Over the past decade the Air Force has increasingly relied on the ARC to meet operational requirements. The ARC is composed of two entities—the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve (AFR)—which together comprise a substantial part of the total Air Force capability. AFSOC relies on either volunteerism or involuntary mobilization to activate ARC units. House Report 115-676, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, contains a provision for GAO to assess ANG and AFR involuntary mobilization plans to support special operations. GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) AFSOC's mobilization process provides the ARC with timely and reliable forecasts of planned utilization of units and personnel; and (2) the ARC identifies and communicates information to AFSOC on the units and individuals available for mobilization or on voluntary deployments. The Air Force Special Operation Command's (AFSOC) mobilization process does not fully support Air Reserve Component (ARC) needs for timely and reliable information. While AFSOC has established mobilization processes in line with Air Force guidance, the command faces difficulties, as follows: consistently providing ARC units and personnel with timely notifications regarding anticipated demand for their capabilities; coordinating with ARC commands on potential requirements for ARC capabilities; and sharing reliable information about mission requirements and resources with ARC units and personnel. According to AFSOC officials, these difficulties stem from AFSOC's limited organizational capacity to conduct the planning, coordination, and execution of involuntary mobilizations (that is, ARC units or personnel ordered to active duty). Other Air Force entities that provide ARC capabilities to meet Air Force-wide requirements have established the capacity within their operations departments to coordinate with the ARC when implementing the involuntary mobilization process. AFSOC officials stated that because AFSOC did not, until recently, regularly use involuntary mobilizations to access the ARC, it was not considered necessary to have an organizational entity dedicated to managing involuntary mobilizations. AFSOC officials stated that the command's operations center has submitted requests to its headquarters for additional resources toward creating such organizational capacity, but the requests were not funded in fiscal years 2018 or 2019, as other requests received higher priority. According to officials, AFSOC is currently exploring possible short-term solutions. In the absence of the organizational capacity to conduct the planning, coordination, and execution of involuntary mobilizations, AFSOC will continue to be impeded in providing the notice required to access the ARC in support of requirements. The ARC does not provide AFSOC with complete information regarding which of its units could be used to support AFSOC requirements for special operations activities. The Air Force uses a model that captures and organizes Air Force-wide requirements, but the model does not include special operations requirements, and AFSOC is expected to develop its own processes for its unique requirements. According to AFSOC and ARC officials, the ARC has not developed a method for capturing and organizing special operations requirements because it has historically supported special operations activities using volunteerism, which is more flexible and requires less up-front planning. Consolidated information on potential unit deployments would provide units with advanced notification, facilitating deployment preparation activities and helping personnel make arrangements with civilian employers or in their personal lives. Without a method to provide consolidated information on reserve component units available for deployment, the ARC will not have the information it needs to successfully plan its deployments, or to easily identify which of its units will be available for mobilization.


An uprising against Bahrain's Al Khalifa ruling family that began on February 14, 2011, has subsided, but punishments of oppositionists and periodic demonstrations continue. The mostly Shia opposition to the Sunni-minority-led regime has not achieved its goal of establishing a constitutional monarchy, but the unrest has compelled the ruling family to undertake some modest reforms. Elections for a legislative body, held most recently in 2018, were marred by the banning of opposition political societies and allegations of gerrymandering to prevent opposition victories, but observers praised the newly elected lower house of the Assembly for naming a woman as its speaker. The mainstream opposition uses peaceful forms of dissent, but small factions, reportedly backed by Iran, have conducted some attacks on security officials. The Bahrain government's repression has presented a policy dilemma for the United States because Bahrain is a longtime ally that is pivotal to maintaining Persian Gulf security. The country has hosted a U.S. naval command headquarters for the Gulf region since 1948; the United States and Bahrain have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1991; and Bahrain was designated by the United States as a "major non-NATO ally" in 2002. There are over 7,000 U.S. forces, mostly Navy, in Bahrain. Bahrain relies on U.S.-made arms, but, because of the government's use of force against protesters, the Obama Administration held up some new weapons sales to Bahrain and curtailed U.S. assistance to Bahrain's internal security organizations. In 2014, Bahrain joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State and flew strikes against the group's fighters in Syria that year. Bahrain supports a U.S.-backed concept for a broad Arab coalition to counter Iran, the "Middle East Strategic Alliance." The Trump Administration has prioritized countering Iran and addressing other regional security issues, aligning the Administration closely with Bahrain's leadership on that issue. In keeping with that approach, the Administration lifted the previous administration's conditionality on major arms sales to Bahrain's military and has corroborated Bahrain leadership assertions that Iran is providing material support to violent opposition factions in Bahrain. Critics of the policy assert that the Administration is downplaying human rights concerns in the interests of countering Iran. Within the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), Bahrain generally supports Saudi policies. In March 2015, it joined Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to restore the government of Yemen that was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. In June 2017, it joined a Saudi and UAE move to isolate Qatar for its purported support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist movements, accusing Qatar of hosting Bahraini dissidents and of allying with Iran. Bahrain has fewer financial resources than do most of the other GCC states and has not succeeded in significantly improving the living standards of the Shia majority. The unrest has, in turn, strained Bahrain's economy by driving away foreign investment. In October 2018, three GCC states assembled an aid package of $10 billion to reduce the strain on Bahrain's budget. Bahrain's small oil exports emanate primarily from an oil field in Saudi Arabia that the Saudi government has set aside for Bahrain's use, although a major new oil and gas discovery off Bahrain's coast was reported in early 2018. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). Some U.S. labor organizations assert that Bahrain's arrests of dissenting workers should void the FTA.


Over the past decade, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple ("Big Tech" or the "Big Four") have revolutionized the internet economy and affected the daily lives of billions of people worldwide. While these companies are responsible for momentous technological breakthroughs and massive wealth creation, they have also received scrutiny related to their privacy practices, dissemination of harmful content and misinformation, alleged political bias, andâas relevant hereâpotentially anticompetitive conduct. In June 2019, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC)âthe agencies responsible for enforcing the federal antitrust lawsâagreed to divide responsibility over investigations of the Big Four's business practices. Under these agreements, the DOJ reportedly has authority over investigations of Google and Apple, while the FTC will look into Facebook and Amazon. The DOJ and FTC investigations into Big Tech will likely involve inquiries into whether the relevant companies have illegally monopolized their respective markets or engaged in anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is illegal for a company with monopoly power to engage in exclusionary conduct to maintain or enhance that power. And under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, companies may not engage in mergers or acquisitions that "substantially lessen" competition. The scope of the market in which a defendant-company operates is a key question in both monopolization and merger cases. The Supreme Court has identified certain qualitative factors that courts may consider in defining the scope of relevant antitrust markets. The DOJ and FTC have also adopted a quantitative market-definition inquiry known as the "hypothetical monopolist" or "SSNIP" test, according to which a relevant antitrust market consists of the smallest grouping of products for which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 5% price increase. The application of this quantitative inquiry to certain zero-price technology markets may present courts and regulators with important issues of first impression. However, commentators have proposed a variety of methods by which regulators could assess the scope of the markets in which the Big Four operate. In addition to demonstrating that a defendant-company possesses monopoly power in a properly defined market, monopolization plaintiffs must show that the defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct to maintain or enhance that power. In investigating allegedly exclusionary behavior by the Big Four, antitrust regulators may be evaluating Google Search's alleged discrimination against Google's vertical rivals, certain tying and exclusive-dealing arrangements related to the company's Android mobile operating system, and exclusive and restrictive-dealing arrangements related to the company's ad-brokering platform; Amazon's alleged predatory pricing and discrimination against third-party merchants on its online marketplace; Facebook's allegedly anticompetitive pattern of acquiring promising potential competitors, including its acquisitions of the photo-sharing service Instagram and the messaging service WhatsApp; and Apple's decision to design its mobile-operating system to prevent customers from downloading iPhone apps from any source other than the company's App Store. While the antitrust action surrounding Big Tech is currently concentrated in the executive branch and the courts, digital competition issues have also attracted the interest of Congress, which may pursue legislation to address anticompetitive conduct by large technology companies. Specifically, some commentators have proposed that Congress adopt changes to certain elements of antitrust law to promote competition in technology markets, including modifications to predatory-pricing doctrine, exclusionary-design law, and merger review. In contrast, other commentators have advocated sector-specific competition regulation for large technology companies that would include data-portability rules, interoperability standards, nondiscrimination requirements, and separation regimes.


Over the years, the U.S. military has become reliant on precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to execute military operations. PGMs are used in ground, air, and naval operations. Defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as "[a] guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage," PGMs can include air- and ship-launched missiles, multiple launched rockets, and guided bombs. These munitions typically use radio signals from the global positioning system (GPS), laser guidance, and inertial navigation systems (INS)âusing gyroscopesâto improve a weapon's accuracy to reportedly less than 3 meters (approximately 10 feet). Precision munitions were introduced to military operations during World War II; however, they first demonstrated their utility operationally during the Vietnam War and gained prominence in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Since the 1990s, due in part to their ability to minimize collateral damage, PGMs have become critical components in U.S. operations, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems is likely to increase the operational utility of PGMs. In particular, peer competitors like China and Russia have developed sophisticated air defenses and anti-ship missiles that increase the risk to U.S. forces entering and operating in these regions. Using advanced guidance systems, PGMs can be launched at long ranges to attack an enemy without risking U.S. forces. As a result, DOD has argued it requires longer range munitions to meet these new threats. The Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all use PGMs. In FY2021, the Department of Defense (DOD) requested approximately $4.1 billion for more than 41,337 weapons in 15 munitions programs. DOD projects requesting approximately $3.3 billion for 20,456 weapons in FY2022, $3.9 billion for 23,306 weapons in FY2023, $3.9 billion for 18,376 weapons in FY2024, and $3.6 billion for 16,325 weapons in FY2025. Previously DOD obligated $1.96 billion for 13,985 weapons in FY2015, $2.98 billion for 35,067 weapons in FY2016, $3.63 billion for 44,446 weapons in FY2017, $5.05 billion for 68,988 weapons in FY2018, and $4.3 billion in FY2019 for 60,62 munitions. In FY2020, Congress authorized $5.30 billion for 56,067 weapons. Current PGM programs can be categorized as air-launched, ground-launched, or naval-launched. Air-Launched: Paveway Laser Guided Bomb, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Small Diameter Bomb, Small Diameter Bomb II, Hellfire Missile, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM), Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile. Ground - Launched: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM); Naval PGMs: Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and Naval Strike Missile. Congress may consider several issues regarding PGMs, including planned procurement quantities and stockpile assessments, defense industrial base production capacity, development timelines, supply chain security, affordability and cost-effectiveness, and emerging factors that may affect PGM programs.


Overview. Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa"), which received over a quarter of U.S. aid obligated in FY2018. Annual State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five-fold over the past two decades, primarily due to sizable increases in global health spending and more incremental growth in economic and security assistance. State Department and USAID-administered assistance allocated to African countries from FY2019 appropriations totaled roughly $7.1 billion. This does not include considerable U.S. assistance provided to Africa via global accounts, such as emergency humanitarian aid and certain kinds of development, security, and health aid. The United States channels additional funds to Africa through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and World Bank. Objectives and Delivery. Over the past decade, roughly 70-75% of annual U.S. aid to Africa has sought to address health challenges, notably relating to HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health, and nutrition. Much of this assistance has been delivered via disease-specific initiatives, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). Other U.S. aid programs seek to foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve education access and social service delivery; bolster democracy, human rights, and good governance; support sustainable natural resource management; and address humanitarian needs. What impacts the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic may have for the scale and orientation of U.S. assistance to Africa remains to be seen. Aid to Africa during the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration has maintained many of its predecessors' aid initiatives that focus wholly or largely on Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused trade and investment initiative, known as Prosper Africa. At the same time, the Administration has proposed sharp reductions in U.S. assistance to Africa, in line with proposed cuts to foreign aid globally. It also has proposed funding account eliminations and consolidations that, if enacted, could have implications for U.S. aid to Africa. Congressional consideration of the Administration's FY2021 budget request is underway; the Administration has requested $5.1 billion in aid for Africa, a 28% drop from FY2019 allocations. Congress has not enacted similar proposed cuts in past appropriations measures. Selected Considerations for Congress. Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether sectoral allocations are adequately balanced given the broad scope of Africa's needs and U.S. priorities in the region. Concern also exists as to whether funding levels are commensurate with U.S. interests. Comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made publicly available in budget documents, complicating estimates of U.S. aid to the region and congressional oversight of assistance programs. In addition to authorizing and appropriating U.S. foreign assistance, Congress has shaped U.S. aid to Africa through legislation denying or placing conditions on certain kinds of assistance to countries whose governments fail to meet standards in, for instance, human rights, debt repayment, or trafficking in persons. Congress also has restricted certain kinds of security assistance to foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses. Some African countries periodically have been subject to other restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, including country-specific provisions in annual aid appropriations measures restricting certain kinds of assistance. Congress may continue to debate the merits and effectiveness of such restrictions while overseeing their implementation.


PMIAA requires OMB to adopt program management standards and guidelines government-wide; OPM is to establish new—or revise existing—occupational standards for program and project management. PMIAA includes a provision for GAO, no later than 3 years after the enactment of the act, to issue a report examining the implementation and effectiveness of certain provisions of the act on federal program and project management. This report (1) describes steps taken by OMB, OPM, and agencies to implement PMIAA; (2) assesses OMB's efforts to address issues on GAO's High-Risk List using PMIAA; and (3) examines the extent to which OMB provided methods for agencies to measure and assess the results of PMIAA. GAO reviewed documents from and conducted interviews with OMB and OPM. GAO surveyed all 24 CFO Act agencies, and selected five agencies to illustrate implementation efforts. GAO also interviewed subject matter specialists from academia and the private sector regarding their views on how program and project management practices applied to PMIAA. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has begun to implement all requirements of the Program Management Improvement Accountabilitiy Act of 2016 (PMIAA), but further efforts are needed to fully implement the law. OMB released its 5-year strategic plan for PMIAA and developed program management standards. However, the standards are not detailed compared with accepted program and project management standards, and OMB's governance structure is insufficient for developing and maintaining these standards over time. In 2019, OMB conducted ten reviews of agency program portfolios—organized groupings of programs whose coordination in implementation enables agencies to achieve their objectives. Each review addressed one or two portfolios per agency. Further, OMB's required portfolio reviews of high-risk areas were limited to only five out of 35 areas on GAO's High-Risk List. OMB could establish measures to track agencies' progress. Although not required by PMIAA, this is a good practice for demonstrating improvement. As required by PMIAA, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) developed competencies for program and project managers and updated the program management job series. Further, OPM is developing a career path for program and project managers by the end of 2019. OPM also plans to create a unique job identifier code in 2020 so that agencies can more completely identify their program management workforce. The Program Management Policy Council (PMPC), established by PMIAA and chaired by OMB's Deputy Director for Management, met for the first time in September 2018 and met twice in 2019 to discuss PMIAA implementation with Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies. All CFO Act agencies designated a Program Management Improvement Officer to participate in the PMPC. However, the PMPC has neither addressed GAO high-risk areas nor advised OMB on how to address high-risk areas, as required by the PMIAA.


Paid family leave (PFL) refers to partially or fully compensated time away from work for specific and generally significant family caregiving needs, such as the arrival of a new child or serious illness of a close family member. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3) provides eligible workers with a federal entitlement to unpaid leave for a limited set of family caregiving needs, no federal law requires private-sector employers to provide paid leave of any kind. Currently, employees may access paid family leave if it is offered by an employer. In addition, workers in certain states may be eligible for state family leave insurance benefits that can provide some income support during periods of unpaid leave. As defined in state law and federal proposals, family caregiving activities that are eligible for PFL or family leave insurance generally include caring for and bonding with a newly arrived child and attending to serious medical needs of certain close family members. Some permit leave for other reasons, but in practice, day-to-day needs for leave to attend to family matters (e.g., a school conference or lapse in child care coverage), minor illness, and preventive care are not included among "family leave" categories. Employer provision of PFL in the private sector is voluntary. According to a national survey of employers conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 16% of private-industry employees had access to PFL through their employers in March 2018. The availability of PFL was more prevalent among professional and technical occupations and industries, high-paying occupations, full-time workers, and workers in large companies (as measured by number of employees). Recent announcements by several large companies indicate that access may be increasing among certain groups of workers. In addition, some states have enacted legislation to create state paid family leave insurance (FLI) programs, which provide cash benefits to eligible workers who engage in certain caregiving activities. California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey currently operate FLI programs, which offer 4 to 10 weeks of benefits to eligible workers. Three other states and the District of Columbia have enacted FLI programs, but they are not yet fully implemented and paying benefits. The New York program began phased implementation in 2018. The District of Columbia FLI legislation took effect in April 2017, and Washington State's FLI law took effect in July 2017; benefit payments start in 2020 for both programs. Massachusetts' family leave program was signed into law in June 2018; its benefit payments are to begin in January 2021. Many advanced-economy countries entitle workers to some form of paid family leave. Whereas some provide leave to employees engaged in family caregiving (e.g., of parents, spouses, and other family members), many emphasize leave for new parents, mothers in particular. The United States is the only Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member to not offer paid leave to new mothers. In December 2017, Congress passed H.R. 1 (P.L. 115-97), which included tax incentives to employers to voluntarily offer paid family and medical leave to employees. Proposals to expand national access to paid family leave have been introduced in the 116th Congress, such as the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act (FAMILY Act; S. 463/H.R. 1185), which proposes to create a national wage insurance program for persons engaged in family caregiving activities or who take leave for their own serious health condition (i.e., a family and medical leave insurance program), and the New Parents Act (S. 920/ H.R. 1940) which would allow parents of a new child to receive Social Security benefits for the purposes of financing parental leave. Others have proposed using the tax code to provide tax advantages to individuals with caregiving responsibilities.


Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a group of fluorinated compounds that have been used for various purposes, including numerous commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications. Some common uses include food packaging, nonstick coatings, and stain-resistance fabrics, and as an ingredient in fire suppressants in Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) used at U.S. military installations, at civilian airports, and by state and local fire departments, and elsewhere. PFAS persist in the environment and in humans, and studies on several PFAS indicate that exposures above certain levels are associated with various adverse health effects. Some PFASâprimarily perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)âhave been detected in soil, surface water, groundwater, and drinking water in numerous locations. These detectionsâassociated with releases from federal and industrial facilities, civilian airports, and fire department facilitiesâhave prompted calls for increased federal action and authority to prevent and mitigate releases of and exposures to PFAS. Federal actions to address potential risks from PFAS have focused mostly on PFOS and PFOA because of past uses, prevalence in the environment, and availability of health effects research. These actions have been taken primarily under the authorities of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and related Department of Defense (DOD) response authorities. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used various authorities to address PFAS in commerce, public water supplies, and in the environment. Under TSCA, EPA has taken actions over recent decades to gather and assess existing information on the risks of PFOS, PFOA, and certain other PFAS. The agency has required manufacturers to develop new information to evaluate risks of various PFAS and has issued orders restricting the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, and/or disposal pending the development of new risk information. In addition, EPA worked with U.S. manufacturers as they voluntarily phased out production of PFOS, PFOA, and related substances. Under SDWA, EPA is evaluating PFOA and PFOS to determine whether national drinking water regulations are warranted. EPA plans to propose preliminary determinations in 2019. Among other actions, EPA has issued nonenforceable health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS, intended to be protective over a lifetime of daily exposure, and has used SDWA emergency powers to issue enforcement orders to require responses to drinking water contamination by PFAS. DOD and other federal agencies have used CERCLA authorities to respond to releases of various PFAS at federal facilities, although such responses are not statutorily required. DOD administers the vast majority of federal facilities where PFAS has been detected. DOD has been responding to releases of PFOA and PFOS from the use of AFFF at active and decommissioned U.S. military installations under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. DOD has been phasing out the use of AFFF that contains PFOA or PFOS to reduce the risks of future releases. Several federal agencies, including EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, have been evaluating potential health effects that may be associated with exposures to various PFAS. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are addressing risks of PFAS in dairy milk, other foods, and food contact applications. Various stakeholders have urged federal agencies to act more quickly and broadly to address potential PFAS risks and to provide assistance to address contamination. In the 116 th Congress, more than 40 bills, including House- and Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) bills for FY2020 ( H.R. 2500 and S. 1790 ), would address PFAS through various federal agencies and authorities (see Table 2 ). Among other PFAS provisions, H.R. 2500 would establish liability for PFAS response costs though designation of PFAS as hazardous substances, both under CERCLA and through the Clean Water Act, while S. 1790 would expand DOD response requirements to include releases of any pollutant or contaminant. Unlike H.R. 2500 , S. 1790 would amend SDWA to direct EPA to issue drinking water standards for PFAS and for other purposes. Both bills would address PFAS under other statutes and new authorities. Several bills, including H.R. 2500 and S. 1790 , would variously authorize funds to be appropriated to assist communities in addressing contaminated water supplies.


Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are fluorinated chemicals that have been used in an array of commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications for decades. Some of the more common applications include nonstick coatings, food wrappers, waterproof materials, and fire suppressants. Detections of some PFAS in drinking water supplies and uncertainty about potential health effects associated with exposure to particular PFAS above certain concentrations have increased calls for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address these substances in public water supplies. For those few PFAS for which scientific information is available, animal studies suggest that exposure to particular substances above certain levels may be linked to various health effects, including developmental effects; changes in liver, immune, and thyroid function; and increased risk of some cancers. In 2009, EPA listed certain PFAS for formal evaluation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to determine whether regulations may be warranted. EPA has not issued drinking water regulations for any PFAS but has taken various actions to address PFAS contamination. In the 116 th Congress, Members have introduced more than 40 bills to address PFAS through various means. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020, P.L. 116-92 , includes multiple PFAS provisions regarding primarily the Department of Defense (DOD), but several involve EPA and other federal agencies. Among the EPA provisions, Title LXXIII, Subtitle A, directs EPA to require public water systems to conduct additional monitoring for PFAS and creates a grant program for public water systems to address PFAS and other emerging contaminants. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 535 , a broad PFAS bill, on January 10, 2020. Among SDWA provisions, H.R. 535 would direct EPA to issue drinking water regulations for at least two PFAS within two years and establish a separate standard-setting process for PFAS. In February 2019, EPA released its PFAS Action Plan, which discusses the agency's current and proposed actions to address these substances under its various statutory authorities. Regarding SDWA, the plan notes that EPA is following the statutory process for evaluating PFASâparticularly perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)âto determine whether national primary drinking water regulations are warranted. The Fall 2019 Regulatory Agenda indicated that EPA planned to propose preliminary regulatory determinations for PFOA and PFOS by the end of 2019 and finalize determinations by January 2021. The absence of a national health-based drinking water standard for any PFAS has increased interest in the SDWA process for regulating contaminants. The statute prescribes a risk- and science-based process for evaluating and regulating contaminants in drinking water. The evaluation process includes identifying contaminants of potential concern, assessing health risks, collecting occurrence data (and developing reliable analytical methods necessary to do so), and making determinations as to whether a national drinking water regulation is warranted for a contaminant. PFAS include thousands of diverse chemicals, and setting drinking water standards for individual or groups of PFAS raises technical and scientific challenges. For example, SDWA requires EPA to make determinations and set standards using the best available peer-reviewed science and occurrence data. However, data on the potential health effects and occurrence are available for few of these substances. Further, EPA may face challenges in developing test methods and identifying treatment technologies for a diverse array of PFAS. Contamination of drinking water by PFAS can pose challenges for states and communities, and some have called for EPA to establish enforceable standards. State drinking water regulators have noted that many states may face significant obstacles in setting their own standards. For contaminants not regulated under SDWA, EPA is authorized to issue non-enforceable health advisories, which provide information on health effects, testing methods, and treatment techniques for contaminants of concern. In 2016, EPA established health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS in drinking water at 70 parts per trillion (separately or combined). SDWA also authorizes EPA to take actions it deems necessary to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from a contaminant present in or likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water. Actions may include issuing orders requiring persons who caused or contributed to the endangerment to provide alternative water supplies or to treat contamination. Since 2002, EPA has used this authority to require responses to PFOA and/or PFOS contamination of water supplies associated with four sites, including three DOD sites.


Platform companies typically classify workers offering services as independent contractors and do not withhold taxes from their payments for remittance to IRS. GAO was asked to review issues related to platform workers and tax compliance. This report, among other things, examines (1) what is known about the platform workforce, and (2) options to promote compliance among its workers. GAO reviewed research on the U.S. platform economy and interviewed stakeholders on the tax-related challenges platform workers face; reviewed IRS documents; interviewed IRS officials; and assessed potential impacts of some options that could address platform worker tax-related challenges. The platform economy is an arrangement where workers offering goods or services connect with customers through an app or other online platform. Estimates of the population of platform workers lack certainty, but generally range from around 1.5 million to 2 million workers for recent years and suggest that the platform workforce may be growing. According to stakeholders, such as researchers and tax preparers, platform workers may not realize that a company is treating them as independent contractors rather than employees and that they must comply with different tax requirements. To help address this challenge, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed a communications plan aimed at workers in the platform economy (which IRS calls the gig economy). The communications plan incorporates leading practices for redesigning web pages and improving the online user experience, but lacks a monitoring plan to help assure IRS's efforts address platform workers' tax challenges. GAO found that platform workers may not receive information on their earnings, creating compliance challenges for them and enforcement challenges for IRS. GAO identified actions that could promote compliance. For example, some platform companies only report total annual payments for workers if they exceed $20,000 and 200 transactions—an amount that exceeds the average gross pay from a single company for many platform workers. Amending this rule to lower the reporting thresholds would provide workers with more information to help them comply with their tax obligations. The change could also enhance IRS's ability to ensure that these workers are correctly reporting their income. Additionally, IRS could implement voluntary withholding on payments to independent contractors (including platform workers). IRS data indicate that tax withholding substantially increases the compliance rate.


Policy discussions around border security often involve questions about how illicit drugs flow into the United States. These include questions about the smugglers, types and quantities of illicit drugs crossing U.S. borders, primary entry points, and methods by which drugs are smuggled. Further, these discussions often center on the shared U.S.-Mexico border, as it is a major conduit through which illicit drugs flow. There are no comprehensive data on the total quantity of foreign-produced illicit drugs smuggled into the United States at or between official ports of entry (POEs) because these are drugs that have generally evaded seizure by border officials. In lieu of these data, officials, policymakers, and analysts sometimes rely on certain drug seizure data to help understand how and where illicit drugs are crossing U.S. borders. Data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) indicate that, by weight, more marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl were seized at POEs than between them in FY2019. While available indicators suggest that drug seizures are more concentrated at POEs, it is the flow of drugs between them that have been a primary topic of recent policy discussions around border security. Specifically, there has been some debate about whether, how, and to what extent physical barriers along the Southwest border between the POEs may deter or alter the smuggling of foreign-produced, illicit drugs into the country. Since the early 1990s, there have been efforts to build pedestrian and vehicle barriers along the Southwest border in part to deter the unauthorized entry of migrants and smugglers. Analysts have suggested that in some cases, smugglers have responded by moving contraband under, over, or through the barriers, as well as around themâincluding by changing their concealment techniques to move illicit drugs more effectively through POEs. Drug smugglers utilize subterranean, cross-border tunnels to move illicit drugsâprimarily marijuanaâfrom Mexico into the United States. Their construction has increased in sophistication; tunnels may include amenities such as ventilation, electricity, and railways, and tunnel architects may take advantage of existing infrastructure such as drainage systems. Traffickers move contraband over border barriers through myriad mechanisms, from tossing loads by hand and launching bundles from compressed air cannons to driving vehicles on ramps up and over certain types of fencing, as well as employing ultralight aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and drones. Smugglers may also attempt to go through various types of border barriers; strategies include cutting holes in the barriers and bribing border officials to provide keys to openings in them. Smugglers may also move illicit drugs around border barriers. For instance, along the Southwest border, they may use boats to move contraband around fencing that extends into the Pacific Ocean, move drugs over land areas without constructed barriers, or smuggle goods through the POEs. A key question policymakers may ask is what effect an increase in border barrier length or enhancement of barrier style might have on drug smuggling between the POEs. Specifically, they may question whether or how additional border barrier construction might substantially alter drug smugglers' routes, tactics, speed, or abilities to breach these barriers and bring contraband into the country, and whether or how it has done so in the past. A comprehensive analysis of this issue is confounded by a number of factors, the most fundamental being that the exact quantity of illicit drugs flowing into the United States is unknown . Without this baseline, analysts, enforcement officials, and policymakers rely on other data points to help inform whether or how border barriers may affect illicit drug smuggling.


Policy discussions around issues such as border security, drug trafficking, and the opioid epidemic include questions about illicit drug flows into the United States. While there are numerous data points involved in understanding the trafficking of illicit drugs into the United States, these data are often estimated, incomplete, imperfect, or lack nuance. For example, debates about drug flows and how best to counter drug trafficking into the country often rely on selected drug seizure data from border officials, which do not reflect all drug flows into the United States. One way of conceptualizing the flow of illicit drugsâboth plant-based and syntheticâinto the United States is as a funnel. At the top of this funnel is the universe of illicit drugs produced around the world, both foreign and domestic. Factors affecting actual illicit cultivation and/or production are numerous and diverse, as are those affecting analysts' and officials' abilities to measure total worldwide production. Of all the illicit drugs that are produced around the world, some portion is destined for the United States. Of the total amount of illicit drugs that reach the U.S. border by land, air, or sea, some portion is known because it was seized by border officials, and an unknown portion is successfully smuggled into the country. While the proportion of illicit drugs coming into the country that are seized is unknowable, the amount of drugs seized is. And, data on drug seizures at the U.S. borders have sometimes served as a reference for policy debates on border security and drug trafficking into the country, in part because it is a knowable portion of drug trafficking problem. The primary agency charged with safeguarding the U.S. borders (including seizing illicit drugs and other contraband) is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for managing ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the United States at ports of entry; the Border Patrol is responsible for securing the border between ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the country between ports of entry. CBP data from OFO and Border Patrol indicate that for cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl, larger quantities by weight are seized at legal ports of entry than are seized between the ports. Conversely, a larger quantity by weight of illicit marijuana is seized between the ports of entry. CRS analysis of OFO drug seizure data from FY2014 to FY2018 indicate that across those five years, about 65% of seized illicit drugs, by weight, were seized at land ports of entry at the border, about 28% of seized drugs were seized at air ports of entry, and about 5% were seized at sea ports of entry. CRS analysis of these data also indicate that nearly 97% of drugs were seized during inbound inspections across those years. CBP is not the only agency that seizes illicit drugs in the United States or even in the border regions. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are all involved in enforcement actions thatâeven if not focused on drug-related crimesâmay involve drug seizures. Notably, though, there is no central database housing information on illicit drug seizures from all law enforcement agencies, federal or otherwise. Even though the quantity of total illicit drugs produced around the world that is destined for the United Statesâand successfully smuggled into the countryâis unknown, the likely source of the drugs seized may, in some instances, be knowable. U.S. officials chemically analyze a portion of illicit drugs seized to identify the source and, in conjunction with drug intelligence, assess which countries may be the major suppliers of certain illicit drug types found in the country. In the absence of precise data on illicit drugs moving toward and into the United States, seizure data can provide insight into various elements of drug flows such as smuggling points into the United States and target markets within the country. If policymakers are interested in having a more robust view of drug seizures throughout the country, they could move, through mandates or incentives, to enhance data collection and consolidation of drug seizure data by law enforcement officials. Policymakers may also question how border officials use intelligence about drug flows and data on drug seizures to assess the risks posed by drug trafficking and appropriately allocate resources to counter the threat. They may also evaluate how well available data on drug seizures can help measure progress toward achieving goals outlined in national strategies aimed, at least in part, at reducing drug trafficking into and within the country.


Approximately 300 airports in foreign countries offer last point of departure flights to the United States. When threat information or vulnerabilities at foreign airports indicate an immediate need for air carriers to implement additional security measures, TSA may issue new or revise existing security directives (for domestic air carriers) and emergency amendments (for foreign air carriers). The TSA Modernization Act includes a provision for GAO to examine TSA's review process for directives that apply at last point of departure airports. This report (1) identifies key characteristics of the TSA directives and (2) assesses TSA's process to review directives. GAO reviewed TSA policies and procedures, analyzed TSA program information, and interviewed TSA officials and representatives from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 air carriers, selected to represent carriers with high numbers of U.S.-bound flights, and three industry associations. As of March 2019, there were 46 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security directives and emergency amendments (i.e., directives) in effect related to air carrier operations at foreign airports. Twenty-eight directives addressed threats (e.g., explosives in laptops) and 18 pertained to vulnerabilities identified at foreign airports (e.g., inadequate perimeter fencing). TSA reviews directives, but its process does not fully define how to coordinate with industry representatives and TSA has not incorporated the security measures of many longstanding directives into air carrier security programs in accordance with TSA policy. Representatives from four domestic air carriers stated that coordination with TSA on directives has improved. However, representatives from six air carriers and two associations indicated that TSA has issued revised directives that are vague or difficult to implement—which, for example, contributed to TSA officials offering different interpretations of aircraft cabin search requirements—because TSA did not sufficiently include them in the review process. Better defining how TSA coordinates with air carriers and other stakeholders would help ensure that TSA issues directives that enable air carriers to effectively secure their operations against the identified threats or vulnerabilities. In addition, when TSA officials have coordinated with air carriers, they have not documented the input provided. Documenting the input could help ensure that TSA is consistently addressing air carrier concerns and retaining knowledge about who, what, when, where, and why coordination occurred. Further, TSA policy states that directives are not intended to be permanent and are expected to eventually be canceled or incorporated into security programs. GAO analysis found that TSA issued more than one half (25) of the directives prior to 2014, meaning they have been in effect for more than 5 years. Several have been in effect for more than 10 years (see figure). As of July 2019, TSA officials had begun the process to migrate directives into security programs as deemed appropriate, but had not yet finalized their plans for doing so. Defining the process for incorporating directives into security programs, including expected timeframes, and taking actions to implement this process, as applicable, could better ensure that TSA clarifies and streamlines security requirements in a timely manner.


President Trump and various U.S. lawmakers have expressed concerns about U.S. reliance on critical mineral imports and potential disruption of supply chains that use critical minerals for various end uses, including defense and electronics applications. Chinese export quotas on a subset of critical minerals referred to as rare earth elements (REEs) and China's 2010 curtailment of REE shipments to Japan heightened U.S. vulnerability concern. In December 2017, Presidential Executive Order 13817, "A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals," tasked the Department of the Interior to coordinate with other executive branch agencies to publish a list of critical minerals. The Department of the Interior published a final list of 35 critical minerals in May 2018. The concern among many in Congress has evolved from REEs and REE supply chains to include other minor minerals and metals that are used in small quantities for a variety of economically significant applications (e.g., laptops, cell phones, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies) and national defense applications. Also, as time passed, concerns increased about access to and the reliability of entire supply chains for rare earths and other minerals. Congressional action (e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014, P.L. 113-66 ) has led to the acquisition of REEs and other materials for the National Defense Stockpile. In 2017, the United States had no primary production of 22 minerals and was limited to byproduct production of 5 minerals on the critical minerals list. In contrast, the United States is a leading producer of beryllium and helium, and there is some U.S. primary production of 9 other critical minerals. China ranked as the lead global producer of 16 minerals and metals listed as critical. Although there are no single monopoly producers in China, as a nation, China is a dominant or near-monopoly producer of yttrium (99%), gallium (94%), magnesium metal (87%), tungsten (82%), bismuth (80%), and rare earth elements (80%). The United States is 100% import reliant on 14 minerals on the critical minerals list (aside from a small amount of recycling). These minerals are difficult to substitute inputs into the U.S. economy and national security applications; they include graphite, manganese, niobium, rare earths, and tantalum, among others. The United States is more than 75% import reliant on an additional 10 critical minerals: antimony, barite, bauxite, bismuth, potash, rhenium, tellurium, tin, titanium concentrate, and uranium. The current goal of U.S. mineral policy is to promote an adequate, stable, and reliable supply of materials for U.S. national security, economic well-being, and industrial production. U.S. mineral policy emphasizes developing domestic supplies of critical materials and encourages the domestic private sector to produce and process those materials. But some raw materials do not exist in economic quantities in the United States, and processing, manufacturing, and other downstream ventures in the United States may not be globally cost competitive. Congress and other decisionmakers have multiple legislative and administration options to weigh in deliberating on whether, and if so how, to address the U.S. role and vulnerabilities related to critical minerals.


President Trump has prioritized the construction of border barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border. Over the course of negotiations for FY2019 appropriations, the Administration asked Congress to appropriate $5.7 billion to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for that purpose. When Congress appropriated $1.375 billion to DHS for border fencing, the President announced that his Administration would fund the construction of border barriers by repurposing funds appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) and transferring funds from the Department of the Treasury. The Administration asserted that these funding transfers were authorized by a combination of the following federal laws: National Emergenc ies Act (NEA) . The NEA establishes a framework for the President to declare national emergencies. The NEA does not itself appropriate or authorize the transfer of funds, but the declaration of a national emergency triggers other statutory provisions that allow certain executive departments to repurpose existing appropriations. 10 U.S.C. Â§ 2808 . Section 2808 becomes available upon the President's declaration of a national emergency under the NEA. This provision authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use unobligated military construction funds for the construction of otherwise unauthorized military construction projects. Section s 8005 and 9002 of the 2019 D OD Appropriations Act . Sections 8005 and 9002 of the 2019 DOD Appropriations Act authorize the transfer of up to $6 billion appropriated in that act for "military functions" arising from "unforeseen military requirements." Funds may be transferred under these authorities only for "unforeseen military requirements" where the item for which funds will be transferred "has [not] been denied by the Congress." 10 U.S.C. Â§Â 284 . The 2019 DOD Appropriations Act also appropriated funds to a Drug Interdiction Account. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Â§Â 284, money in this fund may be spent by DOD in support of other agencies' counterdrug activities, including by constructing "roads and fencing . . . to block drug smuggling corridors across international borders of the United States." The Trump Administration proposed to use Sections 8005 and 9002 of the 2019 DOD Appropriations Act to transfer additional funds into the Drug Interdiction Account, which would then be used to construct border barriers. 31 U.S.C. Â§ 9705 . This provision establishes a Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) in the Department of the Treasury and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make payments from unobligated sums in the TFF to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for various law enforcement purposes. Several plaintiffs filed lawsuits in federal courts in California, the District of Columbia, and Texas to prevent the Administration from using these authorities to repurpose appropriations for border barrier construction, arguing that none of the Administration's funding initiatives were authorized by Congress. Some plaintiffs also argued that the construction of border barriers was subject to the environmental assessment requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Though a federal court in California initially entered an injunction prohibiting the Trump Administration from using the funds to initiate construction of border fencing, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately stayed that injunction. The California federal district court's injunction would have prohibited the Administration from using Sections 8005 and 9002 to transfer funds for border barrier construction. The court did not rule on the lawfulness of the Administration's other proposed funding sources, though it did determine that waivers issued by DHS under Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act rendered NEPA inapplicable to the proposed border projects. But following the Supreme Court's stay of the district court's injunction, DOD was able to use funds transferred under Sections 8005 and 9002 for barrier construction purposes while litigation in the case continues. A second federal district court in Texas has enjoined the use of Section 2808 for border barrier construction purposes. A third lawsuit challenging the Trump Administration's funding initiatives is ongoing in the District of Columbia, though that court has not ruled on the merits. Meanwhile, both houses of Congress have continued to move through the annual appropriations process. Although the House of Representatives initially passed a version of the DOD Appropriations Act for FY2020 that would have expressly prohibited the use of funds for the construction of border barriers, these limitations were not included as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (which included DOD appropriations and $1.375 billion for construction of a barrier system along the southwest border), or the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act as they were passed by both chambers of Congress and signed into law.


President Trump's budget request for FY2021 includes approximately $142.2 billion for research and development (R&D) for FY2021, $13.8 billion (8.8%) below the FY2020 enacted level of $156.0 billion. In constant FY2020 dollars, the President's FY2021 R&D request would result in a decrease of $16.6 billion (10.6%) from the FY2020 level. F ederal Research and Development Funding, FY2019-FY2021 In billions of dollars In 2017, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) adopted a change to the definition of development, applying a more narrow treatment that it describes as "experimental development." This change was intended to harmonize the reporting of U.S. R&D funding data with the approach used by other nations. The new definition is used in this report. Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. In FY2020, five federal agencies received 93.2% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (DOD, 41.4%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 26.2%) combined accounting for more than two-thirds of all federal R&D funding. In the FY2021 request, the top five R&D agencies would account for 93.8%, with DOD accounting for 42.1% and HHS for 26.6%. Under the President's FY2021 budget request, nearly all federal agencies would see their R&D funding decline relative to FY2020. The only exception is the Department of Veterans Affairs, which would increase by $38 million (2.9%) in FY2021 to $1.351 billion. The largest dollar reductions in R&D funding would be made to the DOD (down $4.713 billion), the Department of Energy (down $3.168 billion), and HHS (down $2.843 billion). The largest percentage declines in R&D funding would be at the Department of Transportation (down 47.6%), the Environmental Protection Agency (down 35.4%), and Department of the Interior (down 25.5%) The President's FY2021 budget request would reduce funding for basic research by $2.822 billion (6.5%), applied research by $5.125 billion (11.7%), development by $3.466 billion (5.5%), and facilities and equipment by $2.375 billion (39.6%). Several multiagency R&D initiatives continue under the President's FY2021 budget. Some activities supporting these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and are reported in the agency analyses in this report. However, comprehensive aggregate budget information on these initiatives will likely not be available until budget supplements for each are released later in the year. The request represents the President's R&D priorities. Congress may opt to agree with none, part, or all of the request, and it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In recent years, Congress has completed the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. Completing the process after the start of the fiscal year and the accompanying use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and the acquisition of R&D-related equipment. It is not yet clear how the national response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic will affect Administration and congressional priorities for FY2021 R&D funding, or the congressional authorization and appropriations processes for enacting that funding.


Presidential records provide Congress, members of the public, and researchers with documentation, context, and explanations for presidential actions. The Presidential Records Act (PRA; 44 U.S.C. Â§Â§2201-2207) set forth requirements regarding the maintenance, access, and preservation of presidential and vice presidential information during and after a presidency. This report describes the institutions involved in presidential recordkeeping, explains what is and is not considered a presidential record, and identifies recordkeeping responsibilities and access policies during and after a presidency. The report concludes with information and policy options for congressional oversight and enforcement of the PRA with respect to electronic records provisions under the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014. Prior to the PRA, records were considered the President's private property. Now, the PRA states that presidential records are the property of the United States. Under the PRA, the President may request advice and assistance from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) regarding records management practices, and the Archivist of the United States (the head of NARA) plays an important role in the maintenance and access of a former President's records. The PRA does not establish automatic access to an incumbent President's records, which may be protected by executive privilege on a case-by-case basis. However, the PRA does statutorily narrow an incumbent President's ability to restrict records access as the Administration draws to a close. As the length of time between the conclusion of a presidency and the present day increases, presidential records become more accessible. Access to a former President's records is governed in terms of time passed since the conclusion of the presidency: Less than five years out, no public access is granted due to the Archivist's processing of the records. Between five and 12 years out, the Archivist determines PRA restrictions with the former President in accordance with Title 44, Section 2204, of the U.S. Code . After 12 years, these PRA restrictions no longer apply. Certain federal officials may access a former President's records within the 12-year time frame by gaining "special access" to presidential records. The PRA permits either house of Congress, committees, or subcommittees requesting information for chamber or committee business to be granted special access to the former President's records. In practice, observers have questioned what constitutes a House or Senate request for presidential records and who needs to make the request to qualify under the PRA. This statutory ambiguity may impact the ability of minority party members and general committee members to gain access to presidential records. As a result of the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, presidential records are assessed for preservation not by the media used to store the information but rather by the content of the information itself. Questions regarding the volume and completeness of records may be suitable for congressional consideration. Any delay in NARA's processing of records will directly impact timely access to those records and the ability of NARA to comply with the PRA's statutory directive to make records available as rapidly and completely as possible.


Previous attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's screening and vetting processes for NIVs. State manages the visa adjudication process. DHS seeks to identify and interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug smugglers and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. DHS also has certain responsibilities for strengthening the security of the visa process. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018. This statement addresses (1) data and information on NIV adjudications and (2) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued in January 2017 and August 2018, along with selected updates conducted in December 2018 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address a prior GAO recommendation. In August 2018, GAO reported that the total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually increased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, but decreased in fiscal year 2017 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's report). NIVs are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. The number of adjudications peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. State refused about 18 percent of adjudicated applications during this time period, of which more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought and 0.05 percent were due to terrorism and security-related concerns. In 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern. GAO's analysis indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused specifically due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions. In January 2017, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates predeparture programs to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.- bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S.-bound travelers on those flights that are precleared at the 15 Preclearance locations at foreign airports—which serve as U.S. ports of entry—and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program and two Joint Security Program locations, as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups, through which CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit identified high-risk travelers to board U.S.-bound flights. CBP data showed that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers through these programs in fiscal year 2015 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's report). While CBP tracked some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, it had not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs. GAO recommended that CBP develop a system of performance measures and baselines to better position CBP to assess program performance. As of December 2018, CBP set preliminary performance targets for fiscal year 2019, and plans to set targets for future fiscal years by October 31, 2019. GAO will continue to review CBP's actions to address this recommendation.


Prior to the enactment of the CFO Act, government reports found that agencies lost billions of dollars through fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. These reports painted the picture of a government unable to properly manage its programs, protect its assets, or provide taxpayers with the effective and economical services they expected. The CFO Act was enacted to address these problems—calling for comprehensive federal financial management reform. Among other things, the act established CFO positions, provided for long-range planning, and began the process of auditing federal agency financial statements. The act also called for integrating accounting and financial management systems and systematic performance measurement and cost information. This statement is based on preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing review of the federal government's efforts to meet the requirements of the CFO Act. GAO reviewed federal financial management legislation, guidance, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews and a panel discussion with experts in federal financial management, and surveyed federal CFOs, inspectors general, and independent public accountants. The federal government has made significant strides in improving financial management since enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act). Substantial progress has occurred in areas such as improved internal controls, reliable agency financial statements, and establishment of chief financial officer (CFO) positions. To help ensure that the CFO Act achieves its full potential, there are several opportunities for enhancement. Standardize CFO and deputy CFO responsibilities across government. The responsibilities assigned to CFOs vary among agencies. Uniform and effective responsibilities of CFOs would help enhance strategic decision-making and correct inconsistencies across government. In addition, deputy CFOs should have appropriate responsibilities in order to be better prepared to act for CFOs when there are vacancies. Prepare government-wide and agency-level financial management plans. Since 2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not prepared the annual 5-year government-wide plans that the CFO Act requires. Instead, OMB has provided information in the President's Management Agenda, the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, and other documents. A complete and integrated government-wide financial management plan and supporting agency plans, prepared every few years, could help ensure continuity in direction and a more comprehensive understanding of gauging progress toward addressing financial management challenges across government. Better link performance and cost information for decision-making. While agencies have made efforts in this direction, opportunities exist for agencies to better link performance and cost information to effectively make financial management decisions that are based on dollars allocated and results achieved. Develop a broader set of key selected financial management performance-based metrics. Agencies currently have limited performance-based metrics to help them assess the quality of financial management and ensure that the federal government better manages and uses the resources entrusted to it. Rectify internal control issues in certain areas. The federal government faces many internal control problems. For example, assessments continue to identify long-standing, as well as new, material weaknesses. Improper payments continue to be a long-standing internal control issue. And finally, material weaknesses continue to prevent GAO from rendering an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. Improve financial management systems. The federal government has made unsuccessful efforts to implement new financial management systems at several agencies and spent billions of dollars on failed systems. Moreover, in fiscal year 2018, eight of 24 CFO Act agencies' still did not substantially comply with federal systems requirements. Strengthen the federal financial management workforce. With rapid changes, such as emerging technologies, it is critical for the government to identify and strategically plan for the future workforce.


Privileged nominations are a subset of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed positions that are eligible for consideration under procedures established by S.Res. 116 (112 th Congress, 2011-2012). The vast majority of the 285 nominations designated as privileged are part-time positions to various boards and commissions, though some full-time positions are privileged as well (e.g., chief financial officers and certain assistant secretaries in Cabinet-level agencies). The procedures for privileged nominations may reduce the workload of committees of jurisdiction in processing these appointments for consideration by the Senate. The creation of privileged nominations and the special procedures for their consideration were part of a larger effort at reforming the confirmation process in the Senate during the 112 th Congress. At the outset of the 112 th Congress, a bipartisan working group was formed and ultimately produced both S.Res. 116 , "A resolution to provide for expedited Senate consideration of certain nominations subject to advice and consent," and S. 679 , the "Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011" ( P.L. 112-166 ). The list of privileged nominations, first established in 2012, was expanded in 2015 by P.L. 114-1 , the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, to include 13 members of the Board of Directors for the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers. Unlike a typical nomination, a privileged nomination is not referred to committee unless requested by any Senator. Instead, it is entered into the "Privileged Nominations" section of the Senate Executive Calendar . Committees are required to request biographical and financial information from these nominees, typically in the form of committee questionnaires. Upon receipt of the requested information, the committee chair notifies the Executive Clerk in writing. The nomination then remains in the "Privileged Nominations" section of the Executive Calendar for 10 days of session before moving to the "Nominations" section, where it is eligible to be brought up for consideration on the floor of the Senate. This process allows a nomination to become eligible for floor consideration even though the committee did not hold a formal markup meeting to vote to report it. There are no expedited floor procedures for privileged nominations, and they are brought up and considered under the same procedures as any nomination reported by a committee. Any Senator may request on his or her own behalf, or on behalf of any identified Senator, that a privileged nomination be referred to committee. Such a request automatically triggers the referral of a privileged nomination. If a nomination is referred in this way, it must be reported by the committee (or the Senate must discharge the committee of the nomination) before the full Senate can consider it. The vast majority of privileged nominations considered on the Senate floor were not subject to a request for referral to committee. As of the end of 2019, the Senate has considered 467 privileged nominations, and there have been 22 instances of privileged nominations being referred to a committee at the request of a Senator. Such requests for referral are usually initiated by a Member on the committee with jurisdiction over the nomination and oftentimes originate with the committee's chair or ranking member.


Production of oil and natural gas from offshore leases is a significant source of federal revenue, totaling almost $90 billion from 2006 through 2018. BOEM is required to seek a fair return from offshore leasing and production activities in federal waters. Companies generally pay (1) bids for leases for the right to develop tracts, (2) rents on leased but undeveloped tracts, and (3) royalties on revenues from the sale of oil and gas produced from leases. BOEM holds auctions to award leases to the company offering the highest bid so long as the bureau determines the bid represents fair market value. GAO was asked to examine issues related to offshore federal oil and gas leasing. This report, among other objectives, (1) describes the effect of oil prices and royalty rates on industry bids for leases and (2) examines the extent to which BOEM's valuation process assures receipt of fair market value. GAO reviewed laws, policies, and regulations; interviewed BOEM officials; and developed an empirical model using BOEM data to analyze the effect of royalty rates and other factors on industry bidding. GAO's analysis indicates that changes in the price of oil and in royalty rates drive changes in the amount companies in the offshore oil and gas industry bid for leases (the amount paid upfront at auction for the right to explore and develop offshore tracts of land). Specifically, between May 1985 and June 2018, peaks in industry bidding coincided with higher oil prices. Additionally, when the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) offered leases at lower royalty rates, industry bid somewhat higher amounts per acre. For example, certain leases were sold from 1996 through 2000 with no royalties on initial volumes of production, which GAO estimates resulted in BOEM collecting, at most, nearly $2 billion in additional bid revenue. However, bureau estimates indicate these leases resulted in about $18 billion in foregone royalties through 2018. BOEM's valuation process might not fully assure receipt of fair market value, based on GAO's analysis of BOEM data. BOEM develops valuations for offshore tracts it assesses to be economically viable—assessments of their fair market value—and awards leases so long as the bid is greater than or equal to BOEM's valuation. BOEM's valuations for tracts were generally low relative to industry bids because, according to BOEM officials, they conservatively forecast to account for inherent uncertainties in, among other things, the quantity of oil and gas present as well as exploration and development costs. In addition, GAO identified two ways BOEM's valuation process results in lowering its already conservative valuations that might not fully assure receipt of fair market value: Unreasonably high depreciation . BOEM forecast that tracts would lose a median of 23 percent of their value in between sales, leading the bureau to accept lower bids because it determined the tracts might be worth even less in the future. Bureau officials told GAO that lower future values are generally due to BOEM discounting the delayed collection of revenue. However, BOEM's forecasted depreciation increased even though tracts are now available twice as frequently as they were prior to August 2017, reducing the time for discounting. Officials said they were unaware of the high rates and the issue warrants further examination. Enlisting a third party to examine the extent to which the bureau's use of delayed valuations assures the receipt of fair market value, and making changes as appropriate, would help BOEM mitigate risks of continuing to accept bids based on poor information on tracts' future values. Lowered valuations . BOEM officials told GAO that they lower some initial valuations that are “slightly above” industry's bids and which would therefore be rejected per procedures to assure fair market value. Officials said they prefer to accept bids unless there is high certainty that the bids are inadequate. However, GAO identified bias, or statistical anomalies, where BOEM lowered many valuations that were initially higher than industry's bids. Specifically, from March 2000 through June 2018, BOEM rejected 27 bids for tracts that it ultimately valued at up to double industry's bid whereas it accepted 359 bids in which industry's bid was up to double BOEM's valuation. Tracts for rejected bids are, on average, subsequently sold for more than twice the initial rejected amount, suggesting that BOEM could be forgoing hundreds of millions of dollars in bid revenue by accepting bids that are too low.


Protection of the nation's critical infrastructure (CI) against asymmetric physical or cyber threats emerged in the late 1990s as a policy concern, which was then further amplified by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the wake of the attacks, and directed the new Department to identify, prioritize, and protect systems and assets critical to national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Identification of CI assets was, and remains, a complex and resource-intensive task. Many governmental and non-governmental stakeholders increasingly advocate for a fundamentally different approach to critical infrastructure security, maintaining that criticality is not a fixed characteristic of given infrastructure assets. Rather, they argue, criticality should be understood in the context of ensuring system-wide resilience of American government, society, and economic life against the full range of natural and manmade hazards. Congress further elevated resilience as a priority when it passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Act into law in late 2018. As the name indicates, CISA was created to lead the national cybersecurity and infrastructure security effort as an operational component of DHS. In April 2019, leadership of the new agency identified a set of 56 National Critical Functions (NCF) (" Appendix A : National Critical Functions") which it plans to use as the basis of a resilience-based CI risk management approach. However, implementation will rely to a large degree on repurposed legacy programs. Thus, CI policy is currently at an inflection point that raises several potentially pressing issues for Congress: Scope of federal CI policy: The CI security enterprise has expanded significantly from its early focus on protecting systems and assets "essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government" against deliberate attack. Congress may consider narrowing the scope of CI policy. The legacy policy framework: National CI policy retains many legacy mandates and programs designed to support asset protection despite a long-term policy shift towards an all-hazards resilience framework. Congress may consider revising existing asset identification and reporting requirements statutorily linked to federal homeland security grant award processes. Validity of new risk management methods: Congress may assess the potential advantages and drawbacks of the resilience framework, and NCF as the basis for national-level infrastructure risk assessments and investment prioritization. In the past, Congress has called for external validation of DHS risk management methods and may wish to do so in the present case given its comparative novelty. Roles and responsibilities of federal agencies: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and consolidated many of the federal government's CI security functions in a large-scale reorganization of government and its mission that is still ongoing. Congress may consider transfer of certain infrastructure security related functions to or from DHS as appropriate. Scope of regulation: Congress may consider legislating compulsory compliance with security standards in cases where voluntary private-sector measures are deemed insufficient to protect national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Appropriateness of existing public-private partnership structures: CISA plans to maintain the current sector specific public-private partnership structures as the preferred vehicle for information sharing and policy coordination. Congress may consider whether adjustment or replacement of these structures is needed to better align partnership efforts with the emerging federal emphasis on system-level resilience. Effectiveness of public-private partnerships: CISA and its predecessor organizations have not been able to provide reliable data indicating the reach and effectiveness of public-partnership programs in incentivizing efficient private investments in national level (as opposed to enterprise level) resilience. Congress may consider whether new or revised reporting requirements are necessary.


Public alerts and warnings are critical to protect lives and provide information during emergencies, such as wildfires and floods. The IPAWS Modernization Act, enacted in 2016, required FEMA, in consultation and coordination with FCC, to enhance and test the capabilities of IPAWS and increase its adoption among state and local public safety agencies. GAO was asked to review the federal response to recent natural disasters. This report examines, among other things: (1) trends in the use of IPAWS and (2) actions that FEMA and FCC have taken to modernize IPAWS and increase its adoption. GAO analyzed relevant data and documentation and assessed FCC's efforts against leading government performance management practices and FEMA and FCC's efforts against internal control standards. GAO interviewed federal officials involved in emergency alerting. GAO also interviewed a non-generalizable selection of IPAWS alerting authorities and applicants, local governments, public safety and industry associations, and communications companies. GAO selected alerting authorities that experienced different types of disasters and threats to public safety from 2017 to 2019. Use of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) has increased since its launch in 2012. IPAWS enables authorized federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local alerting authorities to send a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) to mobile devices, such as cell phones and an Emergency Alert System (EAS) alert to media platforms, such as radios and television. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operates IPAWS and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) establishes rules for telecommunications providers to deliver WEA and EAS alerts. A public safety agency must submit an application and receive approval from FEMA to become an IPAWS alerting authority. In September 2019, more than 1,400 alerting authorities had access to IPAWS, up from fewer than 100 authorities in 2013. All states have at least one state alerting authority, but gaps in local authority access remain (see figure) that could limit the timeliness of alerts as emergencies occur at the local level. GAO found 430 pending IPAWS applications as of September 2019, some of which dated back to 2012. FEMA has not established procedures to prioritize and follow up with applicants and FEMA officials acknowledged that doing so would be beneficial. FEMA and FCC have taken steps to modernize IPAWS and improve alerting. For example, FEMA has made system upgrades and FCC has made various WEA improvements, such as requiring wireless phone carriers to provide more precise geographic targeting of alerts. Prior to these improvements, officials from many alerting authorities said the inability to geographically target alerts with accuracy made the officials reluctant to send WEA messages. FCC intends to partner with certain localities to test geographic targeting and, according to FCC officials, plans to use other tests to learn about how the improvements perform during emergencies. However, FCC has not developed goals and performance measures for these efforts. Doing so would help FCC more clearly assess whether the WEA improvements are working as intended. Furthermore, having specific performance information could increase alerting authorities' confidence in and use of IPAWS.


A crucial component of protecting the integrity of the Medicaid program is ensuring that only eligible providers participate in Medicaid. States' non-compliance with provider screening and enrollment requirements contributed to over a third of the $36.3 billion estimated improper payments in Medicaid in 2018. To improve the integrity of the Medicaid program, PPACA and the 21st Century Cures Act established new requirements for screening and enrolling providers and expanded enrollment to include additional provider types. In this report, GAO (1) describes challenges states faced implementing provider screening and enrollment requirements; and (2) examines CMS support for and oversight of states' implementation of these requirements. GAO reviewed federal laws and CMS guidance. GAO also reviewed CMS documents, including reports resulting from CMS oversight activities published from 2014 through 2018 for seven states. These states were selected based on their use of CMS's contractor site visits, among other things. GAO also interviewed officials from CMS and the seven selected states. Officials from seven selected states that GAO interviewed described challenges they faced implementing new Medicaid provider screening and enrollment requirements, established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010 and the 21st Century Cures Act in 2016. These challenges included establishing procedures for risk-based screenings, using federal databases and collecting required information, and screening an increased volume of providers. Due in part to these challenges, officials from five of the seven selected states told GAO they had not implemented certain requirements. For example, one state plans to launch its new information technology system, which automates screenings, before it will enroll providers under contract with managed care organizations, as required under these laws. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal agency that oversees Medicaid—supports states' implementation of new requirements with tailored optional consultations, such as CMS contractor site visits that examine the extent of states' implementation. Yet, because these are optional, states that need support might not participate, and CMS would not have information on those states. CMS uses other methods to oversee states' compliance, such as, the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) process for estimating improper payments, and focused program integrity reviews. PERM. This process assesses states' compliance with provider screening and enrollment requirements, but does not assess compliance for all providers and all requirements, and occurs once every 3 years. Focused program integrity reviews. These reviews examine specific areas in Medicaid, like state compliance with provider screening and enrollment requirements, but have not been done in all states. CMS conducted reviews in 39 states in fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Collectively, CMS's oversight methods do not provide it with comprehensive and timely reviews of states' implementation of the provider screening and enrollment requirements or the remediation of deficiences. As a result, CMS lacks assurance that only eligible providers are participating in the Medicaid program.


April 1, 2020, will mark the official date of the 24 th U.S. decennial census. Mandated by the Constitution and federal law, the census is considered a cornerstone of the nation's representative democracy. Nevertheless, an enumeration that is complete and accurate is difficult to achieve. Among other challenges, the census is often misunderstood, mischaracterized, feared, or avoided. This report addresses common questions concerning the 2020 census. The report is intended to provide information about the census, including clarifying various aspects of the census process. Among the topics covered are the origin and purpose of the census; the dates of key census activities; what the Census Bureau has done to promote the enumeration and gain cooperation with it, such as background research on hard-to-count groups and areas, and outreach to them and the broader public through a $500 million communications strategy that includes paid advertising; what basic data the census will collect, largely about how many people live in each household; each person's sex, age, birthdate, race, Hispanic or non-Hispanic ethnicity, and relationship to the person filling out the census form; and whether the housing unit is owned or rented; what information, the Census Bureau has explained, the census never collects, including Social Security numbers, bank or credit card account information, money, or anything on behalf of a political party; why people who consider themselves to be of Middle Eastern or North African race or ethnicity will not be able to report themselves as such on the census questionnaire; clarification that the census will not include a citizenship, nationality, immigration, or other related question; how the Census Bureau will collect detailed socioeconomic and housing data separately from the census; clarification that people have several different options for answering the censusâonline, on paper, or by telephoneâeven though online responses are officially most encouraged; language support for the census, including online questionnaires in English and 12 non-English languages, Census Questionnaire Assistance by telephone in the same languages and through a telecommunications device for the deaf, and language guides in 59 non-English languages that will be available in video, standard and large print, braille, and American Sign Language; legal requirement to answer the census and possible $5,000 penalty for nonresponse or false answers; clarification that people must respond to the 2020 census even if they participated in the 2018 or 2019 census tests; the process for updating the Master Address File, the basis for contacting the population about the start of the census and following up with nonrespondents; how and when people can become employed as temporary 2020 census workers, what the requirements are for being hired, and what this work can offer to employees; how the public can identify census workers to be sure that they are legitimate; and legal and cybersecurity protections for confidential census information.


Public school facilities primarily serve an educational role, and they also serve a civic role as voting places and emergency shelters. School districts collectively spend tens of billions of dollars each year on facilities construction needs at the nearly 100,000 K-12 public schools nationwide. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 included a provision for GAO to study the condition of public school facilities. This report examines (1) the common facility condition issues school districts identify in public schools and how they have done so and (2) school districts' highest priorities for their school facility renovations and updates, and how districts and states fund them. GAO conducted a nationally representative survey of school districts and also surveyed 50 states and the District of Columbia; visited 55 schools in 16 districts across six states, selected for geographic variation and other characteristics; analyzed federal data on school district expenditures for capital construction projects; and interviewed federal, state, district, and school officials. About half (an estimated 54 percent) of public school districts need to update or replace multiple building systems or features in their schools, according to GAO's national survey of school districts. For example, an estimated 41 percent of districts need to update or replace heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems in at least half of their schools, representing about 36,000 schools nationwide that need HVAC updates (see figure). In about half of the 55 schools GAO visited in six states, officials described HVAC-related problems, such as older systems that leaked and damaged flooring or ceiling tiles. If not addressed, such problems can lead to indoor air quality problems and mold, and in some cases caused schools to adjust schedules temporarily. To determine the condition of their school facilities, an estimated two-thirds of districts conducted a facilities condition assessment at least once in the last 10 years. According to GAO's survey of the 50 states and District of Columbia, most states do not conduct statewide assessments to determine school facilities' needs and instead leave this task to school districts. School districts' highest priorities for their school facilities were improving security (an estimated 92 percent), expanding student access to technology (87 percent), and monitoring health hazards (78 percent), according to GAO's school district survey. In school districts GAO visited, officials said they first address health hazards and safety issues. In nearly all districts GAO visited, security also had become a top priority, with some districts prioritizing security updates over replacing building systems, such as HVAC. In about half of districts nationwide, funding for school facilities primarily came from local sources such as property taxes, based on GAO's survey. High-poverty districts more commonly relied on state funding and used property taxes less commonly than low-poverty districts. According to GAO's state survey, 36 states provided capital funding to school districts for school construction or renovations, including five of the six states GAO visited, though the funding amounts and mechanisms differed considerably within and across states.