The Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant program is intended to encourage individuals to enter the teaching profession by providing recipients with grants of up to $4,000 annually to pursue coursework that leads to a certification in teaching. Congress authorized the TEACH Grant program in the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-84 ) to address concerns about growing demand for high-quality teachers, especially in low-income schools. To be eligible for a TEACH Grant, among other requirements, a postsecondary student has to meet certain academic achievement requirements and be enrolled in a TEACH-Grant eligible program of study. The TEACH Grant program is the only HEA Title IV program with an academic merit requirement. As a condition of receiving a TEACH Grant, a recipient must complete four years of teaching in a high-need field and in a school that serves low-income students, within eight years of completing his or her program of study. If a recipient fails to complete the required teaching service, his or her TEACH Grant is converted into a Federal Unsubsidized Direct Loan, which must be repaid in full including interest that accrued since grant disbursement. To be eligible to disburse TEACH Grants, among other requirements, an institution of higher education (IHE) must provide a high-quality teacher preparation program that is either accredited by a Department of Education (ED)-recognized accrediting agency of teacher education programs; or is approved by a state, includes a minimum of 10 weeks of full-time pre-service clinical experience, and provides or assists in providing pedagogical coursework. Additionally, such teacher preparation programs must provide or assist in providing supervision and support services to program completers when they are working as teachers. Program administration tasks are divided among IHEs, ED, and the loan servicer with which ED contracts. IHEs award and disburse TEACH Grants to recipients, while the loan servicer performs day-to-day administrative tasks after a grant has been disbursed. ED oversees both the IHE's and the loan servicer's functions. Since the inception of the program, over 300,000 TEACH Grants, totaling nearly $938 million, have been disbursed. Based on a Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis, the estimated take-up rate of TEACH Grants by the potentially eligible population in the 2013-2014 academic year was 19%. According to an American Institutes for Research (AIR) study, among TEACH Grant recipients who began their eight-year service period prior to July 2014, 63% saw their grants converted to loans as of July 2016. Several issues related to TEACH Grants may garner congressional attention. The bulk of these issues pertain to program design, including the extent to which the program successfully identifies individuals who commit to teaching, the size of the TEACH Grant benefit, challenges associated with finding and sustaining a qualifying teaching placement, teacher preparation program quality at IHEs that disburse TEACH Grants, and the continued application of the "highly qualified teacher" definition to the TEACH Grant program. Other issues are related to program implementation, such as challenges associated with certification of teaching service and the absence of an appeals process. Lawmakers may also wish to consider other changes that have been proposed since the TEACH Grant program was authorized. Some of these include permitting partial payback of TEACH Grants converted into loans that is prorated based on the length of service fulfilled for recipients who do not complete the service requirement, allowing teachers whose roles or duties change to continue to fulfill their required teaching service with such new roles or duties, or replacing or sunsetting the program altogether.


The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; P.L. 104-193 ). That law culminated four decades of debate about how to revise or replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Most AFDC assistance was provided to families headed by single mothers who reported no work in the labor market, and the debates focused on whether such aid led to dependency on assistance by discouraging work and the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. TANF provides a fixed block grant to states ($16.5 billion total per year) that has not been adjusted at either the national or state levels since 1996. The TANF block grant is based on expenditures in the AFDC program in the early to mid-1990s, and thus the distribution of funds among the states has been "locked in" since that time. The purchasing power of the block grant has also declined over time due to inflation. Since 1997, it has lost 36% of its initial value. The debates that led to the creation of TANF in 1996 focused on the terms and rules around public assistance to needy families with children. However, PRWORA created TANF as a broad-purpose block grant. States may use TANF funds "in any manner that is reasonably calculated" to achieve the block grant's statutory purposes, which involve TANF providing states flexibility to address the effects or the root causes of economic and social disadvantage of children. For pre-TANF programs, public assistance benefits provided to families comprised 70% of total spending. In FY2018, such public assistance comprised 21% of all TANF spending. States spend TANF funds on activities such as child care, education and employment services (not necessarily related to families receiving assistance), services for children "at risk" of foster care, and pre-kindergarten and early childhood education programs. There are few federal rules and little accountability for expenditures other than those made for assistance. Before the 1996 law, many states experimented with programs to require work or participation in job preparation activities for AFDC recipients. PRWORA established "work participation requirements." Most of these requirements relate to a performance system that applies to the state as a whole, and are not requirements that apply to individuals. The system requires states to meet a minimum work participation rate (WPR). The complex rules of the WPR can be met through several different routes in addition to engaging unemployed recipients in job preparation activities: caseload reduction, state spending beyond what is required under TANF, and assistance to needy parents who are already working. In FY2018, all but one state met the participation standard. A total of 18 states met their minimum WPR through caseload reduction alone. Spending on assistance and the number of individuals receiving assistance have both declined substantially since the mid-1990s. The reduction in the assistance caseload was caused more by a decline in the percentage of those who were eligible receiving benefits than a decline in the number of people who met TANF's state-defined definitions of financial need. Assistance under TANF alleviates less poverty than it did under AFDC. While there have been expansions in other low-income assistance programs since PRWORA was enacted, such as the refundable tax credits from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the child tax credit, those programs do not provide ongoing assistance on a monthly basis. Some of the TANF reauthorization bills introduced in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses attempt to focus a greater share of TANF dollars on activities related to assistance and work. Additionally, these bills would revise the system by which state programs are assessed on their performance in engaging assistance recipients in work or job preparation activities.


The Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant program is a discretionary program providing grants to surface transportation projects on a competitive basis, with recipients selected by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). It originated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), where it was called "national infrastructure investment" (as it has been in subsequent appropriations acts); in FY2018 the program was renamed the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) program. Although the program's stated purpose is to fund projects of national, regional, and metropolitan area significance, in practice its funding has gone more toward projects of regional and metropolitan-area significance. In large part this is a function of congressional intent, as Congress has directed that the funds be distributed equitably across geographic areas, between rural and urban areas, and among transportation modes, and has set relatively low minimum grant thresholds (currently $5 million for urban projects, $1 million for rural projects). The average grant size has been in the $10 million to $15 million range; such sums are only a small portion of the funding requirements for projects of national significance. The TIGER/BUILD program is not a statutory program. Congress has continued the program by providing funding for it each year in the annual DOT appropriations act. It is a popular program in part because for most of its existence it has been one of a few transportation grant programs that offer regional and local governments the opportunity to apply directly to the federal government for funding, and one of a few that offer states additional funding beyond their annual highway and public transportation formula funding. The program is heavily oversubscribed; over the 10-year period FY2009-F2018, the amount of funding applied for totaled around 24 times the amount of money available for grants. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that, while DOT has selection criteria for the TIGER grant program, it has sometimes awarded grants to lower-ranked projects while bypassing higher-ranked projects without explaining why it did so, raising questions about the integrity of the selection process. DOT has responded that while its project rankings are based on transportation-related criteria, such as safety and economic impact, it must sometimes select lower-ranking projects over higher-ranking ones to comply with other selection criteria established by Congress, such as geographic balance and a balance between rural and urban awards. Although Congress established the parameters of the program, since the grantees are selected by DOT the Administration controls the grant process. The Obama Administration distributed grants relatively evenly across modes and population areas. The Trump Administration has prioritized grants to road projects in rural areas; in the FY2018 round, 69% of the grant funds went to rural areas. DOT also announced that it would favor projects that provided new nonfederal sources of revenue ("better utilizing investments to leverage development"). Congress subsequently rejected that initiative, directing DOT not to favor projects that provided additional revenue or even projects that requested a low federal share. Congress also capped the share of funding that can go to rural areas in response to the Administration's tilt toward awarding grants to rural areas. DOT has published two reports on the topic of the performance of projects that received TIGER grants. The reports note that measuring the performance of the array of projects in several modes eligible for TIGER grants is challenging. DOT has required grantees to develop performance plans and measures for each project, beginning before the construction of the project and continuing for years. The reports themselves largely consist of case studies of several projects.


The Trump Administration requested $28.5 billion in foreign assistance in fiscal year 2019, to be administered by at least 22 federal agencies. Almost 95 percent of this assistance is administered by six agencies—the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), State (State), Health and Human Services (HHS), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). FATAA required the President to set forth guidelines for M&E of U.S. foreign assistance. In January 2018, OMB issued the required guidelines for federal agencies. FATAA also contained a provision for GAO to analyze the guidelines established by OMB; and assess the implementation of the guidelines by the agencies. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which (1) OMB's M&E Guidelines incorporate GAO leading practices, and (2) agencies incorporate the OMB Guidelines in their M&E policies and plans. GAO assessed the OMB Guidelines against GAO's 28 leading practices identified in GAO-16-861R . GAO also assessed the six agencies' foreign assistance M&E policies against the Guidelines and interviewed OMB and relevant agency officials in Washington, DC. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) foreign assistance Guidelines incorporate most of GAO's leading practices for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but gaps exist (see figure). Monitoring : The Guidelines define monitoring as the continuous tracking of program or project data to determine whether desired results are as expected during implementation. The Guidelines do not require GAO's leading practices on risk assessments, staff qualifications, and program close-out procedures. Evaluation : The Guidelines define evaluation as the systematic collection and analysis of program or project outcomes for making judgments and informing decisions. They do not require GAO's leading practices on developing staff skills and following up on recommendations. OMB officials indicated the Guidelines are focused on elements required in the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (FATAA), but noted that agencies can add additional requirements to their own M&E policies. FATAA requires the President to set forth guidelines “according to best practices of monitoring and evaluation.” OMB staff acknowledged that GAO's leading practices are important, but stated that there is no singular established standard for best monitoring practices. Nevertheless, all of GAO's leading practices can help agencies address impediments, effectively manage foreign assistance, and meet their goals. When assessing agencies' M&E policies against OMB Guidelines, GAO found that agencies incorporated most of the requirements. However, for monitoring, one of the six agencies GAO reviewed—DOD—did not include the requirements to establish agencies' roles and responsibilities and ensure verifiable data for monitoring activities. For evaluation, agencies required most Guideline requirements, but not all. For example, DOD, HHS, and USDA did not require conducting impact evaluations for pilot programs or projects. Without a clear requirement to do such evaluations, agencies risk duplicating or scaling up programs without fully understanding the factors that could lead to their success or failure. Agencies GAO reviewed have plans or mechanisms in place to oversee the implementation of their M&E policies. For example, State developed a guidance document to operationalize and oversee its M&E policy to ensure the implementation of the Guidelines.


The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has initiated a series of major internal reforms, branded as Transformation at USAID . The reforms are largely in response to Trump Administration directives aimed at making federal agencies more efficient, effective, and accountable. Most of the reforms proposed under this initiative do not involve statutory reorganization, but USAID Administrator Mark Green has sought congressional input as the reform process is developed and launched, especially in the area of changes to USAID organizational structure. Congress has the power to shape USAID reforms through oversight activities, and through funding requirements and restrictions. Some of these proposed reforms are consistent with efforts by past USAID Administrators and do not represent major changes of course for USAID. At the same time, USAID policy documents signal a consistent emphasis on "ending the need for foreign assistance" by supporting partner countries' "journey to self-reliance." This report highlights reforms that represent new or enhanced approaches to achieving longstanding objectives, including the following: Process and p olicy reforms focused on promoting and measuring partner country progress toward economic self-reliance, engaging the private sector in international development, and reforming procurement practices to better support these broader goals. Organizational s tructure reforms intended to enhance the agency's leadership structure, improve the efficiency of humanitarian assistance programming, and consolidate technically specialized offices within the agency. Workforce management reforms, including the creation of a new noncareer hiring mechanism. The figure below depicts the timing of key events of Transformation implementation to date. Congress may view USAID's reform initiatives through longstanding areas of interest and policy questions, including the relationship between the "journey to self-reliance" and broader U.S. foreign policy concerns, including great power competition; the consistency of the "self-reliance" goal with foreign assistance priorities identified by Congress in annual appropriations legislation; potential impacts of significant USAID funding cuts repeatedly proposed by the Trump Administration; potential impacts of proposed new Senate-confirmed management positions on agency operations; implications of replacing existing strategies, indicators, and mechanisms with new strategies, indicators, and mechanisms proposed in the Transformation initiative; the means for prioritizing goals identified in the new USAID Policy Framework and initiatives such as Prosper Africa, which do not seem appear to fall under the Trans formation umbrella; alignment of USAID policies and foreign assistance indicators with those of other U.S. agencies funding and implementing assistance, including the State Department and the Millennium Challenge Corporation; and the effect on food assistance funded by Congress through multiple channels, including the Food for Peace account, of the proposed bureau restructuring and consolidation of the Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace.


The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an agency within the Department of Defense with both military and civil works responsibilities. The agency's civil works activities consist largely of the planning, construction, and operation of water resource projects to maintain navigable channels, reduce the risk of flood and storm damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Congress directs USACE's civil works activities through authorization legislation, annual and supplemental appropriations, and oversight. Unlike federal funding for highways and municipal water infrastructure, the majority of federal funds provided to USACE are not distributed by formula to states or through competitive grant programs. Instead, USACE generally is directly engaged in the planning and construction of projects. The majority of the agency's appropriations are used to perform work on geographically specific studies and congressionally authorized projects. Between FY2010 and FY2020, USACE discretionary appropriations, typically funded through Title I of annual Energy and Water Development appropriations acts, have ranged from $4.72 billion in FY2013 to $7.65 billion in FY2020. Congress also has provided USACE with emergency supplemental appropriations, most often as part of flood response and recovery efforts (see CRS In Focus IF11435, Supplemental Appropriations for Army Corps Flood Response and Recovery , for more information). USACE's annual appropriations process generally involves three major milestones: the President's budget request, congressional deliberation and enactment of appropriations, and Administration development of a USACE work plan. Each of the milestones is accompanied by various documents, such as USACE budget justifications, congressional conference reports, and USACE work plans. The process begins with the release of the President's budget request, typically in early February. The request's appendix includes funding levels for different USACE accounts (e.g., Investigations, Construction, Operation and Maintenance). USACE also releases more detailed documents (i.e., press book, budget justifications) providing information on the projects that the request would fund. Congress may consider the President's budget request, stakeholder interests, and other factors when creating an annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill and its USACE civil works title. In reports accompanying appropriations bills, Congress provides direction to USACE on how to allocate enacted appropriations to various USACE activities and types of projects. In the months following enactment, the Administration develops a work plan that adheres to congressional direction regarding the priorities for the funding provided above the requested amount (e.g., $2.7 billion for 26 categories of USACE activities in FY2020) and the number of new starts (e.g., six new studies and six new construction projects using FY2020 appropriations). Some USACE-related topics repeatedly arise in congressional appropriations deliberations For example, Congress often considers how to address the increasing maintenance needs of USACE's aging infrastructure, stakeholder demand for USACE projects, and the number of finalized project studies awaiting construction. Issues for Congress also may include the distribution of appropriations (e.g., activity type, new starts, and geographic distribution) and the level of discretion Congress provides the Administration in allocating USACE's funding in the work plan.


The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the primary federal agency involved in federal construction to help reduce community flood risk. Congressional direction on USACE flood risk reduction activities has evolved from primarily supporting levees, dams, and engineered dunes and beaches. Since 1974, Congress has required that USACE evaluate nonstructural alternatives, such as elevation of structures and acquisition of floodplain lands, during its planning of projects. Since the mid-2010s, Congress also has directed the consideration of natural and nature-based features (NNBFs). Examples of potential NNBFs for reducing flood risk include wetlands; oyster, mussel, and coral reefs; and the combination of these natural features with hard components, such as rock and concrete. Various factors are shaping how USACE is incorporating NNBFs into its flood risk reduction projects and post-flood repair activities. NNBFs in Flood Risk Reduction Projects Congress specifically included NNBFs as a planning requirement for USACE flood risk reduction projects in 2016. In 2018, Congress required that USACE feasibility reports for flood risk reduction projects consider using traditional and natural infrastructure, alone or in conjunction with each other. In recent feasibility reports, USACE primarily has proposed using NNBFs (other than engineered dunes and beaches) in combination with traditional structural measures rather than having the NNBFs as the primary means for reducing flood risk. To be recommended for congressional construction authorization, a USACE flood risk reduction project generally must have national flood risk reduction benefits that exceed the project's costs. Under current Administration guidance, USACE's evaluation of NNBFs is tailored to each project (i.e., it is case-by-case rather than standardized). NNBFs in Program to Repair Damaged Nonfederal Flood Control Works In 1996, Congress amended USACE's program to repair damage to certain nonfederal flood control works. Congress allowed for the program to fund nonstructural alternatives in lieu of USACE making repairs if a nonfederal entity requests and assumes responsibility for the nonstructural alternative. In 2016, Congress defined the program's nonstructural alternatives to include restoring and protecting natural resources (e.g., floodplains, wetlands, and coasts), if those alternatives reduce flood risk. In practice, the program continues to predominantly repair the damaged flood control works. That is, there remain a limited number of nonfederal entities pursuing nonstructural alternatives under this program. Identifying Challenges and Opportunities for NNBFs as Flood Risk Reduction Measures Quantifying the effectiveness and reliability of NNBFs as flood risk reduction measures in different environmental conditions and for different floods and storms is an area of ongoing research. In some circumstances, NNBFs may provide flood risk reduction and a suite of environmental and social benefits. In other applications, NNBFs may be unable to replicate the level of flood risk reduction provided by traditional structural and nonstructural measures. Congress may consider the following issues for NNBFs in USACE flood risk reduction activities: knowledge gaps in measuring the benefits and limitations of NNBFs and the research to fill these gaps; how USACE processes account for NNBFs' benefits, costs, and performance; and effects of agency practice, Administration guidance, and statutory authority on the consideration and adoption of NNBFs for flood risk reduction. Congress has requested two reports related to NNBFs from USACE. These reports, when available, may inform congressional deliberations on whetherâand, if so, howâto support the use of NNBFs as part of USACE flood risk reduction efforts.


The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with ensuring the security and safety of the waters under U.S. jurisdiction. To help carry out its missions, the Coast Guard maintains Specialized Forces units with the capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime environment. The Coast Guard reorganized the command structure of these units in 2007 and again in 2013. The Maritime Security Improvement Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate Specialized Forces units and provide a report to Congress. This report examines the extent to which the Coast Guard addressed key practices and considerations for assessing reorganization of its Specialized Forces units. GAO assessed the Coast Guard report and associated workforce planning documentation and data used for its 2013 reorganization and analyzed the extent to which the agency applied key practices. GAO also analyzed guidance and data on Specialized Forces capabilities and operations to identify potential overlap or gaps and interviewed agency officials. In reorganizing its Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) in 2013, the Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for agency reorganization, including establishing goals and outcomes, engaging stakeholders, and addressing longstanding management challenges, such as training shortfalls. However, the Coast Guard did not fully apply the other two key practices—using data and evidence and addressing potential overlap and duplication within the Specialized Forces workforce. For example: The Coast Guard has not assessed the overall Specialized Forces workforce needs, as this practice recommends. Officials from some units stated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other units with the same or similar capabilities turned down operations for lack of available personnel. GAO identified some overlap among the capabilities of the different Specialized Forces units and the Coast Guard missions they support—in some cases Specialized Forces units were co-located with other Specialized Forces units with many of the same capabilities and similar missions. In August 2019, Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the 2013 reorganization did not conduct an analysis of potential overlap or duplication of capabilities and agreed that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces capabilities could exist. Assessing workforce needs and the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication may exist among Specialized Forces would help ensure that the agency effectively allocates resources and uses them efficiently.


The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate trade with foreign nations and levy tariffs. Since 1922, U.S. law and foreign policy have favored applying tariffs and duties equally to all trading partners. This principle, known as most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, has been central to the rules-based global trading system since 1947. One of the most frequently invoked exceptions to MFN treatment are three "trade remedy" laws. These laws are enforced primarily through administrative investigations of two U.S. government agencies: the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Trade remedy laws enable the United States to impose additional duties aimed at specific producers or countries to remedy unfair trade practices and to help domestic industries adjust to sudden surges of fairly traded goods. The three types of laws traditionally classified as "trade remedies" are: Antidumping (AD) laws provide relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by imported goods sold in the U.S. market at prices that are shown to be less than fair market value. The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the dumped imports based upon calculations made by the ITA. Antidumping orders are the most frequently used and the most controversial trade remedy. Countervailing duty (CVD) laws give a similar kind of relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by imported goods that have been found to have received WTO-inconsistent government subsidies, and can therefore be sold at lower prices than similar goods produced in the United States. The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the subsidized imports. Safeguard (also referred to as escape clause) laws give domestic industries relief from surges of imported goods that are fairly traded if serious injury is found or is threatened to the domestic industry. The most frequently applied safeguard law, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, is designed to give domestic industry the opportunity to adjust to the new competition and remain competitive. The relief provided is generally an additional temporary import duty, a temporary import quota, or a combination of both. Safeguard laws also require presidential action in order for relief to be put into effect. Economists have generally seen antidumping laws and policies as economically inefficient. Some, however, have acknowledged the role that these economically inefficient policies have played in making trade liberalization more politically feasible by providing protection for industries that might otherwise oppose such measures. In recent years, U.S. exports have increasingly become a target of AD measures by several major emerging economies, including India and China. Antidumping laws and policies have also been at the center of dozens of trade disputes between the United States and its trading partners in the WTO. Reports issued by the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) on the subject have been one of the primary targets of the U.S. Trade Representative's criticisms of the AB mechanism in the broader WTO dispute settlement system. If Congress wishes to maintain a functional dispute settlement system at the WTO it may consider either directing the President to seek amendments to underlying WTO agreements such that U.S. practices are internationally compliant or direct the ITA to bring its AD policies into conformity with the AB's interpretation of the WTO's Antidumping Agreement.


The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) collects livestock and meat price data and related market information from meat packers under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. Â§1621 et seq. ). This information was collected on a voluntary basis until 2001, when most of it became mandatory. As the livestock industry became increasingly concentrated in the 1990s, fewer animals were sold through negotiated (cash or "spot") purchases and with increasing frequency were sold under alternative marketing arrangements that were not publicly disclosed under voluntary reporting. Some livestock producers, believing such arrangements made it difficult to impossible for them to assess "fair" market prices for livestock going to slaughter, called for livestock mandatory reporting (LMR) for packers who purchase livestock, process them, and market the meat. In response, Congress passed the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-78 ) that mandated price reporting for cattle, boxed beef, and swine and allowed USDA to establish mandatory price reporting for lamb purchases. USDA issued a final rule that included lamb reporting in December 2000 and took effect in April 2001. Since then, the law has been amended to include more detail on swine reporting and has added wholesale pork as a covered product. The act has been reauthorized four times, and most recently the Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-54 ) reauthorized LMR through September 30, 2020. In addition to extending LMR, the enacted legislation established the "negotiated formula purchase" category for swine and added additional swine reporting requirements (e.g., net prices and head counts by type of swine). The act also amended reporting volume thresholds for lamb importers and lamb packers. The reauthorization required USDA to conduct a study that analyzed current marketing practices, identified livestock industry stakeholder concerns, and solicited stakeholder legislative and regulatory recommendations for LMR. AMS submitted this report to Congress in April 2018. The LMR study found that the meatpacking industry has become more concentrated and vertically integrated since LMR was established. It also found that the industry is responding to domestic and global consumer meat demand with product differentiation and a mix of new products that did not exist when LMR began. And it concluded that the types of transactions for livestock and meat have significantly changed as negotiated trades decrease and are replaced by formula pricing, forward contracts, and other arrangements. AMS held several meetings with cattle, swine, and lamb industry stakeholders to gather feedback on the LMR program in 2016 and 2017. Stakeholders represented at the meetings included industry associations, farm groups, meat processors, and food companies. Since then, AMS has implemented reporting changes that address several concerns raised by stakeholders. A common concern among stakeholders is the low volume of negotiated purchases and a parallel trend toward increased formula purchases or other marketing arrangements. Other concerns are about confidentiality and a lack of clarity on how transactions are categorized in reports, with some stakeholders advocating for the inclusion of more details about transactions, such as premium levelsâespecially as the market changesâand reporting on the number of livestock committed to packers. Swine and lamb stakeholders have provided specific legislative recommendations to be considered during possible reauthorization of the act in the 116 th Congress. Swine stakeholders have recommended eliminating the "negotiated formula purchase" transaction and the reporting of wholesale pork prices based on shipment to Omaha, Nebraska, because these reporting requirements are rarely used in the swine industry today. They also recommended expanding definitions and reporting on certain swine attributes. Lamb stakeholders have recommended setting a lower threshold for the number of lambs processed by a packer to be covered by LMR and requiring custom slaughtered lambs and the number of lambs committed to packers to be reported.


As the leasing agent for the federal government, GSA acquires space for federal agencies and currently manages over 8,000 leases. To help negotiate leases, GSA contracts with commercial real-estate brokerage firms. In previous reviews, GAO reported that GSA was unable to demonstrate cost savings and results from its use of brokers, and GAO made related recommendations. A statute included a provision for GAO to review GSA's broker program. This report examines: (1) how GSA's broker program has changed over time and (2) GSA's goals for the broker program and how GSA measures the program's results. GAO reviewed documentation from GSA's broker program and GSA's available data on leases assigned to brokers from October 2005 to July 2019. GAO interviewed officials from GSA headquarters, selected GSA regional offices that work with brokers, as well as other stakeholders, including representatives from the six brokers currently participating in the program. The General Services Administration (GSA) contracts with commercial real estate brokers to perform a variety of services needed to acquire and complete leases. GSA uses brokers to negotiate leases meeting certain thresholds in urban areas (see figure). GSA has made several changes to its broker program since 2015, including: changing how brokers can be assigned to leases, i.e., using brokers for specific geographical zones rather than on a nationwide basis; allowing greater flexibility in when and how brokers can be used during the leasing process; and changing the name from the National Broker Contract program to the GSA Leasing Support Services program. Statistics for General Services Administration's (GSA) Leases That Involve Brokers Compared For the broker program, GSA's goals include saving money and supplementing its leasing workforce; however, potentially inaccurate data and limited outcome-based metrics could affect GSA's ability to assess whether it is meeting these goals. According to GSA, in the last 3 years, brokers have negotiated 303 leases, 60 percent of which were below the market rate (17.8 percent below the market rate, on average), an outcome that, GSA says helped it avoid $676 million in costs. However, selected GSA regional officials and brokers expressed concerns about the accuracy of the market reports used to calculate these cost savings. Additionally, while GSA has identified various outcome-based metrics related to its leasing program, these metrics do not indicate whether using brokers to supplement its leasing workforce has enabled GSA to complete leasing work it would have otherwise been unable to complete. For example, GSA sets targets for and tracks the number of leases assigned to brokers each year, but this measure is not an indicator of the effectiveness of using brokers. Quality information, along with additional reliable outcome-based measures, is important for GSA to define success for its 2020 broker program which creates new contracts and expands services performed by brokers.


The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Development agency (RD) administers programs to support rural infrastructure and economic development. This includes programs focused on rural housing, rural business development, rural water and energy infrastructure, and, more recently, rural broadband deployment. Congress considers reauthorizing these programs in periodic omnibus farm bills. In December 2018, President Trump signed the 2018 farm bill (Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334 ) into law. This legislation reauthorizes and amends RD programs, establishes new rural development programs and initiatives, and repeals other programs. Economic trends and social issues prevalent in rural America during the drafting of a farm bill typically influence the law's rural development provisions. Issues that influenced the rural development provisions of the 2018 farm bill include: rural population decline; the changing nature of rural employment, especially the decline in agriculture and manufacturing employment; rural health challenges, including an increasing number of rural hospital closures and increasing rates of drug overdose deaths related to opioids; aging rural infrastructure and a lack of access to broadband internet in rural areas; and a shift among some scholars and policymakers toward regional approaches to rural economic development. The 2018 farm bill establishes new rural development programs and initiatives. Among the new provisions, the law directs USDA to temporarily prioritize funding under certain rural development programs for projects that address substance use disorder. It also authorizes USDA to make similar temporary prioritizations in the future, to respond to public health disruptions in rural areas. P.L. 115-334 also establishes a new rural broadband program to finance middle mile infrastructure âinfrastructure that connects a local network to the internet backbone. The law also authorizes a new grant program to support high-wage jobs and new businesses in rural areas. P.L. 115-334 directs USDA to establish Tribal Promise Zones, which are to receive priority consideration for certain federal grant programs. Other new rural development provisions relate to broadband deployment, precision agriculture, and rural community development. P.L. 115-334 reauthorizes and amends a number of existing rural development programs. It adds a grant component to the Rural Broadband Access Loan Program and increases the authorization of appropriations from $25 million to $350 million per year for FY2019-FY2023. To be eligible for newly authorized grants, at least 90% of households in a service area must lack access to sufficient broadband service. The law also amends eligibility criteria for program loans, raising the percentage of households in an eligible service area that must lack access to sufficient broadband service from 15% to 50% of households. P.L. 115-334 codifies the Community Connect Grant Program and authorizes appropriations of $50 million per year for FY2019-FY2023. It also increases the authorizations of appropriations for the Emergency and Imminent Community Water Assistance Program, the Rural Decentralized Water Systems Program (formerly the Household Well Water Systems Program), and water and wastewater technical assistance and training programs. The law also amends the Cushion of Credit Program to terminate deposit authority and incrementally reduce the interest rate that accrues to borrowers. P.L. 115-334 amends certain definitions of rural used to determine eligibility for RD programs. It amends the definition of rural for certain housing and broadband programs to exclude incarcerated populations and the first 1,500 people residing on a military base. It also increases to 50,000 the maximum population of communities eligible for guaranteed loans under the Community Facilities and Water and Waste Disposal programs. The law reestablishes the position of Under Secretary of Agriculture for Rural Development as a permanent position within USDA, subject to Senate confirmation. USDA had eliminated the position in 2017 and replaced it with the Assistant to the Secretary for Rural Development, a position that did not require Senate confirmation. The 2018 farm bill also repeals the Rural Telephone Bank and grants to rural broadcasting systems, among other programs.


The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) consumes more energy than any other federal agencyâ77% of the entire federal government's energy consumption. Energy management is integral to DOD operations. From running bases and training facilities to powering jets and ships, DOD relies on energy to maintain readiness and resiliency for mission operations. Energy efficiencyâproviding the same or an improved level of service with less energyâover time can reduce agency expenses, particularly at an agency like DOD, where energy represents roughly 2% of the department's annual budget. Since the 1970s, Congress mandated energy requirements for federal agencies. Legislation required reductions in fossil fuel consumption and increases in renewable energy use and efficiency targets for government fleets and buildings. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA, P.L. 95-619 ) requires federal agencies to report annually on energy management activities. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05, P.L. 109-58 ) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ) amended and addressed additional energy management targets for the federal government. As the largest energy consumer in the federal government, DOD drives total federal energy management goal achievements. The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has included provisions related to DOD energy management and authorities. With one exception, the NDAA for FY2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ), each NDAA since 1993 contains a section on "authorized energy conservation projects." Further, NDAAs have contributed to internal DOD energy management protocol. Throughout several administrations, Presidents have issued executive orders to establish energy management guidelines and targets for the federal government. The Trump Administration's Executive Order 13834, "Efficient Federal Operations" (E.O. 13834), directs the heads of agencies to maintain annual energy reductions and efficiency measures that reduce costs and meet statutory requirements for renewables, among other things, but does not set specific targets. DOD categorizes energy into two typesâ installation energy and operational energy . DOD's installation energy (i.e., energy for fixed installations and non-tactical vehicles) is subject to federal energy management requirements. Although DOD energy use has trended downward since the 1970s, DOD has not met all federally mandated targets and reporting on progress has been challenging. DOD's operational energy (e.g., energy required for sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations) is not subject to federal energy management requirements. This represents around 70% of total DOD energy use. Operational energy consists largely of petroleum products purchased on the open market by the Defense Logistics Agency. This leaves DOD and its spending susceptible to oil price volatility. Reviewing how these federal energy management goals impact DOD's mission could be an overarching consideration for Congress. Making operational equipment more fuel efficient could increase range and decrease refueling convoys; however, the challenge is maintaining combat readiness and mission operations. Congress may consider legislation addressing operational energy, such as setting a standard fuel efficiency target or a requirement for alternative fuel use. Congress may also consider continuing to leave operational energy efficiency goals to be determined by DOD or each military branch. In many cases, federal energy management goals in statute or executive order established targets for FY2015 (e.g., EISA petroleum and alternative fuel consumption targets were due no later than October 1, 2015). Several agencies, including DOD, did not reach the targeted goals. Congress may assess how and whether setting specific targets enhances the agency's mission and reduces costs for DOD. This approach may include addressing target dates or baselines. Congress may consider removing statutory targets altogether, and direct heads of federal agencies to establish protocols that foster efficiency and cost reductions that serve the mission of the agency. Managing an organization as large and complex as DOD presents certain challenges. One of the challenges DOD faces in meeting these targets is implementing appropriate financing mechanisms. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92, P.L. 102-486 ) amended NECPA and authorized alternative financing methods for federal energy projects, including energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) and utility energy service contracts (UESCs). ESPCs have become a preferred means of making energy efficiency improvements because, in part, funds do not have to be directly appropriated (or programmed). With $2.9 billion awarded in FY2017, these contracts can assist with increasing efficiency and meeting renewable energy management goals. Training and guidance for utilizing ESPCs and UESCs is provided to all federal agencies through the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). However, challenges remain, particularly in data collection and consistent measurements. One option may be to increase training and awareness of UESCs and ESPCs.


The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent federal agency charged with helping improve the administration of federal elections. It was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252 ; 116 Stat. 1666; 52 U.S.C. Â§Â§20901-21145) and includes a four-member commission, a professional staff, an inspector general, and three advisory bodies. The EACâand the legislation that created itâmarked a shift in the federal approach to election administration. Congress had set requirements for the conduct of elections before HAVA, but HAVA was the first federal election administration legislation also to back its requirements with substantial federal support. In addition to setting new types of requirements, it provided federal funding to help states meet those requirements and facilitate other improvements to election administration and created a dedicated federal agencyâthe EACâto manage election administration funding and collect and share election administration information. There was broad support in Congress during the HAVA debate for the idea of providing some assistance along these lines. Both at the time and since, however, opinions have differed about exactly what kind of assistance to provide and for how long. Members have disagreed about whether the EAC should be temporary or permanent, for example, and about whatâif anyâregulatory authority it should have. Changes in the election administration landscape and in Congress have brought different aspects of the debate to the forefront at various times. The 112 th Congress saw the start of legislative efforts in the House to limit or eliminate the EAC, for example, while the agency's participation in the federal response to attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections has been cited as new grounds to extend or expand it. These shifts have been reflected in some cases in legislative activity related to the agency. For example, bills have been introduced to grant the EAC additional authority as well as to eliminate it. Other legislative proposals would leave the fundamental role of the EAC largely as it is but add new versions of its existing responsibilities or change the way it performs those responsibilities. Such proposals would direct the EAC to administer new types of grants, for example, or add new members to its advisory bodies.


The U.S. Navy requested over $40 billion each of the last 3 years to build, operate, and sustain its fleet. Acquisition decisions made as ships are developed and built can have a long-term effect on sustainment costs and ship quality. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD considers and plans for sustainment when acquiring weapons. Among other objectives, this report assesses the extent to which: (1) Navy ship programs deliver ships to the fleet that can be sustained as planned; (2) the Navy develops and uses effective sustainment requirements during acquisition; (3) ship programs are effectively identifying and evaluating sustainment risks in planning documents; and (4) leadership considers programs' sustainment planning and outcomes. GAO reviewed DOD and Navy acquisition policy and guidance, evaluated acquisition plans, collected sustainment metrics, and conducted interviews with more than 100 organizations, including program office and fleet units. GAO assessed 11 classes of shipbuilding programs (all nine that delivered warships during the last 10 years, as well as two newer classes of ships). The Navy has delivered warships—such as aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines—to its fleet over the past 10 years that require more effort to sustain than initially planned. In assessing how these classes of ships are sustained, GAO found 150 examples of class-wide problems, such as unreliable ship systems. These problems stemmed from shipbuilding programs not identifying, evaluating, or mitigating sustainment risks during the acquisition process. GAO found that it would cost the Navy $4.2 billion to correct just the 30 percent of these problems for which the Navy had data on estimated repair costs. GAO found that shipbuilding programs' requirements for sustainment reflect weaknesses with how Department of Defense (DOD) policy defines these requirements for ships. Sustainment requirements should influence acquisition decisions that determine the sustainability of a ship class, such as the ship's design. However, the Navy's sustainment requirements do not provide key information on how reliable and maintainable mission-critical systems should be and, therefore, cannot adequately inform acquisition decisions. GAO also found that shipbuilding programs did not consistently address sustainment risks in acquisition planning documents. For example, the operating and support costs included in cost estimates did not capture all sustainment risks that could affect costs or evaluate sensitivity to changing sustainment assumptions, contrary to DOD and Navy cost estimating guidance. As a result, for six shipbuilding programs whose costs GAO could assess, the Navy had underestimated sustainment costs by $130 billion, as shown below. The Navy has begun making some changes to its acquisition oversight process, such as developing sustainment program baselines and adding a sustainment oversight review. While positive, these changes focus on considering sustainment after key decisions are made early in the acquisition process. GAO also found that DOD is not required to provide detailed information about shipbuilding programs' sustainment cost growth to Congress. As such, Congress does not have full insight into the extent of shipbuilding programs' cost growth and why such growth occurred.


The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including direct disaster loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion; and contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting. Congressional interest in these programs has always been high, primarily because small businesses are viewed as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs, but it has become especially acute in the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic's widespread adverse economic impact on the national economy, including productivity losses, supply chain disruptions, major labor dislocation, and significant financial pressure on both businesses and households. This report provides a brief description of the SBA's programs, examines congressional action to assist small businesses during and immediately following the Great Recession (2007-2009), and discusses legislation to assist small businesses adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, including P.L. 116-123 , the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, which provided the SBA an additional $20 million for SBA disaster assistance administrative expenses and deemed the coronavirus to be a disaster under the SBA's Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. This change made economic injury from the coronavirus an eligible EIDL expense. P.L. 116-136 , the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), which, among other provisions, created the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to provide "covered loans" with a 100% SBA loan guarantee, a maximum term of 10 years, and an interest rate not to exceed 4% to assist small businesses, small 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, and small 501(c)(19) veterans organizations that have been adversely affected by COVID-19. The act also provides for loan deferment and forgiveness under specified conditions. A c overed loan is defined as a loan made to an eligible recipient from February 15, 2020, through June 30, 2020. The SBA announced that PPP loans will have a two-year term at an interest rate of 1.0%. P.L. 116-139 , the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (Enhancement Act), among other provisions, appropriates an additional $321.335 billion for the PPP. H.R. 6800 , the Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (HEROES Act), among other provisions, would expand PPP eligibility and provide small businesses additional flexibility by extending the PPP loan forgiveness covered period from eight weeks to the earlier of 24 weeks or December 31, 2020 . Some of the CARES Act's provisions (e.g., fee waivers, increased loan limits, and increased guarantee percentages) were used in legislation passed during the 111 th Congress to address the severe economic slowdown during and immediately following the Great Recession (2007-2009). The main difference between that legislation and the CARES Act is that the CARES Act includes loan deferrals, loan forgiveness, and greatly expanded eligibility, including, for the first time, specified types of nonprofit organizations. The SBA started accepting PPP loan applications on April 3, 2020. Because the SBA neared its $349 billion authorization limit for section 7(a) lending, which includes the PPP, the SBA stopped accepting new PPP loan applications on April 15. The SBA started accepting PPP loan applications once again on April 27, following the Enhancement Act's enactment on April 24, 2020. The act increased the SBA's section 7(a) loan authorization limit from $349 billion to $659 billion, and appropriated an additional $321.335 billion to support that level of lending. One lesson learned from the actions taken during the 111 th Congress to assist small businesses during and immediately following the Great Recession is the potential benefits that can be derived from providing additional funding for the SBA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO and the SBA's OIG can provide Congress information that could prove useful as Congress engages in congressional oversight of the SBA's administration of legislation to address COVID-19's adverse economic impact on small businesses, provide an early warning if unforeseen administrative problems should arise, and, through investigations and audits, serve as a deterrent to fraud. Requiring the SBA to report regularly on its implementation of the CARES Act could promote transparency and assist Congress in performing its oversight responsibilities. In addition, requiring both output and outcome performance measures and requiring the SBA to report this information to Congress and the public by posting that information on the SBA's website could enhance congressional oversight and public confidence in the SBA's efforts to assist small businesses.


The U.S. aircraft registry, managed by FAA, maintains information on approximately 300,000 civil aircraft. FAA issues aircraft registration to individuals and entities that meet eligibility requirements, such as U.S. citizenship or permanent legal residence. Registry fraud and abuse hinders the ability of law-enforcement and safety officials to use the registry to identify aircraft and their owners who might be involved in illicit or unsafe operations. GAO was asked to examine registry fraud and abuse. This report assesses FAA's actions to (1) prevent, (2) detect, and (3) respond to fraud and abuse risks in aircraft registrations. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and FAA policies; reviewed reports, DOJ press releases, and court cases that illustrated risks associated with the registry; analyzed aircraft registry data from fiscal year 2010 through 2018 to identify registrations with risk indicators; and interviewed FAA registry, legal, law-enforcement liaison, and safety officials, as well as officials from DOJ and DHS. To register civil aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) generally relies on self-certification of registrants' eligibility and does not verify key information. According to GAO's review of the registry process, there are risks associated with FAA not verifying applicant identity, ownership, and address information. The registry is further vulnerable to fraud and abuse when applicants register aircraft using opaque ownership structures that afford limited transparency into who is the actual beneficial owner (i.e., the person who ultimately owns and controls the aircraft). Such structures can be used to own aircraft associated with money laundering or other illegal activities (see example in figure). FAA has not conducted a risk assessment that would inform its eligibility review and collection of information to manage risks. Without a risk assessment, FAA is limited in its ability to prevent fraud and abuse in aircraft registrations, which enable aircraft-related criminal, national security, or safety risks. FAA makes some use of registry information to detect risks of fraud and abuse, but the format of the data limits its usefulness. Specifically, most data on individuals and entities with potentially significant responsibilities for aircraft ownership, such as trustors and beneficiaries, are stored in files that cannot be readily analyzed due to system limitations. As FAA modernizes its information-technology systems, it has an opportunity to develop data analytics capabilities to detect indicators of fraud and abuse in the registry. FAA takes administrative actions, such as registration revocations, to respond to registration violations and coordinates with law-enforcement agencies on investigations and enforcement actions such as aircraft seizures. Since 2017, FAA has coordinated with the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) as part of an Aircraft Registry Task Force to address aircraft registry vulnerabilities. However, this coordination is informal, and other mechanisms for joint enforcement actions, sharing of information, and use of liaison positions are not in place,


The U.S. compacts of free association permit eligible citizens from the freely associated states (FAS), including Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, to migrate to the United States and its territories without visa and labor certification requirements. In fiscal year 2004, Congress authorized and appropriated $30 million annually for 20 years to help defray costs associated with compact migration in affected jurisdictions, particularly Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI. This funding ends in 2023, though migration to U.S. areas is permitted to continue and is expected to grow. GAO was asked to review topics related to compact migration. This report describes (1) estimated compact migrant populations and recent trends in compact migration; (2) reported costs related to compact migration in Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI; and (3) effects of compact migration on governments, workforces, and societies in these and other U.S. areas. GAO reviewed Census Bureau data to determine the numbers of compact migrants in U.S. areas. In addition, GAO interviewed federal, state, and territory government officials; representatives of private sector and nonprofit groups employing or serving compact migrants; FAS embassy and consular officials; and members of compact migrant communities. In commenting on a draft of this report, U.S. area governments and FAS Ambassadors to the United States identified areas for additional study related to compact migration and impact. Some also discussed policy considerations, including restoration of Medicaid benefits to compact migrants. More than 94,000 compact migrants—that is, citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (Micronesia), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Marshall Islands), and the Republic of Palau (Palau) as well as their U.S.-born children and grandchildren younger than 18 years—live and work in the United States and its territories, according to Census Bureau data. Data from Census Bureau surveys covering the periods 2005-2009 and 2013-2017 and an enumeration in 2018 show that the combined compact migrant populations in U.S. areas grew by an estimated 68 percent, from about 56,000 to about 94,000. Historically, many compact migrants have lived in Hawaii, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). From 2013 to 2018, an estimated 50 percent of compact migrants lived on the U.S. mainland. Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI track and report the financial costs related to compact migration, or compact impact, for their state or territory. These areas reported estimated costs totaling $3.2 billion during the period fiscal years 2004 through 2018. In fiscal years 2004 through 2019, Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI received a combined total of approximately $509 million in federal grants to help defray the costs of providing services to compact migrants. In the U.S. areas GAO visited—Arkansas, the CNMI, Guam, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington—state and territorial officials identified effects of providing public education and health care services to compact migrants. Some area governments use a combination of federal and state or territorial funds to extend health care coverage to compact migrants. For example, some states help compact migrants pay for coverage through health insurance exchanges, created under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, by covering the cost of premiums not covered by advanced premium tax credits available to eligible compact migrants. Effects of compact migration in these U.S. areas also include compact migrants' budgetary contributions through payment of taxes and fees as well as their workforce contributions—for example, through jobs in hotels, manufacturing, the U.S. military, poultry processing, caregiving, and government.


The U.S. government has funded education assistance to Palestinians. The State Department oversees U.S. contributions to UNRWA, and USAID provides assistance to Palestinian Authority schools. UNRWA generally administers schools for Palestine refugees. The Palestinian Authority generally administers schools for non-refugee Palestinians who live in the WBG. During the 2016-2017 school year, it issued new pilot textbooks for grades 1 through 4 for use in both its and UNRWA's schools. GAO was asked to review issues related to U.S. education assistance to the WBG. This report examines (1) the funding the U.S. government provided for education assistance to the WBG for fiscal years 2015 through 2017, (2) how UNRWA and State have identified and addressed potentially problematic content in textbooks, and (3) whether State has submitted required annual reports to Congress including information on educational materials used in UNRWA schools. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S. government, UNRWA, and Palestinian Authority officials. For this report, GAO refers to potentially problematic content as that which State defined as inappropriate and that UNRWA defined as not aligned with UN values. The U.S. government funded an estimated $243 million for education assistance in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) for fiscal years 2015 through 2017, including an estimated $193 million from the Department of State (State) and about $50 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Of State's contribution of approximately $193 million, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) estimated that about $187 million was provided for its education assistance. State provided the remaining approximately $6 million for non-UNRWA education projects. UNRWA purchased English language textbooks used in UNRWA schools with funds that consist of contributions from donor countries, including the United States. The U.S. government and UNRWA did not fund textbooks published by the Palestinian Authority because the Palestinian Authority provided these textbooks free of charge, according to agency officials. UNRWA and State have taken steps to identify and address potentially problematic content of textbooks used in UNRWA schools, such as maps that exclude Israel. UNRWA reviewed textbooks, including English language textbooks, and took actions to address content it deemed as not aligned with UN values. For example, UNRWA created complementary teaching materials, such as alternate photos, examples, and guidance for teachers to use with the textbooks in UNRWA schools. However, due to financial shortfalls and other constraints, UNRWA officials told GAO that UNRWA did not train teachers or distribute the complementary teaching materials to classrooms. As a result, these materials were not used in UNRWA classrooms. To address textbook content deemed problematic, State examined nongovernmental organizations' studies, encouraged Palestinian Authority officials to address the issue, and monitored UNRWA's efforts. The annual appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 through 2017 require State to report to Congress on several topics, including steps UNRWA has taken to ensure that the content of all educational materials taught in UNRWA schools is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance, and do not induce incitement. Although State submitted its required reports to Congress on time, State included inaccurate information in the 2017 report and omitted potentially useful information in all three reports. In its 2017 report, State noted incorrectly that UNRWA had completed training teachers and distributed complementary teaching materials to address textbook content that UNRWA deemed as not complying with UN values. In all three of the reports, State omitted information concerning whether UNRWA found that any educational materials used in its schools do not comply with two of four elements, dignity and not inducing incitement. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives and communicate it in a way that is useful to users. Without a fuller explanation, Congress may not have the information it needs to oversee efforts to identify and address potentially problematic textbook content.


The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the criminal organizations that traffic them, as significant threats to the United States. In 2017, over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. DOD and DHS created joint task forces to help facilitate and strengthen interagency efforts in combating the flow of illicit drugs, particularly in the maritime domain. GAO was asked to review the structure of these task forces and their ability to coordinate and conduct missions effectively. Among other objectives, this report (1) assesses the extent to which the task forces coordinate effectively to minimize duplication, and (2) examines how the task forces measure the effectiveness of their missions and activities. GAO reviewed and assessed documentation on the task forces' missions, coordination efforts, and performance assessments and compared them to best practices from prior work, departmental guidance, and federal internal control standards. GAO also met with task force officials to discuss and observe planning and coordination activities. Many federal agencies are involved in efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs into the United States. Among them are the Department of Defense (DOD), which has lead responsibility for detecting and monitoring illicit drug trafficking into the country, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for securing U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity. DOD and DHS lead and operate task forces—Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and three DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF)—to coordinate and conduct counterdrug missions and activities. Task force officials reported that the task forces coordinated effectively with each other when they had shared purposes and overlapping or shared geographical boundaries (see map). The task forces also used coordination mechanisms that align with best practices, such as working groups and liaison officers, to minimize duplication of their missions and activities. Note: DHS also has JTF-Investigations, which is a functional task force with no geographic area of responsibility. Each of the five task forces GAO reviewed has performance measures, but only JIATF-South uses output (e.g., number of detected smuggling events) and outcome-based measures to assess the effectiveness of its activities. Specifically, JIATF-South developed an outcome-based measure of its overall effectiveness: the percentage of smuggling events it detected and provided to law enforcement that resulted in disrupted or seized illicit drugs. JIATF-West evaluates its numerous initiatives and activities, for instance, by determining if they were executed as planned, but has not established a vital few performance measures that consistently convey the overall effectiveness of its activities. Lastly, the DHS JTFs' performance measures are not outcome-based and do not fully assess the effectiveness of the task forces' activities. Enhancing their measures would better position JIATF-West and the JTFs to demonstrate contributions and convey trends in the overall effectiveness of their activities.


The U.S. government implements an export control system to manage risks associated with exporting sensitive items while facilitating legitimate trade. State currently controls the export of most firearms, artillery, and ammunition. Regulatory changes proposed by State and Commerce would transfer this responsibility for many of these items to Commerce, which implements export controls under different legal and regulatory authorities. The proposed changes are part of a larger export control reform effort since 2010 to transfer control of less sensitive items from State to Commerce. GAO was asked to review the proposed changes to export controls of firearms, artillery, and ammunition. This report assesses (1) the volume and value of commercial export license applications State reviewed for these items in fiscal years 2013-2017, (2) how certain export controls differ between State and Commerce, and (3) what is known about the resource implications for State and Commerce due to the proposed transfer. GAO reviewed the proposed rules and related laws and regulations; analyzed data and documents related to licensing, end-use monitoring, and staff resources; and interviewed agency officials. The Department of State (State) reviewed approximately 69,000 commercial export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition valued at up to $45.4 billion during fiscal years 2013 to 2017. About two-thirds of these applications were for firearms, and the majority involved the export of non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms, which are among the items proposed for transfer from State to Department of Commerce (Commerce) control. GAO identified several differences in Commerce's and State's export controls including those related to registration, licensing, end-use monitoring, and congressional notification that, according to the agencies, would apply to firearms, artillery, and ammunition proposed for transfer. Some of these differences are due to varying requirements in applicable laws and regulations. For example, the law requires manufacturers, exporters, and brokers to register with State for items controlled by State but not for items controlled by Commerce. Additionally, while Commerce and State both screen parties to licenses against relevant watch lists, Commerce officials said they do not have direct access to State's internal watch list, which contains derogatory information from past screening of licenses for firearms, artillery, and ammunition exports. State and Commerce officials stated that, while they have held some discussions, they have not established a process for sharing watch list information. Without access to State's watch list, Commerce may lack critical information to effectively screen parties to exports of firearms and related items. State and Commerce also both have end-use monitoring programs to confirm the legitimacy of end-users but some differences exist. For example, State relies on embassy staff to conduct end-use monitoring whereas Commerce relies primarily on several officers positioned overseas specifically for this purpose. In addition, a statutory requirement to notify Congress of proposed firearms exports over $1 million would no longer apply to firearms that transfer from State to Commerce, according to Commerce officials. According to the proposed rules and agency officials, the proposed transfer, if finalized, would result in a decline in licenses and revenues for State and an increase in licenses for Commerce, but the precise extent of these changes is unknown. State estimates that the transfer would result in a decline in revenue from registration fees but officials stated it is difficult to predict the extent of this decline. Commerce officials stated that they expected their licensing and enforcement workload to increase as a result of the transfer, if finalized, but they believe they have sufficient staff resources available to absorb the increase.


Autonomous vehicles have the potential to bring major improvements in highway safety. Motor vehicle crashes caused an estimated 36,560 fatalities in 2018; a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has shown that 94% of crashes are due to human errors. For this and other reasons, federal oversight of the testing and deployment of autonomous vehicles has been of considerable interest to Congress. In the 115 th Congress, autonomous vehicle legislation passed the House as H.R. 3388 , the SELF DRIVE Act, and a separate bill, S. 1885 , the AV START Act, was reported from a Senate committee. Neither bill was enacted. In the 116 th Congress, interest in autonomous vehicles remains strong, but similar comprehensive legislative proposals have not been introduced. The America's Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019, S. 2302 , which has been reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, would encourage research and development of infrastructure that could accommodate new technologies such as autonomous vehicles. In recent years, private and government testing of autonomous vehicles has increased significantly, although it is likely that widespread use of fully autonomous vehiclesâwhere no driver attention is neededâmay be many years in the future. The pace of autonomous vehicle commercialization may have slowed due to the 2018 death in Arizona of a pedestrian struck by an autonomous vehicle, which highlighted the challenges of duplicating human decisionmaking by artificial intelligence. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the fatality was caused by an "inadequate safety culture" at Uberâwhich was testing the vehicleâand deficiencies in state and federal regulation. The U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA have issued three reports since 2016 that inform the discussion of federal autonomous vehicle policies, suggesting best practices that states should consider in driver regulation; a set of voluntary, publicly available self-assessments by automakers showing how they are building safety into their vehicles; and a proposal to modify the current system of granting exemptions from federal safety standards. On February 6, 2020, NHTSA announced its approval of the first autonomous vehicle exemptionâfrom three federal motor vehicle standardsâto Nuro, a California-based company that plans to deliver packages with a robotic vehicle smaller than a typical car. Proponents of autonomous vehicles contend that lengthy revisions to current safety regulations could impede innovation, as the rules could be obsolete by the time they took effect. Federal and state regulatory agencies are addressing vehicle and motorist standards, while Congress is considering legislative solutions to some of the regulatory challenges. Legislation did not pass the 115 th Congress due to disagreements on several key issues. These included the following: The extent to which Congress should alter the traditional division of vehicle regulation, with the federal government being responsible for vehicle safety and states for driver-related aspects such as licensing and registration, as the roles of driver and vehicle merge. The number of autonomous vehicles that NHTSA should permit to be tested on highways by granting exemptions to federal safety standards, and which specific safety standards, such as those requiring steering wheels and brake pedals, can be relaxed to permit thorough testing. How much detail legislation should contain related to addressing cybersecurity threats, including whether federal standards should require vehicle technology that could report and stop hacking of critical vehicle software and how much information car buyers should be given about these issues. The extent to which vehicle owners, operators, manufacturers, insurers, and other parties have access to data that is generated by autonomous vehicles, and the rights of various parties to sell vehicle-related data to others. Congress may address these issues in legislation reauthorizing surface transportation programs. The current surface transportation authorization expires at the end of FY2020. Policy decisions about the allocation of radio spectrum and road maintenance also may affect the rate at which autonomous vehicle technologies come into use.


The U.S. government provides international food assistance to promote global food security, alleviate hunger, and address food crises among the world's most vulnerable populations. Congress authorizes this assistance through regular agriculture and international affairs legislation, and provides funding through annual appropriations legislation. The primary channel for this assistance is the Food for Peace program (FFP), administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Established in 1954, FFP has historically focused primarily on meeting the emergency food needs of the world's most vulnerable populations; however, it also manages a number of nonemergency programs. These lesser-known programs employ food to foster development aims, such as addressing the root causes of hunger and making communities more resilient to shocks, both natural and human-induced. Nonemergency activities, which in FY2019 are funded at a minimum annual level of $365 million, may include in-kind food distributions, educational nutrition programs, training on agricultural markets and farming best practices, and broader community development initiatives, among others. In building resilience in vulnerable communities, the United States, through FFP, seeks to reduce the need for future emergency assistance. Similar to emergency food assistance, nonemergency programs use U.S. in-kind food aidâcommodities purchased in the United States and shipped overseas. In recent years, it has also turned to market-based approaches, such as procuring food in the country or region in which it will ultimately be delivered (also referred to as local and regional procurement, or LRP) or distributing vouchers and cash for local food purchase. The 115 th Congress enacted both the 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ) and Global Food Security Reauthorization Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-266 ), which authorized all Food for Peace programs through FY2023. In the 116 th Congress, Members may be interested in several policy and structural issues related to nonemergency food assistance as they consider foreign assistance, agriculture, and foreign affairs policies and programs in the course of finalizing annual appropriations legislation. For example, The Trump Administration has repeatedly proposed eliminating funding for the entire FFP program, including both emergency and nonemergency programs, from Agriculture appropriations and instead fund food assistance entirely through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations. The Administration asserts that the proposal is part of an effort to "streamline foreign assistance, prioritize funding, and use funding as effectively and efficiently as possible." To date, Congress has not accepted the Administration's proposal and continued to fund the FFP program in Agriculture appropriations, which is currently authorized through FY2023. USAID's internal reform initiative, referred to as Transformation , calls for the merger of the Office of FFP with the Office U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) into a new entity called the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) by the end of 2020. While the agency has indicated that the new HA will administer nonemergency programming, there are few details on how it will do so. FFP programs fall into two distinct committee jurisdictionsâAgriculture and Foreign Affairs/Relationsâmaking congressional oversight of programs more challenging. No one committee receives a comprehensive view of all FFP programming, and the committees of jurisdiction sometimes have competing priorities. For additional information, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview .


The U.S. government relies on U.S.-flag vessels to transport cargo and provide a pool of U.S.-citizen mariners who could be called upon to support defense needs in times of war or crisis. Through financial support and by requiring government agencies to ship certain cargo on U.S. flag vessels, the United States has supported the viability of the U.S.-flag fleet. However, concern has grown about the fleet's future sustainability. In 2014, Congress mandated that DOT develop national strategies to address this issue. This statement summarizes GAO's August 2018 report on challenges in sustaining the U.S. flag fleet for defense purposes and DOT's efforts to draft a national maritime strategy that addresses these challenges. Specifically, it discusses: (1) the status of the mandated national strategies and (2) challenges that stakeholders identified related to sustaining the U.S.-flag fleet and options DOT has considered for addressing them. For the August 2018 report, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, reports, and studies. GAO also analyzed data on international government cargo and interviewed officials from DOT and DOD, vessel operators, and other stakeholders. For this statement, GAO spoke to DOT officials for an update on the status of the strategy. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is still finalizing the national maritime strategies that were called for in two separate mandates by Congress in 2014. According to DOT officials, DOT has been working on a single draft maritime strategy to meet both mandates. This strategy is intended to address how to make vessels registered to the United States (U.S.-flag vessels) more competitive in the international cargo market. It is also intended to address how to ensure the long-term viability of U.S.-flag vessels and U.S.-citizen mariners. The Department of Defense (DOD) counts on U.S.-citizen mariners that work on U.S.-flag vessels to crew the government-owned reserve fleet during a crisis. In an August 2018 report, GAO concluded that by not completing the strategy or establishing a timeline for completing it, DOT had delayed providing decision-makers the information they needed to address challenges facing the U.S. flag fleet. Subsequently, with the passage of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Congress extended the deadline for the strategy to February 2020. According to DOT officials, DOT will issue the strategy by the new deadline. Stakeholders GAO spoke with for its August 2018 report identified two primary challenges to ensuring that the U.S.-flag fleet would continue to meet DOD's national defense needs: (1) maintaining the financial viability of the U.S.-flag fleet, which is threatened by the increasingly higher costs of operating U.S. vessels compared to foreign flag vessels and a decrease in government cargo being shipped internationally; and (2) a potential shortage of U.S. citizen mariners available to support defense needs, in part due to the declining numbers of U.S.-flag vessels that employ these mariners. For example, the number of U.S. flag vessels involved in international trade declined from 199 vessels at the end of 1990 to just 82 vessels by the end of 2017. DOT officials have identified some options to make U.S.-flag vessels more competitive, increase the amount of commercial cargo on U.S. flag vessels, and address a potential shortage of U.S.-citizen mariners, although they are not ready to assess their feasibility or formally propose these options. To address the challenge of maintaining the financial viability of U.S.-flag vessels, DOT has identified options such as changing regulations to decrease the costs of bringing a ship under the U.S. flag and requiring that certain energy export commodities, such as oil or liquefied natural gas, be carried on U.S.-flag vessels. To address the potential shortage of U.S.-citizen mariners, DOT convened a working group to determine how many mariners would be needed to meet defense needs. The working group estimated a shortage of over 1,800 U.S.-citizen mariners in the event of a sustained military activation, although it also recommended data improvements to increase the accuracy of the count of available mariners. In addition, the working group identified two actions that could help increase the number of U.S.-citizen mariners: (1) developing a reserve program to identify and support qualified mariners willing to sail to support defense needs during an emergency and (2) expanding programs and requirements that support U.S.-citizen mariners, such as requirements that government agencies must ship certain cargo on U.S. flag vessels.


The U.S. government seeks to advance human rights when it provides security assistance to foreign countries. Such assistance includes DOD– and State–supported human rights and international humanitarian law training for foreign security forces. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 consolidated multiple capacity building authorities, now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333. DOD implements most U.S. human rights training for foreign security forces. Congress included a provision in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018 for GAO to review human rights training for foreign security forces. This report, among other objectives, (1) describes the entities through which DOD and State provide such training, (2) assesses the extent to which DOD and State track the provision of and funding for such training, and (3) examines the extent to which DOD and State have evaluated the effectiveness of the training. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, guidance, agency training and funding data, and course catalogs, and interviewed agency officials. Several entities within the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) are involved in human rights training. DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) conducts program management for DOD's efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces. The human rights training required by 10 U.S.C § 333 is provided exclusively by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), a DOD entity. DOD operates a number of other educational entities that provide training to foreign security forces, and many include human rights–related material in their curriculum or through operational exercises. (See figure.) DOD does not systematically track human rights training and, as a result, only limited information is available on the provision of and funding for these activities. Without a process to ensure systematic and accurate tracking of human rights training data, DSCA is limited in its ability to monitor its compliance with the training–related provision of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017. State relies on DOD to track human rights training for military forces and tracks some training and funding data for police. DOD and State have not assessed the effectiveness of human rights training for foreign security forces, according to agency officials. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 required DOD to conduct monitoring and evaluation of its security assistance programs. DOD has taken initial steps to develop monitoring and evaluation policies but officials stated that they have not yet determined when DOD will evaluate human rights training. State officials said they do not know when the agency will begin monitoring and evaluating human rights training provided under the International Military Education and Training program, a large source of funding for such training. Monitoring and evaluation would enable DOD and State to determine the effectiveness of U.S.–provided human rights training for foreign security forces.


The U.S. military and the public depend daily on GPS data. OCX, the ground system that will command and control next generation GPS satellites, is one of several interdependent systems the Air Force is developing to modernize GPS. OCX has been hampered by delays and $2.5 billion in cost growth since the program started in 2012. The Air Force set a new baseline for cost and schedule in 2018 after OCX breached its cost threshold in 2016. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 contained a provision that the Air Force provide quarterly reports to GAO on the next generation GPS acquisition programs, and a provision that GAO brief the defense committees as needed. GAO provided numerous briefings from 2016 through 2018 and issued reports in 2016 and 2017. Continuing this body of work, this report focuses on the extent to which schedule risks may affect OCX delivery, acceptance, and approval for operation. GAO reviewed the Air Force's baseline review results, schedule risks, and progress, and applied selected best practices for cost and schedule management. GAO also reviewed OCX monthly management briefings and quarterly assessments, and interviewed officials from the OCX program office and Raytheon (the prime contractor), among others. The Global Positioning System's (GPS) next generation operational control system's (OCX) program schedule continues to be optimistic and, with significant development remaining, more delays are likely for delivery, acceptance, and operation. See the figure below for previous delays, cost growth, and the current baseline. Completing the full OCX program schedule requires (1) timely delivery by the contractor and acceptance by the Air Force and (2) an efficient completion of a planned 7-month government-run post-acceptance developmental testing. GAO found that there is potential for significant delays on both fronts. While there has been some improvement to the pace of software development, the rollout of the new development methodology has been delayed to a point where most of the contractor's schedule reserve has been used. Assumed improvements in how long it takes to repair software defects has not occurred as planned, placing additional pressure on the contractor's delivery date. Additionally, Air Force officials have acknowledged that the government developmental test period after acceptance could double in duration and delay operations further because of concurrency, test plan uncertainty, and risks of late discovery of problems. With approximately 2 years of work remaining before delivery, there is no plan to have the full schedule independently assessed. For complex programs, such as OCX, best practices state an independent view is necessary and that a periodic schedule assessment should be performed as progress is made and risks change. Such an assessment would help inform congressional and DOD decision makers as they consider what steps may be taken to address delays to the start of OCX operations and ensure the investments in needed new receivers are properly aligned.