The Navy in FY2021 and beyond wants to develop and procure three types of large unmanned vehicles (UVs). These large UVs are called Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). The Navy is requesting $579.9 million in FY2021 research and development funding for these large UVs and their enabling technologies. The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture. Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more distributed architecture is to include proportionately fewer large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs. The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring these large UVs, so as to get them into service more quickly. The Navy's desire to employ these accelerated acquisition strategies can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as China. The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons. The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloadsâparticularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Although referred to as UVs, LUSVs might be more accurately described as optionally or lightly manned ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, particularly in the nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational concepts. In marking up the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget, some of the congressional defense committees expressed concerns over whether the Navy's accelerated acquisition strategies provided enough time to adequately develop concepts of operations and key technologies for these large UVs, particularly the LUSV. In response, the Navy's FY2021 budget submission proposes to modify the acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to provide more time for developing operational concepts and key technologies before entering into serial production of deployable units. Under the Navy's proposed modified LUSV acquisition strategy, the Navy is proposing to use research and development funding to acquire two additional prototypes in FY2021 and one more additional prototype in FY2022 before shifting in FY2023 to the use of procurement funding for the procurement of deployable LUSVs at annual procurement rates in FY2023-FY2025 of 2-2-3. The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 tons. The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy is pursuing the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 acquisition authority. The first MUSV prototype was funded in FY2019 and the Navy wants fund the second prototype in FY2023. The first five XLUUVs were funded in FY2019; they are being built by Boeing. The Navy wants procure additional XLUUVs at a rate of two per year starting in FY2023. The Navy's FY2021 budget submission does not include funding for the procurement of additional XLUUVs in FY2021 or FY2022. The Navy's large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical basis for the more distributed fleet architecture; the Navy's accelerated acquisition strategies for these programs; technical, schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base implications of the programs; potential implications for miscalculation or escalation at sea; the personnel implications of the programs; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in FY2021 on the programs.


The Navy relies on its fleet of over 150 surface ships to be ready to operate when needed for the defense of the United States. The Navy spends billions annually in maintaining this fleet. In 2015, the Navy changed how it contracts for such maintenance work, aiming to better control costs and improve quality. The new approach, called MAC-MO, generally uses firm-fixed-price contract delivery orders for individual ship availabilities competed among pre-qualified contractors at Navy regional maintenance centers. House Report 115-676 included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's implementation of the MAC-MO strategy. This report (1) examines outcomes under the strategy; (2) evaluates actions the Navy has taken related to recent lessons learned; and (3) describes contractors' considerations when planning for hiring and facilities. GAO analyzed data on ship repair under MAC-MO; reviewed six case studies involving different availability types, classes of ships, maintenance centers, and contractors; and interviewed Navy officials and contractors. Since shifting to the Multiple Award Contract-Multi Order (MAC-MO) contracting approach for ship maintenance work in 2015, the Navy has increased competition opportunities, gained flexibility to ensure quality of work, and limited cost growth, but schedule delays persist. During this period, 21 of 41 ship maintenance periods, called availabilities, for major repair work cost less than initially estimated, and average cost growth across the 41 availabilities was 5 percent. Schedule outcomes were less positive and Navy regional maintenance centers varied in their performance (see figure). To mitigate these delays, the Navy has identified and taken actions to implement lessons learned, including negotiating and funding undefined but expected increases in work at the time of contract award. However, these actions have not resolved the delays that result from the approval process the Navy often must use to obtain funds to complete this maintenance work. Namely, if an availability extends into a new fiscal year and needs more than $4 million in additional prior-year funding, both Navy and Defense Department approvals are required. GAO found this approval process took between 26 and 189 days based on Defense Department data. In December 2019, Congress established a pilot program that would potentially allow the Navy to avoid this process. Leading practices GAO identified for pilot programs call for development of an analysis plan to track implementation and performance and for evaluating final results. As the Navy moves into implementation of its pilot program, developing an analysis plan would provide it with a means to identify opportunities to evaluate schedule outcomes of pilot program availabilities, as compared to non-pilot program availabilities, and document a process for evaluating lessons learned from the pilot program. Such evaluations would provide information to determine if the pilot approach should expand to help address persistent schedule challenges. Ship repair contractors now operating in the MAC-MO environment told GAO that two key considerations drive their decisions on workforce and facilities investments: visibility regarding planned workloads within a given port and their assessment of the share of that work they are most likely to win. In recognition of these considerations, Navy officials have begun taking steps to increase predictability of workloads at each port. These officials anticipate that these steps, coupled with increasing workloads at the ports, will help increase contractors' confidence in their ability to forecast their share of future work.


The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) does not currently have a specific standard that protects healthcare or other workers from airborne or aerosol transmission of disease or diseases transmitted by airborne droplets. Some in Congress, and some groups representing healthcare, meat and poultry processing, and other workers, are calling on OSHA to promulgate an emergency temporary standard (ETS) to protect workers from exposure to SARS-Cov-2, the virus that causes Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) gives OSHA the ability to promulgate an ETS that would remain in effect for up to six months without going through the normal review and comment process of rulemaking. OSHA, however, has rarely used this authority in the pastânot since the courts struck down its ETS on asbestos in 1983. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), which operates California's state occupational safety and health plan, has had an aerosol transmissible disease (ATD) standard since 2009. This standard includes, among other provisions, the requirement that employers provide covered employees with respirators, rather than surgical masks, when these workers interact with ATDs, such as known or suspected COVID-19 cases. Also, according to the Cal/OSHA ATD standard, certain procedures require the use of powered air purifying respirators (PAPR). Both OSHA and Cal/OSHA have issued enforcement guidance to address situations when the shortage of respirators may impede an employer's ability to comply with existing standards. H.R. 6139 , the COVID-19 Health Care Worker Protection Act of 2020, would require OSHA to promulgate an ETS on COVID-19 that incorporates both the Cal/OSHA ATD standard and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) 2007 guidelines on occupational exposure to infectious agents in healthcare settings. The CDC's 2007 guidelines generally require stricter controls than its interim guidance on COVID-19 exposure. The provisions of H.R. 6139 were incorporated into the version of H.R. 6201 , the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, as introduced in the House. However, the OSHA ETS provisions were not included in the version of legislation that passed the House and the Senate and was signed into law as P.L. 116-127 . H.R. 6379 , as introduced in the House, also includes a requirement for an OSHA ETS and permanent standard to address COVID-19 exposure, with similar provisions in S. 3584 . H.R. 6559 includes the requirements for an ETS and permanent standard, clarifies the requirement that employers must report work-related COVID-19 cases, and expands protections for whistleblowers. The provisions of H.R. 6559 were included in H.R. 6800 , the Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (HEROES Act) passed by the House on May 15, 2020. A group representing hospitals claims that because SARS-Cov-2 is primarily transmitted by airborne droplets and surface contacts, surgical masks are sufficient protection for workers coming into routine contact with COVID-19 cases, and that the shortage of respirators may adversely impact some hospitals' patient capacities if stricter requirements to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to employees were to be enacted.


The Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), within the U.S. Department of Education (ED), is established as a performance-based organization (PBO) pursuant to Section 141 of the Higher Education Act (HEA). FSA is a discrete management unit "responsible for managing the administrative and oversight functions supporting" the HEA Title IV federal student aid programs, including the Pell Grant and the Direct Loan programs. As such, it is the largest provider of postsecondary student financial aid in the nation. In FY2019, FSA oversaw the provision of approximately $130.4 billion in Title IV aid to approximately 11.0 million students attending approximately 6,000 participating institutions of higher education (IHEs). In addition, in FY2019, FSA managed a student loan portfolio encompassing approximately 45 million borrowers with outstanding federal student loans totaling about $1.5 trillion. Among other functions, FSA develops and maintains the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA); obtains funds from the Department of the Treasury to make aid available to students; contracts with numerous third parties to provide goods and services related to Title IV administration, such as student loan servicing; provides oversight of the numerous third parties (e.g., contracted student loan servicers and IHEs) that play a role in administering the Title IV programs; and provides information to third-party stakeholdersâsuch as students, the public, and Congressâregarding Title IV program operations and performance. Responsibility for developing and promulgating policy and regulations relating to the Title IV programs, however, remains with the Secretary of Education. Congress established FSA's PBO structure under the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 ( P.L. 105-244 ) in response to a belief in Congress and ED that the Title IV student aid programs were "severe[ly]" mismanaged and that ED was in need of restructuring to improve federal student aid delivery. In general, PBOs are intended to be business-like, results-driven organizations that have clear objectives and measureable goals designed to improve an agency's performance and transparency. PBO leaders are to be held professionally accountable for meeting organization goals, with continued tenure and a portion of compensation linked to these measures of success. In exchange, PBOs and their leaders are granted greater discretion to deviate from certain government-wide management processes and to operate more like private-sector companies. Specific to FSA's structure as a PBO, the HEA vests management of FSA in a chief operating officer (COO) who is appointed based on demonstrated ability and without regard to political affiliation. Each year, the COO and the Secretary must agree on and publicly make available a five-year performance plan for FSA that establishes measurable goals and objectives addressing a variety of statutory specifications, such as FSA's responsibilities in improving customer service to stakeholders and reducing costs of administering the Title IV student aid programs. The COO is required to annually submit to Congress a report on FSA's performance. In addition, each year the COO and the Secretary, and the COO and FSA senior managers, enter into performance agreements that set forth measurable organizational and individual goals. The COO and senior managers are eligible to receive bonus compensation based on an evaluation of work performed relative to the annual goals specified in their annual performance agreements. The HEA provides FSA with some flexibilities with regard to traditional federal rules around hiring, compensation, and procurement. Since FSA's creation as a PBO, it has experienced some notable successes, including the Title IV aid programs' removal from the Government Accountability Office's High Risk List in 2005, the transition to 100% direct lending under the Direct Loan program, and implementation of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Data Retrieval Tool. Since FSA's establishment, the programs it administers have grown substantially larger, and the federal student aid programs and benefits have become substantially more complex to administer (e.g., with the addition of numerous loan forgiveness and income-driven repayment plans). In recent years, particularly over the last decade, several issues have arisen related to FSA's Title IV program administration. In broad terms, they pertain to oversight of entities participating in and helping with administration of Title IV programs, transparency, and accountability to certain stakeholders and consumers (i.e., aid recipients). Oversight issues relate to FSA's oversight of IHEs participating in the Title IV loan programs. Criticisms have focused on FSA's assessment of the well-being of IHEs and ability to proactively mitigate risk in the Title IV programs. Other concerns relate to FSA's oversight of its contracted student loan services, including its monitoring of such entities and the accountability of servicers to FSA in certain areas of their performance. Concerns have also been raised about the shortage of operational guidance FSA has provided to loan servicers to enable them to ensure they are meeting Title IV statutory and regulatory requirements and to assist borrowers in navigating the aid programs. Transparency issues relate to the extent to which FSA makes available information about the Title IV programs' performance and operations to relevant parties. Congress, other entities with oversight responsibilities, and other federal agencies sometimes have imperfect information on Title IV program performance and operations, which can make it difficult to make informed, well-honed policy or enforcement decisions. In addition, consumers may be faced with incomplete information on the Title IV programs and the IHEs that participate in such programs, which may make it difficult to make informed college-going and financial decisions. Stakeholder and borrower accountability issues include the extent to which FSA is fulfilling its statutory mandate to consult with relevant stakeholders in developing performance plans and annual reports and whether FSA is leveraging information garnered from stakeholder interactions to make program administration improvements. They also relate to whether FSA is sufficiently responsive to customer needs, especially given that FSA administers programs for which, arguably, there are no comparable competitors. As Congress contemplates the reauthorizations of the HEA, it might consider whether any adjustments should be made to address any of these issues and, if so, the extent to which any efforts to address issues might involve or affect FSA's PBO function and structure.


A highly concentrated health insurance market may indicate less competition and could affect consumers' choice of issuers and the premiums they pay. In 2014, PPACA required the establishment of health insurance exchanges—a new type of marketplace where individuals and small groups can compare and select among insurance plans sold by participating issuers—and the introduction of other reforms that could affect market concentration and competition among issuers. GAO previously reported that enrollment through these newly established exchanges was also generally concentrated. PPACA included a provision for GAO to study market concentration. This report describes changes in the concentration of enrollment among issuers in (1) overall individual, small group, and large group markets, and (2) individual and small group exchanges. GAO determined market share in the overall markets using enrollment data from 2015 and 2016 that issuers are required to report annually to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and compared that data to 2011 through 2014 enrollment data GAO analyzed in previous reports. GAO determined market share in the exchanges from 2015 through 2017 using other sources of enrollment data from CMS and states. For all data sets, GAO used the most recent data available. Enrollment in private health insurance plans continued to be concentrated among a small number of issuers in 2015 and 2016. In the overall large group market (coverage offered by large employers), small group market (coverage offered by small employers), and individual market (coverage sold directly to individuals), the three largest issuers held 80 percent of the market or more in at least 37 of 51 states. This is similar to what GAO previously reported for 2011 through 2014. GAO also found that within the overall individual and small group markets in each state, the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) were also concentrated from 2015 to 2017. For the individual market exchanges, in each year, three or fewer issuers held 80 percent or more of the market, on average, in at least 46 of the 49 state exchanges for which GAO had data. Further, the largest issuers increased their market share in about two-thirds of exchanges. The number of issuers participating in a market and their market shares can affect concentration, and many individual exchanges generally had a decreasing number of participating issuers over time. For the small group market exchanges, in each year, three or fewer issuers held 80 percent or more of the market in at least 42 of the 46 state exchanges for which GAO had data. The small group exchanges also had slight changes in issuer participation and market share over this time period. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Health and Human Services and incorporated them as appropriate.


As the federal government's role in the student loan industry has expanded over time, the United States has contracted with student loan servicers to help it administer its growing student loan portfolio. These servicers perform a variety of functions, including (1) communicating with borrowers regarding repayment; (2) disclosing information about student loan terms to borrowers; (3) applying payments to outstanding loan balances; (4) processing applications for enrollment in repayment plans; and (5) processing requests for loan forbearance and deferment. Several federal statutes and regulationsâalong with an array of contractual provisionsâmay affect how these servicers conduct these various functions on the government's behalf with respect to federal student loans. Some allege that the existing scheme of federal regulation has not deterred servicers from engaging in various forms of alleged misconduct. According to critics, servicers of federal student loans have engaged in several undesirable behaviors, such as (1) steering borrowers experiencing financial hardship toward forbearance instead of repayment plans that would be more beneficial; (2) neglecting to inform borrowers of the consequences of failing to promptly submit certain required information; (3) misinforming borrowers on their eligibility for loan forgiveness; and (4) misallocating or misapplying loan payments. The servicers deny these allegations. Federal laws governing higher education do not authorize borrowers who have allegedly been harmed by servicer misconduct to directly pursue litigation against servicers. Instead, existing law places the primary burden of policing federal student loan servicers upon the federal government. Some commentators disagree, however, over whether the U.S. Department of Education (ED) has exercised sufficient oversight over the servicers with which it contracts. Observers have also disagreed over the extent to which other federal agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), should participate in the regulation of federal student loan servicers. At the same time, more and more states have enacted legislation specifically targeted at student loan servicers. While the specifics of these laws vary from state to state, many purport to impose legal requirements upon servicers of federal student loans that go beyond those imposed by federal law, such as supervision by a state ombudsperson or mandatory licensing. Furthermore, in addition to new laws specifically aimed at servicers, state attorneys general and borrowers alike have invoked existing state consumer protection statutes and common law causes of action against servicers in civil litigation. These burgeoning disputes between servicers on the one hand and states and borrowers on the other have raised legal questions regarding how existing federal law interacts with the growing body of state servicing regulations. ED has taken the position that federal law "preempts"âthat is, displacesâstate laws purporting to regulate servicers of federal student loans. While some courts have agreed with ED's conclusions on preemption, the bulk of courts have reached the opposite conclusion that states retain a role in regulating student loan servicing. This ongoing legal debate has significant legal consequences. On the one hand, if federal law preempts state servicing regulations, servicers will be subject to a single uniform national standard and will not need to expend resources to comply with each jurisdiction's state-specific regulatory regime. On the other hand, allowing states to enact and enforce their own servicing laws could fill regulatory gaps whereâat least in the view of some criticsâexisting federal regulation has not ensured that servicers perform their duties with sufficient regard for borrowers' interests. Preserving a regulatory role for the states could also enable each state to experiment with novel regulatory schemes. Given these legal consequences, several Members and committees of the 116th Congress have expressed interest both in the federal regulation of servicers generally and the preemptive scope of that regulation.


The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) officially notified the Congress of the Trump Administration's plans to enter into formal trade negotiations with the European Union (EU) in October 2018. In January 2019, USTR announced its negotiating objectives for a U.S.-EU trade agreement, which included agricultural policiesâboth market access and non-tariff measures. However, the EU's negotiating mandate, released in April 2019, stated that the trade talks would exclude agricultural products. U.S.-EU27 Agricultural Trade, 1990-201 9 Improving market access remains important to U.S. agricultural exporters, especially given the sizable and growing U.S. trade deficit with the EU in agricultural products (see figure). Some market access challenges stem in part from commercial and cultural practices that are often enshrined in EU laws and regulations and vary from those of the United States. For food and agricultural products, such differences are focused within certain non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade involving Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), as well as Geographical Indications (GIs). SPS and TBT measures refer broadly to laws, regulations, standards, and procedures that governments employ as "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" from the risks associated with the spread of pests and diseases, or from additives, toxins, or contaminants in food, beverages, or feedstuffs. SPS and TBT barriers have been central to some longstanding U.S.-EU trade disputes, including those involving EU prohibitions on hormones in meat production and pathogen reduction treatments in poultry processing, and EU restrictions on the use of biotechnology in agricultural production. As these types of practices are commonplace in the United States, this tends to restrict U.S. agricultural exports to the EU. GI protections refer to naming schemes that govern product labeling within the EU and within some countries that have a formal trade agreement with the EU. These protections tend to restrict U.S. exports to the EU and to other countries where such protections have been put in place. Plans for U.S.-EU trade negotiations come amid heightened U.S.-EU trade frictions. In March 2018, President Trump announced tariffs on steel and aluminum imports on most U.S. trading partners after a Section 232 investigation determined that these imports threaten U.S. national security. Effective June 2018, the EU began applying retaliatory tariffs of 25% on imports of selected U.S. agricultural and non-agricultural products. In October 2019, the United States imposed additional tariffs on imports of selected EU agricultural and non-agricultural products, as authorized by World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures in response to the longstanding Boeing-Airbus subsidy dispute. Public statements by U.S. and EU officials in January 2020, however, signaled that the U.S.-EU trade talks might include SPS and regulatory barriers to agricultural trade. Statements by U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials cited in the press call for certain SPS issues as well as GIs to be addressed in the trade talks. However, other press reports of statements by EU officials have downplayed the extent that specific non-tariff barriers would be part of the talks. More formal discussions are expected in the spring of 2020. Previous trade talks with the EU, as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations during the Obama Administration, stalled in 2016 after 15 rounds. During those negotiations, certain regulatory and administrative differences between the United States and the EU on issues of food safety, public health, and product naming schemes for some types of food and agricultural products were areas of contention.


The PSLF program was established in 2007 and forgives borrowers' remaining federal student loan balances after they have made at least 10 years of qualifying loan payments while working in public service. Starting in September 2017, the first borrowers potentially became eligible for the PSLF program and began applying to have their loans forgiven. In 2018, Congress appropriated $700 million to temporarily expand the PSLF program for certain borrowers who initially did not qualify for the program. This statement—based on GAO's reports issued in September 2018 ( GAO-18-547 ) and September 2019 (GAO-19-595 )—discusses (1) the extent to which borrowers' requests for loan forgiveness through PSLF and the temporary expanded process have been approved or denied, (2) the extent to which Education provides the PSLF servicer with sufficient information to administer the program, and (3) opportunities for improving service to borrowers. A large number of borrowers are pursuing the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, but the Department of Education (Education) has denied about 99 percent of loan forgiveness applications as of March 2019. Close to one-half of these applications were denied because the borrowers had not yet made the required 120 qualifying monthly loan payments. As of May 2019, Education has also denied 99 percent of loan forgiveness requests made through the temporary expanded process, which is intended for borrowers who did not initially qualify for the PSLF program. In its 2018 report, GAO found that shortcomings in the information Education provided to the loan servicer that administers the PSLF program increased the risk of administrative errors. For example, Education had not provided the PSLF servicer with a definitive source of information for determining which employers qualify. GAO made three recommendations to Education to address these issues (see table below). Education agreed with these recommendations and has taken some actions, but has not yet fully implemented them. In its 2018 and 2019 reports, GAO found that Education can provide better service to borrowers by expanding outreach, streamlining processes, and sharing critical information with borrowers. For example, GAO found that Education does not include information for borrowers about the temporary expanded process in key online sources. GAO made five recommendations to Education to address these issues with the PSLF program and the temporary expanded process (see table below). Education agreed with these recommendations, but has not yet fully implemented them.


The Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT; 31 U.S.C. Â§Â§6901-6907) program provides compensation for certain tax-exempt federal lands, known as entitlement lands . PILT payments are made annually to units of general local governmentâtypically countiesâthat contain entitlement lands. PILT was first enacted in 1976 () and later recodified in 1982 ( P.L. 97-258 ). PILT is administered by the Office of the Secretary in the Department of the Interior (DOI), which is responsible for the calculation and disbursement of payments. PILT has most commonly been funded through annual discretionary appropriations, though Congress has authorized mandatory funding for PILT in certain years, which has replaced or supplemented discretionary appropriations. Since the start of the program in the late 1970s, PILT payments have totaled approximately $9.2 billion (in current dollars). From FY2015 through FY2019, authorized PILT payments averaged $489 million each year and appropriations for PILT payments averaged $485 million each year. Although several federal programs exist to compensate counties and other local jurisdictions for the presence of federal lands within their boundaries, PILT applies to the broadest array of land types. Entitlement lands under PILT include lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, all in the DOI; lands administered by the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture; federal water projects; some military installations; and selected other lands. Nearly 2,000 counties and other local units of government received an annual PILT payment in FY2019. PILT comprises three separate payment mechanisms, which are named after the sections of law in which they are authorized: Section 6902 (31 U.S.C. Â§6902), Section 6904 (31 U.S.C. Â§6904), and Section 6905 (31 U.S.C. Â§6905). Section 6902 payments are the broadest of the three. They account for nearly all of the funding disbursed under the PILT program and are made to all but a few of the counties receiving PILT funding. In contrast, Section 6904 and Section 6905 payments are provided only under selected circumstances, account for a small fraction of PILT payments, and are made to a minority of counties (most of which also receive Section 6902 payments). In addition, whereas Section 6902 payments are provided each year based on the presence of entitlement lands, most payments under Section 6904 and Section 6905 are provided only for a short duration after certain land acquisitions. Section 6902 payments are determined based on a multipart formula (31 U.S.C. Â§6903). Payments are calculated according to several factors, including (1) the number of entitlement acres present within a local jurisdiction; (2) a per-acre calculation determined by one of two alternatives (Alternative A, also called the standard rate , or Alternative B, also called the minimum provision ); (3) a population-based maximum payment (ceiling); (4) selected prior-year payments made to the counties pursuant to certain other federal compensation programs; and (5) the amount appropriated to cover the payments. Section 6904 and Section 6905 payments are provided to counties after the federal acquisition of specific types of entitlement lands (Section 6904) or entitlement lands located in specific areas (Section 6905) and are based on the fair market value of the acquisitions. If the appropriated amount is insufficient to cover the total payment amounts authorized in Sections 6902, 6904, and 6905, payments are prorated in proportion to the authorized rate. Annual discretionary appropriations bills generally also have included additional provisions dictating the terms of payments. PILT is of perennial interest to many Members of Congress and stakeholders throughout the country, and many local governments consider PILT payments to be an integral part of their annual budgets. In contemplating the future of PILT, Congress may consider topics and legislation related to the eligibility of various federal lands for entitlement under PILT (such as Indian lands or other lands currently excluded from compensation), amendments to the formula for calculating payments (especially under Section 6902), and issues related to funding PILT, among other matters.


The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) has significantly increased its overseas investments since launching its "Go Global Strategy" in 1999 in an effort to support the overseas expansion of Chinese firms and make them more globally competitive. Since then, these firmsâmany of which are closely tied to the Chinese governmentâhave acquired foreign assets and capabilities and pledged billions of dollars to develop infrastructure abroad. As a result, many in Congress and the Trump Administration are focusing on the critical implications of China's growing global economic reach for U.S. economic and geopolitical strategic interests. Some analysts see these Chinese activities as primarily commercial in nature. Others contend that the surge in global economic activity is also part of a concerted effort by China's leaders to bolster China's position as a global power and ensure support for their foreign policy objectives. There is also growing concern about the terms of China's economic engagement, particularly over the ways that Chinese lending may be creating unsustainable debt burdens for some countries and over how much of China's lending is tied to commercial projects and Chinese state firms that benefit from the investment. A major challenge to understanding the implications of China's growing global economic reach is the critical gap in the availability and accuracy of data and information. Most notable is the fact that no comprehensive, standardized, or authoritative dataâfrom either the Chinese government or international organizationsâare available on Chinese overseas economic activities. Given the complexity and multifaceted nature of the projects in which Chinese entities are involved, attempts to assess the size and scope of these projects are rough estimates, at best, and should be regarded as such. Figures cited in news articles, think-tank reports, and academic studies may not be entirely accurate and should be interpreted with caution. For instance, many publicly and privately available unofficial "trackers"âfrom which these data are often sourcedâare based on initial public announcements of Chinese overseas projects, which may differ significantly from actual capital flows because such projects may evolve or may never come to fruition. In the absence of accurate and sufficient data, Members of Congress may seek ways to improve their own understanding by supporting U.S. and international efforts to better track, analyze, and publicize actual Chinese investment, construction, assistance, and lending activities. Congress, for example, may direct agencies within the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government approach to better assess the global economic activities of U.S., Chinese, and other major actors. Additionally, Congress could require these agencies to study the adequacy of data and information recording, collection, disclosure, reporting, and analysis at the U.S. and international levels. Better information could facilitate clearer, deeper, and better informed assessment of such activities and their (1) impact on U.S. interests and (2) ramifications for the norms and rules of the global economic systemâa system whose chief architect and dominant player to date largely has been the United States.


The Post-9/11 GI Bill is VA's largest educational program. It provides payments for eligible veterans to cover tuition and fees, housing and other costs while they pursue a higher education. However, for some veterans this pursuit is interrupted when the school they attend unexpectedly closes. This testimony addresses (1) the distribution of Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fee payments among schools, (2) outcomes of students at schools that receive the most Post-9/11 GI Bill payments, and (3) how school closures can affect student veterans. To address these topics, GAO reviewed VA data on Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fee payments to schools for fiscal year 2017, the most recent school-level data available. GAO analyzed student outcome measures for these schools using Department of Education data reported for school year 2017-2018. GAO also reviewed its prior reports issued between 2013 and 2017 on school closures, credit transfers, and related challenges faced by student veterans. In fiscal year 2017, nearly 700,000 student veterans used their Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to attend programs at almost 6,000 schools. Of the almost $4.5 billion in Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fee payments VA made to schools in fiscal year 2017, about 40 percent went to public schools, 30 percent to nonprofits, and 30 percent to for-profits. A small number of schools received a large share of the tuition and fees paid, with 30 percent of payments totaling $1.4 billion going to 50 schools that enrolled over 190,000 veterans in fiscal year 2017. The average student outcomes at the 50 schools that received the highest total amount of Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fee payments in fiscal year 2017 were generally comparable to the national averages, but varied widely when examined by school sector. For example, the average 4-year program graduation rate for the top 50 schools was the same as the national average (61 percent). Within the top 50 schools, average graduation rates varied between public (73 percent), nonprofit (66 percent) and for-profit schools (22 percent). Although a relatively small number of schools close each year, these closures can affect thousands of student veterans. School closures, which have increased in recent years, are particularly harmful when they involve large schools that close abruptly with little or no advance warning. For example, more than 7,000 veterans receiving Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits were attending schools operated by Corinthian Colleges and ITT Educational Services when they abruptly closed in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Although veterans affected by school closures may qualify to have their GI Bill benefits restored, these closures can create hardships for veterans and significant costs for taxpayers. For example, veterans can face challenges transferring credits and continuing their education at a new school. This may make it more difficult for veterans to complete their degrees before exhausting their eligibility for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. School closures also pose a financial risk for the government and taxpayers due to the costs associated with restoring benefits.


The President has made numerous trips to the Mar-a-Lago property in Palm Beach, Florida, during which he met with foreign leaders and conducted presidential activities. GAO was asked to review the establishment of secure areas for use by the President at Mar-a-Lago. This report provides information on, among other things, (1) vetting of individuals expected to be near the President; (2) efforts to establish secure areas for handling classified information; and (3) regulations and processes for agency expenditures on employees who travel with the President. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2018. Information that the Secret Service and DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO analyzed laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; reviewed agreements between federal agencies and trip after-action reports; and interviewed DOD and Secret Service officials. GAO also reviewed vouchers from the four presidential trips to Mar-a-Lago from February 3, 2017 through March 5, 2017.GAO also reviewed documentation and descriptions of specific security practices with DOD and Secret Service officials. The Executive Office of the President has not responded to requests regarding its role in assisting DOD and the Secret Service in carrying out their responsibilities. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) vets individuals differently depending on the person's expected proximity to the President when he travels, including during his visits to Mar-a-Lago. According to Secret Service officials, vetting may include using physical screening (measures to detect physical threats to the president and secure the property) and background checks intended to identify individuals who have prior criminal activity or present other types of threats. Individuals at Mar-a-Lago who are not expected to meet with the President or enter spaces the President may visit pass through an outer layer of security consisting of physical screening checkpoints surrounding the property. The Secret Service physically screens all individuals who will access areas where the President will be present, such as a dining room. According to Secret Service officials, individuals who have a meeting with the President generally undergo both physical screening and enhanced background checks. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Secret Service coordinate to establish and secure several areas that are suitable for handling classified information when the President travels to Mar-a-Lago. These areas include a conference center, spaces used by staff of the National Security Council and the Executive Office of the President, and presidential transportation vehicles. Details associated with these areas and facilities are sensitive and have been omitted from this report. The Secret Service and DOD are subject to regulations that govern the reimbursement of employees for official travel expenses. Both organizations have processes to review these travel-related expenses when their personnel travel with the President and try to acquire lodging at the General Services Administration's per diem lodging rate. When the Secret Service is not able to acquire rooms at the per diem lodging rate, including when it needs rooms for operational purposes that exceed 300 percent of the per diem rate (a threshold set by the General Services Administration), employees must submit a waiver request. DOD personnel must also obtain approval when costs exceed the General Services Administration's lodging rate. Our review of DOD vouchers and Secret Service documentation confirmed that personnel did not exceed the 300 percent threshold for lodging during the Mar-a-Lago trips examined in this review. We assessed the costs of Presidential travel in a separate report.


The President makes appointments to certain positions within the federal government, either using authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 151 full-time leadership positions on 34 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate for full-time positions on these 34 boards and commissions during the 115 th Congress. Information for each board and commission is presented in profiles and tables. The profiles provide information on leadership structures and statutory requirements (such as term limits and party balance requirements). The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, incumbents as of the end of the 115 th Congress, incumbents' parties (where balance is required), and appointment action within each board or commission. Additional summary information across all 34 boards and commissions appears in Appendix A . During the 115 th Congress, the President submitted 140 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions on these boards and commissions (most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time). Of these 140 nominations, 75 were confirmed, 12 were withdrawn, and 53 were returned to the President. At the end of the 115 th Congress, 22 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 43 vacancies among the 151 positions. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database at https://www.congress.gov/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). This report will not be updated.


The Saltonstall-Kennedy (S-K) Act of 1954 (15 U.S.C. Â§713c-3) established a program to provide financial support for research and development of commercial fisheries. The S-K Act created a fund (known as the S-K fund) that is financed by a permanent appropriation of a portion of import duties on marine products. S-K funds are distributed by the Secretary of Commerce as grants and cooperative agreements to address needs of the U.S. fishing industry, including but not limited to harvesting, processing, marketing, and associated infrastructure. However, Congress allocates most funding to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to fund agency activities related to marine fisheries research and management. Some have questioned whether the allocation of S-K funds reflects the original intent of the S-K Act and whether the S-K Grant Program addresses the needs and priorities of the fishing industry. Since its creation, the S-K fund's authorizing language and priorities have evolved with changes to the fishing industry, new or amended federal laws governing fisheries management, and changing federal agency responsibilities. In 1980, the American Fisheries Promotion Act (AFPA) amended the S-K Act to authorize a competitive grant program, known as the Saltonstall-Kennedy Grant Program (S-K Grant Program) and the National Program to support fishing industry research and development projects. Both programs are administered by NMFS, part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In the 1980s, the S-K Grant Program focused on fisheries development, but in subsequent years, as U.S. fisheries became fully or overexploited, priorities generally shifted to resource conservation and management. The S-K Grant Program has supported a variety of different projects, such as gear technology research, seafood marketing, aquaculture, and others. The S-K Grant Program is funded by a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous calendar year's customs receipts from imports of fish and fish products. These funds are transferred into NOAA's Promote and Develop American Fisheries Products and Research Pertaining to American Fisheries Fund (P&D account). Transfers of revenue into the P&D account have grown steadily from $26.7 million in 1980 to $182.8 million in 2020. Congress subsequently transfers most funds into the Operations, Research, and Facilities (ORF) account within NOAA. Congress has directed NMFS to use funds allocated to the ORF account for specific activities including stock assessments, fishing information networks, survey and monitoring projects, cooperative research, and interjurisdictional fisheries. The remaining funds are available for supporting the annual competitive S-K Grant Program and in some cases the National Program. Since the early 1980s, Congress has transferred most P&D account funds into the ORF discretionary account, sometimes leaving little or no funding for the specified purposes of the S-K Act. Some critics have questioned whether funds from the P&D account could be used more effectively by targeting fishing industry needs, as Congress originally intended. For example, in the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses, bills were introduced that would have used most S-K funds to establish a regional fisheries grant program. By contrast, some have expressed concerns that if significant funding is shifted away from NMFS fisheries management programs, additional funds would need to be appropriated or activities such as data collection and fish population assessments could be compromised. These NMFS activities provide information and analyses used to manage and conserve fish populations. Some also have questioned whether the S-K Grant Program could be modified to provide the fishing industry with more direct input into the S-K grant process. Currently, NMFS, in consultation with the fishing industry, identifies S-K Grant Program priorities and selects the recipients of S-K grants. Over the last several Congresses, bills have been introduced that would change the procedure for screening, evaluating, and awarding S-K grants. In the 116 th Congress, the American Fisheries Advisory Committee Act ( H.R. 1218 and S. 494 ) would establish an industry advisory committee to identify the needs of the fishing industry, develop requests for proposals, review grant applications, and select grant applications for approval. S. 494 was reported on August 16, 2019, by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; on September 18, 2019, H.R. 1218 was ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Natural Resources.


The Second Continental Congress formally adopted the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776. Since that day, Americans have celebrated this holiday through events held in towns and cities across the country. In the nation's capital, Washington, D.C., visitors have celebrated on the National Mall by attending federally sponsored events such as the National Independence Day Parade; A Capitol Fourth Concert; Independence Day Fireworks Display; and in 2019, A Salute to America. GAO was asked to review the impacts and estimated costs associated with the Fourth of July events on the National Mall. Specifically, this report describes the following for the Fourth of July events on the National Mall for 2016 through 2019: (1) the total costs federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions are estimated to have incurred and (2) the appropriations that were used to pay for the estimated federal costs; the extent, if any, to which the federal government reimbursed costs incurred by state and local jurisdictions; and the extent, if any, to which federal agencies delayed, deferred, or canceled other programs or activities as a result of resources being used for Fourth of July events. To perform this work, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed personnel from federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions about their estimated costs and resources used for the events. From 2016 through 2019, hundreds of personnel from numerous federal agencies, state and local jurisdictions, and private entities planned, produced, and executed events on the National Mall that celebrated Independence Day of the United States. The National Park Service (NPS) was responsible for the overall execution of Fourth of July events on the National Mall. In addition, various federal agencies—including the Department of Homeland Security, United States Capitol Police, United States Coast Guard, and Department of Justice—helped to ensure safety. Beyond the federal effort, the District of Columbia Government (DC Government) and local law enforcement played a role in the overall events. Further, given the crowds and potential for high temperatures in July in Washington, D.C., it was important that organizers—including the Department of Health and Human Services—ensured adequate medical resources were available to attendees and participants. The estimated costs for the events held in 2016, 2017, and 2018 ranged from $6 million to $7 million annually, and included contract costs with private entities tasked with producing and executing the concert and fireworks. They also included the costs for overtime and holiday pay for federal employees working at the events. In 2019, with the addition of the Salute to America event, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Executive Office of the President undertook additional efforts. Estimated costs for the 2019 events on the National Mall increased to more than $13 million. This increase was attributable to the cost for DOD to transport several vehicles to the National Mall, the production and execution of the Salute to America event, and the additional security involved because the President attended the event. In addition, there were costs not directly attributable to the events, including salaries of some federal employees who performed duties during the events, as well as costs for fuel and depreciation on DOD assets. These costs were classified as not directly attributable to the Fourth of July events because they would have been incurred regardless of whether the events occurred. For example, according to DOD, the flight time related to the military flyovers for the Salute to America event were required training hours that pilots must complete annually, and therefore the related expenses, such as pilot salaries and fuel costs, were not included in event cost estimates. Finally, federal agencies and the DC Government primarily used annual federal appropriations to pay for the event costs. The DC Government received an appropriation each year to provide for public safety at certain events within the District of Columbia. According to DC Government officials, DC Government obligated the entire amount appropriated in fiscal year 2019 for the various events in the District of Columbia, including the Fourth of July events on the National Mall. DC Government officials stated that they did not request additional appropriations from Congress because they used funds from other appropriations to cover the cost of events exceeding the fiscal year 2019 appropriation. Agency officials did not identify any federal activities that were delayed, deferred, or canceled because of the resources used for the Fourth of July events on the National Mall in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.


The Secret Service, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for protecting the President, the Vice President, and their families, as well as the White House complex. In October 2014, following several security lapses, the Secretary of Homeland Security established the Panel, an independent panel of experts, to review White House security and other aspects of Secret Service operations. The Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018 contains a provision for GAO to report on the progress made by the Secret Service in implementing the Panel's recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which the Secret Service has implemented the recommendations in the Panel's 2014 report. GAO reviewed Secret Service documents, analyzed agency training and labor-distribution data from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and interviewed agency officials and Panel members. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) has made progress implementing the 19 recommendations related to training and personnel; technology, perimeter security, and operations; and leadership made by the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (Panel). The Secret Service fully implemented 11 of the recommendations. For example, the agency increased the number of agents and officers in the divisions that protect the President and White House and secured approval to build a new fence around the White House complex. The Secret Service is in the process of implementing the remaining eight recommendations. The Panel found that the security incident of September 19, 2014, when an intruder jumped the north fence and entered the White House, arose from a “catastrophic failure of training.” The Panel recommended, and the Secret Service agreed, that the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions train for 25 percent of their work time. However, the Secret Service has not met this target and lacks a plan for achieving it. In fiscal year 2018, special agents assigned to these divisions trained for about 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of their regular work hours (see figure). In commenting on a draft of this report in May 2019, the Secret Service stated that it no longer agrees with the training target and plans to reevaluate it. Developing and implementing a plan for ensuring that the established training target is met given current and planned staffing levels would better ensure that agents assigned to the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions are prepared to carry out Secret Service's protection priority. In addition, the Secret Service does not have a policy with a documented process for collecting complete and appropriate (i.e., protection-related) training hour data for Uniformed Division officers. Implementing such a policy will better position the Secret Service to assess the training data and make informed decisions about whether and how training needs are being met.


As the global internet develops and evolves, digital trade has become more prominent on the global trade and economic policy agenda. The economic impact of the internet was estimated to be $4.2 trillion in 2016, making it the equivalent of the fifth-largest national economy. The digital economy accounted for 6.9% of current‐dollar gross U.S. domestic product (GDP) in 2017. Digital trade has been growing faster than traditional trade in goods and services. Congress has an important role to play in shaping global digital trade policy, from oversight of agencies charged with regulating cross-border data flows to shaping and considering legislation implementing new trade rules and disciplines through trade negotiations. Congress also works with the executive branch to identify the right balance between digital trade and other policy objectives, including privacy and national security. Digital trade includes end-products, such as downloaded movies, and products and services that rely on or facilitate digital trade, such as productivity-enhancing tools like cloud data storage and email. In 2017, U.S. exports of information and communications technology-enabled services (excluding digital goods) were an estimated $439 billion. Digital trade is growing on a global basis, contributing more to global domestic product (GDP) than financial or merchandise flows. The increase in digital trade raises new challenges in U.S. trade policy, including how to best address new and emerging trade barriers. As with traditional trade barriers, digital trade constraints can be classified as tariff or nontariff barriers. In addition to high tariffs, barriers to digital trade may include localization requirements, cross border data flow limitations, intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement, forced technology transfer, web filtering, economic espionage, and cybercrime exposure or state-directed theft of trade secrets. China's policies, in particular, such as those on internet sovereignty and cybersecurity, pose challenges for U.S. companies. Digital trade issues often overlap and cut across policy areas, such as IPR and national security; this raises questions for Congress as it weighs different policy objectives. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) points out three potentially conflicting policy goals in the internet economy: (1) enabling the internet; (2) boosting or preserving competition within and outside the internet; and (3) protecting privacy and consumers, more generally. While no multilateral agreement on digital trade exists in the World Trade Organization (WTO), other WTO agreements cover some aspects of digital trade. Recent bilateral and plurilateral agreements have begun to address digital trade rules and barriers more explicitly. For example, the proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and ongoing plurilateral discussions in the WTO on a potential e-commerce agreement could address digital trade barriers to varying degrees. Digital trade is also being discussed in a variety of international forums, providing the United States with multiple opportunities to engage in and shape global norms. With workers in the high-tech sector in every U.S. state and congressional district, and over two-thirds of U.S. jobs requiring digital skills, Congress has an interest in ensuring and developing the global rules and norms of the internet economy in line with U.S. laws and norms, and in establishing a U.S. trade policy on digital trade that advances U.S. interests.


The Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government , which contains the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. As part of the fiscal year 2018 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other continuing control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to provide (1) details on new control deficiencies GAO identified related to the processes used to prepare the CFS, along with related recommendations, and (2) the status of corrective actions that Treasury and OMB have taken to address GAO's prior recommendations related to the processes used to prepare the CFS that remained open as of the completion of GAO's audit of the fiscal year 2017 CFS. During its audit of the fiscal year 2018 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control that involve the federal government's inability to adequately account for intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; reasonably assure that the consolidated financial statements are (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and reasonably assure that the information in the (1) Reconciliations of Net Operating Cost and Budget Deficit and (2) Statements of Changes in Cash Balance from Budget and Other Activities is complete, properly supported, and consistent with the underlying information in the audited entities' financial statements and other financial data. During its audit of the fiscal year 2018 CFS, GAO identified three new internal control deficiencies. Treasury did not have sufficient procedures to analyze and determine whether appropriate disclosures related to new federal accounting standards were included in the draft fiscal year 2018 Financial Report of the United States Government . Treasury did not have sufficient procedures to properly support and consistently report restatements, reclassifications, and adjustments to beginning net position in the draft fiscal year 2018 Financial Report of the United States Government . Treasury and OMB did not have adequate processes and procedures for reporting appropriate information regarding legal contingency losses in the fiscal year 2018 CFS. In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits with respect to the processes used to prepare the CFS either were resolved or continued to exist. Specifically, Treasury, in coordination with OMB, implemented corrective actions that resolved the control deficiencies related to two of the 14 recommendations open as of the completion of GAO's fiscal year 2017 CFS audit, and as a result, GAO closed these recommendations. While progress was made, 12 of the 14 recommendations remained open as of March 20, 2019, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2018 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions to address the four new recommendations made in this report as well as the 12 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2019 CFS audit.


The Senate's procedures are determined not only by its standing rules but also by standing orders, published precedents, committee rules, party conference rules, and informal practices. The Constitution and rulemaking statutes also impose procedural requirements on the Senate. Official parliamentary reference documents and other publications set forth the text of the various authorities or provide information about how and when they govern different procedural situations. Together, these sources establish the parameters by which the Senate conducts its business. They provide insight into the Senate's daily proceedings, which can be unpredictable. In order to understand Senate procedure, it is often necessary to consider more than one source of authority. For example, the Senate's standing rules provide for the presiding officer to recognize the first Senator who seeks recognition on the floor. By precedent, however, when several Senators seek recognition at the same time, the majority leader is recognized first, followed by the minority leader. This precedent may have consequences for action on the floor. This report reviews the coverage of Senate parliamentary reference sources and provides information about their availability to Senators and their staff. Among the resources presented in this report, four may prove especially useful to understand the Senate's daily order of business: the Senate Manual, Riddick's Senate Procedure, the rules of the Senate standing committees, and the publication of unanimous consent agreements. The Senate sets forth its chief procedural authorities in a Senate document called the Senate Manual (S.Doc. 113-1), a new edition of which appears periodically. The Manual contains the text of the Senate's standing rules, permanent standing orders, laws relating to the Senate, and the Constitution, all of which establish key Senate procedures. The most recent version of the Manual can be accessed online at govinfo.gov, a website of the Government Publishing Office (GPO) at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SMAN-113/pdf/SMAN-113.pdf. It is also accessible via the Senate resources page of Congress.gov (a website of the Library of Congress) at https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Senate. Riddick's Senate Procedure (S.Doc. 101-28) presents a catalog of Senate precedents arranged alphabetically on topics ranging from adjournment to recognition to voting. Summaries of the precedents are accompanied by citations to the page and date in the Congressional Record or the Senate Journal on which the precedent was established. Individual chapters of Riddick's Senate Procedure are available for download through govinfo.gov at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-RIDDICK-1992. A searchable version is also accessible via the Senate resources page of Congress.gov at https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Senate. The Senate's standing rules require each standing committee to adopt its own rules of procedure. These rules may cover topics such as how subpoenas are issued. Each Congress, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration prepares a compilation of these rules and other relevant committee materials, such as jurisdiction information, in a document titled Authority and Rules of Senate Committees. The most recent version (S.Doc. 115-4) is available via govinfo.gov at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-115sdoc4/pdf/CDOC-115sdoc4.pdf. To facilitate the legislative process, the Senate often conducts its business through unanimous consent agreements that may schedule the time for taking up a measure or specify what motions are in order during its consideration. These can be found, via Congress.gov, in the Congressional Record (https://www.congress.gov/) and the Senate Calendar of Business or the Executive Calendar (https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Calendars+and+Schedules).


The September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) provides cash benefits to certain persons whose health may have been affected by exposure to debris or toxic substances in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the terrorist-related aircraft crash at Shanksville, PA. Congress created the original VCF shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks to provide compensation to persons injured and the families of persons killed in the attacks and their immediate aftermath. The original VCF closed in 2003. In 2011, Congress reopened the VCF to provide benefits to persons who responded to the terrorist attack sites, were involved in the cleanup of these sites, or lived in lower Manhattan during the attacks. The reopened VCF was authorized through October 3, 2016. However, the VCF was reauthorized in December 2015 ( P.L. 114-113 ) and July 2019 ( P.L. 116-34 ). All VCF claims must be filed by October 1, 2090. Since its reopening, the VCF has awarded more than $5.5 billion to more than 23,000 claimants. There is no cap on the total VCF award amount, but there are limits on the amounts of individual awards for economic and noneconomic losses claimants suffered. The 2019 reauthorization legislation provides all necessary appropriations for VCF awards and administrative expenses through the end of FY2092.


The September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) provides cash benefits to certain persons whose health may have been affected by exposure to debris or toxic substances in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the terrorist-related aircraft crash at Shanksville, PA. Congress created the original VCF shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks to provide compensation to persons injured and to the families of persons killed in the attacks and their immediate aftermath. In 2011, Congress reopened the VCF to provide benefits to persons who responded to the terrorist attack sites, were involved in the cleanup of these sites, or lived in lower Manhattan during the attacks. The VCF was reauthorized in 2015, and it is scheduled to sunset on December 18, 2020. The VCF has awarded more than $5 billion since its reopening and is in danger of exceeding its current appropriation of $7.375 billion before its sunset date and thus being unable to pay full benefits. In February 2019, the Special Master of the VCF announced that all future VCF awards would be reduced to prevent the VCF from running out of appropriated funds. The Special Master cites increases in death claims, cancer claims, and claims from non-responders as drivers of the increase in VCF benefit costs. Reauthorization bills, H.R. 1327 and S. 546 , have been introduced, with H.R. 1327 being ordered reported out of the Judiciary Committee on June 12, 2019. Both bills would reauthorize the VCF without changing any eligibility categories and appropriate "such sums as may be necessary" for each fiscal year through FY2090. On July 12, 2019, H.R. 1327 was passed by the House of Representatives with amendments that changed the bill's name, changed the provisions for adjusting the maximum amount of income considered for determining noneconomic loss, added up to two Deputy Special Masters to the program's administration, and made the bill's spending exempt from PAYGO requirements.


The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers programs to support small businesses, including several loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses "that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions." The SBA's 504 Certified Development Company (504/CDC) loan guaranty program is administered through nonprofit Certified Development Companies (CDCs). It provides long-term fixed rate financing for major fixed assets, such as land, buildings, equipment, and machinery. Of the total project costs, a third-party lender must provide at least 50% of the financing, the CDC provides up to 40% of the financing through a 100% SBA-guaranteed debenture, and the applicant provides at least 10% of the financing. Its name is derived from Section 504 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-699, as amended), which provides the most recent authorization for the SBA's sale of 504/CDC debentures. In FY2018, the SBA approved 5,874 504/CDC loans amounting to nearly $4.8 billion. Congressional interest in the SBA's 504/CDC program has increased in recent years because of concern that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to grow and create jobs. For example, during the 111th Congress, P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increased the 504/CDC program's loan guaranty limits from $1.5 million to $5 million for "regular" borrowers, from $2 million to $5 million if the loan proceeds are directed toward one or more specified public policy goals, and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturers; temporarily expanded, for two years, the types of projects eligible for 504/CDC program refinancing of existing debt; created an alternative 504/CDC size standard to increase the number of businesses eligible for assistance; and provided $505 million (plus an additional $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend temporary fee subsidies for the 504/CDC and 7(a) loan guaranty programs and a temporary increase in the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. The temporary fee subsidies and 90% loan guaranty percentage ended on January 3, 2011, and the temporary expansion of the projects eligible for 504/CDC program refinancing of existing debt expired on September 27, 2012. During the 114th Congress, P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, reinstated the expansion of the types of projects eligible for refinancing under the 504/CDC loan guaranty program in any fiscal year in which the refinancing program and the 504/CDC program as a whole do not have credit subsidy costs. The act requires each CDC to limit its refinancing so that, during any fiscal year, the new refinancings do not exceed 50% of the dollars it loaned under the 504/CDC program during the previous fiscal year. This report examines the rationale provided for the 504/CDC program; its borrower and lender eligibility standards; operating requirements; and performance statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, proceeds usage, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. This report also examines congressional action taken to help small businesses gain greater access to capital, including enactment of P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA); P.L. 111-240; P.L. 114-113; and issues related to the SBA's oversight of 504/CDC lenders.


The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) Federal Contracting Program is designed to provide greater access to federal contracting opportunities for WOSBs and economically disadvantaged women-owned small businesses (EDWOSBs). By doing so, the program aims to help federal agencies achieve their statutory goal of awarding 5% of their federal contracting dollars to WOSBs. Under this program, federal contracting officers may set aside federal contracts (or orders) for WOSBs (including EDWOSBs) in industries in which the SBA determines WOSBs are substantially underrepresented in federal procurement and for EDWOSBs exclusively in industries in which the SBA determines WOSBs are underrepresented in federal procurement. The SBA has identified 364 six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes (out of 1,023) in which federal agencies may set aside federal contracts exclusively for WOSBs (including EDWOSBs) and 80 six-digit NAICS industry codes (out of 1,023) that may be set aside exclusively for EDWOSBs. Federal agencies may also award sole source contracts to WOSBs and EDWOSBs in eligible industries under the following conditions: the contracting officer does not have a reasonable expectation that offers would be received by two or more eligible WOSBs and EDWOSBs; the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price; and the anticipated total value of the contract, including any options, is below $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts). To participate in the program, WOSBs must be a small business (as defined by the SBA); be at least 51% unconditionally and directly owned and controlled by one or more women who are U.S. citizens; have women manage day-to-day operations and make long-term decisions; and be certified by a federal agency, a state government, the SBA, or a national certifying entity approved by the SBA. EDWOSBs must meet all the requirements of the WOSB contracting program; be owned and controlled by one or more women, each with a personal net worth less than $750,000; be owned and controlled by one or more women, each with $350,000 or less in adjusted gross income averaged over the previous three years; and be owned and controlled by one or more women, eachÂ having $6 million or less in personal assets (including business value and primary residence). The WOSB program's legislative history is a bit more complicated than other small business contracting programs, primarily due to the distinctions between WOSBs and EDWOSBs and among underrepresented, substantially underrepresented, and other NAICS codes. These distinctions were designed to shield the WOSB program from legal challenges related to the heightened level of legal scrutiny applied to contracting preferences after the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995), which involved contracting preferences for small disadvantaged businesses. The Court found in that case that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. An unintended consequence of these distinctions has been the SBA's difficulty in defining these terms, which contributed to a 10-year delay in the program's implementation and may help to explain why it has taken the SBA nearly six years to implement its own WOSB certification process as required by P.L. 113-291 , the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. That act also prohibited small businesses from self-certifying their eligibility for the WOSB program to ensure the program's contracts are awarded only to intended recipients. The SBA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register on December 18, 2015, to solicit public comments on drafting a proposed rule to meet these requirements. The proposed rule was issued on May 14, 2019, and the final rule implementing the certification program and removing the self-certification option was issued on May 11, 2020. The final rule's effective date for the new WOSB certification process is October 15, 2020, nearly six years after these requirements were enacted on December 19, 2014.


The Small Business Administration's (SBA) management of the State Trade Expansion Program (STEP) does not provide reasonable assurance of compliance with some legal requirements. Specifically, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requirements for STEP include: Proportional distribution requirement. SBA's Office of International Trade (OIT) must distribute grant funds so that the total amount awarded to the 10 states with the highest percentage of eligible small businesses does not exceed 40 percent of the program's appropriation that year. Total match requirement. States must provide a 25 or 35 percent non-federal match to the federal grant amount. Cash match requirement. A state's match cannot be less than 50 percent cash. GAO found that, while OIT has a process to meet the distribution requirement, it does not have a process for documenting that states have met the total match requirement before grant closeout, and does not have a process to determine whether states are meeting the cash match requirement. Without such processes, SBA cannot be reasonably assured that states are contributing per the law's requirements. GAO found that, while OIT has made changes to STEP in response to states' feedback, officials from states with low grant use described ongoing challenges with the program that affect their ability to fully use funds. These challenges include compressed application and award timelines, administrative burden, and poor communication. SBA has not adequately assessed risks to the program, including the risk to achieving program goals posed by some states' low grant fund use rates. Without such an assessment, OIT's ability to support U.S. exporters may be diminished. Further, SBA has not effectively facilitated sharing best practices among states. By doing this, SBA could help states make full use of funds to achieve the program's goals.


The Social Security Act requires boards of trustees to issue reports to Congress by April 1 each year on the financial status of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds. Policymakers and others can use these reports to understand the programs' finances, conduct oversight, and consider legislative proposals for the programs. GAO was asked to review the timeliness of these reports. This report (1) describes how the boards of trustees develop the annual Trustees reports, and (2) examines the extent to which the boards of trustees have provided the reports to Congress by the April 1 deadline since 1995, and what factors account for any delays. GAO reviewed boards of trustees meeting minutes from 1995-2018, working group agendas from 2011-2018, and report development schedules and the annual Trustees reports from 1995-2019; as well as relevant federal law. GAO also interviewed agency working group officials from SSA and CMS; the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury; and eight former public trustees who served since 1995. Annual reports on the status of Social Security and Medicare trust funds are developed through a collaboration between agency officials and trustees, which include relevant Cabinet members and public members nominated by the President (if confirmed). Offices of the Chief Actuaries from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) submit data and draft reports to a working group of agency officials representing trustees and any public trustees. The working group reviews the information and, after gaining consensus, submits it to the boards of trustees for final approval. The boards of trustees send the final reports to Congress. The trustees missed the April 1 statutory deadline for submitting the reports to Congress in 17 of the 25 years from 1995 to 2019, and have issued them more than 2 months late in 6 of the last 10 years (see figure). According to agency officials and former public trustees GAO interviewed, factors that may account for delays include late-breaking changes to assumptions or data, and difficulty scheduling the boards' meetings. Additionally, contrary to GAO's guide on best practices for project schedules, officials have not taken steps to update the report-development schedules to reflect actual progress, maintained a formally documented baseline schedule to incorporate lessons learned from prior years, or notified Congress of their progress. Without taking steps to improve report-development schedule management, these trust fund reports will likely continue to be untimely, missing the April 1 statutory deadline. Also, without improved efforts to keep congressional committees informed, Congress will be unaware of when the reports will be issued, potentially hindering oversight of the trust funds.


The Social Security program pays monthly benefits to retired or disabled workers and their families and to the family members of deceased workers. Social Security, or Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OAS DI), is intended to operate primarily as a pay-as-you-go system, where program revenues cover program costs. The OASDI program's revenues and costs are largely determined by economic and demographic factors. The Social Security program is experiencing rising costs and relatively stable income, a trend that is projected to continue for several decades. Although economic and program-specific factors affect the balance between program revenues and costs, research has shown demographic factors to be one of the leading contributors to the increasing imbalance between costs and revenues. The U.S. population has been experiencing a shift in age structure toward older ages and an increase in the median age, termed demographic aging . Two demographic effects have contributed to this aging over time: decreasing fertility and increasing longevity. While aging reflects a society's shared advances in medical, social, and economic matters, it strains the very social insurance systems that provide social support to the aging population. The post-World War II baby boom generation's effect on OASDI highlights this point. Baby boomers, the relatively large cohort resulting from higher fertility rates from 1946 through 1964, have started to exit the paid labor force and collect Social Security benefits. They are being replaced in the workforce by relatively smaller cohorts resulting from lower fertility rates in subsequent generations. Program costs are also rising as an increasing number of retirees collects benefits for longer time periods. According to the Board of Trustees of the OASDI Trust Funds, costs are expected to rise throughout the 75-year projection period, 2019-2093. The Social Security population's changing age distribution is creating a situation in which fewer workers in covered employment are supporting a growing number of people collecting benefits. This relationship is temporarily sustainable, as the OASDI program can draw upon the $2.89 trillion in asset reserves held in the trust funds to augment annual program revenues and fulfill all scheduled benefit payments. However, the OASDI program's ability to pay 100% of scheduled benefits becomes unsustainable when these asset reserves are depleted. The Board of Trustees, which oversees the OASDI Trust Funds, projects the funds' assets to be depleted in 2035 due in part to the cumulative strain placed upon the system by an older age distribution. After this, the OASDI program would operate as a strict pay-as-you-go system that can only pay out in benefits what it receives in revenue. Under current laws and projections, the trustees estimate sufficient revenues to be able to pay about 80% of scheduled benefits after asset reserves are depleted. The Social Security program's ability to cover 100% of scheduled benefits depends upon a combination of increased revenues and decreased benefits. One set of policy options to address the funding shortfall includes increasing the full retirement age (the age at which a beneficiary is entitled to full benefits) or the earliest eligibility age (the age at which a beneficiary is first entitled to benefits). This set of policy options uses a demographic solution for a largely demographic issue: the projected imbalance between program costs and income. Measures that include increasing the retirement ages are estimated to improve the program's long-range financial status but not to prevent trust funds depletion by themselves. Although these adjustments help to reduce rising costs, those costs would still be projected to exceed revenues. This suggests that efforts to avoid depleting the OASDI Trust Funds throughout the trustees' projection period would also be improved by including a revenue-increasing mechanism. In addition, increases in life expectancy are not shared equally within the population; disparities exist when life expectancies are analyzed by sex, race, and income levels. A policy measure that increases Social Security eligibility ages may disproportionally help some beneficiaries and disadvantage others.


The Supreme Court term that began on October 1, 2018, was a term of transition, with the Court issuing a number of rulings that, at times, suggested but did not fully adopt broader transformations in its jurisprudence. The term followed the retirement of Justice Kennedy, who was a critical vote on the Court for much of his 30-year tenure and who had been widely viewed as the Court's median or "swing" Justice. As a result, the question looming over the October 2018 Term was how the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Justice Kavanaugh would alter the Court's jurisprudence going forward. Notwithstanding the alteration in the Court's makeup, observers have generally agreed that the October 2018 Term largely did not produce broad changes to the Court's jurisprudence. Although a number of cases presented the Court with the opportunity to rethink various areas of law, the Court largely declined those invitations. In other cases, a majority of the Justices did not resolve potentially far-reaching questions, resulting in the Court either issuing more narrow rulings or simply not issuing an opinion in a given case. Nonetheless, much of the low-key nature of the October 2018 Term was a product of the Court's decisions to not hear certain matters. And for a number of closely watched cases that it did agree to hear, the Court opted to schedule arguments for the next term. While the Supreme Court's latest term generally did not result in wholesale changes to the law, its rulings were nonetheless important, in large part, because they provide insight into how the Court may function following Justice Kennedy's retirement. For the fourth straight year at the Court, the number of opinions decided by a bare majority increased, with 29% of the Court's decisions being issued by a five-Justice majority. While a number of decisions saw the Court divided along what are perceived to be the typical ideological lines, the bulk of the Court's closely divided cases involved heterodox lineups in which Justices with divergent judicial philosophies joined to form a majority in a given case. Collectively, the voting patterns of the October 2018 Term have led some commentators to suggest that the Court has transformed from an institution that was largely defined by the vote of Justice Kennedy to one in which multiple Justices are now perceived to be the Court's swing votes. Beyond the general dynamics of the October 2018 Term, the Court issued a number of opinions of importance for Congress. Of particular note are five opinions from the October Term 2018: (1)Â Kisor v. Wilkie , which considered the continued viability of the Auer-Seminole Rock doctrine governing judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation; (2) Department of Commerce v. New York , a challenge to the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census questionnaire; (3) Rucho v. Common Cause , which considered whether federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of excessive partisanship in drawing electoral districts;Â (4)Â American Legion v. American Humanist Association , a challenge to the constitutionality of a state's display of a Latin cross as a World War I memorial; and (5) Gundy v. United States , which considered the scope of the long-dormant nondelegation doctrine.


As the latest generation of mobile communications, 5G networks are expected to provide faster connections to support consumer, industry, and public sector services. While private sector carriers deploy 5G networks, FCC has a role in managing deployment challenges, such as how to allocate low-, mid-, and high-band spectrum for 5G use. GAO was asked to review 5G deployment challenges. This report examines challenges and the federal government's efforts related to 5G deployment with regard to managing spectrum for 5G and closing the digital divide, among other things. GAO, with assistance from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, convened a meeting of 17 experts from academia, industry, and consumer groups; reviewed relevant statutes, literature, and FCC documentation; and interviewed FCC and other relevant federal officials, along with stakeholders that include various localities, wireless carriers, and industry associations. Approximately every 10 years since the early 1980s, wireless carriers have deployed a new generation of wireless communication technology. This decade is no different, as carriers are now developing and deploying 5G networks, which offer greater speed and higher data capacity than previous generations of mobile wireless networks. Carriers in the United States are currently deploying “hybrid” 5G, which uses 5G technologies in combination with existing 4G networks to improve the networks' speed. In the future, carriers may deploy “standalone” 5G, which relies exclusively on 5G equipment to allow for additional enhanced capabilities (see fig. 1). Radio frequency spectrum is a finite natural resource used to provide a variety of communication services to businesses and consumers, as well as to federal, state, and local governments. The frequency bands—often referred to as low-band, mid-band, and high-band spectrum—have different characteristics that make them more or less suitable for specific purposes. Experts GAO convened said that mid-band spectrum is highly congested, leading to an insufficient amount available for carriers to deploy their 5G networks in the United States. The experts stated that to avoid delays in 5G deployment, the commercial sector needs access to more mid-band spectrum. These experts highlighted the need for mid-band spectrum for 5G due to mid-band's use internationally and because of its properties. Mid-band spectrum allows for higher data capacity than lower bands and can penetrate physical obstacles over long distances—a property known as “propagation”— better than higher bands (see fig. 2). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has some efforts under way to make additional mid-band spectrum available but so far has primarily made high-band spectrum available for 5G because it is more readily available. Making more mid-band spectrum available to the commercial sector will be challenging, as current mid-band spectrum users include federal government users that may not be able to readily transition to new or less favorable spectrum bands. FCC's planning document for 5G includes a section on making additional spectrum available but does not clearly identify specific and measurable performance goals or measures to manage the spectrum demands for 5G. Without such strategic planning efforts, FCC will be unable to determine the effectiveness of its spectrum management efforts, particularly related to the congested mid-band spectrum that is critical to 5G deployment. The experts GAO convened also stated that 5G deployment would likely exacerbate disparities in access to telecommunications services, known as the “digital divide.” Specifically, experts as well as stakeholders GAO interviewed said that 5G using high-band spectrum—which allows for high data capacity—is likely to be first deployed in areas already equipped with much of the necessary infrastructure. Experts said the areas with existing infrastructure are generally urban, densely populated, high-income areas as opposed to rural or low-income areas. Further, within urban settings, experts said that high-band 5G networks are more likely to be deployed in commercially viable areas, including those parts of a city that already are equipped with fiber and power and, presumably, already benefit from the most advanced mobile broadband services available. FCC has taken steps to address the digital divide, including a recent announcement to make up to $9 billion in funding available to carriers to deploy 5G in rural areas of the United States. However, FCC has not developed specific and measurable performance goals with related strategies and measures to assess how well its actions are mitigating the added effects 5G deployment will have on the digital divide.