The population of unlawfully present aliens in the United States numbers between ten million and twelve million, according to recent estimates. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) takes three primary approaches to regulating this population: removal, deterrence, andâto a lesser extentâlegalization. Legalization, as used here, means the granting of a lawful immigration status to an unlawfully present alien so that he or she is no longer subject to removal under the INA. Put differently, an unlawfully present alien "legalizes" by obtaining lawful permanent resident status (LPR or "green card" status) or any other status (such as a nonimmigrant status) that extinguishes the statutory basis for his or her removal. The INA takes a generally restrictive approach to legalization. During much of the 20th century, a statutory provision called "registry" allowed unlawfully present aliens to obtain LPR status based on their long-standing presence in the United States. If unlawfully present aliens had entered the United States before a fixed cutoff date and satisfied other requirements, such as a lack of certain types of criminal convictions, they could apply to the Attorney General for LPR status. The registry statute is now effectively obsolete because its cutoff date, which Congress last updated in 1986, remains fixed at 1972. The most consequential body of legalization principles in the INA governs when unlawfully present aliens may obtain LPR status through qualifying family relationships or on other qualifying grounds. In general, the INA imposes barriers to the acquisition of LPR status for unlawfully present aliens who come within one of the three major categories that the law uses to select aliens for immigration to the United States: family-based immigrants, employment-based immigrants, and diversity immigrants. Specifically, most unlawfully present aliens who come within these categories must pursue LPR status by departing the United States to apply for an immigrant visa abroad (rather than applying to adjust status within the United States), and their departure typically triggers a ten-year bar on readmission to the United States. There are important exceptions to this general framework, however. In particular, an alien who overstays a nonimmigrant visa and then becomes the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen (through marriage, for example) may generally apply to adjust to LPR status without leaving the country and without facing any time bars on admission. Other INA provisions allow for legalization on hardship or humanitarian grounds. Cancellation of removal allows for legalization where the removal of an unlawfully present alien would cause hardship to immediate relatives who are U.S. citizens or LPRs, but the hardship must be "exceptional and extremely unusual." Cancellation of removal also is generally only available as a defense in removal proceedings (aliens cannot apply for it affirmatively), is subject to an annual cap, and, among other requirements, is only available to unlawfully present aliens who have been in the United States for at least ten years. As for humanitarian relief, asylum creates a pathway to LPR status for unlawfully present aliens who have a well-founded fear of persecution or suffered past persecution in their countries of origin. However, aliens generally must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States (unless an exception applies), so asylum is not available to most unlawfully present aliens who have been in the country for long periods of time. Subsidiary protections from persecution and tortureâwithho lding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)âdo not have the one-year application deadline, but they offer more limited relief that arguably does not qualify as lawful immigration status. Separately, a series of nonimmigrant statuses, including the U visa, offer the prospect of lawful immigration status to unlawfully present aliens who are victims or witnesses of certain crimes. U.S. immigration law has also taken other approaches to legalization, separate and apart from the narrow legalization provisions in the INA. First, Congress occasionally has enacted ad hoc legalization laws that, rather than reforming the INA's generally applicable provisions going forward, have offered one-time relief or relief only for discrete populations. Second, executive branch agencies have exercised enforcement discretion to grant unlawfully present aliens discretionary reprieves from removal, such as deferred action or the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative, which have conferred a weaker form of protection than lawful immigration status. This weaker form of protection is sometimes known as "quasi-legal status" and, although it typically confers work authorization and gives an unlawfully present alien an assurance that immigration authorities will not pursue his or her removal during a certain time, it does not extinguish the statutory basis for the alien's removal.


The poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older has declined by almost 70% in the past five decades. In 2017, approximately 9.2% of Americans aged 65 and older had income below the poverty thresholds. However, the number of aged poor has increased since the mid-1970s as the total number of elderly has grown. In 2017, 4.7 million people aged 65 and older lived in poverty. The poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older historically was higher than the rates for younger groups, but the aged have experienced lower poverty rates than children under age 18 since 1974 and lower rates than adults aged 18 to 64 since the early 1990s. In 2017, the 9.2% poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older was lower than the 11.2% poverty rate among adults aged 18 to 64 and the 17.5% poverty rate among children under 18 years old. Although the poverty rate has generally declined for older Americans in most demographic groups, certain aged people still live in poverty. For example, People aged 80 and older have a higher poverty rate than other elderly Americans. In 2017, approximately 11.6% of people aged 80 and older lived in poverty, compared with poverty rates of 9.3% among individuals aged 75-79, 8.6% among those aged 70-74, and 7.9% among those aged 65-69. Women aged 80 and older had the highest poverty rate among elderly women and men in all age groups, at 13.5% in 2017 for women aged 80 and older, and 18.6% for those living alone. Americans aged 65 and older who were married and living together with spouses at the time of the survey generally had a lower poverty rate than those who were not married. Among women aged 65 and older, about 4.3% of married women had total incomes below the official poverty threshold in 2017, compared with 13.9% of widows, 15.8% of divorced women, and 21.5% of never-married women. Among individuals aged 65 and older, poverty rates were also high among never-married men, at 22.5% in 2017. Poverty rates vary by race and Hispanic origin. Hispanic origin is distinct from race, and people may identify with one or more races. From 1975 to 2017, the poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older has decreased for those identifying as non-Hispanic white alone, black alone, and Hispanic. In 2017, the poverty rate was lowest among the non-Hispanic white population (5.8% for men and 8.0% for women) and highest among those identifying as black or African American (16.1% for men and 21.5% for women). The official poverty measure is defined using cash income only, before taxes, and was computed based on food consumption in 1955 and food costs in 1961, indexed to inflation. That definition prevents the official measure from gauging the effects of noncash benefits, taxes, or tax credits on the low-income population, and it does not consider how certain other costs, such as housing or medical expenses, might affect them as well. After decades of research, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) was developed to address some of the official poverty measure's limitations. The SPM poverty rate for the aged population is higher than the official poverty rate (14.1% compared with 9.2% in 2017). This higher poverty rate results largely from higher medical out-of-pocket costs among the aged. Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are the main federally funded programs that provide cash benefits to the aged poor; they accounted for almost 90% of total money income received by Americans aged 65 and older whose incomes were below the poverty thresholds in 2017. The federal government also provides certain noncash benefits to help the elderly poor, such as housing subsidies and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The SPM poverty rate among individuals aged 65 and older would increase by more than 34 percentage points if Social Security benefits were excluded from their income resources, holding other economic behaviors constant. Among the other resources, eliminating SSI, housing subsidies, or SNAP from income would each increase the SPM poverty rate by about one percentage point.


Broadband is critical for economic, educational, and personal uses. Industry and federal investments have made broadband available to the vast majority of Americans. For example, FCC's high-cost program provides funding to broadband providers to deploy broadband in rural, insular, and high-cost areas. However, some rural areas continue to lack access due, in part, to challenges with providing service to areas where deployment costs are high and returns on investment are low. GAO was asked to examine the current state of broadband investment and deployment. This report examines (1) industry and federal investments to deploy broadband in the United States since 2009, and (2) efforts federal agencies are making to address deployment challenges. GAO analyzed industry and federal government data from 2009 through 2017 or 2018 (the most recent year of available data) on broadband investments and deployment; reviewed statutes and regulations, rulemaking proceedings, and FCC, RUS, and NTIA program information; interviewed federal officials; and obtained information about deployment challenges from interviews with 32 industry, academic, and consumer stakeholders, including 16 broadband providers selected to represent a range of provider sizes and types of technologies. Telecommunications industry and federal government investments have expanded access to broadband in the United States. From 2009 through 2017, the industry made capital investments of about $795 billion, including investments in broadband infrastructure, according to U.S. Census Bureau survey data. Federal investments totaled about $47.3 billion to target broadband infrastructure for rural areas over the same time, according to data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Rural Utilities Service (RUS), and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). FCC's Universal Service Fund high-cost program expanded service to about 2.3 million residential and small business locations, mostly from 2015 through 2017, according to data FCC collects from providers. FCC reported that fixed broadband service was available to 94.4 percent of the U.S. population in 2018, up from 81.2 percent in 2012, although affordability and digital literacy remain barriers to adoption and use. While service availability for people in rural areas increased from 45.7 percent in 2012 to 77.7 percent in 2018, service in rural areas continues to lag behind urban areas, according to FCC's broadband availability report (see figure). FCC and RUS have taken actions to address deployment challenges, such as taking steps to improve their ability to pinpoint where gaps in broadband deployment still exist. In August 2019, FCC proposed an initiative to change how it collects broadband deployment data, with the goal of using a new methodology to improve data accuracy and FCC's ability to target funds to locations that lack access. FCC and RUS have also coordinated on broadband deployment issues. For example, to avoid funding areas where broadband service is already deployed, agency officials regularly communicate on information about where their broadband deployment programs are funding new deployments. Continued communication and coordination on topics such as collecting and using improved data will be especially important in assuring that federal dollars are effectively targeted as agencies' efforts to improve mapping and target resources progress.


The primary source of federal aid for elementary and secondary education is the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)âparticularly its Title I-A program, which authorizes federal aid for the education of disadvantaged students. The ESEA was initially enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-10), and was most recently comprehensively amended and reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ). Under Title I-A, the ESEA as amended by the ESSA continues to require states and public schools systems to focus on educational accountability as a condition for the receipt of grant funds. Public school systems and individual public schools are held accountable for monitoring and improving achievement outcomes for students and closing achievement gaps, sustaining a focus that was initiated by amendments to the ESEA made by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ) but modified under the ESSA. While states were given more latitude to develop their accountability systems under the ESSA provisions, as a condition of receiving Title I-A funds each state must continue to have content and academic achievement standards and aligned assessments in reading/language arts (RLA), mathematics, and science for specific grade levels. States must now have an accountability system that incorporates (1) long-term and interim performance goals for specified measures; (2) weighted indicators based, in part, on these goals; and (3) an annual system for meaningful differentiation that is used to identify schools that need additional support to improve student achievement. Beyond Title I-A, other ESEA programs provide grants and contracts for a variety of educational purposes. ESEA programs and general provisions are included in eight titles, which collectively received appropriations of $25.2 billion in FY2019. The ESEA's titles are as follows: Title I: Programs for disadvantaged students, student assessment, migratory students, and neglected and delinquent students. Title II: Programs for teachers, principals, and school leaders; literacy; and American history and civics education. Title III: Programs to support English language acquisition for English learners. Title IV: Programs to support a well-rounded education, safe and healthy students, and technology; after-school instruction and care; charter schools; magnet schools; family engagement in education; and various national activities. Title V: Programs to support rural education. Title VI: Programs for Indian education, Native Hawaiian education, and Alaska Native education. Title VII: Impact Aid programs. Title VIII: General provisions. This report provides an overview of major provisions of the ESEA. It also includes a table showing annual appropriations for ESEA programs for FY2017 through FY2019, as well as a table showing the transition in authorized programs and related appropriations from FY2016, when NCLB provisions were still in effect, to FY2017, when ESSA provisions took effect. Finally, a table detailing authorizations of appropriations under current law is also included. The ESSA authorized appropriations for ESEA programs through FY2020.


The purpose of barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border has evolved over time. In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, fencing at the border was more for demarcation, or discouraging livestock from wandering over the border, rather than deterring smugglers or illegal migration. Physical barriers to deter migrants are a relatively new part of the border landscape, first being built in the 1990s in conjunction with counterdrug efforts. This phase of construction, extending into the 2000s, was largely driven by legislative initiatives. Specific authorization for border barriers was provided in 1996 in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and again in 2006 in the Secure Fence Act. These authorities were superseded by legislation included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which rewrote key provisions of IIRIRA and replaced most of the Secure Fence Act. The result of these initiatives was construction of more than 650 miles of barriers along the nearly 2,000-mile border. The Trump Administration has driven the second phase of construction of border barriers. On January 25, 2017, the Administration issued Executive Order 13767, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements." Section 2(a) of the E.O. indicates that it is the policy of the executive branch to "secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism." The debate over funding for and construction of a "border wall system" in this phase has created congressional interest in the historical context of border barrier funding. There has not been an authoritative compilation of data on the level of federal investment in border barriers over time. This is in part due to the evolving structure of the appropriations for agencies charged with protecting the borderâaccount structures have shifted, initiatives have come and gone, and appropriations typically have not specified a precise level of funding for barriers as opposed to other technologies that secure the border. Funding was not specifically designated for border barrier construction until FY2006. The nearly $4.5 billion in appropriations provided by Congress for border barrier planning and construction since the signing of the E.O. exceeds the amount provided for those purposes from FY2007 to FY2016 combined by almost $2 billion. Most of the contracts that have been awarded thus far are for improvements to, or replacements of, the existing barriers at the border. However, a significant portion of the funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is available for construction of barriers where they do not currently exist. The Administration took steps in FY2019 to secure funding beyond the levels approved by Congress for border barriers. These included: transferring roughly $601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); using $2.5 billion in Department of Defense funds transferred to the Department's counterdrug programs to construct border barriers; and reallocating up to $3.6 billion from other military construction projects using authorities under the declaration of a national emergency. This report provides an overview of the funding appropriated for border barriers, based on data from CBP and congressional documents, and a primer on the Trump Administration's efforts to enhance the funding for border barriers, with a brief discussion of the legislative and historical context of construction of barriers at the U.S-Mexico border. It concludes with a number of unanswered questions Congress may wish to explore as this debate continues. An appendix tracks reported barrier construction mileage on the U.S.-Mexico border by year.


The purpose of the diversity immigrant visa program (DV program, sometimes called "the green card lottery" or "the visa lottery") is, as the name suggests, to foster legal immigration from countries other than the major sending countries of current immigrants to the United States. Current law weights the allocation of immigrant visas primarily toward individuals with close family in the United States and, to a lesser extent, toward those who meet particular employment needs. The diversity immigrant category was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 ) to stimulate "new seed" immigration (i.e., to foster new, more varied migration from other parts of the world). The DV program currently makes 50,000 visas available annually to natives of countries from which immigrant admissions were less than 50,000 over the preceding five years combined. The formula for allocating these visas is specified in statute: visas are divided among six global geographic regions, and each region and country is identified as either high-admission or low-admission based on how many immigrant visas were given to foreign nationals from each region and country over the previous five-year period. Higher proportions of diversity visas are allocated to low-admission regions and countries. The INA limits each country to 7% (3,500, currently) of the total and provides that Northern Ireland be treated as a separate foreign state. Because demand for diversity visas greatly exceeds supply, a lottery system is used to select individuals who may apply for them. Those selected by lottery ("lottery winners"), like all other foreign nationals wishing to come to the United States, must undergo reviews performed by Department of State consular officers abroad and Department of Homeland Security immigration officers upon entry to the United States. These reviews are intended to ensure that the foreign nationals are not ineligible for visas or admission to the United States under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the INA. To be eligible for a diversity visa, the INA requires that a foreign national have at least a high school education or the equivalent, or two years' experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. The foreign national or the foreign national's spouse must be a native of one of the countries listed as a foreign state qualified for the diversity visa program. The distribution of diversity visas by global region of origin has shifted over time, with higher shares coming from Africa and Asia in recent years compared to earlier years when Europe accounted for a higher proportion. Of all those admitted through the program from FY1995 (the first year it was in full effect) through FY2017 (the most recent year for which data are available), individuals from Africa accounted for 40% of diversity immigrants, while Europeans accounted for 31% and Asians for 25%. Some argue that the DV program should be eliminated and its visas re-allocated for employment-based visas or backlog reduction in various visa categories. Critics of the DV program warn that it is vulnerable to fraud and misuse and is potentially an avenue for terrorists to enter the United States, citing the difficulties of performing background checks in many of the countries whose citizens are eligible for a diversity visa. Critics also argue that admitting immigrants on the basis of their nationality is discriminatory and that the reasons for establishing the DV program are no longer germane. Supporters of the program argue that it provides "new seed" immigrants for a system weighted disproportionately to family-based immigrants from a handful of countries. Supporters contend that fraud and abuse have declined following measures put in place by the State Department, and that the system relies on background checks for criminal and national security matters that are performed on all prospective immigrants seeking to come to the United States, including those applying for diversity visas. Supporters also contend that the DV program promotes equity of opportunity and serves important foreign policy goals.


The rise of great-power competitors, such as China and Russia, prompted the Army to transform the way it plans to fight. The Army is developing a new warfighting concept to guide how its forces will engage jointly with other services in multiple domains, especially in cyber and space. The House Armed Services Committee included a provision in House Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 for GAO to review the Army's implementation of the concept. Among its objectives, this report addresses (1) how the Army is changing its doctrine, organizations, and training in order to execute multi-domain operations; and (2) the extent to which the Army has established new cyber and electronic warfare units, including any challenges faced by these units, and whether the Army assessed risks associated with its plan to establish these units. GAO reviewed Army concepts, doctrine, force design, and training documents concerning multi-domain operations. GAO also interviewed Army and Department of Defense officials. The Army is changing aspects of its doctrine, organizations, and training to develop a force that can effectively engage great-power competitors—Russia and China—through multi-domain operations by 2028. Multi-domain operations present adversaries with multiple challenges across multiple domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space) in contested environments. To this end, the Army is revising its doctrine to guide how the force and specific units will function. The Army is also reorganizing its force by creating new units to conduct missions in multiple domains and by updating the responsibilities of key Army formations, such as Army divisions. Also, the Army is training its combat forces for multi-domain operations in part by increasing the focus on cyber operations. The Army is establishing new cyber and electronic warfare units for multi-domain operations, but did not fully assess the risk of activating some units at an accelerated pace and is experiencing staffing, equipping, and training challenges. For example, the Army activated a cyber battalion in December 2018, and as of March 2019, this unit was understaffed by more than 80 percent. Army guidance directs the Army staff to conduct assessments on new units to determine whether the Army can staff, equip, and train these organizations. However, Army leadership believed the threats justify developing these units at an accelerated pace. Consequently, the Army did not assess the staffing, equipping, and training risk before activating one unit, and only conducted an initial risk assessment before activating a second unit. As a result, senior Army leaders may not know what other challenges could arise, such as sustainment, as the units grow in capabililty. Army officials told GAO that as these units evolve, it is uncertain when more comprehensive risk assessments would take place. The Army has previously accelerated the activations of other units when it saw fit to do so, and is considering creating other new units for multi-domain operations. If the Army does not assess risks for units activated at an accelerated pace, those units may be unable to effectively conduct multi-domain operations.


The role of female servicemembers in the military has expanded in the last half century as restrictions on female servicemembers serving on active duty, including in combat, have been eliminated. DOD has also stated that recruiting and retaining women is important in order to reflect the nation's population and ensure strong military leadership. House Report 115-676 includes a provision that GAO review female retention and promotion in the military. This report examines (1) trends in the percentage of female active-duty servicemembers in the military and their attrition rates, including reported factors leading to attrition; (2) how female active-duty servicemember promotion rates compare with those of males and among females with differing characteristics, and what factors influence these rates; and (3) the extent to which DOD and the military services have plans to guide and monitor female active-duty servicemember recruitment and retention. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2004 through 2018 personnel data to identify attrition and promotion rates and conducted statistical modeling to determine the likelihood of separation and promotion, reviewed DOD reports and other literature on servicemember attrition, and interviewed officials from DOD and other military organizations. The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced slight increases in the overall percentage of female active-duty servicemembers from fiscal year 2004 through 2018 (15.1 percent in fiscal year 2004 to 16.5 percent in fiscal year 2018), with those percentages varying by pay grade category (see figure). During that period, female enlisted and commissioned officers had higher annual attrition rates than corresponding males. However, the gaps between male and female attrition rates have narrowed. For example, in fiscal years 2004 and 2018, female enlisted servicemembers' annual attrition rates were 33.1 and 8.6 percent, respectively, and enlisted males' annual attrition rates were 22.7 and 6.1 percent respectively. GAO's statistical model found that the likelihood of separation for female servicemembers is 28 percent higher than that of males. GAO's literature review of selected studies on reasons why females separate from the military identifed six themes, including family planning, sexual assualt, and dependent care, as influencing separations. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2004 through 2018 data estimated that promotion rates were slightly lower for female enlisted in most years, but higher for officers as compared to their male counterparts. Specifically, female enlisted promotion rates ranged from 0.1 to 2.5 percentage points lower than male enlisted promotion rates during much of that period. However, from fiscal year 2004 through 2018, female commissioned officer promotion rates ranged from 3.3 to 5.3 percentage points higher than the rates of their male counterparts. GAO's statistical model also estimated that the likelihood of promotion outcomes varies by certain characteristics, such as gender and pay grade. For example, GAO estimated that the likelihood of promotion for female enlisted in the Navy may be lower than male enlisted, and the evidence is mixed for the other services. DOD has identified female recruitment and retention as important to diversity in the military, but the services do not have plans that include goals, performance measures, and timeframes to guide and monitor current or future efforts to recruit and retain females. According to officials, DOD is currently updating its diversity and inclusion strategic plan; however, neither its prior plan nor the updated plan include goals, such as recruitment or retention goals, performance measures, and timelines for any one particular demographic group. DOD officials stated that retention goals have, in the past, been misconstrued as quotas and, as such, the department does not set goals or targets for gender. However, goals are not quotas and can help guide continued improvement. Without DOD guidance and service plans with goals, performance measures, and timeframes to monitor female recruitment and retention efforts, DOD may continue to miss opportunities to recruit and retain a valuable segment for its active-duty force.


The roles, duties, and activities of congressional staff are matters of ongoing interest to Members of Congress, congressional staff, and observers of Congress. Members of the House and Senate establish their own employment policies and practices for their personal offices. It is arguably the case that within Member offices, a common group of activities is executed for which staff are necessary. Accordingly, a group of job advertisements for those positions from a number of different offices can shed light on the expectations Members have for position duties, as well as staff skills, characteristics, experience, and other expectations. This report provides a set of 39 widely expected job duties, applicant skills, characteristics, prior experiences, and other expectations based on a sample of ads placed by Members of Congress between approximately December 2014 and September 2019 seeking staff in their offices for 33 position titles: Sample position expectations might assist Congress from multiple perspectives, including assessment of staffing needs in Member offices; guidance in setting position expectations, qualifications, and experience when offices need to hire staff; and informing current and potential congressional employees of position expectations. At the same time, categorizing congressional staff positions by position title relies on an assumption that similarly titled positions in House and Senate personal offices carry out the same tasks under essentially similar circumstances. Although personal offices may carry out similar activities, the assumption might be questionable given the differences in staff resources in House and Senate offices, as well as potential differences among offices of each chamber, particularly the Senate. Genera lizations about staff roles and duties may also be limited in some ways due to the broad discretion Members have with regard to running their office activities. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which sample position expectations might match operational practices in all congressional offices. This is one of several CRS products on congressional staff. To access those products, see CRS Report R44688, Congressional Staff: CRS Products on Size, Pay, and Job Tenure .


The sale and export of U.S.-origin weapons to foreign countries ("defense articles and defense services," officially) are governed by an extensive set of laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. Congress has authorized such sales under two laws: The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, 22 U.S.C. Â§2151, et seq. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, 22 U.S.C. Â§2751, et seq. The FAA and AECA govern all transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and services, whether they are commercial sales, government-to-government sales, or security assistance/security cooperation grants (or building partnership capacity programs provided by U.S. military personnel). These measures can be provided by Title 22 (Foreign Relations) or Title 10 (Armed Services) authorities. Arms sold or transferred under these authorities are regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the U.S. Munitions List (USML), which are located in Title 22, Parts 120-130 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The two main methods for the sale and export of U.S.-made weapons are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licenses. Some other arms sales occur from current Department of Defense (DOD) stocks through Excess Defense Articles (EDA) provisions. For FMS, the U.S. government procures defense articles as an intermediary for foreign partners' acquisition of defense articles and defense services, which ensures that the articles have the same benefits and protections that apply to the U.S. military's acquisition of its own articles and services. For DCS, registered U.S. firms may sell defense articles directly to foreign partners though licenses and agreements received from the Department of State. Firms are still required to obtain State Department approval, and for major sales DOD review and congressional notification is required. In some cases where U.S. firms have entered into international partnerships to produce some major weapons systems, comprehensive export regulations under 22 CFR 126.14 are intended to allow exports and technical data for those systems without having to go through the licensing process. Congress has amended the FAA and AECA to restrict arms sales to foreign entities for a variety of reasons . These include restrictions on transfers to countries that violate human rights and states that support terrorism, as well as limitations on specific countries at certain times, such as any Middle East countries whose import of U.S. arms would adversely affect Israel's qualitative military edge. Arms transfers to Taiwan are governed under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, P.L. 96-8 , 22 U.S.C. Â§ 3301 et seq. Under the AECA, Congress can also overturn individual notified arms sales via a joint resolution . During the 116 th Congress, such joint resolutions were introduced in opposition to planned arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but did not pass . All U.S. defense articles and defense services sold, leased, or exported under the AECA are subject to end-use monitoring (to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the U.S. government with respect to use, transfers, and security of the articles and services) to be conducted by the President (Section 40A of the AECA) to ensure compliance with U.S. arms export rules and policies. FMS transfers are monitored under DOD's Golden Sentry program and DCS transfers are monitored under the State Department's Blue Lantern program.


The share of wind and solar power in the U.S. electricity mix grew from 1% in 2008 to 8% in 2018. Wind and solar are variable renewable energy (VRE) sources. Unlike conventional sources, weather variability creates uncertainty about the availability of VRE sources. This uncertainty could potentially result in a lack of reliability. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the reliability of the electric power system given recent growth in generation from wind and solar sources and projections that growth will continue. According to official metrics, electric reliability was generally stable or improving over the 2013-2017 period. In other words, generation from wind and solar sources does not appear to be causing electric reliability issues at the national level over this period. Questions remain, however, about maintaining reliability if generation from wind and solar should increase above current projections, as some Members of Congress have supported. Entities in the electric power sector and their regulators are evaluating changes to their approaches to reliability to prepare for this possibility. Congress might seek clarification on whether new or modified approaches are required. Under the current regulatory framework, the federal government oversees reliability for the generation and transmission systems of the electric power sector. These components comprise the bulk power system and include large-scale wind and solar sources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05; P.L. 109-58 ) authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop and enforce mandatory reliability standards for the bulk power system. Small-scale wind and solar sources, such as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, are connected to the distribution system which is localized and under state jurisdiction. Federal mandatory reliability standards do not apply to the distribution system. The colloquial definition of reliability is "having power when it is needed," but regulators and operators of power system components require a more precise statement of objectives and metrics. FERC and NERC have developed numerous technical standards to address reliability. These standards apply over the range of timescales over which reliability is measured, from milliseconds to years. FERC has approved approximately 100 reliability standards to date, and new standards are developed as needed to respond to changing conditions, including increasing generation from wind and solar sources. Multiple entities spanning multiple jurisdictions work together to maintain electric reliability. For economic reasons, wind and solar sources tend to be utilized to the maximum extent possible. When their availability changes, which can happen quickly, other sources must quickly respond to maintain reliability. Typically, other sources respond by increasing or decreasing their output, an operation known as balancing. Multiple types of electricity sources are used to balance wind and solar, including some fossil fuel-fired generators, some nuclear generators, other wind and solar sources (provided sufficient transmission availability), energy storage, and demand response. Each of these has benefits and limitations. Some sources and system operations that currently support balancing have received federal financial support in the past, such as tax credits, grants to states or other entities, and Department of Energy research programs. Congress might consider continuing or expanding such support, if lawmakers believed current activities affecting reliability were insufficient. Beyond developing and enforcing reliability standards, other federal government activities affect electric reliability. For example, FERC's regulation of interstate electricity transmission can be a key determinant of how effectively different electricity sources can meet demand. FERC's regulation of the wholesale electricity markets that operate in some regions of the country may also affect reliability, because market rules can influence which individual generators are used for system balancing. Market prices directly affect project revenues, influencing the kinds of sources that are developed. Additionally, some projects and programs Congress funds support reliability by enabling technology development and providing financial support for projects that support reliability.


The statutory definition of patent-eligible subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act has remained essentially unchanged for over two centuries. As a result, the scope of patentable subject matterâthat is, the types of inventions that may be patentedâhas largely been left to the federal courts to develop through "common law"-like adjudication. In the 20th century, the U.S. Supreme Court established that three main types of discoveries are categorically patent-ineligible: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Recent Supreme Court decisions have broadened the scope of these three judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter. Over a five-year period, the Supreme Court rejected, as ineligible, patents on a business method for hedging price-fluctuation risk; a method for calibrating the dosage of a particular drug; isolated human DNA segments; and a method of mitigating settlement risk in financial transactions using a computer. These cases established a new two-step test, known as the Alice / Mayo framework, for determining whether a patent claims ineligible subject matter. The first step of the Alice / Mayo test addresses whether the patent claims are "directed to" a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea. If not, the invention is patentable. If the claims are directed to one of the ineligible categories, then the second step of the analysis asks whether the patent claims have an "inventive concept." To have an inventive concept, the patent claim must contain elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the ineligible concept, so that the claim amounts, in practice, to something "significantly more" than a patent on the ineligible concept itself. If the invention fails the second step of Alice / Mayo , then it is patent-ineligible. The Supreme Court's decisions have been widely recognized to effect a significant change in the scope of patentable subject matter, restricting the sorts of inventions that are patentable in the United States. The Alice / Mayo test has been the subject of criticism, with some stakeholders arguing that the Alice / Mayo framework is vague and unpredictable, unduly restricts the scope of patentable subject matter, reduces incentives to invest and innovate, and harms American industry's competitiveness. In particular, the Alice / Mayo test has created uncertainty in the computer technology and biotechnology industries as to whether innovations in medical diagnostics, personalized medicine, methods of treatment, computer software, and artificial intelligence are patent-eligible. As a result, some patent law stakeholders, including academics, bar associations, industry representatives, judges, and former Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) officials, have called for the Supreme Court or Congress to act to change the law of patentable subject matter. However, other stakeholders defend the legal status quo, arguing that the Alice / Mayo framework provides an important tool for combating unmeritorious patent litigation, or that the revitalized limits on patentable subject matter have important benefits for innovation. Recently, there have been several substantial administrative and legislative efforts to clarify or reform patent-eligible subject matter law. In January 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance to its patent examiners with the aim of clarifying and improving predictability in how PTO patent examiners make Section 101 determinations. In April and May of 2019, a bipartisan and bicameral group of Members released draft legislative proposals that would abrogate the Alice / Mayo framework and transform the law of Section 101 and related provisions of the Patent Act. Following a series of hearings in June 2019, many expect a bill to reform Section 101 to be introduced this fall. These proposed changes could have significant effects as to the types of technologies that are patentable. The availability of patent rights, in turn, affects incentives to invest and innovate in particular fields, as well as consumer costs and public access to technological innovation. Understanding the legal background and context can aid Congress as it debates the legal and practical effects that legislative Section 101 reforms would have if enacted.


The substantial burden of opioid abuse related to the current opioid epidemic in the United States has resulted in a disparity between the need for substance abuse treatment and the current capacity. Methadone and buprenorphine are two medications used in medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorder (OUD). Methadone and buprenorphine are both opioids; their use to treat opioid use disorders is often called opioid agonist treatment or therapy (OAT) or opioid agonist MAT . As controlled substances, methadone and buprenorphine are subject to additional regulations. Methadone may be used to treat opioid addiction within federally certified opioid treatment programs (OTP)âoften referred to as methadone clinics. Buprenorphine may be used to treat opioid use disorder in two settings: (1) within an OTP and (2) outside an OTP pursuant to a Drug Addiction Treatment Act (DATA) waiver. The federal government has taken steps to increase the availability of MAT in response to the escalation of opioid overdoses and deaths in recent years. Policy efforts to address the opioid epidemic have corresponded with increased treatment availability, yet access to substance abuse treatment has not kept pace with the increasing rates of opioid addiction in the United States. Geographic information is important in accurately evaluating treatment capacity. Treatment location may be especially relevant to understanding the discrepancy between need and capacity. The current report identifies the geographic location of MAT providers using methadone and buprenorphine (opioid agonist treatment) in the United States. The analysis uses Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) data to identify the number and location of (1) federally certified opioid treatment programs and (2) practitioners with DATA waivers. The geographic location of OTPs and DATA-waived practitioners are displayed in several national and regional maps. Identifying the location of OAT providers may have utility in increasing accessibility to treatment. However, simply increasing capacity for treatment may not effectively increase availability (or decrease opioid-related overdoses) if treatment providers are not located in areas of need. The current analysis does not evaluate needâby locating opioid-related overdose hospital admissions and deaths for instance. It does, however, provide an initial step in assessing how treatment providers are dispersed geographically. Other factors, such as substance use treatment financing, stigma, and waiting periods for services may also affect OAT availability. Practitioners are subject to state laws and regulations regarding prescribing privileges which affect their eligibility for DATA waivers and, in turn, the availability of treatment. Congress may incorporate geographic factors in strategies designed to increase capacity and availability of treatment.


Broadband service on tribal lands continues to lag behind the rest of the country, especially on rural tribal lands. Broadband service can be delivered through wireless technologies using radio frequency spectrum. According to FCC, increasing tribal access to spectrum would help expand broadband service on tribal lands. This statement is based on GAO's November 2018 report ( GAO-19-75 ) related to spectrum use for broadband services by tribal entities and selected updates. Specifically, it discusses (1) tribal entities' ability to obtain and access spectrum to provide broadband services and the reported barriers that may exist, and (2) the extent to which FCC promotes and supports tribal efforts to obtain and access spectrum. For that report, GAO interviewed 16 tribal entities that were using wireless technologies. Selected entities varied geographically, among other characteristics. GAO analyzed FCC's license and auction data as of September 6, 2018, reviewed FCC's rulemakings on spectrum for broadband services, and interviewed other tribal and industry stakeholders and FCC officials. The information obtained was not generalizable to all tribes or industry participants. As an update, GAO reviewed FCC's June 2019 draft order related to spectrum in the 2.5 GHz band. The tribal entities—tribal governments and tribally owned telecommunications providers—GAO contacted for its November 2018 report cited various barriers to obtaining spectrum licenses in bands that can be used to provide broadband services. Based on data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as of September 2018, GAO identified 18 tribal entities that held active spectrum licenses in such bands. For example, of these 18 tribal entities, 4 obtained licenses through secondary market transactions—that is, they bought or leased the license from another provider, and 2 obtained a license through an FCC spectrum auction. The barriers tribal officials identified to obtaining licensed spectrum include high costs at auctions and, in the case of secondary market transactions, a lack of information on who holds licenses over tribal lands. Because most spectrum allocated for commercial use has already been assigned, the secondary market is one of the few avenues available to tribal entities that would like to access licensed spectrum. At the time of GAO's November 2018 report, FCC had taken some actions to increase tribal access to spectrum. For example, FCC issued proposed rulemakings in 2011 and 2018 that sought comment on tribal-specific proposals, such as establishing tribal-licensing priorities and initiating processes to transfer unused spectrum licenses to tribal entities. FCC had not finalized these rules at the time of GAO's report, but FCC published a draft order in June 2019 that would create a tribal-licensing priorty window, whereby tribal entities would have an opportunity to obtain spectrum in the 2.5 gigahertz (GHz) band prior to the spectrum being auctioned. FCC adopted the order on July 10, 2019. FCC stated that it will implement spectrum initiatives and that it recognizes the importance of promoting a robust secondary market to improve communications throughout the United States, including tribal lands. However, GAO found that FCC had not consistently collected data related to tribal access to spectrum. For example: FCC did not collect data on whether spectrum auction applicants are tribal entities and therefore did not have a comprehensive understanding of the extent that tribal entities are attempting to obtain licensed spectrum. FCC did not analyze the extent that unused licensed spectrum exists over tribal lands. Although FCC officials said evaluating the effectiveness of FCC's secondary market policies is a way to increase the use of unused spectrum, FCC's approach did not include an analysis of unused spectrum licenses on tribal lands. As a result, FCC's evaluations of the secondary market may not accurately reflect how its policies affect tribal entities. By collecting data on the extent that tribal entities are obtaining and accessing spectrum, FCC could better understand tribal spectrum issues and use this information as it implements ongoing spectrum initiatives. Further, given that the secondary market is one of few ways for tribal entities to access licensed spectrum to provide Internet service, FCC could promote a more robust secondary market by analyzing unused licensed spectrum over tribal lands and using that information to inform FCC's oversight responsibilities.


The tax gap—the difference between tax amounts that taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid voluntarily and on time—has been a persistent problem for decades. The tax gap estimate is an aggregate estimate of the five types of taxes that IRS administers—individual income, corporation income, employment, estate, and excise taxes. For each tax type, IRS attempts to estimate the tax gap based on three types of noncompliance: (1) underreporting of tax liabilities on timely filed tax returns; (2) underpayment of taxes due from timely filed returns; and (3) nonfiling, when a taxpayer fails to file a required tax return on time or altogether. This testimony discusses factors contributing to the tax gap and strategies to reduce it. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports on the tax gap and enforcement of tax laws, including those with open recommendations or matters for congressional consideration that could help reduce the tax gap. Enforcement of tax laws has been on GAO's High Risk List since its inception in 1990, and GAO has made various recommendations to IRS and suggestions to Congress to reduce the tax gap that have resulted in improvements. For example, GAO recommended that IRS consider comparing individuals' tax returns with the information educational institutions report to verify taxpayers' education tax benefits claims and suggested that Congress require brokers to report to both taxpayers and IRS the adjusted cost of the securities sold by taxpayers. These actions resulted in billions of dollars in additional revenue. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) latest tax gap estimate (2016) found that taxpayers voluntarily and timely paid about 81.7 percent of owed taxes for tax years 2008-2010, leaving an annual gross tax gap of $458 billion. IRS estimated a net tax gap—after late payments and enforcement actions—of $406 billion. GAO's work has found that three important factors contribute to the tax gap. Limited third party information reporting. The extent to which individual taxpayers accurately report their income is closely aligned with whether third parties (e.g., employers) report income (e.g., wages) to them and to IRS. IRS resource tradeoffs. IRS's budget and staffing levels have fallen over the past decade, and IRS faces increasing responsibilities, such as implementing Public Law 115-97—commonly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act—which involved significant changes to tax law. Tax code complexity. The federal tax system contains complex rules that may be necessary to appropriately target tax policy goals; however, this can engender errors and lead to underpaid taxes. GAO's work has demonstrated that no single approach will fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance since the problem has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers. In light of these challenges, GAO has made numerous recommendations to IRS—some of which have not yet been implemented—such as developing and documenting a strategy that outlines how IRS will use data to update compliance approaches to help address the tax gap. Reducing the tax gap will also require targeted legislative actions. For example, expanding third-party information reporting could increase voluntary compliance and providing IRS with the authority to regulate paid tax return preparers could improve the accuracy of the tax returns they prepare.


The transmission of COVID-19 has been greatly aided by air travel. In light of the pandemic and warnings about the risks of air travel, U.S. passenger airline traffic fell by 96 percent in April 2020 as compared to April 2019. COVID-19 is only the latest communicable disease threat to raise public health concerns regarding the spread of contagion through air travel. Ensuring that the United States is prepared to respond to disease threats from air travel, as well as conducting the necessary research to reduce the risks of contagion, are two vital responsibilities of the federal government. This statement provides information on (1) the U.S. aviation system's preparedness to respond to communicable disease threats and (2) FAA's management of its R&D portfolio, including the extent to which disease transmission on aircraft and at airports has been the focus of FAA research. This statement is based on GAO-16-127 issued in December 2015 and GAO-17-372 issued in April 2017. GAO conducted updates to obtain information on the actions agencies have taken to address these reports' recommendations. The United States still lacks a comprehensive plan for national aviation preparedness to limit the spread of communicable diseases through air travel. In December 2015 during the Ebola epidemic, GAO recommended that the Department of Transportation (DOT) work with relevant stakeholders, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. GAO concluded that the absence of a national plan undermined the ability of the public-health and aviation sectors to coordinate on a response or to provide consistent guidance to airlines and airports. Moreover, Annex 9 to an international aviation treaty to which the United States is a signatory contains a standard that obligates member states to develop such a plan. DOT is now confronting an even more widespread public health crisis—the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic—without having taken steps to implement this recommendation. Not only could such a plan provide a mechanism for the public-health and aviation sectors to coordinate to more effectively prevent and control a communicable disease threat, it could also help minimize unnecessary disruptions to the national aviation system, disruptions that to date have been significant. Some aviation stakeholders have publicly highlighted the resulting piecemeal approach to adopting standards during the response to COVID-19, such as various airline and airport policies regarding facemasks, as demonstrating the need for a more coordinated response. The existence of a national plan might have reduced some of the confusion among aviation stakeholders and passengers. While DOT agrees that a national aviation preparedness plan is needed, the agency continues to suggest that HHS and the Department of Homeland Security have responsibility for communicable disease response and preparedness planning. GAO continues to believe that DOT is in the best position to lead this effort given its oversight responsibilities and ties with relevant aviation stakeholders. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has sponsored limited federal research into disease transmission onboard aircraft and in airports. FAA's research goals focus on areas like improving airport operations and air space management, and developing new technologies, which FAA has aligned to DOT's strategic goals related to safety, infrastructure, and innovation. Based on prior work and interviews with FAA officials, GAO found that FAA's research in cabin safety for crew and passengers does not focus on disease transmission. For example, according to FAA officials, ongoing research that most closely relates to disease contamination is research related to monitoring the quality of “bleed air,” which is outside air that is drawn through jet engines into an aircraft cabin. In 2017, GAO found that FAA could be more strategic in how it develops its research and development (R&D) portfolio, chiefly in identifying long-term research needs and explaining how FAA selects projects. Of the three recommendations GAO made in that report to improve FAA's management of its R&D portfolio, FAA fully addressed one, issuing guidance in 2018 on prioritizing and selecting R&D projects. While FAA has made some progress addressing GAO's recommendations on research portfolio development and reporting, further attention to these recommendations could help ensure that FAA strategically identifies research priorities across the agency.


The use of IT is crucial to helping VA effectively serve the nation's veterans. Each year the department spends billions of dollars on its information systems and assets. However, VA has experienced challenges in managing its IT programs, raising questions about its ability to deliver intended outcomes needed to help advance the department's mission. To improve federal agencies' IT acquisitions, in December 2014 Congress enacted FITARA. GAO has previously reported on IT management challenges at VA, as well as its progress in implementing FITARA and cybersecurity requirements. GAO was asked to summarize key results and recommendations from its work at VA that examined systems modernization efforts, FITARA implementation, and cybersecurity efforts. To do so, GAO reviewed its recently issued reports and incorporated information on the department's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made limited progress toward addressing information technology (IT) system modernization challenges. From 2001 through 2018, VA pursued three efforts to modernize its health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA). However, these efforts experienced high costs, challenges to ensuring interoperability of health data, and ultimately did not result in a modernized VistA. Regarding the department's fourth and most recent effort, the Electronic Health Record Modernization, GAO recently reported that the governance plan for this program was not yet defined. VA has not fully implemented GAO's recommendation calling for the department to define the role of a key office in the governance plans. The Family Caregiver Program, which was established to support family caregivers of seriously injured post-9/11 veterans, has not been supported by an effective IT system. Specifically, GAO reported that, due to limitations with the system, the program office did not have ready access to the types of workload data that would allow it to routinely monitor workload problems created by the program. GAO recommended that VA expedite the process for identifying and implementing an IT system. Although the department concurred with the recommendation, VA has not yet fully addressed it. VA had developed the Veterans Benefits Management System—its system that is used for processing disability benefit claims; however, the system did not fully support disability and pension claims, as well as appeals processing. GAO made five recommendations for VA to improve its efforts to effectively complete the development and implementation of the system. The department concurred with the recommendations but has implemented only one thus far. VA has demonstrated uneven progress toward fully implementing GAO's recommendations related to key Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) provisions. Specifically, VA has implemented all six recommendations in response to GAO's 2014 report on managing software licenses, leading to, among other things, savings of about $65 million over 3 years. However, the department has not fully addressed two recommendations from GAO's 2016 report on managing the risks of major IT investments. Further, the department has not implemented (1) two of four recommendations related to its effort to consolidate data centers and (2) GAO's four recommendations to increase the authority of its Chief Information Officer. VA's management of cybersecurity has also lacked key elements. For example, GAO reported in May 2016 that VA had established numerous security controls, but had not effectively implemented key elements of its information security program. In addition, as GAO reported in March 2019, the department had not accurately categorized positions to effectively identify critical staffing needs for its cybersecurity workforce. VA has implemented three of six cybersecurity-related recommendations from these two reports.


There is concern that coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) could quickly spread among federal prisoners and prison staff because of the nature of the prison environment. Prisons are places where hundreds of prisoners and staff are living and working in close proximity to each other and where they are forced to have regular contact. Prisons are generally not conducive to social distancing. Also, prison infirmaries typically do not have the resources available to most hospitals, such as isolation beds, that would help prevent the spread of the disease. There are also concerns that if prison staff were hard hit by COVID-19, a significant number of staff would require quarantine; they would be unavailable to perform their duties, including providing care to sick prisoners; and the disease could spread. On March 13, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) released a COVID-19 action plan. The action plan largely focuses on restricting access to federal prisons and limiting the movement of prisoners between prisons. On March 18, 2020, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sent a letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its BOP seeking the release of prisoners in the custody of BOP and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) who might be at risk for serious illness because of COVID-19, and a reduction in the intake of new prisoners to avoid overcrowding. In addition, multiple Members of Congress have also urged DOJ and BOP to take steps "to reduce the incarcerated population and guard against potential exposure to coronavirus," and legislation has been introduced that would require the release of some federal prisoners during a national emergency relating to a communicable disease. BOP updated its action plan on March 19, 2020, to clarify that while prisoner movement is limited under the plan, BOP will still move prisoners as needed to properly manage the prison population and to outline new conditions that must be met if a prisoner is transferred. On March 31, 2020, BOP announced that effective April 1, 2020, all prisoners will be placed on a 14-day lockdown in their assigned cells as a measure to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Prisoners will be allowed to leave their cells during this period for certain reasons, such as attending programming or to shower and use the phone. On April 14, 2020, BOP announced that its action plan, which was initially set to expire on April 12, 2020, would be extended until May 18, 2020. Regarding the release of federal criminal defendants in detention pending trial, 18 U.S.C. Section 3142 allows for federal courts to reopen pretrial detention hearings based on new information or permit temporary release of pretrial detainees for "compelling" reasons. With respect to the release of federal prisoners who are currently serving their court-imposed sentences, 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a federal court to reduce a prisoner's sentence and impose a term of probation or supervised release if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," or the prisoner is at least 70 years of age, the prisoner has served at least 30 years of his or her sentence, and BOP has determined that the prisoner is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community. Under 34 U.S.C. Section 60541(g), BOP is authorized to conduct a program whereby elderly and terminally ill prisoners who meet certain statutory requirements can be placed on home confinement. Under 18 U.S.C. Section 3624(c), BOP is authorized to place prisoners in a Residential Reentry Center (i.e., a halfway house) and/or on home confinement at the end of their sentences. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the CARES Act; P.L. 116-136 ) permits the BOP Director to extend the maximum amount of time for which a prisoner may be placed on home confinement under Section 3624(c)(2) under certain circumstances. Under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President has broad authority to grant clemency for federal offenses, which can include commuting a prisoner's sentence to time served. The Attorney General has issued three memoranda outlining how DOJ will utilize the legal authorities available to it to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Two of the memoranda are to the BOP Director, and they direct BOP to increase the number of prisoners placed on home confinement and outline factors for BOP to consider when making decisions about which prisoners should be released from federal prison. The other memorandum is for all components of DOJ, including all United States Attorneys, and it provides a directive on how prosecutors should make decisions about the use of pretrial detention for federal defendants in light of possible exposure to COVID-19.


Third-party providers, such as paid tax return preparers and tax preparation software providers, greatly impact IRS’s administration of the tax system. If these third parties do not properly secure taxpayers’ personal and financial information, taxpayers will be vulnerable to identity theft refund fraud and their sensitive personal information will be at risk of unauthorized disclosure. IRS estimates that it paid out at least $110 million in identity theft tax refund fraud during 2017, and at least $1.6 billion in identity theft tax refund fraud during 2016. GAO was asked to review IRS’s efforts to track, monitor, and deter theft of taxpayer information from third parties. Among other things, this report assesses what is known about the taxpayer information security requirements for the systems used by third-party providers, IRS’s processes for monitoring compliance with these requirements, and IRS’s requirements for third-party security incident reporting. GAO analyzed IRS’s information security requirements, standards, and guidance for third-party providers and compared them to relevant laws, regulations, and leading practices, such as NIST guidance and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government . GAO reviewed IRS’s monitoring procedures and its requirements and processes for third-party reporting of security incidents, and compared them to Internal Control Standards and GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risk in Federal Programs . GAO also interviewed IRS and tax industry group officials. Federal law and guidance require that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the sensitive financial and taxpayer information that resides on its systems. However, taxpayer information held by third-party providers—such as paid tax return preparers and tax preparation software providers—generally falls outside of these requirements, according to IRS officials. In 2018, about 90 percent of individual taxpayers had their tax returns electronically filed by paid preparers or used tax preparation software to prepare and file their own returns. IRS seeks to help safeguard electronic tax return filing for various types of third-party providers through requirements under its Authorized e-file Provider program. However, IRS’s efforts do not provide assurance that taxpayers’ information is being adequately protected. Paid Preparers. IRS has not developed minimum information security requirements for the systems used by paid preparers or Authorized e-file Providers. According to IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel, IRS does not have the explicit authority to regulate security for these systems. Instead, the Internal Revenue Code gives IRS broad authority to administer and supervise the internal revenue laws. The Department of the Treasury has previously requested additional authority to regulate the competency of all paid preparers; GAO has also suggested that Congress consider granting IRS this authority. Congress has not yet provided such authority. Neither the Department of the Treasury request nor the GAO suggestion included granting IRS authority to regulate the security of paid preparers’ systems. Having such authority would enable IRS to establish minimum requirements. Further, having explicit authority to establish security standards for Authorized e-file Providers’ systems may help IRS better ensure the protection of taxpayers’ information. Tax Software Providers. As part of a public-private partnership between IRS and the tax preparation industry, 15 tax software providers voluntarily adhere to a set of about 140 information security controls developed using guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, these controls are not required, and these providers represent only about one-third of all tax software providers. Additionally, IRS established six security, privacy, and business standards for providers of software that allows individuals to prepare their own tax returns (as opposed to software that paid preparers use). However, IRS has not substantially updated these standards since 2010, and they are, at least in part, outdated. For example, IRS cites an outdated encryption standard that NIST recommends not using due to its many known weaknesses. A key factor contributing to missed opportunities to address third-party cybersecurity is IRS’s lack of centralized leadership. Consequently, IRS is less able to ensure that third-party providers adequately protect taxpayers’ information, which may result in identity theft refund fraud. IRS monitors compliance with its electronic tax return filing program requirements for those paid preparers who electronically file returns; however, IRS’s monitoring has a limited focus on cybersecurity issues. For example, the monitoring techniques largely focus on physical security (e.g., locked filing cabinets) rather than verifying that preparers have an information security policy consistent with NIST-recommended controls. Without effective monitoring of cybersecurity controls, IRS has limited assurance that those paid preparers’ systems have adequate controls in place to protect clients’ data. IRS recently began collecting information on high-risk security incidents, such as hackers infiltrating third-party provider systems. Reported incidents increased from 2017 to 2018, the only years for which IRS has data. However, IRS does not have a full picture of the scope of incidents because of inconsistent reporting requirements, including no reporting requirements for paid preparers.


Thirteen temporary business tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2020. Four other temporary business tax provisions are scheduled to expire in 2021 or 2022. In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of the 17 business-related tax provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2020, 2021, or 2022. The provisions discussed in this report are listed below, grouped by type and scheduled year of expiration. The following special business investment (cost recovery) provisions are scheduled to expire in 2020: special expensing rules for certain film, television, and live theatrical productions; seven-year recovery period for motorsports entertainment complexes; three-year depreciation for race horses two years or younger; and accelerated depreciation for business property on an Indian reservation. The following economic development provisions are scheduled to expire in 2020: e mpowerment zone tax incentives; American Samoa economic development credit; and new markets tax credit. The following other business-related provisions are scheduled to expire in 2020: Indian employment tax credit; mine rescue team training credit; employer tax credit for paid family and medical leave; work opportunity tax credit; look-through treatment of payments between related controlled foreign corporations; and p rovisions modifying excise taxes on wine, beer, and distilled spirits. The following provisions are scheduled to expire in 2021 or 2022: 12.5% increase in low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) authority; computation of adjusted taxable income without regard to any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization, or depletion; the rum cover over; and c redit for certain expenditures for maintaining railroad tracks. The 13 temporary business-related tax provisions scheduled to expire at the end of 2020 were most recently extended by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ). Of these 13 provisions, 8 had expired in 2017 and were extended retroactively and 5 were scheduled to expire in 2019. Past tax extenders legislation had extended 11 of these 13 provisions. The other two provisions, both of which were scheduled to expire in 2019, were added to the tax code as part of the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ). Four other business-related provisions will expire in 2021 or 2022. This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as individual or energy-related. See CRS Report R46243, Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders") Expiring in 2020: In Brief , coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; and CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") , by Molly F. Sherlock, Donald J. Marples, and Margot L. Crandall-Hollick. For a general overview of tax extenders, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") , by Molly F. Sherlock.


This report describes actions taken to provide FY2021 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Department of Commerce, which includes bureaus and offices such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the National Science Foundation (NSF); and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Administration requests $74.849 billion for CJS for FY2021, which is $4.910 billion (-6.2%) less than the $79.759 billion appropriated for CJS for FY2020. The Administration's request includes $8.318 billion for the Department of Commerce, $32.964 billion for the Department of Justice, $32.994 billion for specified science agencies, and $574 million for the related agencies. The Administration's FY2021 budget proposes reduced funding for the Department of Commerce, NSF, and most of the related agencies, and increased funding for DOJ and NASA. The proposed reduction in overall funding for CJS is partially the result of a proposed $5.886 billion (-77.9%) decrease in funding for the Census Bureau, which, in keeping with past precedent, receives less funding in the fiscal year after conducting the decennial census. The FY2021 budget request for CJS also includes reductions to several other CJS accounts along with proposals to eliminate several CJS agencies and programs, including the Economic Development Administration, the Community Oriented Policing Services Office, NASA's STEM Engagement Office (formerly the Office of Education), and the LSC.


This report describes selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the first session of the116 th Congress (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2019). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time-limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. The report also includes health care-related provisions that were enacted in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ) or last extended under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). In addition, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the 115 th Congress (i.e., during CY2017 or CY2018). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. This report generally focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning that it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline, or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activitiesâsuch as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user feesâare excluded from this report. Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified time period are not considered to require legislative attention and are excluded. The report provides tables listing the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2019 and that expired in 2018 or 2017. The report then describes each listed provision, including a legislative history. An appendix lists relevant demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2019 or that expired in 2018 or 2017.


This report describes selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the second session of the 116 th Congress (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2020). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time-limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached, absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. The report also includes health care-related provisions enacted in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ) or extended under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136 ). In addition, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the first session of the 116 th Congress (i.e., during CY2019). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. This report focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first, and most common, type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activitiesâsuch as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user feesâare excluded from this report. Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified period are not considered to require legislative attention and are excluded. The report provides tables listing the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2020 and that expired in 2019. The report then describes each listed provision, including a legislative history. An appendix lists relevant demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2020 or that expired in 2019.


This report describes the structure, activities, legislative history, and funding history of seven federal regional commissions and authorities: the Appalachian Regional Commission; the Delta Regional Authority; the Denali Commission; the Northern Border Regional Commission; the Northern Great Plains Regional Authority; the Southeast Crescent Regional Commission; and the Southwest Border Regional Commission. All seven regional commissions and authorities are broadly modeled after the Appalachian Regional Commission structure, which is composed of a federal co-chair appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the member state governors, of which one is appointed the state co-chair. This structure is broadly replicated in the other commissions and authorities, albeit with notable variations and exceptions to local contexts. In addition, the service areas for all of the federal regional commissions and authorities are defined in statute and thus can only be amended or modified through congressional action. While the service areas for the federal regional commissions and authorities have shifted over time, those jurisdictions have not changed radically in their respective service lives. Of the seven federal regional commissions and authorities, four could be considered active: the Appalachian Regional Commission; the Delta Regional Authority; the Denali Commission; and the Northern Border Regional Commission. The four active regional commissions and authority received $15 million to $165 million in congressional appropriations in FY2019 for their various activities. Each of the four functioning regional commissions and authority engage in economic development to varying extents, and address multiple programmatic activities in their respective service areas. These activities may include, but are not limited to: basic infrastructure; energy; ecology/environment and natural resources; workforce/labor; and business development. Though they are federally-chartered, receive congressional appropriations for their administration and activities, and include an appointed federal representative in their respective leadership structures (the federal co-chair and his/her alternate, as applicable), the federal regional commissions and authorities are quasi-governmental partnerships between the federal government and the constituent state(s) of a given authority or commission. This partnership structure, which also typically includes substantial input and efforts at the sub-state level, represents a unique federal approach to economic development and a potentially flexible mechanism for coordinating strategic economic development goals to local, state, and multi-state/regional priorities and contexts. Congress has expressed interest in the federal regional commissions and authorities pursuant to its appropriations and oversight authority, as well as its interest in facilitating economic development programming. Given relevant congressional interest, the federal regional commissions and authorities provide a model of functioning economic development approaches that are place-based, intergovernmental, and multifaceted in their programmatic orientation (e.g., infrastructure, energy, environment/ecology, workforce, business development).


Business IDT is an evolving threat to both taxpayers and IRS and if not addressed can result in large financial losses to the government. The risk of business IDT has increased due to the availability of personally identifiable information and general ease of obtaining business-related information online. This makes it more difficult for IRS to distinguish legitimate taxpayers from fraudsters. GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat business IDT. This report (1) describes IRS's current efforts to detect business IDT, (2) evaluates IRS's efforts to prevent business IDT against selected fraud risk management leading practices, and (3) assesses IRS's efforts to resolve business IDT cases. GAO reviewed IRS documents and business IDT fraud detection data, evaluated IRS's efforts to combat business IDT against two components of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework , analyzed case resolution data, and interviewed IRS officials. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has efforts in place to detect business identity theft refund fraud (business IDT), which occurs when thieves create, use, or try to use a business's identifying information to claim a refund. IRS uses computerized checks, or fraud filters, to screen incoming returns. From January 2017 to August 2019, IRS researched about 182,700 returns stopped by business IDT fraud filters. IRS determined that about 77 percent of returns (claiming $38.3 billion) were not business IDT and about 4 percent of returns (claiming $384 million) were confirmed business IDT. As of August 2019, IRS was reviewing the remaining returns. The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 created requirements for agencies to establish financial and administrative controls for managing fraud risks. These requirements are aligned with leading practices outlined in GAO's A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs ( Fraud Risk Framework) . IRS has taken steps to understand fraud risks associated with business IDT but has not aligned its efforts with selected components within the Fraud Risk Framework . First, IRS leadership has demonstrated a commitment to identifying and combating overall identity theft refund fraud, but has not designated a dedicated entity to design and oversee business IDT fraud risk management efforts agency-wide. This is because the program is relatively new. Without designating an entity to help guide agency-wide business IDT fraud risk efforts, it is not clear which entity would be responsible for assessing business IDT risks and documenting the results. Second, IRS has not conducted a fraud risk assessment or developed a fraud risk profile for business IDT consistent with the Fraud Risk Framework's leading practices. Doing so would help IRS determine the likelihood and impact of risks, the level of risk IRS is willing to tolerate, and the suitability, costs, and benefits of existing fraud risk controls. IRS officials stated that they have not formally performed a fraud risk assessment or developed a risk profile because they have directed their resources toward identifying and addressing business IDT that is occurring right now and improving fraud detection efforts. Documenting a risk profile would also help IRS determine whether additional fraud controls are needed and whether to make adjustments to existing controls. Third, IRS has not assessed which business-related tax forms or fraud scenarios pose the greatest risk to IRS and taxpayers. Current business IDT fraud filters cover the most commonly filed tax forms; however, IRS has not developed fraud filters for at least 25 additional business-related forms that may be susceptible to business IDT. Without additional data on business IDT, IRS cannot estimate the full size and scope of this problem. IRS has procedures for resolving business IDT cases and has described general guidelines for resolving business IDT cases, but it does not resolve all cases within these guidelines. Further, IRS has not established customer service-oriented performance goals for resolving business IDT cases, which is inconsistent with federal guidance. Establishing performance goals may help IRS better serve taxpayers and minimize additional costs to the Treasury.


This report details the National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget and appropriations process with a focus on FY2020 and FY2021, and on coronavirus supplemental funding for NIH. The report also provides an overview of funding trends in regular appropriations to the agency from FY1995 to FY2021. Appendix A includes funding tables by account and program-specific funding levels for FY2020 and FY2021. The NIH is the primary federal agency charged with conducting and supporting medical, health, and behavioral research, and it is made up of 27 Institutes and Centers and the Office of the Director (OD). About 80% of the NIH budget funds extramural research through grants, contracts, and other awards. About 10% of NIH funding goes to intramural researchers at NIH-operated facilities. Almost all of NIH's funding is provided in the annual Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. NIH also receives smaller amounts of funding from Interior/Environmental appropriations and a mandatory budget authority for type 1 diabetes research. NIH has an FY2020 program level of $41.685 billion and has received emergency supplemental appropriations in three coronavirus supplemental appropriations acts, totaling over $3.59 billionâan 8.6% funding increase over regular enacted FY2020 appropriations. The administration's FY2021 budget request, as amended by a March 2020 letter, proposes an FY2021 program level of $39.133 billionâa 6.1% decrease from the FY2020 program level (regular appropriations). NIH has seen periods of high and low funding growth during the period covered by this report, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Between FY1994 and FY1998, funding for NIH grew from $11.0 billion to $13.7 billion (nominal dollars). Over the next five years, Congress and the President doubled the NIH budget to $27.2 billion in FY2003. In each of FY1999 through FY2003, NIH received annual funding increases of 14% to 16%. From FY2003 to FY2015, NIH funding increased more gradually in nominal dollars. In some years (FY2006, FY2011, and FY2013), funding for the agency decreased in nominal dollars. From FY2016 through FY2020, NIH has seen funding increases of over 5% each year. The largest increase was from FY2017 to FY2018, where the program level increased by $3.0 billion (+8.7%), making this the largest single-year nominal dollar increase since FY2003. When looking at NIH funding adjusted for inflation (in projected constant FY2021 dollars using the Biomedical Research and Development Price Index; BRDPI), the purchasing power of NIH funding peaked in FY2003âthe last year of the five-year doubling periodâand then declined fairly steadily for more than a decade until back-to-back funding increases were provided in each of FY2016 through FY2020. The FY2021 budget request would provide a program level that is 13.0% below the peak FY2003 program level.