In 2017, the U.S. freight rail system moved over 1.5-billion tons of goods. The largest freight railroads—Class Is—dominate the industry and account for more than 90 percent of its annual revenue. In recent years, railroad workers and local communities have expressed safety concerns related to longer freight trains, and recent accidents involving such trains are currently under investigation by FRA. FRA does not currently place limits on freight train length. GAO was asked to review the safety and other impacts of longer freight trains. This report examines: (1) changes in freight train length over time, (2) safety considerations for operating longer freight trains, and (3) the extent to which FRA is assessing any safety risks. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agencies' reports and plans; analyzed available data on freight train length from railroads; and interviewed federal officials and various stakeholders, including state and local officials and first responders from five states (selected to represent different railroads and regions), and officials from the railroad industry, unions, and advocacy groups. Freight train length has increased in recent years, according to all seven Class I freight railroads. Data on train length are not publicly available; however data provided to GAO by two Class I railroads indicated that their average train length has increased by about 25 percent since 2008, with average lengths of 1.2 and 1.4 miles in 2017. Officials from all seven Class I railroads said they are currently operating longer than average trains on specific routes, although some said such trains are a small percentage of the trains they operate. One railroad said it runs a 3-mile-long train twice weekly. Officials identified increased efficiencies and economic benefits among the advantages of longer freight trains. Stakeholders said that the arrangement of train cars and locomotives—known as “train makeup”—and the potential for blocking highway-railroad crossings are issues to consider to safely operate longer freight trains. To prevent derailment, stakeholders said it is important that longer trains are arranged appropriately and that crews are trained to operate them. While Class I railroads and others said that longer trains may decrease the frequency of blocked crossings, some state and local officials said these trains can prolong their duration, posing challenges for emergency responders unable to cross the tracks. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is studying the safety risks of and strategies for operating longer trains. As part of the study, FRA plans to analyze train-handling and braking capabilities under varying conditions. FRA officials said they plan to share their research results with relevant stakeholders; however, FRA currently has no documented strategy for sharing the results of its research. FRA officials are also analyzing which parts of the country are reporting frequently blocked crossings. However, FRA officials said they do not plan to use information from either of these efforts to determine whether longer freight trains might contribute to increases in blocked crossings, and the officials believe the issues are unrelated. Developing and implementing a strategy for sharing FRA's research results and identifying any potential impacts of longer freight trains on highway-railroad crossings would enable FRA and stakeholders to better determine what, if any, actions are needed to ensure the safe operation of longer freight trains.


In 2017, there were about 2 million farm and ranch operations nationwide. Farmers and ranchers often require loans to buy agricultural real estate, make capital improvements, and purchase supplies and equipment. However, minorities and women comprise a disproportionately small share of agricultural producers, and certain minority groups have alleged discrimination in obtaining agricultural credit. Most agricultural lending is done by either commercial banks or the Farm Credit System, a network of lenders regulated by the Farm Credit Administration. USDA accounts for a small share of agricultural credit, but it makes direct loans and guarantees loans made by private lenders. USDA and Farm Credit System lenders have responsibilities to expand credit access. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to study agricultural credit services provided to SDFRs. USDA direct loans were outside the scope of GAO's review. This report examines (1) what is known about the amount and types of agricultural credit to SDFRs, (2) challenges SDFRs reportedly face in obtaining agricultural credit, and (3) outreach efforts to SDFRs regarding agricultural credit and related services. GAO analyzed survey, census, and other USDA data; reviewed statutes and regulations governing collection of personal data on borrowers; and reviewed Farm Credit Administration and USDA documentation on outreach to SDFRs. GAO also interviewed SDFR advocacy groups, lending industry groups, and officials from the Farm Credit Administration, USDA, and the federal depository institution regulators. Information on the amount and types of agricultural credit to socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFR)—which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines as members of certain racial and ethnic minority groups and women—is limited. Comprehensive data on SDFRs' outstanding agricultural debt are not available because regulations generally prohibit lenders from collecting data on the personal characteristics of applicants for loans other than certain mortgages. A Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rulemaking pursuant to a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that requires collection of such data in certain circumstances would modify this prohibition for certain loans, possibly including some agricultural loans. The bureau delayed the rulemaking in 2018 due to stated resource constraints and other priorities, but reported that it plans to resume work on the rule later in 2019. An annual USDA survey of farmers provides some insights into agricultural lending to SDFRs but, according to USDA, may underrepresent SDFRs compared to more inclusive estimates from the 2017 Census of Agriculture. In the 2015–2017 surveys, SDFRs represented an average of 17 percent of primary producers in the survey, but they accounted for 8 percent of outstanding total agricultural debt. Loans to purchase agricultural real estate accounted for most of SDFRs' outstanding debt (67 percent). SDFRs reportedly face a number of challenges that hamper their ability to obtain private agricultural credit. According to SDFR advocacy groups, lending industry representatives, and federal officials, SDFRs are more likely to operate smaller, lower-revenue farms, have weaker credit histories, or lack clear title to their agricultural land, which can make it difficult for them to qualify for loans. SDFR advocacy groups also said some SFDRs face actual or perceived unfair treatment in lending or may be dissuaded from applying for credit because of past instances of alleged discrimination. Additionally, they noted that some SDFRs may not be fully aware of credit options and lending requirements, especially if they are recent immigrants or new to agriculture. Private lenders and federal agencies conduct outreach to SDFRs, but the effectiveness of these efforts in increasing lending is unknown. For example, lenders have sponsored educational events targeted to SDFRs and translated marketing materials for non-English speakers. Farm Credit Administration regulations require Farm Credit System lenders to prepare marketing plans that include specific outreach actions for diversity and inclusion. The Farm Credit Administration examines these plans and indicated that it has prescribed corrective actions in some cases. However, the Farm Credit Administration does not require lenders to meet specific lending goals, and the regulatory data restrictions noted previously constrain the Farm Credit Administration's ability to assess the effect of outreach efforts. USDA conducts outreach to SDFRs and lenders about its loan programs and collects data on the personal characteristics of loan applicants. However, USDA officials said they face challenges evaluating the impact of their outreach efforts, in part because outreach participants are reluctant to provide their demographic information.


In 2018, DOD sent an F-35 aircraft to its first combat mission and started initial operational testing. DOD now plans to spend over $270 billion to buy more than 2,000 F-35 aircraft over the next 26 years. Since 2011, GAO has found the need for more attention to the F-35's R&M performance to achieve an operationally suitable system. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the F-35 acquisition program until it reaches full-rate production. This is GAO's fourth report under this provision. This report assesses, among other objectives, (1) the program's progress in meeting R&M requirements (such as mission reliability) and (2) its plans for spending on new capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed management reports and historical test data; discussed key aspects of F-35 development with program management and contractor officials; and compared acquisition plans to DOD policies and GAO acquisition best practices. The F-35 program has made slow, sustained progress in improving the aircraft's reliability and maintainability (R&M). The F-35 aircraft (see figure) are assessed against eight R&M metrics, which indicate how much time the aircraft will be in maintenance rather than operations. Half of these metrics are not meeting targets. While the Department of Defense (DOD) has a plan for improving R&M, its guidance is not in line with GAO's acquisition best practices or federal internal control standards as it does not include specific, measurable objectives, align improvement projects to meet those objectives, and prioritize funding. If the R&M requirements are not met, the warfighter may have to settle for a less reliable and more costly aircraft than originally envisioned. In 2019, the F-35 program will start modernization efforts—estimated to cost $10.5 billion—for new capabilities to address evolving threats, without a complete business case, or a baseline cost and schedule estimate. Key documents for establishing the business case, such as an independent cost estimate and an independent technology assessment, will not be complete until after the program plans to award development contracts (see figure). Without a business case—consistent with acquisition best practices—program officials will not have a high level of confidence that the risk of committing to development has been reduced adequately prior to contract awards. Moving ahead without a business case puts F-35 modernization at risk of experiencing cost and schedule overruns similar to those experienced by the original F-35 program during its development.


In 2018, about 6,300 pedestrians—17 per day—died in collisions with motor vehicles in the United States, up from about 4,400 in 2008. Many factors influence pedestrian fatalities, including driver and pedestrian behavior. Vehicle characteristics are also a factor. NHTSA tests and rates new vehicles for safety and reports the results to the public through its NCAP. Currently, pedestrian safety tests are not included in NCAP. This report examines: (1) what is known about the relationship between vehicle characteristics and pedestrian fatalities and injuries, (2) approaches automakers have taken to address pedestrian safety, and (3) actions NHTSA has taken to assess whether pedestrian safety tests should be included in NCAP. GAO analyzed data on pedestrian fatalities and injuries from 2008 through 2018 (the most recent available data); reviewed NHTSA reports; and interviewed NHTSA officials. GAO also obtained information about pedestrian safety features from 13 automakers that represented about 70 percent of new vehicle sales in the United States in 2018, and compared NHTSA's actions with leading program management practices. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) data show that certain vehicle characteristics related to age, body type, and the speed of the vehicle at the time of the crash are associated with increases in pedestrian fatalities from 2008 to 2018. Specifically, the number of pedestrian fatalities during this time period increased more for crashes involving vehicles that were: 11 years old or older compared to newer vehicles, sport utility vehicles compared to other passenger vehicles, and traveling over 30 miles per hour compared to vehicles traveling at lower speeds. GAO also found that NHTSA does not consistently collect detailed data on the type and severity of pedestrian injuries, but began a pilot program in 2018 to improve its data collection efforts. NHTSA, however, lacks an evaluation plan with criteria to assess whether to expand the pilot program, as called for in leading practices. As a result, NHTSA lacks information to determine how and whether it should expand the pilot to meet the agency's data needs. Automakers offer a range of approaches to address pedestrian safety. For example, pedestrian crash avoidance technologies use cameras or radar to detect an imminent crash with a pedestrian and engage a vehicle's brakes to avoid a crash. GAO found that about 60 percent of the model year 2019 vehicles offered in the United States by 13 automakers had pedestrian crash avoidance technologies as standard or optional equipment. In 2015 NHTSA proposed pedestrian safety tests for its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), but NHTSA has not decided whether it will include such tests in the program. NHTSA has reported that crash avoidance technologies could lead to a decrease in pedestrian fatalities. Nine automakers that GAO interviewed reported that NHTSA's lack of communication about pedestrian safety tests creates challenges for new product development. NHTSA has also not documented a clear process for updating NCAP with milestones for decisions. NHTSA officials said that updating NCAP involves many actions and can take years. However, absent a final decision on whether to include pedestrian safety tests in NCAP and a documented process for making such decisions, the public lacks clarity on NHTSA's efforts to address safety risks.


In 2018, almost 30 million children participated in the National School Lunch Program and over 14 million participated in the School Breakfast Program, with cash payments totaling almost $17 billion. Historically, the school meals programs have reported high estimated improper payment error rates, which suggest that these programs may also be vulnerable to fraud. GAO was asked to review improper payment error rates and potential fraud in the school meals programs. This report (1) describes steps USDA has reported taking since 2015 to lower improper payment error rates and (2) examines the extent to which USDA has assessed areas of risk for fraud in the school meals programs. GAO reviewed the results of the most recent study USDA uses to estimate improper payments in the school meals programs, as well as the error rates and actions to reduce them reported in USDA's agency financial reports from fiscal years 2015 through 2018. Further, GAO analyzed guidance for key oversight practices and documentation regarding USDA's risk assessment processes. GAO examined these processes against the leading practices in the Fraud Risk Framework for assessing fraud risks. GAO also interviewed agency officials. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has reported various actions aimed at lowering estimated improper payment error rates in the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program (school meals programs). Examples include a new application prototype intended to reduce applicant errors and training for food service workers to reduce administrative errors. USDA uses a model based on a periodic study to estimate improper payments, and reported error rates will generally not reflect the effect of most actions until USDA's next study is released, likely in 2020. However, in fiscal year 2018, USDA redefined what it considers an improper payment. Specifically, meal claiming errors—for example, meals that are missing a required nutritional component but that are counted as reimbursable—are no longer considered improper payments, resulting in error rates for fiscal year 2018 that are not comparable to prior years. USDA has not assessed fraud risks in the school meals programs, which hinders its ability to ensure that its key oversight practices—extensive processes designed for broad monitoring purposes—address areas at risk for fraud. The assess component of A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework) calls for managers to plan regular fraud risk assessments and to assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. USDA officials stated that the agency considers fraud risks through efforts to assess overall program integrity risk in the programs, which include research projects and consideration of specific risks when allocating monitoring resources. However, GAO found that USDA's efforts to assess risk do not comprehensively consider fraud risks. As a result, these efforts are not aligned with the overarching concepts of planning and conducting fraud risk assessments in the Fraud Risk Framework. Establishing a process to plan and conduct regular fraud risk assessments that align with the leading practices in the Fraud Risk Framework—including those in the figure below—will help USDA design and implement an antifraud strategy, as well as evaluate and adapt its strategy to improve fraud risk management in the school meals programs.


After over 70 years of nuclear weapons production and energy research at hundreds of sites across the country, DOE faces over $500 billion in environmental liabilities associated with cleanup of hazardous contamination and long-term management of these sites. LM is responsible for the portion of these liabilities associated with long-term management of sites after active cleanup has been completed. LM oversees 100 sites across the country. Depending on the sites' clean-up standards and intended reuse, LM will likely be managing some sites for centuries. Senate Report 116-48 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 includes a provision for GAO to review LM's operations, including the nature of its environmental liability. This report examines (1) LM's environmental liability, and (2) any challenges LM faces in managing its sites and how it is addressing those challenges. GAO analyzed data on LM's environmental liability; interviewed officials at LM headquarters and those responsible for the nine sites requiring the most intensive level of management; and reviewed relevant policies, procedures, and guidance. The environmental liability of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) was estimated at $7.35 billion in fiscal year 2019 and, according to LM officials, is expected to grow as LM acquires more sites (see figure for LM's current sites). Long-term surveillance and maintenance activities associated with radioactive and hazardous waste, such as treating residual groundwater contamination, account for about 40 percent of the costs. LM's environmental liability has generally remained stable over the past 5 years. As of September 2019, LM is scheduled to receive 52 additional sites by 2050, and officials expect LM's environmental liability to grow as a result. Officials said LM is taking steps to reduce its environmental liability at its current sites, such as exploring alternative approaches for reducing residual contamination. LM officials identified challenges in providing long-term surveillance and maintenance of sites related to: (1) the performance of remedies that contain or reduce contamination, (2) environmental conditions, and (3) new regulatory requirements. LM is taking some actions to address these challenges. For example, at its Rocky Flats, Colorado, site, LM is repairing an aging landfill that was damaged by extreme rainfall events. However, LM has not yet planned for how to address challenges at some sites that may require new cleanup work that is not in the scope of LM's expertise and resources. By developing agreements and procedures with the entities that would be responsible for conducting this new cleanup work, LM can help mitigate risks to human health and the environment. In addition, LM has not made plans to assess the effects of climate change on its sites or to mitigate those effects, as called for in its strategic plan. By developing plans to assess the effect of climate change on its sites and to mitigate any significant impacts, LM could better ensure that its remedies will protect human health and the environment in the long term.


In 2018, approximately 38.1 million people, or 11.8% of the population, had incomes below the official definition of poverty in the United States. Poverty statistics provide a measure of economic hardship. The official definition of poverty for the United States uses dollar amounts called poverty thresholds that vary by family size and the members' ages. Families with incomes below their respective thresholds are considered to be in poverty. The poverty rate (the percentage that was in poverty) fell from 12.3% in 2017. This was the fourth consecutive year since the most recent recession that the poverty rate has fallen. The poverty rate for female-householder families in 2018 (24.9%, down 1.3 percentage points from the previous year) was higher than that for male-householder families (12.7%) or married-couple families (4.7%), neither of which registered a decline from 2017. Of the three age groupsâchildren under 18, the working-age population, and those age 65 and olderâthe 65-and-older population used to have the highest poverty rates, but now has the lowest: 28.5% of the aged population was poor in 1966, but 9.7% was poor in 2018. People under 18, in contrast, had the highest poverty rate of the three age groups: 16.2% of this population was poor in 2018. From 2017 to 2018, poverty rates fell among children (from 17.4% to 16.2%) and the working-age population (from 11.1% to 10.7%), but not among the aged population (9.7% in 2018). Poverty was not equally prevalent in all parts of the country. The poverty rate for Mississippi (19.7%) appeared highest but was in a statistical tie with New Mexico (19.5%). New Hampshire's poverty rate (7.6%) was lowest in 2018. Criticisms of the official poverty measure have inspired poverty measurement research and eventually led to the development of the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). The SPM uses different definitions of needs and resources than the official measure. The SPM includes the effects of taxes and in-kind benefits (such as housing, energy, and food assistance) on poverty, while the official measure does not. Because some types of tax credits are used to assist the poor (as are other forms of assistance), the SPM may be of interest to policymakers. The poverty rate under the SPM (12.8%) was about 1 percentage point higher in 2018 than the official poverty rate (11.8%). Under the SPM, the profile of the poverty population is slightly different than under the official measure. Compared with the official measure, poverty rates under the SPM were lower for children (13.7% compared with 16.2%) and higher for working-age adults (12.2% compared with 10.7%) and the 65-and-older population (13.6% compared with 9.7%). While the SPM reflects more current measurement methods, the official measure provides a comparison of the poor population over a longer time period, including some years before many current antipoverty assistance programs had been developed. In developing poverty-related legislation and conducting oversight on programs that aid the low-income population, policymakers may be interested in these historical trends.


In 2018, nearly one in six children in the United States lived in families with incomes below the federal poverty thresholds, or about $26,000 annually for a family of four. Research has shown that poverty is associated with negative outcomes for the entire family. State and local entities are currently using two-generation, or whole family, approaches to reduce poverty and move families towards economic self-sufficiency. Senate Committee Report 115-150 included a provision for GAO to review two-generation approaches. GAO examined (1) the primary federal programs that support two-generation approaches and how these programs were leveraged by selected state and local entities, and (2) the challenges selected state and local entities faced implementing two-generation approaches and steps federal agencies have taken to address those challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal, state, and local agency documentation; and interviewed officials from five federal agencies, and from 23 state and local entities in five states. States were selected to achieve variation in approaches used and percentage of families with children in poverty, among other factors. To reduce poverty through a two-generation approach, which involves working simultaneously with adults and children in a family, selected state and local entities most commonly reported leveraging resources from 10 federal programs. Among the 10 programs were the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Head Start; the Department of Agriculture's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; and three Department of Labor Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act core programs. Some of these entities also reported using state, local, and/or philanthropic resources to enhance their flexibility to provide services. State and local officials told GAO that difficulties with data sharing and limited information on successful two-generation approaches made it challenging to implement them, and some federal agencies have taken steps to address these challenges. State and local officials said that data sharing is difficult due to various concerns, including protecting participant privacy. Multiple federal agencies have resources on data sharing that may be useful to entities implementing two-generation approaches. State and local officials also said they wanted more examples of successful two-generation approaches and information on federal funding to implement them. To help address this challenge, various federal offices provided information and technical assistance, but the information is distributed via separate email lists and websites, thereby limiting cross-programmatic access and availability. HHS officials said the interagency Council on Economic Mobility—led by HHS—may help address information sharing. Given its recent establishment, related efforts are yet to be seen. Without readily available information, state and local entities may lack useful resources when designing programs to serve families.


In 2018, the F-35 program began operational testing. Also in 2018, the Air Force continued planning for the acquisition of ABMS, intended to modernize how DOD maintains command and control over and manages the future battlefield. Both the F-35 and ABMS are expected to play key roles in DOD's modernization efforts. This testimony statement discusses (1) the F-35 program's development and modernization efforts, and progress in improving the aircraft's R&M and (2) DOD's current planning efforts for ABMS. This statement is based on two GAO reports on the F-35 published in April 2019 and on GAO's ongoing work examining ABMS. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD management reports; discussed the efforts with program and contractor officials; and compared both efforts to DOD policy and GAO acquisition best practices. The Department of Defense (DOD) wrapped up the F-35 development program in April 2018 and expects to complete operational testing in December 2019. DOD has turned its attention to modernization efforts—referred to as Block 4—to add new capabilities to address evolving threats. The program office estimates Block 4 to cost at least $10.5 billion through 2024. DOD plans to start Block 4 development without a complete business case identifying baseline cost and schedule estimates. Key documents for establishing a business case, such as an independent cost estimate, will not be ready before the program plans to award Block 4 development contracts in May 2019 (see figure). Without a business case—consistent with acquisition best practices—program officials cannot be confident that the risk of committing to development has been reduced adequately prior to planned contract awards. The program made slow, sustained progress in improving the F-35's reliability and maintainability (R&M). F-35 aircraft are assessed against eight R&M metrics, which inform how much time the aircraft will be in maintenance rather than operations. Half of these metrics are not meeting targets. While the program office has a plan for improving R&M, its guidance is not in line with GAO's acquisition best practices or internal control standards as it does not include specific, measurable objectives, align improvement projects to meet those objectives, and prioritize funding to match resources to R&M requirements. If the R&M requirements are not met, the warfighter will have to settle for a less reliable and more costly aircraft than originally planned. This contributes to the F-35's $1.12 trillion estimated sustainment costs and challenges with maintaining an expanding fleet that also has supply chain and logistics system problems. GAO's ongoing work indicates that the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)—intended to provide battle management command and control and surveillance across air, land, and sea—is in the early stages of planning. The capabilities and the strategy to deliver those capabilities are still to be determined. The Air Force plans to manage ABMS as a family of systems, integrating sensors from existing and future weapons programs, and overseen by a Chief Architect—whose role is still to be determined. The Air Force expects to further define ABMS after analyzing different options for delivering the capability. That analysis is expected to be complete in summer 2019.


In 2019, the Supreme Court issued a sizeable number of criminal law decisions, which addressed several topics, including sentencing, pretrial, statutory construction, and ineffective assistance of counsel. This report discusses the following Supreme Court holdings in greater detail: Racially Discriminatory Jury Selection : "[T]he trial court at Flowers' sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the State's peremptory strike of [a] black prospective juror â¦ was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent." Flowers v. Mississippi , 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). Execution of the Mentally Inc ompetent : "First, under Ford and Panetti , the Eighth Amendment may permit executing Madison even if he cannot remember committing his crime. Second, under those same decisions, the Eighth Amendment may prohibit executing Madison even though he suffers from dementia, rather than delusions. The sole question on which Madison's competency depends is whether he can reach a 'rational understanding' of why the State wants to execute him." Madison v. Alabama , 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019). Execution of the Intellectually Disabled : Texas Court of Criminal Appeals erred in assessing and denying a death-row inmate's claim of intellectual disability. Moore v. Texas , 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019). Habeas Jurisdiction : Federal courts may not grant state prisoners habeas relief based on Supreme Court precedent established after the completion of state proceedings. Shoop v. Hill , 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019). Method of Execution : A death row inmate challenging the state's method of execution must show that the state's method involves a risk of severe pain and that a feasible, readily available alternative method will significantly reduce the risk of pain. "[E]ven if execution by nitrogen hypoxia were a feasible and readily implemented alternative to the State's chosen method, Mr. Bucklew has still failed to present any evidence suggesting that it would significantly reduce his risk of pain." Bucklew v. Precythe , 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). Violent Crime Sentencing : The Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) Section 924(c) residual clause purporting to provide an alternative definition for "crime of violence" is constitutionally vague. United States v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Conviction under Florida robbery statute qualifies as a crime of violence under ACCA elements clause. Stokeling v. United States , 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019). Under the ACCA's specific crimes clause, the generic crime of "burglary" covers unlawfully entering, or remaining in, a building or structure, including mobile homes, trailers, tents, or vehicles, if they are designed, adapted, or customarily used for overnight accommodations of individuals. United States v. Stitt , 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). Under the ACCA's specific crimes clause, the generic burglary definition includes entering with an intent to commit a crime or remaining in a building or structure after forming an intent to commit a crime . Quarles v. United , 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019). Excessive Fines : The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and is therefore binding on the States. Timbs v. Indiana , 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). Supervised Release : Imposing a mandatory term of imprisonment after revoking supervised release, based on finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had breached the conditions of his supervised release, violated the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard for criminal cases. The lower court will decide, at least initially, whether the error was harmless and, if not, the appropriate remedy. United State s v. Haymond , 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). A federal supervised release term does not run for a convict held in state pretrial detention if the time in state pretrial detention counts as time served for state conviction purposes. Mont v. United States , 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019). Mens Rea : Conviction of an alien unlawfully present in the United States for unlawful firearms possession requires proof that the alien knew both that (1) he was in possession of a firearm and (2) he was unlawfully present. Rehaif v. United States , 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Nondelegation : Authorizing the Attorney General to issue regulations governing registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) for pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible did not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Gundy v. United States , 139 U.S. 2116 (2019). Double Jeopardy : The dual sovereign doctrine of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause permits successive state and federal prosecutions for the same misconduct. Gamble v. United States , 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). Drunk Driving : A suspect's loss of consciousness following his probable cause arrest for drunk driving will almost always qualify for the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Mitchell v. Wisconsin , 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (plurality). Section 1983 Litigation : Probable cause to arrest precludes a Section 1983 civil liability claim based on alleged First Amendment retaliation unless "a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." Nieves v. Bartlett , 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 cause of action alleging falsification of evidence "began to run when criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor." McDonough v. Smith , 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019). In assessing a Section 1983 qualified official immunity claim, "[t]he Court of Appeals should have asked whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances. Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the clearly established right at a high level of generality by saying only that the 'right to be free of excessive force' was clearly established." City of Escondido v. Emmons , 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019). Ineffective Assistance of Counsel : A defense attorney's failure to honor his client's request to appeal is presumptively prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel "even when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver." Garza v. Idaho , 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019).


In August and September 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made landfall in Texas, Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to public transit facilities. Access to transit plays an important role in a community's post-disaster recovery. FTA has primary responsibility for providing disaster assistance funding to transit agencies if it receives an appropriation from Congress. If FTA does not receive an appropriation, transit agencies can apply to FEMA for funding. GAO was asked to evaluate the federal government's response and recovery efforts related to the 2017 hurricanes. This report provides information on FTA's emergency relief allocations and examines FTA's and FEMA's coordination. GAO reviewed FTA's allocation of emergency relief funds; conducted site visits to Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico; obtained survey responses from 44 of 52 transit agencies; and interviewed and reviewed documentation from FTA and FEMA officials. In response to hurricanes in 2017, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) announced in May 2018 that it would allocate about $233 million of appropriated emergency relief funds to 52 transit agencies for response, recovery, and rebuilding projects, with most of that funding going to Puerto Rico ($198 million). Most of Puerto Rico's funds, and around half the funds FTA allocated ($116 million), will be distributed to one transit system—Tren Urbano—San Juan's rail-transit service provider (see figure below). While FTA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shared information and coordinated efforts, both agencies still approved about $35,000 to one applicant for the same expenses. GAO found that FTA awarded a grant in April 2019 that included expenses for which FEMA had already obligated funds in January 2019. Although FTA contacted FEMA prior to the award to inquire whether the applicant had received FEMA funding, FEMA did not respond within 5 days, and per an agreement between FTA and FEMA, FTA processed the application. After GAO identified the duplicate funding, FTA and FEMA took steps to limit the potential for duplicate funding; FTA, for example, changed its policy of moving applications forward after 5 days if FEMA does not respond. FTA and FEMA officials noted challenges they face in identifying transit expenses in the applications they receive. For example, they may be unaware that a transit agency received FEMA funds if it received those funds through a larger entity such as a city, county, or state government. Although the amount of funding FEMA and FTA approved for the same expenses was relatively small, without addressing these challenges, FTA and FEMA will continue to face the risk that both agencies will approve funding for the same expense in the future.


In Congress, multiple bills and resolutions have been introduced related to China's handling of a novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China, that expanded to become the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) global pandemic. This report provides a timeline of key developments in the early weeks of the pandemic, based on available public reporting. It also considers issues raised by the timeline, including the timeliness of China's information sharing with the World Health Organization (WHO), gaps in early information China shared with the world, and episodes in which Chinese authorities sought to discipline those who publicly shared information about aspects of the epidemic. Prior to January 20, 2020âthe day Chinese authorities acknowledged person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirusâthe public record provides little indication that China's top leaders saw containment of the epidemic as a high priority. Thereafter, however, Chinese authorities appear to have taken aggressive measures to contain the virus. The Appendix includes a concise version of the timeline. A condensed version is below: Late December: Hospitals in Wuhan, China, identify cases of pneumonia of unknown origin. December 30: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issues "urgent notices" to city hospitals about cases of atypical pneumonia linked to the city's Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. The notices leak online. | Wuhan medical workers, including ophthalmologist Li Wenliang, trade messages about the cases in online chat groups. December 31: A machine translation of a Chinese media report about the outbreak is posted to ProMED, a U.S.-based open-access platform for early intelligence about infectious disease outbreaks. WHO headquarters in Geneva sees the ProMED post and instructs the WHO China Country Office to request verification of the outbreak from China's government. | The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issues its first public statement on the outbreak, saying it has identified 27 cases. January 1: Wuhan authorities shut down the city's Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. January 3: Dr. Li Wenliang is reprimanded by local Wuhan police for spreading allegedly false statements about the outbreak online. | Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) Director-General Gao Fu tells U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. CDC) Director Robert Redfield about a pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan. January 4: In its first public statement on the outbreak, WHO tweets, "China has reported to WHO a cluster of pneumonia casesâwith no deathsâin Wuhan, Hubei Province." January 6: Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Alex M. Azar II and U.S. CDC Director Redfield offer to send U.S. CDC experts to China. | U.S. CDC issues a "Watch Level 1 Alert" for Wuhan and advises travelers to Wuhan to avoid animals, animal markets, and animal products. January 11 : A team led by Prof. Yong-zhen Zhang of Fudan University in Shanghai posts the genetic sequence of the virus on an open-access platform, sharing it with the world. | China CDC and two other Chinese teams subsequently also post genetic sequences of the virus on an open-access platform. | China shares the virus' genomic sequence with WHO. January 1 2: Dr. Li Wenliang is hospitalized with symptoms of the novel coronavirus. January 20: China confirms person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus and infections among medical workers. January 21: U.S. CDC announces the first novel coronavirus case in the United States, in a patient who returned from Wuhan on January 15, 2020. January 23: Wuhan suspends public transportation and bars residents from leaving the city. January 28: Chinese leader Xi Jinping and WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus meet in Beijing. January 30: WHO Director-General Tedros declares the epidemic a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. | President Trump announces the formation of the President's Coronavirus Task Force. January 31: President Trump suspends entry into the United States of most foreigners who were physically present in mainland China during the preceding 14-day period, effective February 2. | HHS Secretary Azar declares a public health emergency for the United States to aid response to the novel coronavirus.


In December 2014, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation that included provisions related to ongoing federal data center consolidation efforts. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation efforts; improve federal data centers' performance; and establish goals for inventory closures, cost savings and avoidances, and optimization performance. The 2014 legislation included a provision for GAO to annually review agencies' data center inventories and strategies. This report addresses (1) agencies' progress and plans for data center closures and savings; and (2) agencies' progress against OMB's June 2019 revised data center optimization metrics. To do so, GAO assessed the 24 DCOI agencies' data center inventories as of August 2019, reviewed their reported cost savings documentation, evaluated their data center optimization strategic plans, and assessed their progress against OMB's established optimization targets. GAO also compared OMB's revised metrics to key characteristics of an effective performance measure. The 24 agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) reported progress toward achieving OMB's fiscal year 2019 goals for closing unneeded data centers. As of August 2019, 23 of the 24 reported that they had met, or planned to meet, their fiscal year closure goals, and would close 286 facilities in doing so (see figure). Agencies also reported plans to close at least 37 of the remaining data centers. OMB issued revised guidance in June 2019 that narrowed the scope of the type of facilities that would be defined as a data center. This revision eliminated the reporting of over 2,000 facilities government-wide. OMB had previously cited cybersecurity risks for these types of facilities. Without a requirement to report on these, important visibility is diminished, including oversight of security risks. The 24 DCOI agencies have reported a total of $4.7 billion in cost savings from fiscal years 2012 through 2019. Of the 24 agencies, 23 reported in August 2019 they had met, or planned to meet, OMB's fiscal year 2019 savings goal of $241.5 million. One agency did not complete a plan, but planned to do so in the future. Agencies also reported plans to save about $264 million in fiscal year 2020. The 24 agencies reported progress against OMB's three revised data center optimization metrics for virtualization, advanced energy monitoring, and server utilization. For a new fourth metric (availability), the data were not sufficiently reliable to report on because of unexpected variances in the information reported by the agencies. As of August 2019, eight agencies reported that they met all three targets for the metrics GAO reviewed, five met two targets, and six met one target. In addition, one agency had not established any targets, and four agencies reported that they no longer owned any data centers. While the three revised metrics' definitions included the key characteristics of being clearly defined and objective, none included statistical universe parameters that enable determinations of progress. Specifically, these metrics call for counts of the actual numbers of (1) virtualized servers, (2) data centers with advanced energy metering, and (3) underutilized servers; but the metrics did not include a count of the universe of all servers and all data centers. Accordingly, percentages cannot be calculated to determine progress–for example, the number of virtualized servers may increase, but if the universe of servers increases at a higher rate, then progress would actually be negative.


In December 2014, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation that included provisions related to ongoing federal data center consolidation efforts. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation efforts; improve federal data centers' performance; and establish goals for inventory closures, cost savings and avoidances, and optimizing performance. The 2014 legislation included a provision for GAO to annually review agencies' data center inventories and strategies. Accordingly, GAO's objectives were to (1) evaluate agencies' progress and plans for data center closures and cost savings; (2) assess agencies' progress against OMB's data center optimization targets; (3) and identify effective agency practices for achieving data center closures, cost savings, and optimization progress. To do so, GAO assessed the 24 DCOI agencies' data center inventories as of August 2018; reviewed their reported cost savings documentation; evaluated their data center optimization strategic plans; and assessed their progress against OMB's established optimization targets. GAO also solicited practices that selected agencies reported to be effective in meeting DCOI goals. The 24 agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) reported mixed progress toward achieving OMB's goals for closing data centers and realizing the associated savings by September 2018. As of August 2018, 13 agencies reported that they had met, or had plans to meet, all of their OMB-assigned closure goals by the deadline. However, 11 agencies reported that they did not have plans to meet their goals. Further, 16 agencies reported that, as of August 2018, they had met, or planned to meet, their cost savings targets, for a total of $2.36 billion in cost savings for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. This is about $0.38 billion less than OMB's DCOI savings goal of $2.7 billion. This shortfall is the result of 5 agencies reporting less in planned cost savings and avoidances in their DCOI strategic plans, as compared to their savings targets established for them by OMB. Three agencies did not have a cost savings target and did not report any achieved savings. In addition, the 24 agencies reported limited progress against OMB's five data center optimization targets for server utilization and automated monitoring, energy metering, power usage effectiveness, facility utilization, and virtualization. As of August 2018, the agencies reported that 3 had met three targets, 9 had met one target, and 10 met none of the targets. Two agencies did not have a basis to report on progress as they do not own any data centers. Further, as of August 2018, 20 agencies did not plan to meet all of OMB's fiscal year 2018 optimization goals. Specifically, only 2 agencies reported plans to meet all applicable targets; 6 reported that they did not plan to meet any of the targets (see figure). We selected 6 agencies that had demonstrated success towards meeting their DCOI goals and those agencies reported a number of key practices that contributed to their efforts. The officials noted the importance of, among other things, obtaining executive leadership support for consolidation and optimization activities, employing an organization-wide communications plan, and focusing on data center closures. The officials also cited the use of past experience and lessons learned to inform improvements to future consolidation plans and processes.


In December 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) updated its policy on pregnant women, removing language that stated that pregnant women would generally not be detained except in extraordinary circumstances or as mandated by law. Within DHS, CBP temporarily holds individuals in its facilities and processes them for further action, such as release or transfer to ICE. ICE manages the nation's immigration detention system. ICE utilizes various facility types to detain individuals, such as those owned and operated by ICE and contract facilities. GAO was asked to review issues related to the care of pregnant women in DHS facilities. This report examines (1) what available data indicate about pregnant women detained or held in DHS facilities, (2) DHS policies and standards that address the care of pregnant women, and (3) what is known about the care provided to pregnant women in DHS facilities. GAO analyzed available DHS data and documents from calendar years 2015 through 2019, including detention data, inspection reports and data, and complaints; reviewed policies related to the care of pregnant women; and interviewed agency officials and three national non-governmental organizations. GAO also interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 14 pregnant women detained or released by DHS and five non-governmental organizations in four field locations that had the greatest number of detentions of pregnant women, among other things. GAO's analyses of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data on pregnant women found: ICE detained pregnant women over 4,600 times from calendar year 2016 through 2018, with more than 90 percent resulting from CBP arrests. Sixty-eight percent of these detentions were for 1 week or less, while 10 percent were for more than 30 days. Seventy-eight percent of these initial detentions occurred at facilities staffed with ICE medical personnel. ICE has policies and detention standards that address a variety of topics regarding the care of pregnant women, such as pregnancy testing requirements, for which non-governmental organizations, professional associations, and federal agencies have issued recommended guidance. However, some facility types—which vary based on who owns, operates, and provides medical care at the facility—did not address all these pregnancy-related topics in their policies and standards, such as prenatal vitamins, as of December 2019. ICE has plans to address the gaps GAO identified in these facility types, including updating some of its policies and detention standards in February 2020. In regards to CBP, its facilities are designed for holding individuals for no more than 72 hours, and therefore are not equipped to provide long-term care. Nonetheless, CBP has some policies and standards regarding pregnant women for its short-term facilities, including those related to nutrition and the circumstances in which restraints could be used. GAO's analyses of inspections and complaint mechanisms offered the following insights into the care provided to pregnant women: ICE inspections found 79 percent or greater compliance with most of its pregnancy-related performance measures. For example, inspections found 91 percent of pregnant woman were seen by an obstetrician-gynecologist within 30 days of pregnancy confirmation, from December 2016 through March 2019. According to ICE officials and agency documentation, ICE has processes in place to address non-compliance. Additional inspections identified pregnancy-related issues at 13 facilities from January 2015 through July 2019. The facilities or ICE have taken actions to address the issues. CBP generally relies on offsite care for pregnant women, and as a result has limited information on care CBP provided. However, CBP has efforts underway to enhance medical support at selected facilities. Over 100 complaints were filed about ICE's and CBP's care of pregnant women from January 2015 through April 2019. Of these complaints, 3 were substantiated or partially substantiated, and 24 were unsubstantiated or partially unsubstantiated. In most cases there was not enough information for the investigating agency to determine whether proper care had been provided.


In December 2017, the MGT Act was enacted, which established the TMF. OMB, the Technology Modernization Board, and GSA oversee the TMF. The board is responsible for approval of agency project proposals focused on replacing aging IT systems. Agencies receive incremental award funding and are required to repay the funds transferred and an administrative fee within five years. Agencies may use the project's generated cost savings to repay the award. GSA can use TMF appropriations to cover its operating expenses, and is required to collect administrative fees from awarded projects to offset these expenses. GSA's fee rate was established with the intent to fully recover its costs. As of August 2019, Congress had appropriated $125 million to the TMF. The act included a provision for GAO to report biannually on the TMF. For its first TMF report, among other things, GAO analyzed the TMF's operating costs and assessed the reliability of selected projects' cost savings estimates. To do so, GAO reviewed OMB and GSA's administrative fund processes, and GSA financial data on TMF operating costs. GAO also analyzed TMF project proposal and supporting cost estimate documentation from selected agencies. As of August 2019, the Technology Modernization Board had made seven Technology Modernization Fund (TMF) awards to five agencies, totaling about $89 million, and had transferred $37.65 million of this funding to the projects (see table). In addition, pursuant to the Modernizing Government Technology (MGT) Act, the General Services Administration (GSA) had obligated about $1.2 million to cover TMF operating expenses, but had recovered only about 3 percent of those expenses through fee payments. The seven projects are expected to make $1.2 million in scheduled fee payments by the end of fiscal year 2025; as of August, three projects have made fee payments totaling $33,165. Based on the current schedule, GSA will not fully recover these expenses until fiscal year 2025 at the earliest. GSA had collected fewer fees than planned to offset costs due to several factors. For example, the seven projects paid fees based on the amounts transferred, rather the total funds awarded, thereby reducing fee collections in the initial years. Two projects also proposed scope changes that are expected to reduce funding required and, thus, reduce total fees. Such factors raise doubts on whether GSA will be able to fully recover future operating expenses. Although GSA acknowledged this issue, the agency has not yet developed a plan outlining the actions needed to fully recover its TMF operating costs in a timely manner. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) funding guidelines require projects to include a reliable estimate of any project-related savings. However, the seven projects' reported savings estimates derived from cost estimates are not reliable. None of the projects incorporated all of the best practices for a reliable cost estimate, as defined in GAO and OMB guidance. Without clarifying the requirement that agencies follow Circular A-11's cost estimating process (that references GAO's cost estimating guidance discussed in this report), agencies are at risk of continuing to provide unreliable cost information in their proposals.


After the House impeaches a federal officer, the Senate conducts a trial to determine if the individual should be removed from office. The Senate has a set of rules specific to the conduct of an impeachment trial, most of which originated in the early 19 th century. The impeachment rules lay out specific steps that the Senate takes to organize for a trial. House managers (Members of the House who present the case against the impeached officer in the Senate) read the articles of impeachment on the Senate floor. The Presiding Officer and Senators take an oath to do impartial justice, and the Senate issues a "summons" to the accused and requests that a written answer be filed. The House Managers are also invited to respond to the answer of the impeached officer. Actions after these organizing steps, however, are not specified in the impeachment rules. The impeachment rules mention some actions that are common in judicial trials, such as opening and closing statements by the parties to the case and the examination of witnesses, but provide little specific guidance. Instead, the rules allow the Senate, when sitting for a trial, to set particular procedures through the approval of "orders." Some orders of the Senate are unanimous consent agreements, but others are proposals adopted by the Senate. If such a proposal is considered while the Senate is sitting for the trial, then debate is limited by the impeachment rules. As a result, the support of three-fifths of the Senate to invoke cloture is not necessary to reach a vote to approve a procedural proposal. In previous trials, such proposals have been subject to amendment. Senate published precedents do not provide guidance on what can or cannot be included in such an order. Compared to when the Senate meets in legislative and executive session, the opportunity for individual participation by Senators in a Senate trial is limited. The rules require that any debate among Senators take place in closed session. Senators can make motions under the impeachment rules, but these rules are silent on what motions can be offered, and when. In modern trials, when Senators proposed motions, it was often pursuant to a previously-agreed-to order of the Senate. Senators can also submit written questions during the trialâto House Managers, counsel for the impeached officer, or witnessesâthat the Presiding Officer presents on their behalf. Orders of the Senate, however, might structure the time and process for posing questions. During the open portion of an impeachment trial, Senators spend most of the time listening to arguments presented by House Managers and counsel for the impeached officer. Impeachment Rule XI allows the Senate to create trial committees to hear and consider evidence and report it to the Senate. Such committees were not intended to be used for presidential impeachments, but four of the five impeachment trials completed since 1936 concerned federal judges, and in each of these cases the Senate established a trial committee. When the Senate meets in closed session to deliberate, each Senator may speak only once on each question. Such remarks are limited to 15 minutes on the final questionâwhether the impeached officer is guilty or not guiltyâand to 10 minutes on other questions. On the final question, Senators respond "guilty" or "not guilty" on each article of impeachment. The support of two-thirds of Senators present on an article is necessary to convict. The Presiding Officer of a trial operates much like the Presiding Officer in regular Senate session, in that the Chair may issue an initial ruling, but any Senator could request that the full Senate vote instead. Because of the debate limitations in the impeachment rules, procedural decisions appealed or submitted by the Chair can be reached with majority support. In a presidential impeachment trial, the Chief Justice of the United States is the Presiding Officer. Although the impeachment rules prescribe that the Senate convene at noon for a trial, six days a week, a Senate majority can alter this schedule. It is possible for the Senate to conduct legislative and executive business on the same calendar days that it meets for a trial, but it must meet in legislative or executive session to do so. When the Senate is sitting as a Court of Impeachment, legislative and executive business cannot occur. The information presented in this report is drawn from published sources of congressional rules and precedents, as well as the public record of past impeachment trial proceedings. It provides an overview of the procedures, and some past actions, but should not be treated or cited as an authority on congressional proceedings. Authoritative guidance on the interpretation and possible application of rules and precedents can be obtained only through consultation with the Office of the Senate Parliamentarian.


In December 2019, hospitals in the city of Wuhan in China's Hubei Province began seeing cases of pneumonia of unknown origin. Chinese health authorities ultimately connected the condition, later named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), to a previously unidentified strain of coronavirus. The disease has spread to almost every country in the world, including the United States. WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 30, 2020; raised its global risk assessment to "Very High" on February 28; and labeled the outbreak a "pandemic" on March 11. In using the term pandemic, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus cited COVID-19's "alarming levels of spread and severity" and governments' "alarming levels of inaction." As of May 14, 2020, WHO had reported more than 4.2 million COVID-19 cases, including almost 300,000 deaths, of which more than 40% of all cases and 55% of all deaths were identified in Europe, and more than 30% of all cases and nearly 30% of all deaths were identified in the United States. Members of Congress have demonstrated strong interest in ending the pandemic domestically and globally. To date, Members have introduced dozens of pieces of legislation on international aspects of the pandemic (see the Appendix ). Individual countries are carrying out not only domestic but also international efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic, with the WHO issuing guidance, coordinating some international research and related findings, and coordinating health aid in low-resource settings. Countries are following (to varying degrees) WHO policy guidance on COVID-19 response and are leveraging information shared by WHO to refine national COVID-19 plans. The United Nations (U.N.) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is requesting almost $7 billion to support COVID-19 efforts by several U.N. entities. International financial institutions (IFIs), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the regional development banks, are mobilizing their financial resources to support countries grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic. The IMF has announced it is ready to tap its total lending capacity, about $1 trillion, to support governments responding to COVID-19. The World Bank can mobilize about $150 billion over the next 15 months, and the regional development banks are also preparing new programs and redirecting existing programs to help countries respond to the economic ramifications of COVID-19. On January 29, 2020, President Donald Trump announced the formation of the President's Coronavirus Task Force, led by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and coordinated by the White House National Security Council (NSC). On February 27, the President appointed Vice President Michael Pence as the Administration's COVID-19 task force leader, and the Vice President subsequently appointed the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Ambassador Deborah Birx as the "White House Coronavirus Response Coordinator." On March 6, 2020, the President signed into law the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, P.L. 116-123 , which provides $8.3 billion for domestic and international COVID-19 response. The Act includes $300 million to continue the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) global health security programs and a total of $1.25 billion for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State. Of those funds, $985 million is designated for foreign assistance accounts, including $435 million specifically for Global Health Programs. On March 27, 2020, President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), P.L. 116-136 , which contains emergency funding for U.S. international COVID-19 responses, including $258 million to USAID through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account and $350 million to the State Department through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account ( P.L. 116-127 ). The pandemic presents major consequences for foreign aid, global health, diplomatic relations, the global economy, and global security. Regarding foreign aid, Congress may wish to consider how the pandemic might reshape pre-existing U.S. aid prioritiesâand how it may affect the ability of U.S. personnel to implement and oversee programs in the field. The pandemic is also raising questions about deportation and sanction policies, particularly regarding Latin America and the Caribbean and Iran. In the 116 th Congress, Members have introduced legislation to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in particular and to address global pandemic preparedness in general. This report focuses on global implications of and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and is organized into four broad parts that answer common questions regarding: (1) the disease and its global prevalence, (2) country and regional responses, (3) global economic and trade implications, and (4) issues that Congress might consider. For information on domestic COVID-19 cases and related responses, see CRS Insight IN11253, Domestic Public Health Response to COVID-19: Current Status and Resources Guide , by Kavya Sekar and Ada S. Cornell.


In January 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13768 that instructs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enforce U.S. immigration law against all removable individuals. In February 2017, the Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum (2017 DHS memo) establishing policy and providing guidance related to the Executive Order. Within DHS, ICE is responsible for providing safe confinement for detained aliens, including certain vulnerable populations. GAO was asked to review ICE immigration enforcement priorities, including those for vulnerable populations. This report examines (1) ICE data on arrests, detentions, and removals from calendar years 2015 through 2018; (2) the policies in effect for selected populations and any changes ICE made to align these policies with the 2017 DHS memo; and (3) the extent to which ICE collects data on selected populations and what those data show. GAO analyzed ICE data on arrests, detentions, and removals from calendars years 2015 through 2018; reviewed policies and documents on eight populations GAO selected based on ICE policies and input from organizations that represent various vulnerable populations; and interviewed agency officials. The numbers of administrative arrests (arrests), detentions, and removals of aliens (people who are not citizens or nationals of the United States) by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) varied during calendar years 2015 through 2018, and increased overall for the period. Males, aliens from four countries—Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—and convicted criminals accounted for the majority of ICE arrests and removals. The majority of detentions were made up of males, aliens from the same four countries, and non-criminals. ICE has policies related to six of the selected populations GAO examined, including aliens who are: transgender, individuals with disabilities, individuals with mental disorders, juveniles, parents of minors, and pregnant. These policies provide guidance on identifying, detaining, caring for, and removing aliens in these populations. After issuance of the 2017 DHS memo, ICE removed language from its existing policies for individuals who are pregnant and parents of minors that it determined to be inconsistent with 2017 DHS memo. Available ICE detention data show that detentions of transgender and pregnant individuals increased from calendar years 2016 to 2018 and detentions of individuals with disabilities increased from 2017 to 2018. Detentions at facilities staffed by ICE medical personnel of individuals with mental disorders and women who are nursing varied from calendar years 2015 to 2018. We found that ICE does not collect or maintain readily available data on detained parents or legal guardians of U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident minors, as required by ICE policy. Without such information, ICE headquarters officials cannot ensure that ICE officers are collecting and entering this information into the system as required by policy. ICE officials said they have considered actions to identify this population, but are no longer considering these actions as of October 2019. Maintaining these data in a readily available format could help ensure that ICE personnel identify, evaluate, and share information on this population.


In January 2017, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector. The designation allowed DHS to prioritize assistance to state and local election officials to protect key election assets, including voter registration databases and voting equipment. The Conference Report (H. Rep. No. 116-9) accompanying the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act included a provision for GAO to examine how DHS is implementing key responsibilities to help protect the election infrastructure and the reported benefits and challenges of such efforts. This report addresses (1) DHS's election security efforts and selected election officials' perspectives on them, and (2) DHS's planning for the 2020 elections. GAO reviewed DHS's strategies, plans, and services provided to election officials. GAO also interviewed DHS officials, representatives of the EI-ISAC, a DHS-funded center responsible for sharing threat information nationwide, and election officials from eight states and three local jurisdictions. GAO selected the states and local jurisdictions to provide geographic diversity and variation in election administration, among other factors. The results from these states and localities are not generalizable, but provide insight into election officials' perspectives on DHS's efforts. Since the 2017 designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), has assisted state and local election officials in securing election infrastructure through regional support and assistance, education, and information sharing. Such efforts help state and local election officials protect various election assets from threats (see figure). In August 2019, the CISA Director identified election security as one of the agency's top five operational priorities. CISA security advisors, who are located throughout the country, consult with state and local election officials and identify voluntary, no cost services that CISA can provide. According to CISA, as of November 2019, 24 cybersecurity advisors and 100 protective security advisors perform and coordinate cyber and physical security assessments for the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including the Election Infrastructure Subsector. Technical teams at CISA headquarters generally provide the services, once requested. To further assist state and local election officials, CISA conducted two exercises simulating real-world events and risks facing election infrastructure in August 2018 and June 2019. According to CISA, the 2019 exercise included 47 states and the District of Columbia. In addition, CISA has funded the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC). According to CISA officials, the EI-ISAC is the primary mechanism for exchanging information about threats and vulnerabilities throughout the election community. The EI-ISAC director reported that, as of November 2019, its members included 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 2,267 local election jurisdictions, an increase from 1,384 local jurisdictions that were members in 2018. As a result of its efforts, CISA has provided a variety of services to states and local election jurisdictions in the past 2 years (see table). State election officials with whom GAO spoke were generally satisfied with CISA's support to secure their election infrastructure. Specifically, officials from seven of the eight states GAO contacted said that they were very satisfied with CISA's election-related work. Also, officials from each of the eight states spoke positively about the information that they received from the EI-ISAC. Further, officials from five states told GAO that their relationship with CISA had improved markedly since 2017 and spoke highly of CISA's expertise and availability. To guide its support to states and local election jurisdictions for the 2020 elections, CISA reported that it is developing strategic and operations plans. CISA intended to finalize them by January 2020, but has faced challenges in its planning efforts due to a reorganization within CISA, among other things. In the absence of completed plans, CISA is not well-positioned to execute a nationwide strategy for securing election infrastructure prior to the start of the 2020 election cycle. Further, CISA's operations plan may not fully address all aspects outlined in its strategic plan, when finalized. Specifically, according to CISA officials, the operations plan is expected to identify organizational functions, processes, and resources for certain elements of two of the four strategic plan's lines of effort—protecting election infrastructure, and sharing intelligence and identifying threats. CISA officials stated that CISA was unlikely to develop additional operations plans for the other two lines of effort—providing security assistance to political campaigns, and raising public awareness on foreign influence threats and building resilience. Moreover, CISA has not developed plans for how it will address challenges, such as concerns about incident response, identified in two reviews—one conducted by CISA and the other done by an external entity under contract—of the agency's 2018 election security assistance. Challenges that the reviews identified include: inadequate tailoring of services, which could have made it more difficult for CISA to meet the resource and time constraints of customers such as local election jurisdictions; not always providing actionable recommendations in DHS classified threat briefings or making unclassified versions of the briefings available, which may have hindered election officials' ability to effectively communicate with information technology and other personnel in their agencies who did not have clearances; the inability of CISA personnel supporting election security operations to access social media websites from situational awareness rooms, which hindered their collection and analysis of threat information; few capabilities that CISA field staff could quickly provide on Election Day, which could limit the agency's timeliness in responding to an incident; and a lack of clarity regarding CISA's incident response capabilities in the event of a compromise that exhausts state and local resources, which may limit knowledge about agency capabilities that are available. Although CISA officials said that the challenges identified in the reviews have informed their strategic and operational planning, without finalized plans it is unknown whether CISA will address these challenges.


In January 2019, at the direction of Congress, GAO formed the Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team to expand its work on cutting-edge science and technology issues, and to provide oversight, insight, and foresight for science and technology. TAs can be used to strengthen decision-making, enhance knowledge and awareness, and provide early insights into the potential impacts of technology. TA design can enhance TA quality, credibility, and usefulness; ensure its independence; and ensure effective use of resources. Under the Comptroller General authority, we developed this handbook using the format of the 2012 GAO methodology transfer paper, Designing Evaluations . Below is a summary of the approach we used to affirm and document TA design steps and considerations for this handbook. Reviewed select GAO documents, including Designing Evaluations (GAO-12-208G), published GAO TAs, select GAO products that presented policy options, and other GAO reports Reviewed select Office of Technology Assessment reports Reviewed select Congressional Research Service reports Reviewed select literature on TAs and related to development and analysis of policy options Held an expert forum to gather experts’ input on TA design Considered experiences of GAO teams that have successfully assessed and incorporated policy options into GAO products, as well as GAO teams that are currently incorporating policy options into their TA design Collected input from GAO staff who provided key contributions to GAO TAs, regarding challenges to TA design and implementation and possible solutions The Technology Assessment Design Handbook identifies tools and approaches GAO staff and others can consider in the design of robust and rigorous technology assessments (TAs). The handbook underscores the importance of TA design (Chapter 1), outlines the process of designing TAs (Chapter 2), and describes approaches for mitigating selected TA design and implementation challenges (Chapter 3). While the primary audience of this handbook is GAO staff, we expect that other organizations engaged or interested in TAs will find portions of this handbook useful. We anticipate modifying and refining this handbook, as needed, based on experience and public comments received. We will accept comments on this handbook at TAHandbook@gao.gov for approximately 1 year after publication. The handbook identifies three general design phases, as appropriate, as shown in the figure below. T terative nature of TA design, the requester’s interests, resources, independence, stakeholder engagement, potential challenges, and communication. In addition, ormulating initial policy options to consider; gathering evidence, determining relevant dimensions to analyze, and analyzing the policy options; and presenting the results of the policy analysis. Summary of Key Phases of Technology Assessment Design We found that GAO TAs have and can use a variety of design approaches and methods. The handbook provides TA design and methodology examples, including related to objectives commonly found in GAO TAs, such as: describe a technology, assess opportunities and challenges of a technology, and assess policy considerations. One example provided is: some GAO TAs include an objective related to describing the status and feasibility of a technology, which GAO teams have done by using methodologies such as expert panels, interviews, literature and document reviews, site visits, and determining the Technology Readiness Level. Also included in the handbook are examples of TA design and implementation challenges we found, along with possible mitigation strategies. We identified four general categories of challenges, including: (1) ensuring TA products are useful for Congress and others; (2) determining policy goals and measuring impact; (3) researching and communicating complicated issues; and (4) engaging all relevant stakeholders. An example of a potential mitigation strategy to the specific challenge of writing simply and clearly about technical subjects includes: allowing sufficient amount of time for writing, including reviewing and revising writing.


In July 2016, Congress enacted P.L. 114-216 (2016 Act), comprehensive legislation to govern the labeling of bioengineered foods. The 2016 Act required the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard ( the Standard ) . The Standard regulates labeling of bioengineered foods, a term defined in the 2016 Act. The act does not address or define other terms that some members of the public might associate with bioengineered foods, such as genetically engineered (GE), genetically modified , and genetically modified organism (GMO). The Standard guides the mandatory labeling of foods to indicate the presence of GE ingredients. As such, foods meeting requirements identified in the Standard must bear a bioengineered disclosure. Implementation began on January 1, 2020, and mandatory compliance begins on January 1, 2022. The Standard provides details under the three key issues of applicability, disclosure options, and administrative provisions: Applicability discusses the definition of bioengineered food and the USDA-maintained List of Bioengineered Foods (List). The Standard applies to foods that are or may be derived from bioengineered ingredients, with some exclusions and exemptions. It does not apply to refined products, such as oils or sugars, that derive from GE plants but no longer contain detectable modified deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Many groups interpret the Standard as not applying to foods derived from gene editing and other new technologies that do not use recombinant DNA. The Standard exempts from disclosure foods served in restaurants. Some have endorsed such exclusions and exemptions, and others have criticized them. Disclosure Options outlines acceptable disclosure options for regulated entities, as well as additional options available for specific entities and types of food packages. Most regulated entities may disclose by text, symbol (pictured above), electronic or digital link, or text message. In some cases, a telephone number or website address may be acceptable. Some groups have praised the flexibility that this range of options provides regulated entities, while others have criticized these options as confusing. Administrative Provisions reviews compliance dates, recordkeeping requirements, and enforcement mechanisms, which include audits, examinations, hearings, and release of public findings. The 2016 Act provided few enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The Standard establishes how USDA may investigate accusations of non-compliance and how it may publicly release its findings. The Standard does not affect how foods derived from biotechnology are regulated for safety and approval for human consumption. The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology , a policy the White House issued in 1986, continues to govern how federal agencies, including USDA, evaluate and approve products developed using modern biotechnology. More generally, USDA and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) continue to ensure that foods sold in the United States are safe and properly labeled. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) developed the Standard within a broader societal context. Before the 2016 Act, some members of the public had demanded mandatory labeling of the presence of GE ingredients in foods, based on the consumer's right to know. Other members of the public had opposed any GE labeling because of the scientific consensus that GE foods are safe to eat and concern that labeling may introduce unwarranted doubts about food safety. Before the 2016 Act, several states had enacted GE labeling laws, creating concerns among industry and consumer groups. In response, Congress debated this and other federal GE labeling legislation. GE labeling programs may be voluntary or mandatory and may indicate the presence or absence of GE ingredients. Several voluntary labeling programs predate the Standard's mandatory labeling requirements. Public and private programs for the voluntary labeling of foods continue to indicate the absence of GE ingredients in foods. These include the Non-GMO Project and the USDA National Organic Program. Future considerations for Congress may include ongoing questions consumers may have concerning what it means for a food to be labeled as bioengineered , how regulated entities will respond to the Standard's new requirements, how USDA will implement its responsibilities under the Standard, potential market impacts as demand for GE versus non-GE foods may change, and how the Standard aligns with international labeling requirements. Congress may choose to monitor implementation of the new Standard in accordance with its oversight responsibilities.


In June 2018, Congress passed the VA MISSION Act of 2018, which requires VA to establish a permanent community care program. VA plans to consolidate the Choice Program and its other VA community care programs into one community care program—the VCCP. This legislation helps address some of the challenges faced by the Choice Program and VA's other community care programs. VA's implementation of the VCCP can benefit from the lessons learned under the Choice Program. Ignoring these lessons learned increases VA's risk for not being able to ensure that all veterans receive timely access to care in the community and that community providers are reimbursed in a timely manner. This testimony focuses on lessons learned from the Choice Program, including recommendations GAO has made to VA to help ensure (1) veterans' timely access to care under the VCCP (2) effective monitoring of veterans' access to care under the VCCP, and (3) timely payments to community providers under the VCCP. This testimony is based on GAO reports on the Choice Program that were issued in June 2018 and September 2018. The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program) allows eligible veterans to obtain health care services from providers not directly employed by VA (community providers). The program is largely managed by third party administrators (TPA), who are responsible for establishing provider networks, scheduling veterans' appointments, and paying providers. GAO has identified the following challenges to the Choice Program that VA needs to address as it implements its new Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP). Factors that adversely affected veterans' timely access to care. GAO found that numerous factors adversely affected veterans' timely access to care through the Choice Program. These factors included (1) administrative burden caused by complexities of referral and appointment scheduling processes; (2) poor communication between VA and its medical facilities; and (3) inadequacies in the networks of community providers established by the TPAs, including an insufficient number, mix, or geographic distribution of community providers. VA has taken steps intended to help address these factors, however, some have not been fully addressed. In June 2018, GAO made five recommendations to VA, including that VA establish a system that will facilitate care coordination and exchanges of information among VA medical facilities, VA clinicians, TPAs, community providers, and veterans. VA agreed or agreed in principle with all five recommendations, but has not yet implemented them. Unavailable and unreliable data. GAO found that VA cannot systematically monitor the timeliness of veterans' access to Choice Program care because it lacks complete, reliable data to do so. The data limitations GAO identified included a lack of data on the timeliness of accepting referrals and opting veterans in to the program, inaccurate data on clinically indicated dates (which are used to measure the timeliness of care), and unreliable data on the timeliness of urgent care. In June 2018, GAO made five recommendations to VA, including that VA implement mechanisms to allow VA to systematically monitor the amount of time taken to prepare referrals, schedule appointments, and complete appointments. VA agreed with four of the five recommendations, but has not yet implemented them. Untimely payments to community providers. GAO identified three key factors that affected timeliness of payments to community providers under the Choice Program. These factors included (1) VA's untimely payments to TPAs, which in turn extended the length of time TPAs took to pay providers' claims; (2) Choice Program reimbursement requirements, which led to claim denials; and (3) inadequate provider education on filing claims. GAO found that VA has taken actions to address the factors, such as amending certain reimbursement requirements. However, two of these factors have not been fully addressed. In September 2018, GAO made two recommendations to VA, including that VA collect data on and monitor compliance with its requirements pertaining to customer service for community providers. VA agreed with the recommendations, but has not yet implemented them.


In June 2018, the administration proposed reorganizing OPM by devolving its responsibilities to other agencies and entities including GSA and the EOP; see the figure for details. OMB's role is to coordinate and oversee the reorganization proposal, with support from OPM and GSA. In June 2018, GAO reported on key practices to assess agency reform efforts. This testimony focuses on preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to the transfer of functions from OPM to GSA and the EOP. Specifically, we evaluated (1) the extent to which OMB, OPM, and GSA have addressed key practices for effective reforms and reorganizations; (2) legal authorities that may affect the reorganization of OPM, and (3) key capacities important for effective strategic human capital management, which need to be in place regardless of how the leadership over federal human capital is organized. For the information in this testimony, as of May 17, 2019, GAO met with OMB staff, GSA officials, OPM's and GSA's Inspectors General staff, and analyzed documentation provided by GSA. GAO also reviewed its prior related work. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and General Services Administration (GSA) have generally not addressed key practices for agency reform efforts as they have moved forward with their proposal to reorganize OPM. They have not established outcome-oriented goals, developed a cost-benefit analysis or implementation plans, and have not fully involved or communicated their efforts with the Congress, employees, and other key stakeholders. OPM and GSA also have not shown how they will address management challenges that may affect their ability to successfully reorganize the government's central human capital functions. OMB, OPM and GSA have not identified specific actions, as of May 17, 2019, that can be taken administratively versus those that will require legislative action to reorganize OPM. The administration has acknowledged the need for additional statutory authority to execute certain transfers of functions from OPM to GSA and the Executive Offices of the President (EOP), but has also stated that it will rely on existing authority to move certain functions administratively. Without additional information from OMB and agencies, GAO cannot assess the legal authorities the administration is relying on to implement the reorganization. As the Congress and administration consider whether or how to restructure OPM, it will be important to retain the capacity to execute certain government-wide, strategic human capital functions, regardless of the decision made about the organizational arrangement. These capacities include an ability to identify future workforce trends and to effectively collaborate with stakeholders—for the purpose of creating, executing, and overseeing human capital policies and programs, and enforcing civil service laws and regulations. This is particularly important because GAO continues to designate strategic human capital management as a high-risk area.


In June 2018, the administration released its government-wide reform plan, which included 32 proposals aimed at achieving management improvements and organizational efficiencies, among other things. OMB has a central role in overseeing these reform proposals, with support from various lead agencies. In July 2018, GAO reported on key questions to consider when developing and implementing reforms. GAO was asked to examine reform implementation. This report discusses three selected reforms that the administration prioritized: (1) moving background investigations from OPM to DOD, (2) solving the cybersecurity workforce shortage, and (3) establishing the GEAR Center. For each selected reform, GAO determined the extent to which OMB and the lead agencies addressed key practices for effectively implementing reforms, among other issues. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed OMB staff and agency officials. GAO assessed OMB's and lead agencies' efforts against relevant key practices for effective reforms. In working to implement three selected government-wide reforms that GAO reviewed, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and lead agencies followed some, but not all, of the key practices associated with effective reforms. Following key practices, such as those reflected in the questions below, would better position OMB and lead agencies to effectively implement such major change initiatives and achieve their intended objectives. Moving background investigations from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to the Department of Defense (DOD) : As required, the transfer of background investigations took place by September 30, 2019. OMB, OPM, and DOD generally addressed most key reform practices in this transfer, including involving employees and stakeholders, establishing an implementation team, and developing implementation plans. With the transfer complete, DOD officials told GAO they are shifting focus toward addressing GAO's high-risk area on the government-wide personnel security clearance process. Solving the cybersecurity workforce shortage : OMB and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) partially addressed most leading practices through their efforts to implement several projects, such as reskilling employees to fill vacant cybersecurity positions, and streamlining hiring processes. However, GAO found that OMB and DHS have not established a dedicated implementation team, or a government-wide implementation plan, among other practices. Without these practices in place, OMB and DHS may not be able to monitor implementation activities and determine whether progress is being made toward solving the cybersecurity workforce shortage. Establishing the Government Effectiveness Advanced Research (GEAR) Center : According to OMB, the GEAR Center will bring together researchers from private and public sectors to inform and develop ways to improve government services and operations. OMB is working toward establishing the GEAR Center by collecting input from the public, academia, and industry for how the Center could be structured and ideas for possible research projects. However, OMB has not yet developed an implementation plan with key milestones and deliverables to track its progress. Developing and communicating an implementation plan will help OMB track the GEAR Center's progress and communicate its results.