Individuals apprehended by DHS and placed into expedited immigration proceedings are to be removed from the country without a hearing in immigration court unless they express an intention to apply for asylum, or a fear of persecution, torture, or return to their country. Those with such “fear claims” are referred to USCIS for a credible fear screening. Individuals who have certain criminal convictions or who have a reinstated order of removal and claim fear are referred for a reasonable fear screening. Those with negative outcomes can request a review by EOIR's immigration judges. GAO was asked to review USCIS's and EOIR's processes for fear screenings. This report examines (1) USCIS and EOIR data on fear screenings, (2) USCIS policies and procedures for overseeing fear screenings, and (3) USCIS and EOIR processes for workload management. GAO analyzed USCIS and EOIR data from fiscal years 2014 through mid-2019; interviewed relevant headquarters and field officials; and observed fear screenings in California, Texas, and Virginia, where most screenings occur. Data from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) indicate that their credible and reasonable fear caseloads generally increased from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2018. USCIS's caseloads nearly doubled during this timeframe—from about 56,000 to almost 109,000 referrals for credible and reasonable fear screenings. Further, the credible fear caseload was larger in the first two quarters of fiscal year 2019 alone than in each of fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Referrals to USCIS for reasonable fear screenings also increased from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. USCIS asylum officers made positive determinations in 71 percent of all credible and reasonable fear screenings between fiscal years 2014 and the first two quarters of fiscal year 2019. The outcomes of the remaining screenings were generally split evenly (14 percent each) between negative determinations or administrative closures (such as if the applicant was unable to communicate). EOIR's caseload for immigration judge reviews of USCIS's negative credible and reasonable fear determinations also increased between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2018. EOIR's immigration judges reviewed about 55,000 cases from fiscal year 2014 through the third quarter of 2019 (the most recent data available), and judges upheld USCIS's negative determinations in about three-quarters of all reviews. USCIS has developed various policies and procedures for overseeing credible and reasonable fear screenings in accordance with the regulations governing those screenings, such as interview requirements and mandatory supervisory review. USCIS provides basic training for new asylum officers and other training at individual asylum offices that includes credible and reasonable fear. The training at asylum offices includes on-the-job training for officers newly-assigned to credible and reasonable fear cases and ongoing weekly training for incumbent officers—some of which includes credible and reasonable fear. However, USCIS asylum offices do not all provide additional pre-departure training before officers begin screening families in person at DHS's family residential centers. Asylum Division officials told GAO that additional training for asylum officers before they begin screening such cases is important—in particular, credible fear screenings at these facilities represent about one-third of USCIS's caseload. Almost all USCIS asylum offices send officers to the family residential centers, including those offices with small fear caseloads at the local level. Some asylum offices provide pre-departure training to officers being sent to screen families, but such training is inconsistent across offices. By comparison, officials from the Chicago and New York offices stated they do not provide formal pre-departure training, but rather direct or recommend that officers review Asylum Division guidance and procedures on family processing independently before they travel. Officials from two other offices stated they rely on the training asylum officers may receive throughout the year related to credible and reasonable fear, which can vary. Providing pre-departure training, in addition to USCIS's basic training for new asylum officers, would help USCIS ensure that officers from all asylum offices are conducting efficient and effective fear screenings of families. Further, consistent with regulation, USCIS policy is to include any dependents on a principal applicant's credible fear determination if the principal applicant receives a positive determination, resulting in the principal and any dependents being placed into full removal proceedings with an opportunity to apply for various forms of relief or protection, including asylum. For example, a parent as a principal applicant may receive a negative determination, but his or her child may receive a separate positive determination. In the interest of family unity, USCIS may use discretion to place both the parent and child into full removal proceedings rather than the parent being expeditiously ordered removed in accordance with the expedited removal process. However, USCIS's case management system does not allow officers to record whether an individual receives a determination on his or her case as a principal applicant, dependent, or in the interest of family unity. Without complete data on all such outcomes, USCIS is not well-positioned to report on the scope of either the agency's policy for family members who are treated as dependents, pursuant to regulation, or USCIS's use of discretion in the interest of family unity. USCIS and EOIR have processes for managing their respective credible and reasonable fear workloads. For example, USCIS uses national- and local-level staffing models to inform staffing allocation decisions. USCIS also sets and monitors timeliness goals for completing credible and reasonable fear cases. Although USCIS monitors overall processing times, it does not collect comprehensive data on some types of case delays, which officers told us can occur on a regular basis. Asylum officers whom GAO interviewed stated that certain delays could affect the number of credible or reasonable fear cases they can complete each day. Collecting and analyzing additional information on case delays would better position USCIS to mitigate the reasons for the delays and improve efficiency. EOIR has developed processes for immigration courts and judges to help manage its workload that include performance measures with timeliness goals for credible and reasonable fear reviews. EOIR data indicate that about 30 percent of credible and reasonable fear reviews are not completed within the required timeframes. EOIR officials said they plan to implement an automated tool in early 2020 to monitor court performance, including the credible and reasonable fear performance goals. Because implementation of the automated tool is planned for early 2020, it is too soon to know if EOIR will use the tool to monitor adherence to the required credible and reasonable fear review time frames or if it will help EOIR understand reasons for case delays.


Individuals may be subject to certain restrictions when leaving the government for private employment or joining the government from the private sector. These restrictions were enacted in response to what is often referred to as the revolving door . Generally, the revolving door is described as the movement of individuals between the public and private sector. Individuals may move because they possess policy and procedural knowledge and have relationships with former colleagues that are useful to prospective employers. Laws attempting to restrict the movement of individuals between the government and the private sector have existed since at least the late 1800s. Today's revolving door laws focus on restricting former government employees' representational activities that attempt to influence federal officials with whom they used to work. Found at 18 U.S.C. Â§207, revolving door laws for executive branch officials include (1) a lifetime ban on "switching sides" (e.g., representing a private party on the same "particular matter" involving identified parties on which the former executive branch employee had worked while in government); (2) a two-year ban on "switching sides" on a broader range of issues; (3) a one-year restriction on assisting others on certain trade and treaty negotiations; (4) a one-year "cooling off" period for certain senior officials on lobbying; (5) two-year "cooling off" periods for very senior officials from lobbying; and (6) a one-year ban on certain former officials from representing a foreign government or foreign political party. In addition to laws, executive orders have been used to place further restrictions on executive branch officials, including officials entering government. For example, President Trump issued an executive order (E.O. 13770) to lengthen "cooling off" periods for certain executive branch appointees both entering and exiting government. To date, much of the empirical work concerning the revolving door has focused on former Members of Congress or congressional staff leaving Capitol Hill, especially those who become lobbyists in their postcongressional careers. This report provides some empirical data about a different aspect of the revolving doorâthe movement into and out of government by executive branch personnel. Using research conducted by the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University's capstone class over the 2017-2018 academic year, this report presents data about the revolving door in the executive branch through the lens of President George W. Bush's and President Barack Obama's Administrations. The analysis includes Cabinet department officials who were listed, for either Administration, in the United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (the Plum Book ). Through an examination of appointees in President Bush's and President Obama's Administrations, several findings emerge. First, approximately 92% of executive branch officials in the examined dataset were never registered lobbyists, while 8% were registered lobbyists at some point before or after their government service. Second, Cabinet departments differed greatly in the number of officials who were registered lobbyists either before or after their federal service. Although every Cabinet department surveyed had some percentage of officials registered as lobbyists either before or after their government service, the percentage of officials included in the dataset who registered as lobbyists before their government service, after their government service, or both ranged from a high of 18% (Department of Commerce) to a low of 1% (Department of Justice). Third, the data also show that for lobbyists entering government, the percentage of officials in the dataset who had been lobbyists before government serving in the Bush and Obama Administrations ranged from 10% in the Department of Labor to 61% in the Department of Veterans Affairs. The analogous percentages for government employees in the dataset leaving to become lobbyists ranged from 39% in the Department of Veterans Affairs to 82% in the Department of Transportation. Finally, the report identifies several areas for potential congressional consideration. In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress to address many of these potential areas. These include options to amend existing "cooling off" periods and evaluate the administration and enforcement of revolving door regulations. Alternatively, Congress may choose to maintain current "cooling off" periods, administration, and enforcement practices.


Information resellers—companies that collect and resell information on individuals—have dramatically increased the collection and sharing of personal data in recent years, raising privacy concerns. Increasing use of social media, mobile applications, and other technologies have intensified these concerns. This statement is primarily based on findings from GAO's 2013 report on information resellers ( GAO-13-663 ). It also discusses a 2015 report on facial recognition technology ( GAO-15-621 ), a 2018 report on financial technology ( GAO-18-254 ), and two 2019 reports on internet privacy and consumer data protection ( GAO-19-52 and GAO-19-196, respectively). GAO discusses (1) existing federal laws related to the privacy of consumer information held by information resellers and (2) any gaps in this legal framework. For the prior work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, regulations, and enforcement actions and interviewed representatives of federal agencies, trade associations, consumer and privacy groups, and resellers. In recent years, GAO issued reports that relate to information resellers and consumer privacy issues. Two central findings from a 2013 GAO report remain current: No overarching federal privacy law governs the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies , including information resellers (data brokers). Instead, a variety of laws are tailored to specific purposes, situations, or entities. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act limits use and distribution of personal information collected or used to help determine eligibility for such things as credit or employment. Other laws apply to health care providers, financial institutions, or to online collection of information about children. Gaps exist in the federal privacy framework . With regard to data that private-sector entities use for marketing, no federal statute provides consumers the right to learn what information is held about them and who holds it. In many cases, consumers also do not have the legal right to control the collection or sharing with third parties of sensitive personal information (such as their shopping habits and health interests) for marketing purposes. In 2013 and in 2015, GAO also reported that the statutory framework for consumer privacy did not fully address new technologies—such as online tracking and facial recognition—and the vastly increased marketplace for personal information, including the proliferation of information sharing among third parties. In two 2019 reports, GAO found additional gaps in the federal privacy framework and potential limitations in regulatory authority under current privacy law. Internet content providers and internet service providers collect, use, and share information from customers to enable their services, support advertising, and for other purposes. Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) generally has addressed internet privacy through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, and other agencies have used industry-specific statutes, there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute with specific internet privacy standards for the private sector. GAO also reported that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, a key law governing the security of consumer information, does not provide FTC with civil penalty authority for violations of the privacy and data security provisions of the act. New and more advanced technologies and changes in the marketplace for consumer information have vastly increased the amount and nature of personal information collected and the number of parties using or sharing it. Such changes warrant reconsideration of how well the current privacy framework protects personal information.


Intellectual property (IP) rights in pharmaceuticals are typically justified as necessary to allow manufacturers to recoup their substantial investments in research, development, and regulatory approval. IP law provides exclusive rights in a particular invention or product for a certain time period, potentially enabling the rights holder (e.g., a brand-name drug manufacturer) to charge higher-than-competitive prices. If rights holders are able to charge such prices, they have an incentive to lengthen the period of exclusive rights as much as possible. Indeed, some commentators allege that pharmaceutical manufacturers have engaged in patenting practices that unduly extend the period of exclusivity. These critics argue that these patenting practices are used to keep drug prices high, without any benefit for consumers or innovation. Criticisms center on four such practices: " E vergreening " : So-called patent "evergreening" is the practice of filing for new patents on secondary features of a particular product as earlier patents expire, thereby extending patent exclusivity past the original twenty-year term. Later-filed patents may delay or prevent entry by competitors, thereby allowing the brand-name drug manufacturer (the brand) to continue charging high prices. " Product Hopping " : Generic drug manufacturers allege that as patents on a particular product expire, brand manufacturers may attempt to introduce and switch the market to a new, similar product covered by a later-expiring patentâa process known as "product hopping" or "product switching." This practice takes two forms: a "hard switch," where the older product is removed from the market, and a "soft switch," where the older product is kept on the market with the new product. In either case, the brand will focus its marketing on the new product in order to limit the market for any generic versions of the old product. " Patent Thickets " : Generic and biosimilar companies also allege that the brands create "patent thickets" by filing numerous patents on the same product. These thickets allegedly prevent generics from entering the market due to the risk of infringement and the high cost of patent litigation. " Pay-for-D elay " Settlements : Litigation often results when a generic or biosimilar manufacturer attempts to enter the market with a less expensive version of a branded pharmaceutical. Core issues usually include whether the brand's patents are valid, and whether the generic or biosimilar product infringes those patents. Rather than litigate these issues to judgment, however, the parties will often settle. Such settlements may involve the brand paying the generic or biosimilar to stay out of the marketâreferred to as "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay" settlements. These settlements are allegedly anticompetitive because they allow the brand to continue to charge high prices without risking invalidation of its patent, thus unjustifiably benefiting the settling companies at the expense of the consumer. Drug manufacturers respond that their patenting practices protect new, innovative inventions, as Congress intended when it created the patent system. In their view, the terms for these practices are unfairly pejorative, or, at most, describe outlier behavior by a few companies. Defenders of these patenting practices reject their characterization as anticompetitive and emphasize that strong patent rights are needed to encourage innovation and life-saving research and development efforts. In recent years, some commentators and Members of Congress have proposed patent reforms that seek to limit or curtail these patenting practices, which some perceive as contributing to high prices for pharmaceutical products. Such proposals aim, for example, to reduce the impact of later-filed patents (e.g., TERM Act of 2019, H.R. 3199 , and REMEDY Act, S. 1209 / H.R. 3812 ); to encourage challenges to pharmaceutical patents (e.g., Second Look at Drugs Patents Act of 2019, S. 1617 ); to make product hopping an antitrust violation in certain circumstances (e.g., Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S. 1416 ); to facilitate generic market entry (e.g., Orange Book Transparency Act of 2019, H.R. 1503 ); to increase transparency as to the patents that cover biological products (e.g., Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019, H.R. 1520 , and Biologic Patent Transparency Act, S. 659 ); and to reform pay-for-delay settlements (e.g., Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64 / H.R. 2375 ).


Interior oversees energy production on federal lands and waters and is responsible for ensuring taxpayers receive a fair return for access to federal energy resources. Oil, gas, and coal on federal lands provide an important source of energy for the United States; they create jobs; and they generate billions of dollars in revenues that are shared between federal, state, and tribal governments. However, when not managed properly, energy production on federal lands can create risks to public health and the environment, such as contaminated surface water. In February 2011, GAO designated Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources as a program at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation. This testimony discusses GAO's work related to ensuring a fair return on resources from federal lands. To do this work, GAO drew on reports issued from May 2007 through September 2019 and preliminary observations from ongoing work. GAO reviewed relevant federal and state laws, regulations, and policies; analyzed federal data; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others. GAO's prior and ongoing work found challenges related to ensuring a fair return for oil, gas, and coal developed on federal lands in areas, including the following: Oil, Gas, and Coal Lease Terms and Conditions. Key federal lease terms are the same as they were decades ago, and Interior has not adjusted them for inflation or other factors that may affect the federal government's fair return. In June 2017, GAO reported that raising federal royalty rates—a lease term that defines a percentage of the value of production paid to the government—for onshore oil, gas, and coal resources could decrease production on federal lands by a small amount or not at all but could increase overall federal revenue. Also, preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work indicate that selected states charge royalty rates for oil and gas produced on state lands at a higher rate than the federal government charges for production on federal lands. Oil, Gas, and Coal Bonding. GAO found in September 2019 that oil and gas bonds do not provide sufficient financial assurance because, among other things, most individual, statewide, and nationwide lease bonds are set at regulatory minimum values that have not been adjusted for inflation since the 1950s and 1960s (see figure). Further, GAO reported in March 2018 that coal self-bonding (where an operator promises to pay reclamation costs without providing collateral) poses financial risks to the federal government. Bonds provide funds that can be used to reclaim lands—restore them as close to their original natural states as possible—if an operator or other liable party does not do so. Natural Gas Emissions. In October 2010, GAO reported that data collected by Interior likely underestimated venting and flaring because they did not account for all sources of lost gas. GAO reported that economically capturing vented and flared natural gas could increase federal royalty payments by $23 million annually and made recommendations to help Interior better account for and manage emissions. In November 2016, Interior issued regulations consistent with GAO's recommendations, but Interior has since issued revised regulations, which are inconsistent with GAO's recommendations.


Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a national public health issue. IPV is also a crime characterized by recidivism and escalation, meaning offenders are likely to be repeat abusers, and the intensity of the abuse or violence is likely to grow over time. Like the broader phenomenon of domestic violence and abuse, a subset of which includes IPV, associated physical and mental trauma for those who are victims of abuse, as well as for those minor children who witness the abuse, can have both immediate and long-term health effects and significant costs to society. When military servicemembers are involved as either victims or perpetrators of IPV, the consequences of IPV can also harm unit readiness. Congress has constitutional authority to fund, regulate, and oversee the Armed Forces, including the military justice system. Congress has used this authority in recent years to mandate domestic violence prevention and victim response policies, programs, and services. In addition, Congress has acted to improve accountability measures for military perpetrators through statutory changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Within the Department of Defense (DOD), IPV may include domestic violence and domestic abuse. Domestic violence is defined as an offense with legal consequences under the U.S. Code , UCMJ, and State laws, while domestic abuse refers to a pattern of abusive behavior. Within DOD, the Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is responsible for clinical assessment, supportive services, and treatment in response to domestic abuse, child abuse, and neglect in military families. Military responses to incidents of IPV may involve military law enforcement, unit or installation commanders, and military health personnel. In some cases, military and civilian officials may coordinate additional responses to IPV. In FY2018, DOD reported 16,912 incidents of spouse and intimate partner abuse (the active servicemember population totals over 1.3 million). Roughly half (8,039) of these incident reports met the criteria for abuse under the DOD definition. Some of these incidents have severe consequences. In FY2018, there were 15 confirmed domestic abuse fatalities involving military personnel as perpetrators or victims; in three of the cases, the victims had reported prior incidents of abuse to FAP personnel. Congress has taken numerous actions over the past few decades to address risk factors for IPV among the servicemember population, to raise awareness, to protect victims, and to hold perpetrators accountable. More recently, in the 116 th Congress, lawmakers added a punitive article to the UCMJ specifically for domestic violence offenses (prior offenses had been prosecuted under the punitive article for assault). As Congress continues to consider policy issues related to IPV, areas for continued oversight include community coordination in prevention and response, coverage and access to military-sponsored victim services, the appropriateness of law enforcement response, data collection and federal reporting requirements, and other programs that can help mitigate risk factors for IPV.


Almost all U.S. offshore oil and gas production occurs in the Gulf of Mexico. Federal oil and gas leasing in the Gulf is governed primarily by two lawsâthe Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. Â§Â§1331-1356b), which broadly controls oil and gas leasing throughout the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS); and the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA; 43 U.S.C. Â§1331 note), whose provisions relate specifically to leasing in the Gulf region. GOMESA imposes an oil and gas leasing moratorium through June 30, 2022, in most of the Eastern Gulf (off the Florida coast) and a small part of the Central Gulf. The law also establishes a framework for sharing revenues from certain qualified oil and gas leases in other parts of the Gulf with the "Gulf producing states" of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, as well as with a nationwide outdoor recreation programâthe state assistance program establis hed by the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (LWCF; 54 U.S.C. Â§Â§200301 et seq.). The 116 th Congress is considering changes to GOMESA, as statutory provisions related to both the moratorium and revenue sharing enter a period of transition. GOMESA Moratorium GOMESA's leasing moratorium is scheduled to expire in June 2022, and the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has begun to plan for offshore leasing in the moratorium area after the expiration. Some Members of Congress seek to forestall new lease sales in the area by extending the moratorium; others support allowing it to expire on the scheduled date. On September 11, 2019, the House passed H.R. 205 , which would make the GOMESA moratorium permanent. Some other 116 th Congress bills (e.g., H.R. 286 , H.R. 291 , H.R. 341 , H.R. 2352 , H.R. 3585 , and S. 13 ) also would extend the moratorium or make it permanent. By contrast, H.R. 4294 would mandate lease sales in the area directly following the expiration. Absent congressional action, the executive branch is to decide whether to offer new oil and gas leases in the GOMESA moratorium area after June 2022. The Trump Administration has indicated interest in pursuing oil and gas leasing in that area after the expiration and has included two lease sales in a preliminary draft of its offshore leasing program for 2019-2024. In addition to economic, budgetary, and environmental considerations in extending or ending the moratorium, a particular issue is potential conflict related to the Department of Defense's (DOD's) intensive use of the area for military testing and training. DOD generally has supported the moratorium and has indicated that, from a defense standpoint, stipulations and restrictions on oil and gas activities would be necessary if the area were to be opened to leasing in 2022. GOMESA Revenue Sharing A second revenue-sharing phase (referred to as "Phase II") has begun under GOMESA. Compared with GOMESA's first decade (FY2007-FY2016), Phase II requires revenues to be shared from an expanded set of leases. Revenues continue to be shared at a rate of 37.5% with the Gulf producing states and their coastal political subdivisions, and at a rate of 12.5% with the LWCF state assistance program. The remaining 50% of qualified revenues are deposited in the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. Revenue sharing from the added Phase II areas is capped annually at $500 million for most years through FY2055 for the four states and LWCF combined. Stakeholders have debated whether the Phase II revenue-sharing provisions should remain in place or whether different proportions should be shared with coastal states, used for broader federal programs, or deposited as miscellaneous receipts to the U.S. Treasury. Some Members of Congress seek to increase revenues shared with the Gulf Coast states, for example, by raising or eliminating GOMESA's revenue-sharing cap, increasing the state-shared percentage, or both. In the 115 th Congress, P.L. 115-97 increased the revenue-sharing cap to $650 million for FY2020 and FY2021. Several bills in the 116 th Congress (e.g., H.R. 3814 , H.R. 4294 , and S. 2418 ) would eliminate the cap and raise the state share of qualified revenues to 50%. S. 13 would add Florida as a revenue-sharing state. Other bills have proposed new uses of Gulf oil and gas revenues for other federal programs and purposes outside of revenue sharing; and some stakeholders have proposed to end GOMESA state revenue sharing altogether. Also at issue are questions about the overall adequacy of revenue amounts to fulfill existing and proposed purposes, including considerations about the optimal extent of federal offshore oil and gas leasing in the Gulf and how various policy choices would affect revenue amounts.


Introduction . Congress has shown enduring interest in Liberia, a small coastal West African country of about 4.8 million people. The United States played a key role in the country's founding, and bilateral ties generally have remained close despite significant strains during Liberia's two civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003). Congress has appropriated considerable foreign assistance for Liberia, and has held hearings on the country's postwar trajectory and development. In recent years, congressional interest partly has centered on the immigration status of over 80,000 Liberian nationals resident in the United States. Liberia participates in the House Democracy Partnership, a U.S. House of Representatives legislative-strengthening initiative that revolves around peer-to-peer engagement. Background. Liberia's conflicts caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, spurred massive displacement, and devastated the country's economy and infrastructure, aggravating existing development challenges. Postwar foreign assistance supported a recovery characterized by high economic growth and modest improvements across various sectors. An Ebola outbreak from 2014-2016 cut short this progress; nearly 5,000 Liberians died from the virus, which overwhelmed the health system and spurred an economic recession. The outbreak also exposed enduring governance challenges, including weak state institutions, poor service delivery, official corruption, and public distrust of government. Politics. Optimism surrounding the 2018 inauguration of President George Weahâwhich marked Liberia's first electoral transfer of power since 1944âarguably has waned as his administration has become embroiled in a series of corruption scandals and the country has encountered new economic headwinds. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economy contracted by 1.4% in 2019, down from 1.2% growth in 2018, as rising inflation has undermined household purchasing power. Weah's government has struggled to deliver on ambitious pro-poor campaign pledges, as diminishing foreign aid flows, poor tax administration, and low global prices for Liberia's top export commodities have strained state finances. Public discontent with alleged mismanagement and corruption has given way to large anti-government protests in the capital city of Monrovia. The Economy and Development Issues . Liberia faces substantial obstacles to broad-based, sustainable development. Infrastructure gaps, poor electricity provision, corruption, and an uncompetitive business climate impede growth. Exports of raw rubber, gold, iron ore, diamonds, and palm oil are key sources of government revenues and foreign exchange, but these industries provide few high-paying jobs to local Liberians, and much of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Nearly one-third of Liberians face moderate to severe chronic food insecurity despite the country's fertile land, extensive coastline, and abundant rainfall. Human Rights. Human rights conditions have improved considerably since the early 2000s, though corruption, episodic security force abuses against civilians, and di scrimination against women and marginalized communities persist. Press freedoms have come under threat during Weah's presidency; reporters have faced harassment and occasional violence from government officials, including legislators, and some journalists reportedly self-censor to evade persecution. Accountability for wartime abuses remains a highly sensitive issue, and several individuals who played key roles in Liberia's conflicts retain influence and/or serve in elected office. Several perpetrators of wartime abuses have faced trial in the U.S. court system, most on immigration-related fraud or perjury charges related to nondisclosure of involvement in such abuses in applications for U.S. asylum, residency, or citizenship. U.S. Assistance. Since the end of Liberia's second conflict in 2003, the United States has provided more than $2.4 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered assistance to support Liberia's post-war stabilization and development. This does not include nearly $600 million in emergency assistance for Liberia's Ebola response, aid channeled through other U.S. agencies, or U.S. funding for a long-running U.N. peacekeeping mission that completed its mandate in 2018. Current U.S. assistance, which totaled $96.5 million in FY2019, centers on supporting agriculture-led development and strengthening the health system, public service delivery, civil society capacity, and justice and security sectors. An ongoing $256.7 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact seeks to enhance Liberia's power sector and roads infrastructure.


Investors are increasingly asking public companies to disclose information on ESG factors to help them understand risks to the company's financial performance or other issues, such as the impact of the company's business on communities. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires public companies to disclose material information—which can include material ESG information—in their annual 10-K filings and other periodic filings. GAO was asked to review issues related to public companies' disclosures of ESG information. This report examines, among other things, (1) why investors seek ESG disclosures, (2) public companies' disclosures of ESG factors, and (3) the advantages and disadvantages of ESG disclosure policy options. GAO analyzed 32 large and mid-sized public companies' disclosures on 33 selected ESG topics. Among other criteria, GAO selected companies within eight industries that represented a range of sectors in the U.S. economy and selected ESG factors that were frequently cited as important to investors by market observers. GAO also reviewed reports and studies on ESG policy proposals and interviewed 14 large and mid-sized institutional investors (seven private-sector asset management firms and seven public pension funds), 18 public companies, 13 market observers (such as ESG standard-setting organizations, academics, and other groups), and international government, stock exchange, and industry association representatives. Most institutional investors GAO interviewed (12 of 14) said they seek information on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues to better understand risks that could affect company financial performance over time. These investors added that they use ESG disclosures to monitor companies' management of ESG risks, inform their vote at shareholder meetings, or make stock purchasing decisions. Most of these institutional investors noted that they seek additional ESG disclosures to address gaps and inconsistencies in companies' disclosures that limit their usefulness. GAO's review of annual reports, 10-K filings, proxy statements, and voluntary sustainability reports for 32 companies identified disclosures across many ESG topics but also found examples of limitations noted by investors. Twenty-three of 32 companies disclosed on more than half of the 33 topics GAO reviewed, with board accountability and workforce diversity among the most reported topics and human rights the least. Disclosure on an ESG topic may depend on its relevance to a company's business. As shown in the figure, most companies provided information related to ESG risks or opportunities that was specific to the company, though some did not include this type of company-specific information. Additionally, differences in methods and measures companies used to disclose quantitative information may make it difficult to compare across companies. For example, companies differed in their reporting of carbon dioxide emissions. Policy options to improve the quality and usefulness of ESG disclosures range from legislative or regulatory action requiring or encouraging disclosures, to private-sector approaches, such as using industry-developed frameworks. These options pose important trade-offs. For example, while new regulatory requirements could improve comparability across companies, voluntary approaches can provide flexibility to companies and limit potential costs.


JWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. Problems discovered during integration and testing caused multiple delays that led NASA to replan the project in June 2018. Now estimated to cost $9.7 billion, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and its launch date has been delayed by over 6.5 years since its cost and schedule baselines were established in 2009. Prior to the replanning process, an independent review board assessed the project and made recommendations to improve performance and oversight. Conference Report No. 112-284 included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is GAO's eighth report. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the project is executing within its revised cost and schedule targets and (2) NASA has implemented and sustained key improvements to performance and oversight established following the June 2018 replan. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project has made significant progress since GAO's last report in March 2019, such as completing testing of the observatory's individual elements and integrating them together in August 2019. However, new technical challenges have required the project to use more schedule reserve—extra time set aside in the project's schedule to accommodate unforeseen risks or delays—than planned. As of October 2019, the project had used about 76 percent of its available schedule reserve and no longer plans to launch in November 2020 (see figure). The project is now managing to a March 2021 launch date but estimates only a 12 percent likelihood that this date will be achieved. NASA plans to reassess the launch date in the spring of 2020. The project used much of the schedule reserve in April 2019 to address issues with two components needed to transmit science data to ground control. The contractor has been able to mitigate some of the schedule loss and continues to look for new efficiencies. Technical challenges also resulted in longer employment of the contractor workforce than planned, which could result in additional cost increases. NASA continues to monitor multiple, other risks that could place further schedule and cost strains on the project. Since NASA replanned the project again in June 2018, the agency has taken steps meant to improve performance and oversight. NASA has addressed all recommendations from an independent review board, but in doing so sometimes took actions that differed from those outlined in the board's report. NASA has sustained, and in some cases expanded, oversight initiatives following the revised cost and schedule commitments that, in many cases, were designed to enhance communication between the government and the contractor.


Job Corps' 119 centers, which are operated primarily by contractors, provide an array of services to help low-income youth find a job, go to college, or enter the military. ETA is generally required to award competitive contracts, but can award noncompetitive contracts in certain instances. Some noncompetitive contracts act as bridge contracts—which can be a useful tool to avoid a lapse in service but, when used frequently and for prolonged periods, can increase the risk of the government overpaying for services. This report examines (1) the extent to which ETA used bridge contracts to operate Job Corps centers in program year 2016; (2) strategies ETA used to decrease the use of noncompetitive bridge contracts; and (3) how ETA monitored contractor performance at selected Job Corps centers. GAO analyzed data from program years 2016 and 2017(the most current data available at the time we began our review) from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, and reviewed contract documents. GAO also conducted an in-depth review of 10 centers that reflected a mix of contractor performances and at least one center from Job Corps' six regions, and interviewed ETA officials. In program year 2016, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) operated 68 of its 97 Job Corps centers using bridge contracts. GAO has generally defined a bridge contract as an extension to an existing contract or a new noncompetitive contract awarded to the current contractor to avoid a lapse in service. GAO found that ETA operated most of these Job Corps centers (49 of 68) under bridge contracts for at least a year, with over a third operating under bridges for 2 years or potentially longer. ETA cited workforce challenges such as staff vacancies and the need to address issues raised in protests as contributing to its use of bridge contracts. ETA officials said they used various strategies to decrease their use of noncompetitive bridge contracts, including prioritizing efforts to award more contracts competitively. By the end of program year 2017, most of the centers operating under bridge contracts during program year 2016 (48 of 68) had transitioned to competitive contracts. Despite these efforts, ETA continues to face workforce challenges. Contracting officials expressed concern about having sufficient staff to award a large group of contracts that will begin to expire in program years 2021 and 2022 (see figure). ETA officials said it takes about 8 to 12 months from solicitation to contract award for new 5-year competitive procurements. Therefore, acquisition planning for a center contract set to expire in January 2021 would usually need to begin early 2020. However, ETA does not have a comprehensive workforce strategy to address its workforce challenges or support these new contract awards. As a result, ETA risks relying on noncompetitive bridge contracts again in the future. Note: Centers are operated on a program year basis, which runs from July 1 of a given year to June 30 of the following year. ETA used various strategies to monitor and incentivize contractor performance at the 10 centers GAO reviewed, including conducting onsite visits to Job Corps centers and paying incentive fees to contractors. However, contracting and program officials GAO interviewed had limited or no insight into how ETA calculates and pays incentive fees. Without coordinating and documenting the process for calculating incentive fees, ETA's program and contract officials may lack key information regarding contractor performance.


Kosovo, a country in the Western Balkans with a predominantly Albanian-speaking population, declared independence from Serbia in 2008, less than a decade after a brief but lethal war. It has since been recognized by about 100 countries. The United States and most European Union (EU) member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, China, and various other countries (including some EU member states) do not. Key issues for Kosovo include the following: Resuming talks with Serbia. An EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, aimed at normalization of relations, stalled in 2018 when Kosovo imposed tariffs on Serbian goods in response to Serbia's efforts to undermine Kosovo's international legitimacy. Despite U.S. and EU pressure, the parties have not resumed talks. On April 1, 2020, acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti conditionally lifted tariffs against Serbian imports; this step was praised by EU officials but drew U.S. criticism because of the government's simultaneous pledge to gradually introduce measures to match Serbian barriers to the movement of goods and people. Government collapse . The governing coalition led by Albin Kurti of the Self-Determination Party (VetÃ«vendosje) lost a vote of confidence in March 2020, less than two months after it had formed. The outgoing government comprises two parties formerly in opposition, both of which had campaigned on an anti-corruption platform. Among other factors, the collapse was attributed to divisions over managing relations with Serbia amid U.S. pressure on the government to immediately lift tariffs against Serbian imports, as well as to domestic political infighting. Kosovo's leaders disagree over how to proceed from the current political crisis. Strengthening the rule of law. The victory of Kurti's VetÃ«vendosje in the October 2019 election partly reflected widespread voter dissatisfaction with corruption. Weakness in the rule of law contributes to Kosovo's difficulties in attracting foreign investment and complicates the country's efforts to combat transnational threats. Relations with the United States. Kosovo regards the United States as a key ally and security guarantor. Kosovo receives the largest share of U.S. foreign assistance to the Balkans, and the two countries cooperate on numerous security issues. The United States is the largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which has contributed to security in Kosovo since 1999. In 2019, the Trump Administration appointed a Special Representative for the Western Balkans and a Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations. These appointments are considered to reflect the Administration's interest in securing a comprehensive settlement between Kosovo and Serbia and may signal a potentially greater U.S. role in a process that the EU has largely facilitated to date. Leaders in Kosovo generally have welcomed greater U.S. engagement, but some observers expressed concern over reported U.S. pressure on the Kurti government to lift tariffs on Serbian goodsâincluding pausing some U.S. assistance to Kosovoâand over perceived U.S. support for the no-confidence session that resulted in the March 2020 government collapse. U.S. officials maintain that the United States is committed to working with any government formed in compliance with constitutional processes. Transatlantic cooperation . Since the Kosovo war ended in 1999, the United States, the EU, and key EU member states have largely coordinated their efforts to promote regional stability in the Western Balkans, including efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. More recently, however, some observers have expressed concern that transatlantic coordination has weakened on some issues relating to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and to Kosovo's current political impasse. Congress was actively involved in debates over the U.S. response to a 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo and subsequently supported Kosovo's declaration of independence. Today, many Members of Congress continue to support Kosovo through country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding levels averaging around $50 million per year since 2015.


Leveraged lending generally refers to loans made to businesses that are highly indebted or have a low credit rating. Most leveraged loans are syndicated, meaning a group of bank or nonbank lenders collectively funds a leveraged loan made to a single borrower, in contrast to a traditional loan held by a single bank. In some cases, investors hold leveraged loans directly. However, more than 60% of leveraged loans are securitized into collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)âsecurities backed by cash flow from pools of leveraged loans. These securities are then sold to investors. The largest investors in leveraged loans and CLOs are mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and pension funds. During the past decade, the U.S. leveraged loan market experienced periods of growth; it grew by 20% in 2018, bringing the amount outstanding to more than $1 trillion. According to some industry observers, deteriorating credit quality and decreasing investor safeguards have accompanied this growth; however, default rates have remained low. The share of leveraged loans originated by and held by banks has declined, whereas the roles of nonbank participants, such as investment management and finance companies, have increased. In addition, some observers have noted similarities between leveraged lending and CLO market characteristics and those of certain mortgage lending and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets in the lead-up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. As a result, leveraged lending has raised a number of interrelated policy issues. Observers express concerns that leveraged lending presents certain financial and economic risks, as both a potential source of systemic risk and a mechanism that could exacerbate a future recession (even if it does not cause financial instability). Leveraged lending could pose systemic risk because it couples high risk with opacity, potentially leading to unexpectedly high losses and financial disruption. Some experts have argued that potential leveraged loan losses or illiquidity could lead to contagion effects, wherein one financial firm's distress affects other firms and activities. However, banks' limited exposure to leveraged loans and stronger postcrisis capital and liquidity positions might mitigate contagion effects. For these reasons, some financial authorities (e.g., the chairman of the Federal Reserve) have indicated that although leveraged loans raise some concerns, they "do not appear to present notable risks to financial stability." Even if leveraged loans do not cause financial instability, some nonfinancial firms that rely on leveraged lending could lose access to financing during the next downturn, which could negatively affect their operations if they were unable to find alternative funding. Overall borrowing by nonfinancial firms is historically high, which could lead to a larger-than-normal cutback in their spending or more corporate failures in the next recession, exacerbating that recession. Some assert that because certain leveraged loans, such as those involved in private nonbank transactions, face different regulation than leveraged lending by banks and comparable bond issuances, the market might be ineffectively regulated. In addition, some analysts have argued that a lack of transparency in the leveraged lending market prevents the industry and regulators from fully monitoring risks that could be addressed through increased data collection and sharing. To date, Congress and the financial regulators have mainly limited the policy response to leveraged lending to monitoring risks. A more active regulatory intervention would be complicated by the fact there are few specific regulations governing leveraged lending. (One exception is a supervisory guidance issued by bank regulators in 2013, which the regulators have stressed is nonbinding but the Government Accountability Office declared to be a regulation for Congressional Review Act purposes in 2017.) Addressing systemic risk is under the purview of federal financial regulators, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), an interagency council headed by the Treasury Secretary. Although FSOC recommended in its 2018 Annual Report that the financial regulators "continue to monitor levels of nonfinancial business leverage, trends in asset valuations, and potential implications for the entities they regulate," it did not recommend regulatory or legislative changes to address leveraged lending.


Local and state governments have traditionally played an important role in regulating cable television operators, within limits established by federal law. In a series of rulings since 2007, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has further limited the ability of local governments (known as local franchise authorities ) to regulate and collect fees from cable television companies and traditional telephone companies (known as telcos ) offering video services. In August 2019, in response to a ruling by a federal court of appeals, the FCC tightened restrictions on municipalities' andâfor the first timeâon states' ability to regulate video service providers. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, still allows local governments to require video service operators to provide public, educational, and government (PEG) channels to their subscribers. The FCC's August 2019 order, however, sets new limits on local governments' ability to collect fees from operators to support the channels. In addition, the FCC ruled that local franchise authorities could not regulate nonvideo services offered by incumbent cable operators, such as broadband internet service, business data services, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. In October 2019, also for the first time, the FCC concluded that a video streaming service was providing "effective competition" to certain local cable systems, thereby preempting the affected municipalities' ability to regulate local rates for basic cable service. These rulings have caused controversy. The FCC has asserted that they fulfill a statutory mandate to promote private-sector investment in advanced telecommunications and information services and to limit government regulation when competition exists. State and local governments, however, have objected that the regulatory changes deprive them of revenue and make it harder for them to ensure that video providers meet local needs. Against this backdrop of federal government actions limiting cable service regulation at the local level, consumer behavior continues to change. Specifically, an increasing number of consumers are substituting streaming services for video services provided by cable companies and telcos. As a result, the amount of revenue state and local governments receive from cable and telco providers subject to franchise fees is declining, which also reduces the amount cable providers can be required to spend to support PEG channels. In response, some municipalities and states have attempted to impose fees on online video services, such as Netflix and Hulu. Courts have not yet ruled on the legality of such fees. These regulatory developments and industry trends raise several potential issues for Congress. First, Congress could consider whether the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act with respect to local regulation of video service providers is consistent with Congress's policy goals. Specifically, Congress could explore the extent, if any, to which, if any, it encourages or permits state and local regulations designed to promote the availability of PEG programming as well as subsidized voice, data, and video services for municipal institutions. Second, Congress could evaluate whether to create regulatory parity with respect to local regulation of cable and telcos' nonvideo services. While states and municipalities may regulate both video and voice services of telcos, they may only regulate video services of cable operators. Congress could address regulatory parity by either deregulating traditional telcos' nonvideo services or regulating cable operators' nonvideo services. Third, as the FCC and local governments include online video streaming services in their definitions of video providers for the purposes of evaluating competition and/or imposing franchise fees, Congress could clarify whether these actions achieve its stated policy goals. Finally, given the FCC's actions to reduce local government rate regulation of cable services and the State of Maine's legislation to enable video subscribers to seek alternatives to bundled programming, Members of Congress could reconsider past proposed statutory changes to require video programming distributors to offer individual channels to consumers. Alternatively, Congress could clarify that states and local governments lack authority to enact such laws.


MDA is developing missile defense capabilities to defend the United States, deployed forces, and regional allies from missile attacks. However, missile threats continue to emerge, as adversaries continue to improve and expand their missile capabilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a provision that GAO annually assess and report on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, and include any other findings and recommendations. This report is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in May 2019, which addresses (1) the challenges MDA and the defense intelligence community face in meeting the agency's threat assessment needs and (2) the extent to which MDA engages the defense intelligence community on missile defense acquisitions. GAO reviewed MDA's threat-related acquisition processes and interviewed relevant officials from the defense intelligence community, MDA, test community, and warfighters. Information deemed classified by DOD has been omitted. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is experiencing delays getting the threat assessments needed to inform its acquisition decisions. Officials from the defense intelligence community—intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD)—told GAO this is because they are currently overextended due to an increased demand for threat assessments from a recent upsurge in threat missile activity, as well as uncertainties related to their transition to new threat processes and products. The delays are exacerbated because MDA does not collectively prioritize the various types of threat assessment requests submitted to the defense intelligence community or provide resources for unique requests, as other major defense acquisition programs are generally required to do. Without timely threat assessments, MDA risks making acquisition decisions for weapon systems using irrelevant or outdated threat information, which could result in performance shortfalls. MDA has increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community over the past few years, but opportunities remain for further engagement on key threatrelated processes and decisions. Specifically, MDA provides the defense intelligence community with limited insight into how the agency uses threat assessments to inform its acquisition decisions. MDA is not required to obtain the defense intelligence community's input, and instead has discretion on the extent to which it engages the defense intelligence community. However, the defense intelligence community is uniquely positioned to assist MDA and its involvement is crucial for helping MDA keep pace with rapidly emerging threats. Moreover, this limited insight has, in part, prevented the defense intelligence community from validating the threat models MDA builds to test the performance of its weapon systems. Without validation, any flaws or bias in the threat models may go undetected, which can have significant implications on the performance of MDA's weapon systems. MDA and the defense intelligence community recently began discussing a more suitable level of involvement in the agency's acquisition processes and decisions. Note: the threat missile coverage depicted is notional and not representative of MDA's actual threat coverage.


MHPAEA requires large group health plans that offer MH/SU benefits to ensure parity between MH/SU and medical/surgical benefits. To meet the essential health benefits requirements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, certain issuers offering small group and individual plans must comply with MHPAEA's MH/SU parity requirements. The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to review federal and state oversight of MH/SU parity requirements and the extent to which health plans comply with these requirements. This report, among other objectives, (1) examines how DOL, HHS, and states oversee health plan compliance with MH/SU parity requirements; and (2) describes what is known about the extent to which health plans are complying with MH/SU parity requirements. For this report, GAO reviewed DOL and HHS policies, guidance, and reports; conducted a survey and received responses from all 50 states and the District of Columbia about oversight practices; interviewed officials from DOL, HHS, and selected states; interviewed national and state stakeholders; and reviewed available research studies regarding health plan compliance with MH/SU parity. The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) generally requires that coverage for mental health and substance use disorder (MH/SU) be no more restrictive than coverage for medical/surgical services. State agencies and the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Health and Human Services (HHS) share responsibility for overseeing compliance with these MH/SU parity requirements among group and individual health plans. These oversight practices vary. While nearly all of the state officials who responded to GAO's survey reported that they perform some review of group and individual insurance plans for compliance with MH/SU parity requirements before they are approved to be sold to consumers, states vary in the frequency and type of reviews they conduct after consumers enroll in plans. For example, officials from 12 states reported that they conducted a targeted review of specific MH/SU parity concerns in 2017 and 2018, with the number of reviews ranging from one to 22 reviews per state. DOL and HHS conduct targeted reviews of certain employer-sponsored group plans when they receive information—such as consumer complaints—about possible noncompliance with MH/SU parity requirements or other federal heatlh care requirements. Unlike states, these reviews only occur after consumers enroll in these plans. For example, in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, DOL completed 302 reviews that included a review of MH/SU parity compliance in its oversight of 2.2 million plans. Nearly all these reviews originated from complaints or other information about potential noncompliance with federal health care laws unrelated to MH/SU parity. According to DOL and HHS officials, the departments have not analyzed whether relying on targeted reviews alone increases the risk of noncompliance with MH/SU parity requirements in employer-sponsored group plans. Without such an evaluation, DOL and HHS do not know if their oversight is effective or whether they need to adopt additional strategies. While states, DOL, HHS, and the research GAO reviewed identified some instances of noncompliance with MH/SU parity requirements, the extent of compliance with these requirements is unknown. States, DOL, and HHS have identified some noncompliance with MH/SU parity requirements based on consumer complaints and other information about potential noncompliance. For example, DOL reported citing 113 violations of MH/SU parity requirements through its reviews in 2017 and 2018. The available research studies GAO reviewed also identified noncompliance with some of the requirements by reviewing plan documentation and benefit data, among other methods. However, according to stakeholders GAO interviewed, complaints are not a reliable indicator of the extent of noncompliance because consumers may not know about MH/SU parity requirements or may have privacy concerns related to submitting a complaint.


Management of lands and resources is a principal mission for four federal agenciesâthe Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Forest Service (FS), and National Park Service (NPS). Most of the appropriations for these agencies come from discretionary appropriations enacted by Congress through annual appropriations laws. However, each of the agencies also receives mandatory appropriations under provisions of authorizing statutes enacted by Congress. Under these laws, the agencies spend money without further action by Congress. A number of issues arise for Congress in deciding the type of appropriations to provide and the terms and conditions of appropriations. One consideration is whether mandatory (rather than discretionary) appropriations best suit the purposes of the program or activity and Congress's role in authorizing, appropriating, and conducting oversight. Another question is how to fund any mandatory appropriationânamely, whether through general government collections (in the General Fund of the Treasury) or through a specific collection (e.g., from a particular activity or tax). A third issue is how to use the funds in a mandatory account, such as for agency activities, revenue sharing with state and local governments, or grant programs. In FY2018, the four agencies together had $3.17 billion in mandatory appropriations, which was 19% of their total discretionary and mandatory appropriations for the year ($16.36 billion). This funding was provided through 68 separate accounts, of which each agency had a dozen or more. The dollar amount of mandatory appropriations varied widely among the agencies (from $300.4 million for BLM to $1.46 billion for FWS), as did the percentage of each agency's total appropriations that was mandatory (from 10% for FS to 45% for FWS). (See the figure below.) BLM had 18 accounts with mandatory spending authority in FY2018. Of these, seven had mandatory appropriations each exceeding $5.0 million, with the largest account containing $157.8 million. The accounts typically are funded from agency receipts of various sorts. Most accounts support BLM activities, although several are compensation programs that share revenue with state or local governments. FY2018 total mandatory appropriations for BLM were $300.4 million, which was 18% of combined BLM mandatory and discretionary appropriations of $1.65 billion. FWS had 12 accounts with mandatory spending authority in FY2018. Of these, seven had mandatory appropriations each exceeding $5.0 million, and the largest had $829.1 million. Funding mechanisms for these accounts vary, including receipts; excise and fuel taxes; and fines, penalties, and forfeitures. Several accounts, including some of the largest, provide grants to states (and other entities); other accounts fund agency activities or provide compensation to counties. FY2018 total mandatory appropriations for FWS were $1.46 billion, which was 45% of combined FWS mandatory and discretionary appropriations of $3.27 billion. FS had 22 accounts with mandatory spending authority in FY2018. Of these, 10 had mandatory appropriations each exceeding $5.0 million, with the largest account containing $234.6 million. Agency receipts fund many accounts, although one is supplemented by the General Fund of the Treasury, as needed. Almost all accounts support agency activities, but one is for a compensation program. FY2018 total mandatory appropriations for FS were $705.1 million, which was nearly 10% of combined FS mandatory and discretionary appropriations of $7.29 billion. NPS had 16 accounts with mandatory spending authority in FY2018. Of these, 11 had mandatory appropriations each exceeding $5.0 million; the largest had $301.5 million. Funding sources for the accounts vary, including agency receipts, offshore energy development revenues, District of Columbia payments, the General Fund of the Treasury, donations, and an endowment. Almost all of the accounts support agency activities, but one is for recreation assistance grants to states and another is a compensation program. FY2018 total mandatory appropriations for NPS were $704.9 million, which was 17% of the combined NPS mandatory and discretionary total of $4.16 billion. Source: CRS, based on sources including FY2020 agency budget justifications, which contain FY2018 actual funding levels, and FY2018 appropriations laws, including Division G of P.L. 115-141 , P.L. 115-72 , and P.L. 115-123 and accompanying explanatory statements .


A complete address list is a cornerstone of the Bureau's effort to conduct an accurate census. LUCA is one of several operations the Bureau uses to produce its address list. It gives tribal, state, and local governments the opportunity to review the address list for their areas and provide the Bureau with any updates before the census. GAO was asked to review the status of LUCA, including its effect on other operations, as well as LUCA's overall effectiveness and necessity. This report examines (1) LUCA's status and its likely effects on 2020 field operations, and (2) what considerations the Bureau and other stakeholders could use to reexamine LUCA for 2030. GAO reviewed Bureau plans, analyzed data from LUCA participation and the Bureau's review of submissions, and held 9 discussions on a possible reexamination of LUCA with relevant Bureau officials, a council representing participating governments, and census data subject matter specialists. The Census Bureau generally followed the operational design for its Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) program, which is intended to give tribal, state, and local governments the ability to review and offer modifications to the Bureau's Master Address File (MAF). The Bureau met milestones, apart from extending the participation window for natural disaster-stricken areas, and generally followed plans for outreach, training, and participation options. However, some decisions created additional fieldwork. The Bureau received more updates from participants than it expected, so it only reviewed roughly 860,000 of the 5.1 million updates that did not match to the MAF (see figure below). The rest will be added to potential fieldwork. Had more addresses been reviewed in-office, many may have been rejected, based on the rejection rate for reviewed addresses. Avoiding this unnecessary fieldwork could have saved the Bureau millions of dollars when following up with non-responding households. The Bureau has not reexamined LUCA with respect to the cost, quality, and public perception of the census since the program was authorized in 1994. Yet much has changed since then, from the tools the Bureau uses in building its address list to the provision of publicly accessible address data. As the Bureau turns to its strategic planning process for 2030, it will have several issues to address regarding the future of LUCA, including: whether LUCA should continue to have a role in building the address list given the advent of other address-building initiatives; how often to have governments review the MAF for the census, in light of the costs and benefits of administering such a program more frequently; whether statutory nondisclosure protection of census address data is still needed given that address data sources and services are more prevalent.


Although the United States is currently experiencing its longest economic expansion, history has shown that economic expansions inevitably give way to economic slowdowns. If the next slowdown is significant, the economy could enter a recession, which is typically characterized by falling output and rising unemployment. Short-term forecasts are predicting continued economic expansion, but predicting when the economy may transition from expansion to recession is notoriously difficult, as the ebb and flow of the economy is determined by many different factors, including a number that lie outside the country's borders. This report identifies and summarizes options Congress may consider in response to a possible recession. Recognizing that the economy has the potential to return to full employment without intervention, one policy option is simply to allow the economy to correct on its own with the support of certain "automatic stabilizers" already in place. Automatic stabilizers work without congressional action to lower taxes and increase spending as the economy weakens. Examples include the progressive structure of the income tax system and Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits, among others. Congress also has a range of other options it could consider when designing a stimulus package should a recession occur and automatic stabilizers are not sufficient to counteract it. The options presented in this report are drawn from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Moody's Analytics, both of which estimated the impact of specific policies or approaches in response to the Great Recession. While a general approach to stimulating a weakened economy with reduced taxes and increased spending is often advocated, specific policies have different impacts on the economy and differing administrative complexities. CBO's and Moody's estimates provide insight into which specific policy options may be most worthwhile to implement during the next downturn. The policy options presentedâor variations of themâare ones commonly considered when designing a fiscal stimulus package and are not unique to either CBO or Moody's. The United States' recent budget deficits and the country's long-run budget outlook could influence the size of any stimulus package. Large and persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth by lowering the rate of capital formation via reduced national saving, and can potentially offset short-term economic stimulus. At the same time, high levels of debt relative to gross domestic product can constrain a country's borrowing capacity. There are no signs that federal borrowing capacity will be exhausted in the short term. However, the consequences of exhausted fiscal space may be worth considering in designing the next stimulus package since it would increase both deficits and the debt.


Many Members of Congress have demonstrated an interest in the mandates, effectiveness, and funding status of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in Africa as an integral component of U.S. policy toward Africa and a key tool for fostering greater stability and security on the continent. As of September 2019, there are seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa: the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the U.N. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID); and the U.N. Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The United States, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, plays a key role in establishing, renewing, and funding U.N. peacekeeping operations, including those in Africa. For 2019, the U.N. General Assembly assessed the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping operation budgets at 27.89%; since the mid-1990s Congress has capped the U.S. payment at 25% due to concerns that the current assessment is too high. During the Trump Administration, the United States generally has voted in the Security Council for the renewal and funding of existing U.N. peacekeeping operations, including those in Africa. At the same time, the Administration has been critical of U.N. peacekeeping activitiesâboth overall and in Africa specificallyâand called for a review of operations to ensure that they are "fit for purpose" and to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. Over the years, Congress has considered a range of overarching policy issues and debates regarding U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, including how effectively such operations fulfill their mandates, particularly related to civilian protection and peacekeeping; under what circumstances a U.N. peacekeeping mission might be an effective tool for addressing or preventing mass atrocities in Africa; to what extent and in what ways can U.N. peacekeeping operations effectively work with abusive or neglectful host governments and state security forces in Africa; how to prevent and address sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, particularly in operations in Africa; and the role of Africa-led (as opposed to U.N.-conducted) operations as a response to regional crises. This report focuses on U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa; it does not address broader policy issues related to U.N. peacekeeping, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). For more information on U.N. peacekeeping and U.S. funding, see CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping . For further analysis on the political and security context for the above operations, see CRS In Focus IF11171, Crisis in the Central African Republic ; CRS In Focus IF10116, Conflict in Mali ; CRS In Focus IF10218, South Sudan ; CRS Report R45794, Sudan's Uncertain Transition ; CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations ; and CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara .


Many federal agencies rely on CRAs, such as Equifax, to help conduct remote identity proofing. The 2017 breach of data at Equifax raised concerns about federal agencies' remote identity proofing processes. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' remote identity proofing practices in light of the recent Equifax breach and the potential for fraud. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe federal practices for remote identity proofing and the risks associated with those practices, (2) assess federal agencies' actions to ensure the effectiveness of agencies' remote identity proofing processes, and (3) assess the sufficiency of federal identity proofing guidance. To do so, GAO identified remote identity proofing practices used by six agencies (CMS, GSA, IRS, SSA, USPS, and VA) with major, public-facing web applications providing public access to benefits or services. GAO compared the agencies' practices to NIST's remote identity proofing guidance to assess their effectiveness, and compared NIST's and OMB's guidance to requirements in federal law and best practices in IT management to assess the sufficiency of the guidance. Remote identity proofing is the process federal agencies and other entities use to verify that the individuals who apply online for benefits and services are who they claim to be. To perform remote identity proofing, agencies that GAO reviewed rely on consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) to conduct a procedure known as knowledge-based verification. This type of verification involves asking applicants seeking federal benefits or services personal questions derived from information found in their credit files, with the assumption that only the true owner of the identity would know the answers. If the applicant responds correctly, their identity is considered to be verified. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses this technique to verify the identities of individuals seeking access to the “My Social Security” service, which allows them to check the status of benefit applications, request a replacement Social Security or Medicare card, and request other services. However, data stolen in recent breaches, such as the 2017 Equifax breach, could be used fraudulently to respond to knowledge-based verification questions. The risk that an attacker could obtain and use an individual's personal information to answer knowledge-based verification questions and impersonate that individual led the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to issue guidance in 2017 that effectively prohibits agencies from using knowledge-based verification for sensitive applications. Alternative methods are available that provide stronger security, as shown in Figure 1. However, these methods may have limitations in cost, convenience, and technological maturity, and they may not be viable for all segments of the public. Two of the six agencies that GAO reviewed have eliminated knowledge-based verification. Specifically, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently developed and began using alternative methods for remote identity proofing for their Login.gov and Get Transcript services that do not rely on knowledge-based verification. One agency—the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—has implemented alternative methods for part of its identity proofing process but still relies on knowledge-based verification for some individuals. SSA and the United States Postal Service (USPS) intend to reduce or eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification sometime in the future but do not yet have specific plans for doing so. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has no plans to reduce or eliminate knowledge-based verification for remote identity proofing. Several officials cited reasons for not adopting alternative methods, including high costs and implementation challenges for certain segments of the public. For example, mobile device verification may not always be viable because not all applicants possess mobile devices that can be used to verify their identities. Nevertheless, until these agencies take steps to eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification, the individuals they serve will remain at increased risk of identity fraud. NIST has issued guidance to agencies related to identity proofing and OMB has drafted identity management guidance, but their guidance is not sufficient to ensure agencies are adopting such methods. Sound practices in information technology (IT) management state that organizations should provide clear direction on how to implement IT objectives. However, NIST's guidance does not provide direction to agencies on how to successfully implement alternative identity-proofing methods with currently available technologies for all segments of the public. For example, the guidance does not discuss the advantages and limitations of currently available technologies or make recommendations to agencies on which technologies should be adopted. Further, most of the agencies that GAO reviewed reported that they were not able to implement the guidance because of limitations in available technologies for implementing alternative identify proofing methods. NIST officials stated that they believe their guidance is comprehensive, and at the time of our review they did not plan to issue supplemental implementation guidance to assist agencies. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 ( FISMA) requires that OMB oversee federal agencies' information security practices. Although OMB has the authority under this statute to issue guidance, OMB has not issued guidance requiring agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST's identity proofing guidance. OMB staff plan to issue guidance on identity management at federal agencies, but their proposed guidance does not require agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST guidance. Until NIST provides additional guidance to help agencies move away from knowledge-based verification methods and OMB requires agencies to report on their progress, federal agencies will likely continue to struggle to strengthen their identify proofing processes.


Many of DHS's major IT acquisition programs have taken longer than expected to develop or failed to deliver the desired value. In April 2016, to help improve the department's IT acquisition and management, DHS identified Agile software development as the preferred approach for all of its IT programs and projects. GAO was asked to examine DHS's adoption of Agile software development. The objective of this review was to assess the extent to which DHS has addressed selected leading practices for its transition to the use of Agile software development. GAO identified leading practices for planning, implementing, and measuring organizational change that apply to DHS's transition to Agile through its review of guidance published by the Project Management Institute and GAO. GAO also reviewed work it performed to develop leading practices for Agile software development adoption. GAO analyzed DHS documentation, such as policies, guidance, plans, and working group artifacts and assessed them against the selected leading practices. GAO also reviewed the implementation of selected practices within individual IT projects. Finally, GAO interviewed DHS officials to discuss any practices that were not fully implemented. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to implement selected leading practices in its transition from waterfall, an approach that historically delivered useable software years after program initiation, to Agile software development, which is focused on incremental and rapid delivery of working software in small segments. As shown below, this quick, iterative approach is to deliver results faster and collect user feedback continuously. DHS has fully addressed one of three leading practice areas for organization change management and partially addressed the other two. Collectively, these practices advise an organization to plan for, implement, and measure the impact when undertaking a significant change. The department has fully defined plans for transitioning to Agile development. DHS has partially addressed implementation—the department completed 134 activities but deferred roughly 34 percent of planned activities to a later date. These deferred activities are in progress or have not been started. With respect to the third practice, DHS clarified expected outcomes for the transition, such as reduced risk of large, expensive IT failures. However, these outcomes are not tied to target measures. Without these, DHS will not know if the transition is achieving its desired results. DHS has also addressed four of the nine leading practices for adopting Agile software development. For example, the department has modified its acquisition policies to support Agile development methods. However, it needs to take additional steps to, among other things, ensure all staff are appropriately trained and establish expectations for tracking software code quality. By fully addressing leading practices, DHS can reduce the risk of continued problems in developing and acquiring current, as well as, future IT systems.


Marine debris—waste such as discarded plastic and abandoned fishing gear and vessels in the ocean—is a global problem that poses economic and environmental challenges. The Marine Debris Act, enacted in 2006, requires the committee to coordinate a program of marine debris research and activities among federal agencies. The act also requires the committee to submit biennial reports to Congress that include certain elements such as an analysis of the effectiveness of the committee's recommendations. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to address marine debris. This report examines (1) how the committee coordinates among federal agencies and the process for determining membership, (2) the extent to which the committee's biennial reports contain required elements, and (3) experts' suggestions on actions the federal government could take to most effectively address marine debris. GAO examined the Marine Debris Act and committee reports, compared committee practices with leading collaboration practices, interviewed federal agency officials, and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 14 marine debris experts selected to reflect various sectors and experiences with different types of marine debris. The Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act, as amended, (Marine Debris Act) designated six agencies as members of the Interagency Marine Debris Coordinating Committee and specifies that members shall include senior officials from certain other agencies as the Secretary of Commerce determines appropriate. Within Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) serves as the committee chair. The committee coordinates through sharing information about members' activities to address marine debris, but GAO found that NOAA has not established a process for determining committee membership for agencies not specifically designated in the act. As a result, such agencies may not be included in the biennial reports required by the act which discuss committee members' marine debris activities. NOAA officials said they plan to develop a membership process but have not established a time frame to do so. By establishing a time frame, the committee can more fully benefit from capturing all members' activities. The committee's biennial reports provide information on members' activities such as education and cleanup, but they do not contain some information required by the Marine Debris Act. Specifically, the reports do not include (1) an analysis of the effectiveness of the committee's recommendations and strategies to address marine debris and (2) recommendations for priority funding needs. Our past work has shown that collaborative entities can better demonstrate progress if they develop a way to monitor and report the results of their collective efforts and identify and leverage resources. By doing so, the committee would be in a better position to know the extent to which it is effectively addressing marine debris and provide Congress with required information about priority funding needs. Experts suggested a range of actions—from research to cleanup—the federal government could take to most effectively address marine debris. They stressed that there is not one solution to the growing problem (see figure). Committee officials noted factors to consider, such as cost, when evaluating these actions.


Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS), to a diverse low-income population. In general, individuals qualify for Medicaid coverage by meeting the requirements of a specific eligibility pathway. An eligibility pathway is the federal statutory reference that extends Medicaid coverage to certain groups of individuals. Each eligibility pathway specifies the group of individuals covered by the pathway (i.e., the categorical criteria). It also specifies the financial requirements applicable to the group (i.e., the financial criteria), including income and, sometimes, resources (i.e., assets). In addition, an eligibility pathway often dictates the services that individuals are entitled to under Medicaid. Some eligibility groups are mandatory, meaning all states with a Medicaid program must cover them; other eligibility groups are optional. Older adults and individuals with disabilities are more likely to require LTSS due to chronic disabling conditions or other functional or cognitive impairments (e.g., extended nursing facility care, personal care, and other home and community-based services). Federal policymakers have an interest in understanding Medicaid eligibility pathways for these populations, as Medicaid plays a key role in providing LTSS coverage. Generally, LTSS is not covered by Medicare or major health insurance plans in the private market. In fact, Medicaid is the largest single payer of LTSS in the United States, accounting for 42% of all LTSS expenditures in 2016 (or $154 billion). Individuals eligible for or enrolled in Medicaid who are in need of Medicaid-covered LTSS must demonstrate the need for long-term care by meeting state-based level-of-care criteria. They may also be subject to a separate set of Medicaid financial eligibility rules. This report focuses on the ways in which adults aged 65 and older and individuals with disabilities qualify for Medicaid based on their age or disability status; that is, the eligibility pathways where the categorical criteria are being aged, blind, or disabled (referred to as "ABD" or "ABD eligibility"). Individuals who qualify for Medicaid on the basis of being blind or disabled include adults under the age of 65 as well as children. Generally, ABD populations qualify for Medicaid through an eligibility pathway under one of two broad coverage groups described in this report: Supplemental Security Income (SSI)-Related Pathways and Other ABD Pathways. SSI-Related Pathways SSI is a federal program that provides cash assistance to aged, blind, or disabled individuals who have limited income and resources. SSI rules form the foundation of Medicaid eligibility criteria for ABD populations. Thus, the relationship between SSI and Medicaid is important to understanding Medicaid eligibility for ABD populations, as states are generally required to provide Medicaid coverage for SSI recipients. The SSI-Related Pathways consist of Medicaid eligibility groups that generally meet the categorical and financial criteria of the SSI program, including SSI Recipients, Special Groups of Former SSI Recipients, and Other SSI-Related Groups. Other ABD Pathways States may extend Medicaid coverage to older adults and individuals with disabilities who have higher levels of income or resources than SSI program rules permit. These optional pathways allow states to offer Medicaid eligibility to individuals receiving LTSS either in an institution or home and community-based setting; working individuals who may need LTSS to support employment; and individuals with high medical expenses who "spend down" or deplete their income and resources. These optional eligibility pathways, referred to as Other ABD Pathways, include the following: Poverty-Related, Special Income Level, Special Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) Waiver Group, HCBS State Plan, Katie Beckett, Buy-In, and Medically Needy. Topics Covered in This Report This report begins with an overview of Medicaid eligibility, followed by a summary of ABD eligibility pathways (i.e., SSI-Related Pathways and Other ABD Pathways). Next, it provides information about the categorical and financial eligibility criteria for each Medicaid ABD eligibility pathway. The Appendix provides tables that include statutory references and certain financial eligibility criteria for each Medicaid ABD eligibility pathway.