Federal obligations under SBA's 8(a) Business Development Program totaled about $10.9 billion in fiscal year 2019, according to federal procurement data reported as of October 7, 2019. SBA's 8(a) program is one of the federal government's primary vehicles for developing socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses, including firms owned by ANCs. One of the key benefits of this program is the ability for ANC-owned firms to receive federal contract awards that have been set aside solely for 8(a) firms. From 2006 through 2016, GAO issued three reports detailing the limitations of SBA's oversight and monitoring of ANC-owned firms participating in the 8(a) program. GAO's testimony discusses the highlights of the aforementioned three reports and the extent to which SBA has addressed the recommendations GAO made in those reports, as of October 2019. GAO examined SBA files and other documents, conducted site visits, and interviewed program officials to perform the work of those reports. In three reports issued between 2006 and 2016, GAO has found persistent weaknesses in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) oversight and monitoring of Tribal 8(a) firms, in particular the Alaska Native Corporations' (ANC) subsidiary firms (ANC-owned firms) that participate in SBA's 8(a) program. Over the course of the program, qualified small, disadvantaged businesses, including ANC-owned firms, can receive federal contract awards that have been set aside solely for such businesses, and business development support from SBA, such as mentoring, financial assistance, and other management and technical assistance. In its three reports, among other things, GAO found that SBA had (1) incomplete information and documentation on ANC-owned firms and their compliance with regulatory requirements; (2) limitations in its ability to track and share key program data needed to enforce its own program; (3) insufficient staffing in its Alaska District Office to carry out necessary and critical monitoring tasks; and (4) inadequate or vague program guidance for clearly communicating to staff how to interpret new regulations. GAO made 21 recommendations to SBA that address weaknesses in SBA's oversight and monitoring of ANC-owned firms participating in the 8(a) program. SBA has taken steps to implement many of those recommendations, including enhancing training for SBA staff that emphasized program rules, and developing and implementing a regulation that helps SBA better enforce rules against ANC-owned firms obtaining contracts for which they were not necessarily eligible. However, SBA has not yet implemented recommendations that, if implemented as intended, could significantly improve its oversight of the 8(a) program. For example, SBA has not yet addressed limitations raised in GAO's 2006 and 2016 reports regarding SBA's tracking of revenue information for ANC-owned firms, which limits SBA's oversight of 8(a) rules prohibiting multiple subsidiaries under one ANC from generating revenue in the same primary line of business—which 8(a) program regulations intend to limit. SBA officials informed GAO of the agency's plans to develop an information system capable of addressing this issue. However, at the time of GAO's 2016 report, SBA could not provide detailed information or plans about this system, and as of today, the agency could not provide documentation that this system is operational. As another example, SBA has not addressed GAO's 2006 recommendation to consistently determine whether other small businesses are losing contracting opportunities when SBA awards contracts through the 8(a) program to ANC-owned firms, as required in regulation—an area where GAO found that SBA had fallen short in its oversight. Instead, in 2009, SBA reported that it performed a single analysis of a limited set of procurement data from a limited period and concluded the data did not indicate that other small 8(a) firms (e.g., black-owned, Hispanic-owned, and others) were losing contracting opportunities to ANC-owned firms. However, SBA's actions did not address the intent of GAO's recommendation to “consistently” perform this oversight. Absent action on these recommendations, the program continues to be at risk of noncompliance.


Federal personal property is generally defined as anything the government owns that is not real property. Common examples of personal property include furniture, cars, laptops, scientific equipment, and machinery. Sound management of the government's personal property inventoryâwhich is valued at more than $1 trillionâis necessary to mitigate the risk of waste, fraud, and loss. Federal statutes and regulations require agencies to regularly survey their personal property inventories and dispose of items they no longer need (excess personal property). When an agency identifies excess property, it must first offer it at no charge to other federal agencies. If excess property is not transferred to another federal agency, it is then declared "surplus" and may be transferred to a State Agency for Surplus Property (SASP) for distribution to state and local governments and nonprofits. Surplus personal property that is not donated may be sold to the public. Unsold surplus property may be abandoned or destroyed (including through recycling). Personal property surveys may identify items that are still needed, are near the end of their useful lives, and need to be replaced. Agencies have the authority to exchange (trade in) or sell the items that need to be replaced and apply the credit (from an exchange) or sales proceeds to the acquisition of similar items. The method of replacement chosenâexchange or saleâshould maximize the potential offset to the cost of acquiring new items. The government may realize cost savings when agencies regularly survey their inventories and dispose of excess and surplus property in a timely manner. Federal expenditures may be reduced when one agency's excess personal property is used to fill another agency's need and when replacement items are acquired in the most cost-effective manner. Federal expenditures may be further reduced if, as a result of disposing of unneeded items, agencies are able to decrease the amount of space needed to store personal property. Similarly, state and local governments and nonprofits may be able to reduce their expenditures if they obtain surplus federal personal property at no charge. According to federal auditors, agencies do not consistently fulfill the government's personal property disposal requirements. Some agencies do not regularly survey their inventoriesâoften because they have not identified who is responsible for implementing the surveys. Agencies have been allowed to establish their own threshold for accountable personal propertyâitems with longer useful lives and higher acquisition costsâbelow which items are not tracked. As a consequence, some agencies have set accountability thresholds higher than others, thereby excluding more items from regular monitoring and disposition. Agencies have also been able to set their own thresholds for capitalized personal property, which are the items with the longest lives and highest acquisition costs. Capitalized personal property is subject to additional reporting and evaluation requirements, so higher thresholds reduce the scope of oversight. Similarly, some agencies do not identify and dispose of unneeded personal property on an ongoing basis. Rather, they may wait until they face a "triggering event," such as an office relocation or other real property transition. Without adequate planning for these events, the disposal of unneeded personal property could potentially delay the project and increase costs. Many agencies are unclear on how to use their exchange/sale authorities and often do not choose the option that would provide the greatest potential financial benefits to the government. The Federal Personal Property Management Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-419 ) seeks to address these inconsistent policies and practices. The legislation requires the General Services Administration (GSA) to establish government-wide capitalization and accountability thresholds. It also requires GSA to issue guidance that directs agencies to conduct an annual inventory and assessment of capitalized personal property to identify which items, if any, are no longer needed and should be declared excess. The guidance must also require agencies to regularly inventory and assess their accountable personal property. Implementation of the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2017 (FASTA; P.L. 114-287 ) may result in the disposal of dozens or hundreds of government buildings within the same time frame. FASTA requires agencies to work with GSA to develop a list of recommended real property projects, including the sale, conveyance, consolidation, and reconfiguration of space. GSA submits the recommendations to a newly established Public Buildings Reform Board, which reviews them and submits a revised list to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director. If the OMB director approves of the list in its entirety, then all of the recommendations must be implemented within six years. Incorporating personal property plans into the FASTA process may mitigate the risk of delays resulting from the disposition of excess items.


Federal research and development (R&D) has played a significant role in strengthening the innovative capacity of the United States to achieve goals such as economic competitiveness, national security, improved healthcare, and protection of the environment. The results of federal R&D have led to scientific breakthroughs and new technologies with broad social and economic impacts, including artificial intelligence, the internet, and magnetic resonance imaging. The global landscape for innovation is rapidly evolvingâthe pace of innovation has increased and the composition of R&D funding has changed (e.g., public versus private funding and the U.S. share of global R&D has declined ). These changes have led some to call for new approaches and the expansion of existing federal authorities to help the United States maintain its leadership in innovation, research, and technology. Over the years, Congress has created several agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations to advance the R&D needs of the federal government. The stated goals and potential benefits of these quasi-governmental entities include: (1) providing a flexible and efficient mechanism for establishing public-private R&D partnerships; (2) enabling the solicitation, acceptance, and use of private donations to supplement the work performed with federal R&D funds; (3) increasing technology transfer and the commercialization of federally funded R&D; (4) improving the ability of federal agencies to attract and retain scientific talent; and (5) enhancing public education and awareness regarding the role and value of federal R&D. This report provides an overview of the purpose and intent, governance structure, and federal funding associated with selected congressionally mandated, agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations: the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, the National Foundation for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the Food and Drug Administration, the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine and the nonprofit research and education corporations associated with the Department of Veterans Affairs. The report also identifies potential issues for consideration related to oversight of existing agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations as well as potential issues for consideration should Congress elect to establish additional ones. Specifically, while government agencies are, with certain exceptions, subject to management laws and regulations designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and fairness, agency-related research foundations and corporations are generally exempt from them. This situation may raise questions about how Congress and federal agencies can protect the public interest and ensure confidence in the decisionmaking of such entities. Additionally, recent concerns that some have raised related to conflict of interest, the potential for industry influence, and questions about effectiveness may prompt further examination of these entities. Among the options that Congress might consider are: crafting a broad, general nonprofit research foundation authority that federal science agencies could draw on to create an entity that meets their specific needs; examining the existing authorities of individual federal science agencies and, as appropriate, supplementing those authorities to increase the flexibility of an agency to enter into public-private partnerships; creating additional agency-related nonprofit research foundations on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific needs of particular federal science agencies; and maintaining the status quo, i.e., allowing agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations that currently exist to continue, and requiring other federal agencies to use their existing authorities to enter into public-private R&D partnerships and transfer federal technologies to the marketplace.


Few drugs are currently available to treat certain tropical and rare pediatric diseases and to use as medical countermeasures, given their small market or potentially limited profitability. To help provide incentives for the development of such drugs, Congress created three PRV programs, which award PRVs to drug sponsors that develop drugs for tropical diseases, rare pediatric diseases, and medical countermeasures (e.g., drugs to mitigate harm from biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents). FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers these programs. The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to study the PRV programs. GAO examined the number of PRVs awarded and redeemed and the drugs for which they were awarded or redeemed, and what is known about the extent to which the PRVs provide incentives for developing drugs to meet unmet needs. GAO analyzed FDA data on awarded and redeemed PRVs for fiscal years 2009 through 2019 and other publicly available information on their transfers and sales. GAO conducted a literature review of peer-reviewed articles published from January 2009 through May 2019 that examined the PRV programs and interviewed FDA officials. GAO also interviewed seven stakeholder groups, seven academic researchers, and seven drug sponsors selected based on factors such as familiarity with PRV programs or drug development. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) awards priority review vouchers (PRV) to drug sponsors that develop drugs for tropical diseases or rare pediatric diseases or to use as medical countermeasures. The PRV—which can be sold to another drug sponsor—may be redeemed later to receive priority review from FDA with a targeted review time of 6 months, rather than the 10-month standard review, for a drug application of the PRV holder's choice. The potential for additional revenue from either marketing a drug about 4 months sooner or from selling the PRV could provide an incentive for drug sponsors to develop drugs for these diseases or conditions. From fiscal year 2009, when the first PRV was awarded, through fiscal year 2019, FDA awarded 31 PRVs, mostly for drugs to treat rare pediatric diseases. Of the 31 PRVs awarded by FDA,17 were sold to another drug sponsor for prices ranging from about $67 million to $350 million, according to available data. As of September 30, 2019, available data show that drug sponsors had redeemed 16 of the 31 PRVs to obtain a shorter FDA review time for drugs to treat conditions and diseases such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), type 2 diabetes, and different forms of arthritis. These drug applications may not otherwise qualify for priority review. GAO found few studies that examined the PRV programs, and those that did found the programs had little or no effect on drug development. However, all seven drug sponsors GAO spoke with stated that PRVs were a factor in drug development decisions—six sponsors said they were one of a number of factors, while one sponsor said they were pivotal in its development of a drug. Some academic researchers and stakeholders expressed concerns about the PRVs as incentives for drug development, including the potential for the expected revenue from the sale of a PRV to decline as more are awarded and available for sale.


First responders and others in 11 large metropolitan areas use radio systems operating in the T-Band since spectrum is limited in other bands. In 2012, FCC was required by statute to begin an auction of this T-Band public safety spectrum by February 2021 and to make the proceeds available to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to develop and administer a grant program to help cover costs associated with relocating public safety users' radio systems. GAO was asked to review issues related to the required T-Band auction. This report examines, among other things: (1) the challenges selected first responders and local governments anticipate facing in relocating public safety communications from the T-Band and (2) the actions FCC has taken both to help facilitate the required T-Band relocation and to address identified challenges. GAO reviewed FCC's March 2019 congressional briefing and analysis on T-Band spectrum and conducted case studies in four cities selected based on the number of public safety licenses in each area, among other things. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and regulations, FCC documents, and T-Band studies conducted by a public safety organization. GAO interviewed FCC officials and other stakeholders, including first responders in case study cities. Public safety officials, such as police and fire fighters, in 11 metropolitan areas rely on radio systems that use the portion of spectrum known as the T-Band for mission critical voice communications. Selected stakeholders GAO interviewed, including first responders and officials in three of four areas selected as case studies, anticipate significant challenges in relocating public safety communications from the T-Band. For example, stakeholders in Boston, Los Angeles, and New York said the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not identified sufficient alternative spectrum. Additionally, two studies conducted by a public safety organization concluded these three areas and others may also have insufficient alternative spectrum (see figure below). Moreover, a recent FCC analysis showed that relocation options for public safety users are limited or nonexistent. Further, costs for relocating public safety users from the T-Band were calculated by FCC to be $5-to-$6 billion. Selected stakeholders said relocating their communication systems would require such things as new towers and radios as well as other infrastructure. FCC has taken limited actions to address challenges and assist public safety users of the T-Band with the mandatory relocation. For example, FCC has taken steps to notify stakeholders, but officials told GAO they have not begun planning the auction. FCC officials acknowledged challenges the auction and relocation requirements present. FCC officials explained that public safety entities were licensed to operate on the T-Band in large metropolitan areas because other public safety spectrum was already heavily used. In March 2019, FCC briefed Congress on the auction's challenges and concluded that all T-Band auction scenarios would fail. Nonetheless, FCC officials said the agency will conduct the auction unless the law is amended. While FCC provided information to Congress, it did not suggest changes to law in this instance. Stakeholders in two metropolitan areas said the auction could result in substantial harmful effects on their ability to maintain continuous and effective communications during an emergency.


Fiscal and economic challenges facing the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) government raise several issues for Congress. Congress may choose to maintain oversight of federal policies that could affect the USVI's long-term fiscal stability. Congress also may consider further legislation that would extend or restructure long-range disaster assistance programs to mitigate those challenges and promote greater resiliency of infrastructure and public programs. Federal responses to the USVI's fiscal distress could conceivably affect municipal debt markets more broadly. Greater certainty in federal funding for disaster responses and Medicaid could support the USVI economy. The USVI, like many other Caribbean islands acquired by European powers, were used to produce sugar and other tropical agricultural products and to further strategic interests such as shipping and the extension of naval forces. Once the United States acquired the U.S. Virgin Islands shortly before World War I, they effectively ceased to have major strategic importance. Moreover, at that time the Virgin Islands' sugar-based economy had been in decline for decades. While efforts of mainland and local policymakers eventually created a robust manufacturing sector after World War II, manufacturing in the Virgin Islands has struggled in the 21 st century. In particular, the 2012 closing of the HOVENSA refinery operated by Hess Oil resulted in the loss of some 2,000 jobs and left the local economy highly dependent on tourism and related services. A renovation of the HOVENSA complex is reportedly in progress. The territorial government, facing persistent economic challenges, covered some budget deficits with borrowed funds, which has raised concerns over levels of public debt and unfunded pension liabilities. Local policymakers have proposed tax increases and austerity measures to bolster public finances, which currently operate with restricted liquidity. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed doubts that those fiscal measures would restore access to capital markets or address shortfalls in the funding of public pensions. The previous governor, Kenneth Mapp, set forth measures in his FY2019 budget proposals to delay expected public pension insolvency from 2024 to 2025 and promised to outline other measures that would further delay insolvency until 2028. Governor Albert Bryan Jr. succeeded Mapp in January 2019. Damage caused by two powerful hurricanesâIrma and Mariaâthat hit the USVI in September 2017 created additional economic and social challenges. Public revenues, according to estimates based on USVI fiscal data, were halved after the two hurricanes. The USVI economy has relied heavily on tourism and related business activity, which made it more vulnerable to the effects of hurricanes than jurisdictions with more diverse economies. The severity of damage from Irma and Maria, and the subsequent disruption of the USVI tourism industry, suggest that a full economic recovery could take years. Federal disaster assistance has included aid to public institutions, such as long-term loans to the USVI government and two hospitals; loans and grants to individuals and small businesses; and direct operations of the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other federal agencies. Funding for disaster relief has been augmented by supplemental appropriations. The extent of federal disaster assistance received by the USVI will depend, in part, on how funds provided in response to needs resulting from hurricanes and fires in 2017 are allocated among affected areas. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ; Â§20301), enacted on February 9, 2018, included additional Medicaid funding for the USVI and Puerto Rico through September 30, 2019. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) allocated $774 million in mitigation funds (CDBG-MIT funds) to the U.S. Virgin Islands and put restrictions on their use.


Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published simulations of long-term fiscal trends in the state and local government sector, which have consistently shown that the sector faces long-term fiscal pressures. While a great majority of states have requirements related to balancing their budgets, deficits can arise for reasons including planned annual revenues are not generated at the expected rate, demand for services exceeds planned expenditures, or both, resulting in a near-term operating deficit. This report updates GAO's state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the components of state and local expenditures likely to contribute to the sector's fiscal pressures as well as the effects of revenue changes on the sector's outlook. GAO's model uses the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts as the primary data source and presents the results in the aggregate for the state and local government sector as a whole. The model shows the expected level of receipts and expenditures for the sector until 2068, based on historical spending and revenue patterns. In addition, the model assumes that the current set of policies in place across state and local governments remains constant to show a simulated long-term outlook. Because the model covers the sector in the aggregate, the fiscal outcomes for individual states and localities cannot be identified. GAO's simulations suggest that state and local governments will likely face an increasing difference between expenditures and revenues during the next 50 years as reflected by the operating balance—a measure of the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of its current revenues. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of United States' gross domestic product (GDP), a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are expected to grow faster than revenues throughout the simulation period. The sector would need to make changes to avoid fiscal imbalance and assure that revenues are at least equal to expenditures. GAO's simulations suggest that growth in the sector's overall expenditures is largely driven by health care, with states' share of Medicaid spending as the primary driver. These expenditures are projected to grow more than GDP each year. Employee compensation, the largest share of operating expenditures, decreases as a share of GDP during the simulation period. Health benefits are the only component of employee compensation that increase as a percentage of GDP. Revenues from federal grants to states and localities are also expected to increase during the simulation period, in part because of Medicaid grants to states. GAO also conducts sensitivity analyses to see how the sector's outlook changes when using alternative assumptions of key model variables – economic growth, health care excess cost growth, and the real rate of return on pension assets. Using these alternative assumptions highlights the operating balance's sensitivity to changes and possible shifts in the future fiscal outcomes for the sector.


Flying can pose significant challenges for persons who rely on wheelchairs, including the lack of wheelchair accessible lavatories on most flights. In 1990, DOT required wheelchair accessible lavatories on twin-aisle aircraft used mainly for long flights. It did not require them for single-aisle aircraft, although DOT continued to study the issue. Since 1990, technological advances have enabled single-aisle aircraft to fly longer distances, and these aircraft now make 99 percent of domestic flights. In 2016, a DOT advisory committee recommended that DOT require accessible lavatories in certain single-aisle aircraft in the future. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a provision that GAO examine the availability and designs of lavatories on commercial aircraft and the ability of passengers with disabilities to access them. This report describes (1) what is known about lavatory designs and accessibility for persons with reduced mobility and (2) the challenges wheelchair-bound passengers and others face while traveling on single-aisle aircraft without accessible or functional lavatories. GAO reviewed DOT's guidance and rulemaking and analyzed DOT's aircraft complaint data and fleet data for the eight largest U.S. air carriers. GAO interviewed officials from the eight largest mainline carriers and reviewed their fleet and lavatory data. GAO also interviewed officials from Airbus and Boeing and subsidiary lavatory manufacturers, as well as representatives from cabin crew labor associations and consumer groups representing persons with disabilities. Aircraft manufacturers offer lavatories that carriers can provide and that are designed to accommodate users of onboard wheelchairs, but carriers do not choose to acquire this option for their single-aisle aircraft. We found designs for lavatories that enable a passenger in an onboard wheelchair to use them, to varying degrees. In recent years, both Airbus and Boeing—makers of single-aisle aircraft—began offering similarly designed lavatories to provide greater access for these passengers. For example, one design consists of two adjacent lavatories located in the rear galley area with a connecting retractable wall to allow for a wheelchair-bound passenger to enter one lavatory and transfer or be transferred to the toilet in the other lavatory. Another design is a single lavatory large enough to accommodate a passenger using an onboard wheelchair. Four of the eight U.S. carriers—and only one of the four with the largest fleets—GAO interviewed have Airbus aircraft with an adjacent lavatory design (Space Flex version 1) or the single lavatory design found on the A220 aircraft, constituting about 4.5 percent of the carriers' combined single-aisle fleet (see figure). None of the eight U.S. carriers have purchased a similar lavatory for their Boeing's single-aisle aircraft. Carrier officials told GAO that they consider many factors when ordering lavatories, including financial and service tradeoffs such as the potential to lose seating spaces, or reduced food and beverage service for passengers. While the Department of Transportation (DOT) receives few complaints on lavatory inaccessibility, consumer groups told GAO that the lack of an accessible lavatory on single-aisle aircraft presents challenges for persons with reduced mobility. For example, some passengers take precautionary measures to avoid the need to use the aircraft lavatory and others avoid flying altogether. Additionally, although some aircraft have wheelchair-accommodating lavatories, they are not well advertised to passengers, making it difficult for passengers to know whether their flight may have such a lavatory. To address such challenges and the findings of its 2016 advisory committee, DOT issued, on December 16, 2019, a notice of proposed rulemaking to require carriers to install accessibility features without changing the size of the lavatories. DOT also expressed intent to study the costs and benefits of enlarging single-aisle aircraft lavatories to enable use by passengers using the onboard wheelchair.


Following a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide three primary forms of assistance: Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA), and Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA). IA, which is the focus of this report, provides aid to affected individuals and households. PA provides grants to local, state, territorial, and Indian tribal governments, as well as certain private nonprofit organizations for emergency protective measures, debris removal operations, and repair or replacement of damaged public infrastructure. HMA funds pay for mitigation and resiliency projects and programs to reduce the threat or impacts of future disasters. State, territorial, and Indian tribal governments do not automatically receive IA when a disaster occurs. Instead, the governor or tribal chief executive must request that the President declare an emergency or major disaster and that IA be authorized. When drafting such a request, the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government must demonstrate that the incident exceeds their capacity to effectively respond without federal assistance. FEMA then evaluates the request using a set of factors and provides a recommendation to the President. The evaluation of the IA factors, in addition to helping FEMA determine whether or not to recommend the President declare a major disaster, helps FEMA identify the types of IA that are needed. This report provides brief descriptions of the categories of IA authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288 , as amended; 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§5121 et seq.): 1. Mass Care and Emergency Assistance; 2. Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program; 3. Disaster Unemployment Assistance; 4. Disaster Legal Services; 5. Disaster Case Management; and 6. Individuals and Households Program. The information regarding the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) is covered in greatest detail herein, because it is the primary assistance program for providing federal assistance to individuals and households following a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster. The IHP provides financial and/or direct assistance to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of a disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. Forms of financial assistance include some categories of Housing Assistance (e.g., Rental Assistance) and Other Needs Assistance (ONA), and forms of direct assistance include other categories of Housing Assistance (e.g., Transportable Temporary Housing Units). The IA program information is based on the guidance that FEMA released in March 2019, to serve as a comprehensive IA program policy resource; the Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG) applies to emergencies and disasters declared on or after March 1, 2019. This report also briefly describes the updated factors considered when evaluating a governor's request for IA pursuant to a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster, which became effective June 1, 2019. As required by Section 1109 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ), FEMA released these updated factors to establish more objective criteria for evaluating the need for assistance, clarify eligibility requirements, and expedite a presidential declaration determination.


Following their introduction in the mid-1990s, the usage of government purchase cards expanded at a rapid rate. Spurred by legislative and regulatory reforms designed to increase the use of purchase cards for small acquisitions, the dollar volume of government purchase card transactions grew from $527 million in FY1993 to $19.5 billion in FY2011. While the use of purchase cards was credited with reducing administrative costs during that time, audits of agency purchase card programs found varying degrees of waste, fraud, and abuse. One of the most common risk factors cited by auditors was a weak internal control environment: many agencies failed to implement adequate safeguards against card misuse, even as their purchase card programs grew. In response to these findings, Congress passed the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act; P.L. 112-194 ), which sought to enhance the management and oversight of agency purchase card programs. Drawing on recommendations from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Charge Card Act required executive branch agencies to implement a specific set of internal controls, establish penalties for employees who misuse agency purchase cards, and conduct periodic risk assessments and audits of agency purchase card programs. This report begins by providing background on the origin and structure of agency purchase card programs. It then discusses identified weaknesses in agency purchase card controls that have contributed to card misuse, and examines provisions of the Charge Card Act that are intended to address those weaknesses. Finally, the report examines implementation of the Charge Card Act and analyzes ongoing risks to agency purchase card programs.


According to VA, in 2016, racial and ethnic minority veterans represented about 22 percent of the total veteran population of 18.6 million. VA projects racial and ethnic minority veterans will make up 36 percent of its total veteran population by 2040. VA has identified racial and ethnic disparities in its health care outcomes, mirroring trends seen across the United States. House Report 115-188 included a provision for GAO to review whether VHA provides quality, equitable care for minority veterans. GAO's report examines, among other issues, (1) the extent to which VA has taken steps to advance health equity for racial and ethnic minority veterans, and (2) VA's efforts to use race and ethnicity data to identify and address disparities in health care outcomes involving minority veterans. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as strategic and operational plans and peer-reviewed research studies; assessed VA's health equity action plan against criteria identified in GAO's body of work on effectively managing performance; and interviewed VA officials familiar with VA's health equity efforts, as well as race and ethnicity data. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken steps to reduce disparities in health care outcomes linked to race and ethnicity, but lacks mechanisms to measure progress and ensure accountability for results. In 2012, VA established the Office of Health Equity to identify and address health care outcome disparities and to develop an action plan to achieve health equity. This office issued an action plan in 2014 that identified activities to make improvements in five focus areas, such as increasing awareness of the significance of disparities and strengthening leadership for addressing them. However, GAO found that the extent of VA's progress in implementing the action plan and advancing health equity is unknown because the action plan lacked performance measures and clear lines of accountability for specific offices. For example, although VA's action plan included a list of “success criteria” for each of the five focus areas, these criteria were not measurable, and were not linked to specific activities or to offices responsible for implementation. VA funds research efforts that have identified disparities in health care outcomes involving minority veterans, but rely on data that VA officials and researchers noted have weaknesses in completeness and accuracy. One concern is that race and ethnicity information can be labeled incorrectly in VA patients' electronic health records as ”self-reported”, a highly reliable method of collection, when data were actually collected based on the less reliable method of VA staff observation. Other reported concerns include missing values on patients' race and conflicting race and ethnicity information. VA researchers told GAO they account for some of these concerns by using data from other sources, such as Medicare, but such work-arounds are time intensive. Further, VA officials reported that data weaknesses limit their ability to identify and address disparities in health care outcomes in their medical centers. Despite recognizing weaknesses related to the quality of race and ethnicity data, VA has not implemented corrective actions to address them. Without doing so, VA medical center officials cannot readily identify and address disparities in health care outcomes by race and ethnicity. Note: Concerns about the completeness and accuracy of race and ethnicity information were raised by officials from VA's Office of Health Equity, Veterans Experience Office, and Health Services Research & Development.


For 22 years, GAO has designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area. FISMA requires federal agencies to develop, document, and implement information security programs and have independent evaluations of those programs and practices. It also assigns government-wide responsibilities for information security to OMB, DHS, and NIST. FISMA includes a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on agencies' implementation of the act. GAO's objectives in this report were to (1) describe the reported adequacy and effectiveness of selected federal agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) evaluate the extent to which OMB, DHS, and NIST have implemented their government-wide FISMA requirements. GAO categorized information security deficiencies as reported by 16 randomly selected agencies and their IGs according to the elements of an information security program; evaluated IG reports for 24 CFO Act agencies; examined OMB, DHS, and NIST documents; and interviewed agency officials. During fiscal year 2018, many federal agencies were often not adequately or effectively implementing their information security policies and practices. For example, most of the 16 agencies GAO selected for review had deficiencies related to implementing the eight elements of an agency-wide information security program required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) (see figure) . Further, inspectors general (IGs) reported that 18 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 agencies did not have effective agency-wide information security programs. GAO and IGs have previously made numerous recommendations to agencies to address such deficiencies, but many of these recommendations remain unimplemented. With certain exceptions, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) were generally implementing their government-wide FISMA requirements, including issuing guidance and implementing programs that are intended to improve agencies' information security. However, OMB has not submitted its required FISMA report to Congress for fiscal year 2018 and has reduced the number of agencies at which it holds CyberStat meetings from 24 in fiscal year 2016 to three in fiscal year 2018—thereby restricting key activities for overseeing agencies' implementation of information security. Also, OMB, in collaboration with the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), did not include a metric for system security plans, one of the required information security program elements, in its guidance on FISMA reporting. As a result, oversight of agencies' information security programs was diminished.


For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $708.1 billion to fund programs falling under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes appropriations for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related atomic energy programs of the Department of Energy. In addition to authorizing appropriations, the NDAA establishes defense policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational administrative matters related to DOD. Unlike an appropriations bill, the NDAA does not provide budget authority for government activities. The President's FY2019 budget request for DOD reflected in part the department's efforts to align its priorities with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and conform to discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-23 ). Of the $708.1 billion, the Trump Administration's request included $639.1 billion in discretionary funding for the so-called base budgetâthat is, funds intended to pay for defense-related activities that DOD and other agencies would pursue even if U.S. armed forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $69 billion of the request, designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), would fund the incremental costs of those ongoing contingency operations, as well as any other costs that Congress and the President agreed to so designate. The request was consistent with discretionary spending limits (or caps) on defense activities originally established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). The FY2019 defense spending cap is $647 billion and applies to discretionary defense programs (excluding OCO). The cap includes programs outside the scope of the NDAA and for which the Administration requested approximately $8 billion. Thus, the portion of the cap applicable to spending authorized by the NDAA is approximately $639 billion. On May 24, 2018, the House voted 351-66 to pass H.R. 5515 , an amended version of the FY2019 NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee. On June 18, 2018, the Senate voted 85-10 to pass its version of H.R. 5515 , after replacing the House-passed text of H.R. 5515 with an amended version of the FY2019 proposal reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S. 2987 ). On July 25, 2018, a conference committee reported a revised version of the bill ( H.Rept. 115-874 ). On July 26, 2018, the House voted 359-54 to approve the conference report. On August 1, the Senate voted 87-10 to approve the conference report. The conference version authorized approximately the same amount as the President's request, though with several billions of dollars of adjustments to amounts within the appropriation titles. On August 13, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-232 ). Congressional authorization of FY2019 defense authorizations reflected a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic and budgetary issues facing the United States.


For at least four decades, Congress has been concerned about the Coast Guard's ability to maintain an adequate staff of experienced marine safety personnel to ensure that vessels meet federal safety standards. The 2015 sinking of the U.S.-flag cargo ship El Faro during a hurricane near the Bahamas with the loss of 33 lives renewed attention to the Coast Guard's persistent difficulty with hiring and training a marine safety workforce with technical knowledge of vessel construction and accident investigation, as the safety inspections of the vessel were found to have been inadequate. In the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-265 ), Congress directed the Coast Guard to brief congressional committees of jurisdiction on its efforts to enhance its marine inspections staff. In the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-282 ), Congress requested a report from the Coast Guard detailing the courses and other training a marine inspector must complete to be considered qualified, including any courses that have been dropped from the training curriculum in recent years. Congress's concern about the Coast Guard's inspection staff comes at a time when the agency's vessel inspection workload is increasing by about 50% because towing vessels have been added to its responsibilities. Additionally, Congress has been increasing the agency's role in fishing vessel safety. Adding to the Coast Guard's safety responsibilities is the construction of several liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals as well as the increasing use of LNG as ship fuel. Vessel safety inspections are especially critical for the U.S.-flag fleet, like the El Faro , because a majority of it is much older than the 15 to 20 years of age at which ships in the foreign-flag worldwide oceangoing fleet are typically scrapped. Over half of the U.S.-flag commercial fleet is over 20 years old; the El Faro had been in service for 40 years. Vessels that transport cargo or passengers domestically (from one U.S. point to another U.S. point) must be built in the United States, as required by the Jones Act. The comparatively high cost of domestic ship construction encourages ship owners to keep Jones Act vessels in service well beyond their normal retirement age. In general, older vessels are believed to have a higher risk of structural defects and to require more intensive inspection. Currently, the Coast Guard's marine inspection staff consists of 533 military and 138 civilian personnel, while its accident investigation staff consists of 120 military staff and 38 civilians. As a military organization, the Coast Guard frequently rotates its staff among various duty stations, so personnel may not develop the knowledge and experience required of a proficient marine inspector or investigator. A common perception inside the agency that marine safety is an area that retards promotion also may be thwarting efforts to boost this mission's workforce. The Coast Guard recently has stated its intention to improve the quality of its inspection workforce and to make marine safety an attractive long-term career path by extending promotion potential. However, its recent statements are similar to statements made 10 years ago, when some Members of Congress advocated transferring the marine safety function to a civilian agency. It is unclear what the agency has accomplished over the last decade regarding its inspection workforce. Government audits dating to 1979 have been consistently critical of the proficiency level of Coast Guard inspectors and accident investigators. Reorganizing the marine safety function under a civilian agency, perhaps as an element of a larger reorganization of navigation functions in the federal government, might improve the quality of safety inspections and investigations, but other federal agencies with transportation-related safety inspection workforces have had similar issues with retaining experienced personnel.


For decades, the government has contracted and entered into agreements to sponsor academic, nonprofit, or private organizations to operate FFRDCs. DOD military departments and other DOD components sponsor 10 FFRDCs to help develop innovative solutions to diverse national security threats. Five FFRDCs—referred to as S&A Centers—aim to provide independent analyses to support DOD policy development. Federal regulation and DOD guidance specify sponsors' oversight activities, including the establishment, use, and review of FFRDCs. A Senate Armed Services Committee report included a provision that GAO review DOD's use of FFRDCs. This report describes, among other objectives: (1) DOD obligations (in dollars) to DOD's FFRDCs from fiscal years 2013 through 2018; (2) factors that led DOD to use S&A Centers for research; and (3) how DOD used this research. GAO analyzed obligation data for DOD's 10 FFRDCs. GAO focused further review on DOD's five S&A Centers that primarily provide studies and analysis. GAO analyzed sponsoring agreements, comprehensive reviews, and 22 S&A Center research projects selected based on factors such as obtaining a mix of project costs, and interviewed DOD and FFRDC representatives. From fiscal years 2013 through 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated about $2 billion annually to 10 DOD-sponsored Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC), excluding obligations related to two intelligence programs and capital equipment costs (such as antenna or radar systems). Of these obligations, roughly $400 million annually went to a subset of five FFRDCs called Study and Analysis (S&A) Centers. Note: Obligation amounts were not adjusted for inflation and totals may be affected by rounding. a Numbers in parentheses refer to the number of FFRDCs within each category. DOD primarily cited strategic relationships between the sponsor (the agency responsible for the overall use of the FFRDC) and the FFRDC and the core competencies of the FFRDC as factors when sponsoring S&A Centers and initiating projects. For example: Strategic relationships. The Army determined that an S&A Center was uniquely qualified to conduct a research project that required knowledge of defense planning scenarios, noting that awarding the project to an industry contractor would have given that contractor a competitive advantage. Core competencies. The Center for Naval Analyses has core competencies in Navy policy, strategy, and doctrine, among other things. S&A Centers perform hundreds of research projects annually on behalf of DOD, and DOD reported using them to inform decisions, shape guidance, and identify opportunities to improve efficiency. For example, one S&A Center's study on the causes of weapons system cost overruns found DOD needed to re-examine its assumptions when estimating program cost, schedule, and performance. DOD officials told us the study contributed to policy, process, and training updates.


For more than 50 years, the United States has taken an interest in the eradication of vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) in children worldwide, as well as vaccine research and development, particularly since playing a vital role in the global campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1960s. Since then, vaccinating children against VPDs has been a major U.S. foreign policy effort. Vaccinations are one of the most cost-effective ways to prevent infectious disease and associated morbidity and mortality. According to UNICEF, immunizations save around 3 million lives per year. As of 2019, VPDs continue to cause high levels of morbidity (illness) and mortality (death), and the World Health Organization (WHO) notes that the adoption of new vaccines by low- and middle-income countries (which often have the highest disease burdens) has been slower than in high-income countries. Receiving a vaccination during childhood can protect the recipient from VPDs, decrease the spread of related diseases, and improve child survival prospects (as children, particularly those under five years old, are more likely than adults to die from VPDs). Recently, a global resurgence of certain VPDs has caused concern among public health officials and drawn attention to the challenges of vaccine hesitancy and stigma. For example, polio continues to elude global eradication and remains endemic in three countries. In 2019 measles has seen a resurgence in some middle- and high-income countries due to a variety of factors, including reluctance among some individuals and religious communities to vaccinate their children. In April 2019, the WHO reported a n increase in global measles cases compared to the same period in 2018, with the greatest surges in cases in the Americas, the Middle East, and Europe. A number of European countries are at risk of or have lost their measles eradication certificate from the WHO, raising questions about global consensus on the use of vaccines, participation in and support for the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI, now called GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance) and other global immunization efforts. Prompted in part by this global resurgence, the WHO has listed "vaccine hesitancy" as one of the 10 biggest global public health threats. The U.S. government is the second-leading government donor to global vaccination campaigns. Through annual appropriations to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of State, Congress funds global immunization activities through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and GAVI. In recent years, annual appropriations by Congress for multilateral immunizations campaigns led by GAVI have averaged $290 million and $226 million for bilateral campaigns led by CDC. USAID works to support routine immunization overseas through health systems strengthening, and Global Polio Eradication Initiative Activities. The authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S. funding for global child vaccination is thus an ongoing area of concern for many in Congress. Other key issues for Congress include the extent of donor coordination and burden-sharing for such efforts, and the extent to which global child vaccination promotes U.S. foreign policy, development, and domestic health security (i.e., pandemic preparedness) goals.


For more than a decade, federal agencies have grappled with how to address climate change effects when implementing the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). The ESA aims to protect threatened and endangered fish, wildlife, and plants from extinction. As set forth by Congress, one of the main purposes of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively, the Services) have acknowledged that the changing climate may threaten the survival of and habitat for some species. As noted by courts and legal scholars, the ESA does not expressly require the Services to consider the effect of climate change in their ESA decisions. However, the ESA and its implementing regulations (1) direct the Services to consider "natural or manmade factors affecting [a species'] continued existence" when determining whether a species should be protected under the ESA; and (2) require the Services to analyze cumulative effects on a species' survival when analyzing whether federal actions jeopardize a species protected under the Act. The courts and the Services have interpreted these provisions as requiring the Services to consider climate change effects in the ESA decisionmaking process. Various lawsuits have challenged the Services' interpretation of complex scientific data or models that predict short- and long-term effects from a changing global climate on specific species and their habitats. Legal challenges have influenced how the Services implement the ESA when climate change affects species and their habitats. Lawsuits typically focus on two main issues: (1) when the Services should list, delist, or reclassify a species as threatened or endangered because of climate change effects; and (2) whether the Services can or should regulate activities that affect the climate to protect species and their habitat. Judicial review has helped to ensure that the Services consider projected climate change effects on species in their ESA decisions. However, the courts have not required the Services to curb activities that may contribute to climate change to protect threatened or endangered species. Stakeholders disagree on whether the ESA should play a role in addressing climate change, with some arguing that the ESA is not equipped to mitigate climate change effects. Other stakeholders believe that the Services can and should wield the ESA to protect further species threatened by climate change by curbing activities contributing to climate change. From the Services' viewpoint, the best available scientific and commercial data have been insufficient to determine whether greenhouse gas emissions from a proposed activity cause detrimental effects on a species or its habitat. In light of the judicial deference afforded to the Services, the courts have not expanded the ESA as a tool to protect listed species by regulating activities that contribute to climate change. This report analyzes the courts' role in shaping how the Services have factored climate change effects into ESA decisions and recent 2019 regulatory developments that aim to clarify how the Services consider and address climate change in their ESA decisions. In August 2019, the Services finalized revisions to the ESA implementing regulations, aiming to increase transparency and effectiveness of the ESA while easing regulatory burdens. Among those changes, the Services clarified their existing policies and practices for factoring climate change effects into their ESA decisions. As legislative proposals to revise the ESA continue to develop, legal battles over the how the Services interpret climate change effects in their ESA decisions will likely continue.


For more than a decade, the activities of transnational criminal organizations have led to increased crime, violence, and lawlessness in parts of Mexico. In October 2007, Mexico and the United States created the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral partnership to address crime and violence and enhance the rule of law in Mexico. State/INL and USAID are the lead U.S. agencies for developing programming for the Mérida Initiative. Both State/INL and USAID also manage and fund the Mérida Initiative with the support of a wide range of project implementers, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ); contractors; nongovernmental organizations; and international organizations. GAO was asked to describe funding and projects the United States has provided under the Mérida Initiative. This report describes (1) State/INL and USAID funding for the Mérida Initiative from fiscal year 2014 through 2018 and (2) the number and type of Mérida Initiative projects active during these years. GAO reviewed State and USAID documents and data, and interviewed officials from State, USAID, DOD, DHS, and DOJ in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. From fiscal year 2014 through 2018, the Department of State's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated about $723 million for the Mérida Initiative, which aims to mitigate the impact of the drug trade on the United States and reduce violence in Mexico. State/INL and USAID allocated this funding under the following government-wide foreign assistance funding categories: Civil Society, Counternarcotics, Good Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Transnational Crime. U.S. agencies use these categories to broadly define foreign assistance programs for planning, budgeting, and reporting across agencies, countries, and regions. Over 80 percent of the funding went toward Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Counternarcotics efforts. Of the $723 million, State/INL allocated about $542 million and USAID allocated about $182 million. There were 445 State/INL and USAID Mérida Initiative projects active from fiscal year 2014 through 2018. State/INL funded 388 of the projects and USAID funded 57, which tended to be larger with higher funding amounts than State/INL projects. State/INL projects generally focused on providing training and assistance to Mexican officials from the justice sector, border security, military, and law enforcement, as well as equipment, including for forensic drug laboratories, drug detection, and border surveillance. Many USAID projects were intended to engage with Mexican civil society organizations and the public to address corruption, promote trust in government, or prevent crime and violence, such as through skill-building for youth, efforts to advance human rights, or technical support for judicial system development. State/INL and USAID implemented their projects mainly through contracts, grants, and interagency agreements, as well as through agreements with international organizations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization of American States.


For nearly a century, Congress has contemplated how to help businesses repair and rebuild after a disaster. Congress has also expressed interest in helping businesses use mitigation measures to protect their investments from future incidents. Mitigation activities entail identifying risks and hazards and taking measures to either substantially reduce or eliminate the impact of an incident. As described in this report, mitigation measures primarily take place during the recovery phase of a disaster. Currently, only damaged businesses in declared disaster areas are eligible for disaster loans. Businesses seeking mitigation assistance before a disaster strikes, however, must look to other sources for the assistance. Congress experimented with business pre-disaster mitigation (PDM) through a pilot program operated by the Small Business Administration (SBA) from FY2000 to FY2006. Though Congress authorized appropriations of $15 million each fiscal year to carry out the SBA PDM pilot program, four businesses obtained pre-disaster mitigation loans, totaling just over $100,000. Although the federal government has traditionally favored a post-disaster approach to mitigation, there are indications suggesting congressional interest in pre-disaster mitigation has increased in recent years, partly as a result of recent and recurring large-scale disasters, including hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Michael. This is evidenced by enactment of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254 ), which made substantial reforms to pre-disaster mitigation. The renewed focus on pre-disaster mitigation has also led to discussions about reauthorizing the SBA PDM pilot program. This report describes the underlying rationale for post-disaster and pre-disaster mitigation and provides an overview of the SBA PDM loan pilot program, including its past performance and potential reasons why so few businesses participated in the pilot program. These potential reasons include (1) the fact that the pilot program was tied to FEMA programs, which delayed the program's implementation; (2) limitations on business eligibility for SBA PDM loans; and (3) the fact that businesses may not have been aware that the SBA was offering pre-disaster mitigation loans. This report also provides an overview of various policy options should Congress decide to reauthorize the SBA PDM pilot program, including considerations that may help increase business participation. These policy options include decoupling the SBA PDM disaster loan pilot program from FEMA programs and examining the most effective forms of outreach and advertising. Congress could also consider restructuring the current SBA Disaster Loan Program to allow businesses to apply a greater percentage of their disaster loan towards mitigation, and may consider investigating ways to help businesses develop continuity and disaster response plans. Congress could also consider providing PDM loans to homeowners so they can protect their homes before a disaster strikes.


For over half a century, the Department of Defense (DOD) has funded efforts to defend the United States from ballistic missile attacks. From 2002 to 2017, MDA has received about $142 billion and has requested 46.7 billion through fiscal year 2023 to develop the BMDS. The BMDS consists of diverse and highly complex land-, sea-, and space-based systems and assets located across the globe, including planned sites in Romania and Poland to protect United States forces and allies in Europe. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, included a provision that GAO annually assess and report on MDA's progress. Among other objectives, this report addresses for fiscal year 2018 (1) the progress MDA made in achieving delivery and testing goals and (2) the extent to which MDA made progress in developing and delivering integrated regional BMDS capabilities. GAO reviewed the planned fiscal year 2018 baselines and other program documentation and assessed them against program and baseline reviews and GAO's acquisition best practices guides, and interviewed officials from relevant agencies. In fiscal year 2018, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made progress toward achieving its delivery and testing goals for some of the individual systems—known as elements—that combine and integrate to create the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA is also making progress testing for integrated capabilities, which are achieved by combining BMDS elements. However, MDA did not meet its planned goals. The figure below shows MDA's progress delivering assets and conducting tests against its fiscal year 2018 plans. MDA delivered a significant integrated capability for defending the United States, meeting a goal set by the Secretary of Defense in March 2013 to increase the inventory of ground-based interceptors by December 2017. Other on-time deliveries included software upgrades and additional assets. However, developmental challenges and testing failures contributed to MDA being unable to deliver all assets as planned. MDA completed four of eight flight tests. MDA successfully conducted testing to support a production decision; however, it was unable to complete its annual test plan due to failures, cancellations, and delays. MDA has delayed the delivery of the BMDS's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3—which is intended to protect allies from Iranian threats—until 2020. Construction contractor issues at the planned Aegis Ashore site in Poland drove the delay. At the same time, testing for EPAA Phase 3 against planned threats has been substantially reduced and other vital testing has been deferred until after delivery. MDA officials consider EPAA testing for Phase 3 delivery complete. However, DOD guidance and acquisition best practices stress the importance of testing to understand the extent of capabilities and how to deploy them. The 18-month delay to EPAA Phase 3 provides MDA an opportunity to conduct additional testing and collect more performance data. This testing could provide the warfighter with more information and confidence in the system's ability to protect our allies against expected ballistic missile threats.


For over half a century, the Department of Defense has funded efforts to defend the United States from ballistic missile attacks. From 2002 to 2020, MDA has received about $174 billion to develop the BMDS and has requested about $9.2 billion for fiscal year 2021. The BMDS consists of diverse and highly complex land-, sea-, and space-based systems and assets located across the globe. This statement summarizes lessons that GAO has identified from its prior reviews of MDA starting in 2004 that can be applied to strengthen the transparency and acquisition practices for developing and fielding missile defense elements. Specifically, this testimony provides information on (1) steps MDA has taken to increase transparency and reduce acquisition risks; and (2) ongoing challenges associated with improving transparency and reducing high risk acquisition practices. In our prior work, GAO reviewed key MDA management documents including annual program reviews, tests plans and budget documents. We also interviewed officials from MDA and from other key DOD offices. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has taken important steps in recent years to improve management practices, reduce acquisition risks, and deliver capabilities to defend the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attacks. Specifically, MDA has made advances across a broad range of management activities, such as improving stakeholder outreach, reducing concurrency, (broadly defined as the overlap between product development, testing, and production), improving testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and increasing transparency of its progress. MDA has also made progress toward improving homeland and regional defense. However, MDA can go further to align itself with best practices as it faces ongoing challenges associated with improving transparency and reducing high risk acquisition practices. These challenges include: Stakeholder involvement: MDA has improved its outreach to stakeholders, including the intelligence community and other DOD stakeholders, however, opportunities remain, such as obtaining more input from the defense intelligence community. While MDA is not required to do so, the community is uniquely positioned to help keep pace with emerging threats and validate threat models. Concurrency: MDA has taken steps to reduce concurrency, but falls back on this practice when experiencing developmental delays or schedule pressures. The recently canceled Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) initially aligned production decisions with flight testing. However, in response to advancements from North Korea, development and production were performed concurrently and flight testing was reduced, thereby removing the safeguards that had been put into place. Flight test schedule changes: Despite initiating a new approach to developing its flight test schedule in 2009, MDA continues to struggle with execution. Namely, MDA is frequently revising its annual schedule by adding new tests, and deleting or delaying others—sometimes multiple times. Transparency of test cost estimates: MDA regularly makes changes to its test schedule without reporting the impact to its costs and funding needs. We continue to believe that breaking out funding requests by test will improve transparency into planned versus actual test costs and aid departmental and congressional decision makers as they make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources. MDA is at a pivotal crossroads, needing to balance its ability to pursue new and advanced efforts while also maintaining its existing portfolio. Congress and the Secretary of Defense are undertaking multiple reviews to determine how to address these concerns and chart a path forward for MDA.


According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of people in the United States over age 65 is expected to almost double by 2050. As Americans age, family caregivers, such as adult children and spouses, play a critical role in supporting the needs of this population. However, those who provide eldercare may risk their own long-term financial security if they reduce their workforce participation or pay for caregiving expenses. GAO was asked to provide information about parental and spousal caregivers and how caregiving might affect their retirement security. This report (1) examines what is known about the size and characteristics of the parental and spousal caregiving population, including differences among women and men; (2) examines the extent to which parental or spousal caregiving affects retirement security; and (3) identifies and discusses policy options and initiatives that could improve caregivers' retirement security. GAO analyzed data from three nationally representative surveys; conducted an extensive literature review; and interviewed experts who are knowledgeable about caregiving or retirement security, engaged in research or advocacy around caregiving, or represent groups that might be affected by the identified policy approaches. An estimated one in 10 Americans per year cared for a parent or spouse for some period of time from 2011 through 2017, and women were more likely than men to provide care, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data. Both parental and spousal caregivers were older than the general population, with spousal caregivers generally being the oldest. In addition, spousal caregivers were less likely to have completed college or to be employed, and they had lower earnings than parental caregivers and the general population. Most parental and spousal caregivers provided care for several years, and certain groups were more likely to provide daily care, including women and minorities. Some caregivers experienced adverse effects on their jobs and had less in retirement assets and income. According to data from a 2015 caregiving-specific study, an estimated 68 percent of working parental and spousal caregivers experienced job impacts, such as going to work late, leaving early, or taking time off during the day to provide care. Spousal caregivers were more likely to experience job impacts than parental caregivers (81 percent compared to 65 percent, respectively). According to 2002 to 2014 data from the Health and Retirement Study, spousal caregivers ages 59 to 66 had lower levels of retirement assets and less income than married non-caregivers of the same ages. Specifically, spousal caregivers had an estimated 50 percent less in individual retirement account (IRA) assets, 39 percent less in non-IRA assets, and 11 percent less in Social Security income. However, caregiving may not be the cause of these results as there are challenges to isolating the effect of caregiving from other factors that could affect retirement assets and income. Expert interviews and a review of relevant literature identified a number of actions that could improve caregivers' retirement security, which GAO grouped into four policy categories. Experts identified various benefits to caregivers and others from the policy categories—as well as pointing out possible significant costs, such as fiscal concerns and employer challenges—and in general said that taking actions across categories would help address caregivers' needs over both the short-term and long-term (see figure). Several experts also said public awareness initiatives are critical to helping people understand the implications of caregiving on their retirement security. For example, they pointed to the need for education about how decisions to provide care, leave the workforce, or reduce hours could affect long-term financial security.


For several decades the federal government has funded efforts to explore the feasibility of mitigating the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) while burning fossil fuels as a source of energy. Carbon capture and storage (CCS)âthe process of capturing manmade carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) at its source, such as a coal-fired power plant, and storing it before its release into the atmosphereâhas been proposed as a technological solution for mitigating emissions into the atmosphere while continuing to use fossil energy. Underground carbon storage, known as geologic sequestration, is the long-term containment of a fluid (including gas or liquid CO 2 in subsurface geologic formations). Long-term storage of CO 2 can also occur incidentally through enhanced oil recovery (EOR), a process of injecting CO 2 into an oil or gas reservoir that can significantly increase the amount of oil or gas produced. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) leads the federal government's carbon storage research and development (R&D) as part of the agency's fossil energy programs. The agency conducts research on geologic sequestration and EOR, and carries out the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships (RCSP) programâa set of public-private partnerships across the United States to deploy testing and development of CO 2 injection and storage. To date in the United States, nine projects have injected large volumes of CO 2 into underground formations as demonstrations of potential commercial-scale storage. Four of these projects are actively injecting and storing CO 2 âone in an underground saline reservoir to demonstrate geologic sequestration and three in oil and gas reservoirs as part of EOR. Currently, while numerous large-scale storage R&D projects are ongoing in the United States, none of the projects injecting CO 2 solely for geologic sequestration are operating in a commercial capacity. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), provides authorities for regulating underground injection of fluids and serves as the framework for regulation of geologic sequestration of CO 2 and EOR. The major purpose of the act's Underground Injection Control (UIC) provisions is to prevent endangerment of underground sources of drinking water from injection activities. EPA has promulgated regulations and established minimum federal requirements for six classes of injection wells. In 2010, EPA promulgated regulations for the underground injection of CO 2 for long-term storage and established UIC Class VI, a new class of wells solely for geologic sequestration of CO 2 . The well performance standards and other requirements established in the Class VI rule are based on the distinctive features of CO 2 injection compared to other types of injection. Two Class VI wells, both in Illinois, are currently permitted by EPA in the United States. No state has issued a permit for a Class VI well. CO 2 injection for EOR is conducted using Class II wells (associated with oil and gas production). SDWA also authorizes states to administer UIC programs in lieu of EPA, known as primacy . For Class VI CO 2 geologic sequestration wells, only North Dakota has primacy. Most oil and gas producing states have primacy for Class II wells and regulate these wells under their own state programs. Congress has supported carbon storage via underground injection through recent legislation directing DOE to expand R&D activity and increasing the federal tax credit for underground carbon storage. A policy challenge that Congress may face with underground carbon storage is balancing protection of underground sources of drinking water with supporting and encouraging the development of cost-effective CCS technology. If Congress were to explore future policy in this area, Members may consider the potential health and environmental risks (beyond any related risks to underground sources of drinking water) not addressed by SDWA. Other issues for Congress include unresolved liability and property rights issues, overall CCS project cost, public acceptance of these sequestration projects and participation in their planning, and the relationship of the growth of underground carbon storage with continuing to burn fossil fuels for generating electricity.


For the past 70 years, the United States has been instrumental in leading and promoting a strong U.S.-European partnership. Often termed the transatlantic relationship, this partnership has been grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared U.S.-European commitment to free markets and an open international trading system. Transatlantic relations encompass the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), close U.S. bilateral ties with most countries in Western and Central Europe, and a massive, interdependent trade and investment partnership. Despite periodic U.S.-European tensions, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the broad transatlantic relationship, viewing it as enhancing U.S. security and stability and magnifying U.S. global influence and financial clout. Transatlantic Relations and the Trump Administration The transatlantic relationship currently faces significant challenges. President Trump and some members of his Administration have questioned the strategic value and utility of NATO to the United States, and they have expressed considerable skepticism about the fundamental worth of the EU and the multilateral trading system. President Trump repeatedly has voiced concern that the United States bears an undue share of the transatlantic security burden and that EU trade policies are unfair to U.S. workers and businesses. U.S.-European policy divisions have emerged on a wide range of regional and global issues, from certain aspects of relations with Russia and China, to policies on Iran, Syria, arms control, and climate change, among others. The United Kingdom's pending departure from the EU ("Brexit") also could have implications for U.S. security and economic interests in Europe. The Trump Administration asserts that its policies toward Europe seek to bolster the transatlantic relationship by ensuring that European allies and friends are equipped to work with the United States in confronting the challenges posed by an increasingly competitive world. Administration officials maintain that the U.S. commitment to NATO and European security remains steadfast; President Trump has backed new NATO initiatives to deter Russian aggression and increased U.S. troop deployments in Europe. The Administration also contends that it is committed to working with the EU to resolve trade and tariff disputes, as signaled by its intention to launch new U.S.-EU trade negotiations. Supporters credit President Trump's approach toward Europe with strengthening NATO and compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns. Critics argue that the Administration's policies are endangering decades of U.S.-European cooperation that have advanced key U.S. geostrategic and economic interests. Some analysts suggest that current U.S.-European divisions are detrimental to transatlantic cohesion and represent a win for potential adversaries such as Russia and China. Many European leaders worry about potential U.S. global disengagement, and some argue that Europe must be better prepared to address both regional and international challenges on its own. Congressional Interests The implications of Trump Administration policies toward Europe and the extent to which the transatlantic relationship contributes to promoting U.S. security and prosperity may be of interest to the 116th Congress. Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO, and many Members of Congress view the EU as an important U.S. partner, especially given extensive U.S.-EU trade and investment ties. At the same time, some Members have long advocated for greater European burdensharing in NATO, or may oppose European or EU policies on certain foreign policy or trade issues. Areas for potential congressional oversight include the future U.S. role in NATO, as well as prospects for U.S.-European cooperation on common challenges such as managing a resurgent Russia and an increasingly competitive China. Based on its constitutional role over tariffs and foreign commerce, Congress has a direct interest in monitoring proposed new U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations. In addition, Congress may consider how the Administration's trade and tariff policies could affect the U.S.-EU economic relationship. Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO's Value, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF11209, Proposed U.S.-EU Trade Agreement Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Renée Johnson.


Foreign nationals from 82 countries may obtain E-2 nonimmigrant investor status in the United States. The E-2 nonimmigrant classification allows an eligible foreign national to be temporarily admitted to the United States to direct the operations of a business in which they have invested a substantial amount of capital, or to work in an approved position (e.g., manager or essential employee). To obtain E-2 status, a foreign national can apply through State for an E-2 visa abroad, or if already in the United States, by petitioning USCIS to extend or change to E-2 status. GAO was asked to review State's and USCIS' E-2 adjudication process. This report addresses: (1) outcomes and characteristics of foreign nationals who sought or received E-2 status from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, (2) policies and procedures for ensuring that individuals meet E-2 eligibility requirements, and (3) efforts to assess and address potential E-2 fraud. GAO analyzed State and USCIS data on E-2 adjudications, generalizable samples of E-2 visa applications and petitions, and relevant documents. GAO interviewed officials at 14 State posts abroad, selected based on E-2 application volume and other factors, and observed E-2 adjudications at four of these posts and USCIS's California Service Center. The Department of State (State) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) annually adjudicated about 54,000 visa applications or petitions from fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for foreign nationals seeking E-2 nonimmigrant status, over 80 percent of which were approved. About eighty percent of E-2 adjudications were for State visa applications, and the remaining 20 percent were for USCIS petitions to extend or change to E-2 status. Generally, about half of the foreign nationals seeking E-2 status were investors, managers, or essential employees of an E-2 business, and the other half were their spouses or children. State and USCIS have guidance, procedures, and training intended to help consular and immigration officers ensure foreign nationals meet E-2 eligibility requirements; however, officials GAO interviewed from both agencies identified challenges in the E-2 adjudication process. State. Consular officers noted that E-2 visa adjudications are complicated and resource-intensive, often requiring more documentation and time to complete than other visas. For example, the requirement that the investment in the business be substantial does not prescribe a minimum capital amount. Rather, the investment must be large enough to support the likely success of the business, among other criteria. Consular officers at 10 of 14 posts GAO interviewed indicated that determining the investment's substantiality is difficult for newly encountered business types. Providing additional E-2 training or related resources would help ensure that consular officers and locally employed staff have the necessary knowledge and abilities to carry out their responsibilities. USCIS. Officials identified similar challenges with respect to E-2 adjudications. However, officials stated that colocating immigration officers who adjudicate E-2 petitions helps to mitigate the challenges because the officers can communicate with each other on how USCIS has typically adjudicated such cases. State and USCIS have resources to address E-2 fraud, which includes submitting falsified documents or making false statements material to the adjudication; however, coordination on E-2 anti-fraud efforts is limited. State has anti-fraud efforts in place for all nonimmigrant visa types, but State officials stated that they consider E-2 visa fraud to be lower risk compared to other visas because the large amount of complex paperwork required for the E-2 visa discourages malicious actors. USCIS officials consider E-2 fraud to be a significant issue and have taken steps to identify fraud, such as using fraud assessment technology to determine if a business is financially viable and conducting site visits if fraud is suspected. Both State and USCIS collect information that could be useful to each other's anti-fraud efforts, but interagency coordination on E-2 fraud issues is ad hoc and relatively rare. For example, the main formal mechanism of coordination on E-2 visa issues—a quarterly teleconference—was cancelled 7 out of 8 times in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Coordinating regularly on fraud issues, which is a best practice from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework, will help both entities to better identify emerging E-2 fraud trends and areas for potential resource sharing.


Forty-two railroads are currently subject to the statutory mandate to implement PTC, a communications-based system designed to automatically slow or stop a train that is not being operated safely. Railroads were required to implement PTC by December 31, 2018, but would receive extensions up to December 31, 2020, if specific statutory requirements were met. GAO was asked to review railroads' PTC implementation progress. This statement discusses (1) railroads' implementation progress and any related implementation challenges and (2) FRA's plans for overseeing railroads' implementation. GAO analyzed railroads' most recent quarterly reports covering activities through March 31, 2019; received responses from all 42 railroads on a brief questionnaire; and interviewed officials from FRA and 8 railroads, selected to include variation in implementation status and type of railroad, among other criteria. Amtrak, commuter railroads, and freight railroads continue to make progress implementing positive train control (PTC), but significant work remains to achieve interoperability among the railroads' individual PTC systems. Since the end of 2018, many railroads reported making progress on testing and implementation of their own PTC systems. Four railroads reported reaching full implementation as of March 31, 2019, the same number in this stage at the end of 2018. However, many railroads remained in earlier stages of implementation, such as the 11 railroads that reported being in field testing. Nearly all railroads plan to complete full PTC implementation in the last quarter of 2020. Full implementation with interoperability is achieved when the PTC system on the locomotive of a “tenant” railroad and the PTC system of a “host” railroad whose track is being used can successfully communicate, allowing uninterrupted movements over property boundaries. As of March 31, 2019, 11 of the 31 host railroads that must have interoperable PTC systems reported that they had achieved interoperability with at least 1 of their tenant railroads. Collectively, 38 of the 227 unique host-tenant relationships that require interoperability have been completed (17 percent), according to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Most railroads reported to GAO that vendor and software issues were currently major or moderate challenges for PTC implementation. Over half of railroads also reported that interoperability was a major or moderate challenge, and can be complicated by software issues and coordinating host and tenant schedules, among other issues. For example, one railroad said that certain software functionality still had to be developed, tested, and implemented to address reliability issues and facilitate interoperability. FRA continues to provide assistance and support to railroads on PTC interoperabilty and the testing process, but workload challenges for the agency persist. FRA will continue to face a substantial workload through 2020 as it oversees railroads' PTC implementation and reviews documents, including lengthy safety plans required for railroads to obtain PTC system certification. While FRA officials have described supporting interoperability and testing as areas of focus, they have not demonstrated how, within these broad areas, they are monitoring risk and prioritizing resources, as GAO recommended in March 2018. GAO continues to see value in FRA developing a risk-based approach to allocate its resources to oversee PTC.


From fiscal years 2007 to 2018, DOD collected about $2.3 billion in fees into the FMS transportation accounts and expended about $1.9 billion from the accounts. Foreign partners can pay DOD a fee to cover the costs of DOD transporting items. Fees are collected into transportation accounts in the FMS Trust Fund, and expenditures for related transportation are paid from those accounts. DSCA is responsible for financial oversight of the accounts, and DFAS—a service provider to DSCA—also has some accounting responsibilities related to the accounts. House Report 114-537 and Senate Report 114-255 included provisions that GAO review DSCA's management of FMS fees. This report examines (1) DSCA's oversight of DOD components' activities that affect fees collected into the FMS transportation accounts, and (2) DSCA's financial oversight of expenditures from the FMS transportation accounts. GAO reviewed DOD guidance, analyzed 3 months of DOD expenditure data, and interviewed DOD officials. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is one of the primary ways the U.S. government supports its foreign partners, by annually selling them billions of dollars of military equipment and services. However, gaps in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) oversight of Department of Defense (DOD) components' activities increase the risk that fees collected into the FMS transportation accounts may be inaccurate. While DSCA requires components to perform annual reviews of FMS cases to verify the accuracy of transportation fees collected, DSCA does not routinely oversee these reviews. Additionally, DSCA lacks oversight of the timeliness of DOD components' reporting of deliveries, which should occur within 30 days. DSCA officials indicated that they are developing guidance and processes to help address these challenges, but had not completed them as of February 2020. DSCA's financial oversight of expenditures from the FMS transportation accounts does not provide reasonable assurance that expenditures are allowable and paid from the correct account. In fiscal year 2016, DSCA established internal guidance for financial oversight of expenditures from the accounts. While that guidance includes a process to review expenditures on a monthly basis, DSCA has not established procedures for conducting that review, including how to analyze expenditure data, or identify and address discrepancies. As a result, DSCA may not review FMS transportation expenditures consistently or identify and address discrepancies. GAO found that approximately 19 percent of expenditures reported to DSCA over a 3-month period in fiscal year 2019 inconsistently identified the DOD component responsible for the transaction. For example, a transaction may indicate that both Navy and Air Force are responsible for the shipment. Further, DSCA has not documented how the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) should generate the reports DSCA uses for its review, and DFAS's review of expenditures excludes some expenditures from two DOD components. Without a routine process to review expenditures and correct discrepancies, DSCA cannot provide reasonable assurance that all expenditures are allowable and paid from the correct account, raising the risk of misuse of funds. DSCA officials told GAO that they are developing guidance to help address these challenges, and expect to implement it in 2020.