This report examines selected human rights issues in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and policy options for Congress. U.S. concern over human rights in China has been a central issue in U.S.-China relations, particularly since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. In recent years, human rights conditions in China have deteriorated, while bilateral tensions related to trade and security have increased, possibly creating both constraints and opportunities for U.S. policy on human rights. After consolidating power in 2013, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping intensified and expanded the reassertion of party control over society that began during the final years of his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Since 2015, the government has enacted new laws that place further restrictions on civil society in the name of national security, authorize greater control over minority and religious groups, and reduce the autonomy of citizens. PRC methods of social and political control are evolving to include the widespread use of sophisticated surveillance and big data technologies. Government arrests of human rights advocates and lawyers, which intensified in 2015, were followed by party efforts to instill ideological conformity across various spheres of society. In 2016, President Xi launched a policy known as "Sinicization," through which the government has taken additional measures to compel China's religious practitioners and ethnic minorities to conform to Chinese culture, the socialist system, and Communist Party policies and to eliminate foreign influences. In the past decade, the PRC government has imposed severe restrictions on the religious and cultural activities, and increasingly on all aspects of the daily lives, of Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group who practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam and live primarily in the far western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since 2017, government authorities in Xinjiang have detained, without formal charges, up to an estimated 1.5 million Uyghurs out of a population of about 10.5 million, and a smaller number of ethnic Kazakhs, in ideological re-education centers. Some may have engaged in religious and ethnic cultural practices that the government now perceives as extremist or terrorist, or as manifesting "strongly religious" views or thoughts that could lead to the spread of religious extremism or terrorism. Members of the 116 th Congress have introduced several bills and resolutions related to human rights issues in China, particularly regarding Tibetans, Uyghurs, and religious freedom. Successive U.S. Administrations and Congresses have deployed an array of means for promoting human rights and democracy in China, often exercised simultaneously. Policy tools include open censure of China; quiet diplomacy; congressional hearings, legislation, investigations, statements, letters, and visits; funding for rule of law and civil society programs in the PRC; support for human rights defenders and prodemocracy groups; sanctions; bilateral dialogue; internet freedom efforts; international broadcasting; and coordinated international pressure, including through multilateral organizations. Another high-profile practice is the State Department's issuance of congressionally mandated country reports and/or rankings, including on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons. Broadly, possible approaches for promoting human rights in China may range from those emphasizing bilateral and international engagement to those conditioning the further development of bilateral ties on improvements in human rights conditions in China; in practice, approaches may combine elements of both engagement and conditionality. Some approaches may reflect a perceived need to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with other U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship. Others may challenge the assumption that promoting human rights values involves trade-offs with other interests, reflecting instead a view that fostering greater respect for human rights is fundamental to other U.S. objectives. (This report does not discuss the distinct human rights and democracy issues in the PRC's Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. For information on developments in Hong Kong, see CRS In Focus IF11295, Hong Kong's Protests of 2019 , by Michael F. Martin.)


This report offers an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2019 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill includes all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Department of Labor (DOL) and Department of Education (ED). It also provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). Finally, the LHHS bill provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for the Southern Border : During the 116 th Congress, on July 1, 2019, the President signed into law P.L. 116-26 , a supplemental appropriations act for FY2019 focusing primarily on the provision of humanitarian assistance and security at the southern border. The bill was passed by the House on June 27 and by the Senate on June 26. (An earlier version of the bill had passed the House on June 25. A related bill, S. 1900 , had passed the Senate on June 19; this bill was substantially similar to the final version of P.L. 116-26 .) As enacted, the bill contained nearly $2.9 billion in emergency-designated LHHS appropriations for the Refugee and Entrant Assistance account at HHS. The FY2019 enacted levels presented throughout this report are based on amounts provided by the FY2019 LHHS omnibus ( P.L. 115-245 , see below) and do not include these supplemental funds, which were provided in addition to the annual appropriations. FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief : During the 116 th Congress, on June 6, 2019, the President signed into law P.L. 116-20 , a supplemental appropriations act for FY2019 focusing primarily on certain expenses arising from hurricanes, typhoons, wildfires, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and other natural disasters or emergencies. The bill was passed by the House on June 3 and by the Senate on May 23. (An earlier version of the bill had passed the House on May 10.) As enacted, the bill included roughly $611 million in emergency-designated LHHS appropriations for accounts at DOL, HHS, and ED. The FY2019 enacted levels presented throughout this report are based on amounts provided by the FY2019 LHHS omnibus ( P.L. 115-245 ) and do not include these supplemental funds, which were provided in addition to the annual appropriations. FY201 9 LHHS Omnibus: During the 115 th Congress, on September 28, 2018, the President signed into law the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( H.R. 6157 , P.L. 115-245 ). This law contained full-year LHHS appropriations in Division B. This is the first occasion since the FY1997 appropriations cycle that full-year LHHS appropriations were enacted on or before the start of the fiscal year (October 1). The FY2019 LHHS omnibus contained discretionary appropriations totaling $189.4 billion. This amount is 1.5% more than FY2018 enacted levels and 8.9% more than the FY2019 President's budget request. The omnibus also provided $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.059 trillion. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $12.1 billion, 0.8% less than FY2018. HHS: $90.5 billion, 2.6% more than FY2018. ED: $71.4 billion, 0.8% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.3 billion, 0.1% more than FY2018. FY2019 LHHS Senate Action: The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill on June 28, 2018, by a vote of 30-1 ( S. 3158 ). Instead of taking up the committee-reported vehicle, the Senate chose to take up a different appropriations vehicle ( H.R. 6157 ) and amend it to contain FY2019 LHHS appropriations as well. (Those LHHS appropriations, which were added as Division B of H.R. 6157 , were substantially the same as S. 3158 .) During floor consideration of H.R. 6157 , the Senate also adopted 31 amendments to the new LHHS division of the bill (see Appendix B for a summary of these amendments). The Senate passed an amended H.R. 6157 by a vote of 85-7 on August 23, 2018. The Senate-passed bill would have provided $189.4 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This would have been 1.5% more than FY2018, and 8.9% more than the FY2019 President's request. In addition, the Senate-passed bill would have provided an estimated $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $1.059 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $12.1 billion, 0.8% less than FY2018. HHS: $90.5 billion, 2.7% more than FY2018. ED: $71.4 billion, 0.8% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.4 billion, 0.5% more than FY2018. FY2019 LHHS House Action: The House Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2019 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 11, 2018, by a vote of 30-22, and reported to the House on July 23 ( H.R. 6470 ). This bill would have provided $187.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, a 0.3% increase from FY2018 enacted levels. This amount would have been 7.6% more than the FY2019 President's request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $1.057 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $11.9 billion, 2.4% less than FY2018. HHS: $89.3 billion, 1.3% more than FY2018. ED: $71.0 billion, 0.2% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.0 billion, 2.2% less than FY2018. The House committee-reported version of the LHHS bill did not receive floor consideration. FY2019 President's Budget Request: On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released the FY2019 President's budget. The President requested $173.9 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which would have been a decrease of 6.8% from FY2018 levels. In addition, the President requested $869.8 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $1.044 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $10.9 billion, 11.1% less than FY2018. HHS: $86.7 billion, 1.6% less than FY2018. ED: $63.2 billion, 10.8% less than FY2018. Related Agencies: $13.2 billion, 14.0% less than FY2018.


This report provides a basic overview of interim continuing resolutions (CRs) and highlights some specific issues pertaining to operations of the Department of Defense (DOD) under a CR. DOD has started the fiscal year under a CR for 13 of the past 18 years (FY2002-FY2019) and every year since FY2010 excluding FY2019. The amount of time DOD has operated under CR authorities during the fiscal year has tended to increase in the past 10 years and equates to a total of more than 39 months since 2010. As with regular appropriations bills, Congress can draft a CR to provide funding in many ways. Under current practice, a CR is an appropriation that provides either interim or full-year funding by referencing a set of established funding levels for the projects and activities that it funds (or covers ). Such funding may be provided for a period of days, weeks, or months and may be extended through further continuing appropriations until regular appropriations are enacted, or until the fiscal year ends. In recent fiscal years, the referenced funding level on which interim or full-year continuing appropriations has been based was the amount of budget authority that was available under specified appropriations acts from the previous fiscal year. CRs may also include provisions that enumerate exceptions to the duration, amount, or purposes for which those funds may be used for certain appropriations accounts or activities. Such provisions are commonly referred to as anomalies . The purpose of anomalies is to preserve Congress's constitutional prerogative to provide appropriations in the manner it sees fit, even in instances when only interim funding is provided. The lack of a full-year appropriation and the uncertainty associated with the temporary nature of a CR can create management challenges for federal agencies. DOD faces unique challenges operating under a CR while providing the military forces needed to deter war and defend the country. For example, an interim CR may prohibit an agency from initiating or resuming any project or activity for which funds were not available in the previous fiscal year (i.e., prohibit the use of procurement funds for "new starts," that is, programs for which only R&D funds were appropriated in the previous year). Such limitations in recent CRs have affected a large number of DOD programs. Before the beginning of FY2018, DOD identified approximately 75 weapons programs that would be delayed by the FY2018 CR's prohibition on new starts and nearly 40 programs that would be affected by a restriction on production quantity. In addition, Congress may include provisions in interim CRs that place limits on the expenditure of appropriations for programs that spend a relatively high proportion of their funds in the early months of a fiscal year. Also, if a CR provides funds at the rate of the prior year's appropriation, an agency may be provided additional (even unneeded) funds in one account, such as research and development, while leaving another account, such as procurement, underfunded. By its very nature, an interim CR limits an agency's ability to take advantage of efficiencies through bulk buys and multi-year contracts. It can foster inefficiencies by requiring short-term contracts that must be reissued once additional funding is provided, requiring additional or repetitive contracting actions. On the other hand, there is little evidence one way or the other as to whether the military effectiveness of U.S. forces has been fundamentally degraded by the limitations imposed by repeated CRs of months-long duration.


This report provides a brief history of the major legislative changes to the charitable deduction that have occurred over the past 100 years, focusing on changes to the amount that taxpayers could deduct. Over the past 100 years, Congress has generally increased the amount that eligible taxpayers can deduct for their charitable donations. These changes are summarized in the below table. As Congress has expanded the amount that can be deducted by those who claim the deduction, policymakers have debated the deduction's effectiveness at increasing charitable giving and the broader role of government subsidies for the philanthropic sectorâa discussion that continues to this day.


This report provides a legislative history of the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-20 ), and provides an overview of some of the issues that often arise with consideration of supplemental disaster assistance appropriations. In total, 59 major disasters were declared in calendar year 2018, and 27 major disasters were declared in 2019 up to the date the compromise on the disaster supplemental was announced. In addition to these specifically declared incidents, other situations arose that caused disruption to lives, economic resources, and infrastructure. Together, these incidents and ongoing recovery efforts from previous disasters drove a demand for additional federal budgetary resources beyond those provided through regular annual appropriations. This kind of demand is usually reflected in a request by the Administration for supplemental appropriations after the need for funding is recognized. Despite the absence of such a request by the Trump Administration, congressional leadership in both the House and the Senate chose to consider disaster-related supplemental appropriations at the end of the 115 th Congress. An initial $7.8 billion proposal that passed the House in the 115 th Congress as part of a consolidated appropriations bill did not advance in the Senate. In the 116 th Congress, H.R. 268 passed the House. This measure included $14.19 billion in disaster relief appropriations, as well as continuing appropriations intended to resolve an ongoing lapse in annual appropriations that had caused a partial government shutdown. The Senate was unable to get cloture on proposed amendments to the measure, and consideration of the bill stalled. After the lapse in appropriations was resolved, Senate Appropriations Chairman Richard Shelby introduced a $13.45 billion supplemental appropriations measure structured as a substitute to H.R. 268 . Again, the Senate could not achieve cloture on the proposal. On April 9, House Appropriations Chairwoman Nita Lowey introduced H.R. 2157 , a supplemental appropriations bill, which covered the same disasters addressed in H.R. 268 , as well as additional disasters that had occurred since the earlier measure had been passed by the House. CBO estimated the new bill, as introduced, would provide $17.31 billion in discretionary spending, which grew to $19.26 billion through floor action. The bill passed the House May 10, 2019, by a vote of 257-150. A $19.19 billion bipartisan, bicameral agreement on FY2019 disaster funding was negotiated, and offered in the Senate as S.Amdt. 250 to H.R. 2157 on May 23, 2019. The bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate, 85-8. Three attempts to approve the amended bill by unanimous consent were blocked in the House of Representatives while the body was in pro forma session during the Memorial Day recess. The House subsequently considered the amended bill under suspension of the rules on June 3, 2019, and voted 354-58 to approve the measure. The bill was signed into law as P.L. 116-20 on June 6, 2019. This report includes a more detailed legislative history and a tabular comparison that shows how the funding in these different approaches evolved. Congressional clients seeking further insight into specific programs and provisions in P.L. 116-20 may consult the analysts and background reports listed in CRS Report R45714, FY2019 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: CRS Experts . The report also includes a discussion of issues that commonly arise during debate on supplemental appropriations, including the relative timeliness of supplemental appropriations; adjustments to spending limits that are often applied to them; offsets for disaster relief and recovery appropriations; the appropriate scope of supplemental appropriations; timelines for obligation of funding; and oversight of supplemental spending. This report will not be updated.


This report provides a regional snapshot of the political climate in Latin America and the Caribbean, based on the U.S. Department of State's description of each country's political system and selected nongovernmental indices that measure democracy trends worldwide. Using tables and graphs to illustrate regional trends, this report provides a snapshot of democracy indicators from the following sources: (1) the U.S. Department of State's 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices ; (2) Bertelsmann Stiftung's 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI); (3) the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU's) Democracy Index 2018 ; (4) Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2019 ; and (5) the Varieties of Democracy Institute's (V-DEM's) Liberal Democracy Index in its Democracy Report 2019 . A bibliography at the end provides sources for further information.


This report provides a snapshot of the characteristics of the poor in the United States in 2018. It shows that people from families whose income falls below the federal poverty thresholds represent a diverse subset of the overall population. There were 38.1 million people living below the federal poverty level in 2018, representing 11.8% of the total population. Nearly half (45.3%) of all people in poverty lived in deep poverty (with income below 50% of the poverty threshold). The largest share of people in poverty were non-Hispanic white (41.2%) but the majority were not. Almost all other racial and ethnic groups were over-represented among the poor, relative to their prevalence in the overall population. Similar to the overall population, children who were poor were more racially and ethnically diverse than adults who were poor, especially aged adults. A majority (56.0%) of poor people were women. Children (under age 18) were disproportionately represented among people in poverty, constituting slightly less than one-third (31.1%) of this group. Over two-thirds of poor children (68.1%) lived in families where there was at least one worker, compared with 11.0% who lived in families with at least two workers. Conversely, in the overall population, half of all children lived in families with two workers. Most poor children lived in single parent homes, but nearly one-third (32.2%) lived in married-couple families. Over two-thirds (68.2%) of children in the overall population lived in married-couple families. The majority of people in poverty were working-age adults (age 18-64). While most (77.3%) working-age adults in the overall population were working in 2018, most (63.2%) working-age adults in poverty were not working in 2018. The most common reasons reported for non-work among those in poverty were illness or disability, the need to meet caretaking responsibilities, or being enrolled in school. Although most working-aged adults in poverty were not working, 36.8% were working in 2018; 12.0% were working full-time, full-year. Most working-age adults in poverty lacked a post-secondary educational credential; 78.9% had a high school diploma or less, compared to 56.0% in the overall population. Among people in poverty, 13.5% were aged (age 65 and older); because aged adults make up 16.3% of the overall population, this means they are underrepresented among people in poverty. The vast majority of aged adults in poverty either had, or lived in families that had, income from work or from retirement or other social insurance tied to prior work. Aged adults in poverty are far more likely to live alone than aged adults overall (49.9% compared to 28.0%).


This report provides an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions for FY2020 included in Division A (Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020) of H.R. 4378 . The legislation also included a separate Division B (Health and Human Services Extenders and Other Matters), which extended multiple federal health care programs that were otherwise set to expire September 30, 2019, and provided for some adjustments to additional health programs. This report examines only Division A, the continuing resolution (CR) portion of the legislation. On September 27, 2019, the President signed H.R. 4378 into law ( P.L. 116-59 ). Division A of H.R. 4378 was termed a CR because it provided temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending in FY2020 in the same manner as a resolution enacted separately for that purpose. It provides temporary funding for the programs and activities covered by all 12 of the regular appropriations bills, since none of them had been enacted prior to the start of FY2020. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2019 by that fiscal year's applicable appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated for "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism." Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2019, through November 21, 2019âroughly the first seven weeks of the fiscal year. The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2020 for most projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2019. Although it is effective only through November 21, the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides an annualized projection of the discretionary budget authority provided in the measure. As provided in P.L. 116-59 , the amount subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits is approximately $1.253 trillion. When spending that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements, and program integrity adjustments) is also included, the CBO estimate is $1.345 trillion. CRs frequently include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the general funding rate formula or otherwise single out a program, activity, or purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (typically referred to as "anomalies"), as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (including the renewal of expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations experts for each of these provisions are indicated in the accompanying footnotes and Table 1 . Congressional clients may also access CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts . For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2019, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Practices .


This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2020 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on the funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on DHS appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $92.08 billion, the Trump Administration requested $51.68 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2020. The request amounted to a $2.27 billion (4.6%) increase from the $49.41 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2019 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 , Division A). The Administration also requested discretionary funding that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $14.08 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 ; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $190 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) for the Coast Guard to be transferred from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 11, 2019, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 3931 , its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2020. H.Rept. 116-180 was filed July 24, 2019. Committee-reported H.R. 3931 included $52.80 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, according to the Congressional Budget Office's initial score of the bill. This was $1.12 billion (2.2%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $3.39 billion (6.9%) above the enacted annual level for FY2019. Much of this increase was due to the addition of several immigration-related policy provisions in the full committee markup, which added more than $3.0 billion to the score of the bill, putting the bill over its subcommittee allocation (CBO later revised the scoring of those provisions to $1.9 billion in a separate letter on September 10, 2019). On September 26, 2019, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up S. 2582 , its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2020. S.Rept. 116-125 was filed the same day. Committee-reported S. 2582 included $53.18 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. This was $1.50 billion (2.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $3.77 billion (7.6%) above the enacted annual level for FY2019. Much of this latter increase was due to the inclusion of $5 billion in funding for border barrier construction as opposed to $1.38 billion in the FY2019 act. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees recommended more discretionary funding for the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and FEMA than had been requested by the Administration. No annual appropriations for FY2020 had been enacted as FY2019 was drawing to a close, so a continuing resolution was enacted ( P.L. 116-59 ) on September 27, 2019. It temporarily extended funding at the FY2019 rate for operations through November 21 for most DHS programs (see limited exceptions in the Department of Homeland Security section of CRS Report R45982, Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2020 (P.L. 116-59) ). This CR was subsequently extended through December 20. Annual appropriations for DHS were enacted on December 20, 2019, in P.L. 116-93 , Division D. The act included $50.47 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. This was $1.22 billion (2.4%) below the level requested by the Administration, and $1.06 billion (2.1%) above the enacted annual level for FY2019. The FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act included $17.35 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and $190 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard rather than as a transfer from the Navy. This report will be updated as events warrant.


CBP and GSA own, lease, or manage all of the nation's 167 land border crossings. CBP facilitates trade and travel at these crossings and has identified significant capital investment needs at these facilities. GAO was asked to review land border crossing infrastructure. This report examines (1) infrastructure constraints CBP faces and the extent CBP and GSA have information on infrastructure condition, (2) the extent CBP prioritizes capital projects and (3) the extent recent GSA capital projects met cost, schedule, and scope goals and challenges CBP and GSA reported. GAO analyzed land border crossing data and documentation, including CBP and GSA facility assessments, CBP capital investment plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and data for GSA capital infrastructure projects active during those years. GAO also interviewed officials from CBP field offices that oversee all crossings about infrastructure constraints and visited 16 crossings selected based on high traffic volume and border crossings CBP has prioritized for infrastructure improvement. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported infrastructure constraints at land border crossings including limited inspection capacity, technology challenges, and security limitations. However, CBP does not have complete information on infrastructure conditions at all land border crossings. Specifically, CBP assessed facility conditions at four of the 40 land border crossings it owns from 2016 through 2018. Further, CBP has not developed a plan to ensure it conducts such assessments, consistent with DHS policy which calls for them every three years. Developing and implementing a plan to ensure CBP executes its facility condition assessment program would enable CBP to collect more complete and current infrastructure information. In addition, while CBP and the General Services Administration (GSA) both assess facility conditions at 101 GSA-owned land border crossings, they do not consistently share or use each other's information. Doing so could enable CBP and GSA to improve the accuracy and completeness of their respective assessments. CBP prioritizes land border crossing capital projects in a five-year plan, which by statute is to be submitted with DHS's annual budget request to Congress. In fiscal years 2014 through 2018, CBP submitted two plans on time, submitted two plans more than 100 days after submission of the budget request, and did not submit a plan in one year due to delays in the plan's review and approval process. By establishing timeframes for the review process, CBP would be better positioned to identify and address sources of delay in the review process, and improve its ability to meet statutory reporting requirements by including its five-year plan with its annual budget submission to Congress. The 10 completed or ongoing GSA land border crossing capital projects in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 generally experienced schedule growth ranging from 0 to 59 percent, but stayed within a 10 percent cost contingency allowance. Circumstances contributing to increased project costs or schedule growth include funding lags between project design and construction, and CBP-requested changes during construction to meet evolving mission needs, according to GSA and CBP officials.


This report provides an overview of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 budget request and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations. This report also provides a review of these trade agencies' programs. The Administration's FY2020 Budget Request The President submitted his budget request to Congress on March 11, 2019. For FY2020, the Administration requested a total of $620.2 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. The request was $26.8 million less (a 4.1% decrease) than the FY2019 appropriated amount. The request included the following for the three agencies. ITA : $460.1 million, 4.9% less than the FY2019 amount. USITC : $91.1 million, 4.1% less than the FY2019 amount. USTR : $69.0 million, 1.5% more than the FY2019 amount. Congressional Actions The House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2020 CJS appropriations proposal, H.R. 3055 , in early June 2019 and passed the measure on June 25, 2019 by a 227-194 vote. The House-passed bill included a total of $694.0 million for the three CJS trade agencies, which was $47.0 million (or 7.3%) more than the FY2019-enacted amount, and $73.8 million (11.9%) more than the Administration's request. The House proposal included the following for the three agencies. ITA : $521.0 million, 7.6% more than the FY2019 amount, and 13.2% more than the Administration's request. USITC : $101.0 million, 6.3% more than the FY2019 amount, and 10.9% more than the Administration's request. USTR : $72.0 million, 5.9% more than the FY2019 amount, and 4.3% more than the Administration's request. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a CJS bill, S. 2584 , on September 26, 2019. In late October, the Senate took up the House-adopted CJS proposal, H.R. 3055 , and passed it with amendments, by a vote of 84-9 on October 31, 2019. The Senate-passed version included a total ofÂ $678.7 million for the three CJS trade agencies, which was $31.7 million (4.9%) more than the FY2019-enacted amount, $58.5 million (9.4%) more than the Administration's request, and overall $15.3 million less than the House-adopted bill. The Senate-passed version included the following for the three trade agencies. ITA : $510.3 million, 5.4% more than the FY2019 amount, and 10.9% more than the Administration's request. USITC : $99.4 million, 4.6% more than the FY2019 amount, and 9.1% more than the President's budget request. USTR : $69.0 million, 1.5% more than more than the FY2019 amount, and equal to the Administration's request. On December 20, 2019, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-93 ), approving FY2020 annual appropriations for the three CJS trade agencies. The act included the Senate's proposed funding levels for these agencies. The act provided $678.7 million for the three trade-related agencies, which was $31.7 million (4.9%) more than FY2019, and $58.5 million (9.4%) more than the Administration's request. The act provided the following for the three trade-related agencies. ITA : $510.3 million, 5.4% more than the FY2019 amount, and 10.9% more than the Administration's request. USITC : $99.4 million, 4.6% more than the FY2019 amount, and 9.1% more than the Administration's request. USTR : $69.0 million, 1.5% more than more than the FY2019 amount, and equal in total to the Administration's request.


This report provides information about the FY2021 budget request for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Historically, HHS has been one of the larger federal departments in terms of budgetary resources. Estimates by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) indicate that HHS has accounted for at least 20% of all federal outlays in each year since FY1995. Most recently, HHS is estimated to have accounted for 27% of all federal outlays in FY2019. (FY2019 funding levels are generally considered final, whereas some FY2020 funding levels remain estimates.) The FY2021 President's budget request was submitted to Congress on February 10, 2020. Subsequently, on March 17, 2020, the President submitted a letter to Congress about FY2021 budget amendments (along with a supplemental appropriations request for FY2020) related to the response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. According to the letter, these budget amendments would have budgetary effects for the FY2021 President's request for some HHS accounts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The letter did not contain sufficient details to incorporate potential effects of these amendments into the FY2021 request numbers contained in this report. As a result, the report reflects the President's initial request as submitted on February 10. Under the FY2021 President's budget request, as submitted in February 2020, HHS would spend an estimated $1.37 trillion in outlays in FY2021. This would be $48 billion (+4%) more than estimated HHS outlays in FY2020 and $156 billion (+13%) more than actual HHS outlays in FY2019. Mandatory spending typically comprises the majority of the HHS budget. Two mandatory spending programsâMedicare and Medicaidâare expected to account for 86% of all estimated HHS outlays in FY2021, according to the President's budget request. Medicare and Medicaid are entitlement programs, meaning the federal government is required to make mandatory payments to individuals, states, or other entities based on criteria established in authorizing law. While mandatory spending is controlled (but not always provided) by authorizing laws, all discretionary spending is controlled and provided through the annual appropriations process. Discretionary spending accounts for about 8% of HHS outlays in the FY2021 President's budget request. Although discretionary spending represents a relatively small share of the HHS budget, the department nevertheless receives more discretionary money than most federal departments. According to OMB data, HHS accounted for nearly 8% of all discretionary budget authority across the government in FY2019.


This report provides statistical information on indigenous peoples in Latin America, including populations and languages, socioeconomic data, land and natural resources, human rights and international legal conventions. Resource lists for each section (languages; socioeconomics; land and resources; international organizations; and human rights) are available in the appendix as well as a lists of national agencies that oversee indigenous affairs in each Central American or South American country.


This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Furthermore, commercially licensed arms sales cases involving defense articles that are firearms-controlled under category I of the United States Munitions List and valued at $1 million or more must also be formally notified to Congress for review 30 days prior to the license for export being approved. In the case of proposed licenses for such sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, 15 days prior notification is required. In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the AECA, is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. Under current law Congress faces two fundamental obstacles to block or modify a presidential sale of military equipment: it must pass legislation expressing its will on the sale, and it must be capable of overriding a presumptive presidential veto of such legislation. Congress, however, is free to pass legislation to block or modify an arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved. This report will be updated, if notable changes in these review procedures or applicable law occur.


This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) farm income projections (as of November 27, 2019) and agricultural trade outlook update (as of November 25, 2019) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook for 2019. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm incomeâa key indicator of U.S. farm well-beingâis forecast at $92.5 billion in 2019, up $8.5 billion (+10.2%) from last year. The forecast rise in 2019 net farm income is largely the result of a 64.0% increase in government payments to the agricultural sector, with a projected total value of $22.4Â billion (highest since 2005). USDA's forecast of outlays for farm support for 2019 includes $14.3 billion in direct payments made under trade assistance programs intended to help offset foreign trade retaliation against U.S. agricultural products, as well as over $8 billion in payments from other farm programs, including the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program (WHIP). Without this federal support, net farm income would be lower, primarily due to continued weak prices for most major crops. Commodity prices are under pressure from large carry-in stocks from a record soybean and near-record corn harvest in 2018, and diminished export prospects due to the ongoing trade dispute with China. Should these conditions persist into 2020, they would signal the potential for continued dependence on federal programs to sustain farm incomes in 2020. Since 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured or processed agricultural sales. In 2018, total agricultural exports were estimated at $143.4 billion (the second-highest export value on record). However, strong competition from major foreign competitors and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute are expected to shift trade patterns and lower U.S. agricultural export prospects significantly (-5.5%) to a projected $135.5 billion in 2019. Farm asset value in 2019 is projected up from 2018 at $3.1 trillion (+2.3%). Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. U.S. farmland values are projected to rise 2.1% in 2019, slightly higher than the 1.6% in 2018 but below the 3.0% of 2017. Because they comprise 83% of the U.S. farm sector's asset base, change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance. However, another critical measure of the farm sector's well-being is aggregate farm debt, which is projected to be at a record $415.5 billion in 2019âup 3.5% from 2018. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-equity ratios have risen for seven consecutive years, suggesting a weakening of the U.S. farm sector's financial situation. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, this advantage derives primarily from off-farm income as a share of farm household total income. Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations. Furthermore, the farm household income advantage over the average U.S. household has narrowed in recent years. In 2014, the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) was about 77% higher than the average U.S. household income. In 2018 (the last year with comparable data), that advantage was expected to decline to 25%.


This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of August 30, 2019) and agricultural trade outlook update (as of August 29, 2019) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm incomeâa key indicator of U.S. farm well-beingâis forecast at $88 billion in 2019, up $4 billion (+4.8%) from last year. However, the forecast rise in 2019 net farm income is largely the result of a 42.5% increase in government payments to the agricultural sector valued at $19.5Â billion (highest since 2005). USDA's support outlays forecast for 2019 include nearly $11 billion in direct payments made under trade assistance programs intended to help offset foreign trade retaliation against U.S. agricultural products, as well as payments under traditional farm programs. Without this federal support, net farm income would be lower, primarily due to the outlook for continued weak prices for most major crops. Commodity prices are under pressure from large planted acreage estimates of corn and soybeans in 2019, large carry-in stocks from a record soybean and near-record corn harvest in 2018, and diminished export prospects due to the ongoing trade dispute with China. Should these conditions persist into 2020, they would signal the potential for continued dependence on federal programs to sustain the U.S. agricultural sector in 2020. Since 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured or processed agricultural sales. In 2018, total agricultural exports were estimated up 2% at $143.4 billion. However, abundant supplies in international markets, strong competition from major foreign competitors, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute are expected to shift trade patterns and lower U.S. agricultural export prospects significantly (-6%) to a projected $134.5 billion in 2019. Farm asset value in 2019 is projected up from 2018 to $3.1 trillion (+2%). Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. U.S. farmland values are projected to rise 1.8% in 2019, similar to the increases of 1.9% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2017. Because they comprise such a large portion of the U.S. farm sector's asset base (83%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance. However, another critical measure of the farm sector's well-being is aggregate farm debt, which is projected to be at a record $415.7 billion in 2019âup 3.4% from 2018. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-equity ratios have risen for seven consecutive years, suggesting a weakening of the financial situation for the U.S. farm sector. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, this advantage derives primarily from off-farm income as a share of farm household total income. Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations. Furthermore, the farm household income advantage over the average U.S. household has narrowed in recent years. In 2014, the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) was about 77% higher than the average U.S. household income. In 2017 (the last year with comparable data), that advantage was expected to decline to 30%.


This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of February 5, 2020) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook for 2020. Two major indicators of U.S. farm well-being are net farm income and net cash income. Net farm income represents an accrual of the value of all goods and serviced produced on the farm during the yearâsimilar in concept to gross domestic product. In contrast, net cash income uses a cash flow concept to measure farm well-being: Only cash transactions for the year are included. Thus, crop production is recorded as net farm income immediately after harvest, whereas net cash income records a crop's value only after it has been sold in the marketplace. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income is forecast at $96.7 billion in 2020, up $3.1 billion (+3.3%) from 2019. The forecast rise in 2020 net farm income stands in contrast with a projected decline of over $10.8 billion in net cash income (-9.0%). Last year's (2019) net cash income forecast included $14.7 billion in sales of on-farm crop inventories, which helped to inflate the 2019 net cash income value to $120.4 billion. The 2020 net cash income forecast includes a much smaller amount ($0.5 billion) in sales from on-farm inventories, thus contributing to the decline from 2019. Government direct support payments to the agricultural sector are expected to continue to play an important role in farm income projections. USDA projects $15 billion in farm support outlays for 2020, including the $3.7 billion of 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP) paymentsâthe third and final tranche of payments under the $14.5 billion program. If realized, the 2020 government payments of $15 billion would represent a 36.6% decline from 2019 but would still be the second largest since 2006. The $23.6 billion in federal payments in 2019 was the largest taxpayer transfer to the agriculture sector (in absolute dollars) since 2005. The surge in federal subsidies in 2019 was driven by large payments (estimated at $14.3 billion) under the MFP initiated by USDA in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. The Administration has not announced a new MFP for 2020. Weather conditions and planting prospects for 2020 are unknown this early in the year. Commodity prices are under pressure from abundant global supplies and uncertain export prospects. Despite the signing of a Phase I trade agreement with China on January 15, 2020, it is unclear how soonâif at allâthe United States may resume normal trade with China or how international demand may evolve in 2020. Farm asset value in 2020 is projected up year-to-year at $3.1 trillion (+1.3%). Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. Another critical measure of the farm sector's well-being is aggregate farm debt, which is projected to be at a record $425.3 billion in 2020âup 2.3% from 2019. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-equity ratios have risen for eight consecutive years, potentially suggesting a continued slow erosion of the U.S. farm sector's financial situation. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, this advantage derives primarily from off-farm income as a share of farm household total income. Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations. This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of February 5, 2020) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook for 2020. Two major indicators of U.S. farm well-being are net farm income and net cash income. Net farm income represents an accrual of the value of all goods and serviced produced on the farm during the yearâsimilar in concept to gross domestic product. In contrast, net cash income uses a cash flow concept to measure farm well-being: Only cash transactions for the year are included. Thus, crop production is recorded as net farm income immediately after harvest, whereas net cash income records a crop's value only after it has been sold in the marketplace. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income is forecast at $96.7 billion in 2020, up $3.1 billion (+3.3%) from 2019. The forecast rise in 2020 net farm income stands in contrast with a projected decline of over $10.8 billion in net cash income (-9.0%). Last year's (2019) net cash income forecast included $14.7 billion in sales of on-farm crop inventories, which helped to inflate the 2019 net cash income value to $120.4 billion. The 2020 net cash income forecast includes a much smaller amount ($0.5 billion) in sales from on-farm inventories, thus contributing to the decline from 2019. Government direct support payments to the agricultural sector are expected to continue to play an important role in farm income projections. USDA projects $15 billion in farm support outlays for 2020, including the $3.7 billion of 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP) paymentsâthe third and final tranche of payments under the $14.5 billion program. If realized, the 2020 government payments of $15 billion would represent a 36.6% decline from 2019 but would still be the second largest since 2006. The $23.6 billion in federal payments in 2019 was the largest taxpayer transfer to the agriculture sector (in absolute dollars) since 2005. The surge in federal subsidies in 2019 was driven by large payments (estimated at $14.3 billion) under the MFP initiated by USDA in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. The Administration has not announced a new MFP for 2020. Weather conditions and planting prospects for 2020 are unknown this early in the year. Commodity prices are under pressure from abundant global supplies and uncertain export prospects. Despite the signing of a Phase I trade agreement with China on January 15, 2020, it is unclear how soonâif at allâthe United States may resume normal trade with China or how international demand may evolve in 2020. Farm asset value in 2020 is projected up year-to-year at $3.1 trillion (+1.3%). Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. Another critical measure of the farm sector's well-being is aggregate farm debt, which is projected to be at a record $425.3 billion in 2020âup 2.3% from 2019. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-equity ratios have risen for eight consecutive years, potentially suggesting a continued slow erosion of the U.S. farm sector's financial situation. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, this advantage derives primarily from off-farm income as a share of farm household total income. Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations.


This testimony summarizes information contained in GAO's March 2020 report, entitled The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Action Is Needed to Address the Federal Government’s Fiscal Future ( GAO-20-403SP ). Long-term fiscal projections by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and in the 2019 Financial Report of the U.S. Government (2019 Financial Report) all show that, absent policy changes, the federal government continues to face an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Although the assumptions in each of these projections vary somewhat, all result in the same conclusion: over the long term, the imbalance between spending and revenue that is built into current law and policy will lead to (1) deficits exceeding $1 trillion each year beginning in fiscal year 2020 and (2) both the annual deficit and the cumulative total debt held by the public continuing to grow as shares of gross domestic product (GDP). This situation—in which debt grows faster than GDP—means the current federal fiscal path is unsustainable. To change the long-term fiscal path, policymakers will need to consider policy changes to the entire range of federal activities, both revenue (including tax expenditures) and spending (entitlement programs, other mandatory spending, and discretionary spending). As Congress considers changes in revenue and spending policies to improve the federal government’s long-term fiscal path, it will also need to consider other approaches for managing the level of debt.


This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's April 2019 report, entitled Scientific Integrity Policies: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Integrity of Federal Research ( GAO-19-265 ). The nine selected agencies GAO reviewed have taken various actions to help achieve the objectives of their scientific integrity policies in three areas: Educating staff. Seven of the nine agencies have taken some actions to educate and communicate to staff about their policies, consistent with the 2007 America COMPETES Act. However, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE), which follows the Department of Energy's (DOE) policy, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have not taken action. Providing oversight. Eight of the nine agencies have a designated official, or the equivalent, to oversee implementation of their scientific integrity policies. However, FE does not have such an official because DOE has not appointed one and currently has no plans or timeframe to do so, although DOE policy states that DOE will appoint an official for oversight. Monitoring and evaluating implementation. Four of the nine agencies have monitored and evaluated implementation of their scientific integrity policies, consistent with federal standards that call for such control activities. However, FE, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NIST, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) have not undertaken such activities. Seven of the nine agencies have specific, documented procedures for identifying and addressing alleged violations of their scientific integrity policies. Although the details of agencies' procedures vary, they generally include the steps shown below. However, two agencies—FE, following DOE's policy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—do not have documented procedures for identifying and addressing alleged violations. A 2009 presidential memo on scientific integrity states that agencies should have procedures to identify and address instances in which the scientific process or the integrity of scientific and technological information may be compromised. Without procedures, FE and NASA do not have assurance that their staff understand how to report allegations and that investigations are conducted consistently.


This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2019 report, entitled Internet Privacy: Additional Federal Authority Could Enhance Consumer Protection and Provide Flexibility ( GAO-19-52 ). cackleya@gao.gov goldsteinm@gao.gov The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy.


CBP is responsible for securing U.S. borders and employs nearly 45,000 law enforcement officers across its three operational components at and between U.S. ports of entry, in the air and maritime environment, and at certain overseas locations. In recent years, CBP has not attained target staffing levels for its law enforcement positions, citing high attrition rates in some locations, a protracted hiring process, and competition from other law enforcement agencies. This statement addresses CBP's efforts to (1) recruit and more efficiently hire law enforcement applicants, and (2) retain law enforcement officers. This statement is based on a GAO report issued in June 2018 on CBP's recruiting, hiring, and retention efforts along with updates as of February 2019 on actions CBP has taken to address GAO's prior recommendation. For the previous report, GAO analyzed CBP data on recruitment efforts, hiring process steps, and retention rates; examined strategies related to these activities; and interviewed CBP officials and union groups. GAO also reviewed information on CBP actions to implement GAO's prior recommendation. In June 2018, GAO reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) increased its emphasis on recruitment by establishing a central recruitment office in 2016 and increasing its participation in recruitment events, among other things. As a result, the number of applications it received for law enforcement positions across its operational components—the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, and Air and Marine Operations—more than tripled from fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017. Also, in November 2017, CBP hired a contractor to more effectively target potential applicants and better utilize data to enhance CBP's recruitment and hiring efforts. However, at the time of GAO's June 2018 report, it was too early to gauge whether the contractor would be effective in helping CBP to achieve its goal to recruit and hire more law enforcement officers. CBP improved its hiring process as demonstrated by two key metrics—reducing its time-to-hire and increasing the percentage of applicants that are hired. As shown in the table, CBP's time-to-hire decreased from FY 2015 through 2017. CBP officials stated that these improvements, paired with increases in applications, have resulted in more hires. However, the hiring process remains lengthy. For example, in FY 2017, CBP officer applications took more than 300 days, on average, to process. Certain factors contributed to the lengthy time-to-hire, including process steps that can be challenging and time-consuming for applicants to complete—such as the polygraph exam—as well as CBP's reliance on applicants to promptly complete certain aspects of the process—such as submitting their background investigation form. CBP enhanced its efforts to address retention challenges. However, staffing levels for law enforcement positions consistently remained below target levels. For example, CBP ended FY 2017 more than 1,100 CBP officers below its target staffing level. CBP officials cited employees' inability to relocate to more desirable locations as the primary retention challenge. CBP offered some relocation opportunities to law enforcement personnel and has pursued the use of financial incentives and other payments to supplement salaries, especially for those staffed to remote or hard-to-fill locations. However, retaining law enforcement officers in hard-to-fill locations continues to be challenging for CBP. GAO reported that CBP could be better positioned to understand its retention challenges and take appropriate action to address them by implementing a formal process for capturing information on all departing employees. In response, CBP officials reported taking steps to implement a CBP-wide exit survey and plan to analyze the results of the survey quarterly, beginning April 2019.


This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2019 report, entitled Reverse Mortgages: FHA Needs to Improve Monitoring and Oversight of Loan Outcomes and Servicing ( GAO-19-702 ). The vast majority of reverse mortgages are made under the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. In recent years, a growing percentage of HECMs insured by FHA have ended because borrowers defaulted on their loans. While death of the borrower is the most commonly reported reason why HECMs terminate, the percentage of terminations due to borrower defaults increased from 2 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 18 percent in fiscal year 2018 (see figure). Most HECM defaults are due to borrowers not meeting occupancy requirements or failing to pay property charges, such as property taxes or homeowners insurance. Since 2015, FHA has allowed HECM servicers to put borrowers who are behind on property charges onto repayment plans to help prevent foreclosures, but as of fiscal year-end 2018, only about 22 percent of these borrowers had received this option. FHA's monitoring, performance assessment, and reporting for the HECM program have weaknesses. FHA loan data do not currently capture the reason for about 30 percent of HECM terminations (see figure). FHA also has not established comprehensive performance indicators for the HECM portfolio and has not regularly tracked key performance metrics, such as reasons for HECM terminations and the number of distressed borrowers who have received foreclosure prevention options. Additionally, FHA has not developed internal reports to comprehensively monitor patterns and trends in loan outcomes. As a result, FHA does not know how well the HECM program is serving its purpose of helping meet the financial needs of elderly homeowners. FHA has not conducted on-site reviews of HECM servicers since fiscal year 2013 and has not benefited from oversight efforts by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). FHA officials said they planned to resume the reviews in fiscal year 2020, starting with three servicers that account for most of the market. However, as of August 2019, FHA had not developed updated review procedures and did not have a risk-based method for prioritizing reviews. CFPB conducts examinations of reverse mortgage servicers but does not provide the results to FHA because the agencies do not have an agreement for sharing confidential supervisory information. Without better oversight and information sharing, FHA lacks assurance that servicers are following requirements, including those designed to help protect borrowers.


Thousands of facilities across the United States contain hazardous chemicals that could be used by terrorists to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through August 2018, along with updates as of September 2018 on actions DHS has taken to address GAO's prior recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program; how DHS assesses risk; and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and relevant stakeholders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. To improve this process, GAO recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so. DHS implemented both recommendations by revising the CFATS risk assessment methodology to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence to better cover the range of security issues, and conducting peer reviews and technical reviews to verify and validate the CFATS program's new risk assessment approach. Reviewing and approving facility site security plans . DHS is to review facility security plans to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7- to 9-year backlog for these reviews. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO found that nearly half of the facilities DHS had inspected were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. DHS revised CFATS procedures that, as of February 2019, GAO is reviewing to determine if they sufficiently address the recommendation. Conducting stakeholder and first responder outreach. In August 2018, GAO reported that DHS shares some CFATS information with first responders and emergency planners but these stakeholders may not have all of the information they need to minimize the risk of injury or death when responding to incidents at high-risk facilities. GAO recommended that DHS should, among other things, take actions to explore opportunities to improve information-sharing with first responders and emergency planners. DHS concurred with this recommendation and reported in September 2018 that it is conducting additional outreach and taking other actions to implement it.


Threats to public areas of airports have increased in recent years. TSA is responsible for civil aviation security, which includes ensuring the security and safety of aircraft and the traveling public. In November 2013, an armed individual entered the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and killed a Transportation Security Officer. Subsequent domestic and international attacks in airport public areas further emphasized the need to better secure these areas. In response, Congress has taken action—including passage of the 2015 Gerardo Hernandez Act and the 2018 TSA Modernization Act—to address incident planning and response at airports and the security of public areas of transportation facilities, including airports. GAO was asked to assess actions taken to secure the public areas of TSA- regulated airports. This report (1) describes actions TSA has taken in response to the LAX shooting and the Gerardo Hernandez Act, and (2) examines additional actions taken in response to subsequent security incidents and the TSA Modernization Act. GAO reviewed TSA reports issued after airport attacks; the Gerardo Hernandez Act and TSA Modernization Act; and other TSA documents related to securing public areas. GAO also conducted interviews with and obtained information from TSA and officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 6 TSA-regulated airports, selected based on factors such as size and location. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) took several actions in response to the 2013 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) shooting and the Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015. Specifically, TSA took several actions to better address airport security in public areas, including strengthening and mandating active shooter training drills and installing duress alarms at screening checkpoints, among other things. In response to the Act, TSA updated guidance for reporting suspicious behavior and revised directives identifying responsibilities for local law enforcement coverage of passenger screening checkpoints and nearby public areas, among other actions. In response to subsequent airport public area security incidents, such as those in Fort Lauderdale in 2017 and Brussels and Istanbul in 2016, TSA has taken additional actions. Specifically, TSA issued the Public Area Security National Framework in 2017, in coordination with various aviation security stakeholders. The framework categorized 11 best practices and non-binding recommendations for improving security of public areas, including sharing information and preventing attacks. Aviation security stakeholders have also implemented various actions consistent with these best practices, including establishing airport operations centers and deploying enhanced law enforcement teams to serve as a visible deterrent in airport public areas (see figure). In response to the TSA Modernization Act, TSA established a public area security working group in March 2019 to engage with stakeholders such as airport operators and industry associations and update and validate the best practices cited in the 2017 framework. This group met twice in 2019, but TSA has not outlined specific plans for engaging this group in the future. Developing a plan outlining the roles and responsibilities of the working group members, the mechanisms through which the working group will collaborate, and the frequency of when the working group will meet, would better position TSA to ensure the best practices cited by stakeholders remain relevant and emerging threats are proactively identified.


Threats to the nation's transportation systems persist and continue to evolve. Within DHS, TSA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for the prevention of and defense against terrorist and other threats to the United States' civil aviation, and rail, public transit, pipeline, and other surface transportation systems. The TSA Modernization Act includes provisions intended to enhance security across this broad range of systems and further calls on GAO to review TSA's progress in these areas. This statement summarizes past and ongoing work related to TSA's actions to address selected aviation and surface transportation security areas covered by the TSA Modernization Act. This statement is based on products GAO issued from December 2017 through October 2019 and draft reports currently with TSA for comment. To perform this work GAO reviewed TSA program documents, visited domestic and foreign airports, and interviewed TSA officials, DHS officials, and transportation industry stakeholders, including associations and air carriers. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made initial progress in certain security areas mandated by the TSA Modernization Act, but additional actions are needed. International aviation security. In December 2017, GAO reported that TSA has taken steps to enhance its foreign airport assessments. Since that time, TSA has developed a tool to better track and address foreign airport vulnerabilites. In addition, TSA reviews security directives and emergency amendments it issues to address security concerns. However, TSA's review process does not fully define how to coordinate with industry representatives and it has not determined if it is appropriate to incorporate the security measures of many longstanding directives into air carrier security programs in accordance with TSA policy. In October 2019, GAO recommended, and TSA officals agreed, that TSA better define how to coordinate with air carriers when reviewing directives and when to incorporate directives into security programs. Passenger screening rules. TSA develops screening rules by considering current intelligence and other factors to identify passengers who fall within the scope of the rules for enhanced screening. GAO found that TSA coordinates rules reviews through quarterly meetings and notifies an expanded set of DHS and TSA stakeholders of rule changes as called for by the Act. TSA tracks some data on rule implementation but does not comprehensively measure rule effectiveness. In its draft report, GAO recommended that TSA explore additional data sources for measuring the effectiveness of its rules. TSA is currently reviewing this recommendation. Aviation screening technologies. GAO found that TSA does not ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after they have been deployed to airports. According to officials, the agency uses certification—a step in the test and evaluation process—to confirm that technologies meet detection requirements before they are deployed to airports, and calibration of the technologies to confirm that technologies are at least minimally operational while in use at airports. While these processes serve important purposes, performance can degrade over time. In its draft report, GAO recommended that TSA implement a process to ensure technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment. TSA is currently reviewing this recommendation. Surface transportation pipeline security . In December 2018, GAO identified some weaknesses and made recommendations to strengthen TSA's management of key aspects of its pipeline security program. For example, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and competencies—such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise—necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities. GAO recommended, and TSA concurred, that TSA develop a strategic workforce plan. As of October 2019, TSA has not yet fully addressed this recommendation. We will continue to monitor progress.


Three Air Force and three Navy aviation depots maintain critical fixed-wing aviation platforms, such as the KC-135 aerial refuelers and F/A-18 fighters. The ability of these depots to complete maintenance on time directly affects military readiness because delays reduce the time aircraft are available for operations and training. Senate Report 115-262, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, contained provisions that GAO examine the Department of Defense's (DOD) aviation depots. GAO's report evaluates the extent to which 1) the Air Force and Navy aviation depots completed selected fixed-wing aircraft maintenance on time from fiscal year 2014 through 2019, and 2) the Air Force and Navy accurately planned for depot maintenance requirements from fiscal year 2014 through 2019 and addressed any associated challenges. GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of 18 Air Force and 18 Navy fixed-wing aircraft types; analyzed maintenance and planning data for fiscal year 2014 through 2019; and interviewed service officials. The Air Force and Navy varied in the extent that they completed depot maintenance on time for selected fixed-wing aircraft in fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Specifically, GAO's analysis of aggregate maintenance data found that: Air Force depots completed aircraft maintenance on time or early in 5 of 6 years, with percentages for on-time or early-completion maintenance ranging from 78 to 90 percent. Navy depots completed aircraft maintenance late for each of the 6 years, with percentages for on-time or early-completion maintenance ranging from 45 to 63 percent. Navy fixed-wing aircraft have spent over 62,000 more days in maintenance than expected since fiscal year 2014. The Air Force generally has accurately planned for depot maintenance requirements for selected fixed-wing aircraft during fiscal year 2014 through 2019, but the Navy has not. Both services have initiatives underway to improve planning for aviation depot maintenance; however, GAO identified planning challenges that the Navy has not fully addressed: The Navy has not effectively used historical data to analyze turnaround time—total days planned for depot maintenance periods—and established accurate planning targets for aircraft maintenance packages. Navy depot planners do not have visibility into aircraft maintenance that is performed outside the depots by an operational unit or other maintenance facility—information critical to planning for the condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. The Navy does not yet have formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. Without addressing these challenges, the Navy cannot appropriately plan for depot maintenance workload and will likely continue to experience maintenance delays that reduce the time aircraft are available for operations and training.


Three catastrophic hurricanes affected more than 28 million people living in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—which all made landfall within four weeks—caused a combined $265 billion in damage, and led to unprecedented demands for food and shelter, according to FEMA. FEMA and the Red Cross are the primary agencies responsible for coordinating mass care under the federal disaster response framework. GAO was asked to review their efforts. This report examines (1) FEMA's and the Red Cross' coordination of mass care in response to the 2017 hurricanes, and (2) FEMA's support and use of assessments of mass care capabilities for the 2017 hurricanes. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, federal frameworks, and written agreements between federal, state, or local governments and various voluntary organizations providing mass care services. GAO also interviewed state, territorial, local, and voluntary organization officials in Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; as well as officials from Red Cross, FEMA, other relevant federal agencies, and voluntary organizations. Following the three major U.S. hurricanes in 2017, disaster relief efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Red Cross (Red Cross) benefitted from locating key partners in the same place. In-person coordination was critical to maintaining communication in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands given the prolonged power outages and damage to public structures (see photo). However, some needs related to mass care—such as shelter, food, and supply distribution—were unmet. For example, local officials in Texas said flooded roads prevented trucks from delivering supplies. Providers encountered challenges in part because state and local agreements with voluntary organizations did not always clearly detail what mass care services could be provided. Additionally, FEMA guidance and training materials do not explicitly encourage states and localities to include in their written agreements the specific assistance each agency or organization can provide. This limits the benefits of mass care coordination and may put disaster victims at risk. State, territorial, and local grantees of federal disaster preparedness grants are required to regularly submit information on their capabilities to FEMA, and FEMA has provided related guidance and technical assistance. However, the information some grantees provided to FEMA was not specific enough to aid its response in 2017. Moreover, FEMA does not require grantees to specify the organizations providing mass care services in their capabilities assessments. Also, FEMA does not have systematic protocols for providing feedback to grantees to improve their assessments. These limitations hinder FEMA's efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness.


Three sequential hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—affected more than 28 million people in 2017, according to FEMA. Hurricane survivors aged 65 and older and those with disabilities faced particular challenges evacuating to safe shelter, accessing medicine, and obtaining recovery assistance. In June 2018, FEMA began implementing a new approach to assist individuals with disabilities. This statement describes (1) reported challenges faced by these individuals in accessing disaster assistance from FEMA and its nonfederal partners following the 2017 hurricanes; and (2) the extent to which FEMA has implemented changes in how it supports these individuals. This statement is based on a May 2019 GAO report and selected updates. For the report, GAO analyzed FEMA documents and data from FEMA call centers and also visited 2017 hurricane locations to interview state, territorial, and local officials. GAO also interviewed FEMA officials from headquarters and deployed to each disaster location. To update FEMA's progress toward addressing its recommendations, GAO interviewed FEMA officials and analyzed agency documents. GAO's May 2019 report found that some individuals who are older or have disabilities may have faced challenges registering for and receiving assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its nonfederal partners (such as state, territorial, and local emergency managers). FEMA's registration did not include an initial question that directly asks individuals if they have a disability or if they would like to request an accommodation. GAO recommended that FEMA use new registration-intake questions to improve the agency's ability to identify and address individuals' disability-related needs. FEMA concurred and, in May 2019, updated the questions to directly ask individuals if they have a disability. GAO found that the substantial damage caused by the 2017 hurricanes prevented or slowed some individuals with disabilities from obtaining food, water, and other critical goods and services from states, territories, and localities. Officials from one state reported that few public transportation services, including paratransit, were functional following the 2017 hurricane affecting the state. The officials said this may have prevented people with disabilities from maintaining their health and wellness—such as by shopping for groceries or going to medical appointments—after the storm. GAO's May 2019 report also found that FEMA had taken limited steps to implement the agency's new approach to assist individuals with disabilities. GAO recommended the agency establish and disseminate objectives for implementing its new approach. FEMA concurred, and developed a draft strategic plan that includes strategic goals and objectives for the new approach, which the agency plans to finalize and disseminate in 2019. GAO recommended that FEMA, as part of its new approach, develop a plan for delivering training to all FEMA staff deployed during disasters that promotes competency in disability awareness. In concurring with this recommendation, FEMA described its plan to incorporate a disability awareness competency into the job requirements for all deployable staff, but has not yet developed a plan for training. GAO's May 2019 report also recommended that FEMA develop a timeline for completing the development of training on incorporating the needs of individuals with disabilities into emergency planning, which it planned to offer to its nonfederal partners. FEMA concurred with GAO's recommendation and, in June 2019, officials began procuring external consulting services to develop a replacement course. According to officials, the course will take about 1 year to develop and will be ready to field by August 2020.


Three-dimensional (3D) printing, also known as additive manufacturing, is a highly flexible manufacturing process that has been used in product development and production for the past 30 years. Greater capabilities, lower prices, and an expanded range of manufacturing materials have vastly expanded adoption of 3D printers over the last decade and a half. The economic and scientific potential of this technology, as well as certain regulatory concerns (such as 3D printing of firearms), have recently increased congressional interest. 3D printers are used in a variety of industriesâsuch as aerospace, medicine, and educationâas well as in nonspecific custom prototyping. Both private industry and the federal government have supported these applications of 3D printing. Support from the federal government has included basic and applied research funding from the National Science Foundation, as well as research and development funding from mission agencies such as the Department of Defense, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. More broadly, federal support for additive manufacturing has been provided through the flagship institute of the Manufacturing USA program, the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute (also known as America Makes). This consortium of industry, university, and government seeks to "[accelerate] the adoption of additive manufacturing technologies in the United States to increase domestic manufacturing competitiveness." In recent years, hundreds of millions of dollarsâpublic and privateâhave been invested in 3D printing-related companies and 3D printing research and development. 3D printers span a range of alternative capabilities, print with many different kinds of materials, and are capable of building products at a variety of scales. The price of a 3D printer varies with its capabilities; machines may cost from hundreds of dollars to millions of dollars. 3D printing uses a fundamentally different process than most methods for traditional manufacturing. Much of modern manufacturing uses subtractive manufacturing processes, beginning with a block of material (e.g., a tube, a bar, or an ingot) and using a variety of tools to remove parts of the initial material to achieve a final design. 3D printers are additive, stacking up and fusing thin layer upon thin layer of a material (or materials) onto a blank platform to achieve a final design. This allows for flexibility and complexity in the manufacturing of 3D-printed items. Four primary properties of 3D printers stem from this unique additive construction method: reduced waste, capacity to create parts with high internal complexity, cost-effectiveness of small production runs, and ease of design modification. These four primary properties of 3D printers translate into several distinctive manufacturing impacts: potential reduction in discrete parts per product, potential reduction in manufacturing costs, improved prototyping abilities, potential reduction in part weight or improvement in part strength, potential reduction in inventory, mass customization, potential environmental efficiency, decentralized manufacturing, and low barriers to entry. Although these manufacturing impacts are particularly advantageous for some manufacturing activities, most experts say the current state of 3D printing tends to make the technology a poor fit for mass production of simple parts. For this reason, some have estimated that 3D printing may account for 5% to 10% of manufacturing in the long term. In general, 3D printing has been widely viewed as a driver for American economic development, national security, and combat readiness. At the same time, some have expressed concerns about potential adverse effects of this technology, such as its potential use in the manufacture of firearms or other contraband material by individual criminals, criminal organizations, or terrorists. 3D printing technology is expected to mature substantially in the coming decades to allow the use of new materials, faster production speeds, and lower costs. Prices of consumer 3D printers have fallen by about 80% over the past decade and appear poised to continue to fall. Industrial 3D printing is increasingly an essential part of the U.S. manufacturing portfolio, and it appears to be critical to the nation's upcoming advanced manufacturing strategy.


Through Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Congress has delegated authority to the President to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs). This authority requires congressional approval (through implementation legislation) of comprehensive FTAs. Since 1979, Congress has passed 17 implementation measures for FTAs and multilateral trade agreements. The majority of these trade agreementsâincluding the recent United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) â were considered in Congress under TPA, which provides for expedited consideration of FTAs in Congress. Since 1979, Congress has passed six measures extending TPA for limited time periods. As with many international trade issues, TPA has been politically contentious over time, resulting in vigorous debate and two multi-year lapses in authority. USMCA is the most recent free trade agreement (FTA) to be approved by Congress under TPA.