The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy is working to rebuild its readiness while also growing and modernizing its aging fleet of ships. A critical component of rebuilding Navy readiness is implementing sustainable operational schedules, which hinge on completing maintenance on time. We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges with completing required maintenance on time. This statement provides information on (1) the magnitude of maintenance delays for Navy ships and submarines, (2) factors contributing to maintenance delays, and (3) the Navy's efforts to address these factors. GAO also discusses its prior recommendations on the factors contributing to Navy maintenance delays and the Navy's progress in addressing the recommendations. This statement is based on previously published work from 2015 through 2019 on Navy maintenance, ship acquisition, crew size, ship maintenance and deployment schedules, the condition of Naval shipyards, and recruiting skilled maintenance personnel. The Navy continues to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that affect the majority of its maintenance efforts and hinder its attempts to restore readiness. From fiscal year 2014 to the end of fiscal year 2019, Navy ships have spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected. The Navy was unable to complete scheduled ship maintenance on time for about 75 percent of the maintenance periods conducted during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, with more than half of the delays in fiscal year 2019 exceeding 90 days. When maintenance is not completed on time, fewer ships are available for training or operations, which can hinder readiness. GAO identified multiple factors that contribute to maintenance delays, including insufficient shipyard capacity, shortage of skilled personnel, and deferred maintenance during operational deployments, among others. Ships awaiting or delayed in maintenance incur operating and support costs. For example, GAO estimated that the Navy spent more than $1.5 billion in support costs from fiscal years 2008 through 2018 due to delayed maintenance for attack submarines. The Navy has several efforts underway to improve its maintenance operations, but they will take years to implement, and will require sustained management attention and funding above current levels. For example, the Navy estimates it will take 20 years to improve the infrastructure at its shipyards, 4 years to restore ship crew levels, and several years to improve maintenance planning. Until the Navy addresses these challenges, it will be hindered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future, particularly as it grows the size of the fleet.


The Administration's FY2020 NDAA request would have authorized $568.1 billion designated as base budget funds to cover the routine, recurring costs to man, train, and operate U.S. forces. The request would have authorized an additional $173.8 billion designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, of which $97.9 billion was requested for base programs. As enacted, the FY2020 NDAA authorizes a total of $729.9 billion for national defense-related activities, which is $12.0 billion (1.6%) less than the Administration requested.


The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), enacted in 1946, is known primarily for its procedural requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Those requirements state that when issuing regulations, agencies must generally give public notice (i.e., issue a proposed rule), hold a public comment period, and publish a final rule. A lesser known provision in the APA is a petition mechanism through which any interested party can request an agency to issue, amend, or repeal a rule (Section 553(e)). Such petitions are sometimes referred to as 553(e) petitions, petitions for rulemaking, petitions for reconsideration, administrative petitions, or citizens' petitions. The APA petition mechanism is a potentially efficient (and arguably underused) means for an individual or stakeholder to call on an agency to take a particular action. Although Section 553(e) is only one sentence in length and provides very little detail, other sections of the APA contain some additional requirements for agencies with regard to receiving, considering, and responding to rulemaking petitions. An agency is not necessarily required to grant the petition or take the requested action, but the APA does require the agency to consider the petition and respond and to do so "within a reasonable time." Notably, however, agencies have a great deal of discretion in determining the specifics of their procedures for receiving, considering, and responding to petitions. In 2014, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) found that "few agencies have in place official procedures for accepting, processing, and responding to petitions for rulemaking" and that "how petitions are received and treated varies acrossâand even withinâagencies." The APA's requirement for a petition mechanism applies to all agencies covered by the APA, which includes executive agencies and independent regulatory agencies. The APA's definition of rule is broad and covers a variety of agency actions, including several types of actions that are not subject to the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Such actions include agency interpretive rules and policy statementsâcategories that are often colloquially referred to as "guidance documents"âand rules of agency organization, procedure, and practice. Thus, the petition mechanism could potentially be used for more than just rules that have undergone, or would be required to undergo, the APA's notice-and-comment procedures. If an agency grants a petition for rulemakingâthus issuing, amending, or repealing a rule per request of the petitionerâany relevant procedural requirements for rulemaking or other type of action would still apply. Furthermore, in taking any action pursuant to a petition, the agency may act only within the delegated authority Congress has provided to it in statute. This report briefly discusses the origin of the APA petition mechanism, outlines the mechanism's requirements for agencies, provides information from various outside sources about what may make an effective petition, discusses potential benefits to agencies and the public, and, finally, identifies some examples of statutory petition mechanisms that Congress created in addition to the APA's.


The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. The FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 116-94 , Division B) includes funding for conservation programs and activities at USDA, among other departments. Agricultural conservation programs include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Most conservation program funding is mandatory and is authorized in omnibus farm bills. Other conservation programsâmostly technical assistanceâare discretionary spending funded through annual appropriations. The FY2020 appropriation includes an increase from FY2019 levels for discretionary conservation programs and generally rejects the Administration's proposed reductions to discretionary and mandatory conservation programs. The largest discretionary conservation program is the Conservation Operations (CO) account, which funds conservation planning and implementation assistance on private agricultural lands across the country. The CO account is administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and funds more than half of the agency's total staff positions. The FY2020 enacted appropriation increases funding for CO by $10.1 million above FY2019 levels to $829.6 million. A decline in funding for CO over time has resulted in declining NRCS staffing levels. Much of the conservation technical assistance provided by NRCS is funded through the Conservation Technical Assistance program within CO. Funds are used to support salaries and expenses for NRCS staff, technology development, conservation system design, compliance reviews, grants to partners for additional technical assistance capacity, and resource assessment reports. Reduced staff could impact NRCS's ability to provide technical assistance and administer farm bill conservation programs to farmers and ranchers. The recently created Farm Production and Conservation (FPAC) Business Center receives $206.5 million in the FY2020 appropriationâ$9.8 million less than in FY2019. The FPAC Business Center is responsible for various administrative services for three USDA agencies, including NRCS. In FY2019, Congress realigned funding from NRCS discretionary and mandatory program accounts and NRCS staff to the Business Center. It is unclear how the transfer of NRCS positions and funding to the FPAC Business Center has impacted the agency's overall operations relative to the decline in CO funding. The FY2020 explanatory statement directs USDA to report to Congress on the efficiencies gained through the Business Center's creation, along with other staffing plans. Other discretionary spending is primarily for watershed programs. The largestâWatershed and Flood Prevention Operations (WFPO)âis funded at $175 million in FY2020. This is an increase in WFPO funding from FY2019 levels of $150 million. The FY2020 appropriation also funds other discretionary water-related programs, such as the Watershed Rehabilitation Program ($10 million), Water Bank program ($4 million), and wetland mitigation banking ($5 million). Most mandatory conservation programs are authorized in omnibus farm bills and do not require an annual appropriation. However, previous Congresses have reduced mandatory conservation program funding through Changes in Mandatory Program Spending (CHIMPS) in the annual agricultural appropriations law every year between FY2003 and FY2018. The Trump Administration requested CHIMPS to two mandatory conservation programs for FY2020, but neither of these proposed reductions to mandatory conservation programs is included in the enacted FY2020 appropriation. Agriculture appropriations bills may also include policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out the appropriations. In the FY2020 appropriations act, these range from waiving specific programmatic requirements to requiring reports to Congress.


The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the U.S. Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) andâin even-numbered fiscal yearsâthe Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food assistance and trade; farm assistance loans and salaries; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and technical assistance for conservation programs. Congress passed and the President signed a full-year FY2020 appropriation on December 20, 2019âthe Further Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 116-94 , Committee Print 38-679 )âthat included Agriculture appropriations in Division B. The discretionary total of the FY2020 Agriculture appropriations act is $23.5 billion. This is $183 million more than the comparable amount for FY2019 (+0.8%) that includes the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The appropriation also carries about $129 billion of mandatory spending that is largely determined in authorizing laws. Thus, the overall total of the agriculture portion is $153 billion. In addition to these amounts, the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act includes budget authority that is designated as emergency spending and does not count against discretionary spending caps. These include $535 million to FDA for Ebola prevention and treatment, and $1.5 billion to USDA for the Wildfires and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP). The latter amount was offset by a $1.5 billion rescission of unobligated WHIP funding from a prior appropriation and emergency designation. The primary components of the $183 million overall increase in the regular appropriation from FY2019 include increases to foreign agricultural assistance (+$235 million), rural development (+$229 million), rural broadband (+$175 million, separate from the rural development increase), agricultural research salaries and grants (+$167 million), FDA (+$91 million), departmental administration (+$82 million), Farm Service Agency (+$47 million), CFTC (+$47 million), the Natural Resources Conservation Service (+$35 million), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (+$32 million) and the Agricultural Marketing Service (+$28 million), and miscellaneous appropriations (+$63 million). Most of these increases are offset by decreases such as for construction for agricultural research facilities (-$189 million), Food and Nutrition Service discretionary appropriations (-$54 million), increasing a rescission of carryover balances in WIC (-$500 million), and not renewing temporary appropriations for Food for Peace and rural water and waste disposal grants (-$291 million). The Trump Administration had requested $19.2 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations subcommittees. The request would have been a reduction of $4.1 billion from FY2019 (-18%). Policy provisions are also included that affect how the appropriation is delivered. This year, these provisions include issues such as the relocation of USDA agencies, disaster programs, rural definitions, livestock regulations, nutrition programs, and dietary guidelines. Budget sequestration continues to affect mandatory agricultural spending accounts. Sequestration refers to automatic across-the-board reductions in spending authority. In FY2020, sequestration on mandatory spending accounts is 5.9% and totals about $1.4 billion for agriculture accounts. Recent budget acts have extended sequestration through FY2029.


A growing number of reported Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases have been identified in the United States, significantly impacting many communities. This situation is evolving rapidly, and the economic impact has been large due to illnesses, quarantines, social distancing, local stay-at-home orders, and other business disruptions. Consequently, many Americans will lose income and face financial hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many consumers may have trouble paying their loan obligations, such as mortgages, student loans, auto loans, and credit cards. Due to increasing hardship, l oan forbearance has become a common form of consumer relief during the COVID-19 pandemic. Loan forbearance plans are agreements that allow borrowers to reduce or suspend payments for a short period of time, providing extended time for consumers to become current on their payments and repay the amounts owed. These plans do not forgive unpaid loan payments and tend to be appropriate for borrowers experiencing temporary hardship. Loan forbearance may become a less viable option to deal with the financial ramifications of COVID-19 if the pandemic causes prolonged disruptions, such as persistent elevated levels of unemployment or permanent business closures. A consumer's ability to get a forbearance and under what terms may be significantly influenced by what type of institution owns the loan. These various institutionsâincluding banks and credit unions, private nonbank financial institutions, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and the federal governmentâare subject to different laws, regulations, and business considerations. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the President signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136 ) on March 27, 2020. The act establishes consumer rights to be granted forbearance for federally insured mortgages (Section 4022) and federal student loans (Section 3513). The law also protects the credit histories of consumers with forbearance agreements (Section 4021). The CARES Act establishes consumer rights to be granted forbearance for many types of mortgages and federal student loans, but the act does not grant consumers these rights for other types of consumer loan obligations, such as auto loans, credit cards, private student loans, and bank-owned mortgages. In these cases, financial institutions have discretion about when and how to offer loan forbearance or other relief options to consumers. Therefore, a consumer's ability to access these options may vary. In addition to legislative responses, financial regulatory agencies have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic using existing authorities to encourage loan forbearance and other financial relief options for impacted consumers. Many financial regulatory agencies have updated their guidance to help financial firms support consumer needs during this time. Regulatory guidance does not force financial institutions to take any particular action for consumers (such as offering loan forbearance), but it can encourage them to offer various forms of support. In recent weeks, many banks and credit unions have announced measures to offer various forms of assistance to affected consumers . The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic impact the financial system in important ways. Large numbers of missed consumer loan payments can have significant negative consequences for financial institutions. Because of the potential strain on the financial system, it might be challenging for institutions to provide consumer relief, and financial relief efforts may be insufficient to provide widespread assistance to impacted consumers without direct government intervention. Many consumers having trouble paying their loans may not realize that the CARES Act gives consumers a right to be granted loan forbearance in certain circumstances, and that their financial institutions can provide loan forbearance, access to credit, or other assistance. If consumers are not aware of these existing relief options, it is possible that relief might not reach the most in need. In addition, increasing fraud schemes relating to COVID-19 seem to be occurring, which can drive consumer confusion. Both government agencies and financial institutions can play an important role in communicating with financially impacted consumers.


As federal agencies adjust their operations in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, activities related to the processing and release of government information are also changing. Agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human Services, among others, have announced changes to their processing of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests due to the pandemic. Government information requests through FOIA may be impacted by COVID-19 in two ways. First, certain types of information related to the outbreak may be eligible for expedited consideration; FOIA requests are to be expedited as soon as practicable in cases in which the person requesting the records demonstrates a compelling need. Second, processes for locating information may change due to employees working remotely or on administrative leave. This In Brief report provides an overview of the typical FOIA request process and usual conditions for requesting expedited processing of a request. The report then provides analysis of the impact of agency procedures in response to the pandemic on government information availability, and concludes with a survey of announced agency processing alterations.


The Air Force's ABMS is a family of systems intended to replace the command and control capabilities of aging legacy programs and develop a network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors. Air Force officials stated ABMS has received $172 million in funding through fiscal year 2020 for efforts related to ABMS. The Air Force is not designating ABMS as a major defense acquisition program or a middle tier acquisition program. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the status of ABMS. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force has (1) established a plan for ABMS development and (2) defined management and decision-making authorities for ABMS efforts. To conduct this assessment, GAO reviewed ABMS program documentation and interviewed Air Force officials. The Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) is intended to establish a network to connect sensors on aircraft, drones, ships, and other weapon systems to provide a real-time operational picture on threats across all domains, as depicted below. According to Air Force officials, the department will take a nontraditional approach to develop ABMS through short-term efforts that will enable it to rapidly field capabilities. As a result of this approach, ABMS requirements will change over time as development progresses. The Air Force started ABMS development without key elements of a business case, including: firm requirements to inform the technological, software, engineering, and production capabilities needed; a plan to attain mature technologies when needed to track development and ensure that technologies work as intended; a cost estimate to inform budget requests and determine whether development efforts are cost effective; and an affordability analysis to ensure sufficient funding is available. GAO's previous work has shown that weapon systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues. Congress has kept a close eye on the effort and required quarterly briefings on its status, as well as a list of certain ABMS requirements by June 2020. However, given the lack of specificity that remains regarding the Air Force's ABMS plans, Congress would benefit from future briefings that address the missing business case elements. While the Air Force has taken some steps to establish an ABMS management structure, the authorities of Air Force offices to plan and execute ABMS efforts are not fully defined. Unless addressed, the unclear decision-making authorities will hinder the Air Force's ability to effectively execute and assess ABMS development across multiple organizations.


The Army is investing in near- and long-term modernization efforts to maintain its technological edge over potential adversaries. It is doing this by upgrading and updating current weapon systems, developing new capabilities, and reshaping its doctrine, force structure, training, and leader development. This testimony is based on prior GAO work conducted 2016 through 2019 and addresses the Army's progress in: (1) establishing Army Futures Command, and (2) developing its near-term and long-term modernization strategies. It also highlights several actions recommended in prior reports related to Army modernization. To conduct this work, GAO assessed the Army's near- and long-term modernization efforts, application of leading practices to those efforts, budget documents, and the effectiveness of the process for developing requirements for major weapon systems. This statement includes updates to this information, as of April 2019. In January 2019, GAO reported on initial steps the Army has taken to consolidate its modernization efforts under one authority—Army Futures Command. Army officials call it their most significant institutional change since 1973, when the Army was reorganized after the Vietnam War. As a precursor to this new command, the Army established eight cross-functional teams as a pilot program to increase the efficiency of requirements and technology development in six key modernization areas. These areas are described in the table below. Since announcing the modernization efforts in 2017, the Army has directed more funding toward closing near-term capability gaps. For example, as part of the planning for the fiscal year 2019 budget process, the Army identified 67 high-priority programs that require a $16 billion investment between now and fiscal year 2023. In addition to the near-term capabilities the Army is pursuing, it has identified a number of long-term needs—those focused after fiscal year 2024—and taken steps to realign research and development efforts and funding with those needs. Over the past 2 years, GAO highlighted several steps Army should take to improve its modernization efforts, including: Apply leading practices to Army Futures Command's cross-functional teams, and capture their lessons learned. Assess the resources, particularly personnel, necessary to support its requirements development process. Increase the transparency of its efforts by clarifying how it evaluates whether its modernization efforts are achieving the Army's goals and clearly stating the full costs of pursuing those goals. Reduce risk by ensuring technologies are fully mature—such as demonstrating technologies in an operational environment before starting a formal acquisition program. By implementing these recommendations, Army Futures Command could better ensure its ability to deliver enhanced capabilities to the warfighter and decrease the risk of cost and schedule growth.


The Army is modernizing its weapon systems to improve its ability to face near-peer adversaries. To consolidate and oversee these efforts, the Army established Army Futures Command. The command plans to work with small businesses to develop innovative capabilities through research and development activities. GAO was asked how the establishment of Army Futures Command could affect small businesses that support research and development efforts. This report examines, among other objectives, how the command (1) engages with small businesses and coordinates with other Army organizations and (2) plans to track and measure the effectiveness of that engagement. GAO reviewed the Army's internal analyses of its own modernization efforts; reviewed and analyzed policies and procedures on the command's small business engagement; and interviewed Army officials engaged in modernization efforts as well as two private companies selected because they facilitate Army's work with small businesses. Army Futures Command, established in June 2018 by combining several existing Army organizations and expected to be fully operational in July 2019, is engaging with small businesses. The command considers small business engagement critical to its success and officials reported it intends to continue the engagement activities of the organizations that are moving into it such as conducting outreach and awarding contracts. The Army recognizes the importance of small businesses and has awarded $2.3 billion to hundreds of small businesses from fiscal year 2013 through 2017. The command is also taking initial steps to enhance small business engagement (see figure). Army officials noted that these new efforts are intended to address concerns raised by small businesses in working with the government, such as delays between initial outreach and entering into contracts. However, the command has not fully leveraged other Army organizations that work with small businesses, such as the Army Office of Small Business Programs. According to command officials, they prioritized setting up the command structure and engaging with small businesses quickly, instead of focusing on coordination. The command has recently been working to improve coordination, but has not formally coordinated such as by establishing agreements with other Army organizations that have small business expertise. Doing so would help Army Futures Command leverage this past experience and avoid missing opportunities to engage with these companies and access innovative research and development. The command does not track how frequently or in what ways it engages with small businesses for research and development across all command components. Similarly, command officials stated they have considered performance measures to assess the effectiveness of their engagement efforts, but have not yet developed command-wide measures or a plan to assess effectiveness. Tracking and measuring engagement would help ensure the command obtains quality information that may help the Army evaluate, and potentially enhance, its small business engagement


The Army requested nearly $335 million for fiscal year 2020 to conduct marketing and advertising activities intended to increase awareness of Army service and ultimately generate leads for potential recruits. In April 2018, AAA made recommendations in two reports to improve the contract oversight and return on investment of the Army's marketing and advertising program. Further, in May 2018 and October 2018, respectively, the Army and OPM made recommendations to improve the workforce practices and organizational structure of the program. The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision for GAO to review the actions taken to implement AAA's recommendations and the effects of these actions on AMRG's leadership, workforce and business practices, and return on investment. This report assesses the extent to which the Army has taken steps to address recommendations (1) from AAA to improve the contract oversight and measurement of the effectiveness of the Army's marketing and advertising program and (2) from the Army and OPM to improve the workforce practices and organizational structure of the marketing and advertising program. GAO analyzed Army marketing and advertising data from fiscal year 2018; reviewed marketing and advertising plans and guidance; conducted focus groups with AMRG personnel; interviewed cognizant officials; and compared the Army's efforts to GAO-identified best practices. The Army provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. The Army has recently taken steps to improve the oversight of its primary marketing and advertising contract and measurement of the effectiveness of its marketing and advertising program in response to two U.S. Army Audit Agency (AAA) reports. In April 2018, AAA found that the Army Marketing and Research Group (AMRG)—the component responsible for conducting the Army's national-level marketing and advertising program—did not fully evaluate the performance of its contracted advertising agency or track the effectiveness of its marketing and advertising efforts. GAO found that AMRG has taken or is taking actions to address AAA's recommendations: Contract Oversight . AMRG has developed processes for overseeing the advertising agency's performance and services. For example, AMRG developed a form program managers use to validate that proposed advertising services are not already provided through other contracts. Program Effectiveness . AMRG has taken steps in several areas related to revising its strategic marketing goals to support Army recruiting, updating how it assesses marketing and advertising effectiveness, and improving the reliability of data systems. AMRG's steps are consistent with commercial best practices that GAO identified for assessing the effectiveness of advertising, such as identifying outcomes from advertising. The Army has also taken steps to improve the workforce practices and organizational structure of its marketing and advertising program in response to two workforce reviews. The two reviews—by an Army organization and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)—found that AMRG, among other things, did not have regular communication throughout its workforce and with its stakeholders, and had a poor workforce climate. AMRG took initial steps to address the reviews' recommendations. The Army then established a new office effective August 2019—the Office of the Chief Army Enterprise Marketing—to replace AMRG and to assume all marketing and advertising activities. Some of the Army's early steps to establish the new office are consistent with key practices for agency reform efforts identified previously by GAO. For example, the Army outlined a three-phased plan with specific tasks and associated dates to fully establish the new office by early 2020 consistent with the key practice to establish implementation goals and a timeline.


The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, authorizes DOE to make PILT payments to communities that host DOE sites that meet specific criteria. PILT is discretionary financial assistance that provides payments to communities based on the property taxes they would have received had the property remained on their tax rolls. House Report 115-230 accompanying a bill for the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to review DOE PILT. This report assesses (1) how PILT payments vary, if at all, by site and over time, and (2) reasons for variations in payments and the extent to which DOE is providing assurance that payments meet PILT goals. GAO analyzed data on DOE payments to communities that DOE reported as having received PILT payments between 2008 and 2017. GAO compared 2017 data across sites and identified changes in payments to those communities between 1994 and 2017. GAO reviewed PILT's authorizing statute, DOE's PILT order, and PILT documentation. GAO interviewed officials from DOE, communities, and community organizations. The Department of Energy's (DOE) payments in lieu of taxes (PILT)—payments made to some local communities that host DOE sites—vary considerably across the sites and have generally increased over time. Communities at 11 DOE sites received PILT payments in fiscal year 2017 (the most recent fiscal year for which complete data were available), totaling approximately $23 million (see figure). Payments to communities at the Hanford and Savannah River sites accounted for approximately 70 percent of that total, while payments to six sites combined accounted for less than 5 percent. Total PILT payments have more than doubled since 1994, primarily because of growth in payments to communities at the Hanford and Savannah River sites and because communities at other sites began receiving payments since 1994. DOE intentionally allows for variations of payments across sites so that payments may reflect the revenues communities would have received had the property remained on the tax rolls in the condition in which it was acquired, which DOE officials stated is a goal of PILT. However, DOE's PILT order's lack of requirements has limited DOE's ability to provide adequate assurance that payments consistently meet this and other PILT goals. The PILT order does not require documentation of the key determinants that went into the calculation of payments, or an independent review process to determine whether payment calculations are consistent with PILT goals. The PILT order also lacks specificity about payment determinations in certain scenarios. Without updates to the PILT order to strengthen DOE's internal controls, DOE will continue to lack adequate assurance that payments meet PILT goals.


The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) established statutory limits on discretionary spending for FY2012-FY2021. There are currently separate annual limits for defense discretionary and nondefense discretionary spending. The law specifies that spending for certain activities, such as responding to a national emergency or fighting terrorism, will receive special budgetary treatment. This spending is most easily thought of as being exempt from the spending limits. Formally, however, the BCA states that the enactment of such spending allows for a subsequent upward adjustment of the discretionary limits to accommodate the spending. As a result, these types of spending are referred to as "adjustments." Two adjustmentsâfor spending designated as emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)âhave made up the vast majority of the spending. (These adjustments are uncapped and can be used for broad purposes.) Five other adjustments are capped and can be used for more specific programs or purposes, and two additional adjustments address potential technical issues that can arise in enforcing the spending limits. According to information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (the agency responsible for evaluating compliance with the discretionary spending limits), in the seven fiscal years that have concluded since the discretionary spending limits were instituted, approximately $891 billion of spending has occurred under these adjustments. Spending for OCO made up 73% of the total, and spending for emergencies made up 20%. In addition to the adjustments specified in the BCA, the 21 st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255 ) provided that a limited amount of appropriations for specified purposes are to be exempt from the discretionary spending limits. As of the date of this report, the Cures Act is unique in providing an exemption of this kind.


The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) included two parts: discretionary spending caps, plus a "Joint Committee process" to achieve an additional $1.2 trillion in budgetary savings over FY2013-FY2021. For the initial tranche of savings, the BCA placed statutory limits on discretionary spending for each fiscal year from FY2012 through FY2021. At the time of enactment, the BCA discretionary spending caps were projected to save $917 billion. For the second, and larger, tranche of savings, the BCA established a bipartisan, bicameral Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction ("Joint Committee") to negotiate a broad deficit reduction package to save another $1.5 trillion through FY2021. As a fallback, the BCA provided that automatic spending reductions would be triggered if Congress did not enact at least $1.2 trillion in budget savings by January 15, 2012. The deadline was not met, which triggered the BCA's $1.2 trillion in automatic spending reductions. The automatic reductions were designed to achieve $1.2 trillion in budgetary savings by reducing both discretionary and mandatory spending in each year through FY2021. The largest share of the $1.2 trillion in additional savings was to be achieved by reducing the discretionary spending caps and the remainder through annual across-the-board cuts (sequestration) in all nonexempt mandatory spending. The mandatory spending portion of the automatic reductions (referred to in this report as the "Joint Committee sequester") has been fully implemented in each year since FY2013. It has been extended five times and is now, under current law, effective for each fiscal year through FY2029. This report explains the BCA provisions that established and triggered the Joint Committee sequester, the annual sequester calculations by OMB, the extension and calculation of the Joint Committee sequester through FY2029, the broad scope of the sequester across the federal budget, and sequester exemptions and special rules. The appendixes include a table summarizing each sequester since FY2013, a summary of the FY2020 sequester reductions, the text of the FY2020 sequester order, the text of the OMB sequester calculation, a list of mandatory sequester exemptions, and additional CRS resources on sequestration.


The Bureau is responsible for conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population. The decennial census is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its High-Risk list in February 2017. GAO was asked to testify about the reasons the 2020 Census remains on the High-Risk List and the steps the Bureau needs to take to mitigate risks to a successful census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included preliminary observations from its ongoing work examining the IT systems readiness and cybersecurity for the 2020 Census. This information is related to, among other things, the Bureau's progress in developing and testing key systems and the status of cybersecurity risks. The 2020 Decennial Census is on GAO's list of high-risk programs primarily because the Department of Commerce's Census Bureau (Bureau) (1) is using innovations that are not expected to be fully tested, (2) continues to face challenges in implementing information technology (IT) systems, and (3) faces significant cybersecurity risks to its systems and data. Although the Bureau has taken initial steps to address risk, additional actions are needed as these risks could adversely impact the cost, quality, schedule, and security of the enumeration. Innovations. The Bureau is planning several innovations for the 2020 Census, including allowing the public to respond using the internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part, because they have not been used extensively, if at all, in earlier enumerations. As a result, testing is essential to ensure that key IT systems and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary uncertainties, the Bureau scaled back operational tests in 2017 and 2018, missing an opportunity to fully demonstrate that the innovations and IT systems will function as intended during the 2020 Census. To manage risk to the census, the Bureau has developed hundreds of mitigation and contingency plans. To maximize readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also be important for the Bureau to prioritize among its mitigation and contingency strategies those that will deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the census. Implementing IT systems. The Bureau plans to rely heavily on IT for the 2020 Census, including a total of 52 new and legacy IT systems and the infrastructure supporting them. To help improve its implementation of IT, in October 2018, the Bureau revised its systems development and testing schedule to reflect, among other things, lessons learned during its 2018 operational test. However, GAO's ongoing work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of not meeting near-term IT system development and testing schedule milestones for five upcoming 2020 Census operational deliveries, including self-response (e.g., the ability to respond to the 2020 Census through the internet). These schedule management challenges may compress the time available for the remaining system development and testing, and increase the risk that systems will not function as intended. It will be important that the Bureau effectively manages IT implementation risk to ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and testing, and that it is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census. Cybersecurity. The Bureau has established a risk management framework that requires it to conduct a full security assessment for nearly all the systems expected to be used for the 2020 Census and, if deficiencies are identified to determine the corrective actions needed to remediate those deficiencies. As of the end of May 2019, the Bureau had over 330 corrective actions from its security assessments that needed to be addressed, including 217 that were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.” However, of these 217 corrective actions, the Bureau identified 104 as being delayed. Further, 74 of the 104 were delayed by 60 or more days. According to the Bureau, these corrective actions were delayed due to technical challenges or resource constraints. GAO recently recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that identified corrective actions for cybersecurity weaknesses are implemented within prescribed time frames. Resolving identified vulnerabilities more timely can help reduce the risk that unauthorized individuals may exploit weaknesses to gain access to sensitive information and systems. To its credit, the Bureau is also working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. For example, DHS is helping the Bureau ensure a scalable and secure network connection for the 2020 Census respondents and to strengthen its response to potential cyber threats. During the last 2 years, as a result of these activities, the Bureau has received 42 recommendations from DHS to improve its cybersecurity posture. GAO recently recommended that the Bureau implement a formal process for tracking and executing appropriate corrective actions to remediate cybersecurity findings identified by DHS. Implementing the recommendation would help better ensure that DHS's efforts result in improvements to the Bureau's cybersecurity posture. In addition to addressing risks which could affect innovations and the security of the enumeration, the Bureau has the opportunity to improve its cost estimating process for the 2020 Census, and ultimately the reliability of the estimate itself, by reflecting best practices. In October 2017, the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate was updated and is now projected to be $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. GAO reported in August 2018 that although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, it needed to implement a system to track and report variances between actual and estimated cost elements. According to Bureau officials, they planned to release an updated version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019; however, they released the update on July 15, 2019. GAO will review the released documentation to see whether the revised estimate will address the recommendations. To ensure that future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will be important for the Bureau to implement GAO's recommendation related to the cost estimate. Over the past decade, GAO has made 107 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these risks and other concerns. The Department of Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken action to address many of them. However, as of July 2019, 32 of the recommendations had not been fully implemented. While all 32 open recommendations are important for a high-quality and cost-effective enumeration, 10 are directed at managing the risks introduced by the Bureau's planned innovations for the 2020 Census. To ensure a high-quality and cost-effective enumeration, it will be important for the Bureau to address these recommendations.


The Bureau is responsible for conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population. The decennial census is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its High-Risk list in February 2017. GAO was asked to testify about the reasons the 2020 Census remains on the High-Risk List and the steps the Bureau needs to take to mitigate risks to a successful census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included preliminary observations from its ongoing work examining the IT systems readiness and cybersecurity for the 2020 Census. This information is related to, among other things, the Bureau's progress in developing and testing key systems and the status of cybersecurity risks. The 2020 Decennial Census is on GAO's list of high-risk programs primarily because the Department of Commerce's Census Bureau (Bureau) (1) is using innovations that are not expected to be fully tested, (2) continues to face challenges in implementing information technology (IT) systems, and (3) faces significant cybersecurity risks to its systems and data. Although the Bureau has taken initial steps to address risk, additional actions are needed as these risks could adversely impact the cost, quality, schedule, and security of the enumeration. Innovations. The Bureau is planning several innovations for the 2020 Census, including allowing the public to respond using the internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part, because they have not been used extensively, if at all, in earlier enumerations. As a result, testing is essential to ensure that key IT systems and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary uncertainties, the Bureau scaled back operational tests in 2017 and 2018, missing an opportunity to fully demonstrate that the innovations and IT systems will function as intended during the 2020 Census. To manage risk to the census, the Bureau has developed hundreds of mitigation and contingency plans. To maximize readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also be important for the Bureau to prioritize among its mitigation and contingency strategies those that will deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the census. Implementing IT systems. The Bureau plans to rely heavily on IT for the 2020 Census, including a total of 52 new and legacy IT systems and the infrastructure supporting them. To help improve its implementation of IT, in October 2018, the Bureau revised its systems development and testing schedule to reflect, among other things, lessons learned during its 2018 operational test. However, GAO's ongoing work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of not meeting near-term IT system development and testing schedule milestones for five upcoming 2020 Census operational deliveries, including self-response (e.g., the ability to respond to the 2020 Census through the internet). These schedule management challenges may compress the time available for the remaining system development and testing, and increase the risk that systems will not function as intended. It will be important that the Bureau effectively manages IT implementation risk to ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and testing, and that it is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census. To its credit, the Bureau is also working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. For example, DHS is helping the Bureau ensure a scalable and secure network connection for the 2020 Census respondents and to strengthen its response to potential cyber threats. During the last 2 years, as a result of these activities, the Bureau has received 42 recommendations from DHS to improve its cybersecurity posture. GAO recently recommended that the Bureau implement a formal process for tracking and executing appropriate corrective actions to remediate cybersecurity findings identified by DHS. Implementing the recommendation would help better ensure that DHS's efforts result in improvements to the Bureau's cybersecurity posture. In addition to addressing risks which could affect innovations and the security of the enumeration, the Bureau has the opportunity to improve its cost estimating process for the 2020 Census, and ultimately the reliability of the estimate itself, by reflecting best practices. In October 2017, the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate was updated and is now projected to be $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. GAO reported in August 2018 that although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, it needed to implement a system to track and report variances between actual and estimated cost elements. According to Bureau officials, they planned to release an updated version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019; however, they had not done so as of June 28, 2019. To ensure that future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will be important for the Bureau to implement GAO's recommendation related to the cost estimate. Over the past decade, GAO has made 106 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these risks and other concerns. The Department of Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken action to address many of them. However, as of June 2019, 31 of the recommendations had not been fully implemented. While all 31 open recommendations are important for a high-quality and cost-effective enumeration, 9 are directed at managing the risks introduced by the Bureau's planned innovations for the 2020 Census. To ensure a high-quality and cost-effective enumeration, it will be important for the Bureau to address these recommendations.


The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI), is responsible for the management and development of many of the large federal dams and water diversion structures in the 17 conterminous states west of the Mississippi River. Reclamation is the country's largest wholesaler of water and the country's second-largest producer of hydropower (behind the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Reclamation facilities store up to 140 million acre-feet of water, which serves more than 10 million acres of farmland and 31 million municipal and industrial customers. In addition to water supplies, Reclamation facilities provide flood control, recreation, and fish and wildlife benefits in many parts of the West. Congress created Reclamation in the Reclamation Act of 1902. The act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct irrigation works in western states to "reclaim" arid lands for agricultural purposes. Subsequent laws have built on and in some cases altered Reclamation's authorities, and Congress has authorized more than 180 individual R eclamation projects . Reclamation projects are unique in a number of ways. Among other things, these projects operate according to a beneficiary pays principle in which project beneficiaries must reimburse the government for their allocated share of project costs (some costs are considered federal in nature, with no reimbursement required). Reclamation projects also must obtain state water rights and operate according to state water law. As a result, state law and related considerations play a relatively large role in Reclamation project operations and management. The earliest Reclamation projects were single purpose and focused primarily on irrigation development. Later projects were larger and more complex, and they operated for multiple authorized purposes. Reclamation constructed its largest and most well-known projects (such as the California Central Valley Project, Hoover Dam, and Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River and Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia River Basin Project in Washington) after the beginning of the Great Depression. Congress chose to fund most of these large projects through the General Fund of the Treasury rather than the Reclamation Fund, which Congress had established under the 1902 act to finance most Reclamation projects. A number of events precipitated the gradual slowdown of Reclamation's construction program beginning in the 1970s, and the bureau has constructed few new Reclamation projects (most of them smaller in scale) since that time. Reclamation has evolved considerably since its creation, and it remains an agency in transition. At Congress's direction, Reclamation has increasingly been involved in projects whose primary purpose is not reclaiming land for agricultural irrigation purposes. Some of Reclamation's new authorities include financial support for water reuse and recycling projects (i.e., the Title XVI Program), grants for water and energy conservation efforts (i.e., the WaterSMART Grants Program), and funding for rural water projects and water infrastructure associated with congressionally authorized Indian water rights settlements. How to balance new priorities with the upkeep of existing federal projects, and whether to facilitate new project development (and, if so, how), is a major consideration in discussions related to the bureau's future. These questions are particularly significant given Reclamation's nexus with state and local water resources development. Congress regularly considers legislation related to individual Reclamation projects, as well as broader questions related to Reclamation and its mission. Persistent and recurring drought in the West, along with the 2016 enactment of Reclamation's first significant new authority in decades for water storage project construction (Section 4007 of the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act [WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322 ]), has increased attention on the bureau's future direction. Congress may consider a number of issues related to Reclamation, such as how (or if) the bureau should be involved in new water resource project construction, how to address aging federal water facilities, and the status of proposed and ongoing Indian water rights settlements, among other things.


As of 2019, over 20 million Americansâpredominantly those living in rural areasâlacked access to high speed broadband service according to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Federal subsidies underwritten by taxpayer funds and long-distance telephone subscriber fees have injected billions of dollars into rural broadband markets over the past decadeâmostly on the supply side in the form of grants, loans, and direct support to broadband providers. Yet, adoption rates have leveled off after more than a decade of rapid growth, even as broadband providers have extended service to remote and hard-to-serve areas. The overall share of U.S. adults using the internet has not grown significantly since 2013, according to the Pew Research Centerâa trend reflected in rural broadband subscription rates, which continue to lag significantly behind rates in urban areas. Observers note that weak demand in nascent broadband markets makes it more difficult for federal agencies to elicit private-sector program participation and investment in high-cost, high-risk rural areas. Even in subsidized markets, broadband infrastructure buildout ultimately rests on business decisions made in the private sector. On average, rural areas are less wealthy than urbanized areas, and have older populations with lower educational attainmentâfactors which negatively correlate with demand for broadband service. Related barriers to adoption, such as lower perceived value, affordability, computer ownership, and computer literacy, have persisted over many years. Markets tend to be highly localized. Those with favorable geography and demographic profiles often have higher demand, and thus present relatively attractive investment opportunities, for broadband providers. However, the federal government has found it difficult to incentivize sustained private-sector investment in more isolated and sparsely populated locales where it is clear that new or upgraded service will be costly to provide, and may fail to attract a large number of new paying subscribers. Overall, current federal spending on affordability and adoption programs amounts to less than one-quarter of total spending for rural broadband expansion. The FCC's Lifeline program reduces monthly subscription costs for qualifying low-income households, but enrollment rates are comparatively low. No major federal programs currently support consumer outreach and education, although certain federal grants may use funds for related activities. Other programs to support broadband buildout to schools, clinics, and other community institutions have improved access for residents of rural areas, but it is not clear that these programs have affected overall market demand. Broadband advocates frequently identify broadband enabled services like telemedicine and precision agriculture as potential demand drivers. However, lower rates of health insurance coverage in rural areas and certain state regulations limiting Medicaid reimbursement for telemedicine services may depress demand growth and private sector investment in broadband. Likewise, high up-front costs and unfamiliarity have hindered adoption of precision agriculture technology by small producers in isolated rural areas. Federal broadband programs have generally been agnostic to the demand side of rural broadband markets, based on the implicit assumption that demand for broadband service will quickly emerge as broadband providers extend new or upgraded service to these locales. Program rules typically require broadband providers to extend service availability to a certain area within a certain timeframe, but they generally do not require them to achieve specific market development goals for adoption and usage. The FCC has expressed concern that some subsidized providers may lack incentive to develop markets in their service areas. Options for congressional consideration include measures to address obstacles to adoption and additional incentives for private sector investment in the rural broadband sector. These may include expansion of end-user subsidies, both within the broadband sector and other sectors that utilize broadband-enabled technologies. Congress may also consider measures to encourage broadband providers to increase investment in persistently underserved rural areas and more aggressively develop nascent broadband markets. These may include adjustment to subsidy rates and program rules, including introduction of adoption milestones for subsidy recipients. Additionally, Congress may consider measures to increase education and outreach.


The Bureau, a component of the Department of Commerce (Commerce), is responsible for conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population. The decennial census is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its High-Risk list in February 2017. GAO was asked to testify about the reasons the 2020 Census remains on the High-Risk List and the steps the Bureau needs to take to mitigate risks to a successful census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included preliminary observations from its ongoing work examining the IT systems readiness and cybersecurity for the 2020 Census. This information is related to, among other things, the Bureau's progress in developing and testing key systems and the status of cybersecurity risks. The 2020 Decennial Census is on GAO's list of high-risk programs primarily because the Census Bureau (Bureau) (1) is using innovations that are not expected to be fully tested, (2) continues to face challenges in implementing information technology (IT) systems, and (3) faces significant cybersecurity risks to its systems and data. Although the Bureau has taken initial steps to address risk, additional actions are needed as these risks could adversely impact the cost, quality, schedule, and security of the enumeration. Innovations : The Bureau is planning several innovations for the 2020 Census, including allowing the public to respond using the internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part, because they have not been used extensively, if at all, in earlier enumerations. As a result, testing is essential to ensure that key IT systems and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary uncertainties, the Bureau scaled back operational tests in 2017 and 2018, missing an opportunity to fully demonstrate that the innovations and IT systems will function as intended during the 2020 Census. To manage risk to the census, the Bureau has developed hundreds of mitigation and contingency plans. To maximize readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also be important for the Bureau to prioritize among its mitigation and contingency strategies those that will deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the census. Implementing IT systems : The Bureau plans to rely heavily on IT for the 2020 Census, including a total of 52 new and legacy IT systems and the infrastructure supporting them. To help improve its implementation of IT, in October 2018, the Bureau revised its systems development and testing schedule to reflect, among other things, lessons learned during its 2018 operational test. However, GAO's ongoing work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of not meeting near-term IT system development and testing schedule milestones for two upcoming 2020 Census operational deliveries, including address canvassing (i.e., verification of the location of selected housing units). These schedule management challenges may compress the time available for the remaining system development and testing, and increase the risk that systems will not function as intended. It will be important that the Bureau effectively manages IT implementation risk to ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and testing, and that it is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census. Cybersecurity : The Bureau has established a risk management framework that requires it to conduct a full security assessment for each system expected to be used for the 2020 Census and, if deficiencies are identified, to determine the corrective actions needed to remediate those deficiencies. As of March 2019, the Bureau had over 500 corrective actions from its security assessments that needed to be addressed, including nearly 250 that were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.” However, of these 250 corrective actions, the Bureau identified 115 as being delayed. Further, 70 of the 115 were delayed by 60 or more days. According to the Bureau, these corrective actions were delayed due to technical challenges or resource constraints. Resolving identified vulnerabilities within the Bureau's established time frames can help reduce the risk that unauthorized individuals may exploit weaknesses to gain access to sensitive information and systems. To its credit, the Bureau is also working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. For example, DHS is helping the Bureau ensure a scalable and secure network connection for the 2020 Census respondents and to strengthen its response to potential cyber threats. During the last 2 years, as a result of these activities, the Bureau has received 17 recommendations from DHS to improve its cybersecurity posture. However, the Bureau lacks a formal process for tracking and completing corrective actions for these recommendations which would help to ensure that DHS's efforts result in improvements to the Bureau's cybersecurity posture. In addition to addressing risks which could affect innovations and the security of the enumeration, the Bureau has the opportunity to improve its cost estimating process for the 2020 Census, and ultimately the reliability of the estimate itself, by reflecting best practices. In October 2017, the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate was updated and is now projected to be $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. GAO reported in August 2018 that although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, it needed to implement a system to track and report variances between actual and estimated cost elements. According to Bureau officials, they plan to release an updated version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019. To ensure that future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will be important for the Bureau to implement GAO's recommendation related to the cost estimate. Over the past decade, GAO has made 97 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these risks and other concerns. Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken action to address many of them. However, as of April 2019, 24 of the recommendations had not been fully implemented. Of the 24 open recommendations, 11 were directed at improving the implementation of the innovations for the 2020 Census. To ensure a cost-effective enumeration, it will be important for the Bureau to address these recommendations.


The CCDF is administered as a block grant to the states by OCC, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Recent reports by the HHS Office of the Inspector General show that OCC's monitoring of CCDF state program-integrity efforts remains a challenge. CCDF has also been designated as a program susceptible to significant improper payments, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. GAO was asked to review CCDF program-integrity efforts. This report discusses, among other things, the extent to which OCC provides oversight of (1) states' CCDF program-integrity activities, including encouraging that all requested information is included within State Plans; and (2) improper-payment risks and relevant corrective actions in states' CCDF programs. GAO analyzed 51 approved CCDF State Plans, including from the District of Columbia, for the fiscal years 2019–2021 grant period. GAO also reviewed OCC policies and procedures and compared them to relevant laws, regulations, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , and interviewed relevant federal officials. The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) provided states more than $8 billion in federal funds in fiscal year 2019. The Office of Child Care (OCC) oversees the integrity of the CCDF, which subsidizes child care for low-income families. A key part of OCC's oversight includes reviewing and approving State Plans. OCC requested but did not require states to describe in their State Plans the results of their program-integrity activities, which describe the processes that states use to identify fraud risk. Further, OCC has not defined or communicated what information it considers to be the “results” of program-integrity activities to the states and its own staff. Without defining and communicating its informational needs, OCC may continue to lack quality information that could help ensure states' accountability over their program-integrity activities. OCC oversees states' improper payment risks through a process that includes a requirement for states to submit corrective action plans (CAP) when they estimate their annual payment error rates are at or above 10 percent. Since 2013, seven states have submitted 14 CAPs. These CAPs describe states' proposed actions for reducing improper payments. However, OCC does not have documented criteria to guide its review and approval of the CAPs to ensure the proposed corrective actions are aimed at root causes of improper payments and are effectively implemented. Without developing this guidance, OCC does not have assurance that proposed corrective actions are specifically aimed at root causes of improper payments, leaving the CCDF program at continued risk of improper payments.


The Cannon project intends to preserve the historic character while improving the functionality of the 111 year-old Cannon Building—the oldest congressional office building—as well as address deterioration to the building and its components. The project—nearing the mid-point of its planned 10-year duration—is being implemented in five sequential phases with an initial phase (Phase 0) for utility work and four subsequent phases (Phases 1 through 4) to renovate the north-, south-, east-, and west-facing sides of the building. Each phase is scheduled around a 2-year congressional session. This statement describes: (1) the status of the Cannon project and (2) changes to the project's estimated cost at completion. This statement is based on GAO's prior reports in 2009 and 2014 and ongoing monitoring of the project. To monitor the project, GAO has been observing the ongoing construction, attending project meetings, and analyzing AOC documents. The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) has substantially completed two of five planned phases to renovate the Cannon House Office Building (Cannon project). AOC completed Phase 0 utility work; has almost finished the Phase 1 work to renovate the building's west side, as planned; and is progressing with Phase 2 work to renovate the building's north side. From 2009 to 2018, AOC consistently estimated the project cost at $753 million, but AOC reported in June 2019 that it expects costs to increase by 10 to 15 percent, resulting in a total cost of approximately $828 million to $866 million. In 2014, GAO found that AOC's cost estimate of $753 million reflected several, but not all, of GAO's leading practices for high-quality, reliable cost estimates, including that AOC had conducted a risk and uncertainty analysis. In January 2018, AOC updated its analysis of risks by undertaking an integrated cost-schedule risk analysis. AOC's 2018 analysis arrived at the same conclusion as its earlier analysis—that the project's estimated $753 million total cost was adequate to complete the project. However, AOC's 2018 analysis indicated that inaccurate estimates of costs for risk mitigations, unknown risks, and optimistic assumptions about the effect of risk mitigations on the project's cost and schedule could affect its total cost. In June 2019, AOC reported that greater-than-expected risks, such as from unforeseen conditions that led to more extensive exterior stone restoration than anticipated and the unplanned mitigation of asbestos in roof materials, would increase the project's cost. AOC is currently determining the effect of these and other changes on Phase 1, where work has been substantially completed, but costs have not been settled. AOC is also determining how the costs of the project's remaining phases will be affected by scope changes stemming from lessons learned in Phase 1. Toward this end, in August 2019, AOC began updating its integrated cost-schedule risk analysis, with the aim of more accurately determining the extent to which the project's costs are increasing and its estimated cost at completion.


The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal government's lead public health agency, has identified teen pregnancy as a major public health issue because of its high cost for families of teenage parents and society more broadly. The CDC highlights that the teen pregnancy rate has decreased steadily, dropping below CDC's target goal of 30.3 per 1,000 females aged 15 to 17 by 2015; however, the CDC also raises the concern that the United States has one of the highest rates of teen births of all industrialized countries. This report discusses trends in teen birth ratesâor the number of births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 each yearâsince the 1950s. The rate of teens births peaked in 1957 at 96.3. It then decreased in most years from the 1960s through the 1980s. From 1991 onward, the rate declined except in two years, 2006 and 2007. The greatest decline in teen birth rates has occurred in recent years. For example, from 2007 to 2018, the rate declined by approximately 58%. The 2018 teen birth rate of 17.4 was a historical low since CDC began collecting and reporting birth data in the 1940s. In nearly each year from 1991 through the recent period, the teen birth rate decreased for all racial and ethnic groups; however, the rates declined more for certain groups than others. While the birth rates for two groups (non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics) declined more than the rate for white teens, their birth rates remained higher overall. In 2018, Hispanic (26.7), non-Hispanic black (26.2), and non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native (29.4) teens had more than double the teen birth rate for non-Hispanic white (12.2) and non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander (4.0) teens. Teen birth rates have varied considerably by state and territory. In 2018, the state with the lowest reported rate was Massachusetts (7.2); the state with the highest reported rate was Arkansas (30.4). Teen birth rates have declined in rural areas over time but remain relatively higher than rates in urban areas. Research suggests that multiple trends have led to lower U.S. teen pregnancy and birth rates. From the 1990s through 2007, the risk of teen pregnancy decreased primarily because of improved contraceptive use, including an increase in the use of certain contraception methods (e.g., condoms), an increase in the use of multiple methods of contraception, and substantial declines in foregoing the use of contraception altogether. Some of the risk of pregnancy decreased among younger teens because of decreased sexual activity. A primary factor for more recent declines in the risk of teen pregnancy has been the increasing use of contraceptives among sexually active teens. Broad economic and social variables may influence teen behaviors, such as whether they will abstain from sex or use contraceptives. Teen pregnancy has high costs for teen parents, their children, and society more generally. Teenage mothers and fathers tend to have less education and are more likely to live in poverty than their peers who are not parents. Moreover, lower levels of education reduce teen parents' potential for economic self-sufficiency. Some analysis has looked at these societal impacts and the benefits of avoiding pregnancy during the teen years. This report accompanies CRS Report R45183, Teen Pregnancy: Federal Prevention Programs , which discusses Congress's current approach of supporting programs that seek to prevent pregnancy among teens; and CRS In Focus IF10877, Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs , which includes summary information about the programs.


The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that many Americans' diets lack adequate sources of good nutrition and that this contributes to costly chronic health conditions. USDA funds and administers a variety of nutrition education efforts, which aim to help educate Americans on nutrition and improve their dietary choices. GAO was asked to review these efforts. This report examines the extent to which USDA (1) has information on participation, expenditures, and effectiveness for its nutrition education programs; and (2) coordinates its nutrition education efforts and leverages internal nutrition expertise for these efforts. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and GAO's prior work on nutrition education and leading practices for collaboration; analyzed USDA data on nutrition education participation in fiscal year 2018 and expenditures in fiscal year 2017, the most recent year with complete data available; and reviewed program evaluations and available outcome data for fiscal year 2018. GAO also interviewed USDA officials and representatives of relevant organizations. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers five key programs that provide nutrition education and has information on participation, expenditures, and effectiveness for most of these programs. USDA tracks the number of participants in direct education, such as classes and counseling, as well as other measures of program reach. For example, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Education (SNAP-Ed), one of USDA's largest nutrition education programs, served 3.8 million participants through direct education in fiscal year 2018. USDA also collects nationwide expenditure data for all of its nutrition education programs, which totaled nearly $907 million in fiscal year 2017—the most recent year with complete data available. In addition, USDA collects some information on the effectiveness of most of its nutrition education programs; yet information USDA collects from states on SNAP-Ed effectiveness cannot be easily aggregated or reviewed. States provide this information in narrative reports, which hinders USDA's ability to assess the effectiveness of interventions used across the country and determine whether SNAP-Ed is achieving its goals. USDA does not have a formal coordination mechanism for its nutrition education efforts and does not fully leverage the department's nutrition expertise. According to USDA officials, coordinating nutrition education efforts has not been a priority in recent years, and the department does not have a dedicated individual or entity with leadership responsibility for nutrition education. This has resulted in limited coordination across USDA's nutrition education programs, including programs with similar target populations. GAO previously reported that effective coordination can help reduce overlap and duplication. In its absence, USDA's nutrition education programs are missing opportunities to share information and avoid duplicating efforts. Further, some USDA nutrition experts are not located in agencies or offices overseeing the nutrition education programs, and possibly because of this, program staff consult these experts on a limited basis, if at all. Failing to leverage its internal expertise hinders USDA's development of nutrition education materials that are informed by the latest nutrition guidance and research and may reduce the effectiveness of these efforts.


The Central Valley Project (CVP), a federal water project owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), is one of the world's largest water supply projects. The CVP covers approximately 400 miles in California, from Redding to Bakersfield, and draws from two large river basins: the Sacramento and the San Joaquin. It is composed of 20 dams and reservoirs and numerous pieces of water storage and conveyance infrastructure. In an average year, the CVP delivers more than 7 million acre-feet of water to support irrigated agriculture, municipalities, and fish and wildlife needs, among other purposes. About 75% of CVP water is used for agricultural irrigation, including 7 of California's top 10 agricultural counties. The CVP is operated jointly with the State Water Project (SWP), which provides much of its water to municipal users in Southern California. CVP water is delivered to users that have contracts with Reclamation. These contractors receive varying levels of priority for water deliveries based on several factors, including hydrology, water rights, prior agreements with Reclamation, and regulatory requirements. The Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers' confluence with the San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta or Delta) is a hub for CVP water deliveries; many CVP contractors south of the Delta receive water that is "exported" from north of the Delta. Development of the CVP resulted in significant changes to the area's natural hydrology. However, construction of most CVP facilities predated major federal natural resources and environmental protection laws. Much of the current debate related to the CVP revolves around how to deal with changes to the hydrologic system that were not significantly mitigated for when the project was constructed. Thus, multiple ongoing efforts to protect species and restore habitat have been authorized and are incorporated into project operations. Congress has engaged in CVP issues through oversight and at times legislation, including provisions in the 2016 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322) that, among other things, authorized changes to operations in an attempt to provide for delivery of more water under certain circumstances. Although some stakeholders are interested in further operational changes to enhance CVP water deliveries, others are focused on the environmental impacts of operations. Various state and federal proposals are currently under consideration and have generated controversy for their potential to affect CVP operations and allocations. In late 2018, the State of California finalized revisions to its Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan. These changes would require that more flows from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers reach the Bay-Delta for water quality and fish and wildlife enhancement (and thus would further restrict water supplies for other users). The changes have generally been opposed by the Trump Administration. At the same time, the Trump Administration is pursuing efforts to increase CVP water supplies for users, including changes to CVP operations under an October 2018 White House memorandum on western water supplies. Efforts to add or supplement CVP storage and conveyance also are being considered: The state is proposing a new water conveyance project (known as the California WaterFix) that would bypass the Bay-Delta and, under certain conditions, increase exports from north to south for some users. Additionally, new storage projects are under study by federal and state entities; these projects would aim to increase CVP and/or SWP water supplies. In the 116th Congress, legislators may consider bills and conduct oversight on efforts to increase CVP water exports compared to current baselines. Congress is considering whether to approve funding for new water storage projects, and also may consider legislation to extend or amend previously enacted CVP authorities (e.g., WIIN Act authorities that are expiring or have exceeded their appropriations ceiling).


The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act, P.L. 101-576 ) requires annual financial audits of federal agencies' financial statements to "assure the issuance of reliable financial information ... deter fraud, waste and abuse of Government resources ... [and assist] the executive branch ... and Congress in the financing, management, and evaluation of Federal programs." Agency inspectors general (IGs) are responsible for the audits and may contract with one or more external auditors. Congressional interest in the Department of Defense's (DOD's) audits is especially acute because DOD's expenditures represent about half of federal discretionary spending and about 15% of total spending by the federal government. Also, DOD's financial management has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk list since 1995. Those on the high-risk list are considered more vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOD completed its first-ever agency-wide financial audit in FY2018 and recently completed its FY2019 audit. As expected, DOD received an agency-wide disclaimer of o pinion from the DOD IG in both auditsâmeaning auditors could not express an opinion on the department's financial statements because the financial information was not sufficiently reliable. DOD has stated it could take up to 10 years to receive a clean audit opinion. Some reasons for a disclaimer of opinion can include inadequate internal controls (i.e., a series of integrated actions that management uses to guide operations), financial statements not conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), insufficient property and inventory records, and financial management systems that do not provide sufficient evidence for the auditor to express an opinion. The FY2018 audit included 2,358 notices of findings and recommendations (NFRs), which capture issues that require corrective action. Approximately 94% of the NFRs were related to three critical areas: financial management systems and information technology; financial reporting and DOD's fund balance with Treasury; and property. These NFRs resulted in 20 agency-wide material weaknesses and 129 component-level material weaknesses. All material weaknesses were related to issues with internal control. A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting that results in a reasonable possibility that management will not prevent, or detect and correct, a material financial misstatement. Comprehensive data from the FY2019 audit are not currently available. However, DOD has announced that auditors validated that DOD had resolved over 550 findings, more than 23%, from the department's FY2018 audit and that the audits have helped DOD "target and prioritize corrective actions as we strive to achieve an unmodified audit opinion." After describing what a financial audit entails, this report examines the FY2018 audit in detail and addresses several issues for Congress, including the audit's cost (approximately $413 million in FY2018) and the challenges the material weaknesses identified in the FY2018 audit may create for congressional oversight of DOD.


The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal-state partnership that seeks to ensure child support is a regular source of income for families. The program transfers financial support from a noncustodial parent (NCP) to a child's primary caretaker (usually a custodial parent). Nearly two-thirds of participating custodial families report having incomes below 200% of the federal poverty threshold. The CSE program collects about two-thirds of the current support that is due each year, with the remainder that is unpaid becoming arrears (i.e., past-due support). Many NCPs who do not pay their obligations in full struggle with finding consistent and sufficient employment. Employment programs within the context of CSE are designed to increase NCP employment and child support collections. Many states have CSE-led employment programs and a number of practitioners report that, in their experience, these services are a more effective tool for NCPs with limited ability to pay than other enforcement strategies. CSE employment programs only serve a small proportion of NCPs making zero or partial payments; many observers primarily attribute this to a lack of sustainable funding. In response, some policymakers have proposed dedicating federal funding for CSE-led employment services. CSE employment programs use varied eligibility criteria, but they typically focus on low-income NCPs. Programs also vary in their reliance on mandatory or voluntary recruitment policies, or both. Mandatory recruitment involves courts ordering parents who are behind in their payments to participate or risk incarceration. Voluntary recruitment relies on NCP interest and referrals from CSE staff, courts, and partner organizations. CSE employment programs usually provide a wide range of services, including intensive case management, employment, child support, parenting/fatherhood, and other support services. Service provision is often contracted to partner agencies or community organizations. In terms of employment services, programs traditionally provide services such as job readiness, job search, and job development. Participants are less likely to participate in transitional jobs (short-term subsidized employment) or more intensive vocational education and training services. Under current law, federal funds that can be used by CSE programs to support employment services are fairly limited. Although the federal government normally reimburses each state at 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activitiesâfinancing that totaled more than $3.5 billion in FY2018âemployment services are currently not a reimbursable activity. Similarly, the second largest CSE funding stream, incentive payments (expected to exceed $510 million for FY2018), cannot be automatically used to support employment services. States can pursue Section 1115 waiver demonstrations as a means to receive federal matching payments or request authorization to spend incentive funds on employment services, but both approaches come with restrictions. States can also tap non-CSE federal funding to support employment services for NCPs, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, but this use must compete with other potential uses for the funding. Several rigorous evaluations have been conducted on two employment service models with NCPs: traditional employment services and transitional jobs. Evidence on the effectiveness of traditional employment services for NCPs is mixed, with the most recent federally funded, large-scale random assignment study on this model finding little or no impacts. Earlier evaluations reported more promising effects. Transitional jobs programs are more expensive and challenging to implement, but a recent federally funded, large-scale random assignment evaluation on this model reported stronger impacts than traditional employment services. The effects were substantial while participants were in subsidized jobs, modest for a period after the transitional jobs ended, but then usually continued to fade over time.


The Coast Guard is a multi-mission maritime military service responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental protection, among other things. Since 2006 the Coast Guard has implemented organizational changes to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. During this time, the Coast Guard also created a workforce assessments process to determine the number of personnel and skills required to meet mission needs. In April 2018, the Coast Guard reported to Congress that it was operating below the workforce necessary to meet its mission needs. GAO was asked to review the status of the Coast Guard's modernization and workforce assessment efforts. Among other things, this report examines the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) applied key practices for agency reorganization and (2) has assessed its workforce needs. GAO analyzed Coast Guard documents used to plan and implement its modernization effort against GAO key practices for agency reorganization. GAO also analyzed Coast Guard workforce assessments and data from 2003 through 2019. GAO also reviewed policy and planning documents and interviewed Coast Guard officials. The U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) realigned its mission planning and mission support functions through an effort known as “modernization,” but did not consistently apply key practices for agency reorganization in implementing the effort. Of seven key practices, the Coast Guard did not apply two and partially applied three. For example, the Coast Guard did not measure its progress in achieving the goal of modernization, as key practices recommend. Coast Guard documents for organizational change and associated guidance do not require such practices to be followed. By ensuring such practices are implemented, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to determine the extent to which its investments meet modernization's goal of improving effectiveness and efficiency. Although the Coast Guard has informed Congress that it needs to increase its workforce, it has assessed a small portion of its workforce needs. Its preferred tool for assessing workforce needs is its manpower requirements determination process, which includes manpower requirements analyses (MRA) and is completed with a manpower requirements determination (MRD). Coast Guard guidance states that MRAs are to be updated every 5 years, and according to its April 2018 Manpower Requirements Plan, the Coast Guard's goal is to complete MRDs for all of its 58,000 personnel and 158 unit types. However, the Coast Guard had completed MRAs for 13 percent of its workforce and MRDs for 2 percent over the past 5 calendar years (see figure). The Coast Guard's plan does not include time frames and milestones for how it will achieve its workforce assessment goal, and information on the resources it needs to complete MRDs for all positions and units has not been updated in 10 years. By updating its plan to complete manpower requirements determinations and obtaining information on the resources needed to achieve its workforce assessment goal, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to ensure that it has the right number of people with requisite skills in the right units to meet its mission demands and to inform Congress of its manpower needs.