Each year, hundreds of millions of passengers rely on airlines to get them to their destination without incident—including some of the 57 million Americans with a disability. While airlines maintain their performance and service have improved, passengers may still experience a range of inconveniences. A number of consumer protections are in place at the federal level. These protections have addressed long tarmac delays and increased compensation for passengers who are involuntarily denied boarding. Some protections are specific to passengers with disabilities, requiring that airlines provide (1) help enplaning and deplaning, and (2) compensation for lost or damaged wheelchairs. DOT enforces these protections. This statement discusses (1) DOT's data on airline operational performance from 2008 through 2017, and (2) what is known about passenger complaints and airlines' practices related to accessibility and non-discrimination issues. This statement is based on six prior GAO reports issued in the past 3 years. For that work, GAO analyzed relevant DOT data and passenger complaints; reviewed DOT documents and regulations; and interviewed DOT officials and representatives from selected airlines and consumer advocate organizations. For this statement, GAO updated prior analyses on passenger complaints for accessibility and discrimination issues and reviewed recent DOT rulemakings. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) data show that airlines' operational performance—as measured by rates of denied boardings, mishandled baggage, and flight delays—generally improved from 2008 through 2017, the latest available data at the time of GAO's review. Nevertheless, in 2018, GAO found that passenger complaints to DOT across all complaint categories increased about 10 percent from 2008 through 2017 for 12 airlines that GAO selected for review. Complaints about airlines' operational performance accounted for around 50 percent of the total. Passenger disability complaints submitted to airlines—which vastly outnumber such complaints submitted directly to DOT—have steadily increased since 2011. Unlike all other categories of passenger complaints, airlines are required to annually report the number of disability-related complaints they receive to DOT. Passenger disability complaints submitted directly to DOT also increased in 2019, accounting for the second highest level in the past 10 years. Complaints to airlines and DOT in 2017—the most recent year data were available—were most commonly about failure of airline staff to provide assistance, seating accommodation issues, and issues related to service animals. Passenger complaints submitted to DOT related to discrimination also rose in 2019, with 96 complaints filed. From 2010 through 2019, DOT received, on average, 80 complaints a year from passengers alleging discrimination, most commonly about racial discrimination. DOT requires that airlines provide training on accessibility issues and encourages non-discrimination training for its staff. In 2017, GAO found that 12 selected airlines had accessibility-related training requirements for their staff and contractors, with some variations in the content and format. In 2019, GAO reported that representatives from six selected U.S. airlines provide non-discrimination training to employees, although not all contractor staff receive that training. Airlines have taken initial actions in other areas. More recently, in 2020, GAO found that only about 4.5 percent of the eight largest U.S. airlines' fleet of aircraft with single aisles were designed to accommodate airplane onboard wheelchairs.


Each year, millions of passengers travel internationally by plane. Many of these passengers are served by U.S. and foreign air carriers that have formed alliances to coordinate and integrate their networks. With antitrust immunity provided by DOT, airline alliances pursue a wide range of cooperative activities as outlined in joint venture agreements between the airlines. While this cooperation is meant to provide consumers with better services, it could also affect the extent of airline competition. GAO was asked to review consumer issues related to immunized international air alliances. This report (1) describes how DOT's review of antitrust immunity applications considers the potential effects on consumers and (2) evaluates how DOT monitors approved grants of antitrust immunity. GAO analyzed DOT's antitrust immunity proceedings, interviewed officials from DOT, the Department of Justice, as well as a nongeneralizable selection of 13 stakeholders, including consumer organizations and domestic air carriers with and without antitrust immunity. Potential effects on consumers are included in the analyses the Department of Transportation (DOT) conducts when reviewing international air carriers' requests for antitrust immunity. If granted, this immunity allows the airlines to engage in certain cooperative activities, such as coordinating prices and schedules, without risk of violating U.S. antitrust laws (see figure). DOT's analyses examine: The potential competitive effect of the proposed cooperative agreement in terms of relevant markets, on changes in the number of competitors and market shares, and on market entry. The potential for the close integration of carriers to create public benefits, such as lower consumer prices or expanded service offerings. Such analyses involve DOT staff's reviewing an array of data, documents, and reports filed in a public docket by carriers and interested parties and, ultimately, making a decision based on their assessment of the application. DOT has premised its decisions to grant immunity on the expectation that consumer benefits flow from high levels of integration of critical business functions between carriers. To date, DOT has granted antitrust immunity 31 times, with 23 grants currently in effect, which cover agreements made among carriers in each of the three major international air alliances. DOT has rejected three applications due to concerns about potential anticompetitive harm or insufficient public benefits for consumers. Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally agreed that DOT's decisions were transparent, but some disagreed on the potential benefits of immunity for consumers. DOT takes multiple steps to monitor alliances and understand the effects of immunity. Since 2009, DOT has required all transatlantic and transpacific partnerships to submit annual reports on the status of their immunized agreement. Additionally, DOT recently commissioned an empirical evaluation of immunities' effects and is currently reviewing the findings. However, DOT does not externally report information on the effects of granted immunities to Congress, industry stakeholders, and the public. As a result, these external entities are unable to determine what, if any, steps DOT is taking to ensure that grants of antitrust immunity remain in the public interest. Further, without additional transparency and information on DOT's findings on the effects of immunities, external entities do not know if immunized alliances have delivered the expected consumer benefits that DOT used as a basis to approve the carriers' request for antitrust immunity.


Each year, the DHS invests billions of dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. DHS plans to spend more than $10 billion on these programs in fiscal year 2020 alone. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part, because of management and funding issues. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions on an ongoing basis. This report, GAO's fifth review, assesses the extent to which: (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, and (2) current program baselines trace to key acquisition documents. GAO assessed 27 acquisition programs, including DHS's largest programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of April 2018, and programs GAO or DHS identified as at risk of poor outcomes. GAO assessed cost and schedule progress against baselines; compared APB cost, schedule and performance parameters to underlying documents used in establishing baselines; and interviewed DHS officials. As of August 2019, 25 of the 27 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet current goals. The remaining two programs breached their schedule or cost goals. This represents an improvement since GAO's last review. However, GAO found that some of the programs that were on track as of August 2019 are at risk of not meeting cost or schedule goals or both in the future. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter program faces potential cost increases and schedule slips in the future as a result of damages to the shipbuilder's facility from Hurricane Michael in October 2018. Traceability, which is called for in DHS policy and GAO scheduling best practices, helps ensure that program goals are aligned with program execution plans, and that a program's various stakeholders have an accurate and consistent understanding of those plans and goals. Of the 27 programs GAO assessed, 21 had established baselines after DHS updated its acquisition policy in March 2016 (the most current version of the policy at the beginning of this review). GAO found that the 21 programs' baseline cost and performance goals generally traced to source documents, such as life-cycle cost estimates and planned performance outcomes. However, schedule goals did not generally match up to the programs' integrated master schedules (IMS), as required by DHS acquisition management instruction and as a best practice identified in GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide (see figure). The lack of traceability between IMSs and schedule goals in the approved acquisition program baselines (APB) indicates that DHS does not have appropriate oversight processes in place to ensure that schedules are accurately reflected in program baselines, in accordance with DHS policy and GAO's best practices. Therefore, DHS cannot ensure that the understanding of program schedules among different stakeholders, including component and DHS leadership is consistent and accurate. As a result, DHS leadership may be approving program schedule goals that do not align with program execution plans.


Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides authorization of appropriations for a range of Department of Defense (DOD) and national security programs and related activities. New or clarified defense policies, organizational reform, and directed reports to Congress are often included. For FY2020, the NDAA ( P.L. 116-92 ) addresses or attempts to resolve high-profile military personnel issues. Some are required annual authorizations (e.g., end-strengths); some are updates or modifications to existing programs; and some are issues identified in certain military personnel programs. In the FY2020 NDAA, Congress authorized end-strengths identical to the Administration's FY2020 budget proposal. The authorized active duty end-strength increased by about 1% to 1,339,500. The authorized Selected Reserves end-strength decreased by about 2% to 807,800. A 3.1% increase in basic military pay took effect on January 1, 2020. This increase is identical to the Administration's FY2020 budget proposal and equal to the automatic annual adjustment amount directed by statutory formula (37 U.S.C. Â§1009). Congress also directed modifications to several existing personnel programs, including extension of DOD Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) privileges to Foreign Service Officers on mandatory home leave; repeal of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) and Veterans Affairs' Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) offset requirement (i.e., the wi dows' tax ); modification of DOD workplace and command climate surveys to include questions relating to experiences with supremacist activity, extremist activity, or racism; expansion of Special Victim Counsel services for victims of domestic violence; prohibition of gender-segregated Marine Corps recruit training; expansion of spouse employment and education programs, including reimbursement for relicensing costs associated with military relocations; clarified roles and responsibilities for senior military medical leaders assigned to the Defense Health Agency or a service medical department; and medical documentation and tracking requirements for servicemembers or family members exposed to certain environmental or occupational hazards (e.g., lead, open air burn pits, blast pressure). As part of the oversight process, several provisions address selected congressional items of interest, including DOD review of service records of certain World War I veterans for potential eligibility for a posthumously awarded Medal of Honor; a process for former servicemembers to appeal decisions issued by a Board of Correction of Military Records or a Discharge Review Board; a feasibility study on the creation of a database to track domestic violence military protective orders and reporting to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System; transparency on military medical malpractice, including the ability for servicemembers to file administrative claims against the United States; and limitations on the reduction of military medical personnel.


Each year, the federal government obligates billions of dollars on contracts for which the final costs depend, in part, on the amount of overhead and other costs charged to the contract. Congress created the Board in 1970. The standards it created ensure contractors appropriately charge costs to government contracts. In contrast, GAAP is a set of financial reporting principles that commercial firms may use in preparing financial statements and which include the basis for recognizing and measuring costs in such statements . Industry representatives and others have raised concerns that complying with CAS may be burdensome and questioned whether the government could rely on GAAP. In 2016, Congress included a provision in law that the Board, among other things, conform CAS with GAAP, where practicable. Congress also included a provision for GAO to assess Board efforts. This report assesses the extent to which the Board is taking steps to meet legislative requirements and describes the Board's efforts to conform CAS to GAAP. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations and guidance, Federal Register notices and other documentation on the Board's activities. GAO also examined the Board's methodology for comparing CAS to GAAP and its preliminary analysis of two of the cost accounting standards. Finally, GAO interviewed Board members and federal procurement officials. The Cost Accounting Standards Board (the Board) is generally meeting recent legislative requirements and has taken initial steps to assess the extent to which the government's Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) can be conformed with a set of 12commercial financial reporting principles known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Comprising five members representing the government and industry, the Board issued 19 standards between 1972 and 1980. After that point, the Board met intermittently until 2016. At that time, Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to require the Board to meet quarterly, to review CAS-related disputes, to conform CAS with GAAP where practicable, and to report annually to Congress on its efforts, among other things. Since the legislation went into effect, the Board has met regularly, has been briefed on CAS-related disputes, and is preparing its initial report to Congress. The Board has also taken initial steps to assess the extent to which CAS can be conformed with GAAP. The Board summarized its approach in a March 2019 staff discussion paper, which it released for public comment. In it, the Board: outlined a set of five guiding principles to assess whether proposed CAS changes are necessary and whether those changes would reduce the burden on contractors while protecting the government's interests, identified a roadmap that prioritized the Board's proposed review of the standards, and included a preliminary comparison of two of the seven standards identified as having the most overlap with GAAP (see figure). Some comments submitted in response to the discussion paper by industry groups stated that each of the 19 CAS should be eliminated unless proven to be absolutely necessary. Board members told GAO they were considering all options for refining CAS but noted that GAAP and CAS are focused on two separate goals—GAAP on businesses' high-level financial performance, CAS on allocating costs to individual government contracts. The Board and other government officials said that eliminating CAS requirements to rely purely on GAAP would limit the government's ability to protect its interests.


Economic sanctions imposed by the United Statesâthrough enacted legislation and executive actionâon Iran, Russia, and Venezuela aim to pressure the ruling governments to change their behavior and policies. Currently, these sanctions aim to either eliminate (Iran) or restrict (Venezuela) crude oil trade of as much as 3.3 million to 4.0 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly 3%-4% of global petroleum supply. Estimated oil production volumes affected to date have been approximately 1.7 million bpd from Iran. Venezuela oil production has also likely been affected, although accurately quantifying volumes is difficult due to monthly oil production declines over a period of years prior to U.S. sanctions affecting oil trade in January 2019. Sanctions imposed on Russia's oil sector generally target longer-term oil production and to date have not reduced Russian oil supply or trade. Oil production in Russia has increased since oil-sector sanctions began in 2014, although the country has arguably incurred economic costs in order to incentivize and support oil output levels. Sanctions targeting Iran's oil sector date back to the 1980s and affect virtually every element of Iran's oil sector (e.g., investment, shipping, insurance, and exports). Legislation enacted in 2011 ( P.L. 112-81 ) and 2013 ( P.L. 112-239 ), along with subsequent executive orders (E.O.s), created a sanctions framework designed to discourage oil importersâby sanctioning banks that transact with Iran or facilitate oil transactions, as well as entities that buy Iranian oilâfrom purchasing crude oil and other petroleum and petrochemical products from Iran. Iran oil export sanctions include design elements (e.g., significant reduction exceptions, requirements to certify oil markets are adequately supplied, and coordination with oil-producing countries) intended to minimize oil price escalation that could result from sanctions-related oil supply reductions. Iran oil export sanctions have been applied, waived, and reapplied since 2011. As of November 2019, the Trump Administration's stated goal has been to reduce Iran's oil exports to zero. Trade data indicate that observed Iranian crude oil exports declined by approximately 80% between April 2018 and October 2019. Should sanctions affecting Iran's oil exports be relieved or terminated, the reentry of 1 million to 2 million bpd of crude oil could, depending on market conditions and oil-producing country decisions, contribute to oil market oversupply that could lower oil prices. While U.S. petroleum product consumers may welcome such an outcome, severe and persistently low prices could have adverse effects on U.S. oil producers. Oil sector sanctions imposed on Russia via E.O. since 2014, and codified ( P.L. 115-44 ) in 2017, apply to certain Russian oil companies and target two activities: (1) accessing debt finance, and (2) accessing oil exploration and production technology for deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale projects. Near-term Russian oil supply does not appear to have been affected by these sanctions to date; oil production has increased since 2014. Alternative financing, currency devaluation, and Russia's oil tax and export duty policies have provided Russian companies with capital and incentives to increase oil production and exports. Over the long term, Russian oil output could be affected by oil production technology sanctions, as some European and U.S. companies have terminated participation in certain oil exploration and development projects. Economic sanctions affecting Venezuela's oil trade are the product of E.O.s and U.S. Department of the Treasury designations in 2019 prohibiting transactions with Petroleo s de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). Petroleum trade between the United States and Venezuela has been eliminated. As a result, Venezuela has sought alternative buyers of crude oil previously destined for the United States and alternative suppliers of petroleum products previously sourced from U.S. exporters. Although U.S. economic sanctions do not explicitly prohibit non-U.S. entities from trading oil and petroleum products with PdVSA, Treasury has discretion to take action against foreign entities that provide material support to PdVSA. This sanctions framework element could make it difficult for PdVSA to secure alternative buyers and suppliers. Rosneft, a Russian-controlled oil company, has reportedly facilitated Venezuelan crude oil trade with independent oil refiners in China and has provided Venezuela with petroleum products previously sourced from U.S. suppliers. Enacted legislation in the 116 th Congress ( P.L. 116-94 ) requires the Administration to coordinate Venezuela sanctions with international partners and expresses concerns about certain PdVSA transactions with Rosneft. Sanctions-related oil supply constraints have affected oil production and trade. Oil market characteristicsâgenerally inelastic supply and demand in the short termâcould contribute to market conditions that could result in volatile price movements (both up and down) when supply and demand are imbalanced by as little as 1% to 2% for a brief or sustained period. To date, persistently high crude oil prices have been moderated by several factors, including increasing U.S. oil production and exports, trade flow adjustments, expectations of slowing demand growth rates, and sanctions design elements. However, oil trade sanctions have affected price differentials for certain crude oil types (e.g., light vs. heavy).


A 2014 government report predicted that the rate of violent domestic extremist incidents would increase. In recent years, some high-profile incidents have occurred on federal lands, such as the armed occupation of a FWS wildlife refuge in 2016. Federal land management agencies manage nearly 700 million acres of federal lands and have law enforcement divisions that protect their employees and secure their facilities. This testimony summarizes GAO's September 2019 report on how land management agencies protect their employees and secure their facilities (GAO-19-643). In that report, GAO examined, among other things, for the four federal land management agencies, (1) what is known about the number of threats and assaults against their employees and (2) the extent to which agencies met federal facility security assessment requirements. For the report, GAO analyzed available government data on threats and assaults; examined agencies' policies, procedures, and documentation on facility security assessments; compared the agencies' methodologies against ISC requirements; and interviewed land management agency, ISC, and FBI officials. Data from the four federal land management agencies—the Forest Service within the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife (FWS), and National Park Service (Park Service) within the Department of the Interior—showed a range of threats and assaults against agency employees in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, incidents ranged from telephone threats to attempted murder against federal land management employees. However, the number of actual threats and assaults is unclear and may be higher than what is captured in available data for various reasons. For example, employees may not always report threats because they consider them a part of the job. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 also showed that the FBI initiated under 100 domestic terrorism investigations into potential threats against federal land management agencies. The majority of these FBI investigations involved BLM, and the majority involved individuals motivated by anti-government ideologies. The four federal land management agencies have not completed all of the facility security assessments on their occupied federal facilities as required by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). Officials at the four agencies said that either they do not have the resources, expertise, or training to conduct assessments agency-wide. FWS has a plan to complete its assessments, but BLM, the Forest Service, and the Park Service do not. Such a plan could help these agencies address the factors that have affected their ability to complete assessments. The ISC also requires that agencies conduct assessments using a methodology that meets, among other things, two key requirements: (1) consider all of the undesirable events (e.g., arson and vandalism) identified as possible risks to facilities, and (2) assess the threat, vulnerability, and consequence for each of these events. The Forest Service's methodology meets these two requirements and the Park Service's methodology partially meets the requirements, but BLM and FWS have not yet established methodologies for conducting facility security assessments. Without developing a plan for conducting all of the remaining facility security assessments and using a methodology that complies with ISC requirements, agencies may not identify the risks their facilities face or identify the countermeasures—such as security cameras or security gates—they could implement to mitigate those risks.


Access to high-speed internet, known as broadband, is becoming increasingly essential to daily life as more applications and activities move online. This has become particularly apparent during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, as employers in some sectors transitioned their workers from on-site work to telework and schools migrated their students from classrooms to distance learning. These shifts may seem clear-cut, but many areas of the United Statesâparticularly rural areasâhave either limited or no access to broadband infrastructure. Additionally there are citizens in areas with high broadband penetration who are unable to access it due to socioeconomic factors. The gap between those who have access to broadband and those who do not is referred to as the digital divide. While there is broadband penetration in many areas of the United States, 21.3 million Americans lack access to a connection that enables a download rate of at least 25 megabits per second (Mbps) and an upload rate of 3 Mbps, according to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) 2019 Broadband Deployment Report . Federal agencies such as the FCC, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA, in the Department of Commerce), and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS, in the U.S. Department of Agriculture) have directed resources to help bridge the digital divideâchiefly for broadband infrastructure buildout. While broadband infrastructure addresses a large component of the digital divide by increasing availability, there are additional geographic, social, and economic factors that affect broadband adoption, even where it is available. Major examples of such factors include the cost of internet service and devices and digital literacy skills. To further assist in closing the digital divide, states have been developing their own broadband programs and initiatives. Although many state broadband initiatives focus on building out broadband infrastructure, states have also been considering other factors. As each state approaches broadband access and deployment differently, this report analyzes selected state-level and local initiatives that have tried different approachesâapproaches that may serve as models for future federal broadband initiatives. These include initiatives that address broadband mapping, broadband feasibility, digital equity and digital inclusion, gigabit broadband initiatives, and the homework gap. Among the options Congress may consider are holding hearings with state officials involved in state broadband initiatives to hear their stories, successes, and lessons learned; developing pilot broadband initiatives to evaluate the feasibility of different approaches; providing additional funding and oversight for state initiatives to help improve their sustainability; and finding ways to address duplicative funding while not unintentionally exacerbating the exclusion of unserved and underserved communities. Whether Congress decides to enact new broadband funding or initiatives remains to be seen; however, there appears to be an opportunity for states to share lessons learned from their approaches to closing the digital divide. Numerous bills addressing aspects of the digital divide other than broadband infrastructure have been introduced in the 116 th Congress, including the Homework Gap Trust Fund Act ( S. 3362 ) introduced on February 27, 2020, and the Closing the Homework Gap Through Mobile Hotspots Act ( H.R. 5243 ), introduced on November 21, 2019. Bills addressing the coordination of federal agencies and tracking of federal funding for broadband include Broadband Interagency Coordination Act of 2019 ( H.R. 4283 ) introduced on September 11, 2019, and the Advancing Critical Connectivity Expands Service, Small Business Resources, Opportunities, Access, and Data Based on Assessed Need and Demand Act ( H.R. 1328 ), passed by the House on May 8, 2019.


Edge providers are individuals and entities that provide content, applications, services, and devices accessed over the internet. An edge provider can be a personal blog created by an individual or a website created by a billion-dollar company. Some edge providers sell products or subscriptions, while others sell consumer data or use it for digital advertising. Edge provider activities, conducted on the "edge" of the internetâhence the nameâare not regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Edge providers rely on internet service providers (ISPs) and mobile carriers to deliver content to users. Some companies that operate as ISPs have become edge providers, and a few edge providers with substantial financial resources have become or intend to become ISPs. This has the potential to affect competition among edge providers, as an ISP may have incentives to prioritize content from affiliated edge providers. To deliver content at speeds similar to edge providers associated with ISPs, unaffiliated edge providers may choose to incur the costs of direct connections to users' ISPs. Other unaffiliated edge providers may build or pay to use another company's content delivery networks, which use geographically dispersed servers to deliver online content and services more quickly. Mobile carriers that also serve as edge providers can also have a competitive advantage. For example, they can include their own apps on mobile devices for free, while charging other edge providers a fee. Mobile carriers can also allow users to access content from affiliated edge providers without incurring charges on the users' data plans. These actions could affect net neutrality, a term associated with the concept that all data traveling through the internet should be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Some edge providers are acquiring other edge providers for a variety of reasons, including to increase their customer base, to improve the content or services offered, or to eliminate potential competitors. By increasing its customer base, an edge provider could enhance its market position, increasing its leverage in bargaining with ISPs over the speed and quality with which its content is delivered. An edge provider that relies on digital advertising could also benefit from enlarging its customer base, as this would allow it to send advertisements to more individuals and sell more advertisement spaces to advertisers. It may be difficult to distinguish between acquisitions intended to improve the content or services offered and those seeking to eliminate potential competitors. While consumers generally benefit in the former case, the latter case could have negative effects, such as hindering innovation. While the FCC does not regulate edge provider activities, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) may examine edge providers on a case-by-case basis for potential consumer privacy or antitrust violations. The FTC, DOJ, and at least 47 attorneys general have reportedly opened antitrust investigations of possible anticompetitive behavior, reportedly including Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. The House Judiciary Committee also opened an investigation into competition in digital markets. A key question in these investigations is how to define the markets within which edge providers compete. Oftentimes, edge providers offer products and services that can be classified under multiple industries. For example, do video streaming services compete only with each other, with cable networks and movie theaters, or with the entertainment industry as a whole? Should a diversified company be examined as a unified entity, or should its edge provider component be evaluated separately? Estimating the market shares of edge providers that rely on revenue from digital advertising is further complicated by the difficulty of determining "sales" for these companies, as they may not obtain revenue from offering their content to users. Some edge providers now operate in multiple industries. Some companies have integrated vertically, both generating content as edge providers and delivering it to consumers as internet service providers (ISPs). Other companies have integrated horizontally by acquiring other edge providers, which could increase their customer base and expand the content or services offered, but also eliminate potential competitors. This report focuses on how horizontal and vertical integration may affect edge providers' relationships with ISPs and competition among edge providers.


Electricity portfolio standards, such as renewable portfolio standards and clean energy standards, are policies aimed at changing the energy sources used to generate electricity. Supporters identify multiple policy goals, including greenhouse gas reduction, technology inno vation, and job creation. Twenty-nine states, three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are currently implementing mandatory portfolio standards. Congress, to date, has not established a national portfolio standard, though bills that would do so have been introduced in every Congress since the 105 th . Congressional interest in 2011 and 2012 prompted a variety of analyses about potential impacts of a national portfolio standard. The national electricity generation profile has changed since then in ways that might make previous analyses less relevant to any future policy debate. Between 2012 and 2018, in the U.S. generation from coal fell (from 37% to 27%), generation from natural gas increased (from 30% to 35%), and generation from renewable sources (e.g., hydropower, wind, solar) increased (from 12% to 18%). Many expect these trends to continue, regardless of any new federal policy related to the electric power sector. Portfolio standards are generally envisioned as market-based policies in the sense that they use financial incentives rather than prohibitions to achieve policy goals. Several key concepts in portfolio standards are common to other market-based policies. Credits are an accounting mechanism used for compliance and are tracked in electronic databases sometimes called registries. Lawmakers can choose the degree of flexibility around credit use in a portfolio standard, with potential impacts on overall policy costs and benefits. Procedures to monitor, report, and verify credits can help portfolio standards achieve their policy goals and reduce the risk of fraud. Other concepts are specific to portfolio standards. Choices about these design elements can strongly influence policy outcomes. Generally, choices that would tend to reduce costs would also tend to result in fewer changes in the electricity generation profile. The choice of which energy sources would be eligible for compliance, and therefore would be incentivized by the program, is often central to policy discussions about portfolio standards. Past proposals have included a range of eligible sources, including renewable sources, nuclear, fossil fuel-fired power plants equipped with carbon capture and sequestration technology (CCS), and natural gas combined cycle power plants. Some proposals have included nongenerating sources like energy storage and energy efficiency as well. Other design elements include whether all utilities should have to comply with a portfolio standard or whether some would be exempted; how much generation from eligible sources a portfolio standard is designed to achieve; by when should the desired amount of generation from those sources be achieved; to what share of a utility's electricity sales should a portfolio standard apply; and whether any provisions should be included that delay or halt compliance under certain circumstances (e.g., undesirably high prices). If established, a national portfolio standard would likely have economic effects, though estimating these in advance is subject to some uncertainty. Any sources and associated industries excluded from the definition of eligible sources would likely experience negative economic effects. At the same time, industries associated with sources included in the standard would likely experience positive economic effects. The net effect on national economic activity would depend on the design details of any portfolio standard and the ways that consumers might respond to potentially higher electricity prices. A national portfolio standard might also have environmental effects compared to a business-as-usual scenario, depending on design choices such as source eligibility and the change from business as usual a portfolio standard is designed to achieve. Potential eligible sources vary in their GHG and air pollutant emissions, as well as other attributes such as water consumption and power density (which can affect land requirements). Implementation could affect environmental outcomes too. For example, deploying small-scale distributed eligible sources might have different effects than deploying large-scale eligible sources. Another policy consideration is potential interaction with state energy policies like existing portfolio standards, electricity infrastructure siting, and the use of competitive markets to influence electricity investment decisions. Such interactions may generate debate regarding preemption and highlight potential federalism concerns.


Electricity, as it is currently produced, is largely a commodity resource that is interchangeable with electricity from any other source. Since opportunities for the large-scale storage of electricity are few, it is essentially a just-in-time resource, produced as needed to meet the demand of electricity-consuming customers. Climate change mitigation has increased the focus on the use of renewable electricity. While energy storage is seen as an enabling technology with the potential to reduce the intermittency and variability of wind and solar resources, energy storage resources would have to be charged by low- or zero-emission or renewable sources of electricity to ensure a reduction of greenhouse gases. Energy storage is being increasingly investigated for its potential to provide significant benefits to the interstate transmission grid, and perhaps to local distribution systems and thus to retail electric customers. The ability to store energy presents an opportunity to add flexibility in how electricity is produced and used, and provides an alternative to address peak loads on the system using renewable electricity stored at low-demand times. In addition to providing power on demand, energy storage technologies have the potential to provide ancillary services to the electricity grid to ensure the reliability and stability of the power system, and better match generation to demand for electricity. Hydropower pumped storage (HPS), compressed air energy storage, and cryogenic energy storage are examples of technologies that store potential (or kinetic) energy. These are examples of the mostly large, monolithic systems used for energy storage today do not store electricity directly, but provide a means of producing electricity by use of a stored medium (e.g., water or air). According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), approximately 24 HPS systems are currently operating with a total installed capacity of over 16.5 Gigawatts. HPS is approximately 94% of existing U.S. energy storage capacity. Since the storage of potential energy systems is well established on the grid, this report focuses on the relatively new use of modular batteries for grid level storage. Modular battery technologies generally store electrical energy in chemical media that can be converted to electricity, and consist of standardized individual cells with relatively small power and voltage capacities that are typically aggregated to serve larger power loads. Lead-acid batteries and lithium ion (Li Ion) cells are the most used modular battery technologies for utility scale (i.e., projects of one megawatt or greater in capacity) applications on the electric grid. Li Ion cells are being used for a variety of applications, due largely to their high energy density and ability to undergo a number of full power charging cycles. However, battery technologies, in general, can provide energy for only a few hours, and vary with regard to the time required to recharge battery systems. Procurement of cobalt for Li Ion batteries has also been controversial due to child labor and safety concerns in many Congolese artisanal mines. While Li Ion battery systems are currently the most prevalent form of modular storage, and a key technology for electric vehicles, several issues exist with system cost, materials used, and the safety of these systems. Congress may want to direct further research into modular battery system materials and charging technologies to reduce the cost, improve the safety of systems, increase system performance and cycle efficiency, and to assure the sustainable development of modular battery systems. Congress may also want to look at providing guidance for policy regimes or incentives that promote energy storage in a manner that can decrease greenhouse gas emissions. FERC acknowledged that existing market rules for traditional resources can create barriers to entry for emerging technologies, and energy storage in particular. FERC designed its Order No. 841 to require "each regional grid operator to revise its tariff to establish a participation model for electric storage resources that consist of market rules that properly recognize the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources."


Employment-related identity fraud poses risks to IRS's ability to collect taxes owed on wages and to SSA's ability to correctly calculate and manage Social Security benefits. GAO was asked to review employment-related identity fraud. This report examines (1) the potential scope of employment-related identity fraud, including what IRS knows about this type of fraud and what GAO could determine by analyzing Department of Health and Human Services' National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and IRS data; (2) SSA and IRS actions to detect and deter this fraud as well as notify victims; and (3) SSA and IRS's collaboration on the issue. GAO analyzed 3 months of 2016 NDNH wage data and 2016 IRS taxpayer data to identify potential employment-related identity fraud. GAO also reviewed relevant IRS and SSA documentation and interviewed agency officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in January 2020. Information that SSA deemed sensitive has been omitted. Employment-related identity fraud occurs when people use a name or Social Security number (SSN) other than their own to get a job. People may do this if they are not authorized to work in the United States or are trying to avoid child support payments, among other reasons. Victims may face Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement actions based on wages earned by fraudsters. IRS identified more than 818,000 cases in 2018, but this included only one form of employment-related identity fraud—mismatches between the identity listed on the Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement (W-2) and the identity on the tax return. The true scope of employment-related identity fraud is unknown. GAO reviewed additional forms of this fraud and identified 1.3 million SSNs that for 2016 had both (1) characteristics associated with employment-related identity fraud; and (2) wages reported by the employer on a W-2, but not reported by the employee on a tax return. This includes about 9,000 individuals whose employers reported W-2s in five or more states, but who did not include them all on their tax return (see figure). The Social Security Administration (SSA) processes W-2s before sending W-2 data to IRS for enforcement purposes. SSA has developed processes to detect some inaccurate W-2s and notify potential fraud victims. IRS uses W-2 information to deter some potential fraudsters, but has not assessed the costs and benefits of expanding its enforcement efforts to include certain individuals who may underwithhold taxes or not file returns. Doing so could help IRS determine if such an effort would enable the agency to collect additional revenue. SSA and IRS entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to collaborate to exchange wage data. However, they have not established performance goals and measures for the MOU, implemented the MOU's monitoring provisions, or clearly defined the data elements they exchange.


Enforcement supports SEC's mission by bringing civil and administrative actions against individuals and entities for fraud, financial and accounting irregularities and misstatements, and other misconduct. According to SEC, these enforcement actions serve as a deterrent against future wrongdoing. Since 2017, Enforcement has published an annual report that provides statistics on its enforcement activities and highlights its priorities for the coming year. GAO was asked to examine SEC reporting of enforcement statistics. This report examines (1) the ways that enforcement statistics reporting changed over the last 10 years, and (2) policies and procedures for recording, reviewing, and reporting enforcement statistics. GAO reviewed SEC's internal policies, procedures, and manuals for recording, verifying, and reporting data. GAO also interviewed SEC officials and reviewed past SEC reports containing enforcement statistics. Since 2009, the Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) in the Securites and Exchange Commision (SEC) has made modifications to its reporting of enforcement statistics, including by releasing a stand-alone annual report beginning in fiscal year 2017. The Enforcement Annual Report included additional data on enforcement statistics not previously reported and narratives about enforcement priorities and cases. Enforcement staff told us the annual report was created to increase transparency and provide more information and deeper context than previous reporting had provided. Enforcement has written procedures for recording and verifying enforcement-related data (including on investigations and enforcement actions) in its central database. However, Enforcement does not have written procedures for generating its public reports (currently, the annual report), including for compiling and verifying the enforcement statistics used in the report. To produce the report, Enforcement staff told GAO that staff and officials hold meetings in which they determine which areas and accomplishments to highlight (see figure). Enforcement was not able to provide documentation demonstrating that the process it currently uses to prepare and review the report was implemented as intended. Developing written procedures for generating Enforcement's public reports and documenting their implementation would provide greater assurance that reported information is reliable and accurate, which is important to maintaining the division's credibility and public confidence in its efforts.


Enforcing environmental laws and regulations, including those governing water, air, and hazardous waste, is a central part of EPA's mission. In partnership with states, EPA oversees compliance with these requirements for about 800,000 regulated entities, such as refineries and sewage treatment plants. OECA carries out much of EPA's compliance and enforcement responsibilities through the agency's 10 regional offices. OECA has a range of compliance assistance, compliance monitoring, and enforcement tools available to elicit compliance with laws and regulations from regulated entities. These tools include conducting on-site inspection, training staff and providing technical assistance, developing cases, and issuing warning letters. GAO was asked to review EPA's enforcement efforts. This report examines, among other objectives, the types of information EPA collects on its compliance assistance, compliance monitoring, and enforcement actions. GAO analyzed written responses to its questions from all 10 regional offices, reviewed agency documents and databases, and interviewed EPA officials in headquarters and regional offices. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) collects a range of information on compliance and enforcement such as data on inspections, violations, and enforcement actions. The agency uses these data to manage its efforts and assess progress in meeting the agency's strategic objectives. In an August 2018 memorandum, EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) reported a key strategic change to increase compliance assistance activities (e.g., training) and informal enforcement actions (e.g., warning letters). However, the agency does not consistently collect or maintain data on either type of action (see figure). Specifically, OECA has not directed regional offices to collect or report data on compliance assistance activities since 2012 and, consequently, does not have guidance instructing regional offices to collect such data and specifying which mechanism offices should use to maintain these data. Also, the agency did not provide guidance to those offices defining informal enforcement actions or how to maintain data on them until September 30, 2019, but the guidance does not specify how to collect data on such actions. By clearly documenting in guidance how the offices should use the definition to collect data on such actions, EPA could more consistently collect these data. As the figure shows, OECA does not require regional offices to collect data on compliance assistance or complete data on informal enforcement actions. Having complete information about its compliance assistance activities and informal enforcement is essential because EPA has elevated the role of such activities in its overall enforcement efforts. However, because EPA is not consistently collecting these data, the agency cannot be sure it is achieving its strategic objectives. EPA would have better assurance it has the information it needs by clearly documenting in guidance to the regional offices that they should: collect data on compliance assistance activities and informal enforcement actions and specify which mechanism to use to maintain compliance assistance data. By doing so, EPA would have better assurance that the regional offices consistently collect and maintain these data in order to track progress toward the agency's strategic objective of increasing the use of such activities and actions.


Environmental justice seeks to address the disproportionately high distribution of health and environmental risks among low-income and minority communities by seeking their fair treatment and meaningful involvement in environmental policy. In 1994, Executive Order 12898 directed 11 federal agencies to identify and address environmental justice issues related to their activities and tasked an interagency working group to coordinate federal environmental justice efforts. In 2011, 16 agencies, including the 11 original agencies, recommitted to planning and reporting on environmental justice efforts by signing an MOU. GAO was asked to review federal environmental justice efforts. This report examines agencies' environmental justice actions, strategic plans and progress reports, and working group collaboration. GAO reviewed agency environmental justice plans, reports, and funding data; interviewed agency officials; and compared working group collaboration to leading collaborative practices. Most of the 16 agencies that are members of the interagency working group on environmental justice—created by Executive Order 12898 in 1994—reported taking some actions to identify and address environmental justice issues, such as creating data tools, developing policies or guidance, and building community capacity through small grants and training. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created a mapping tool that can help identify low-income and minority communities exposed to health or environmental risks. Several agencies, such as EPA and the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Interior, also developed policies or guidance to analyze environmental justice issues during environmental reviews or enforcement activities. Most of the agencies supported their efforts with funds and staff from related programs, but EPA and the Department of Energy provided funds ($8.3 million in fiscal year 2018) and staff specifically for environmental justice. Agencies' progress toward environmental justice is difficult to gauge, however, because most do not have updated strategic plans and have not reported annually on their progress or developed methods to assess progress. As they agreed to do in a 2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), most of the agencies developed environmental justice strategic plans, but only six have updated them more recently. Few agencies have measures or methods for assessing progress, and the working group has not provided guidance to help agencies with such assessments. The number of agencies issuing annual progress reports has declined (see fig.). Updated strategic plans and annual progress reports, along with guidance on performance measures and methods, would help agencies provide essential information to assess their progress. The working group, chaired by EPA, has developed committees and written agreements to carry out its responsibilities to coordinate agencies' environmental justice efforts, but it is not carrying out several functions in the 1994 Executive Order. GAO has found that collaborative mechanisms, such as the working group, benefit from clear goals, but the working group's organizational documents do not contain clear strategic goals aligned to address the order. Clear strategic goals to carry out the executive order could enhance the group's strategic direction for intergovernmental environmental justice efforts.


Environmental justice seeks to address the disproportionately high distribution of health and environmental risks among low-income and minority communities by seeking their fair treatment and meaningful involvement in environmental policy. In 1994, Executive Order 12898 directed 11 federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice into their programs, policies, and activities. The executive order also directed the agencies to each establish an environmental justice strategy and created a working group of federal agencies, chaired by EPA, to coordinate federal environmental justice efforts. In 2011, these 11 agencies and five additional federal agencies signed a MOU agreeing to participate in federal efforts in this area as members of the Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice and to issue annual progress reports on their efforts. This statement summarizes GAO’s findings from its September 2019 report on federal environmental justice efforts (GAO-19-543). Specifically, it focuses on (1) actions the working group agencies have taken to address environmental justice issues related to their missions, (2) the agencies’ progress in identifying and addressing environmental justice issues related to their missions, and (3) interagency working group efforts to help agencies coordinate federal environmental justice efforts under the executive order. To perform this work, GAO reviewed agency environmental justice plans, reports, and funding data; interviewed agency officials; and compared working group collaboration to leading collaborative practices. As GAO reported in September 2019, most of the 16 member agencies of the Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice reported planning and implementing some actions to identify and address environmental justice issues, such as creating data tools, developing policies or guidance, and building community capacity through small grants and training. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created a mapping tool that can help identify low-income and minority communities exposed to health or environmental risks. Most of the agencies supported their efforts with funds and staff from related programs, but EPA and the Department of Energy provided funds (totaling $8.3 million in fiscal year 2018) and staff specifically for environmental justice. Agencies’ progress in identifying and addressing environmental justice issues related to their missions is difficult to gauge. Most of the agencies do not have updated strategic plans and have not reported annually on their progress or developed methods to assess progress, as they agreed to do by signing a 2011 memorandum of understanding (MOU). Of the 16 agencies that signed the MOU, 14 have issued strategic plans. However, although the MOU directs the agencies to update their strategic plans periodically, only six of these 14 agencies have done so since 2011. Furthermore, most of these 14 agencies have not consistently issued annual progress reports. In September 2019, GAO recommended that nine agencies develop or update their strategic plans and that 11 develop annual progress reports. Eight agencies agreed and one partially agreed, one agreed with one recommendation but disagreed with another, one disagreed, and three did not state if they agreed or disagreed. GAO also found that while four agencies, including EPA, have established performance measures or milestones for assessing progress toward goals, the other 12 have not done so. Agency officials said guidance from the working group on how to do so would be helpful. The 1994 executive order directs the working group to provide guidance to agencies in developing their environmental justice strategies, but the group has not provided specific guidance on what agencies should include in their strategic plans or on methods to assess and report on environmental justice progress. In September 2019, GAO recommended EPA develop such guidance or create a working group committee to do so, and EPA agreed. The interagency working group has coordinated to some extent but does not have a strategic approach, and member agencies are not fully participating. Specifically, the group’s organizational documents do not provide strategic goals with clear direction for the committees. Furthermore, 11 of the 16 signatory agencies have not chaired or co-chaired one of the committees, and four have not participated in any. In September 2019, GAO recommended EPA update the 2011 MOU and clearly establish strategic goals for federal efforts to carry out the executive order. EPA disagreed, but GAO continues to believe these actions are necessary.


Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often referred to as the Baltic states , are close U.S. allies and considered among the most pro-U.S. countries in Europe. Strong U.S. relations with these three states are rooted in history. The United States never recognized the Soviet Union's forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940, and it applauded the restoration of their independence in 1991. These policies were backed by Congress on a bipartisan basis. The United States supported the Baltic states' accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Especially since Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, potential threats posed to the Baltic states by Russia have been a primary driver of increased U.S. and congressional interest in the region. Congressional interest in the Baltic states has focused largely on defense cooperation and security assistance for the purposes of deterring potential Russian aggression and countering hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Energy security is another main area of U.S. and congressional interest in the Baltic region. Regional Security Concerns U.S., NATO, and Baltic leaders have viewed Russian military activity in the region with concern; such activity includes large-scale exercises, incursions into Baltic states' airspace, and a layered build-up of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities. Experts have concluded that defense of the Baltic states in a conventional military conflict with Russia likely would be difficult and problematic. The Baltic states fulfill NATO's target of spending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, although as countries with relatively small populations, their armed forces remain relatively small and their military capabilities limited. Consequently, the Baltic states' defense planning relies heavily on their NATO membership. Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance The United States and the Baltic states cooperate closely on defense and security issues. New bilateral defense agreements signed in spring 2019 focus security cooperation on improving capabilities in areas such as maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, surveillance, and cybersecurity. The United States provides significant security assistance to the Baltic states; the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) increased and extended U.S. assistance for building interoperability and capacity to deter and resist aggression. Under the U.S. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014, the United States has bolstered its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of the associated Operation Atlantic Resolve, rotational U.S. forces have conducted various training activities and exercises in the Baltic states. NATO has also helped to bolster the Baltic states' security. At the 2016 NATO summit, the allies agreed to deploy multinational battalions to each of the Baltic states and Poland. The United Kingdom leads the battalion deployed in Estonia, Canada leads in Latvia, and Germany leads in Lithuania. Rotational deployments of aircraft from NATO member countries have patrolled the Baltic states' airspace since 2004; deployments have increased in size since 2014. Potential Hybrid Threats Since 2014, when the EU adopted sanctions targeting Russia due to the Ukraine conflict, tensions between Russia and the Baltic states have grown. These conditions have generated heightened concerns about possible hybrid threats and Russian tactics, such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, to pressure the Baltic states and promote anti-U.S. or anti-NATO narratives. A large minority of the Estonian and Latvian populations consists of ethnic Russians; Russia frequently accuses Baltic state governments of violating the rights of Russian speakers. Many ethnic Russians in the Baltic states receive their news and information from Russian media sources, potentially making those communities a leading target for disinformation and propaganda. Some observers have expressed concerns that Russia could use the Baltic states' ethnic Russian minorities as a pretext to manufacture a crisis. Cyberattacks are another potential hybrid threat; addressing potential vulnerabilities with regard to cybersecurity is a top priority of the Baltic states. Energy Security The Baltic states have taken steps to decrease energy reliance on Russia, including through a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Lithuania and projects to build pipeline and electricity interconnections with Poland, Finland, and Sweden.


Every 2 years, Education requires nearly all school districts to report incidents of restraint and seclusion. Generally, restraint is restricting a student's ability to move, and seclusion is confining them alone in a space they cannot leave. The House Committee on Appropriations' explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the CRDC's restraint and seclusion data. This report examines (1) the effectiveness of CRDC data quality control procedures, (2) selected districts' interpretation of CRDC's restraint and seclusion definitions, and (3) selected districts' use of data. GAO analyzed CRDC's quality control processes for school year 2015-16, and interviewed officials from seven stakeholder groups and over 50 school and district officials in three states. GAO selected states, districts, and schools to obtain a range of perspectives on using restraint and seclusion data and interpreting CRDC definitions of restraint and seclusion. Selection criteria included changes in reported incidents year to year and laws requiring districts to report incidents to states. The Department of Education's (Education) quality control processes for data it collects from public school districts on incidents of restraint and seclusion are largely ineffective or do not exist, according to GAO's analysis of school year 2015-16 federal restraint and seclusion data—the most recent available. Specifically, Education's data quality control processes were insufficient to detect problematic data in its Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC)—data Education uses in its efforts to enforce federal civil rights laws (see figure). For example, one rule Education used to check the quality of data submitted only applied to very large school districts, although GAO and Education's own analyses found erroneous reporting in districts of all sizes. Education also had no rules that flagged outliers that might warrant further exploration, such as districts reporting relatively low or high rates of restraint or seclusion. GAO tested for these outliers and found patterns in some school districts of relatively low and high rates of restraint or seclusion. Absent more effective rules to improve data quality, determining the frequency and prevalence of restraint and seclusion will remain difficult. Further, Education will continue to lack information that could help it enforce various federal civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination. Officials in the nine school districts GAO visited lacked a common understanding of the CRDC's restraint and seclusion definitions. Similarly, officials GAO interviewed in all three state educational agencies (Kentucky, Washington, and Wisconsin) and all seven stakeholder groups expressed similar concerns about the clarity of these definitions. For example, officials inconsistently interpreted the word alone in the definition of seclusion and, therefore, on whether to count an incident if a teacher was in the room. Absent clearer definitions, Education will continue to lack quality information on restraint and seclusion in public schools. Officials in school districts GAO visited identified several benefits to collecting these data, including identifying patterns in student behavior and developing interventions that can reduce the need for restraint and seclusion. Officials also said that analyzing their data helped them identify needs for additional staff training and student support services.


According to DHS, the United States has approximately 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and more than 300 ports of entry where travelers and cargo are inspected and processed for entry. Securing U.S. border areas is a key part of DHS's mission, and the department's ability to measure its border security efforts is essential for it to manage its responsibilities effectively and efficiently. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 requires DHS to report annually on 43 border security metrics. DHS issued its first report in May 2018. The Act also includes a provision for GAO, within 270 days of receipt and biennially for the following 10 years, to review and report on the data and methodology contained in DHS's report. This report assesses the extent to which DHS: (1) reported metrics as outlined in the NDAA using quality information; and (2) validated assumptions and conveyed statistical uncertainty for unlawful entry metrics, among other objectives. GAO assessed the methodology and data in DHS's report, analyzed DHS's use of statistical models, and interviewed officials from DHS offices and components involved in developing the metrics. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported on 35 of 43 metrics called for by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 (see figure); it generally used quality information, but did not identify some data limitations. GAO found that about half of the 35 metrics generally included elements as called for by the NDAA, while 17 metrics differed, such as in scope or calculation. For example, DHS only provided information on the southwest border for some metrics, such as the estimate of undetected unlawful border crossers for which a methodology for estimating unlawful crossings for the northern border had not yet been completed. DHS components responsible for collecting the metric data generally have processes in place to ensure the reliability of the data and the quality of the information provided. DHS also identified and disclosed limitations for some, but not all, of the data elements and metrics used. For example, GAO found that DHS did not disclose limitations on data related to apprehensions of individuals that were assisted by unmanned aerial systems. By developing and implementing a process to systematically review the reliability of the data and comprehensively identify and communicate limitations, DHS would improve the quality of the information provided. DHS used a statistical model to estimate three metrics on unlawful border entries but did not validate some assumptions the model employs through sensitivity analyses and provide measures of statistical uncertainty in accordance with standards for federal agencies. For example, DHS's model assumes that 100 percent of families unlawfully crossing the border will be apprehended, but DHS did not provide information on the extent to which the assumption affected its metrics. DHS also did not provide information on the level of statistical uncertainty for the metrics, such as margins of error. Providing such information would allow Congress and the public to better understand the potential limitations and accuracy of these metrics of unlawful entry. Additionally, DHS's statistical model, which is based on Mexican adults not seeking asylum, represents a small and declining share of those apprehended at the border and DHS is developing a new model to account for current border conditions.


Every year in the United States, hundreds of women die of complications related to pregnancy and childbirth. According to CDC data, racial/ethnic disparities exist with regard to these deaths. For example, non-Hispanic black women were more than three times as likely to die as non-Hispanic white women, and non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native women were more than two times as likely to die as non-Hispanic white women. GAO was asked to review issues related to maternal mortality in the United States. In this report, GAO describes, among other things, (1) trends in pregnancy-related deaths in the United States, including trends in causes and timing of these deaths, and (2) HHS funding efforts focused on reducing pregnancy-related deaths. GAO reviewed documentation about HHS's surveillance efforts related to pregnancy-related deaths; and analyzed CDC data on leading causes of pregnancy-related deaths from 2007 through 2016 (the most recent 10-year period available at the time of GAO's review). GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed HHS and state public health officials in five selected states about HHS's funding efforts aimed at reducing pregnancy-related deaths, including select efforts used in these states. GAO selected these states primarily based on their geographic diversity and their implementation of select efforts to address maternal mortality. GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO's analysis of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System data shows that from 2007 through 2016, over 6,700 women died of causes related to or aggravated by their pregnancy—either while pregnant or within 1 year of the end of pregnancy. While CDC data show an overall increase in the pregnancy-related mortality ratio in the United States during this time frame, the annual ratio fluctuated. Cardiovascular conditions, infection, and hemorrhage were the leading causes of pregnancy-related deaths, and comprised about 50 percent of all pregnancy-related deaths from 2007 through 2016. In addition, CDC data show that the leading causes of pregnancy-related deaths differed by racial ethnic groups. (See figures.) The Department of Health and Human Services has 13 ongoing efforts aimed at reducing pregnancy-related deaths. The following are key examples of these: Supporting Maternal Mortality Review Committees Cooperative Agreements . According to CDC officials, in September 2019, CDC awarded 5-year cooperative agreements to 24 recipients covering 25 states with amounts ranging from $150,000 to over $550,000 in the first year, totaling about $8.4 million. Under these agreements, CDC is providing funding to state agencies and organizations that coordinate and manage Maternal Mortality Review Committees. The committees are responsible for comprehensively reviewing deaths to identify prevention opportunities. Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Services Block Grant Program .The Health Resources and Services Administration provides funding through this program to 59 states and jurisdictions to improve maternal and child health. In fiscal year 2017, total expenditures for services for pregnant women from all sources—federal funds, as well as state, local, program income, and other funds—was about $300 million. According to agency officials, many recipients reported using their block grant funding to help support or complement other federal initiatives, such as their review committee, quality collaborative, and use of maternal safety bundles. According to officials GAO interviewed in five selected states, they use these efforts and others collectively to address pregnancy-related deaths. For example, according to officials in one state, they implemented an obstetric hemorrhage maternal safety bundle in 2018 based on the state's Maternal Mortality Review Committee finding that hemorrhage was a leading cause of pregnancy-related deaths in the state. According to officials, the state's Maternal Mortality Review Committee was funded primarily through the MCH Services Block Grant. All five states also mentioned beginning or continuing to address racial/ethnic or other health disparities with block grant funding, through their Maternal Mortality Review Committees, or other efforts. For example, officials in one state said they use block grant funding to support their Black Infant Health Program, which helps address maternal morbidity and mortality of black mothers in the late maternal period. Additionally, two of the HHS funding efforts awarded in fiscal year 2019 have outcomes related to decreasing racial and ethnic disparities in maternal mortality: the Alliance for Innovation on Maternal Health Community Care Initiative and the State Maternal Health Innovation Program.


Executive branch officials testify regularly before congressional committees on both legislative and oversight matters. Most committee requests for testimony are accepted, and the officials appear voluntarily without the need to issue subpoenas or use the other tools available to Congress to compel appearance. Congress's authority under the Constitution to legislate and investigate, along with its practices in exercising these powers, provide strong incentives for the executive branch to work voluntarily with Congress. Congress's control over appropriations and the organization and operations of the executive branch may encourage agency leaders to accommodate its requests rather than risk adverse actions toward their agencies. In addition, there are incentives for the executive branch to work with Congress in order to increase the likelihood of success for the Administration's policy agenda and to manage investigations with the potential to damage the Administration's public standing. These incentives are often sufficient to ensure that the executive branch is responsive to requests from the legislative branch. Many of these interactions are routine, and both Congress and the executive branch have developed formal procedures to promote appropriate engagement. This is particularly apparent in the procedures developed by the Office of Management and Budget in Circular A-11 and Circular A-19 to coordinate and control agency statements to Congress on the budget and pending legislation. There are situations, however, in which the incentives for compliance have been less effective in securing voluntary testimony. While each circumstance is unique, there are three identifiable areas in which executive branch officials may be more likely to conclude that the drawbacks of disclosure to Congress outweigh the incentives discussed in this report: national security and intelligence matters, ongoing law enforcement actions, and executive branch deliberations. Understanding the general incentives that support voluntary testimony, the practices that have developed around its delivery, and when executive branch officials are more likely to object to appearing before Congress may potentially help Congress navigate difficult cases.


Exempt organizations often provide charitable services, or in some instances, membership benefits in furtherance of an exempt purpose. They generally do not pay federal income tax. IRS examines exempt organization returns (Form 990 and others) to address noncompliance, which may promote confidence in the tax exempt sector. In 2016, IRS started using three analytical models using Form 990 data to identify potential noncompliance and select returns for examination. GAO was asked to review IRS's use of Form 990 data. This report assesses (1) IRS's use of data to select returns for examination and, (2) the process IRS has established for selecting returns. GAO analyzed (1) examination data from fiscal years 2016 through 2019 including results from the largest Form 990 model, and (2) model documentation for a generalizable sample. GAO interviewed IRS officials and assessed IRS policies and procedures using relevant standards for internal control. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used data to select almost 70 percent of its examinations of Form 990 returns in fiscal year 2019. Almost half of these examinations were selected using models that score returns for potential noncompliance (see figure). Of the returns examined that were selected using the model, 87 percent resulted in a change to the return, indicating that IRS identified noncompliance. GAO found that the model did not improve change rates compared to prior selection methods and a higher model score is not associated with a higher change rate. IRS has not fully implemented or documented internal controls in its established processes for analyzing data for examination selection. For example: IRS has not defined measurable objectives for using data to select returns for examination . Without measurable objectives, IRS cannot assess how well it is doing or fully implement other internal controls. IRS's models have deficiencies affecting the validity and reliability of return scoring and selection . IRS has incomplete definitions and procedures and did not always follow its definitions when assigning point values for identifying potential noncompliance for examination. As a result, return scoring by the models is not always consistent. IRS did not consistently document the processing and use of data in decision-making on examination selection . Without such documentation, IRS cannot support its use of data in examination selection in all cases. IRS does not regularly evaluate examination selection. Examination data were inconsistent across years and IRS only tracks one prior year of data. IRS also did not save data on all returns that the models scored. Without data and regular evaluations, IRS cannot assure that its models are selecting returns as intended and that deficiencies are identified and corrected.


Explaining persistently low interest rates despite large deficits and rising debt has been one of the central challenges of macroeconomists since the end of the Great Recession. This dynamic has led to increasing attention to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), presented as an alternative to the mainstream macroeconomic way of thinking, in some fiscal policy discussions. Such discussions are at times restricted by a difficulty, expressed by policymakers and economists alike, in understanding MMT's core principles and how they inform MMT's views on fiscal policy. MMT suggests that deficit financing can be used without harmful economic effects in circumstances of low inflation rates and low interest rates, conditions that currently exist despite indications that the country is at full employment. This report surveys the available MMT literature in order to provide a basic understanding of the differences (or lack thereof) between the defining relationships established in MMT and mainstream economics. It then explores how such distinctions may inform policy prescriptions for addressing short- and long-run economic issues, including approaches to federal deficit outcomes and debt management. Included in this analysis are observations of how policy recommendations from MMT and mainstream economics align with current U.S. economic and governance systems. In mainstream macroeconomic models, the asset market is characterized by the sensitivity of investment to interest rates, a determinant of investment returns. Money is typically defined as cash and close substitutes, and used for transactions and held as an asset. In the short run, the capital stock (equipment and other factors of production outside of labor) is assumed to be fixed, and output is dictated by the employment level. Fiscal and monetary policy decisions can be used to expand or contract the short-run economy (with distinct effects for each), and those decisions help to inform growth, the stock of capital and labor, and other decisions in the long run. In general, expansionary fiscal policies, including stimulus policies and other programs that increase net deficits and debt, are thought to be helpful when addressing negative shocks in demand, but they may crowd out private investment and reduce long-term growth if used when the economy is otherwise in balance. Persistent increases in real debt (which occurs when the stock of debt grows more quickly than the economy) are viewed as unsustainable, as they would eventually lead to a lack of real resources to borrow against. Though some MMT adherents have disputed the notion that the model can be viewed through the basic macroeconomic framework, efforts to do so reveal a few key distinctions. In the MMT model of short-run behavior, investment decisions are insensitive to interest rates, and are instead a function of current consumption levels. MMT holds a much broader view of money, asserting that monetary value can be created by financial institutions in a way that renders monetary policy ineffective in dealing with short-run economic fluctuations. MMT supporters therefore prefer a larger fiscal policy role in managing business cycles than mainstream economists, generally claiming that fiscal borrowing constraints are less imposing than mainstream economists believe in countries with a sovereign currency, and call for direct money financing of fiscal policy actions by the central bank. The translation of the MMT approach to long-run output is unclear, though a jobs guarantee supported by MMT adherents would likely change the nature of the relationship between employment and output levels. Full alignment with the economic and political system supported by MMT would likely involve a dramatic shift in the roles and powers of U.S. fiscal institutions. Adopting an MMT framework would involve much more fiscal policy to account for a reduced monetary policy role. Policymakers would also likely need to execute fiscal policy decisions more quickly than has been done in the past in assuming an increased role in economic management. Projections of future debt growth due to spending pressures from social programs have led to a current concern about deficit financing, recognizing the institutional challenges in conducting tax and spending fiscal policy. MMT is largely focused on short-run management of the economy, with tax and spending policies aimed at maintaining a fully employed economy without inflation. The MMT approach appears to implicitly assume that a high level of debt will not be problematic because it can be financed cheaply by maintaining low interest rates. Underlying this policy is the assumption that Congress can act quickly to counteract deficit-driven inflation with tax increases or spending cuts that would allow the economy to maintain low interest rates on public debt.


FAA requires that only mechanics who are "certificated" by the FAA approve aircraft for return to service. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that retirements and attrition could adversely affect the capacity of this workforce to meet the growing demand for air travel, and that the mechanic curriculum is outdated. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 included provisions for GAO to examine the aviation workforce. This testimony examines (1) what federal data reveal about the characteristics of the aviation maintenance workforce, (2) how selected federal agencies and other key stakeholders provide support and coordinate to develop the skills of this workforce, and (3) FAA's progress in updating the curriculum and testing standards for mechanics. GAO analyzed FAA and BLS data; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed selected federal agency, industry, and AMT school officials. Federal data provide some information on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-certificated aviation maintenance workforce, though certain data limitations exist. FAA maintains data on the number of individuals newly certificated each year, but less is known about how many certificated individuals exit the aviation industry each year and the extent of growing demand. A sufficient supply of certificated workers is critical for safety and to meet the growing demand for air travel. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data provide some information on pay and demand for aviation maintenance workers more broadly, but do not differentiate between FAA-certificated and non-certificated workers due to data collection challenges. Demographic data may also be useful for workforce analysis and planning. FAA data provide some demographic information on certificated mechanics and repairmen, such as age and sex, but the agency lacks data on race and ethnicity. According to GAO analysis of FAA data, the median age of the roughly 330,000 mechanics and repairmen FAA had certificated as of December 2018 was 54 years old and three percent were women. Government agencies, educational institutions, and businesses coordinate to some extent in support of this workforce, but FAA does not routinely analyze, collect, or coordinate with other stakeholders on certain data related to workforce development. One of FAA's strategic objectives includes promoting the development of a robust, skilled aviation workforce, and the agency established a committee, in part, to explore ways to diversify this workforce; however, FAA is not currently positioned to understand whether its efforts are optimally targeted or effective. Without routinely analyzing its own data or leveraging others' data, FAA may not have certain information it needs to track or ensure progress toward its workforce development goals. FAA has acknowledged that curriculum requirements for Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) schools and mechanic testing standards are outdated. Efforts to revise the decades-old curriculum requirements for AMT schools are ongoing and FAA officials told GAO that a final rule will be published some time toward the end of 2020. FAA officials indicated that the revised mechanic testing standards would likely be finalized after.


FAA requires that only mechanics who are “certificated” by the FAA approve aircraft for return to service. The required training to become a certificated mechanic can take between 1 and 3 years. FAA also oversees the certification of repairmen who work on aircraft parts. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that retirements and attrition could adversely affect the capacity of this workforce to meet the growing demand for air travel, and that mechanic curriculum is outdated. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 included provisions for GAO to examine the aviation workforce. This report examines (1) what available federal data reveal about the FAA-certificated aviation maintenance workforce; (2) how selected government agencies, educational institutions, and businesses provide support and coordinate to develop the aviation maintenance workforce; and (3) the progress FAA has made in updating its curriculum and testing standards for mechanics. GAO analyzed FAA data on certificate holders as of December 2018; reviewed BLS employment data for 2013 through 2018; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed selected federal agency, industry, and AMT School officials. Federal data provide an incomplete picture of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-certificated aviation maintenance workforce. A sufficient supply of certificated workers is critical for safety and to meet the growing demand for air travel. However, supply and demand data for certificated workers are limited. FAA maintains data on the number of individuals newly certificated each year (see figure), but less is known about how many certificated individuals exit the aviation industry each year and the extent of growing demand. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data provide some information on pay and demand for aviation maintenance workers more broadly, but do not differentiate between FAA-certificated and non-certificated workers due to data collection challenges. Demographic data may also be useful for workforce analysis and planning. FAA data provide some demographic information on certificated mechanics and repairmen, such as age and sex, but the agency lacks data on race and ethnicity. According to GAO analysis of FAA data, over half of the roughly 330,000 mechanics and repairmen FAA had certificated as of December 2018 were between 50 and 70 years old and 97 percent were men. Government agencies, educational institutions, and businesses coordinate to some extent in support of this workforce, but FAA lacks certain information—including information maintained by other agencies that administer related programs—that could advance its workforce development efforts. One of FAA's strategic objectives includes promoting the development of a robust, skilled aviation workforce, and the agency established a committee, in part, to explore ways to diversify this workforce; however, FAA is not currently positioned to understand whether its efforts are optimally targeted or effective. Without routinely analyzing its own data or leveraging others' data, FAA may not have certain information it needs to track or ensure progress toward its workforce development goals. FAA has acknowledged that curriculum requirements for Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) Schools and mechanic testing standards are outdated. Efforts to revise the curriculum requirements for AMT Schools are ongoing and FAA officials told GAO that a final rule will be published some time toward the end of 2020. FAA officials indicated that the revised mechanic testing standards would likely be finalized after.


FCC relies extensively on information systems to accomplish its mission of regulating interstate and international communications in the United States. FCC uses one such system, ECFS, to receive public comments about proposed changes in FCC regulations. In May 2017, a surge in comments caused a service disruption of ECFS during a public comment period. GAO was requested to review ECFS and the reported disruption. In September 2019, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the actions FCC took to respond to the May 2017 event, and the extent to which FCC had effectively implemented security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of selected systems. This current report is a public version of the September 2019 report with sensitive information removed. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which FCC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. In the prior report, GAO compared FCC's policies, procedures, and reports to federal cybersecurity laws and policies. GAO examined logical access controls and security management controls for three systems selected based on their significance to FCC. For this report, GAO examined supporting documents regarding FCC's actions on previously identified recommendations, observed controls in operation, and interviewed personnel at FCC. As GAO reported in September 2019, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) bolstered the capacity and performance of the Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) to reduce the risk of future service disruptions. FCC also implemented numerous information security program and technical controls for three systems that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations. GAO made 136 recommendations to address these deficiencies (see table). As of November 2019, FCC had made significant progress in resolving many security deficiencies by fully implementing 85 (about 63 percent) of the 136 recommendations GAO made in September 2019. FCC had also partially implemented 10, but had not started to implement the remaining 41 recommendations (see figure). Additionally, FCC has created remedial action plans to implement the remaining recommendations by April 2021. Until FCC fully implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and loss.