point for evaluating commercial AI activity between China
and Russia. Through Crunchbase, we ini tially found just four
Chinese AI -related investments in Russian firms and zero Russian
investments in Chinese firms. We broadened our Crunchbase
search results and used keywords to search manually for reporting
about investments into any of the 50 top AI startups in China and
Russia.74 We discovered an additional eight investments in AI
companies through these practices, yielding a total of 12 China -
Russia AI investment deals with known values. The lack of
transparency involving deals with state -owned ente rprises
presents challenges for any comprehensive assessment of
commercial AI activity. While our analysis does not cover all
investment activity between China and Russia, we implemented
several additional checks to account for potential gaps and
limitatio ns in our approach.
We provide case studies of two of the largest AI -related
investments: Alibaba’s joint venture in 2019 with Mail.ru Group, a
Russian internet company that operates social networking sites,
email services, and internet portals; and the 2017 Russia -China
Investment Fund (RCIF) investment in the Chinese AI company
Megvii. In the course of our research, we observed five additional
investment deals with unknown values, bringing the total count to
17 China -Russia AI investment deals. We also n oted several other
forms of cooperation that we did not code as investments ,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 30 including strategic cooperation agreements and joint product
development. While deals involving state -owned enterprises and
other undisclosed transactions raise the level of uncer tainty in our
findings, we cross -referenced our data sets with press releases
and other joint statements and cooperative agreements between
Russian and Chinese firms.
Comparing U.S., Chinese , and Russian AI Investment Activity
The value of AI investments between the United States and China
far exceeds that of any other pair of counties in the world. In 2019,
U.S. companies attracted $25.2 billion, or 64 percent of total
disclosed AI investment value; China was the second largest
market, with $5.4 billion, or 12.9 percent of the global total.75
Between 2010 and 2020, U.S. firms struck 270 investment deals
in Chinese AI companies, and Chinese firms made 323 such
investments in the U.S. AI private market, for a combined total
value of more than $35 billion. Ov er time, U.S. investment into
private AI companies in China has declined from a peak of $13
billion in 2017 to $1 .3 billion in 2020; whereas China’s AI
investment into private AI companies in the United States has risen
steadily from $181 million in 2014 t o $2 billion in 2020.76
This baseline of U.S. -Chinese AI investment serves a s a yardstick
against which to measure other international partnerships.
Although the level of AI investment between China and Russia
seems to be increasing , it remains substantially lower than that of
the United States and China.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 31 Figure 5: Value of Known U.S. -China Private AI Investment, 2010 -
2020 .

Source : 593 investments into AI companies captu red in Crunchbase, 2010 -
2020. Note: Numbers in grey convey the total bilateral investment figures for
each year.
By comparison, the value of U.S. -Russian private AI investment is
far smaller. While conclusive figures are difficult to establish,
Russia’s in vestment market in privately held AI companies was
estimated at $172.5 million in 2019, according to private analytics
company IDC.77 Between 2010 and 2020, U.S. firms struck 9
investment deals with Russian AI companies, whereas Russian
firms made 48 such investments in the United States. The
combined value of all known private sector agreements between
the two countries amounted to $670 million during that period. In
terms of relative trends over time, Russian investment into private
AI companies in the Un ited States declined from a peak of $3 93
million in 2018 to $164 million in 2020. U.S. investment into
private AI companies in Russia has remained flat, with a peak of $3
million in 2018.
Although the total value of U.S. -Russian AI investment is much
smal ler than that of U.S. -Chinese AI investment, it is worth noting
that the United States remains Russia’s largest international
destination of AI investment, with Russian investments amounting

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 32 to $666 million of the total $670 million bilateral value. By
comparison, over the same time period, Russian firms invested
$555 million into Chinese private AI companies.
Figure 6: Value of Known U.S. -Russia Private AI Investment, 2010 -
2020 .

Source : 57 investments into AI companies captured in Crunchbase, 2010 -2020.
Note: Numbers in grey convey the total bilateral investment figures for each
year.
Evaluating Known Chinese -Russian AI Investments
All investments into Chinese and Russian AI companies in our data
set were concluded between 2016 and 2019. Taken collective ly,
they amounted to $879 million, with more than half of all value
arriving from two large deals with China’s Megvii and Russia’s
Mail.ru Group discussed below.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 33 Figure 7: Value of Known China -Russia Private and Sovereign
Wealth Fund AI Investments, 2010 -2020 .

Source : 12 deals identified in Crunchbase and through manual queries for the
top 50 AI startups in China and Russia . Note: New investment deals in 2021
have already exceeded $300 million.
The Russia -China Investment Fund and Megvi i
Since its founding in 2011, Megvii has emerged as a central player
in China’s efforts to develop its homegrown AI market and lessen
reliance on U.S. open -source frameworks. The company is also at
the forefront of China’s growing surveillance system. Its flagship
product , Face++ , is one of the world’s largest open -source
computer vision platforms and powers face scanning systems
across a range of sectors .78 These include phone and consumer
Internet of Things (IoT) devices as well as Smart City and Smart
Community management solutions for city governments t o aid
policing, monitor urban residential communities, and streamline
logistics in more than 100 municipalities across China,
encompassing 38 percent of the country , as detailed in the
company’s prospectus .79
Megvii’s role in providing facial recognition technology to the
Chinese state has put it in the crosshairs of U.S. export controls.
Megvii and Huawei have filed joint patents and tested a

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 34 surveillance system with the capability to target ethnic minori ties.
Advertising for the system claimed that it features a camera with
the capability of scanning faces in a crowd and estimating
individuals’ age, sex, and ethnicity. This camera could allegedly
trigger a “Uyghur alarm” to government authorities when it
identifies members of the oppressed Muslim minority group.80
Mounting concerns about t he company prompted the Trump
administration to add Megvii to the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Entity list in 2019 , blocking its access to U.S.
technology.81
While this decision threatened its future sales abroad, Megvii is
showing no signs of slowing do wn at home. The company is one
of China’s four “AI dragons'' alongside SenseTime, Yitu, and
CloudWalk.82 It has absorbed $1.4 billion in capital through
multiple rounds of funding. Along with Foxconn, Ant Group, SK
Group, China Reform Holdings Corporation, and Sunshine
Insurance Group, RCIF funded Megvii’s second largest round of
financing in a 2017 Series C deal worth $460 million.83 Megvii’s
largest infusion of venture capital, worth $750 million, came in a
2019 Series D round from the Bank of China and Alibaba Group,
among others. By August 2019, Megvii was on track to raise
nearly $1 billion in its initial public offering (IPO) on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange. But the Trump administration’s restrictions
on the company thwarted the IPO.84 Megvii was back for another
try in March 2021, filing for an IPO on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and planning to raise at least 6 billion yuan ($922
million).
Measured against the totality of investments into Megvii, Russia’s
contribution appears modest. RCIF was just one of six investors
funding the $460 million Series C round. In addition, the RCIF
received equal portions from the Russian Direct In vestment Fund,
a sovereign wealth fund established in 2011, and the Chinese
Investment Corporation, meaning that Russia funded only 50
percent of RCIF’s contribution to Megvii’s Series C round.85 While
actual percentages of contributions to the funding rou nd are
difficult to ascertain, one could assume that each of the six
investors may have contributed equal parts. This estimate would

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 35 make RCIF’s contribution worth around $76.7 million and Russia’s
portion just $38.3 million. Out of $1.4 billion venture ca pital
investments thus far, and notwithstanding RCIF’s potential
participation in Megvii’s upcoming IPO, Russia’s investment
contribution will have been around 2.7 percent. In short, even
when looking at the highest value deals, investments made
through jo int Russian -Chinese funds account for a fraction of what
it takes to get an AI company’s IPO off the ground.
Alibaba’s Joint Venture in 2019 with Mail.ru Group
AliExpress Russia is a joint venture between China’s Alibaba and
Russia’s Mail.ru. Launched in 2019 and valued at around $2 billion,
AliExpress Russia claims it will provide a single destination for
online shopping, gaming, instant messaging, and mobile banking
for Mail.ru’s hundreds of millions of registered users.86 As Mail. ru
Group CEO Boris Dobr odeev noted in a statement, “[T]his
partnership will enable us to significantly increase the access to
various segments of the e -commerce offering, including both
cross -border and local merchants. The combination of our
ecosystems allows us to leverage our distribution through our
merchant base and goods as well as product integrations.”87 Such
claims are noteworthy in their ambition and scope, but merit
scrutiny in light of the incentives to overstate planned cooperation
and development. While Mail.ru is a dominant player in Russian
social media, its presence in online banking and commerce is
insignificant.
In terms of ownership, the venture involves Alibaba, Mail. ru Group,
the Russian telecommunications firm MegaFon , and the Russian
Direct Investment Fund. Alibaba will invest $100 million and hold
a 48 percent stake, with the remaining ownership divided among
MegaFon (24 percent), Mail.ru (15 percent), and RDIF (12.9
percent).88 The venture mirrors broader trends in e -commerce
toward integration and consoli dation of services.89 AliExpress
Russia aims to grow Russia’s e -commerce market, solidify
business ties between Russia and China, and expand e -commerce
flows between the two countries. The extent to which this joint
venture will realize such ambitions rema ins to be seen. For

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 36 example, AliExpress is the 9th largest online commerce company
in Russia, well behind market leaders.90
Mail.ru is part of “AI Alliance Russia,” a cooperation agreement
between RDIF, Russia’s largest bank Sberbank, the Russian oil
comp any Gazprom, the Russian internet company and search
engine Yandex, and the Russian telecommunications group MTS.91
Though short on details regarding organizational structure,
resourcing, and enforcement, the AI Alliance seeks to develop
Russia’s AI market, accelerate development of AI products and
services, and deepen linkages between the Russian business
community an d research organizations charged with implementing
Russia’s national AI strategy. AliExpress Russia aims to contribute
to these goals by expanding the e -commerce market in Russia and
increasing cross -border sales with China, laying the foundation for
great er cooperation on AI products and services. While such deals
may improve the commercial AI ecosystems of both countries and
strengthen business ties between Russian and Chinese firms, the
geopolitical implications in the near -term are unclear. Analysts wil l
need to track the potential for large e -commerce deals to bolster
the talent base and facilitate access to data in ways that could
advance Sino -Russian progress in AI with concrete security and
foreign policy implications.
Other Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments with Unknown Value
In addition to the 12 deals captured in Figure 7, we identified five
investment deals where Chinese or Russian firms had invested in
AI companies, but for which we lacked information about the value
of the arrangement. In four of these five cases, RCIF was the
investor backing the deal.92 Established in 2012 by both countries’
sovereign wealth funds, RCIF’s growing portfolio illustrates how
the Sino -Russian relationship is tightening across multiple sectors.
The fund today ma nages $2.5 billion in assets, having received
$500 million from Saudi Arabia in 2017. Its founding signaled both
nations’ desire to strengthen cross -border investment activity, a
trend that has extended to the AI industry.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 37 Figure 8: Number of Investment De als Disclosed in RCIF’s Public
Portfolio, 2013 -2019 .

Source: 21 deals published in RCIF’s public investment portfolio.93
Since 2013, RCIF has made 21 major investments in Chinese and
Russian companies that range in focus from children’s toys to
autonomous vehicles. At least six of these deals have been
substantially related to Chinese and Russian AI development, but
only the value of its 2017 and 2021 investments in Megvii and
DiDi are publicly known.
DiDi. In 2014, RCIF found its first AI -related investme nt in DiDi, a
Chinese rideshare company modeled after Uber. Shortly after the
infusion of capital, DiDi acquired its main homegrown competitor,
Kuaidi, and bought Uber China, solidifying its dominant position in
the Chinese ridesharing industry.94 The valu e of RCIF’s 2014
investment in the company has not been publicly disclosed. Since
then, DiDi has emerged as a world leader in autonomous driving
and AI more broadly, and now competes with U.S. -based
companies Waymo and Uber. In January 2021, RCIF announced a
second investment specifically in DiDi’s Autonomous Driving
division valued at $300 million, the largest investment RCIF has
made thus far, and the second largest AI investment deal between
China and Russia.95
Rostec City. 2017 marked RCIF’s most active investment year to
date, inaugurated with a major investment in Rostec City, a
technology park in the heart of Moscow. Spearheaded by Russian
defense SOE and electronics giant Rostec, the park is expected to

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 38 showcase “smart city” technologies designed to autonomously
regulate traffic, adapt power consumption, and recognize the faces
and movements of its inhabitants.96 Moscow’s Smart City 2030
strategy focuses explicitly on AI.97 Smart city technoparks are a
staple of several Chinese cities and often viewed as proving
grounds for emerging surveillance technologies.98
Nio. In October 2017, RCIF and the China Investment Corporation
jointly invested in Nio, an early -stage electric vehicle company
headquartered in China. With shareholders including Chinese AI
giants Tencent and Baidu, Nio —“China’s Tesla” —quickly came to
focus on autonomous driving.99 Its first car model, a fully electric,
fully autonomous sedan, was unveiled in January 2021.100
NetEase Cloud Music . Known for its web portal and other i nternet
services, NetEase is a well -established Chinese internet company
that also runs a personalized music recommendation system. Its
product includes some social media features and collects data on
users’ music preferences to connect friends and peers.101 In
November 2018, RCIF contributed an unknown amount of funds to
a financing round worth $600 million.102
Other Forms of Cooperation
Beyond investments, we identified several other forms of
corporate partnerships between Chinese and Russian AI
companies. While not indicative of the same commitment as cash -
in-hand, Russian and Chinese companies have signed strategic
cooperation agreements related to AI development, and some
have jointly developed surveillance products to be marketed in
both countries. Mutu al cooperation agreements range from
boosting trade to bring existing products into Chinese and Russian
markets to pursuing joint research and development of new
products.
Russia’s Promobot , China’s FN Holdings , and Beijing Huanuo
Exiang . In 2019, Russian robotics firm Promobot, one of the largest
robotics manufacturers in Europe, signed a cooperation agreement
with Chinese company “FN Holdings,” creating a joint project team
that will develop a linguistic base in Chinese and coordinate joint

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 39 resear ch related to healthcare service robots —a deal that’s
estimated to bring Promobot $2 million.103 Another cooperation
agreement with Beijing Huanuo Exiang (REX), a Chinese trading
company, aims to bring Promobot’s products on to the Chinese
entertainment and services market.104
China’s UBTech and Russia’s LANIT Group . Deepening
cooperation in educational robotics, UBTech Robotics and Russian
technology giant Laboratory of New Information Technology
(LANIT) signed a partnership agreement in 2019, agreeing to bring
AI-enabled humanoid robots into the Russian market.105 In addition
to industrial applications such as inspecting hazardous facilities,
the joint venture will localize and adapt Chinese robots for Russian
service and educational sectors to serve as vir tual assistants,
museum guides, and training references for educational
institutions.106
China’s Fitsco and Russia’s Cognitive Pilot . Advancing cooperation
in smart cities and the autonomous transportation sector, Shanghai
Fuxin Intelligent Transportation Solutions Company (Fitsco) and
Cognitive Pilot, a Russian autonomous vehicle company, partnered
in 2020 to develop an AI -based computer vision system for
autonomous trams in China.107 The collaboration includes joint
research and development, testing and co mmercialization of
products to support China’s push for smart public transport, as
well to modernize transport systems in Southeast Asia and
Russia.108
China’s Dahua Technology and Russia’s NtechLab . Dahua
Technology and NtechLab, two leading providers of s urveillance
technologies, joined forces in 2019 to develop a wearable camera
with facial recognition capabilities for law enforcement.109 The
product is the culmination of Dahua’s two -year foray into the
Russian market through its subsidiary, Dahua Technolo gy Rus.110
The camera incorporates Dahua’s wearable video device and
NTech’s FindFace algorithm that can recognize emotions in
addition to facial features, age, and gender, and process data on
the device, enabling faster identification in near real -time.111

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 40 China’s Vinci Group and Russia’s Jovi Technology . Deepening
cooperation in the IT sector, the software development firm Vinci
Group and the blockchain company Jovi Technologies partnered in
2019 to develop AI -enabled digital commerce solutions for small
businesses.112 The collaboration combines Vinci’s expertise in
encrypted mobile communications platforms with Jovi’s focus on
blockchain to develop integrated applications t hat advance AI -
enabled business solutions in both nations.113
Conclusion
An axis of c onvenience or deepening partnership? A Faustian
bargain or durable entente?114 The lexicon of Sino -Russian
relations obscures as much as it clarifies. China and Russia are
growing more aligned in their interests, actions, and strategies,
and there are clear indications of closer diplomatic, economic,
military, and technological ties . Yet the scale and scope of this
emerging partnership deserve careful scrutiny, particularly in the
field of artificial intelligence.
This issue brief outlined and analyzed Chinese -Russian
collaboration in AI -related research and investment. Our findings
align with previous assessments of Sino -Russian cooperation in
new technologies, tracing an upward trend in the number of AI -
related research publications as well as growing investment in the
AI ecosystems of these countries. At the same time, the scope o f
this partnership still lags behind the breadth and depth of ties
between the United States and China .
The data on joint AI -related research and investment highlight the
limits of Chinese -Russian collaboration. The power asymmetry
between the two nations inevitably complicates this partnership.
More specifically, it remains unclear whether China sees Russia as
a true partner suitable for joint ventures and collaboration on
equal terms. For instance, i n 2019, the president of the Russian
Academy of Sciences expressed concern that in regards to Russia,
“China has shifted from a policy of importing technology t o a
policy of importing brains,” offering Russian scientists not only
better salaries but the opportunity to carry on their research in
China.115 Yet as the exact contours of this partnership continue to

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 41 take shape, China may proceed to acquire Russian tech nology,
through licit and illicit means. Recent CSET research shows that
China’s science and technology diplomats —those individuals
stationed in PRC embassies and consulates around the world to
monitor scientific and technological breakthroughs and track
investment opportunities for the Chinese government —seem
particularly interested in Russia, especially in early -stage
technology projects developed by Russian government -backed
researchers.116
Convergence between America’s two key competitors, especially
around critical technologies like AI, has significant implications for
U.S. national security and global leadership. While this report has
focused on AI -related research and investment linkages, there are
additional dimensions to Chinese -Russian cooperation in AI, with
experts highlighting areas such as dialogues and exchanges, the
development of science and technology parks, joint competitions,
and the expansion of academic cooperation.117 Talent development
and exchanges are worth tracking in particular , esp ecially if
Chinese companies like Huawei continue to expand and deepen
their partnerships with Russian universities and research
institutions. Notably, the Russian Embassy in China recently
claimed that the number of Chinese students in Russian
universitie s has doubled over the past five years, reaching about
48,000 students in 2020; the number of Russian students in
Chinese universities has increased by 36 percent, standing at
20,000.118
Still, Russia is not a top destination for Chinese students, nor is
China for Russian students. In contrast, there were about 372,531
Chinese students enrolled in U.S. universities during the 2019 -
2020 academic year, accounting for 35 percent of the total number
of international students.119 Moreover, the majority of top -tier AI
researchers who received undergraduate degrees in China go on to
study, work, and live in the United States.120 Roughly 30 percent of
international students pursuing a Ph.D. in AI -relevant fields such
as computer science and electrical engineering in t he United States
are from China.121 That said, talent exchanges in particular , and
Sino -Russian cooperation more generally, will likely deepen if the

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 42 United States’ relationships with both countries continue to
deteriorate.
While we are reluctant to put fo rth policy recommendations on the
basis of findings related to only two dimensions of the
multifaceted Chinese -Russian partnership, we offer the following
list of indicators that watchers of China and Russia should track
closely as cooperation between thes e two nations continues to
unfold.
Research:
● Formalization and proliferation of research relationships:
o Chinese and Russian universities, research
institutions, and private companies increasingly
formalize their research ties through multi -year
agreements with designated funding.
o Chinese and Russian universities and research
institutions establish additiona l joint research
centers, joint undergraduate and graduate degree
programs, summer schools, and other ventures.
● Increased volume and quality of collaborative AI -related
publications:
o The share of collaborative publications as part of
overall publications for both China and Russia grows.
o The citation impact and the percentage of highly
cited AI -related papers co -authored by Chinese and
Russian researchers increases.
o Joint Chinese -Russian university research centers
produce more and higher impact research.
o Huawei research centers in Russia and partnerships
with universities produce innovative and
internationally recognized work.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 43 ● Partnerships between defense research institutions and
other entities of note to U.S. national security:
o Chinese companies and in stitutions listed on the
Entity List increasingly collaborate on AI -related
topics with Russian universities and research
institutions.
o Research institutions affiliated with the Russian
Ministry of Defense, or located in the ERA
technopolis, increasingly collaborate with Chinese
counterparts on AI -related research.
Investment:
● Increased disclosed investment values and deal counts in
relative and absolute terms:
o Increases in the disclosed value and deal count of
joint Chinese and Russian AI investments.
o The percentage of joint AI investment between China
and Russia surpasses the level of U.S. -China AI
investment or occupies a majority share of China’s
and Russia ’s overall AI investment portfolios
globally.
o China and Russia develop additional products or
establish additional joint AI ventures and innovation
funds, on the order of RCIF or larger.
● Hidden values or breakthrough developments:
o Drop -offs in disclosed investment values or deal
counts that indicate a greater role for state -owned
enterprises, deliberate obfuscation, or increasing lack
of transparency in joint AI investments.
o Investments leading to groundbreaking AI products
and innovations in th e areas of autonomous vehicles,
smart cities, facial recognition , telecommunications,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 44 large language models (natural language
processing) , or AI -enabled military applications .
o Increase in data sharing agreements, exceptions to
data localization laws, and other signs of mutually
preferential treatment to attract AI companies and
talent.
● Proliferation of investments in areas of concern:
o Significant growth in assets under management of
RCIF’s AI investment portfolio, with a focus on
autonomous vehicles, smart cities, facial recognition,
telecommunications, large language models (natural
language processing), or AI -enabled military
applications .
o Increase s in Chinese and Russian joint AI invest ments
in facial recognition, such as the RCIF investment in
Megvii, or growing partnerships between Russian
firms and China’s four “AI dragons'': SenseTime, Yitu,
CloudWalk, and Megvii.
o Collaboration in AI development between Chinese
and Russian state -own ed defense companies, such
as China Electronics Technology Corporation and
Rostec.
o Implementation of existing corporate partnerships
and development of new strategic cooperation
agreements, such as the agreement between China’s
Dahua Technology and Russia’s NtechLab to develop
surveillance capabilities or between China’s Fitsco
and Russia’s Cognitive Pilot to advance smart city
and autonomous vehicle technologies.
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 45 Authors
Margarita Konaev is a research fellow at CSET, where Andrew
Imbrie is a senior fellow, and Ryan Fedasiuk and Emily Weinstein
are research analysts. Katerina Sedova is a research fellow with
CSET’s CyberAI, and James Dunham is a data scientist at CSET.
Acknowledgements
For their feedback and insights, we thank our CSET colleagues :
Igor Mikolic -Torreira, Dewey Murdick, Catherine Aiken, Melissa
Flagg, Ilya Rahkovsky, and Ngor Luong. The authors are also
grateful for the thoughtful rev iews provided by Chris Miller of The
Fletcher School at Tufts University and Ali Wyne of Eurasia Group.
Additionally, we thank Matt Mahoney for fact -checking, as well as
Melissa Deng, Lynne Weil, Alex Friedland, and the External Affairs
team for editorial support.
© 2021 by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. This
work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution -Non
Commercial 4.0 International License.
To view a copy of this license, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by -nc/4.0/ .
Document Identifier: doi: 10.51593/ 20210033

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 46 Appendix
Table 1A: Top Russian and Chinese Organizations in CNKI
Dataset .
Top Russian Orgs in
CNKI Dataset No. of
Papers
 Top Chinese Orgs
in CNKI Dataset No. of
Papers
Russian Academy of
Sciences 16 Chinese Academy
of Sciences 3
Bauman Moscow State
Technical University 4 Beihang University 2
Moscow State University 3 China Earthquake
Administration 2
Moscow Aviation
Institute 2 Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences 2
Russian Academy of
Natural Sciences 2 Harbin Institute of
Technology 2
Pavlov State Medical
University 2 Institute of
Geographic
Sciences and
Natural Resources
Research 2
Institute of Remote
Sensing and
Digital Earth 2
Nanjing University 2
South China
University of
Technology 2
Tsinghua
University 2
Xinjiang Medical
University 2
Source : CNKI .
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 47 Endnotes
1 Anastasia Muravyeva and Vasily Lemutov, “How Chinese Tech Companies Are
Conquering Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, January 11, 2021,
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83589 . For the Chinese government declaration
on this topic, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “
中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于发展新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（
全文） ,” June 6, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1670 118.shtml .
2 Andrea Kendall -Taylor and David Shullman, “Navigating the Deepening
Russia -China Partnership” (Center for a New American Security , January 2021 ),
https://s3.us -east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS -Report -
Russia -China -Alignment -final -v2.pdf?mtime=20210114133035&focal=none ;
Nahal Toosi, “Biden fea rs what ‘best friends’ Xi and Putin could do together,”
Politico , June 14, 2021 , https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/14/us -officials -
russia -links -china -putin -biden -jinping -494314 .
3 Fred erick Kempe, “China, Russia deepen cooperation in what could be Biden’s
defining challenge as president,” CNBC , April 18, 2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/18/op -ed-china -russia -cooperation -could -be-
bidens -biggest -challenge.html ; “China -Russia Ties Deepen While US and Allies
Flail: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times , March 21, 2021,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219002.shtml .
4 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community,” April 9, 2021,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA -2021 -
Unclassified -Report.pdf . See also Kendall -Taylor and Shullman, “Navigating the
Deepening Ru ssia-China Partnership .”
5 Kendall -Taylor and Shullman, “Navigating the Deepening Russia -China
Partnership”; Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, “A New Sino -Russian High -tech
Partnership” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute , October 29, 2019 ),
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new -sino-russian -high -tech -partnership ; Vita
Spivak, “What Does China’s Latest Five -Year Plan Mean for Russia? ,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Pea ce, March 19, 2021,
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84121 ; Alexander Gabuev, “As Russia and
China Draw Closer, Europe Watches with Foreboding,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace , March 19, 202 1, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84135 ;
Scott Neuman, “China, Russia Announce Plan to Build Moon Research Station,”
NPR , March 10, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/10/975579975/china -
russia -announce -plan -to-build -moon -research -station .
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 48 6 “China -Russia Cooperation Has No Upper Limits: Global Times Editorial,”
Global Times , March 22, 2021,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219115.shtml .
7 Spivak, “What Does China’s Latest Five -Year Plan Mean for Russia?”
8 Kendall -Taylor and Shullman, “Navigatin g the Deepening Russia -China
Partnership.”
9 Many of these concerns are longstanding, so it is reasonable to assume that
Sino -Russian scientific and technological cooperation will continue to progress.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the frictions and lim itations in Sino -Russian
relations that will not necessarily abate —and indeed, may worsen —as the two
countries deepen collaboration on AI. See, for example, Ionut Ilascu, “Suspected
Chinese State Hackers Target Russian Submarine Designer,” Bleeping
Compute r, April 30, 2021,
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/suspected -chinese -state -
hackers -target -russian -submarine -designer/ ; Dimitri Simes, “Russia Up in Arms
over Chinese Theft of Military Technology,” Nikkei Asia , December 20, 2019,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International -relations/Russia -up-in-arms -over -
Chinese -theft -of-military -technology .
10 Elsa Kania and Rogier Creemers, “Xi Jinping Calls for ‘Healthy Development’
of AI (Translation),” New America , November 5, 2018,
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity -initiative/digichina/blog/xi -jinping -
calls -for-healthy -development -of-ai-translation/ ; Ashwin Acharya and Zachary
Arnold, “Chinese Public AI R&D Spending: Provisional Findings” (Center for
Security and Emerging Technology , December 2019 ),
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinese -public -ai-rd-spending -
provisional -findings/ .
11 Margarita Konaev and James Dunham, “Russian AI Res earch 2010 -2018”
(Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2020) ,
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/russian -ai-research -2010 -2018/ .
12 According to news reports, more than 1,200 project startups will be able to
receive support for the development and commercialization of various AI
solutions and technologies. As of June 2021, however, it remains unclear
whether these funds have been dispersed. Margari ta Konaev, “Thoughts on
Russia’s AI Strategy” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October
30, 2019 ), https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/thoughts -on-russias -ai-strategy/ ;
“Draft Resolutions have been Prepared Concerning the Allocation of 16.5 Billion
Rubles in Subsidies for the Development of AI in Russia,” Original Translation,
Center for Security and Emerging Technology , April 15, 2021,
https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp -
content/uploads/t0266\_Russia\_AI\_subsidies\_EN.pdf ; “Chernyshenko said that

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 49 over 1,200 startups will receive support for AI technologies” [ Чернышенко
заявил , что свыше 1200 стартапов получат поддержку по технологиям ИИ],
Tass , June 8, 2021 .
13 Kendall -Taylor and Shullman, “Navigating the Deepening Russia -China
Partnership”; Bendett and Kania, “A New Sino -Russian High -tech Partnership” ;
Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, “The Resilience of Sino -Russian High -Tech
Cooperation ,” War on the Rocks , Augus t 12, 2020,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the -resilience -of-sino-russian -high -tech-
cooperation/ .
14 Jonathan E. Hillman, “China and Russia: Econo mic Unequal s” (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 15, 2020),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/china -and-russia -economic -unequals ; Kendall -
Taylor and Shullman, “ Navigating the Deepening Russia -China Partnership” ;
Muravyeva and Lemutov, “How Chinese Tech Companies Are Conquering
Russia.”
15 Stephanie Petrella, Chris Miller, and Benjamin Cooper, “Russia’s Artificial
Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State -Owned Fir ms,” Orbis 65, no. 1 (2021):
75-100,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438720300648 .
16 Future research could distinguish variations in the level of risk and the quality
of dollars invested between different countries. Qualitatively, one could track
whether investments refine existing products and apply them to new use cases
or whether investments are geared toward joint development of new pr oducts.
Quantitatively, one could disaggregate investments according to target stage,
such as a seed round or Series A, B, and C.
17 “Computer Science Rankings,” CSRankings,
http://csrankings.org/#/index?ai&vision&mlmining&nlp&ir&world .
18 Zachary Arnold, Ilya Rahkovsky, and Tina Huang, “Tracking AI Investment:
Initial Findings from the Private Markets” (Center for Security and Emerging
Technology, September 2020),
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/tracking -ai-investment/ .
19 The number of investment deals in our dataset is small, making it difficult to
assess clear trend lines over time.
20 Karen White, “ Publication s Output: U.S. Trends and International
Comparisons ,” National Science Foundation | National Science Board, December
17, 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20206/international -collaboration .
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 50 21 Nick Mayo, “Growing Sino -Russian Academic Ties,” Inside Higher Ed , June 20,
2019, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/06/20/academic -ties-grow -
between -russia -and-china .
22 “China’s International Scientific Research Collaboration : A Bibliometric
Analysis ” (National Center for S&T Evaluation and Clarivate Analytics, n.d.),
http://www.ncste.org/uploads/www /201712/200927279unk.pdf .
23 Sergey Shashnov and Maxim Kotsemir, “Research landscape of the BRICS
countries: current trends in research output, thematic structures of publications,
and the relative influence of partners ,” Scientometrics 117 (2018): 1115–1155,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11192 -018-2883 -7.
24 Melissa Flagg, Autumn Toney, and Paul Harris, “Research Security,
Collaboration, and the Changing Map of Globa l R&D” (Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, June 2021),
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/research -security -collaboration -and-
the-changing -map -of-global -rd/.
25 Flagg, Toney, and Harris, “Research Security, Collaboration, and the Changing
Map of Global R&D .”
26 See Microsoft Academic Graph , Web of Science , and Dimensions .
27 CNKI is an electronic platform designed to integrate Chinese knowledge -
based information resources. It has become the largest source of Chinese
science and technology, humanities and social sciences, politics, and economics
content and includes resources such as Chin a Academic Journals (used in this
study), China Core Newspapers, China Doctor/Master’s Dissertations, and China
Proceedings and Conferences. For more information, see
https://global.cnki.net/index/ and https://www.eastview.com/resources/cnki -faq/.
28 Konaev and Dunham, “Russian AI Research 2010 -2018.”
29 Further information can be found in James Dunham, Jennifer Melot, and
Dewey Murdick, “Identify ing the Development and Application of Artificial
Intelligence in Scientific Text,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2002:07143 (2020) ,
https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.07143 .
30 Konaev and Dunham, “Russian AI Research 201 0-2018 .”
31 Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, “5 -100
Russian Academic Excellence Project: Regulations,”
https://www.5top100.ru/en/documents/regulations/ , accessed July 6, 2021;
Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia aims to revive science after era of stagnation,”

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 51 Nature , March 18, 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586 -020-00753 -
7.
32 The top 10 fields for Russia and China were determined using the same
classification method described in Konaev and Dunham, “Russian AI Research
2010 -2018.”
33 Since the 1990s, remote sensing research has expanded significantly with
advances in satellite technology, including small, low -cost satellites and other
airborne and spaceborne remote sensing systems. Over the past two decades,
the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles has pushed the envelope in
imagery and data acquisition capabilities even further, bridging the gap between
airborne and spaceborne earth observation and ground or field observations.
34 Yanhua Zhuang, Xingjian L iu, Thuminh Nguyen, Qingqing He, and Song Hong ,
“Global Remote Sensing Research Trends during 1991 –2010: A Bibliometric
Analysis ,” Scientometrics 96, no. 1 (2013): 203 –19,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s1 1192 -012-0918 -z; Hongyue Zhang , Mingrui Huang ,
Xiuling Qing, Guoqing Li, and Chuanzhao Tian, “ Bibliometric Analysis of Global
Remote Sensing Research during 2010 -2015,” ISPRS International Journal of
Geo-Information 6, no. 11 ( 2017): 332, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi6110332 .
35 Guangdong University of Technology was added to the Department of
Commerce’s Unverified List in April 2019. For more information, see: Bureau of
Industry and Security, “Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL),” Federal Register ,
April 11, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/04/11/2019 -
07211/revisions -to-the-unverified -list-uvl.
36 Konaev and Dunham, “Russian AI Research 2010 -2018,” 16 -17.
37 Konaev and Dunham, “Russian AI Research 2010 -2018,” 16 -17.
38 “Introduction to the Chinese Academy of Sciences” [ 中国科学院 简介], Chinese
Academy of Sciences, n.d. , https://perma.cc/5L45 -Q5FH .
39 “The Chi nese Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences sign
a cooperation agreement” [ 中国科学院与俄 罗斯科学院 签署合作协议 ], Chinese
Academy of Sciences, June 10, 2018, https://perma.cc/D6CQ -XUT2; and “The
Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences sign a
roadmap for scientific and technological cooperation” [ 中科院与俄 罗斯科学院 签
署科技合作路 线图 ], Chinese Academy of Sciences official website rehosted by
gov.cn , July 2 1, 2019, https://perma.cc/8RRF -SMKG .
40 “ITMO University expands cooperation with Hangzhou Dianzi University,”
ITMO N ews, August, 1, 2017, https://news.itmo.ru/en/news/6848/ ; “Summary of
visits and exchanges of St. Petersburg ITMO University” [ 圣彼得堡 ITMO大学访
学交流总结 ], Hangzhou Dianzi University Computer and Software School, 2017,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 52 https://perma.cc/H7VN -TPBB ; “SNAC -2019: Summer School on Nonlinear and
Adaptive Control Brings Together Young Scientists From Around the World ,”
ITMO News , June 7, 2019,
https://news.itmo.ru/en/science/cyberphysics/news/8552/ .
41 “School profile” [ 学院概况 ], HDU -ITMO Joint Institute, n.d.,
https://perma.cc/EF9Y -DADX .
42 “Notice of the preliminary review results of the c ooperation and exchange
project between the National Natural Science Foundation of China and the
Russian Basic Research Foundation in 2020” [2020 年度国家自然科学基金委 员会
与俄罗斯基础研究基金会合作交流 项目初审结果通知 ], National Natural Science
Foundation of China, Bureau of International Cooperation, August 19, 2020,
https://perma.cc/6BJ9 -6CCA .
43 This case study focuses predominantly on Huawei’s relationships with
universities and research institutions. For a review of Huawei’s commercial
activities in Russia, see Jeffrey Edmonds, Samuel Bendett, Anya Fink, Mary
Chesnut, Dmitry Gorenburg, Michael Kofman, Kasey Stricklin, and Julian Waller,
“Artificial Intelligence and Auto nomy in Russia” (Center for Naval Analyses, May
2021) , https://www.cna.org/CNA\_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/russia -ai/Russia -
Artificial -Intelligence -Autonomy -Putin -Military.pdf ; Tatyana Tsukanova,
“Huawei’s Growth Strategies and Challenges in Russia ,” in Wenxian Zhang, Ilan
Alon, and Christoph Lattemann (eds.), Huawei Goes Global : Volume II: Regional,
Geopolitical Perspect ives and Crisis Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978 -3-030-47579 -6\_3.
44 Donglin Wu and Fang Zhao, “Entry Modes for International Markets: Case
Study of Huawei, A Chinese Technology Enterprise,” International Review of
Business Research Papers 3, no. 1 (March 2007): 183–196,
http://www.ib erchina.org/files/2018/Entry\_Modes\_For\_International\_Markets\_C
ase\_Study\_Huawei.pdf .
45 Bendett and Kania, “The Resilience of Sino -Russian High -Tech Cooperation”;
Lauren Dudley, “ Part One: Boxed Out of the West, Huawei Looks to Russia to
Survive the Crisis and Emerge Stronger,” Council on Foreign Relations , October
12, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/part -one-boxed -out-west -huawei -looks -
russia -survive -crisis -and-emerge -stronger .
46 Lauren Dudley, “ Part Three: Huawei’s Role in the China -Russia Technological
Partnership,” Council on Foreign Relations , December 16, 2020,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/part -three -huaweis -role-china -russia -technological -
partnership . Note that not everyone is happy with Huawei’s growing presence,
especially local competitors who feel they are losing market share and talent to
Huawei.
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 53 47 Huawei’s Russia website lists 5 addresses for research centers in Moscow,
and one for each of the other three cities. It also lists a research center in Minsk,
Belarus : https://career.huawei.ru/rri/en/ .
48 “Jobs in the current region: Russia,” Huawei, accessed June 3, 2021,
https://hh.ru/employer/2873 .
49 “Huawei Science Projects,” Huawei, accessed June 3, 2021,
https://www.huawei.com/minisite/russia/20anniversary/science -projects.html .
Although the website does not name the specific universities, we were able to
trace collaborations with the following 12 universit ies: Moscow Technological
University, St. Petersburg State University of Telecommunications, ITMO
University, Innopolis University, Russian Customs Academy, Bauman Moscow
State Technical University, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology,
Moscow Inst itute of Physics and Technology, Kazan University, Moscow
Technical University of Communications and Informatics, Tomsk State University
of Control Systems and Radioelectronics, and Novosibirsk State University. For
sources on these partnerships, see “Huaw ei in Russia: stages of a long journey”
[Компания Huawei в России : этапы большого пути ], Huawei, 2017,
https://perma.cc/L6AY -NME6 ; “Chinese telecommunication corporation is
interested in cooperation with St. Petersburg developers,” ITMO News , April 8,
2015, https://news.itmo.ru/en/news/4717/ ; “Innopolis University and Huawei
established a joint educational program,” Innopolis University, June 9, 2015,
https://media.innopolis.university/en/news/innopoli s-university -and-huawei -
established -a-joint -educational -program/ ; “Huawei Partner Voice: Bauman
Moscow State Technical University,” Huawei, n.d.,
https:// e.huawei.com/en/videolist/partner/partner/795b577f275448809b1252fc
d4847399 ; “Skoltech Annual Report 2018” (Skoltech Institute of Science and
Technology, March 2019),
https://www.skoltech.ru/app/data/uploads/2019/04/Annual -report -2018.pdf ;
“Skolkovo develops R&D and venture projects with Chinese players,” Skolkovo
Foundation and East -West Digital News , October 26, 2018,
https://www.ewdn.com/2018/10/26/skolkovo -develops -rd-and-venture -
projects -with -chinese -players/ ; “MIPT and HUAWEI started cooperation in the
field of artificial intelligence,” MIPT,
https://mipt.ru/english/news/mipt\_and\_huawei\_started\_cooperation\_in\_the\_field
\_of\_artificial\_intelli gence ; Kazan Federal University,
https://kpfu.ru/eng/itis/huawei -innovation -research -program.html ; Olga
Inshakova, “MTUCI and Huawei will open the first national ICT Academy i n
Russia,” TB Forum, July 30, 2019, https://eng.tbforum.ru/blog/mtuci -and-
huawei -will-open -the-first-national -ict-academy -in-russia ; “TUSUR and
Huawei Discussed Prospects for Scientific and Research Collaboration,” Tusur
University, November 14, 2019, https://tusur.ru/en/news -and-
events/news/item/ -/novost -tusur -and-huawei -discussed -prospects -for-
scientific -and-research -collaboration ; Mechanics and Mathematics Faculty, “The
Mathematical Center in Akademgorodok will serve as a platform for

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 54 coordinating cooperation between three institutes of the SB RAS and the
Huawei company,” Novosibirsk State University, June 30, 2020,
https://english.nsu.ru/news -events/news/life/the -mathematical -center -in-
akademgorodok -created -as-platform -for-sb-ras-and-huawei -cooperation/ .
50 “Scientific Cooperation in Russia,” Huawei, accessed June 3, 2021,
https://www.huawei.com/minisite/russia/20anniversary/scientific -
cooperation.html .
51 “Huawei, MIPT Establish Lab to Develop AI Tech,” HPC Wire, March 22,
2020, https://www.hpcwire.com/off -the-wire/huawei -mipt -establish -lab-to-
develop -ai-tech/ .
52 “Skoltech Annual Report 2018” (Skolkovo Institute of Science and
Technology, March 2019).
53 “Master of Science in Information Technology and Engineering,” Skolkovo
Institute of Science and Technology, accessed June 3, 2021 ,
https://msc.skoltech.ru/internet -of-things -and-wireless -technologies .
54 “Laboratory for Quantum Information Processing,” Skolkovo Institute of
Science and Technology, accessed June 3, 2021, http://deepquantum.ai/ .
55 “Huawei Science Projects,” Huawei, accessed June 3, 2021,
https://www.huawei.com/minisite/russia/20anniv ersary/science -projects.html .
56 Wireless Networks Lab, “Huawei awards IITP RAS for the best cooperation
project in 2017,” Kharkevich Institute for Information Transmission Problems of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 10, 2017,
http://wireless.iitp.ru/bestproject/ ; Wireless Networks Lab, “Huawei awards IITP
RAS for the best cooperation project in 2018,” Kharkevich Institute for
Information Transmission Pr oblems of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
November 30, 2018, http://wireless.iitp.ru/huawei -award2018/ .
57 “Huawei Russian Research Institute,” Huawei, accessed June 3, 2021 ,
https://career.huawei.ru/rri/en/ ; “Institute of Computational Mathematics and
Mathematical Geophysics of Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences,
Novosibirsk, Russia,” Math -Net, access ed June 3, 2021,
http://www.mathnet.ru/php/organisation.phtml?option\_lang=eng&orgid=2502 .
In fact, Huawei’s research center is located on a street that appears in the
Guinness Book of World Records a s the “smartest street in the world” because
its 2.5 kilometers have more than 20 scientific research institutes. Marina
Moskalenko, “Akademgorodok: The last Soviet Utopia, or a new Silicon Valley ?,”
Russia Beyond , March 28, 2016,
https://www.rbth.com/science\_and\_tech/2016/03/28/akademgorodok -the-last-
soviet -utopia -or-a-new -silicon -valley\_579767 .
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 55 58 Mechanics and Mathematic s Faculty, “The mathematical center in
Akademgorodok will serve as a platform for coordinating cooperation between
three institutes of the SB RAS and the Huawei company,” Novosibirsk State
University, June 30, 2020 , https://english.nsu.ru/news -events/news/life/the -
mathematical -center -in-akademgorodok -created -as-platform -for-sb-ras-and-
huawei -cooperation /.
59 Zach Dorfman, “Tech giants are giving China a vital edge in espionage,”
Foreign Policy , December 23, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/23/china -
tech-giants -process -stolen -data -spy-agencies/ .
60 The Chinese Party -state has historically leveraged the Ch inese commercial
sector to obtain technology and know -how from overseas. For more
information, see Ryan Fedasiuk, Emily Weinstein, and Anna Puglisi, “China’s
Foreign Technology Wishlist” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,
May 2021 ), https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas -foreign -technology -
wish -list/.
61 It is important to note that, since the Chinese language data only contain 43
papers spannin g 15 years, any trends must be taken with a grain of salt. In
addition, these 43 papers may contain papers that were either translated into
Chinese from either English or Russian, or vice versa.
62 The Seven Sons of National Defense are a group of Chinese u niversities,
administered directly by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
with historically intimate ties to China’s defense ecosystem. For more
information, see: Ryan Fedasiuk and Emily Weinstein, “Universities and the
Chinese Defense Tec hnology Workforce” (Center for Security and Emerging
Technology, December 2020),
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/universities -and-the-chinese -defense -
technology -workforce/ ; Bureau of Industry and Security, “Addition of Entities to
the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From
the Entity List,” Federal Register , December 22, 2020,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/22/2020 -28031/addition -
of-entities -to-the-entity -list-revision -of-entry -on-the-entity -list-and-removal -
of-entities .
63 The two papers in question are titled “Approach of pilot modeling for
predicting pilot control behavior” ( 一种预测驾驶员 操纵行为的建模方法 ) and
“Identification of Pilot Neural Network Model in Pitch Tracking” ( 俯仰跟踪任 务中
的驾驶员神经网络模型辨识).
64 “Admissions Guide for the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics -
Moscow Aviation Institute of Russia” [ 北京航空航天大学 -俄罗斯莫斯科航空学院

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 56 硕士研究生 项目招生简章], Beihang University Aero -Engine Research Institute,
September 29, 20 20, https://perma.cc/S9ZY -CYZL .
65 One of these papers focuses on remote sensing, which falls within the top 10
fields for collaborative research, but not in top 10 for each country’s individual
research.
66 Ryan Fedasiuk, Emily Weinstein, Ben Murphy, and Alan Omar Loera Martinez,
“Chinese State Council Budget Tracker” (Center for Security and Emerging
Technology, 2021) , https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinese -state -
council -budget -tracker/; “National Basic Research Programme (973
Programme),” STIP Compass, last updated February 6, 2018,
https://stip.oecd.org/stip/policy -
initiatives/2019%2Fdata%2FpolicyInitiatives%2F2739 .
67 Fedasiuk, Weinstein, Murphy, and Loera Martinez, “Chinese State Council
Budget Tracker”; “973 —National Key Basic Research and Development Plan”
[973——国家重点基 础研究发展计划], Chinese Academy of Sciences, n.d.,
https://perma.cc/9RPE -WF5A .
68 Jenny J. Lee and John P . Haupt , “Winners and Losers in US -China Scientific
Research Collaborations ,” Higher Education 80, no. 1 (2020): 57 –74,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734 -019-00464 -7.
69 White, “ Publication s Output: U.S. Trends and International Comparisons. ”
70 In terms of overall R&D expenditures, the business share of U.S. R&D
surpassed the federal share around 1978 -1980. See U.S. Research and
Development Funding and Performance: Fact Sheet,” Congressional Research
Service , January 24, 2020, 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44307.pdf .
71 These figures rely on Crunchbase data only and reflect disclosed private -
sector AI investments. As such, they likely undercount investment in Russia.
72 Petrella, Miller, and Cooper, “Russia’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy .”
73 Arnold, Rahkovsky, and Huang, “Tracking AI Investment .”
74 For China: “Top 20 AI Startups in China,” AI Startups, a ccessed April 14,
2021 , https://www.ai -startups.org/country/China/ ; For Russia: “Top 25 AI
Startups in Russia,” AI Startups, a ccessed April 14, 2021 , https://www.ai -
startups.org/country/Russia/ ; “Encyclopedia of V C Market,” ( Энциклопедия
венчурного рынка (rb.ru)), RB Data, accessed April 14, 2021 ,
https://rb.ru/deals/ .
75 Arnold, Rahkovsky, and Huang, “Tracking AI Investment.”
Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 57 76 These investment figures differ from those in CSET’s prior report, “Tracking AI
Investment,” where Chinese investors had apparently made just $500 million in
AI investments into the United States f rom 2015 to 2019. The source of data for
both reports, Crunchbase, periodically updates information about investment
deals concluded in previous years. Data used in this report was pulled in January
2021, and indicates a far larger sum of Chinese investmen t concluded from
January 2010 through December 2020.
77 “Russian companies have invested more than $170 million in AI” [ Российские
компании инвестировали в ИИ больше $170 млн], ComNews , April 13, 2020,
https://www.comnews.ru/content/205551/2020 -04-13/2020 -w16/rossiyskie -
kompanii -investirovali -ii-bolshe -170-mln.
78 Shen Lu, “Everything You Need to Know About the Megvii IPO.” Protoco l,
March 12, 2021, https://www.protocol.com/amp/megvii -ipo-2651047390 .
79 Lulu Yilun Chen, “U.S. Blacklist Hurt Megvii’s Sales Before IPO Attempt,”
Bloomberg , April 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2020 -04-
06/u -s-blacklist -hurt-china -ai-giant -s-sales -ahead -of-ipo-attempt . See also Lu,
“Everything You Need to Know About the Megvii IPO.”
80 Drew Harwell and Eva Dou, “Huawei Tested AI Software that Could
Recognize Uighur Minorities and Alert Police, Report Says,” The Washington
Post , December 8 , 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost .com/technology/2020/12/08/huawei -tested -ai-
software -that-could -recognize -uighur -minorities -alert -police -report -says/ .
81 “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” A Rule by the Industry and
Security Bureau, Federal Registry, October 9, 2019,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019 -22210/addition -
of-certain -entities -to-the-entity -list.
82 The “Four AI Dra gons” is a common term used in Chinese to describe Megvii,
CloudWalk, SenseTime, and Yitu Technology. For more information, see: “AI
‘Four Little Dragons’ Evolution” [AI‘ 四小龙’讲化术], Sina , December 26, 2019,
https://finance.sina.com.cn/manage/magazine/2019 -12-26/doc -
iihnzhfz8448554.shtml ; “Chinese AI Unicorn Megvii Targets $500 Million in
New Funding,” Synced, Dec ember 11, 2018,
https://syncedreview.com/2018/12/11/12674/ .
83 DealRoom data indicate 5 investors while Crunchbase and other sources list 6
to include China Reform Holdings Corporation. We are u sing Crunchbase data.
See “Megvii,” DealRoom , accessed March 24, 2021,
https://app.dealroom.co/companies/megvii ; “Series C - MEGVII,” Crunchbase ,
November 1, 2017 , accessed March 2021,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 58
https://www.crunchbase.com/funding\_round/megvii -technology -series -c--
19a5b1c1 .
84 Chen, “U.S. Blacklist Hurt Megvii’s Sales Before IPO Attempt.”
85 “About Us,” Russia -China Investment Fund, accessed January 2021,
http://www.rcif.com .
86 Ingrid Lunden, “Alibaba, Mail.Ru, Megafon Form AliExpress Russia JV to
Double Down on E -Commerce in CIS,” TechCrunch , June 5, 2019,
https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/05/alibaba -mail-ru-megafon -form -aliexpress -
russia -jv-to-double -down -on-e-commerce -in-cis/; East -West Digital News,
“Russia’s Mail.Ru and China’s Alibaba Complete Deal to Team Up,” The Moscow
Times , October 9, 2019,
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/09/russias -mailru -and-chinas -
alibaba -complete -deal -to-team -up-a67659; and “Mail.ru Group,” accessed June
2021, https://corp.mail.ru/en/ .
87 Jon Russell, “Alibaba Goes Big o n Russia with Joint Venture Focused on
Gaming, Shopping and More,” TechCrunch , September 11, 2018,
https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/11/alibaba -russia -mail-ru/. See also “RDIF,
Aliba ba Group, MegaFon and Mail.ru Group Announce Signing of Definitive
Documents for Joint Venture in Russia and the CIS,” Alibaba Group , June 5,
2019, https://www.alibabagroup.com/e n/news/press\_pdf/p190605.pdf .
88 Lunden, “Alibaba, Mail.Ru, Megafon Form AliExpress Russia JV to Double
Down on E -Commerce in CIS.”
89 “The Next Big Thing in Retail Commerce Comes with Chinese Characteristics,”
The Economist , January 2, 2021,
https://www.economist.com/business/2021/01/02/the -next -big-thing -in-retail -
comes -with -chinese -characteristics .
90 “Leading online stores in Russia in 2020, by sales volume, ” Statista , accessed
July 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1006643/leading -online -stores -
russia/ .
91 “RDIF, Sberbank, Gazp rom Neft, Yandex, Mail.ru and MTS create AI -Russia
Alliance,” Russian Direct Investment Fund, September 11, 2019,
https://rdif.ru/Eng\_fullNews/4632/ .
92 The fifth, private -sector deal was closed betwe en Zeroth AI (Hong Kong) and
Metrix AI (Moscow) in March 2018.
93 “Portfolio Highlights,” Russia -China Investment Fund, accessed January 29,
2021, https://perma.cc/H4GY -C8AB .

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 59
94 “Russia -China Investment Fund,” The Legal 500 ,
https://www.legal500.com/gc -powerlist/china -teams -2018/russia -china -
investment -fund/ .
95 “Private Equit y Round --DiDi Autonomous Driving,” Crunchbase , accessed July
2021, https://www.crunchbase.com/funding\_round/didi -autonomous -driving -
private -equity --28b78b36 .
96Anna Baydakova, “Manufacturing Giant Rostec to Manage Data on Waves
Blockchain Platform,” CoinDesk , September 12, 2018,
https://www.coindesk.com/rostec -waves -blockc hain-smart -cities .
97 “Moscow Smart City –2030 Digital Strategy” (Department of Information
Technologies, City of Moscow, 2018), https://perma.cc/UZH4 -MR5A .
98 Dahlia Peterson, “Designing Alternatives to China’s Re pressive Surveillance
State” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology , October 2020 ),
https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/designing -alternatives -to-chinas -
repressive -surveillance -state/ ; Robert Muggah and Greg Walton, “‘Smart’ Cities
Are Surveilled Cities,” Foreign Policy , April 17, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/17/smart -cities -surveillance -privacy -digital -
threats -internet -of-things -5g/.
99 “Nio ET7 First Look: Jumping Headfirst Into Autonomous Driving,” Motor
Trend , January 11, 2021, https://www.motortrend.com/news/nio -et7-first-look-
autonomous -ev-sedan/ .
100 “NIO Launches First Autonomous Driving Model ET7,” Nio, January 9, 2021,
https://www.nio.com/news/nio -launches -first-autonomous -driving -model -et7.
101 Eudora Wang, “Chinese Internet Firm NetEase’s Music Unit Completes
$600M Capital Injection,” China Money Network , November 13, 2018,
https://w ww.chinamoneynetwork.com/2018/11/13/chinese -internet -firm-
neteases -music -unit-completes -600m -capital -injection .
102 Wang, “Chinese Internet Firm NetEase’s Music Unit Completes $600M
Capital Injection.”
103 “Promobot and China will Collaborate to Develop a Service Robot for
Healthcare,” Promobot , October 19, 2019, https://promo -bot.ai/n ews/promobot -
and-china -will-collaborate -to-develop -a-service -robot -for-healthcare/ .
104 “Russian Robotics Firm Promobot Eyes Multiplying Exports to China in
2021,” United News of India , November 23, 2020,
http://www.uniindia.com/russian -robotics -firm-promobot -eyes -multiplying -
exports -to-china -in-2021/world/news/2242292.html .

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 60 105 “LANIT Has Entered into a Partnership Agree ment with the Global Robot
Manufacturer UBTECH ROBOTICS at the St. Petersburg Economic
Forum” [ЛАНИТ заключил соглашение о партнёрстве с мировым
производителем роботов UBTECH ROBOTICS на Петербургском
экономическом форуме ], LANIT Group , June 6, 2019,
https://www.lanit.ru/press/archive/lanit -zaklyuchil -soglashenie -o-partnyerstve -
s-mirov ym-proizvoditelem -robotov -ubtech -robotics -na-pete/ .
106 “LANIT and UBTECH ROBOTICS signed a contract at The Eastern Economic
Forum” [ЛАНИТ и UBTECH ROBOTICS подписали контракт на Восточном
экономическом форуме – Ведомости ], Vedomosti , September 5, 2019,
https://www.vedomosti.ru/press\_releases/2019/09/05/lanit -i-ubtech -robotics -
podpisali -kontrakt -na-vostochnom -ekonomicheskom -forume .
107 SmartCitiesWorld News Team, “Companies join forces to develop
autonomous trams in China, ” SmartCitiesWorld , April 22, 2020,
https://www.smartcitiesworld.net/news/news/companies -join-forces -to-
develop -autonomous -trams -in-china -5216 .
108 Adam Hill, “Cognitive Pilot and Fitsco collaborate on R&D,” ITS International ,
September 22, 2020, https://www.itsinternational.com/its6/news/cognitive -
pilot -and-fitsco -collaborate -rd.
109 Dimitri Simes, “ Huawei plays star role in new China -Russia AI partners hip,”
Nikkei Asia , February 4, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia -
Insight/Huawei -plays -star-role-in-new -China -Russia -AI-partnership .
110 “Dahua Technology opens a subsidiary in Moscow, Russia,” ASMag
Rankings , August 28, 2017,
https://www.asmag.com/rankings/m/content.aspx?id=23553 .
111 “NtechLab and Dahua Technology Rus unveil wearable camera with facial
recognition function ” [“NtechLab и Dahua Technology Rus представили
носимую камеру с функцией распознавания лиц”], Dahua Technol ogies ,
October 16, 2019,
https://www.dahuasecurity.com/ru/newsEvents/pressRelease/3027 ; James
Vincent, “Moscow rolls out live facial recognition system with an app to alert
police,” The Verge, January 30, 2020,
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/30/21115119/moscow -live-facial -
recognition -roll-out-ntechlab -deployment .
112 “Russia and China will help ea ch other with the development of blockchain
and AI technologies” [“Россия и Китай помогут друг другу с развитием
блокчейн - и ИИ-технологий ”], IT Week , December 19, 2019,
https://www.itweek.ru/blockchain/news -company/detail.php?ID=210833 ;
“China and Russia plan to develop blockchain and AI solutions for business,”

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 61
Retail & Loyalty , December 23, 2019, https://retail -loyalty.org/en/news/china -
and-russia -plan -to-develop -blockchain -and-ai-solutions -for-business/ .
113 “China and Russia plan to develop joint blockchain and AI solutions for
business” [“Китай и Россия планируют разработку совместных блокчейн и AI-
решений для бизнеса”], ComNews , December 18, 2019,
https://www.comnews.ru/content/203644/2019 -12-18/2019 -w51/kitay -i-
rossiya -planiruyut -razrabotku -sovmestnykh -blokcheyn -i-ai-resheniy -dlya -
biznesa .
114 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics
(Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/book/axis -of-convenience/ ; Andrea Kendall -Taylor
and David Shullman, “China and Russia’s Dangerous Convergence,” Foreign
Affairs , May 3, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021 -05-
03/china -and-russias -dangerous -convergence ; Ali Wyne, “Assessing the Sino -
Russian Entente,” The Wire China , April 25, 2021,
https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/04/25/assessing -the-sino-russian -
entente/ .
115 “The head of the RAS u rged to revise the principles of scientific cooperation
with China” [ Глава РАН призвал пересмотреть принципы научного
сотрудничества с Китаем ], Tass , September 24, 2019,
https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/6921068 .
116 Ryan Fedasiuk, Emily Weinstein, and Anna Puglisi, “China’s Foreign
Technology Wish List” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May
2021), https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas -foreign -technology -
wish -list/.
117 Bendett and Kania also list joint investment funds , but these have been
considered in our report. Bend ett and Kania, “A New Sino -Russian High -tech
partnership.”
118 “Number of Chinese Students in Russian Universities More Than Doubled in
5 Years,” Russkiy Mir Foundation, September 9, 2020,
https://ru sskiymir.ru/en/news/277542/ .
119 “International Students: Leading Places of Origin,” Open Doors, accessed July
20, 2021, https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international -students/leading -
places -of-origin/ .
120 “The Global AI Talent Tracker ,” MacroPolo, accessed July 20, 2021,
https://macropolo.org/digital -projects/the -global -ai-talent -tracker/ .
121 Remco Zwet sloot, James Dunham, Zachary Arnold, and Tina Huang,
“Keeping AI Talent in the United States” (Center for Security and Emerging

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 62 Technology, December 2019 ), https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp -
content/uploads/Keeping -Top-AI-Talent -in-the-United -States.pdf .

Margarita Konaev
Andrew Imbrie
Ryan Fedasiuk
Emily Weinstein
Katerina Sedova
James Dunham