On December 20, 2019, President Donald J. Trump signed the Satellite Television Community Protection and Promotion Act of 2019, and the Television Viewer Protection Act of 2019 (Titles XI and X of Division P, respectively, of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94 ). The act permanently extends some legal provisions governing the retransmission of distant network broadcast signals, while repealing others. In addition, the act permanently extends and changes rules for retransmission consent negotiations between television station owners and operators of satellite and cable systems. Congress enacted the new laws to prevent the expiration at the end of 2019 of provisions of communications and copyright laws related to the retransmission of broadcast television signals by cable operators, telephone companies (telcos), and satellite operators, pursuant to the STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-200 ). (STELA stands for the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act.) Congress had repeatedly reenacted several of these temporary provisions over several decades. Copyright Act Provisions Generally, copyright owners have exclusive legal rights to license their works. The Copyright Act limits these rights for owners of copyrights to programming carried by retransmitted broadcast television signals. The act provides for statutory licenses that allow cable, telco, and satellite operators to retransmit television broadcast station signals under certain circumstances, even if one or more owners of the copyrights to the programs carried by those signals do not agree. Section 119 of the Copyright Act, which was due to expire at the end of 2019, allows satellite operators to avoid negotiating with copyright holders of programming that they transmit from outside a subscriber's local area and instead pay a royalty fee to the U.S. Copyright Office. The Copyright Office in turn pays the rights holders. The Satellite Television Community Protection and Promotion Act of 2019 permanently extends Section 119 of the Copyright Act, but limits the types of "unserved households" eligible to receive the distant signals. It also requires DIRECTV, a satellite operator, to retransmit local broadcast signals in all 210 U.S. television markets in order to continue using the compulsory copyright license described in this section. Communications Act Provisions Generally, commercial broadcast television stations may either require cable, telco, and satellite operators to carry their signals within the stations' local markets for no fee or demand that the operators negotiate for the right to retransmit the stations' signals within those markets in exchange for a fee. The Television Viewer Protection Act of 2019 made permanent three provisions of the Communications Act. One of the newly permanent provisions permits a satellite operator to retransmit broadcast station signals outside of the stations' local markets without the consent of those stations, if the satellite operator is retransmitting the signals pursuant to Section 119 of the Copyright Act. A second prohibits broadcast stations from entering into exclusive contracts with cable, satellite, or telco operators. The third newly permanent provision of the Communications Act requires all parties to negotiate retransmission consent in "good faith" and assigns the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) a mediation role in the event any party accuses another of failing to negotiate in good faith. However, the act specifies that collective negotiation by smaller cable, telco, and/or satellite operators with large station group owners is not a violation of good faith. On the other hand, the Communications Act specifies that joint retransmission consent negotiations by separately owned (as defined by the FCC) broadcasters within the same market is a violation of good faith. In December 2019, the FCC reinstated rules related to the enforcement of its local ownership limits. If a television company that owns a station in a market sells advertising for another station in the same market under an agreement with that station's owner, the FCC attributes ownership of both stations to that company.


On December 25, 2009, while on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, a person attempted to detonate explosives hidden in their underwear. This person was not included in the government's consolidated database of known or suspected terrorists at the time. In response, in 2010, TSA began identifying passengers who are not known or suspected terrorists, but who TSA determined should receive enhanced screening. Specifically, TSA identifies passengers for enhanced screening through the application of screening rules, which TSA develops by considering current intelligence and other factors. TSA refers to these rules and lists as Silent Partner and Quiet Skies. The TSA Modernization Act includes a provision for GAO to review the current oversight mechanisms and effectiveness of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies. This report examines the extent to which TSA has (1) coordinated with relevant DHS and TSA stakeholders to review passenger screening rules; and (2) assessed the effectiveness of these rules. GAO analyzed TSA documents, including standard operating procedures, and interviewed senior DHS and TSA officials involved in managing and overseeing the programs. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) coordinates reviews of its intelligence-based screening rules known as Silent Partner and Quiet Skies. Specifically, TSA's Intelligence and Analysis office (I&A) coordinates quarterly rule reviews and notifies Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA stakeholders of rule changes. According to stakeholders, these review processes provide a good mechanism for program oversight. TSA has established guidance for rule changes that involve TSA stakeholders reviewing rules in advance of their implementation. In some instances, TSA uses an alternate process, allowed by guidance in exigent circumstances, where rule changes go into effect before some stakeholders review them. However, agency guidance does not define the conditions for using the standard or exigent processes. Further, TSA officials do not document which review process—standard or exigent—they use for each rule change. Clarifying guidance and documenting which review process is used could improve transparency and better ensure screening rule changes are adequately reviewed. TSA tracks some data on rule implementation, but has not identified a means to comprehensively measure rule effectiveness. TSA officials explained that they had not yet fully assessed the rules' effectiveness because it was difficult to measure. Silent Partner rules identify passengers for enhanced screening on inbound flights to the United States. Quiet Skies rules—a subset of the Silent Partner rules—identify passengers for enhanced screening on subsequent domestic and outbound flights. TSA officials said that the one method they had used to assess effectiveness was to count Quiet Skies passengers who were later added to the government's watchlist of known or suspected terrorists. However, because this analysis was limited to Quiet Skies, it excluded 93 percent of the screening rules, making it difficult to interpret what the results indicate about effectiveness. TSA has access to data, such as the outcomes of enhanced screening of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies passengers, that could be explored to better assess rule effectiveness. Exploring additional data sources could help TSA refine and supplement their existing efforts to measure program effectiveness.


On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) was informed of a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China. Illnesses have since been linked to a disease caused by a previously unidentified strain of coronavirus, designated Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19. Despite containment efforts in China, the United States, and elsewhere, by late February there were indications that the COVID-19 outbreak may have entered a new phase, with community spread occurring or suspected in several countries other than China, including in the United States. Diagnostic testing is a critical part of the public health response to and clinical management of COVID-19, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Efforts in the United States to develop and disseminate a test for COVID-19 have faced challenges. Manufacturing and quality issues with the nation's testâdeveloped by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)âresulted in significant delay in access to testing throughout the country. In this context, on February 29, 2020, in an effort to facilitate the expansion of testing capacity as the first cases of community spread were confirmed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced a new policy, issued via agency guidance and effective immediately, that would allow certain laboratoriesâprincipally clinical and large commercial and reference laboratoriesâthat have developed and validated their own COVID-19 diagnostic to begin to use the test prior to it receiving an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the agency. FDA's February 29 guidance aims to facilitate the expansion of diagnostic testing from the public health setting into the clinical health care and commercial settings. Doing so may help the country meet the increasing and substantial demand for testing generated by community spread of the disease and expanded clinical testing guidelines issued by the CDC. This report does not address financing or coverage of diagnostic testing for COVID-19.


On December 9, 2019, the Washington Post published a series of documents termed "the Afghanistan Papers." The Papers comprise two sets of documents: about 1,900 pages of notes and transcripts of interviews with more than 400 U.S. and other policymakers that were carried out between 2014 and 2018 by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and approximately 190 short memos (referred to as "snowflakes") from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, dating from 2001 to 2004. The documents, and the Washington Post stories that accompany them, suggest that U.S. policies in Afghanistan often were poorly planned, resourced, and/or executed. These apparent shortcomings contributed to several outcomes that either were difficult to assess or did not fulfill stated U.S. objectives. Key themes of the SIGAR interviews include N egative effects of U.S. funding. The most frequently discussed subject in the SIGAR interviews was (a) the large sum of U.S. money ($132 billion in development assistance since 2001) that poured into Afghanistan and (b) the extent to which much of it was reportedly wasted, stolen, exacerbated existing problems, or created new ones, particularly corruption. Unclear U.S. g oals . Many of the interviewees argued that, from the beginning, the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, supported by the money noted above, lacked a clear goal. Competing p riorities . The proliferation of U.S. goals in Afghanistan led to another complication: U.S. actions to achieve some of these objectives seemed to undermine others. Organizational confusion and competition. While U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were dominated by the Department of Defense, given the wide array of U.S. interests in Afghanistan, U.S. policy formulation and execution required input from many federal departments and agencies. The problems associated with trying to coordinate among all of these entities was a consistent theme. Lack of e xpertise . Multiple SIGAR interviewees criticized U.S. policies that they claimed failed to generate relevant expertise within the U.S. government or even disincentivized the creation or application of that expertise in Afghanistan. Disorganized m ulti national coalition . Many of the SIGAR interviewees who worked on coordinating U.S. and international efforts discussed what they saw as a disorganized system. Iraq as a distraction. U.S. officials who were working on Afghanistan in the first decade of the war held a nearly universal judgment, in SIGAR interviews, that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 distracted U.S. attention and diverted U.S. financial and other resources. Pakistan 's support for the Taliban . A number of interviewees, particularly senior U.S. officials, attributed the Taliban's resurgence, and the failure of the U.S. to solidify gains in Afghanistan, to material support for the group from, and its safe havens in, Pakistan. Other voices: U.S. efforts as relatively successful. Some of the officials interviewed by SIGAR lauded arguable gains made and facilitated by the international community's work in Afghanistan since 2001, a perspective not generally included in the Washington Post stories. The documents, released at a time when the United States is engaged in talks with the Taliban aimed at ending the 18-year U.S. military presence in the country, have attracted significant attention. Some Members of Congress have called for further investigation into U.S. policy in Afghanistan. However, there is debate over how revelatory the SIGAR interviews are: policymakers and outside analysts disagree about whether they contain new and relevant information and, if so, how the information should affect U.S. policy in Afghanistan going forward.


On February 10, 2020, the Donald J. Trump Administration released their budget request for FY2021, including a $75.84 billion budget request for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is the third largest agency in the federal government in terms of personnel. The appropriations bill that funds itâproviding $70 billion in FY2020âis the seventh largest of the twelve annual funding measures developed by the appropriations committees, and is the only appropriations bill that funds a single agency in its entirety and nothing else. This report provides an overview of the FY2021 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. It provides a component-level overview of the appropriations sought in the FY2021 budget request, putting the requested appropriations in the context of the FY2020 requested and enacted level of appropriations, and noting the primary drivers of changes from the FY2020 enacted level. The FY2021 budget request represents the fourth detailed budget proposed by the Trump Administration. It is the earliest release of a budget request by the Trump Administration, and comes 52 days after the enactment of the FY2020 consolidated appropriations measuresâthe longest such gap since the release of the FY2017 request (53 days), and the first since then to include prior-year enacted funding levels as a comparative baseline. Some of the major drivers of change in the FY2021 request include A $3 billion reduction in border barrier funding through U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) compared to the FY2020 request; A $2.4 billion reduction from the enacted level of funding due to the proposed move of the U.S. Secret Service to the Department of the Treasury; A $709 million increase in requested Transportation Security Administration (TSA) fee revenues; A $9 billion reduction in disaster relief funding through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) compared to the FY2020 request; A $986 million increase from the FY2020 requested level for the U.S. Coast Guardâproposing funding $129 million above the enacted level; A $1.1 billion increase from the FY2020 requested level for Immigration and Customs Enforcementâ$2 billion (24%) more than enacted in FY2020; and A $456 million increase for the Transportation Security Administration's budget from the FY2020 requested levelâproposing funding $59 million below the enacted level. Six of the seven smallest components by gross budget authority saw their budget requests reduced by at least 5% from the enacted level, and four of those components saw reductions of more than 10%. This report will not be updated.


An independent establishment of the executive branch, USPS is required to provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to the public. While USPS is to be self-sustaining, it lost about $78 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2019 due primarily to declining mail volumes and increased costs. Given USPS’s poor financial condition, in 2009 GAO identified USPS’s financial viability as a high-risk area, a designation it retains today. GAO was asked to explore issues related the transformation of USPS and potential implications for stakeholders. This report (1) examines major challenges facing USPS, (2) identifies how selected domestic businesses and foreign posts reportedly have addressed serious challenges, (3) examines critical foundational elements of USPS’s current business model, and (4) identifies key previously issued GAO matters for congressional consideration regarding USPS and actions taken in response. GAO reviewed its prior reports and related matters for congressional consideration, analyzed laws and regulations, and assessed USPS documents on financial and operational performance. It also reviewed reports by the USPS Office of Inspector General, the Postal Regulatory Commission, and other selected groups such as the 2018 Task Force on the United States Postal Service. To identify how domestic businesses and foreign posts addressed similar serious challenges, GAO selected for review (1) six domestic organizations in the airline, automobile, and railroad industries and (2) five foreign posts in five countries—Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The businesses and countries had characteristics similar to USPS, such as large unionized work forces, and had reportedly made significant changes to their business models. For each of these businesses and countries, GAO analyzed public reports on financial and operational performance, as well as institutional structure and requirements. GAO also interviewed government and postal officials from three selected countries and officials from the National Audit Offices of two of the selected countries. Because questions were raised regarding the application of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to USPS, GAO also requested the National Bankruptcy Conference to assess whether USPS could use bankruptcy or other restructuring processes. To examine critical USPS business model elements, GAO reviewed its prior reports and reports from numerous other organizations, and obtained the views of stakeholders. Since GAO's 2009 high-risk designation, the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial viability has progressively worsened due to declining mail volume, increased employee compensation and benefit costs, and increased unfunded liabilities and debt. First-Class Mail volume has declined 44 percent since fiscal year 2006. Additionally, employee compensation and benefits costs have been increasing. Although USPS's work force declined from about 786,000 in fiscal year 2007 to about 617,000 in fiscal year 2013, USPS's work force increased to about 630,000 in fiscal year 2019. Finally, total unfunded liabilities and debt continue their steady upward trend (see figure). To address these challenges, USPS has taken a variety of actions such as providing increased self-service options and reducing facility hours. Statutory requirements, however, limit USPS's ability to make changes in areas such as certain service offerings, pricing, and its employee compensation and benefits. In confronting similar types of challenges that are facing USPS, GAO selected large domestic businesses (companies) and foreign postal entities (widely known as “foreign posts”) that have seen significant change in foundational elements of their business models. Specifically, according to GAO's analysis of publicly available reports and interviews of cognizant officials, these organizations have had major changes in services and products, financial self-sustainment, and institutional structure: Companies and foreign posts have modified services and products to focus on profitable offerings, and two countries’ posts reduced postal service levels. For example, New Zealand Post reduced its mail delivery’s frequency from 5 to 3 days per week in urban areas. Companies have reduced their workforce, infrastructure, and operational costs, and some accepted government financial assistance to help remain financially viable. Cost reduction has also been a priority for all countries’ posts, especially in compensation and benefits, while three countries’ governments provided financial assistance to their posts. Four of the selected companies declared bankruptcy leading to restructured corporations; some merged with other companies to increase their revenues. Two countries privatized their posts, and three others restructured their posts from government departments into government-owned corporations. Regarding USPS, reassessing its business model should start with the level of required postal services. For example, delivery is USPS’s most costly operation; USPS officials estimate annual savings of $1.4 billion to $1.8 billion if delivery of mail were reduced to 5 days rather than 6 days per week. Second, USPS is to function as a financially self-sustaining entity; however, it does not. A reassessment could include determining whether some of USPS’s costs and liabilities should be borne by taxpayers. Third, alternative institutional structures for USPS range from a federal agency to a private company. A bankruptcy proceeding is not an effective or appropriate means to address the issues associated with a potential USPS restructuring, according to the National Bankruptcy Conference. Prior GAO reports have included suggestions for Congress to address USPS’s financial viability. For example, GAO’s 2010 report identified strategies to reduce compensation, benefits, and operational costs. GAO stated that Congress, among other things, consider all options available to reduce costs. While bills in this area were introduced and in some cases passed congressional committees, legislation was not enacted. In 2018, GAO reported that the financial outlook for the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund was poor—the Office of Personnel Management forecasted the fund would be depleted by 2030 if USPS continued not making payments into it. Legislation has not been enacted to place postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. Postal reform legislation has not taken place in part because of the difficulty in obtaining compromise among various stakeholders with divergent views (see figure below). However, since GAO’s 2010 report, USPS’s financial condition has significantly worsened raising fundamental questions about key elements of USPS’s business model. Such questions warrant congressional action.


On June 4, 2019, the House passed the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 ( H.R. 6 ) on a vote of 237 to 187. Title I of the bill, the Dream Act of 2019, would establish a process for certain unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States as children (known as unauthorized childhood arrivals) to obtain lawful permanent immigration status. This vote on H.R. 6 was the latest in a line of House and Senate floor votes on legislation to grant some type of immigration relief to unauthorized childhood arrivals. As commonly used, the term "unauthorized childhood arrivals" encompasses both individuals who entered the United States unlawfully, and individuals who entered legally but then lost legal status by violating the terms of a temporary visa. There is no single set of requirements that defines an unauthorized childhood arrival. Individual bills include their own criteria. Legislation on unauthorized childhood arrivals dates to 2001. The earliest bills, which received Senate committee action in the 107 th and 108 th Congresses, only addressed unauthorized childhood arrivals. More recent proposals receiving legislative action have combined provisions on unauthorized childhood arrivals with other immigration provisionsâin some cases, these have been major bills to reform the immigration system, such as Senate-passed S. 744 in the 113 th Congress. None of these bills have been enacted into law. Most measures on unauthorized childhood arrivals that have seen legislative action have proposed mechanisms for eligible individuals to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs), typically through a two-stage process. Criteria to obtain a conditional or temporary status (stage 1) commonly include continuous presence in the United States for a minimum number of years prior to the date of the bill's enactment, initial entry into the United States as a minor, and satisfaction of specified educational requirements. Criteria to become a full-fledged LPR (stage 2) typically include satisfaction of additional educational requirements or service in the Armed Forces, or, in some cases, employment. Proposals to grant legal immigration status to unauthorized childhood arrivals also require applicants to clear criminal and security-related ineligibility criteria. In June 2012, following unsuccessful efforts in the 111 th Congress to enact legislation to grant LPR status to unauthorized childhood arrivals, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Under this initiative, eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals could receive renewable two-year protection from removal and work authorization. The eligibility criteria for an initial grant of DACA were broadly similar to those in earlier bills on unauthorized childhood arrivals and included continuous residence in the Unite d States since June 2007 , initial U.S. entry before age 16 , and satisfaction of educational requirements or service in the Armed Forces. In September 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that DACA was being terminated. Due to court rulings to date, however, past recipients continue to be able to request DACA. The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on the DACA rescission on November 12, 2019. According to USCIS data, there were approximately 669,080 active DACA recipients as of April 30, 2019, and the total number of individuals who had ever been granted DACA was 822,063 as of July 31, 2019. These DACA recipient numbers can be compared to estimates of the DACA-eligible population. The Migration Policy Institute has estimated that as of 2018, 1,302,000 individuals met the original DACA eligibility requirements and an additional 356,000 met the age, residence, and immigration status criteria but not the educational requirements. It remains to be seen whether H.R. 6 , as passed by the House, or another measure to grant legal status to unauthorized childhood arrivals will be enacted into law.


On June 5, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to adopt Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-291). Reg BI reforms requirements for broker-dealers when they make investment recommendations to retail customers. According to the SEC, Reg BI is meant to "enhance the broker-dealer standard of conduct beyond existing ... obligations [by] requiring broker-dealers ... to: (1) act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made, without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interests of the retail customer; and (2) address [various broker-dealer] conflicts of interest [with those clients]." Broker-dealers have until June 2020 to comply. Broker-dealers execute securities trades and provide investment recommendations. They are licensed and regulated by state securities regulators, the SEC, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a SEC-regulated entity that they must also join. Traditionally, broker-dealers provided transaction-specific discrete investment recommendations and were compensated via commissions for individual transactions. Broker-dealers have generally made investment recommendations under the suitability standard , a FINRA rule requiring that recommendations are merely consistent with customers' interests. By contrast, investment advisersâanother type of financial professional that typically offers more ongoing investment counsel (such as retirement planning) and is compensated by fixed fees or a percentage of total assets managedâhave generally followed the fiduciary standard , a nonstatutory obligation derived from court rulings and decisions from SEC enforcement cases. It requires a more demanding level of financial professional client care than does broker-dealers' suitability standard: advisers are expected to serve their clients' best interests above their own. Partly motivated by reporting on widespread investor confusion over the differences between broker-dealers and investment advisers and their respective client obligations, Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank, P.L. 111-203 ) directed the SEC to evaluate gaps in existing regulations for advisers and broker-dealers. It gave the SEC authority to impose a fiduciary standard of care on broker-dealers akin to that already applied to advisers. Dodd-Frank also required the SEC to study this issue. The resulting 2011 staff study recommended that the SEC adopt a uniform fiduciary standard. In 2016, the Obama Administration's Department of Labor (DOL) issued controversial regulations that subjected financial professionals who work with private-sector retirement plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-406 ) to an elevated fiduciary level of customer duty. The largely unimplemented reform, which earned praise from investor advocates, was vacated in a 2018 court case brought by various business interests who successfully argued that it was statutory overreach. Currently, Trump Administration DOL officials are reportedly working on a new standard projected to align with Reg BI. SEC officials and various business groups argue that Reg BI properly balances the need for an enhanced broker-dealer standard of care with the need to preserve the broker-dealer business model, a model deemed to have special appeal to less-affluent investors. Critics, including investor advocates, argue that it effectively preserves the inadequate suitability standard, exposing investors to harm from unaddressed broker-dealer conflicts of interest. In June 2019, the House passed H.R. 3351 , the FY2020 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill. It included an amendment sponsored by House Financial Services Committee Chair Maxine Waters that would have forbidden the SEC from using any of its congressional spending authority to implement, administer, enforce, or publicize the final rules and interpretations with respect to Reg BI. On December 20, 2019, President Trump signed H.R. 1865 , the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, which became P.L. 116-94 and will fund the federal government through FY2020. It does not contain the aforementioned SEC restrictions contained in H.R. 3351 .


On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared an emergency under Section 501(b) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§5121 et seq.) in response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The declaration authorized assistance to all U.S. states, territories, tribes, and the District of Columbia. Specifically, the Stafford Act emergency declaration authorized one form of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance: Public Assistance emergency protective measures (as authorized under Stafford Act Section 502). Subsequently, the President approved major disaster declaration requests under the Stafford Act for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (authorized under Stafford Act Section 401). This report provides answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the Stafford Act disaster declarations made for COVID-19, federally available assistance, and sources of funding. The subjects to be covered include: Stafford Act declarations, including legal authorities, limitations on assistance, and other information related to the declaration request process; types of assistance available to state, territorial, and tribal governments, private nonprofit organizations, private entities, and individuals and households pursuant to the Stafford Act emergency and major disaster declarations for COVID-19; the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the source used to fund FEMA assistance provided pursuant to Stafford Act emergency and major disaster declarations; and additional references. This report also includes the following appendices: Appendix A includes Table A-1 , which lists the categories of FEMA assistance authorized pursuant to the major disaster declarations for COVID-19, organized by state and territory. Appendix B provides an example of different states, territories, and tribes that have received presidential emergency declarations under the Stafford Act for the same incident. The scope of this report is limited to assistance authorized under the Stafford Act. There are, however, other types of assistance extrinsic to the Stafford Act that are activated by a Stafford declaration. This report does not address these other forms of assistance. The report is not a comprehensive review of all potential forms of federal assistance made available for COVID-19 response and recovery. It does not provide information on the assistance made available pursuant to the President's declaration of emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA; 50 U.S.C. Â§Â§1601 et seq.) or the declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) of a Public Health Emergency under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA; 42 U.S.C. Â§247d). Information included in this report is current as of April 22, 2020.


On March 27, 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was signed into law ( P.L. 116-136 ). The CARES Act includes $3.5 billion in supplemental appropriations for the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). These funds are to be used to "prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus." The CCDBG Act (42 U.S.C. Â§Â§9858 et seq.) is the main federal law supporting child care programs for low-income working families. The CCDBG is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS allocates CCDBG funds to states, territories, and tribes according to a statutory formula. State, territory, and tribal lead agencies submit CCDBG plans to HHS every three years describing how their child care programs will operate. CCDBG funds are used to subsidize the cost of child care for eligible children of low-income working parents. Funds are also used to support activities to improve the quality of child care and for certain other activities. The $3.5 billion in supplemental CCDBG funds are provided in addition to FY2020 annual appropriations of $5.8 billion ( P.L. 116-94 ). The additional $3.5 billion represents a 60% increase in total appropriations to the CCDBG in FY2020. The CARES Act funds may be used under existing CCDBG Act authorities. In addition, the CARES Act includes a number of provisions that clarify allowable uses and, in some cases, waive certain underlying requirements of the CCDBG Act. For instance, the CARES Act specifies that the funds may be used to provide continued payments and assistance to child care providers in cases of decreased enrollment or closures related to coronavirus, and to ensure they are able to remain open or reopen; may be used to continue to pay staff salaries and wages of child care providers (CCDBG lead agencies are encouraged to place conditions on payments to child care providers aimed at ensuring that a portion of the funds they receive go toward costs of salaries and wages); may be used to provide child care assistance to health care sector employees, emergency responders, sanitation workers, and other workers deemed essential during the response to the coronavirus, without regard to typical CCDBG income eligibility requirements (federal law generally limits eligibility to those whose family income does not exceed 85% of state median income, though most states set income limits below this federal threshold); shall be available to eligible child care providers under the CCDBG Act (even if they were not receiving CCDBG funds previously) for the purposes of cleaning and sanitation, and other activities necessary to maintain or resume program operation; are exempt from the minimum spending requirements for quality activities and direct services; may be used for allowable obligations incurred prior to enactment of the CARES Act; may be used for purposes provided in the CARES Act before the lead agency submits any applicable CCDBG plan amendments to HHS (under regulations, lead agencies generally must submit state plan amendments within 60 days of policy change); shall be used to supplement, not supplant, state, territory, and tribal general revenue funds for child care assistance for low-income families; and are to remain available for obligation by HHS through the end of FY2021 and may remain available for obligation by CCDBG le ad a gencies through the end of FY2022.


On May 23, 2019, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would undertake a second trade aid package in 2019 valued at up to $16 billionâsimilar to a trade aid package initiated in 2018 valued at $12 billionâto assist farmers in response to trade damage from continued tariff retaliation and trade disruptions. Under the 2019 trade aid package, USDA will use its authority under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act to fund three separate programs to assist agricultural producers in 2019 while the Administration works to resolve the ongoing trade disputes with certain foreign nations, most notably China. The three programs are similar to the 2018 trade aid package but are funded at different levels: 1. The Market Facilitation Program (MFP) for 2019, administered by USDA's Farm Service Agency, is to provide up to $14.5 billion in direct payments to producers of affected commodities (compared with up to $10 billion in 2018). 2. A Food Purchase and Distribution Program , administered through USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, will use $1.4 billion (compared with $1.2 billion in 2018) to purchase surplus commodities affected by trade retaliation, such as fruits, vegetables, some processed foods, beef, pork, lamb, poultry, and milk, for distribution by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service to food banks, schools, and other outlets serving low-income individuals. 3. The Agricultural Trade Promotion Program , administered by USDA's Foreign Agriculture Service, will be provided $100 million ($200 million in 2018) to assist in developing new export markets on behalf of U.S. agricultural producers. The broad discretionary authority granted to the Secretary under the CCC Charter Act to implement the trade aid package also allows the Secretary to determine how the aid is to be calculated and distributed. Some important differences between the 2018 and 2019 trade aid packages include the following. The 2019 package includes an expanded funding commitment of $16 billion versus $12 billion under the 2018 package. The 2019 package focuses on the same three commodity groupsânon-specialty crops (grains and oilseeds), specialty crops (nuts and fruit), and animal products (hogs and dairy)âbut includes an expanded list of eligible commodities (41 eligible commodities in 2019 compared with nine in 2018). The MFP payment formula for 2019 is modified for non-specialty crops to be a single county payment rate rather than commodity-specific rates that were applied in 2018. This is done to minimize influencing producer crop choices and avoid large payment-rate discrepancies across commodities. MFP payments for non-specialty crops will be based on planted acres in 2019, not harvested production as in 2018. This change will avoid having MFP payments reduced by the lower yields that are expected across major growing regions due to the widespread wet spring and delayed plantings. The 2019 package includes expanded payment limits per individual per commodity group ($250,000 versus $125,000 under the 2018 initiative) and an expanded maximum combined payment limit across commodity groups ($500,000 versus $375,000). It continues the expanded adjusted gross income (AGI) criteria (no restriction if at least 75% of AGI is from farming operations) adopted under the 2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act ( P.L. 116-20 ) and applied to 2018 MFP payments retroactively. Payments may be made in up to three tranches, with the second and third tranches dependent on market developments. The first payment started in August and consisted of the higher of either 50% of a producer's calculated payment or $15 per acre. USDA announced on November 15, 2019, that the second tranche of payments would go out on November 18, 2019. The third tranche would depend on USDA's evaluation of market and trade conditions. If deemed necessary, they would occur in January 2020. As of November 25, 2019, USDA had made $10.2 billion in 2019 MFP payments. USDA's use of CCC authority to initiate and fund agricultural support programs without congressional involvement is not without precedent, but the scope and scale of its use for the two trade aid packagesâat $28 billionâhas increased congressional and public interest. Some have questioned whether MFP payments have established a precedent that might persist as long as trade disputes remain unresolved. Others have questioned the equity of their distribution across commodity sectors and regions. Finally, some economists worry that large MFP payments might contribute to a violation of U.S. trade commitments to the World Trade Organization.


On October 7, 2019, after six months of formal negotiations, the United States and Japan signed two agreements intended to liberalize bilateral trade. One, the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA), provides for limited tariff reductions and quota expansions to improve market access. The other, the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement, includes commitments pertaining to digital aspects of international commerce, such as cross-border data flows. These agreements constitute what the Trump and Abe Administrations envision as "stage one" of a broader trade liberalization negotiation, which the two leaders first announced in September 2018. The two sides have stated their intent to continue negotiations on a more comprehensive deal after these agreements enter into force. Congress has an interest in U.S.-Japan trade agreement negotiations given congressional authority to regulate foreign commerce and the agreements' potential effects on the U.S. economy and constituents. USJTA is to reduce or eliminate tariffs on agriculture and some industrial goods, covering approximately $14.4 billion ($7.2 billion each of U.S. imports and exports) or 5% of bilateral trade. The United States is to reduce or eliminate tariffs on a small number (241) of mostly industrial goods, while Japan is to reduce or eliminate tariffs on roughly 600 agricultural tariff lines and expand preferential tariff-rate quotas for a limited number of U.S. products. The United States framed the digital trade commitments as "gold standard," with commitments on nondiscriminatory treatment of digital products, and prohibition of data localization barriers and restrictions on cross-border data flows, among other provisions. The stage one agreement excludes most other goods from tariff liberalization and does not cover market access for services, rules beyond digital trade, or nontariff barriers. Notably, the agreement does not cover trade in autos, an industry accounting for one-third of U.S. imports from Japan. Japan's decision to participate in bilateral talks came after President Donald Trump threatened to impose additional auto tariffs on Japan, based on national security concerns. Prior to the Trump Administration, the United States negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) that removed virtually all tariffs between the parties and covered a broad range of trade-related rules and disciplines in one comprehensive negotiation, driven in significant part by congressionally mandated U.S. negotiating objectives. Nontariff issues often require implementing legislation by Congress to take effect, and Congress has typically considered implementing legislation for past U.S. FTAs through expedited procedures under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). The Trump Administration, however, plans to put the stage one agreements with Japan into effect without action by Congress. The Administration plans to use delegated tariff authorities in TPA to proclaim the USJTA market access provisions, while the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement does not appear to require changes to U.S. law and is being treated as an Executive Agreement. Japan's Diet (the national legislature) ratified the pact in December 2019. The Administration expects the agreements to take effect in early 2020, with negotiations on the second stage of commitments to begin within four months. The Trump Administration's interest in bilateral trade negotiations is tied to its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2017, which included the United States and Japan, along with 10 other Asia-Pacific countries. In general, TPP was far more comprehensive than the stage one U.S.-Japan agreements, as it would have eliminated most tariffs among the parties and created rules and disciplines on a number of trade-related issues, such as intellectual property rights and services. Japan's FTAs with other countries, including the TPP-11, which entered into force among the remaining TPP members in 2018, and an FTA with the European Union (EU), which took effect in 2019, have led to growing concerns among U.S. industry and many in Congress that U.S. exporters face certain disadvantages in the Japanese market. The USJTA will largely place U.S. agricultural exporters on par with Japan's other FTA partners with regard to tariffs, but unlike the TPP and its successor, the agreement excludes some agricultural products, such as rice and barley. It also does not include rules, such as on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and therefore will not address various nontariff barriers U.S. agriculture and other industries face in Japan. Thus, U.S. agricultural exporters may continue to be at some disadvantage in the Japanese market compared to those from TPP countries or the EU. In general, Congress and U.S. stakeholders support the agreements due to the expected benefits to U.S. agriculture and cross-border digital trade. At the same time, the overall economic effects of the agreement are likely to be modest due to the limited scope of the agreement. Many observers contend the deal should not be a substitute for a comprehensive trade agreement and view the second stage of talks as critical to U.S. interests. If more comprehensive negotiations begin in 2020, they may become intertwined with other bilateral issues, such as concerns among many Japanese officials that the United States has a waning interest in maintaining its current influence in East Asia, and upcoming negotiations over the renewal of the U.S.-Japan agreement on how to share the costs of basing U.S. military troops in Japan. Some Members of Congress have also raised questions over whether the staged approach to the U.S.-Japan negotiations is in the best interest of the United States, and what it may mean for future U.S. trade agreement negotiations. There are also questions about whether the agreements adhere to multilateral trade rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO), given their limited scope, and whether the Administration has adequately consulted with Congress in its negotiation and implementation of the new agreements.


One of the Coast Guard's statutory missions is the care and maintenance of ATON. Much like drivers need signs and universal driving rules, mariners need equivalent nautical “rules of the road.” As of November 2019, the Coast Guard managed 45,664 federal fixed and floating ATON that are designed to assist those operating in the U.S. Marine Transportation System, which includes about 25,000 miles of waterways, 1,000 harbor channels, 300 ports, and 3,700 terminals. According to the Coast Guard, as of July 2018, these ATON had a collective replacement value of about $1.6 billion. The Coast Guard has faced an array of challenges in managing its ATON, such as deteriorating buoys, and questions have been raised regarding the extent to which the Coast Guard is addressing these challenges. This report (1) describes what is known about the condition and costs of maintaining the Coast Guard's ATON, and (2) examines challenges the Coast Guard has experienced in managing its ATON and how it is addressing them. To address these issues, GAO reviewed ATON regulations and guidance, analyzed data on ATON condition and cost measures, collected input from all nine Coast Guard districts on ATON challenges, accompanied ATON units on mission activities, assessed agency initiatives using leading program management practices, and interviewed headquarters and field unit officials. The condition of the Coast Guard's aids to navigation (ATON), both fixed (e.g., lighthouses) and floating (e.g., buoys), have declined slightly while the overall costs for repairing or replacing them increased in recent years. According to Coast Guard data, its key metric for ATON condition—the Aid Availability Rate, or percentage of time that ATON are functioning correctly—declined from 98.0 to 97.1 percent during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, dipping slightly below the 97.5 percent target rate in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. During this time period, the overall costs to repair and replace ATON increased from about $12 million in fiscal year 2014 to about $20 million in fiscal year 2018. According to Coast Guard data, the majority of the costs for fixed ATON were spent on repairs whereas the majority of the costs for floating ATON were spent on replacements. The Coast Guard faces challenges in managing its fixed and floating ATON and has developed plans and initiatives to address them, but it has limited assurance that the plans and initiatives will be effectively implemented. According to Coast Guard officials, the challenges include decreased availability of vessels to service ATON, reduced ability to provide routine ATON servicing in a timely manner due to severe weather, among other factors, and limited capacity at ATON major repair and refurbishment facilities. The Coast Guard has developed plans to guide the ATON program, and these plans have led to the development and implementation of various initiatives at the headquarters and field unit levels to address these challenges. However, GAO found that the initiatives do not contain certain elements that help ensure effective implementation—such as desired outcomes and schedule milestones and completion dates—as recommended by leading program management practices. According to Coast Guard officials, they are still developing guidance and procedures for ATON-related initiatives that are to be implemented by the districts. By updating these initiatives to include certain elements, such as the specific outcomes desired and timeframes for completing them, the Coast Guard would have better assurance that its initiatives to address ATON management challenges will be effectively implemented.


Ongoing sewage spills and stormwater runoff carrying trash, sediment, and other pollutants in the Santa Cruz River Basin and Tijuana River Valley watersheds along the U.S.-Mexico border have affected public health, the environment, and local economies. Under the 1944 treaty, the United States and Mexico agreed to work together through IBWC to address these water quality problems. As part of this effort, USIBWC manages two wastewater treatment plants in Arizona and California. In 2018, the plants treated more than 14 billion gallons of sewage from Mexico. This report (1) describes the authorities and roles for developing and managing the plants and sharing their costs; (2) examines factors affecting the operation of each plant and steps taken to address them; and (3) examines the extent to which USIBWC has taken actions to address water quality problems in the watersheds. GAO reviewed U.S-Mexico treaties, IBWC minutes and permits, and planning and budget data for USIBWC. GAO also interviewed officials from IBWC and other federal agencies, local and state governments, and non-governmental groups. A 1944 treaty designated the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and authorized it to resolve water and boundary issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, including providing wastewater treatment. IBWC's two sections—the U.S. Section (USIBWC) and the Mexican Section, negotiated agreements to construct, manage, and operate two wastewater plants in Nogales, Arizona, and San Ysidro (South Bay), California, to resolve ongoing water quality problems stemming from sewage flowing downhill from Mexico into the United States (see figure). Several of these agreements describe each country's roles, such as sharing costs for the operation and maintenance of each plant. Several factors can affect the plants' operations, including deteriorating infrastructure in Mexico and the United States that results in raw sewage spills around the plants. USIBWC has taken steps to resolve some of these factors. For example, USIBWC proposed a binational rapid response team to address broken pipes and failing pumps that can send sewage from Mexico into the United States; however, the team has not been formalized to ensure its long-term operation. By taking steps to formalize the team, USIBWC would have assurance it can more effectively address recurring infrastructure failures contributing to sewage spills. USIBWC and others have taken some actions to address stormwater problems, such as studying stormwater flows in the Tijuana River Valley watershed and building some retention basins. However, USIBWC has not taken action, in coordination with federal, state, and local partners, to identify alternatives, cost estimates, funding sources, and time frames for implementing solutions in either watershed. USIBWC officials said without direction from Congress, it does not have specific authorization for stormwater management in the watersheds because the 1944 treaty and accompanying legislation did not authorize it to carry out such projects. The long-standing stormwater quality problems and their associated environmental and health effects suggest congressional direction is needed to authorize USIBWC to take action. Such action would include identifying alternatives, cost estimates, funding sources, and time frames.


Open source software is code that is released under a license which grants users the right to modify, share, and reuse the software. Making code available for reuse as open source can have major benefits such as decreasing costs and improving efficiencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 required DOD to submit a plan to Congress for initiating the open source software pilot program established by OMB memorandum M-16-21. DOD submitted its plan to Congress in June 2018. The act includes a provision for GAO to report on DOD's implementation of the open source software pilot program. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which DOD has implemented the open source software pilot program and other related requirements established by OMB; and (2) describe the views of responsible DOD officials on the use of open source software to achieve efficiency, transparency, and innovation at the department. To address these objectives, GAO compared DOD's plan for implementing the program to OMB's memo. GAO also interviewed defense officials at 11 DOD components including military departments, and defense agencies on their views about the benefits and risks of making code available as open source software. The Department of Defense (DOD) has not fully implemented an open source software pilot program and related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. OMB memorandum M-16-21 calls for agencies to implement a pilot program, which it defines as (1) releasing at least 20 percent of new custom developed code as open source, and (2) establishing a metric for calculating program performance. However, DOD has not fully implemented the program and has not established the metric. The OMB memorandum also requires agencies to implement other supporting activities. These include issuing policy on government-wide use of code, conducting analyses of software solutions, securing data rights and inventory code, and facilitating the open source community. DOD has not implemented the policy requirement and has partially implemented the remaining three requirements. Regarding the policy and analysis requirements, DOD plans to issue a policy and conduct analyses by the end of the 2019 calendar year. If the department effectively implements these intended steps consistent with OMB direction, DOD should be able to fully address these requirements. For the requirement of securing data rights and inventorying code, DOD issued a memorandum that directs contracting officers to secure data rights and to identify all source code created after August 2016. However, DOD's components have not executed these activities nor has DOD identified a milestone for when they will be completed. For the facilitating community requirement, DOD issued a memorandum that encourages conversations to foster communities and allow others to contribute knowledge, among other initiatives. However, DOD has not fully engaged in open development, established a release schedule, or fully documented its source code to facilitate use and adoption. To address these areas, DOD's Chief Information Officer plans to issue guidance but has not established a milestone for doing so. Until DOD fully implements the pilot program and develops milestones for two of the four OMB requirements (secure data rights and inventory code, and facilitate community), it will not be positioned to satisfy the mandate established in the law. DOD officials from 11 components expressed their opinions that an open source pilot program would potentially result in financial benefits and increased efficiency. However, there were disparate views on how to manage the cybersecurity risk of using open source software. Specifically, officials from three components noted that security concerns could result in the sporadic use of OSS, whereas eight officials stated that the potential cybersecurity risks were managable.


Originally enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes a three-part system that requires federal agencies to disclose a large swath of government information to the public. First, FOIA directs agencies to publish substantive and procedural rules, along with certain other important government materials, in the Federal Register. Second, on a proactive basis, agencies must electronically disclose a separate set of information that consists of, among other things, final adjudicative opinions and certain "frequently requested" records. And lastly, FOIA requires agencies to disclose all covered records not made available pursuant to the aforementioned affirmative disclosure provisions to individuals, corporations, and others upon request. While FOIA's main purpose is to inform the public of the operations of the federal government, the act's drafters also sought to protect certain private and governmental interests from the law's disclosure obligations. FOIA, therefore, contains nine enumerated exemptions from disclosure that permitâbut they do not requireâagencies to withhold a range of information, including certain classified national security matters, confidential financial information, law enforcement records, and a variety of materials and types of information exempted by other statutes. And FOIA contains three "exclusions" that authorize agencies to treat certain law enforcement records as if they do not fall within FOIA's coverage. FOIA also authorizes requesters to seek judicial review of an agency's decision to withhold records. Federal district courts may "enjoin [an] agency from withholding agency records" and "order the production of any agency records improperly withheld." Judicial decisionsâincluding Supreme Court decisionsâhave often informed or provided the impetus for congressional amendments to FOIA. Although Congress is not subject to FOIA, the act may inform communications between the legislative branch and FOIA-covered entities. Under 5 U.S.C. Â§ 552(d), an agency may not "withhold information from Congress" on the basis that such information is covered by a FOIA exemption (although the provision does not dictate whether another source of law, such as executive privilege, may shield information from disclosure). The executive branch has interpreted this provision to apply to each house of Congress and congressional committees, but generally not to individual Members, whose requests for information are generally treated as subject to the same FOIA rules as requests from the public. This interpretation is not uniformly shared, with at least one federal appellate court interpreting Â§ 552(d) as applying to individual Members acting in their official capacities. In addition, although Congress is under no obligation to disclose its materials pursuant to FOIA, whether a congressional document possessed by an agency is subject to FOIA depends on whether Congress clearly expressed its intention to retain control over the specific document. Lastly, although FOIA is the primary statutory mechanism by which the public may gain access to federal government records and information, other lawsâspecifically the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, and Privacy Actâalso set forth rights and limitations on the public's access to government information or activities.


An internet protocol provides the addressing mechanism that defines how and where information moves across interconnected networks. Increased use of the internet has exhausted available IPv4 address space, spurring the adoption of its successor protocol, IPv6. OMB has required that agencies plan for transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6. Senate and House reports accompanying the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act included provisions for GAO to review DOD's IPv6 transition planning efforts. This report (1) identifies past DOD attempts to transition to IPv6, (2) examines the extent to which DOD has completed OMB's planning requirements for its current transition effort, and (3) identifies DOD's progress in completing its own IPv6 transition activities. To do so, GAO assessed DOD's IPv6 transition plans and documentation against OMB's requirements, reviewed DOD's planned IPv6 transition activities, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) current initiative to transition to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which began in April 2017, follows at least two prior attempts to implement IPv6 that were halted by DOD. In one effort that began in approximately 2003, DOD initially did make progress implementing IPv6 on its systems, but then the department ended the effort due to security risks and a lack of personnel trained in IPv6. DOD initiated another attempt in response to 2010 OMB guidance. However, this initiative was terminated shortly thereafter, again due to security concerns. For its current initiative, DOD has not completed three of four longstanding OMB requirements (see table). Without an inventory, a cost estimate, or a risk analysis, DOD's plans have a high degree of uncertainty about the magnitude of work involved, the level of resources required, and the extent and nature of threats, including cybersecurity risks. In February 2019, DOD released its own IPv6 planning and implementation guidance that listed 35 required transition activities, 18 of which were due to be completed before March 2020. DOD completed six of the 18 activities as of March 2020. DOD officials acknowledged that the department's transition time frames were optimistic; they added that they had thought that the activities' deadlines were reasonable until they started performing the work. Without an inventory, a cost estimate, or a risk analysis, DOD significantly reduced the probability that it could have developed a realistic transition schedule. Addressing these basic planning requirements would supply DOD with needed information that would enable the department to develop realistic, detailed, and informed transition plans and time frames.


Outbreaks of infectious diseases—such as Ebola, Zika, and pandemic influenza—have raised concerns from Congress about how federal agencies use modeling to, among other things, predict disease distribution and potential impacts. In general, a model is a representation of reality expressed through mathematical or logical relationships. Models of infectious diseases can help decision makers set policies for disease control and may help to allocate resources. GAO was asked to review federal modeling for selected infectious diseases. This report examines (1) the extent to which HHS used models to inform policy, planning, and resource allocation for public health decisions; (2) the extent to which HHS coordinated modeling efforts; (3) steps HHS generally takes to assess model development and performance; and (4) the extent to which HHS has addressed challenges related to modeling. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed HHS officials, state officials, and subject matter experts. GAO identified practices commonly used to assess infectious disease model performance and reviewed 10 selected modeling efforts to see if they followed these practices. Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) used models to inform decision-making during and after outbreaks of Ebola, Zika, and pandemic influenza. These agencies' modeling efforts informed public health planning, outbreak response, and, to a limited extent, resource allocation. Four CDC centers perform modeling. HHS agencies reported using multiple mechanisms to coordinate modeling efforts across agencies, but they do not routinely monitor, evaluate, or report on the extent and success of coordination. Consequently, they risk missing opportunities to identify and address modeling challenges—such as communicating clearly, and obtaining adequate data and resources—before and during an outbreak. As a result, agencies may be limiting their ability to identify improvements in those and other areas. Further, there is potential for overlap and duplication of cross-agency modeling efforts, which could lead to inefficiencies. CDC and ASPR generally developed and assessed their models in accordance with four steps GAO identified as commonly-recognized modeling practices: (1) communication between modeler and decision maker, (2) model description, (3) verification, and (4) validation. However, for four of the 10 models reviewed, CDC did not provide all details needed to reproduce model results, a key step that lets other scientists confirm those results. GAO found that CDC's guidelines and policy do not address reproducibility of models or their code. This is inconsistent with HHS guidelines and may jeopardize the reliability of CDC's research. This report also identifies several modeling-related challenges, along with steps agencies have taken to address them.


Over 1.2 million foreign students studied at U.S. universities in 2018 (see fig.). Although foreign students and scholars contribute to U.S. research, there is a risk that they will “export” sensitive knowledge they gain to their home countries. To mitigate this risk, the U.S. government implements export controls. GAO was asked to review agency guidance and universities' security practices. This report examines (1) the extent to which State and Commerce have provided guidance and outreach that supports U.S. universities' understanding of export control regulations; (2) challenges U.S. universities face working with other federal agencies, such as DOD; and (3) the extent to which universities' export compliance practices align with State and Commerce guidelines. GAO reviewed related laws, regulations, and guidance, and interviewed officials from relevant federal agencies and four university associations. GAO also visited nine universities—selected, in part, on the basis of research expenditures and geography—and assessed their compliance practices against agency guidelines. The Departments of State (State) and Commerce (Commerce) have each provided guidance and outreach to support exporters' understanding of and compliance with their separate export control regulations. Exporters, including universities, are subject to these regulations if they ship export-controlled items overseas or if they share such items, including technology or source code, with foreign persons in the United States. University and association officials raised concerns that State and Commerce guidance and outreach does not adequately address export compliance issues that are more common to universities than to industry, such as fundamental research—i.e., research that is ordinarily published and not subject to export control regulations. Without additional guidance and outreach that addresses such issues, universities may not have the information they need to adequately comply with these regulations and properly safeguard export-controlled items. Officials from selected universities and university associations identified three export control-related challenges in working with other federal agencies. For example, university and association officials asserted that Department of Defense (DOD) officials misunderstand the term fundamental research, which may limit universities' ability to conduct research for DOD. DOD acknowledged that some officials have inconsistently interpreted the regulations and that it has not yet fully addressed this challenge. Additionally, university and association officials expressed concerns that threat briefings and other guidance that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security provide are not helpful because, for example, they do not contain unclassified information that can be shared widely. To address these concerns, the FBI partnered with a university association to produce a series of unclassified “awareness-raising” materials for university audiences, among other efforts. Seven of the nine universities GAO visited have export compliance policies and practices that generally align with State's and Commerce's export compliance guidelines. For example, most have demonstrated a strong management commitment to export compliance and have robust practices for tracking export-controlled items, recordkeeping, and reporting potential violations. However, GAO identified gaps in some universities' practices in four areas—risk assessments, training, internal audits, and export compliance manuals.


Over 2 million low- and moderate-income households live in HUD-assisted (subsidized) or -insured multifamily housing. HUD's REAC uses contractors to inspect the physical condition of these properties to determine that they are decent, safe, sanitary, and in good repair. The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, included a provision for GAO to review REAC's policies and processes. This report discusses, among other things, (1) REAC's process for identifying physical deficiencies and (2) REAC's selection, training, and monitoring of contract inspectors and its own quality assurance inspectors. GAO reviewed HUD documents and data related to REAC's physical inspection process, use of contract and quality assurance inspectors, and enforcement processes. GAO also interviewed HUD officials and housing industry stakeholder groups and conducted discussion groups with contract and quality assurance inspectors. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Real Estate Assessment Center's (REAC) standardized process to identify physical deficiencies at HUD multifamily properties (including public housing) has some weaknesses. For example, REAC has not conducted a comprehensive review of its inspection process since 2001, even though new risks to its process have emerged, such as property owners misrepresenting the conditions of their properties. A comprehensive review could help REAC identify risks and ensure it is meeting the goal of producing inspections that are reliable, replicable, and reasonable. In addition, REAC does not track its progress toward meeting its inspection schedule for certain properties, which could hinder HUD's ability to take enforcement actions. Finally, in the wake of concerns that inspections were not always identifying troubled properties, REAC and other HUD units, including the Office of Multifamily Housing, made eight recommendations in January 2017 to enhance the inspection process, but HUD had only approved three of these recommendations and had not implemented any of them as of December 2018. REAC uses contractors to inspect properties; these contract inspectors are trained and overseen by quality assurance inspectors hired directly by REAC. However, REAC's processes to select, train, and monitor both contract inspectors and quality assurance inspectors have weaknesses. Selection. REAC does not verify the qualifications of contract inspector candidates before they are selected to begin training to become certified inspectors. Formal processes to verify qualifications may help REAC identify unqualified candidates before they begin training and avoid expending resources on training these candidates. Training. REAC lacks formal mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of its training program for contract and quality assurance inspectors. In addition, unlike other professional inspection organizations, REAC does not have continuing education requirements. Formal mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of its training program could help REAC ensure that its program supports the development needs of inspectors. Further, requiring continuing education could help REAC ensure that inspectors are current on any changes in REAC's policies or industry standards. Monitoring. REAC has not met management targets for the number and timeliness of its inspection oversight reviews of contract inspectors. For example, REAC has not met its target of conducting three quality assurance reviews of poor-performing contractors per quarter. As a result, if deficiencies are not identified and recorded by contract inspectors, they may not be addressed in a timely manner. In addition, REAC's performance standards for its quality assurance inspectors have not been updated to reflect their broader job duties, such as conducting inspector oversight reviews and coaching and mentoring contract inspectors. Performance standards that are directly linked to these job duties would help ensure that inspectors are assessed on all of their key responsibilities.


Over 37,000 people were killed in traffic crashes on the nation's highways in 2017. Within the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), two agencies—NHTSA for behavioral factors and FHWA for highway infrastructure—provide about $3 billion annually to states for programs to improve traffic safety. To ensure that states are held accountable for these funds, NHTSA and FHWA developed performance management frameworks that require states to use performance measures and targets in tracking traffic fatalities and serious injuries. GAO was asked to review NHTSA's and FHWA's traffic safety performance management frameworks. This report examines the extent to which: (1) states have met fatality and serious injury targets, and NHTSA's and FHWA's approaches to assessing states' achievements, and (2) states have used performance measures and targets to make traffic safety funding decisions. GAO analyzed state-reported targets and NHTSA data from 2014 through 2017—the most recent data available—for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; surveyed these states on the use of performance measures and targets; reviewed requirements in NHTSA's and FHWA's frameworks; and interviewed officials from NHTSA, FHWA, and 10 states, selected to obtain a mix of population sizes, geographic locations, and other factors. From 2014 through 2017, states did not achieve most of the fatality-related targets they set under the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) performance management framework (see table), and the number of serious injury targets states achieved during this period is unclear. GAO did not assess whether states achieved targets they set under the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) framework because the data were not yet available. State officials we interviewed said that achieving fatality targets may depend on factors outside their control, such as demographic, economic, and legislative changes. GAO's analysis of states' reports showed that nearly half of states did not provide the required assessment of progress to NHTSA on their most recent set of fatality targets. While NHTSA has taken steps to improve its review of these reports, officials acknowledged states are not clear on which target years to assess. Further, NHTSA lacks a mechanism to report whether states eventually achieve these targets. As a result, NHTSA and other stakeholders have limited insight into the results states have achieved from their use of federal safety funds. The extent to which states achieved serious injury targets is unclear because states have changed their definitions of serious injury over time. To ensure the consistency of these data, NHTSA and FHWA established a standard definition for reporting serious injuries, which states are in the process of adopting. In a survey that GAO administered, officials from a majority of states said that performance measures informed how they selected projects under NHTSA's framework. GAO found, however, that in the 2019 plans submitted by states to NHTSA, less than a third of states reported how performance targets and funded projects were linked. Since the submission of those plans, NHTSA has provided training and guidance to its staff to ensure future plans will more clearly identify these links. Under FHWA's framework, about one-third of states reported in GAO's survey that performance measures influenced their project selection; the remaining two-thirds reported using an alternative data-driven approach, such as cost-benefit analysis. FHWA officials said they are developing guidance to help states integrate performance measures and targets into methods that states are currently using to select highway safety projects.


Over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses in 2017, according to the most recently available Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data. Overdoses have become the leading cause of death due to injuries in the United States, and most of these deaths involve opioids. GAO has a body of work on drug policy and ongoing work on ONDCP's efforts, including issuance of the National Drug Control Strategy. GAO also noted in its March 2019 High Risk report that federal efforts to prevent drug misuse is an emerging issue requiring close attention. This statement includes preliminary GAO observations on the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy and related findings from select GAO reports on federal opioid-related efforts. It is based on ongoing GAO work, two reports that GAO issued in March 2018 and October 2017, and selected updates on recommendations from these reports as of February 2019. For ongoing work and recommendation updates, GAO assessed the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy against statutory requirements, reviewed ONDCP and HHS documents, and interviewed ONDCP officials. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—responsible for coordinating and overseeing efforts by more than a dozen federal agencies to address illicit drug use—issued the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy on January 31, 2019. ONDCP describes the strategy as a high-level vision of federal drug control efforts, focused on prevention, treatment and recovery. The strategy designates one overarching objective to reduce the number of lives lost to drug addiction, and provides some description of federal agencies' activities, including steps to reduce the availability of illicit drugs. However, it does not include certain information required by law, such as annual objectives that are quantifiable and measurable, or a 5-year projection for program and budget priorities. This required information could help prioritize activities across federal agencies and measure progress over time, which previous GAO work has shown to be important for achieving results. GAO will continue to assess the strategy as part of ongoing work, and make recommendations as appropriate. The lack of information in the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy on measuring progress toward its objective to reduce lives lost is particularly concerning in light of previous GAO reports. These reports found that individual agencies could do more to assess their particular efforts related to opioids. For example, GAO reported in March 2018 on five agency-specific strategies to combat illicit opioids, and also reported in October 2017 on the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) efforts to expand access to medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder. In these reports, GAO recommended, among other things, that federal agencies establish performance measures to better determine progress toward their goals. While federal agencies have taken some action to implement these recommendations, such as establishing performance measures for access to medication-assisted treatment, additional actions to measure the effectiveness of related drug control efforts would further help to gauge agencies' success, determine if new approaches are needed, and efficiently target resources.


Over the 1979-2018 period, real wages at the 10 th percentile of the hourly wage distribution grew by 1.6%, whereas wages at the 50 th percentile grew by 6.1% and wages at the 90 th percentile grew by 37.6%. These patterns varied by sex, race, and ethnicity. Most of the increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution occurred by 1990 and leveled off by 2000, whereas inequality continued to grow at the top of the distribution after 2000. Lower wages are associated with less education, and the college wage premium (the ratio of earnings of those with a college degree over those with a high school degree) grew steeply until 2000. The labor income share of compensation has declined beginning around 2000. Both the growth in hourly wage inequality and the decline in the labor share of compensation contributed to greater inequality of before-tax income. From 1979 to 2017, the income share of the bottom quintile fell from 5.3% to 3.5%, whereas the share of the top quintile rose from 41.9% to 50.1%. Several factors potentially contributed to this change in wage inequality: technological advancement, globalization, wage-setting institutional changes (i.e., the minimum wage, presence of labor unions, and decline in the large firm wage premium), immigration, and declines in job mobility, across jobs in general and geographically. A review of the economic research suggests that a major force in causing this growing wage inequality and lower wage growth was skill-based technological change (change increasing the demand for skilled over unskilled workers). Although there is mixed evidence, most studies find a smaller, modest effect of globalization (although trade affects locations and sectors differently). The minimum wage appeared to play a relatively small role. The decline in wages has coincided with the decline in unions, but to some extent, the decline in unions was a consequence of the decline in jobs in heavily unionized sectors due to technological advancement. Given the size of the decline and the union wage premium, as well as tracing some of the decline to technology, unionization appears to be of limited importance. The decline in the wage premium for large firms may also be traced to increased competition from technological advancement and globalization. Evidence also indicates that immigration had little effect on the distribution of wages, but resulted in a slight increase in inequality because immigrants are concentrated at the upper and lower ends of the income distribution. A decline in labor force mobility has occurred in recent years and could have contributed in some way to inequality. Because the causes of the wage stagnation and growth inequality appear to be traceable largely to technological change, which is otherwise valued, other policies might be considered to increase the well-being of workers whose wages have stagnated. One policy option is to either increase transfers, including those provided through the tax structure, such as the earned income tax credit. Childless workers, in particular, have small earned income credits. Another option is to increase the federal minimum wage, although states are gradually undertaking these increases. A more far-reaching policy option is a federally guaranteed job. Proposals have also been made to expand wage insurance, which currently is available to only a narrow group of trade-affected workers. Policies to increase skill acquisition, including a greatly expanded apprenticeship program, could be considered, although they would have delayed effects on inequality. A variety of policies have been advanced to strengthen unions. In addition, a number of policies might be considered to increase labor mobility. Finally, a variety of geographically targeted provisions aimed particularly at increasing employment in chronically high unemployment areas could be considered. Transfers, including the earned income credit, have improved the distribution of after-tax income, but some other policies have a less successful track record, and some (such as a guaranteed job) are untried.


Over the last several years, lawmakers in the United States have responded to rising drug overdose deaths, which increased four-fold from 1999 to 2017, with a variety of legislation, hearings, and oversight activities. In 2017, more than 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, and approximately 68% of those deaths involved an opioid. Many federal agencies are involved in domestic and foreign efforts to combat opioid abuse and the continuing increase in opioid related overdose deaths. A subset of those agencies confront the supply side (some may also confront the demand side) of the opioid epidemic. The primary federal agency involved in drug enforcement, including prescription opioids diversion control, is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Other federal agencies that address the illicit opioid supply include, but are not limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and Office of National Drug Control Policy. This report focuses on efforts from these departments and agencies only. Lawmakers have addressed opioid abuse as both a public health and a criminal justice issue, and Congress enacted several new laws in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses. These include the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ), and most recently the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271 ). Congress also provided funds specifically to address the opioid epidemic in FY2017-FY2019 appropriations. This report answers common supply and criminal justice-related questions that have arisen as drug overdose deaths in the United States continue to increase. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of opioid abuse as a criminal justice issue. The report is divided into the following sections: Overview of the Opioid Epidemic in the United States; Overview of the Opioid Supply; Opioids and Domestic Supply Control Policy; Opioids and Foreign Supply Control Policy; Recent Congressional Action on the Opioid Epidemic; and The Opioid Epidemic and State Criminal Justice Policies.


Over the past 2 decades, the federal government has undertaken efforts to save money and increase efficiencies by encouraging agencies to use administrative and operational services and processes that other federal and external parties provide, commonly referred to as shared services. The DATA Act was enacted to increase accountability and transparency and, among other things, establish government-wide data standards. Certain agencies have used shared services of federal SSPs to implement the act. The act also requires a series of oversight reports by agencies' Offices of Inspector General (OIG) and GAO. OIGs for five agencies have made recommendations related to agencies' use of SSPs for DATA Act services, and four agencies concurred with the recommendations. The objectives of this report are to describe (1) the types and variations of services that federal SSPs provide to their financial management customer agencies to assist them with implementing the DATA Act and meeting the act's requirements and (2) the challenges federal SSPs and their financial management customer agencies have encountered in their efforts to ensure the quality of data submissions consistent with DATA Act standards and steps they have taken to address those challenges. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed staff at four federal SSPs, OMB, and Treasury; reviewed selected agreements between the SSPs and their customer agencies; conducted a survey of customer agencies from December 2018 to January 2019; and analyzed the survey responses. GAO found that the 27 agencies that responded to its survey use federal shared service providers (SSP) for a variety of services, including financial system hosting, general ledger accounting, financial reporting, and various Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) services. Sixteen of the 27 SSP customer agencies reported that they experienced challenges associated with using an SSP, many of which affected the timeliness, completeness, or accuracy of agency DATA Act submissions. Ten of these agencies experienced challenges with depending on an SSP to take actions before the agency could proceed. Agencies responding to GAO's survey also reported other challenges, such as a lack of guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), limited customer agency and SSP resources, SSP errors affecting data quality, and inadequate SSP project management activities. Twelve of these 16 agencies stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges—such as increasing communication with their SSPs, making technology improvements, and performing manual work-arounds to reconcile and correct data files. Nine agencies reported remaining additional steps, for example, correcting data errors and developing a reconciliation process and internal guidance on topics such as data quality plans. While agencies are primarily responsible for the quality of DATA Act submissions, five agencies also reported that their SSPs had taken similar steps to address identified challenges. Twenty of the 27 agencies described useful practices for working with SSPs on DATA Act submissions, including the agency discussing issues with the SSP and obtaining data files from the SSP each month to provide additional time to correct any identified errors. Treasury officials stated prior to GAO's survey that they held workshops for SSPs in the early stages of DATA Act implementation and clarified guidance issued in June 2018 to specifically address their concerns and questions. After GAO's survey, in April 2019, OMB issued a memorandum on shared services that among other things described the process and desired outcomes for shared services and established a governance and accountability model for achieving them.


Over the past 30 years, the relationship between the United States and Poland has been close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and backed its entry into the European Union (EU) in 2004. Poland has made significant contributions to U.S.- and NATO-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Poland and the United States continue to work together closely on a range of foreign policy and international security issues. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The 2015 Polish parliamentary election resulted in a victory for the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament ( Sejm ). Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS) is Poland's prime minister and head of government. The center-right Civic Platform (PO) party led the government of Poland from 2007 to 2015. Since winning the election, Law and Justice has made changes to the country's judicial system and enacted other reforms that have generated concerns about backsliding on democracy and triggered an EU rule-of-law investigation. Poland's next parliamentary election is due to occur in October or November 2019. European Parliament and regional election results indicate that support for Law and Justice remains strong, and the party is favored to win the 2019 election. Law and Justice candidate Andrzej Duda won Poland's 2015 presidential election. The president is Poland's head of state and exercises a number of limited but important functions. The next presidential election is due to occur in May 2020. Poland was one of the few EU economies to come through the 2008-2009 global economic crisis without major damage. As an EU member Poland is obligated to adopt the euro as its currency, but it has not set a target date for adoption and continues to use the zÅoty as its national currency. Defense Modernization Poland has been implementing an armed forces modernization plan since 2013, and it intends to spend approximately $49Â billion on military equipment acquisitions and upgrades over the period 2017-2026. Completed and prospective purchases from U.S. suppliers, including advanced Patriot missiles and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, have a large role in this initiative. Poland is one of seven NATO members to meet the alliance's benchmark of spending at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, and it plans to reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Defense Cooperation Under the United States' European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the U.S. military's Operation Atlantic Resolve, as well as NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission, U.S. forces have expanded their presence in Poland since 2014 and increased joint training and exercises with their Polish counterparts. While U.S. forces participate in these missions on a rotational basis, the Polish government has proposed the establishment of a permanent U.S. base on Polish territory. Visa Waiver Program Although relations between Poland and the United States are largely positive, Poland's exclusion from the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has been a point of contention for many years. Some Members of Congress have advocated extending the VWP to include Poland. Relations with Russia Relations between Poland and Russia have long been tense, and Polish leaders have tended to view Russian intentions with wariness and suspicion. Poland remains a leading advocate for forceful EU sanctions against Russia over its 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and fostering of separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine. Energy Security Poland has promoted European energy integration, including projects to expand pipeline and electric grid interconnectivity in order to decrease reliance on Russia. Poland is a leading critic of Nord Stream 2, a Russian-owned pipeline project that would allow Germany to increase the amount of natural gas it imports directly from Russia via the Baltic Sea. Outlook and Issues for Congress Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing congressional interest. The main areas of interest include defense cooperation, energy security, and concerns about rule-of-law and governance issues.