Capital allows banks to withstand losses (to a point) without failing, and regulators require banks to hold certain minimum amounts. These requirements are generally expressed as ratios between balance sheet items, and banks (particularly small banks) indicate that reporting those ratios can be difficult. Capital ratios fall into one of two main typesâsimpler leverage ratio s and more complex risk-weighted ratio s . A leverage ratio treats all assets the same, whereas a risk-weighted ratio assigns assets a risk weight to account for the likelihood of losses. In response to concerns that small banks faced unnecessarily burdensome capital requirements, Congress mandated further tailoring of capital rules in Section 201 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-174 ) and created the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR). Under the provision, a bank with less than $10 billion in assets that meets certain risk-profile criteria will have the option to meet a CBLR requirement instead of the existing, more complex risk-weighted requirements. Because most small banks currently hold enough capital to meet the CBLR option, Section 201 will allow many small banks to opt out of requirements to meet and report more complex ratios. Questions related to how much riskier bank portfolios will be if they are only subject to a leverage ratio (rather than a combination of leverage and risk-based ratios) and how high the threshold must be to mitigate those risks are matters of debate. Section 201 grants the federal bank regulatory agenciesâthe Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)âdiscretion over certain aspects of CBLR implementation, including setting the exact ratio; the provision mandated a range between 8% and 10%. In November 2018, the regulators proposed 9%, arguing this threshold supports safety and stability while providing regulatory relief to small banks. Bank proponents criticized this decision and advocated an 8% threshold, arguing that 9% is too high and withholds the exemption's benefits from banks with appropriately small risks. Despite the criticism, the bank regulators announced in a joint press release on October 29, 2019, they had finalized the rule with a 9% threshold. Responding to the coronavirus pandemic, Congress mandated in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136 ) that the ratio be temporarily lowered to 8% until the earlier of (1) the date the public health emergency ends, or (2) the end of 2020, so that banks have more leeway to deal with the pandemic's impact. In rulemaking implementing that provision, the regulators set the ratio for 2021 at 8.5% before raising it back to 9% on January 1, 2022. Of the 5,352 FDIC-insured depository institutions in the United States at the end of the second quarter of 2019, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that 5,078 (about 95%) would have met the size and risk-profile criteria necessary to qualify for the CBLR option. Under the regulator-set risk-profile criteria, nonqualifying banks were on average larger, had larger off-balance-sheet exposures, and had risk-based capital ratios that are about a quarter lower than qualifying banks. Of the 5,078 banks that would have qualified based on size and risk criteria, CRS estimates 4,440 (or 83% of all U.S. banks) exceeded a 9% threshold and would have been eligible to enter the CBLR regime. An additional 515 banks (9.6%) exceeded an 8% threshold. Thus, the difference between setting the ratio at 8% or 9% could, depending on perspective, potentially have provided appropriate regulatory relief to, or removed important safeguards from, about 10% of the nation's banks, which collectively held about 2% of total U.S. banking industry assets. Banks that would have been CBLR compliant at a 9% threshold were similar in size, activities, and off-balance-sheet exposures to 8% threshold banks, but the latter group's risk-based ratios were about half the level of the former's. However, when banks with CBLRs between 9% and 10% are compared to banks with CBLRs between 8% and 9%, the difference in risk-based ratios becomes much less pronounced.


Wildfires have been increasing in size and severity, exacerbated by abnormally dense vegetation, drought, and other climate stressors. Development in and around wildlands also continues to increase, placing more people at risk from wildfires. To reduce vegetation that can fuel such fires, federal land management agencies implement fuel reduction projects on public lands. GAO was asked to examine the federal government's preparedness, response, and recovery efforts following the wildfires and other natural disasters of 2017. This report describes (1) methods federal agencies use to reduce fuels to help protect communities and ecosystems, (2) information the agencies considered in allocating fuel reduction funds in fiscal year 2018, and (3) factors affecting agency efforts to implement fuel reduction projects. GAO examined laws, regulations, and agency policies and budget documents; interviewed federal agency officials at headquarters, as well as in eight regional offices and 10 field units selected based on their locations' high wildland fire hazard potential; and interviewed officials from nonfederal entities, including representatives from the state forestry agencies for the seven states where selected field units were located (three field units were in California and two were in New Mexico). Five federal land management agencies—the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service—use several methods to reduce fuels (vegetation) to help lower the intensity of wildland fires on lands they manage or administer. These methods primarily include mechanical treatments, which use equipment to cut and remove vegetation, and prescribed burns, which are deliberate, planned fires set by land managers. The agencies have long-standing research programs designed to further develop their understanding of how to implement effective fuel reduction projects, including conducting assessments to evaluate project effectiveness. Officials said the research helps the agencies to improve how they design and implement fuel reduction projects to address site-specific conditions. In fiscal year 2018, when allocating fuel reduction funds, the agencies considered information on wildfire hazard potential, the location of communities, and ecosystem health and the location of natural resources. Total fuel reduction appropriations exceeded $5 billion in fiscal years 2009 through 2018 (see figure). Officials from the five agencies cited several factors affecting implementation of fuel reduction projects. A key factor officials cited is that the number of acres needing treatment is significantly larger than the agencies can treat annually. The agencies have estimated that over 100 million acres they manage or administer are at high risk from wildfire, but, for example, in fiscal year 2018 they treated approximately 3 million acres. The agencies are developing risk assessments to help identify areas to prioritize for fuel reductions.


With budget authority of $146 billion in fiscal year 2018, USDA employs nearly 100,000 people organized into 13 major staff offices and eight mission areas comprising 18 agencies. In a November 2017 memorandum, the Secretary of Agriculture called for establishment of a business center in each mission area to provide consolidated administrative services. The memorandum identified three policy goals for these reforms: (1) improve customer engagement, (2) maximize efficiency, and (3) improve agency collaboration. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision for GAO to report on USDA's business centers. Among other things, this report examines the extent to which USDA has (1) established business centers and (2) assessed the effectiveness and impact of these business centers. GAO reviewed USDA documents and interviewed officials from USDA's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration, Office of Budget and Program Analysis, and eight mission areas about their efforts. GAO also interviewed representatives of USDA employee unions and USDA's external customers, such as farmers, for their perspectives on the establishment of the business centers. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has established business centers to provide consolidated administrative services such as human resources and information technology in each of its eight mission areas, in keeping with reforms called for in a November 2017 memorandum from the Secretary of Agriculture. The business centers vary in when they were established; three preceded the Secretary's memorandum (see figure). Typically, each business center is located within one of the mission area's component agencies, and the center's leader reports directly to agency leadership. According to a USDA official, the department regularly reviews data on administrative services, including services provided by the business centers. However, the department has not assessed the effectiveness and impact of its business centers and as of November 2019, did not plan to do so. Beginning in 2018, USDA created an online monitoring system to compile data on the status of administrative services, with “dashboards” displaying data specific to different administrative services, among other things. However, the department has not used dashboards or associated metrics to assess the effectiveness and impact of the business centers, including their impact on USDA's customer service; human resources, including hiring; and overall functionality. GAO's prior work has shown that a key practice to consider during an agency's reform efforts is establishing clear outcome-oriented goals and performance measures to assess the reform's effectiveness and impact. Developing appropriate performance goals and systematically assessing the effectiveness and impact of the business center reforms could help the department determine whether the reforms are meeting the Secretary's overarching policy goals and improving the delivery of administrative services to support the department's mission and program goals.


With less than 1 year until Census Day, many risks remain. For example, the Bureau has had challenges developing critical information technology systems, and new innovations—such as the ability to respond via the internet—have raised questions about potential security and fraud risks. Fundamental to risk management is the development of risk mitigation and contingency plans to reduce the likelihood of risks and their impacts, should they occur. GAO was asked to review the Bureau's management of risks to the 2020 Census. This report examines (1) what risks the Bureau has identified, (2) the risks for which the Bureau has mitigation and contingency plans, (3) the extent to which the plans included information needed to manage risk, and (4) the extent to which the Bureau's fraud risk approach aligns with leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. GAO interviewed officials, assessed selected mitigation and contingency plans against key attributes, and assessed the Bureau's approach to managing fraud risk against GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. As of December 2018, the Census Bureau (Bureau) had identified 360 active risks to the 2020 Census. Of these, 242 required a mitigation plan and 232 had one; 146 required a contingency plan and 102 had one (see table). Mitigation plans detail how an agency will reduce the likelihood of a risk event and its impacts, if it occurs. Contingency plans identify how an agency will reduce or recover from the impact of a risk after it has been realized. Bureau guidance states that these plans should be developed as soon as possible after a risk is added to the risk register, but it does not establish clear time frames for doing so. Consequently, some risks may go without required plans for extended periods. GAO reviewed the mitigation and contingency plans in detail for six risks which the Bureau identified as among the major concerns that could affect the 2020 Census. These included cybersecurity incidents and integration of the 52 systems and 35 operations supporting the census. GAO found that the plans did not consistently include key information needed to manage the risk. For example, three of the mitigation plans and five of the contingency plans did not include all key activities. Among these was the Bureau's cybersecurity mitigation plan. During an August 2018 public meeting, the Bureau's Chief Information Officer discussed key strategies for mitigating cybersecurity risks to the census—such as reliance on other federal agencies to help resolve threats—not all of which were included in the mitigation plan. GAO found that gaps stemmed from either requirements missing from the Bureau's decennial risk management plan, or that risk owners were not fulfilling all of their risk management responsibilities. Bureau officials said that risk owners are aware of these responsibilities but do not always fulfill them given competing demands. Bureau officials also said that they are managing risks to the census, even if not always reflected in their mitigation and contingency plans. However, if such actions are reflected in disparate documents or are not documented at all, then decision makers are left without an integrated and comprehensive picture of how the Bureau is managing risks to the census. The Bureau has designed an approach for managing fraud risk to the 2020 Census that generally aligns with leading practices in the commit, assess, and design and implement components of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. However, the Bureau has not yet determined the program's fraud risk tolerance or outlined plans for referring potential fraud to the Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG) to investigate. Bureau officials described plans to take these actions later this year, but not for updating the antifraud strategy. Updating this strategy to include the Bureau's fraud risk tolerance and OIG referral plan will help ensure the strategy is current, complete, and conforms to leading practices.


With more than 1.2 million school-age military dependents worldwide, per DOD, the department's organizations work to prevent, respond to, and resolve incidents of child abuse. Incidents of child abuse, including child-on-child abuse, can cause a range of emotional and physical trauma for military families, ultimately affecting servicemember performance. GAO was asked to review how DOD addresses incidents of child abuse and child-on-child abuse occurring on a military installation or involving military dependents. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which DOD has (1) visibility over such reported incidents, and (2) developed and implemented policies and procedures to respond to and resolve these incidents. GAO reviewed relevant policies and guidance; interviewed officials at a nongeneralizable sample of seven military installations; analyzed program data; interviewed parents of children affected by abuse; and interviewed DOD, service, and civilian officials, including at children's advocacy centers. The Department of Defense (DOD) has limited visibility over reported incidents of child abuse—physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, or neglect by a caregiver—and child-on-child abuse due to standalone databases, information sharing challenges, and installation discretion. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the military services recorded more than 69,000 reported incidents of child abuse (see figure). However, personnel at all seven installations in GAO's review stated that they use discretion to determine which incidents to present to the Incident Determination Committee (IDC)—the installation-based committee responsible for reviewing reports and determining whether they meet DOD's criteria for abuse (an act of abuse and an actual or potential impact, e.g., spanking that left a welt). Per DOD guidance, every reported incident must be presented to the IDC unless there is no possibility that it could meet any of the criteria for abuse. However, personnel described incidents they had screened out that, per DOD guidance, should have been presented to the IDC. Without the services developing a process to monitor how incidents are screened at installations, DOD does not know the total number of reported child abuse incidents across the department. While DOD has expanded its child abuse policies and procedures to include child-on-child sexual abuse, gaps exist. For example, DOD standardized the IDC process in 2016, but the new structure does not include medical personnel with expertise, contrary to best practices for substantiating child abuse allegations. Without expanding the IDC membership to include medical personnel, members may not have all of the relevant information needed to make fully informed decisions, potentially affecting confidence in the efficacy of the committee's decisions. GAO also found that the availability of certified pediatric sexual assault forensic examiners across DOD is limited—according to DOD officials, there are only 11 in comparison to 1,448 incidents of child sexual abuse that met DOD's criteria for abuse from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Without processes that help ensure timely access to certified pediatric examiners, child victims of sexual abuse overseas may not receive exams in time for evidence to be collected for use in prosecution, increasing the stress and trauma of affected victims.


With the decline of the U.S. coal industry, managing the economic effects of energy transition has become a priority for the federal government. The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative, and the broader POWER Plus Plan of which it was a part, represent the U.S. government's efforts to ease the economic effects of energy transition in coal industry-dependent communities in the United States, and especially in Appalachia. Launched in 2015 by the Obama Administration as a multi-agency effort utilizing various existing programs, the POWER Plus plan received partial backing through appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY2016) to the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Economic Development Administration, and for abandoned mine land reclamation. While certain proposed provisions of POWER Plus were never enacted or funded, other elements of the POWER Initiative continue under the Trump Administration. Continuing programs include the Assistance to Coal Communities program within the Economic Development Administration, the POWER Initiative under the Appalachian Regional Commission (the only program to retain the original branding), and a funding program for abandoned mine land reclamation. Of these efforts, the Appalachian Regional Commission's POWER Initiative is the largest of the initiative's economic development programs, having funded nearly $150 million in projects (out of over $600 million in proposed projects) since it was first launched in FY2016. The Appalachian Regional Commission's POWER Initiative is regionally targeted to declining coal communities in Appalachia, unlike the Economic Development Administration's Assistance to Coal Communities program, which has a national scope. To date, the initiative has reportedly leveraged approximately $772 million of private investment into the Appalachian regional economy. This report provides background on the origins, development, and activities of the POWER Initiative.


With the passage of the first Morrill Act in 1862, the United States began a then-novel policy of providing federal support for post-secondary education, focused on agriculture and the mechanical arts. The national system of land-grant colleges and universities that has developed since then is recognized for its breadth, reach, and excellence in teaching, research, and extension. Land-grant institutions are located in every U.S. state and many territories. These institutions educate the next generation of farmers, ranchers, and citizens, and form the backbone of a national network of agricultural extension and experiment stations. The land-grant university system has continued to evolve through federal legislation. The federal government provides funds, often with state matching requirements, to execute the system's three-fold mission of agricultural teaching, research, and extension. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) distributes these funds to the states as capacity grants, on a formula basis as determined by statute, or to participating institutions on a competitive basis. The Morrill Acts of 1862 (12 Stat. 503) and 1890 (26 Stat. 417), and the Equity in Educational Land-Grant Status Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-382 Â§531-535), established the three institutional categories of the land-grant system, now known as the 1862, 1890, and 1994 Institutions. The 1862 Institutions are the first land-grant institutions; 1890 Institutions are historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs); and 1994 Institutions are tribal colleges and universities (TCUs). Later legislation also recognized additional institutional categories, including non-land-grant colleges of agriculture (NLGCAs) and Hispanic-serving agricultural colleges and universities (HSACUs), for specific programs. The Hatch Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 440), Evans-Allen Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-113 Â§1445), and provisions of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 (AREERA, P.L. 105-185 ) provide the framework for funding research at land-grant institutions. State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) associated with 1862 Institutions receive federal research capacity funds with a one-to-one non-federal matching requirement. The 1890 Institutions also receive federal research capacity funds with this matching requirement, yet USDA can waive up to 50% of their matching requirement. The 1994 Institutions can receive federal research funds through competitive grants programs. They may also use interest distributions from the Native American Institutions Endowment Fund, allocated on a formula basis, at their discretion. The land-grant university system operates the U.S. Cooperative Extension Service (CES) in partnership with federal, state, and local governments. The CES provides non-formal education to agricultural producers and communities through its network of offices located in most of the more than 3,000 U.S. counties and territories. The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 (38 Stat. 372), National Agricultural Research, Education, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (NARETPA, P.L. 95-113 Â§1444-1445), and AREERA extension provisions guide agricultural extension funding in the land-grant university system. The 1862 and 1890 Institutions receive federal capacity funds, according to separate formulas with non-federal matching requirements. USDA may waive up to 50% of the matching requirement for 1890 Institutions. The 1994 Institutions may receive federal extension funding through competitive grants. Looking forward, the scheduled fall 2019 relocation of NIFA from its current location in Washington, D.C.; the decades-long shifting balance of public and private investment in agricultural research; disparities in state matching funds among the different classes of land-grant institutions; and the funding of TCU land-grant institutions may invite congressional engagement.


Within the Department of Justice, ATF and USMS employ more than 10,000 staff responsible for protecting communities from violent criminals, investigating the illegal use of firearms, and apprehending wanted persons, among other things. Our recent studies of employee misconduct processes have highlighted the importance of internal controls to help ensure the quality and independence of these processes. We have also reported on employee misconduct investigations being used to retaliate against individuals who report wrongdoing. GAO was asked to review ATF and USMS employee misconduct investigation and disciplinary processes. This report (1) summarizes data on the number, characteristics, and outcomes of ATF and USMS misconduct investigations that were opened from fiscal years 2014 through 2018 and were closed by the time of GAO's review, and (2) examines the extent to which ATF and USMS have developed, implemented, and monitored internal controls for their employee misconduct processes. For each component, GAO reviewed policies, guidance, and performance reports; analyzed case management system data; analyzed random samples of misconduct cases; and interviewed officials involved in investigation and discipline processes. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) collectively investigated about 3,900 allegations of employee misconduct, as shown in the table below. About one-half of these investigations were closed with no disciplinary action because the components found that the allegations were unsubstantiated. For allegations that were substantiated by an investigation, the most common ATF offenses were poor judgment and failure to adequately secure property, while the most common USMS offenses were general violations of policy or procedure and failure to follow instruction. The most common outcomes for both ATF and USMS substantiated investigations were discipline including suspensions of up to 14 days and lesser penalties such as verbal or written warnings. During this period, ATF and USMS investigated over 300 allegations of management retaliation, with few resulting in discipline. ATF and USMS have developed some internal controls for managing their employee misconduct investigation and disciplinary processes, but have not consistently documented or monitored key control activities. For example: USMS policy requires supervisory review of district and division investigations, but the agency has not consistently documented this control in accordance with policy. ATF and USMS also lack policy for verifing the accuracy and completeness of information in employee misconduct systems. Ensuring supervisory review is documented as required and developing policy for verifying information in misconduct systems would provide greater assurance that controls are operating as intended. ATF and USMS have established policies and goals related to timeliness in completing various types of employee misconduct investigations (e.g., within 120 days). However, ATF has not established performance measures to monitor progress toward meeting the goals. USMS has measures to monitor timeliness for some types of investigations, but not for others. Establishing measures to monitor timeliness of investigations would provide more complete information to ATF and USMS managers responsible for oversight. ATF and USMS have established oversight mechanisms, such as internal management reviews, to monitor certain aspects of the components' operations, such as financial operations. However, ATF and USMS have not fully used these mechanisms to monitor internal controls related to employee misconduct processes, which would help ATF and USMS management ensure that controls are implemented as required by policy.


Within the Department of Justice, BOP is responsible for housing male and female federal inmates at 122 prisons in a safe environment for staff and inmates. Pepper spray is one of the methods BOP employees use to enhance their safety. The Eric Williams Correctional Officer Protection Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to examine certain matters related to the issuance of pepper spray to officers and employees in BOP prisons. This report addresses (1) what is known about the effectiveness and cost of issuing pepper spray in BOP's high, medium, low, and administrative security prisons; (2) BOP's position on expanding the issuance of pepper spray to minimum security prisons and the support used to make this decision; and (3) the challenges, if any, BOP officials identified as affecting the safety of BOP employees and the steps, if any, BOP has taken to address them. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed BOP policies, guidance, incident reports, and cost data on pepper spray use and interviewed knowledgeable officials at BOP headquarters and nine prisons at three locations, selected to represent varying security levels and other characteristics. Pepper spray is an effective tool for reducing the time needed to control incidents involving inmates and for reducing any related injury to Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, according to a 2012 BOP pilot study and BOP officials interviewed by GAO. BOP first issued pepper spray to employees in high security prisons in August 2012 and to medium, low, and administrative security prisons in subsequent years. Officials estimated that a canister of pepper spray costs $7 to $14. However, the total cost to purchase pepper spray and train employees on its use is not readily available because purchases are tracked at the prison level, and pepper spray training costs are commingled with other training costs. BOP determined that it would not issue pepper spray to minimum security prisons. BOP headquarters officials stated that this decision was made because inmates at such prisons are usually nonviolent offenders, among other reasons. However, GAO's analysis of BOP data found 47 reported incidents that included assaults on staff and other inmates across BOP's seven minimum security prisons in 2018. In addition, 56 of 73 officials GAO interviewed said pepper spray should be expanded to minimum security prisons. BOP officials stated they were not aware of an analysis of incident data or other information to support its decision but said that the decision remains appropriate. However, by analyzing available data on incidents that have occurred at minimum security prisons, BOP could better inform its decision on whether to issue pepper spray to employees at minimum security prisons. BOP officials rated the following factors as having the most significant impact on BOP employee safety, as shown in the figure below. BOP officials stated that they are taking steps to mitigate factors impacting safety.


Youth who leave the foster care system at age 18 are often ill-prepared to live on their own and may face challenges as they transition to adulthood, such as difficulties finding stable housing. The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 allowed states to receive federal reimbursement through title IV-E of the Social Security Act for a portion of the cost of extending care to certain eligible youth up to age 21. The Act also allows youth ages 18 up to 21 to live in a supervised setting in which the individual is living independently. One such setting may be an apartment, with monthly check-ins with a case worker (referred to as supervised independent living arrangements). GAO was asked to review supervised independent living arrangements and services for older youth. Among other things, this report examines (1) the types of supervised independent living arrangements available; (2) factors states reported considering when placing youth in these living arrangements; and (3) how selected states prepare youth to live independently. GAO surveyed state child welfare agencies in the 26 states approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to receive federal funding to support their extended foster care programs; interviewed state and local child welfare officials and stakeholders in five states selected for factors such as variation in child welfare administration systems; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; and interviewed HHS officials. The 26 states that have approval to receive federal funding to support their extended foster care programs for youth ages 18 up to 21 reported providing a range of supervised independent living arrangements. These arrangements include transitional living programs, private residences, and other settings (see figure). Officials we spoke with in five selected states said transitional living programs typically involve private child welfare agencies that lease apartments or facilities for youth, either at a single site or scattered across a geographic area, and offer on-site case management and supports to help youth build independent living skills. For private residences, youth may choose where to live, such as a private or shared apartment. In these cases, youth are typically responsible for their own lease, and may receive minimal supervision compared to youth in transitional living programs. For other settings, states reported options such as college dorms and residential employment training programs. Nineteen states also reported allowing youth under 18 to live in supervised independent living settings in certain instances, such as when they are pregnant, parents, or attending college, although such placements are generally not eligible for federal funding. Factors that most states reported considering when placing youth in supervised independent living arrangements include the youth's life skills—for example, their ability to budget finances and schedule medical appointments—as well as their education and employment status. Officials in selected states also said they consider the availability of housing, which may be limited in certain localities due to a lack of affordable housing options or other factors, and the options available to youth with complex needs, such as those who are pregnant and parents. Officials in four selected states said they help prepare youth in extended foster care to live independently by providing targeted trainings and other supports, such as financial literacy training. In all five selected states, youth can also learn independent living skills through services offered more broadly to all older youth in foster care, officials said, including assistance with housing, education, employment, and daily living skills, such as grocery shopping and budgeting.


methods and computer modeling. HHS, USDA, and EPA conduct and fund animal research and regulate products tested on animals. HHS and USDA also oversee federal and nonfederal research facilities including researchers' consideration of alternatives to animal use. GAO was asked to review issues related to alternatives to animal research. This report (1) describes how HHS, USDA, and EPA ensure researchers consider the use of alternatives to animals and (2) examines the steps the agencies have taken to facilitate the use of alternative research methods and to assess the effect of their efforts on animal use. GAO reviewed documents, such as agency policies and practices relevant to the consideration of alternatives and interviewed agency officials. GAO also interviewed representatives of a nongeneralizable sample of 12 federal and nonfederal research facilities randomly selected across agencies and facilities. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) use a variety of methods to ensure researchers consider alternatives to animal use in research (see figure). Two of these methods are (1) requiring researchers to obtain approval of their research protocols, including their consideration of alternatives, from their institutions, and (2) calling for or recommending researchers to use database searches to identify alternatives. HHS and USDA also help ensure that researchers consider alternatives through the agencies' oversight of research facilities. For example, USDA is to conduct annual inspections of nonfederal research facilities. Futhermore, the agencies have provided training to researchers on the consideration of alternatives. HHS, USDA, and EPA have facilitated the development and use of alternatives to animal use in research through individual and collaborative efforts. These efforts include agency strategies and policies for promoting the use of alternative methods and the development of testing methods that rely on non-animal models. Additionally, the agencies are members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative Methods, which is managed by HHS's National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. The committee promotes testing methods that protect human health and the environment while reducing animal use. The interagency committee's 2018 strategic roadmap calls for it to identify appropriate metrics for monitoring progress and measuring success in adopting alternatives. However, the committee and its member agencies have not routinely developed or reported metrics that demonstrate how their efforts to encourage the use of alternative methods affect animal use. They have also not designated an interagency workgroup to address the challenges related to developing and reporting such metrics. Facilitating the establishment of such a workgroup would help the committee and its member agencies better monitor their progress across the range of their efforts to reduce animal use and report members' progress to the public.


Catastrophic biological events have the potential to cause loss of life, and sustained damage to the economy, societal stability, and global security. The biodefense enterprise is the whole combination of systems at every level of government and the private sector that contribute to protecting the nation and its citizens from potentially catastrophic effects of a biological event. Since 2009, GAO has identified cross-cutting issues in federal leadership, coordination, and collaboration that arise from working across the complex interagency, intergovernmental, and intersectoral biodefense enterprise. In 2011, GAO reported that there was no broad, integrated national strategy that encompassed all stakeholders with biodefense responsibilities and called for the development of a national biodefense strategy. In September 2018, the White House released a National Biodefense Strategy. This statement discusses GAO reports issued from December 2009 through March 2019 on various biological threats and biodefense efforts, and selected updates to BioWatch recommendations made in 2015. To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed biodefense reports, relevant presidential directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans; surveyed states; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others. GAO's past work has identified a number of challenges related to the nation's ability to detect and respond to biological events that transcend what any one federal department or agency can address on its own. They include, among others: Assessing enterprise-wide threats. In October 2017, GAO found there was no existing mechanism across the federal government that could leverage threat awareness information to direct resources and set budgetary priorities across all agencies for biodefense. GAO said at the time that the pending biodefense strategy may address this. Situational awareness and data integration. GAO reported in 2009 and 2015 that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC)—created to integrate data across the federal government to enhance detection and situational awareness of biological events—has suffered from longstanding challenges related to its clarity of purpose and collaboration with other agencies. DHS implemented GAO's 2009 recommendation to develop a strategy, but in 2015 GAO found NBIC continued to face challenges, such as limited partner participation in the center's activities. Biodetection technologies. DHS has faced challenges in clearly justifying the need for and establishing the capabilities of the BioWatch program—a system designed to detect an aerosolized biological terrorist attack. In October 2015, GAO recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades until it takes steps to establish BioWatch's technical capabilites. While DHS agreed and described a series of tests to establish capabilities, it continued to pursue upgrades. Biological laboratory safety and security. Since 2008, GAO has identified challenges and areas for improvement related to the safety, security, and oversight of high-containment laboratories, which, among other things, conduct research on hazardous pathogens—such as the Ebola virus. GAO recommended that agencies take actions to avoid safety and security lapses at laboratories, such as better assessing risks, coordinating inspections, and reporting inspection results. Many recommendations have been addressed, but others remain open, such as finalizing guidance on documenting the shipment of dangerous biological material. In September 2018, the White House issued the National Biodefense Strategy and associated plans, which could help to address some of the ongoing challenges GAO has previously identified. However, because implementation of the strategy is in early stages, it remains to be seen how or to what extent the agencies responsible for implementation will institutionalize mechanisms to help the nation make the best use of limited biodefense resources. GAO is currently reviewing the strategy and will report out later this year.


Certain federal contracts must have a small business subcontracting plan if subcontracting opportunities exist. But recent Department of Defense Inspector General reports raised concerns about agency oversight of subcontracting requirements. GAO was asked to review oversight of subcontracting plans. Among its objectives, this report discusses (1) the extent to which selected agencies (DLA, GSA, NASA, and Navy) oversee small business subcontracting plans, and (2) how SBA encourages agency compliance with subcontracting plan requirements. GAO reviewed data and documentation for a non-generalizable sample of 32 federal contracts (including 26 contracts with a subcontracting plan) at four agencies, selected to include contracts over $1.5 million at both civilian and military agencies awarded in fiscal years 2016–2018. GAO also reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation, SBA and selected agency documentation, and interviewed agency officials. GAO found selected agencies did not consistently follow all required procedures for oversight of small business subcontracting plans, both before and after contracts were awarded. GAO reviewed 26 contracts with a subcontracting plan at four agencies—Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), General Services Administration (GSA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of the Navy (Navy). For about half of the 26 contracts, agencies could not demonstrate that procedures for Procurement Center Representative (PCR) reviews were followed. These representatives may review small business subcontracting plans and provide recommendations for improving small business participation. When an agency is awarding a contract that includes a subcontracting plan, contracting officers are required to notify these representatives of the opportunity to review the proposed contract. Without taking steps to ensure these opportunities are provided, agencies may not receive and benefit from suggestions for increasing small business participation. For 14 of the 26 contracts, contracting officers did not ensure contractors submitted required subcontracting reports. After a contract is awarded, contracting officers must review reports contractors submit that describe their progress towards meeting approved small business subcontracting goals. In some cases, contracting officers accepted reports with subcontracting goals different from those in the approved subcontracting plans, with no documentation explaining the difference. Without complete and accurate information about a contractor's subcontracting goals, an agency cannot adequately assess a contractor's performance in meeting its subcontracting plan responsibilities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) encourages agency compliance with small business subcontracting plan requirements by providing training to contracting officers and contractors, and by conducting reviews. For instance, SBA Commercial Market Representatives conduct compliance reviews to evaluate a large prime contractor's compliance with subcontracting program procedures and goal achievement. However, SBA could not provide documentation or information on almost all compliance reviews conducted in fiscal years 2016–2018. SBA has developed new procedures for conducting compliance reviews, but as of mid-March 2020, had yet to fully implement them. SBA has conducted fiscal year 2019 compliance reviews that reflect a first phase of their new procedures. SBA has draft guidance on the new compliance review process, including some specific information regarding what Commercial Market Representatives are to record as part of the compliance review. SBA has begun to conduct compliance reviews in accordance with the guidance, but does not have clearly documented and maintained records for the first phase of these reviews. Without consistent, clear documentation and records that will be maintained going forward, SBA's ability to track contractor compliance and agency oversight efforts will be limited.


Certain foreign nations have targeted U.S. food and agricultural products with retaliatory tariffs since early 2018 in response to U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and Section 301 tariffs levied on U.S. imports from China. Retaliatory tariffs have made imports of U.S. agricultural products relatively more expensive compared to similar products from competitor nations. In the short run, U.S. shipments of products to countries with retaliatory tariffs have declined, reducing overall global demand for affected U.S. agricultural products and driving down the prices of U.S. agricultural commodities. Depending on the length and depth of the tariffs and the range of products affected, some experts caution that the long-run trade impacts could inflict further harm as U.S. competitor countries have an incentive to expand their agricultural production. In response to U.S. Section 232 and Section 301 actions, China levied retaliatory tariffs on almost all U.S. agricultural products, ranging from 5% to 50%. In response to U.S. Section 232 tariffs, Canada, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey retaliated with tariffs during the summer of 2018 on U.S. fruit, nuts, prepared vegetables and meats, pork, cheese, breakfast cereal, fruit juices, and whiskey. India implemented retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. products after a Presidential Proclamation removed India from the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program in May 2019. Canada and Mexico levied retaliatory tariffs in mid-2018, but these tariffs were removed in May 2019 after the Trump Administration announced an agreement with Canada and Mexico to remove the Section 232 tariffs on imports from both countries to facilitate ratification of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreementâa proposed regional free trade agreement that is meant to supersede the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The total value of exports of U.S. food and agricultural products levied retaliatory tariffs in 2018 was $22 billion, down 27% from $30 billion in 2017. China accounted for about 80% of the total affected trade in both years. Despite the retaliatory tariffs, U.S. agricultural exports rose in 2018 to $140 billion from $138 billion in 2017, partly due to higher imports during the months leading up to the retaliatory tariffs and increased exports to other nonretaliating countries. With the continuation of retaliatory tariffs, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects U.S. agricultural exports to decline about 4% in 2019. In the short run, retaliatory tariffs contributed to declining prices for certain U.S. agricultural commodities and reduced exports, particularly for soybeans. Declining prices and exports sales combined with rising input and farm machinery costs contributed to a 16% decrease in U.S. net farm income in 2018, compared with 2017. China's soybean imports are expected to resume growing over the next decade, but a USDA study expects the volume traded to be less than previously anticipated. Because of the retaliatory tariffs on U.S. soybeans, USDA projects that Brazil will account for two-thirds of the global growth in soybean exports to China. The United States accounted for 40% of China's total soybean imports in 2016 and 35% in 2017, compared with Brazil's 46% in 2016 and 53% in 2017. In 2018, the U.S. share of China's soybean import market dropped to 19% and Brazil's share was up at 76%. To help alleviate the financial loss incurred by U.S. farmers due to retaliatory tariffs, USDA announced $12 billion in financial assistance in 2018âreferred to as a trade aid packageâfor certain U.S. agricultural commodities using Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). In 2019, USDA announced a second trade-aid package of $16 billion. Increased trade aid to U.S. farmers has generated questions from some World Trade Organization (WTO) members about whether the trade-aid package may violate U.S. WTO commitments. While trade-aid packages may provide short-term financial assistance, some studies and critics of the President's actions caution that the long-term consequences of the retaliatory tariffs may present more challenges. Even as China has raised tariffs on U.S. imports, it has improved access to its markets for other exporting countries. Brazil, Russia, and other countries are expanding their agricultural production to meet China's import demand. For example, Russia's investments during the past two decades have resulted in agricultural productivity growth ranging from 25% to 75%, with higher productivity growth along its southern region. Although still at relatively modest levels, China's total food and agricultural imports from Russia increased 61% between 2017 and 2018. The continuation of trade disputes and retaliatory tariffs may be of interest to Congress for the following reasons. Trade disputes have disrupted global markets and increased uncertainty in the farm input and output sectors. They may add to production costs, and they have dampened exports, impacted farm income, and triggered additional federal assistance for the farm sector. In the short run, there could be some transient benefits associated with various aspects of the agricultural sector. In the long run, other countries may expand agricultural production, potentially displacing U.S. agricultural exports to become larger food and agricultural suppliers to China.