The Coast Guard's program of record (POR) calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $657 million in procurement funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs. NSCs are the Coast Guard's largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 12 aged Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Although the Coast Guard's POR calls for procuring a total of 8 NSCs to replace the 12 Hamilton-class cutters, Congress through FY2019 has funded 11 NSCs, including the 10th and 11th in FY2018. Six NSCs have been commissioned into service. The seventh was delivered to the Coast Guard on September 19, 2018, and the eighth was delivered on April 30, 2019. The ninth through 11th are under construction; the ninth is scheduled for delivery in 2021. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $60 million in procurement funding for the NSC program; this request does not include funding for a 12th NSC. OPCs are to be smaller, less expensive, and in some respects less capable than NSCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program as the service's top acquisition priority. OPCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $421 million per ship. On September 15, 2016, the Coast Guard awarded a contract with options for building up to nine OPCs to Eastern Shipbuilding Group of Panama City, FL. The first OPC was funded in FY2018 and is to be delivered in 2021. The second OPC and long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the third were funded in FY2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $457 million in procurement funding for the third OPC, LLTM for the fourth and fifth, and other program costs. FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. FRCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $58 million per boat. A total of 56 have been funded through FY2019, including six in FY2019. Four of the 56 are to be used by the Coast Guard in the Persian Gulf and are not counted against the Coast Guard's 58-ship POR for the program, which relates to domestic operations. Excluding these four OPCs, a total of 52 FRCs for domestic operations have been funded through FY2019. The 32nd FRC was commissioned into service on May 1, 2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $140 million in acquisition funding for the procurement of two more FRCs for domestic operations. The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following: whether to provide funding in FY2020 for the procurement of a 12th NSC; whether to fund the procurement in FY2020 of two FRCs, as requested by the Coast Guard, or some higher number, such as four or six; whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs; the annual procurement rate for the OPC program; the impact of Hurricane Michael on Eastern Shipbuilding of Panama City, FL, the shipyard that is to build the first nine OPCs; and the planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs.


As of June 2019, over 113,000 people in the United States—including veterans—were waiting for an organ transplant. In 2018, more than 36,000 organ transplants were performed at transplant centers across the country, including those within the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Organ Transplant Program. GAO was asked to review how VA administers and oversees its organ transplant program. This report, among other things, examines the process and timeliness with which VA reviews referrals and completes evaluations for organ transplants. GAO reviewed data from VHA's Transplant Referral and Cost Evaluation Reimbursement database, documents related to VA's transplant program, and federal internal control standards. GAO conducted site visits to three of the 12 VATCs, selected to obtain diversity in geography and types of organs transplanted. At the selected VATCs, GAO reviewed facility data and documents related to organ transplants and interviewed officials. GAO also collected and reviewed information from the remaining nine VATCs. The 12 Veterans Affairs' transplant centers (VATC), which are overseen by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), almost always met the referral timeliness standard from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. When a veteran is determined to be a potential candidate for an organ transplant, he or she can receive a formal referral to a VATC. Depending on the type of referral, the VATC must meet specific timeliness standards for reviewing the referral and deciding if the veteran should receive a full evaluation. Likewise, VATCs have timeliness standards for conducting the full evaluation, and generally showed improvement in meeting that standard from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. For those delays in conducting full evaluations that did occur, GAO found they varied by organ type and VATC. Specifically, in fiscal year 2018, transplant evaluation timeliness ranged from 60 percent at two VATC kidney programs to 100 percent at kidney, liver, heart or lung programs across seven different VATCs. According to VATC officials, transplant evaluation delays are caused when patients or caregivers are not available or not aware that they are required to be evaluated within 30 days of being referred. Although veterans may prefer to be seen at a later date, untimely evaluations can delay veterans' placement on the national organ donation waitlist. According to VHA data, 192 of the 1,617 transplant evaluation appointments completed in fiscal year 2018 did not meet the 30-day requirement. VATC officials said this was because veterans were not available or not aware of the requirement. GAO found that staff at referring VHA medical centers lacked a full understanding of the transplant referral and evaluation process. For example, VATC providers told GAO that transplant referrals are sometimes incomplete, requiring providers to spend extra time searching for information that should have been readily available. GAO found that additional training for medical center staff would help to improve the efficiency of the transplant referral process and the timeliness of transplant evaluations provided to veterans, a critical factor affecting veteran outcomes.


The Coast Guard, within DHS, owns or leases more than 20,000 shore facilities such as piers, boat and air stations, and housing units at over 2,700 locations. This infrastructure is often positioned on coastlines where it is vulnerable to damage from extreme weather. Noting the importance of protecting critical infrastructure from such risks, in 2013 DHS updated its risk management guidance for enhancing infrastructure resilience—which is the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb and recover from, or successfully adapt to adverse events. GAO was asked to review Coast Guard efforts to improve the resilience of its shore infrastructure. This report (1) describes Coast Guard actions to improve shore infrastructure resilience since 2005, and (2) examines the extent to which its processes to improve shore infrastructure resilience follow DHS's key steps for critical infrastructure risk management. GAO reviewed and analyzed Coast Guard guidance and data on assessed infrastructure and interviewed Coast Guard officials. GAO also compared Coast Guard policies, procedures, and actions to manage shore infrastructure against DHS's framework for managing risks to critical infrastructure. Since 2005, the U.S. Coast Guard's main actions to improve resilience have been to repair or rebuild shore infrastructure to higher building standards after it has been damaged by extreme weather events. The Coast Guard has received more than $2 billion in supplemental appropriations since 2005 to improve resilience after severe storms (see figure). The Coast Guard has also developed new guidance requiring that repairs and new construction meet higher building standards to make it more resilient. Further, in 2015, the Coast Guard began an assessment of certain occupied buildings to identify their vulnerabilities to ten natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. As of 2018, this assessment covered approximately 16 percent of the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure. The Coast Guard aims to complete the assessment in 2025. Coast Guard processes to improve shore infrastructure resilience do not fully align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) key steps for critical infrastructure risk management. These steps are described in DHS's Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework, which recommends that DHS components, among other things, identify critical infrastructure, assess risks, and implement risk management activities. While the Coast Guard has identified some vulnerable shore infrastructure through its ongoing assessment, it has not identified all shore assets that may be vulnerable, such as piers and runways; or assessed operational risks affecting its ability to complete missions with these assets. In addition, the Coast Guard has not taken steps to develop mitigation strategies for buildings already identified as vulnerable. Moreover, Coast Guard data show a growing backlog of at least $2.6 billion in recapitalization, new construction, and deferred maintenance projects that compete for finite funding. However, Coast Guard officials were unable to verify that they have consistently selected projects to also enhance resilience. Coast Guard officials stated that they have not used the DHS framework and have instead focused on implementing their ongoing vulnerability assessment. Fully aligning its processes with the DHS framework would better position the Coast Guard to reduce its future fiscal exposure to the effects of extreme weather events.


The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), owns or leases more than 20,000 shore facilities—such as piers, boat stations, air stations, runways, and housing units—at more than 2,700 locations, from which it carries out its missions. This shore infrastructure is often positioned along the nation's coastlines where it can be vulnerable to damage from extreme weather. This statement summarizes GAO findings related to the condition of Coast Guard shore infrastructure, actions the Coast Guard has taken to improve its management of its shore infrastructure, and additional actions it needs to take. This statement is based on three GAO products issued from October 2017 through September 2019, along with selected updates on actions the Coast Guard has taken to address GAO's recommendations from these reports. GAO analyzed relevant Coast Guard documents, management processes and decisions, and interviewed Coast Guard officials. To conduct updates, GAO also reviewed information on the Coast Guard's actions to implement its prior recommendations. In February 2019, GAO reported that the Coast Guard's $18 billion portfolio of shore infrastructure was deteriorating, and almost half of it was past its service life as of 2018. Coast Guard data showed that it would cost at least $2.6 billion to address its maintenance and recapitalization (major renovation) project backlogs at recent funding levels. Coast Guard data also showed that hundreds of projects had not been factored into the backlog costs. GAO's prior work has shown that the Coast Guard has taken initial steps toward improving how it manages its shore infrastructure, including conducting an initial assessment of shore infrastructure vulnerabilities. However, GAO also found that the Coast Guard had not fully applied leading practices and key risk management steps in managing its shore infrastructure, and needs to take the following actions: Employ models for predicting the outcome of investments and analyzing tradeoffs . In February 2019, GAO found that the Coast Guard had used a model to determine that it could more efficiently prioritize its investment in aviation pavement—one segment of an almost $3 billion portfolio of aviation shore infrastructure—and save about $13.8 million. However, as of February 2019, the agency had not implemented the aviation pavement study results. Moreover, according to Coast Guard officials, the agency could employ models to its entire portfolio of shore infrastructure. By not implementing the results of its aviation pavement model or employing similar models across its shore infrastructure assets, the Coast Guard is missing opportunities to potentially identify and achieve cost savings across other assets. Dispose of unneeded assets. In October 2017, GAO found that closing boat stations that the Coast Guard had found to be unnecessarily duplicative could potentially generate $290 million in cost savings over 20 years. However, in February 2019, GAO found that instead of closures, the Coast Guard was planning recapitalization projects at 5 of the 18 stations it had recommended for closure. Given the Coast Guard's competing shore infrastructure priorities and existing project backlogs, GAO recommended disposing of unneeded assets to more efficiently manage resources and better position the Coast Guard and Congress to address shore infrastructure challenges. Implement DHS's Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework. In September 2019, GAO found that DHS has recognized the importance of protecting critical infrastructure from extreme weather and other risks. However, the Coast Guard has not fully aligned its processes for improving shore infrastructure resilience with DHS's five key steps for critical infrastructure risk management. For example, when identifying and then assessing risks to its infrastructure—two of the steps in the DHS process—the Coast Guard did not identify all assets that are critical to its missions, such as aircraft runways, or screen them for all vulnerabilities, such as flooding. Aligning its processes with the DHS steps would provide greater assurance that the Coast Guard is investing its resources to minimize potential damage and expenses caused by future extreme weather events.


The Coast Guard—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is a multimission, maritime military service that is responsible for maritime safety and national security, among other missions. Given the Arctic region's expansive maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The Coast Guard is also the sole provider and operator of the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet—a critical component in ensuring year-round access to the Arctic. The Coast Guard is developing the first of three heavy polar icebreakers—the Polar Security Cutter—it has acquired in over 40 years. This statement addresses (1) the Coast Guard's assessment of capability gaps in the region, and (2) key risks facing the Polar Security Cutter acquisition. This statement is primarily based on GAO's June 2016 report examining capability gaps in the Arctic and its September 2018 report examining the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker acquisition. In fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard—the primary federal maritime agency in the Arctic—assessed its capability to perform its missions in the region and identified a number of capability gaps. These gaps, which still exist today, include communications, infrastructure, maritime domain awareness, and icebreaking. The Coast Guard has worked to mitigate these gaps with its Arctic partners, such as other federal agencies. For example, during a 2015 annual operation in the Arctic, the Coast Guard took steps to enhance maritime domain awareness by testing the Department of Defense's communications equipment, extending communications capabilities further north than previously possible. However, in June 2016, GAO found that the Coast Guard did not systematically assess the extent to which its actions helped to mitigate these gaps. In response to GAO's recommendation, the Coast Guard is currently developing an implementation plan and corresponding metrics for its April 2019 Arctic Strategy. In September 2018, GAO found that the Coast Guard faced four key risks when it established the Polar Security Cutter program in March 2018: technology, design, cost, and schedule. For example, the Coast Guard's initial planned delivery dates of 2023, 2025, and 2026 for the three ships were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities. The schedule was driven, instead, by the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard's only operating heavy polar icebreaker—the Polar Star —reaches the end of its service life (see figure). GAO recommended in September 2018 that the program develop a realistic schedule and determine schedule risks for the program. In response, the Coast Guard is now tracking additional schedule risks for the program and is in the process of updating its program schedule. GAO will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's progress in addressing this recommendation and other recommendations GAO made to address key risks, such as design and cost, facing the Polar Security Cutter program.


The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964. The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump-sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the "Canadian Entitlement." Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually. The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Beginning in September 2024, either nation can terminate most provisions of the Treaty with at least 10 years' written notice (i.e., starting as early as 2014). To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but both countries have indicated a preliminary interest in modification of the treaty. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to "called-upon" operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary). Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT's hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications "within the Treaty framework." It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity's review process. Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the U.S. State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. Between May 2018 and May 2019, U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams held six rounds of negotiations. Additional negotiations are expected in 2019. If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its constitutional role to provide advice and consent. Both houses have also weighed in on CRT-related activities through their oversight roles.


The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) has served as a mandatory funding mechanism for agricultural programs since 1933. The CCC Charter Act enables the CCC to broadly support the U.S. agriculture industry through authorized programs including commodity and income support, natural resources conservation, export promotion, international food aid, disaster assistance, agricultural research, and bioenergy development. While CCC is authorized to carry out a number of activities, it has no staff of its own. Rather, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) employees and facilities carry out all of its activities. CCC is overseen by the Secretary of Agriculture and a board of directors, which are also USDA officials. CCC has $100 million in capital stock; buys, owns, sells, and donates commodity stocks; and provides loans to farmers and ranchers. It has a permanent indefinite borrowing authority of $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury. By law, it receives an annual appropriation equal to the amount of the previous year's net realized loss. This replenishes its borrowing authority from the Treasury and allows it to cover authorized expenditures that will not be recovered. The majority of CCC activities are authorized through omnibus farm billsâmost recently the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-334 ). Farm bill authorization allows programs to utilize CCC's borrowing authority, thereby dispensing with the need for an annual appropriation for individual programs. The use of this mandatory authority has expanded over time and has led to tension between authorizing committees and appropriation committees in previous fiscal years. The Charter Act also grants the Secretary of Agriculture broad powers and discretion in the use of the CCC. This discretionary use was restricted in annual appropriations legislation from FY2012 through FY2017, effectively reducing the Secretary's discretionary use of CCC. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-124 ) did not include these restrictions, which has allowed the Trump Administration to use CCC's authority to address market impacts from China's retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. agricultural commodities in 2018 and 2019.


The Congressional Budget Office projects that federal deficits will reach $1 trillion in 2020 and average $1.2 trillion per year through 2029, further adding to the more than $16 trillion in current debt held by the public. As a result, Treasury will need to issue a substantial amount of debt to finance government operations and refinance maturing debt. To support its goal to borrow at the lowest cost over time, Treasury must maintain strong demand from a diverse group of investors for Treasury securities. GAO prepared this report as part of continuing efforts to assist Congress in identifying and addressing debt management challenges. This report (1) identifies factors that affect demand for Treasury securities and (2) examines how Treasury monitors and analyzes information about the Treasury market to inform its debt issuance strategy. GAO analyzed data on investor holdings of Treasury securities; surveyed a non-generalizable sample of 109 large domestic institutional investors across 10 sectors (67 responded); reviewed Treasury analysis and market research; and interviewed market participants across sectors, experts on foreign investors, and Treasury officials. The large institutional investors GAO surveyed across multiple sectors identified liquidity, depth, and safety as the most important characteristics of Treasury securities. This combination supports reliable demand from different types of investors through changing market conditions. Many investors accept low yields because of these characteristics, keeping the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) borrowing costs low. Market participants GAO interviewed and surveyed identified risks that could degrade these key characteristics and reduce future demand: Debt limit impasses could force Treasury to delay payments on maturing securities and interest, until sufficient funds are available, compromising the safety of Treasury securities. Unsustainable levels of federal debt could cause investors to demand a risk premium and seek out alternatives to Treasury securities. A reduced role for the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency could diminish the advantages of holding Treasury securities for foreign investors, particularly foreign government investors who hold large amounts of dollar-denominated assets to assist in managing their exchange rates. Changes in the Treasury secondary market where securities are traded— including high-frequency trading and a reduced role for broker-dealers who buy and sell for customers—could increase volatility and reduce liquidity. Treasury regularly makes important issuance decisions—such as what types of securities to issue and in what quantities—to maintain broad-based demand and support its goal of borrowing at the lowest cost over time. Treasury officials said three key inputs support these decisions: market outreach; auction and market metrics (e.g., trading volumes); and analytical models . However, Treasury has not finalized its policy for systematically conducting bilateral market outreach to ensure a thorough understanding of market demand. Treasury also does not have a policy governing important aspects of its analytical modeling, including following and documenting quality assurance steps to ensure that analytical methods are appropriate and available to future model developers and users. Codifying policies governing key information sources would help ensure that Treasury's decisions are based on the best possible information.


The Congressional Research Service (CRS) regularly receives requests about federal benefits and services targeted to low-income populations. This report is the latest update in a series of CRS reports that attempt to identify and provide information about federal spending targeted to this population. The report series does not discuss social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance, but includes only programs with an explicit focus on low-income people or communities. Tax provisions, other than the refundable portion of two tax credits, are excluded. Past reports in this series include the following: CRS Report R44574, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Overview of Spending Trends, FY2008-FY2015 , and CRS Report R43863, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Programs and Spending, FY2008-FY2013 . This current report is intended to provide a brief update of federal spending during FY2008-FY2018 for programs or activities identified in past reports. This report has not been updated to include information on new programs or activities; it simply provides information on the programs or activities that had previously been identified. Over the course of the 11-year period examined, federal spending on people with low income increased by 64% in nominal terms, peaking at nearly $918 billion in FY2018. Increases in recent years were largely driven by spending on health care. Key findings include the following: No single label best describes all programs with a low-income focus, and no single trait characterizes those who benefit. Programs are highly diverse in their purpose, design, and target population. Readers should use caution in making generalizations about the programs described in this report. Total federal spending on low-income programs in nominal terms rose sharply between FY2008 and FY2009 as the Great Recession took hold. Spending stabilized in FY2011, but it has increased at a fairly steady pace since FY2012 largely due to increases in health care spending. The peak spending year in this window was FY2018, when federal spending on low-income populations totaled $918 billion. This represents a nominal increase of 64% from FY2008. Health care is the single largest category of low-income spending and tends to drive overall trends. In each year, spending on health care has accounted for roughly half of all spending; since FY2015, it has accounted for just over half of all spending. The single largest program within the health category is Medicaid. After health care, cash aid and food assistance are the next largest categories, with food assistance seeing a 59% nominal increase over the 11-year period. Other categories (in descending size based on FY2018 spending) are housing and development, education, social services, employment and training, and energy assistance. Most low-income spending is classified in budgetary terms as mandatory (or direct ), which means the amount spent is a function of eligibility and payment rules established in authorizing laws. The amount spent for the remaining discretionary programs is controlled through the annual appropriations process. In some cases, programs receive both mandatory and discretionary funding. In FY2018, 81% of low-income spending was mandatory-only, 15% was discretionary-only, and 4% was spent on programs receiving both mandatory and discretionary funding. Four programs accounted for 68% of low-income spending in FY2018 and ten programs made up 82%. Medicaid alone represented 48% of the total. In addition to Medicaid, the top four include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).


The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) was enacted on February 15, 2019. This omnibus bill included appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which USDA's domestic food assistance programs are a part. Prior to its enactment, the federal government had continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions (CRs). This report focuses on the enacted appropriations for USDA's domestic food assistance programs and, in some instances, policy changes provided by the omnibus law. CRS Report R45230, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2019 Appropriations provides an overview of the entire FY2019 Agriculture and Related Agencies portion of the law as well as a review of the reported bills and CRs preceding it. USDA experienced a 35-day lapse in FY2019 funding and partial government shutdown prior to the enactment of P.L. 116-6. Domestic food assistance funding is primarily mandatory but also includes discretionary funding. Most of the programs' funding is for open-ended, appropriated mandatory spending—that is, terms of the authorizing law require full funding and funding may vary with program participation (and in some cases inflation). The largest mandatory programs include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) and the child nutrition programs (including the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program). Though their funding levels are dictated by the authorizing law, in most cases, appropriations are needed to make funds available for obligation and expenditure. The three largest discretionary budget items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP); and federal nutrition program administration. The domestic food assistance funding is, for the most part, administered by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). The enacted FY2019 appropriation provides over $103 billion for domestic food assistance (Table 1). This is a decrease of approximately $1.7 billion from FY2018. Declining participation in SNAP is responsible for most of the difference. Approximately 94% of the FY2018 appropriations for domestic food assistance are for mandatory spending. Highlights of the associated appropriations accounts are summarized below. For SNAP and other programs authorized by the Food and Nutrition Act, such as The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) commodities, the FY2019 appropriations law provides approximately $73.5 billion. Certain provisions of the law affect SNAP policies. For example, it continues a policy in the FY2017 and FY2018 appropriations laws that limited USDA's implementation of December 2016 regulations regarding SNAP retailers' inventory requirements. USDA must amend its final rule to define "variety" more expansively and must "apply the requirements regarding acceptable varieties and breadth of stock." For the child nutrition programs (the National School Lunch Program and others), the enacted law provides approximately $23.1 billion. This includes discretionary funding for school meals equipment grants ($30 million) and Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration projects ($28 million), and a general provision that provides an additional $5 million for farm-to-school grants. The law includes policy provisions related to processed poultry from China, requirements for schools' paid lunch pricing, vegetables in school breakfasts, and the use of commodities in child nutrition programs. For the WIC program, the law provides nearly $6.1 billion while also rescinding $500 million in prior-year carryover funding. The law includes new funding for telehealth grants. For the Commodity Assistance Program account, which includes funding for the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), TEFAP administrative and distribution costs, and other programs, the law provides over $322 million. The law increases discretionary funding for TEFAP administrative and distribution costs through the annual appropriation and through a $30 million transfer of prior-year CSFP funds. For Nutrition Programs Administration, the law provides nearly $165 million.


The Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, which amended the 1976 covenant between the United States and the CNMI, established federal control of CNMI immigration beginning in 2009. Under the act, the Department of Homeland Security began implementing a foreign worker permit program that was specific to the CNMI. The Northern Mariana Islands U.S. Workforce Act of 2018 extended the CNMI-Only Transitional Worker (CW-1) program for 10 additional years, through the end of 2029. The Northern Mariana Islands U.S. Workforce Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to examine the ratio of United States workers to other workers over the 5 previous calendar years in the CNMI. This report examines (1) recent economic trends in the CNMI through 2018, and (2) recent trends in the composition of the CNMI workforce from 2001 through 2018, including the ratio of United States workers to foreign workers for each of the 5 previous calendar years. GAO analyzed CNMI government and U.S. agency data, prior GAO reports, and interviewed officials from the CNMI government, and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Labor. Although the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) economy grew in 2016 and 2017, it declined in 2018. The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports that the CNMI's gross domestic product (GDP) grew 28.4 percent in 2016 and 25.5 percent in 2017, which reflected continued growth in visitor spending, particularly for casino gambling. However, BEA estimates that GDP in the CNMI fell by 20 percent in 2018, with a sharp drop in tourist spending and casino gambling revenues following the severe damage of Super Typhoon Yutu, which made landfall in October 2018. According to BEA, revenue from casino gambling dropped over 50 percent in 2018. In August 2019, the parent company of the casino in the CNMI warned shareholders and potential investors that it expected to record a loss for the first 6 months of 2019 as compared with a profit for the same period in 2018. The company's independent auditor also concluded that the financial information for the first 6 months of 2019 might cast significant doubt on the ability of the company to continue as a going concern. The ratio of United States workers to foreign workers in the CNMI remained close to 50 percent from 2014 through 2018, with United States workers making up 49 percent of the workforce in 2018, according to CNMI tax data. The size of the workforce grew each year from 2014 through 2017, before contracting by almost 2,000 workers in 2018. For 2018, the Department of Homeland Security approved about 9,000 CW-1 foreign worker permits, and approved more than 11,000 permits for 2019.


The Constitution grants Congress authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal "civil officers" for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Impeachment is one of the various checks and balances created by the Constitution, a crucial tool for holding government officers accountable for violations of the law and abuse of power. Responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual rests in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present and results in that individual's removal from office. The Senate also has discretion to vote to disqualify that official from holding a federal office in the future. The Constitution imposes several additional requirements on the impeachment process. When conducting an impeachment trial, Senators must be "on oath or affirmation," and the right to a jury trial does not extend to impeachment proceedings. If the President is impeached and tried in the Senate, the Chief Justice of the United States presides at the trial. The Constitution bars the President from using the pardon power to shield individuals from impeachment or removal from office. Understanding the historical practices of Congress with regard to impeachment is central to fleshing out the meaning of the Constitution's impeachment clauses. While much of constitutional law is developed through jurisprudence analyzing the text of the Constitution and applying prior judicial precedents, the Constitution's meaning is also shaped by institutional practices and political norms. In fact, the power of impeachment is largely immune from judicial review, meaning that Congress's choices in this arena are unlikely to be overturned by the courts. For that reason, examining the history of actual impeachments is crucial to understanding the meaning of the Constitution's impeachment provisions. One major recurring question about the impeachment remedy is the definition of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." At least at the time of ratification of the Constitution, the phrase appears understood to have applied to uniquely "political" offenses, or misdeeds committed by public officials against the state. Such misconduct simply resists a full delineation, however, as the possible range of potential misdeeds in office cannot be determined in advance. Instead, the type of behavior that merits impeachment is worked out over time through the political process. While this report focuses on the constitutional considerations relevant to impeachment, there are various other important questions that arise in any impeachment proceeding. For a consideration of the legal issues surrounding access to information from the executive branch in an impeachment investigation, see CRS Report R45983, Congressional Access to Information in an Impeachment Investigation , by Todd Garvey. For discussion of the House procedures used in impeachment investigations, see CRS Report R45769, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives , by Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene.


As of March 2018, more than 1.2 million foreign students in the United States were enrolled in 8,774 schools certified by SEVP. ICE is responsible for managing SEVP, which certifies schools to enroll foreign students. Various ICE offices have a role in preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud in the program. GAO was asked to review potential vulnerabilities to fraud in SEVP. GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which ICE (1) implemented controls to address fraud risks in the school certification and recertification processes and (2) implemented fraud risk controls related to DSO training. GAO analyzed ICE policies and documentation, including fraud risk guidance and procedures for school certification and recertification; analyzed 2013 through 2017 recertification data; and interviewed officials from five ICE field offices that GAO selected based on their experience investigating program fraud. GAO also interviewed officials from 17 selected schools located near these ICE field offices. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2018. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been omitted. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has identified several fraud risks to the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). As shown in the figure below, these include risks associated with school owners and designated school officials (DSO) who help ICE oversee students in the program. These fraud risks may occur as schools apply to become SEVP-certified, accept foreign students, and apply for recertification every 2 years. ICE has implemented controls to address fraud risks related to school certification, but long-standing delays in recertifying these schools exacerbate fraud risks. By statute and regulation, ICE must conduct recertification reviews every 2 years to ensure that schools continue to meet program requirements—an important fraud risk control. Between 2013 and 2017, ICE recertified about 12,900 schools. However, according to ICE officials, they have been unable to meet the 2-year time frame and, as of June 2018, had 3,281 recertification petitions waiting for review. To help manage its queue, ICE has lengthened the period between recertification reviews by extending schools' certification expiration dates by 180 days, which is inconsistent with its regulation and may allow fraudulent schools to operate longer without detection. Although ICE is taking steps to increase resources for recertification, it is unclear whether these steps will ensure recertification is conducted consistently with ICE regulations. ICE relies on DSOs to, among other things, update and maintain foreign-student data in ICE's foreign-student information system and report suspected fraud to ICE. However, ICE does not provide DSOs with training that addresses fraud risks to the program. In June 2018, ICE officials stated that they plan to develop this fraud training for DSOs, but do not have documented plans or timelines for when it would be completed. By developing these plans, the agency would be better positioned to ensure that DSOs receive the training needed to address potential fraud in the program.


The Constitution requires that a quorum, defined as a majority of the House, be present on the floor when the House transacts business. The House, however, always presumes that a quorum is present unless and until its absence is demonstrated conclusively. The rules of the House strictly limit the occasions on which a Representative may make a point of order that a quorum is not present. In current practice, Members usually make such a point of order only when a vote is taking place. If a majority of the Members fails to respond to a quorum call or participate in an electronically recorded vote conducted in the House, the House must adjourn or take steps necessary to secure the attendance of enough Members to constitute a quorum. Questions to be decided on the floor are usually first put to a voice vote. Such votesâin which those present on the floor respond by answering together "aye" (after the presiding officer asks how many are in favor) or "no" (after the presiding officer asks how many are opposed)âare very common in the House. For such votes, no public record shows how individual Members voted. In practice, such votes might be taken with few Members present on the floor. Before the final result of a voice vote is announced, however, any Member may demand a division vote or seek an electronically recorded vote. Members' positions on these votes are publicly recorded. During a vote using the House's electronic voting system, Members have at least 15 minutes to come to the floor and cast their votes. The time for a vote by electronic device immediately following another vote by electronic device can be reduced to five minutes if the Speaker determines that Members will have an adequate opportunity to vote. The Speaker also has the authority to postpone record votes on certain questions identified in House Rules, including to approve a bill or resolution and to suspend the rules to pass a bill. Most postponed votes must be scheduled within two additional legislative days. The procedures for securing a vote by electronic device differ based on whether the House is meeting as the House proper or instead in the Committee of the Whole (a parliamentary forum that the House, in current practice, uses to consider amendments to legislation). In the House proper, an electronic vote can be secured in one of three ways. First, one-fifth of the number of Members present on the floor can invoke their constitutional right to demand "the yeas and nays." Second, one-fifth of a quorum (usually 44 Members), can demand a "recorded vote" under House rules. Third, if a quorum is not present, a Member can make a point of order that a quorum is not present and object to a voice vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present. Most often, after such a point of order is made, the Speaker postpones further proceedings on the question being voted on. When the House resumes consideration of the question at a time designated by the Speaker, a quorum is typically present, and an electronic vote can be secured using one of the other two methods. (If, instead, the Speaker sustained a point of order against a voice vote on the grounds that a quorum was not present, an electronic vote would take place automatically to decide the question and establish the presence of a quorum.) To be clear, these three procedures result in votes that are indistinguishable from each other in how they are conducted; they differ in how they are ordered. When instead the House is meeting in the Committee of the Whole, 25 members can secure an electronic vote on a pending amendment or motion. The chair has the authority to postpone a request for a recorded vote on an amendment, and usually does. This allows the request to be renewed at a time the floor is crowded and a member can likely receive the support of a sufficient second to take the vote by electronic device. In addition, if a quorum (100 members of the Committee of the Whole) is not present, a member first can require that a quorum call take place before the chair counts to determine if there is sufficient support to order an electronically recorded vote. This option is less frequently utilized, and proceedings can be postponed in this case as well. In order to prepare for a catastrophic event, in 2005 the House created a procedure to determine a how many Members constitute a quorum when a large number are missing, incapacitated, or incapable of attending House proceedings. The House must hold two lengthy quorum calls and receive a report from the Sergeant at Arms before a quorum will be determined based on the "provisional number of the House." At the time the rule was approved, a Member raised a point of order that the provisional quorum mechanism was unconstitutional. The Speaker does not rule on constitutional questions; instead, the House determines the constitutionality of a proposition by voting to consider it or by adopting it. In this case, a question of consideration was raised, and the House voted to consider the resolution. Thereafter, the resolution was agreed to.


The Constitution requires that the House and Senate approve the same bill or joint resolution in precisely the same form before it is presented to the President for his signature or veto. To this end, both houses must pass the same measure and then attempt to reach agreement about its provisions. The House and Senate may be able to reach agreement by an exchange of amendments between the houses. Each house has one opportunity to amend the amendments from the other house, so there can be Senate amendments to House amendments to Senate amendments to a House bill. House amendments to Senate bills or amendments are privileged for consideration on the Senate floor; Senate amendments to House bills or amendments generally are not privileged for consideration on the House floor. In practice, the House often disposes of amendments between the houses under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee. The Senate sometimes disposes of House amendments by unanimous consent, but the procedures associated with the exchange of amendments can become complicated. Alternatively, the House and Senate can each disagree to the position of the other on a bill and then agree to create a conference committee to propose a package settlement of all their disagreements. Most conferees are drawn from the standing committees that had considered the bill initially. The House or Senate may vote to instruct its conferees before they are appointed, but such instructions are not binding. Conferees generally are free to negotiate in whatever ways they choose, but eventually their agreement must be approved by a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees. The conferees are expected to address only the matters on which the House and Senate have disagreed. They also are expected to resolve each disagreement within the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions. If the conferees cannot reach agreement on an amendment, or if their agreement exceeds their authority, they may report that amendment as an amendment in true or technical disagreement. On the House and Senate floors, conference reports are privileged and debatable, but they are not amendable. The Senate has a procedure to strike out portions of the conference agreement that are considered, under Senate rules, to be "out of scope material" or "new directed spending provisions." The House also has a special procedure for voting to reject conference report provisions that would not have been germane to the bill in the House. After agreeing to a conference report, the House or Senate can dispose of any remaining amendments in disagreement. Only when the House and Senate have reached agreement on all provisions of the bill can it be enrolled for presentation to the President.


The Constitution's Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land" notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. This language is the foundation for the doctrine of federal preemption, according to which federal law supersedes conflicting state laws. The Supreme Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law. First, federal law can expressly preempt state law when a federal statute or regulation contains explicit preemptive language. Second, federal law can impliedly preempt state law when Congress's preemptive intent is implicit in the relevant federal law's structure and purpose. This report begins with an overview of certain general preemption principles. In both express and implied preemption cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that Congress's purpose is the "ultimate touchstone" of its statutory analysis. The Court's analysis of Congress's purpose has at times been informed by a canon of statutory construction known as the "presumption against preemption," which instructs that federal law should not be read as preempting state law "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." However, the Court has recently applied the presumption somewhat inconsistently, raising questions about its current scope and effect. Moreover, in 2016, the Court held that the presumption no longer applies in express preemption cases. After reviewing these general themes in the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence, the report turns to the Court's express preemption case law. In this section, the report analyzes how the Court has interpreted federal statutes that preempt (1) state laws "related to" certain subjects, (2) state laws concerning certain subjects "covered" by federal laws and regulations, (3) state requirements that are "in addition to, or different than" federal requirements, and (4) state "requirements," "laws," "regulations," and "standards." While preemption decisions depend heavily on the details of particular statutory schemes, the Court has assigned some of these phrases specific meanings even when they have appeared in different statutory contexts. Finally, the report reviews illustrative examples of the Court's implied preemption decisions. In these cases, the Court has identified two subcategories of implied preemption: "field preemption" and "conflict preemption." Field preemption occurs when a pervasive scheme of federal regulation implicitly precludes supplementary state regulation, or where states attempt to regulate a field where there is clearly a dominant federal interest. Applying these principles, the Court has held that federal law occupies a number of regulatory fields, including alien registration, nuclear safety regulation, and the regulation of locomotive equipment. In contrast, conflict preemption occurs when simultaneous compliance with both federal and state regulations is impossible ("impossibility preemption"), or when state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals ("obstacle preemption"). The Court has extended the scope of impossibility preemption in two recent decisions, holding that compliance with both federal and state law can be "impossible" even when a regulated party can (1) petition the federal government for permission to comply with state law, or (2) avoid violations of the law by refraining from selling a regulated product altogether. In its obstacle preemption decisions, the Court has concluded that state law can interfere with federal goals by frustrating Congress's intent to adopt a uniform system of federal regulation, conflicting with Congress's goal of establishing a regulatory "ceiling" for certain products or activities, or by impeding the vindication of a federal right.


The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) imposes a unified legal framework to regulate certain drugsâwhether medical or recreational, legally or illicitly distributedâthat are deemed to pose a risk of abuse and dependence. The CSA does not apply to all drugs. Rather, it applies to specific substances and categories of substances that have been designated for control by Congress or through administrative proceedings. The statute also applies to controlled substance analogues that are intended to mimic the effects of controlled substances and certain precursor chemicals commonly used in the manufacturing of controlled substances. Controlled substances subject to the CSA are divided into categories known as Schedules I through V based on their medical utility and their potential for abuse and dependence. Substances considered to present the greatest risk to the public health and safety are subject to the most stringent controls and sanctions. A lower schedule number corresponds to greater restrictions, so substances in Schedule I are subject to the strictest controls, while substances in Schedule V are subject to the least strict. Most substances subject to the CSA are also subject to other federal or state regulations, including the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the federal agency primarily responsible for implementing and enforcing the CSA. DEA may designate a substance for control through notice-and-comment rulemaking if the substance satisfies the applicable statutory criteria. The agency may also place a substance under temporary control on an emergency basis if the substance poses an imminent hazard to public safety. In addition, DEA may designate a substance for control under the United States' international treaty obligations. In the alternative, Congress may place a substance under control by statute. The CSA simultaneously aims to protect public health from the dangers of controlled substances diverted into the illicit market while also seeking to ensure that patients have access to pharmaceutical controlled substances for legitimate medical purposes. To accomplish those two goals, the statute creates two overlapping legal schemes. Registration provisions require entities working with controlled substances to register with DEA and implement various measures to prevent diversion and misuse of controlled substances. Trafficking provisions establish penalties for the production, distribution, and possession of controlled substances outside the legitimate scope of the registration system. DEA is primarily responsible for enforcing the registration provisions and works with the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to enforce the trafficking provisions of the CSA. Violations of the registration provisions generally are not criminal offenses, but certain serious violations may result in criminal prosecutions, fines, and even short prison sentences. Violations of the trafficking provisions are criminal offenses that may result in large fines and lengthy prison sentences. Drug regulation has received significant attention from Congress in recent years, with a number of bills introduced in the 116th Congress that would amend the CSA in various ways. For example, after Congress passed several bills in recent years in response to the opioid crisis, additional proposals aimed at addressing the crisis are pending before the 116th Congress, including the John S. McCain Opioid Addiction Prevention Act ( H.R. 1614 , S. 724 ), which would limit practitioners' ability to prescribe opioids; the LABEL Opioids Act ( H.R. 2732 , S. 1449 ), which would require prescription opioids to bear certain warning labels; and the Ending the Fentanyl Crisis Act of 2019 ( S. 1724 ), which would increase criminal liability for illicit trafficking in the powerful opioid fentanyl. The 116th Congress has also considered measures specifically seeking to address the proliferation of synthetic drugs that mimic the effects of fentanyl, including the Stopping Overdoses of Fentanyl Analogues Act ( H.R. 2935 , S. 1622 ) and the Modernizing Drug Enforcement Act of 2019 ( H.R. 2580 ). In addition, multiple recent proposals would seek to address the divergence between federal and state marijuana laws. For example, the Secure And Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2019 (SAFE Banking Act) ( H.R. 1595 , S. 1200 ) would seek to protect depository institutions that provide financial services to cannabis-related businesses from regulatory sanctions, and the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act (STATES Act) ( H.R. 2093 , S. 1028 ) would amend the CSA so that most provisions concerning marijuana do not apply to marijuana-related activities that comply with state law. Other proposals, such as the Legitimate Use of Medicinal Marihuana Act ( H.R. 171 ) and the Marijuana Justice Act of 2019 ( H.R. 1456 , S. 597 ) could address the gap between federal and state law in the area of marijuana regulation by moving marijuana from Schedule I to a less restrictive schedule or remove marijuana from the CSA's schedules. Finally, recent legislative proposals would aim to facilitate clinical research involving controlled substances, particularly marijuana. These various proposals raise a number of legal questions as Congress contemplates whether to change the laws governing controlled substances.


The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act ( P.L. 116-136 ) includes a variety of oversight provisions designed to increase the information available to Congress regarding the federal government's implementation of the CARES Act and response to the COVID-19 pandemic more generally. Specifically, the CARES Act: establishes a Congressional Oversight Commission, establishes a Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery, establishes a Pandemic Response Accountability Committee made up of certain agencies' inspectors general, provides additional financial resources for certain Offices of Inspectors General, creates additional reporting and oversight duties for the Government Accountability Office, and institutes new reporting requirements on a variety of agencies based on provisions in the CARES Act. As agencies begin to implement the CARES Act and as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to develop, understanding the federal resources and information available can help Congress support both its own oversight activity and the consideration of potential future legislation to respond to COVID-19. This report is a reference guide to the oversight mechanisms in the CARES Act and a launching pad for deeper consideration of oversight-related issues. This report complements other CRS products, such as a list of CRS experts covering issue areas related to other provisions of the CARES Act: CRS products: Other CRS products on the COVID-19 response efforts can be found on the CRS Coronavirus Disease 2019 resource page at https://www.crs.gov/resources/coronavirus-disease-2019 . CRS subject matter experts: For a list of points of contact for CRS's congressional clients with specific questions regarding the particular authorities and appropriations in the CARES Act, see CRS Report R46299, Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act: CRS Experts , by William L. Painter and Diane P. Horn.


The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; H.R. 748 ) was signed into law as P.L. 116-136 on March 27, 2020, to assist those affected by the economic impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). This assistance is targeted to consumers, businesses, and the financial services sector. A key part of this assistance is provided to eligible businesses, states, and municipalities in Division A, Title IV of the CARES Act. Title IV allocates $500 billion to the Treasury Department (through the Exchange Stabilization Fund) to make loans and guarantees for three specified industriesâpassenger airlines, cargo airlines, and businesses critical to national securityâand to support Federal Reserve lending facilities. Some have characterized this as a "bailout" of private industry; others assert it is necessary to avoid employment losses and maintain economic stability. Of the $500 billion, Treasury can make up to $25 billion available to passenger airlines, up to $4 billion to cargo airlines, and up to $17 billion to businesses critical to maintaining national security. Treasury can make the remainderâup to $454 billion, plus whatever is not used to assist the specified industriesâavailable to the Federal Reserve. The authority to enter into new transactions terminates on December 31, 2020. Recipients are legally required to repay assistance with interest, although the ultimate subsidy involved will not be known until terms, such as interest rates and fees, have been decided and it becomes clear to what extent firms are able to repay. Title IV also provides up to $32 billion to continue payment of employee wages, salaries, and benefits at airline-related industries. The Treasury Secretary has discretion to determine what compensation to seek for this assistance and has reportedly chosen not to seek compensation from smaller recipients. According to Treasury, 93 air carriers had received $12.4 billion under the Payroll Support Program as of April 25, 2020. Most funding under Title IV has been used to backstop a series of Federal Reserve emergency programs created in response to COVID-19. These programs assist affected businesses or markets by making loans or purchasing assets. To date, the Fed has created programs to support markets for commercial paper, corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and asset-backed securities, as well as a loan program to help businesses with under 10,000 employees or under $2.5 billion in revenues maintain employment. To date, $215 billion of CARES Act funding has been made available by the Treasury to reimburse the Federal Reserve for potential losses on any transactions in these programs. This assistance carries a number of terms and conditions. All funding faces certain conditions, such as limiting eligibility to U.S. businesses, as defined by the act, and following rules to avoid conflicts of interest. Firms receiving loans, loan guarantees, or grants directly from Treasury must maintain at least 90% of March 24, 2020, employment levels; face controls placed on share buybacks, dividends, and executive salaries; and must provide Treasury specific compensation (e.g., warrants or equity). In addition, Title IV establishes a special inspector general and a Congressional Oversight Commission to oversee the operations carried out under the title. Finally, the key agencies involved in providing this assistance (i.e., the Federal Reserve and Treasury) and the Government Accountability Office must make available to the public and Congress a series of reports on operations under Title IV of the act.


The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is affecting communities around the world and throughout the United States, with case counts growing daily. As private health insurance is the predominant source of health coverage in the United States, there is considerable congressional interest in understanding private health insurance coverage of health benefits related to COVID-19. This report addresses frequently asked questions about private health insurance covered benefits and consumer cost sharing related to COVID-19 testing, treatment, and a potential vaccine. It discusses recent legislation, references existing federal requirements and recent administrative interpretations of them in relation to COVID-19, and notes state and private-sector actions. Federal and state health insurance requirements may relate to covered benefits and consumer cost sharing, among many other topics. These requirements can vary by coverage type (i.e., individual coverage, fully insured small- and large-group coverage, and self-insured plans). Covered benefits, consumer costs, and other plan features may vary by plan within each type of coverage, subject to applicable federal and state requirements. The following bullets summarize federal requirements related to coverage and cost sharing (which includes deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments) of COVID-19 testing, treatment, and vaccination. Additional details are addressed in the report, including the applicability of the requirements to different types of plans; whether the coverage requirements apply even when furnished by out-of-network providers; whether plans are allowed to impose prior authorization or other medical management techniques; and the applicable dates of any coverage requirements. COVID-19 Testing . The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA; P.L. 116-127 ), as amended by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136 ), requires most private health insurance plans to cover COVID-19 testing, administration of the test, and related items and services, as defined by the acts. This coverage must be provided without consumer cost sharing. COVID-19 Treatment . There are no federal requirements that specifically require coverage of COVID-19 treatment. However, the existing federal requirement that certain plans cover a set of 10 categories of essential health benefits (EHB) is potentially relevant to coverage of COVID-19 treatment items and services, depending on state and plan variation with regard to implementation of this requirement. Even where treatment items and services are required to be covered as EHB, cost sharing could apply. COVID-19 Vaccine . As of the date of this report, there is no vaccine against COVID-19 approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United States, although several candidates are in development. The CARES Act requires most plans to cover a COVID-19 vaccine, when available, without cost sharing, if it is recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Similarly, most plans must cover, without cost sharing, any other COVID-19 preventive services that are recommended for use by the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). Some states have also announced relevant requirements on the plans they regulate, and some insurers have reported that they will cover certain relevant benefits. Several organizations are tracking these announcements, as noted in this report. Congressional Research Service (CRS) experts on other topics related to private health insurance and COVID-19, including types of plans and coverage of benefits not addressed in this report, are listed in the Appendix for the benefit of congressional clients. For information on other COVID-19 issues, congressional clients can access the CRS Coronavirus Disease resources page at https://www.crs.gov/resources/coronavirus-disease-2019 .


The Corps constructs water resources projects to reduce risks to coastal communities from storm damage, among other things. These projects can involve building hard structures, such as seawalls, to protect against flooding and wave damage. The Corps and some state and local agencies are increasingly considering using natural infrastructure, such as wetlands, to reduce risks from coastal storms and flooding. GAO was asked to review the uses, costs, and benefits of natural coastal infrastructure for the Corps' coastal storm and flood risk management projects. This report describes (1) how the Corps considered costs and benefits for selected projects that used natural infrastructure and (2) challenges the Corps faces in developing cost and benefit information for using natural infrastructure and steps taken to address them. GAO reviewed Corps guidance; obtained information on projects that used natural infrastructure and received funding from fiscal years 2012 through 2017; randomly selected eight coastal storm and flood risk reduction projects from the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts; and reviewed each project's planning documentation and economic analyses. Findings from these projects are not generalizable to all Corps' projects. GAO also reviewed economic literature, reviewed Corps documents related to the use of natural infrastructure, and interviewed Corps officials and stakeholders with experience in using natural infrastructure. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) typically identified project costs and damage reduction benefits for the eight projects using natural infrastructure that GAO reviewed. In selecting projects, the Corps is to conduct economic analyses of project alternatives, which may include hard structures, natural infrastructure, or a combination, to compare their costs and benefits. Corps guidance states that for coastal storm and flood risk management projects it is to select the alternative determined to have the maximum net benefits (benefits minus project costs). The Corps calculated project costs for the eight projects, such as planning, design, construction, and maintenance costs. It calculated damage reduction benefits for seven projects by estimating reduced damages to existing structures in the project area, including to homes and commercial buildings. Corps guidance allows the economic analysis to also include incidental benefits of a project, and four projects incorporated recreational benefits of alternatives, such as increases in recreational visits because beaches would be larger. The Corps did not include other types of incidental benefits, such as environmental or other social benefits, for the eight projects. Corps documentation for one project identified environmental benefits of constructing wetlands as part of the project, such as improving ecosystems and filtering water. However, Corps officials said they did not incorporate these benefits into the economic analysis because the benefits could not be monetized. The Corps faces challenges in developing cost and benefit information for some types of natural infrastructure and has initiated steps to address this. For example, a 2015 Corps report identified knowledge gaps in understanding how natural coastal infrastructure, such as wetlands, may perform during coastal storms. These knowledge gaps make it challenging for the Corps to develop cost and benefit information for some natural infrastructure alternatives and compare them to other alternatives, such as those that use hard infrastructure. The Corps recognizes the need to obtain additional data to better develop cost and benefit information and has begun taking steps to do so. For example, in 2018, the Corps initiated a project to help identify natural infrastructure knowledge gaps and prioritize key areas for research. The Corps plans to incorporate information gathered from this project into a strategic plan that is intended to help inform research funding decisions for fiscal year 2020, according to a Corps official.


The Corps, among other things, constructs flood risk management projects to reduce flood damage in threatened communities nationwide in collaboration with nonfederal sponsors. The Corps prepares feasibility studies to inform decision makers whether a proposed project warrants federal investment. In the studies, the Corps formulates and evaluates alternative plans for achieving the project's objectives and assesses whether the benefits of constructing it outweigh its costs. GAO was asked to review the methodology the Corps used in feasibility studies. This report examines, for 2015 through 2017, (1) the Corps' process for identifying and evaluating the benefits, costs, and effects of project alternatives; (2) the analyses the Corps used to recommend projects; and (3) the extent to which the Corps' economic analyses of benefits and costs are consistent with best practices. GAO reviewed Corps guidance; examined planning documents and economic analyses in flood risk studies that the Corps had most recently completed from 2015 through 2017 from eight districts; and compared the Corps' economic analyses with best practices in GAO's Assessment Methodology. In the eight flood risk management feasibility studies GAO reviewed (see figure), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) followed a six-step planning process consistent with its guidance to, among other things, identify and evaluate the beneficial and adverse effects of alternative plans for proposed projects. In doing so, the Corps used economic analyses to evaluate project-specific categories of potential monetary benefits and costs of alternative plans, such as flood damage reduction benefits and project construction costs. The studies also used separate analyses to evaluate other effects, such as on wildlife habitat and the health and safety of communities. In the eight studies GAO reviewed, the Corps typically recommended the alternative plan with the greatest net benefit, but also relied on other analyses in certain cases, as allowed under Corps guidance. Corps officials said they relied on other analyses to determine the best project design, help make decisions, or respond to local sponsors' preferences. For example, in one study, the Corps recommended a plan that provided a levee 3 feet higher than the plan with the greatest net benefits, in response to the nonfederal sponsor's request. The Corps' economic analyses in the eight studies were generally consistent with best practices, but did not fully adhere to practices for transparency. For example, most analyses did not discuss the implications of key limitations in the models and data used. Corps officials acknowledged that transparency could be improved through their review process. By having future analyses align with transparency best practices, the Corps can better inform decision makers about potential economic effects of flood risk projects.


The DATA Act required OMB and Treasury to establish data standards for the reporting of federal government spending and required agencies to report spending data using these standards beginning in May 2017. GAO's prior work examining the quality of the data reported under the act found significant challenges that limit the usefulness of the data for Congress and the public. These data quality challenges underscore the need for OMB and Treasury to make progress on addressing GAO's prior recommendation to establish a set of clear policies and processes for developing and maintaining data standards. The DATA Act includes a provision for GAO to report on the implementation and use of data standards, and on the quality of the data reported using those standards. This report (1) describes the status of OMB's and Treasury's efforts to establish policies and procedures for governing data standards; and (2) evaluates the extent to which procedures for changing established data standards are consistent with key practices for data governance. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have established some procedures for governing the data standards established under the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), but a formal governance structure has yet to be fully developed. Since enactment, OMB has relied on a shifting array of advisory bodies to obtain input on data standards. As of December 2018, some governance procedures are in place, but others continue to evolve. OMB staff told us that the governing bodies involved in initial implementation efforts had been disbanded, and that the functions previously performed by these advisory bodies over governance of DATA Act data standards would be accomplished within the broader context of the cross-agency priority goals established under the 2018 President's Management Agenda (PMA). However, the documentation of the governance structure established for these goals does not make explicit how it would apply to the data standards established under the DATA Act. Clarifying the connection between this governance structure and the DATA Act could help stakeholders understand how governance of the DATA Act standards is accomplished within the broader context of the PMA. With regard to one specific data governance function—making changes to existing standards—GAO found that OMB does not have procedures for managing changes to the web page it identifies in guidance as the authoritative source for data definition standards. The DATA Act requires, to the extent reasonable and practicable, that data standards be capable of being continually upgraded. In addition, key practices for data governance state that organizations should document policies and procedures for making decisions about changes to standards. In June 2018, revisions were made to the Primary Place of Performance Address data element without following a documented process. OMB staff described these revisions as minor technical corrections to align the definitions with the technical guidance agencies were already using to report data. However, without documented procedures for revising the definitions, needed changes may not be made in a timely manner, which could lead to inconsistent reporting. OMB also did not transparently communicate to stakeholders these changes to data definition standards. Along with the corrections to definitions, in June 2018 OMB changed introductory text on the data definitions web page to clarify policy about how agencies should use DATA Act definitions. However, OMB did not publicly announce this clarification or identify on the website that changes had been made. Without transparent communication of changes to data definition standards, stakeholders—including staff at federal agencies required to report data according to these definitions—may miss important information relating to changes in how, when, and by whom data definitions are to be applied. Although OMB lacks procedures governing changes to DATA Act data definitions, Treasury has established a process for changing related technical guidance in consultation with stakeholders. Treasury's procedures contribute to the objectives of data quality and transparency by helping to ensure that agencies are aware of reporting requirements and users understand how those data are created and reported.


As of September 2018, almost half of the $859 billion in outstanding federal Direct Loans was being repaid by borrowers using IDR plans. Prior GAO work found that while these plans may ease the burden of student loan debt, they can carry high costs for the federal government. This report examines (1) whether there are indicators of potential fraud or error in income and family size information provided by borrowers on IDR plans and (2) the extent to which Education verifies this information. GAO obtained Education data on borrowers with IDR plans approved from January 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017, the most recent data available, and assessed the risk for fraud or error in IDR plans for Direct Loans by (1) matching Education IDR plan data for a subset of borrowers who reported zero income with wage data from NDNH for the same time period and (2) analyzing Education IDR plan data on borrowers' family sizes. In addition, GAO reviewed relevant IDR policies and procedures from Education and interviewed officials from Education. GAO identified indicators of potential fraud or error in income and family size information for borrowers with approved Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans. IDR plans base monthly payments on a borrower's income and family size, extend repayment periods from the standard 10 years to up to 25 years, and forgive remaining balances at the end of that period. Zero income. About 95,100 IDR plans were held by borrowers who reported zero income yet potentially earned enough wages to make monthly student loan payments. This analysis is based on wage data from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH), a federal dataset that contains quarterly wage data for newly hired and existing employees. According to GAO's analysis, 34 percent of these plans were held by borrowers who had estimated annual wages of $45,000 or more, including some with estimated annual wages of $100,000 or more. Borrowers with these 95,100 IDR plans owed nearly $4 billion in outstanding Direct Loans as of September 2017. Family size. About 40,900 IDR plans were approved based on family sizes of nine or more, which were atypical for IDR plans. Almost 1,200 of these 40,900 plans were approved based on family sizes of 16 or more, including two plans for different borrowers that were approved using a family size of 93. Borrowers with atypical family sizes of nine or more owed almost $2.1 billion in outstanding Direct Loans as of September 2017. These results indicate some borrowers may have misrepresented or erroneously reported their income or family size. Because income and family size are used to determine IDR monthly payments, fraud or errors in this information can result in the Department of Education (Education) losing thousands of dollars of loan repayments per borrower each year and potentially increasing the ultimate cost of loan forgiveness. Where appropriate, GAO is referring these results to Education for further investigation. Weaknesses in Education's processes to verify borrowers' income and family size information limit its ability to detect potential fraud or error in IDR plans. While borrowers applying for IDR plans must provide proof of taxable income, such as tax returns or pay stubs, Education generally accepts borrower reports of zero income and borrower reports of family size without verifying the information. Although Education does not currently have access to federal sources of data to verify borrower reports of zero income, the department could pursue such access or obtain private data sources for this purpose. In addition, Education has not systematically implemented other data analytic practices, such as using data it already has to detect anomalies in income and family size that may indicate potential fraud or error. Although data matching and analytic practices may not be sufficient to detect fraud or error, combining them with follow-up procedures to verify information on IDR applications could help Education reduce the risk of using fraudulent or erroneous information to calculate monthly loan payments, and better protect the federal investment in student loans.


The DATA Act required OMB or a designated federal agency to establish a pilot program to develop recommendations for reducing recipient reporting burden for federal grantees and contractors. The grants portion of the pilot tested six ways to reduce recipient reporting burden while the procurement portion focused on testing a centralized reporting portal for submitting reporting requirements. This report follows a 2016 GAO review on the design of the pilot. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the pilot met the statutory requirements set out in the DATA Act, (2) the grants portion of the pilot demonstrated changes in reporting burden, and (3) the procurement portion demonstrated changes in reporting burden. GAO reviewed statutory requirements, pilot plans, agency data and reports and interviewed OMB staff and officials from HHS and GSA. In response to requirements of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) led implementation of a pilot program, known as the Section 5 Pilot, aimed at developing recommendations for reducing recipient reporting burden for federal grantees and contractors. The pilot program met many, but not all, of its statutory requirements. For example, the act required OMB to issue guidance to agencies for reducing reporting burden for federal award recipients (including both grantees and contractors) based on the pilot's findings. OMB partially met this requirement because the guidance it issued only applied to grants. The pilot program consisted of two parts, which differed considerably in both design and results: The grants portion, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), examined six approaches for reducing grantee reporting burden and found positive results related to reductions in reporting time as well as reduced duplication. HHS incorporated ongoing stakeholder input during the pilot, and its findings contributed to government-wide initiatives related to federal reporting and reducing grantee-reporting burden. The procurement (contracts) portion of the pilot, led by OMB with assistance from the General Services Administration (GSA), did not collect sufficient evidence to determine whether centralizing procurement reporting through a single web-based portal would reduce contractor reporting burden—a key objective of the pilot. The pilot planned to test the portal by collecting weekly Davis-Bacon wage data from a minimum of 180 contractors, potentially resulting in thousands of submissions over a year. However, in the end, the pilot did not result in any Davis-Bacon data due to lack of contractor participation and the absence of iterative and ongoing stakeholder engagement. Subsequently, OMB expanded the pilot to include hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) reporting but received only 11 HFC submissions. (See figure.) In addition, HFC reporting was not suited for assessing changes in reporting burden because it was a new requirement and thus no comparative data existed. OMB plans to expand its use of the portal for additional procurement reporting requirements but still does not have information from stakeholders that could help inform the expansion.


The DATA Act requires federal agencies to disclose roughly $4 trillion in annual federal spending and link this spending information to federal program activities so that policymakers and the public can more effectively track federal spending through its life cycle. The act also requires OMB and Treasury to establish data standards to enable consistent reporting of agency spending. The DATA Act includes a provision for GAO to report on the quality of the data collected and made available through USAspending.gov. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of the data, and the implementation and use of data standards; and (2) progress made in developing a data governance structure consistent with key practices, and how it affects data quality. GAO examined a projectable government-wide sample of Q4 FY2018 spending data from a Treasury database that populates data on USAspending.gov by comparing them to agency source records and other sources. GAO also compared the results of Q4 2018 with results from its previous review of Q2 FY2017 data. The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) requires federal agencies to report spending data to USAspending.gov, a public-facing website. A total of 96 federal agencies submitted required spending data for quarter four of fiscal year 2018 (Q4 FY2018). GAO examined the quality of these data and compared the results with the results of its prior review of quarter two of fiscal year 2017 (Q2 FY2017) data, as appropriate. GAO identified improvements in overall data quality, but challenges remain for completeness, accuracy, use of data standards, disclosure of data limitations, and overall data governance. Completeness. The number of agencies, agency components, and programs that submitted data increased compared to Q2 FY2017. For example, 11 agencies did not submit data in Q4 FY2018, compared to 28 in Q2 FY2017. Awards for 39 financial assistance programs were omitted from the data in Q4 FY2018, compared to 160 financial assistance programs in Q2 FY2017. Accuracy. Based on a projectable governmentwide sample, GAO found that data accuracy for Q4 FY2018—measured as consistency between reported data and agency source records or other authoritative sources and applicable laws and reporting standards—improved for both budgetary and award transactions. GAO estimates with 95 percent confidence that between 84 a 96 percent of the budgetary transactions and between 24 and 34 percent of the award transactions were fully consistent for all applicable data elements. In Q2 FY2017, GAO estimated that 56 to 75 percent of budget transactions and 0 to 1 percent of award transactions were fully consistent. Use of data standards. GAO continued to identify challenges related to the implementation and use of two data elements— Award Description and Primary Place of Performance Address— that are particularly important to achieving the DATA Act's transparency goals. GAO found that agencies continue to differ in how they interpret and apply The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) standard definitions for these data elements. As a result, data on USAspending.gov are not always comparable, and in some cases it is difficult for users to understand the purpose of an award or to identify the location where the performance of the award occurred. USAspending.gov presentation. GAO identified known data limitations that were not fully disclosed on USAspending.gov. For example, the 90-day delay for inclusion of Department of Defense procurement data is not clearly communicated. In addition, although the website provides a total figure for unreported spending it is unclear whether it includes the 11 agencies that did not submit data. Not knowing this information could lead users of USAspending.gov to inadvertently draw inaccurate conclusions from the data. Data governance. OMB and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have established some procedures for governing the data standards established under the DATA Act, but procedures for enforcing the consistent use of established data standards have yet to be developed. Persistent challenges related to how agencies interpret and apply data standards underscore GAO's prior recommendations on establishing a governance structure that ensures the integrity of these standards.


The Department of Defense (DOD, or the Department) has contributed $6.1 billion to the construction of new and replacement barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by invoking a mixture of statutory and nonstatutory authorities. Congressional concerns surrounding the use of these authorities and the further possibility that DOD's actions may jeopardize legislative control of appropriations has generated interest about the decisionmaking process that drove the Department's funding decisions. DOD has not generally made internal and interagency communications related to these processes directly available to congressional staff. However, various letters, memoranda, and explanatory declarations from key decisionmakers have been released into the public record (primarily as the result of ongoing litigation) that provide a more complete picture of the issues the Department considered, along with its final determinations on border barrier funding. This report provides a chronological summary of internal and interagency communications related to DOD's border wall funding processes since approximately April 2018 as described chiefly through court exhibits and declarations in legal proceedings. Due to the technical difficulty of accessing legal records, CRS has made all relevant open source materials accessible to congressional staff via hyperlinks. A comprehensive set of legal citations has also been provided in the accompanying tables.