U.S. policy has long sought to balance U.S. civilian nuclear exports with the nation's obligation to ensure that they are not used to proliferate nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) provides a framework for certain civilian nuclear exports and outlines the requirements for nuclear cooperation agreements, including that certain nonproliferation conditions be met; that State conduct negotiations with the technical assistance and concurrence of DOE; and that the President keep certain congressional committees fully and currently informed of negotiations or initiatives. This report describes, among other things, (1) the status of U.S.-Saudi negotiations and any areas of disagreement and (2) what is known about U.S. agency management of the negotiations. GAO reviewed the AEA and documentation of interactions between U.S. and Saudi officials regarding nuclear cooperation. GAO received limited information from State and DOE officials during the review but interviewed over 30 other stakeholders, including former senior executive branch officials, former congressional staff, and others with knowledge of and insights into nuclear cooperation issues and the negotiations. Since 2008, when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation, the current and prior U.S. administrations have engaged in discussions and negotiations about nuclear cooperation with the Saudi government. However, these negotiations are stalled; the two countries have not been able to resolve disagreements on several nonproliferation conditions, including Saudi Arabia agreeing to enrichment and reprocessing restrictions and signing an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would allow IAEA to obtain additional information about and access to Saudi nuclear activities. U.S. agency management of the negotiations with Saudi Arabia remains unclear in two areas regarding AEA requirements—(1) that the Department of State (State) conduct negotiations, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy (DOE), and (2) that certain congressional committees be informed. First, it is unclear which U.S. agencies were present at or aware of various interactions where nuclear cooperation was or may have been discussed, except for the formal negotiations in 2012 and 2018 and a commercial mission coordinated with State. GAO was able to identify eight interactions where nuclear cooperation was discussed and five more interactions where nuclear cooperation may have been discussed (see figure). Note: Interactions depicted in this figure include meetings, phone calls, and a letter, among other things. Second, GAO was unable to determine whether the agencies kept the committees fully and currently informed. GAO identified two briefings on the negotiations—in December 2017 and January 2018—to the relevant committees, but it does not appear that these committees were briefed until more than a year after the March 2018 formal negotiations. According to congressional staff, Congress on occasion learned of developments through non-agency sources and had to apply forceful measures, including holds on nominations, to get information from the executive branch. By committing to regular briefings to Congress on nuclear cooperation negotiations and initiatives, State could better support congressional oversight on nuclear nonproliferation matters. In addition, congressional staff have said the AEA allows for broad interpretation of the “fully and currently informed” requirement. By specifying, through an amendment to the AEA, its expectations for timeliness and information provided by the agencies on nuclear cooperation negotiations and initiatives, Congress could have better assurance that it receives the information it needs for oversight of nuclear nonproliferation matters.


U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial—but with varying degrees of intensity—since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Since then, U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced. In 2010, the Obama Administration led a campaign of broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program—an effort that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding limits on Iran's missile program or on its regional influence or human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited the JCPOA's deficiencies in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the JCPOA and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions. The stated intent of that step, as well as subsequent actions such as the April 2019 designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and the May 2019 ending of sanctions exceptions for buyers of Iranian oil, is to apply "maximum pressure" on Iran to compel it to change its behavior, including negotiating a new JCPOA that takes into account the broad range of U.S. concerns. Included in these concerns is Iran's support for pro-Iranian regimes and armed factions. Iran has responded by abrogating some of its JCPOA commitments. Before and particularly during an escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions in May 2019, President Trump has indicated a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders. However, Administration statements and reports detail a long litany of objectionable behaviors that Iran must change for there to be any dramatic change in U.S.-Iran relations. Iranian leaders say they will not talk with the Administration unless and until it reenters the 2015 JCPOA. Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran's regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse. In the context of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in May 2019, President Trump has specifically denied that this is his Administration's goal. Any U.S. regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran, as well as evident popular unrest. In part as a response to repression as well as economic conditions, unrest erupts periodically, most recently during December 2017-January 2018, and sporadically since then, including in response to the regime's apparent mishandling of relief efforts for vast flooding in southwestern Iran. But the unrest evident to date is not at a level where it threatens the leadership's grip on power. U.S. pressure has widened leadership differences in Iran. Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to improve Iran's relations with the West, including the United States, won successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017, and reformist and moderate candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities. But hardliners continue to control the state institutions that maintain internal security in large part through suppression. And Iran's Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, is increasingly critical of Rouhani's commitment to the JCPOA in public statements. See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS In Focus IF11212, U.S.-Iran Tensions Escalate, by Kenneth Katzman.


UAS could provide significant economic and social benefits, for example by delivering packages or aiding in search and rescue missions. FAA is conducting a phased approach to incrementally integrate UAS safely into the national airspace. As directed by statute, FAA established UAS test sites to allow industry to assess the safety and feasibility of complex UAS operations, such as flying beyond an operator's line of sight. FAA has stated that this program provides research results and other data needed to reach full integration. GAO was asked to review FAA's management of the test sites. This report examines, among other things: (1) the research conducted at FAA's designated UAS test sites, and (2) how FAA is leveraging and sharing information from the test site program to advance integration. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and regulations, reports, and FAA guidance; analyzed test sites' efforts, including flight test data submitted to FAA from 2015 through 2018; and interviewed FAA officials, test site representatives from all 7 test sites, and 18 test site users, selected to include a range of perspectives. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) seven designated test sites for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have facilitated about 15,000 UAS flight tests since 2015 and supported a wide range of research. Both public and private entities have used the test sites to test technologies in preparation for varied UAS activities, from inspecting utilities to carrying passengers. Research conducted at test sites provides data on the performance of various UAS capabilities and technologies; such data could support FAA's integration efforts. While FAA collects this data from test sites, it has not fully leveraged the data or the program to advance UAS integration. According to FAA's 2018 Roadmap for UAS Integration a key goal of this program is to provide data to support FAA's decisions on drone integration. FAA officials said the agency intends to use the data to a greater extent in the future to advance integration. Without an analysis plan, however, FAA could miss opportunities to better use the data to inform the overall integration effort, such as to inform UAS operational standards. Also, FAA reports limited public information about how test sites' research relates to the agency's integration plans. Agency officials told GAO they were wary of sharing more information about the test sites, citing concerns about, among other things, protecting test site users' proprietary data. All test site representatives and most users GAO interviewed, however, said that more information on test sites' research would be helpful for UAS stakeholders' research efforts. According to FAA plans, the agency must rely on relationships with stakeholders across government and industry to ensure that integration efforts are harmonized. By sharing more information publicly, FAA could demonstrate to such stakeholders how the agency is fostering and using research to inform and advance integration. Further, with more information, more stakeholders may opt to use a test site to conduct their own research, thus potentially increasing data available to FAA to inform its integration decisions.


UAS have the potential to provide significant social and economic benefits in the United States. FAA is tasked with safely integrating UAS into the national airspace. As the UAS sector grows, so do demands on FAA's staffing and other resources to develop, oversee, and enforce rules and systems needed to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 provides for GAO to review issues related to establishing fee mechanisms for FAA to recover its costs related to UAS. This report discusses, among other things, 1) FAA efforts to track the costs of current and planned activities related to UAS and 2) key considerations and options for designing user fee mechanisms that could recover FAA's costs. GAO reviewed FAA documents and financial data for fiscal years 2017 through 2019 and industry reports on drone integration funding. GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 22 UAS industry stakeholders, selected based on participation in FAA advisory groups or prior GAO knowledge to achieve a range of perspectives. GAO reviewed its guidance on designing effective fee mechanisms and OMB instructions to agencies about implementing user fees. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has undertaken actions to integrate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS or “drones”) into the national airspace and has developed plans to allow for increasingly complex operations, including operations over people and beyond visual-line-of-sight and—eventually—passenger operations (see figure). However, FAA efforts to track related costs may result in incomplete information. FAA established a means of tracking the costs associated with some UAS-activities in certain offices, but many, if not all, FAA offices are doing work related to both manned aviation and UAS. FAA officials stated that they do not know or plan to assess the extent to which staff who split their time between UAS-activities and other responsibilities are tracking those costs. Furthermore, FAA's future costs to conduct oversight and provide air navigation services are largely unknown due to the changing nature of the industry and its early stage of development. Ensuring that information on UAS-related costs is complete and reliable now could put FAA in a better position to identify those costs as they evolve and possibly expand in the future. The extent to which FAA should recover costs for its UAS-related activities, and what fees are appropriate, are policy decisions for the administration and Congress. Accordingly, this report does not recommend any specific fee mechanism. Nonetheless, planning and consideration of policy goals, using available guidance on user fee design, could better position FAA to inform future decision-making on these issues as it proceeds with UAS integration. Since 2015, FAA has collected a registration fee from UAS operators, but most of FAA's UAS costs are not related to registration or covered by this fee. A stakeholder group established by FAA identified potential fee mechanisms and concluded in 2018 that the aviation industry, FAA, and Congress should identify revenue streams to help fund FAA's UAS activities. Further, GAO guidance and Office of Management and Budget instructions provide a framework, including information requirements, for designing effective user fees. FAA officials said that they have not considered user fee mechanisms as part of their planning because they have been awaiting this report to inform their decision-making. By using available guidance as part of its planning, FAA could incorporate steps, such as identifying costs and beneficiaries, which would benefit future fee design considerations.


USAID has a stated commitment to fostering an inclusive workforce that reflects the diversity of the United States and has undertaken efforts to increase diversity in its Civil and Foreign Services. However, concerns about the demographic composition of USAID's workforce are longstanding. GAO was asked to review issues related to the diversity of USAID's workforce. This report examines, among other things, the demographic composition of USAID's workforce in fiscal years 2002 through 2018, differences between promotion outcomes for racial or ethnic minorities, and the extent to which USAID has identified workforce diversity issues and worked to address those issues. GAO analyzed USAID's personnel data for its full-time, permanent, career workforce for fiscal years 2002 through 2018—the most recent available data. GAO's analyses do not completely explain the reasons for differences in promotion outcomes, which may result from various unobservable factors. Thus, GAO's analyses do not establish a causal relationship between demographic characteristics and promotion outcomes. GAO also reviewed USAID documents and interviewed USAID officials and members of 13 employee groups. The overall proportion of racial or ethnic minorities in the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) full-time, permanent, career workforce increased from 33 to 37 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2018. The direction of change for specific groups varied. For instance, the proportion of Hispanics rose from 3 to 6 percent, while the proportion of African Americans fell from 26 to 21 percent. The proportions of racial or ethnic minorities were generally smaller in higher ranks. During this period, the overall proportion of women increased from 51 to 54 percent, reflecting their growing proportion in USAID's Foreign Service. 8 Promotion outcomes at USAID were generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites in early to mid career. When controlling for factors such as occupation, GAO found statistically significant odds of promotion in the Civil Service were 31 to 41 percent lower for racial or ethnic minorities than for whites in early and mid career. In the Foreign Service, average promotion rates were lower for racial or ethnic minorities in early to mid career, but differences were generally not statistically significant when GAO controlled for various factors. USAID has previously identified underrepresentation of specific groups in its workforce, but staffing gaps, partly due to a lack of senior leadership attention, prevent the agency from consistently performing required Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activities. The Office of Civil Rights and Diversity (OCRD), responsible for USAID's EEO program, has been significantly understaffed. Vacancy rates in most OCRD divisions were 50 percent or higher in November 2019 and, despite attempts to hire more staff, remained at 30 to 50 percent as of April 2020. These staffing gaps have limited OCRD's capacity to process EEO complaints and investigations within mandated timeframes and analyze USAID's demographic data. Staffing gaps also prevented OCRD from submitting required reporting on the status of its EEO program in fiscal year 2018. A lack of consistent leadership in OCRD as well as a lack of senior USAID leadership attention to diversity has contributed to OCRD's staffing gaps. As a result, USAID lacks the capacity to respond to allegations of discrimination, identify potential barriers to equal employment opportunity, and submit required annual reports on the progress of its diversity and inclusion efforts in a timely manner—all of which are required EEO functions.


USDA has reported that almost one-third of the U.S. food supply is lost or wasted at the retail and consumer levels. Studies indicate that some of this waste may occur because of consumer confusion about the meaning of date labels displayed on packaged food. Such labels are not federally regulated, and food manufacturers use different phrases on date labels. USDA and FDA have roles in ensuring the U.S. food supply is safe and properly labeled, but neither agency been directed—or given express authority—to regulate date labels. GAO was asked to examine consumer confusion about date labels. This report (1) describes the steps USDA and FDA have taken to address consumer confusion about date labels and (2) examines the extent to which USDA and FDA have coordinated with each other and with nonfederal stakeholders on date labels. GAO reviewed studies on date labels and FDA and USDA documents; interviewed agency officials and representatives of nonfederal stakeholders, such as industry, advocacy organizations, and state governments; and compared the agencies' efforts to leading practices identified by GAO. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have taken steps to address consumer confusion about date labels on packaged foods. For example, to reduce confusion about introductory phrases on date labels, such as whether the dates indicate food is safe to eat (see figure), and resulting food waste, USDA in December 2016 issued a fact sheet on date labels for consumers. In addition, USDA has funded research on issues related to date labels (e.g., how labels affected participants' willingness to waste food) and developed a smartphone application that provides consumers with information on the shelf life of products. FDA has issued educational materials to consumers about the meaning of phrases on date labels and in May 2019 issued a statement that it supports industry efforts to standardize date labels. USDA and FDA have coordinated on some initiatives focused on date labels on packaged foods. For example, agency officials said they were working together to develop information for food banks, food donors, and recipients of donated food on how to interpret date labels so food past the date on the label—but otherwise wholesome—is not wasted. In October 2018, the agencies, with the Environmental Protection Agency, signed a formal agreement to educate consumers about food loss and waste. In addition, USDA and FDA have taken steps to work with some nonfederal stakeholders—such as nonprofit organizations and an international organization—on date labeling. However, USDA and FDA officials told GAO that they do not have a specific mechanism to coordinate with state, local, and tribal officials on creating a common approach to date labels. State, local, and tribal governments may choose to regulate date labels, and the majority of states have date label requirements for certain foods. According to prior GAO work, ensuring that relevant participants are included in interagency collaborative efforts is a leading practice for interagency collaboration. By developing a mechanism to facilitate coordination with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local, and tribal officials, on actions related to date labels, USDA and FDA could better assure that approaches they take to address consumer understanding of date labels are effective in helping reduce consumer confusion.


USPS faces a challenging business environment that has led to reduced demand for its traditional services and significant financial losses. USPS aims to address this challenge by offering innovative products and services. The success of these efforts will depend, in part, on how effectively USPS tests each innovation's performance on a small scale to determine whether, how, and when to launch an innovation more broadly—a practice known as “piloting.” GAO was asked to review USPS's efforts to develop postal innovations. This report (1) describes key innovations that USPS recently piloted and (2) examines the extent to which USPS's policies reflect leading practices for pilot design and evaluation. GAO analyzed information on USPS pilots from fiscal years 2013 through 2017; compared USPS policies for piloting innovations to leading practices for pilot design and evaluation in prior GAO work and relevant standards for internal control; and selected four key innovations based on various characteristics (e.g., innovation type) to serve as illustrative examples of USPS's piloting efforts. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) piloted 24 key innovations intended primarily to generate revenue or improve customers' experience. The following four selected innovations illustrate these efforts: Same-Day Delivery: USPS delivered goods consumers bought online or in stores. The pilot sought to test the product's feasibility and revenue potential. Grocery Delivery: USPS delivered groceries to consumers in metropolitan areas. The pilot sought to test the product's feasibility and revenue potential. Informed Delivery: USPS emailed customers an advance image of the mail they would receive. The pilot sought to test the service's potential benefits, such as generating new revenue from advertisers that may use the service. Keyless Parcel Lockers: USPS is testing lockers where customers can independently pick up packages at post offices. The pilot seeks to test the service's operation and potential benefits for USPS and customers. USPS's policies for piloting innovations do not fully reflect the five leading practices for pilot design and evaluation identified in GAO's prior work. The policies fully reflect two of the leading practices because they require articulating a methodology for evaluating pilot performance and documenting lessons learned. The policies do not fully reflect the other three practices because they do not require: (1) linking pilot objectives to identified performance measures; (2) documenting conclusions based on pilot results; or (3) communicating with key external stakeholders, as appropriate. These policy gaps limit the extent to which USPS can ensure that it is making good resource allocation decisions based on pilot experiences. For example, GAO found that USPS did not document its conclusions based on the results of its pilots of same-day delivery, grocery delivery, and Informed Delivery. Documenting conclusions can be especially important when USPS continues to offer the product or service after the pilot has concluded, even though the pilot did not achieve all of its objectives, as was the case with these three innovations. Further, while USPS's policies require documenting lessons learned from its pilots, USPS did not do so for some pilots GAO reviewed. Senior USPS officials said that USPS did not consistently follow this policy because it had not developed tools or training that could help ensure such consistency. As a result, USPS risks losing information that could be relevant to future innovation efforts.


USPS faces major financial challenges. In the last 11 years it has lost over $69 billion; an issue for an organization that is to be self-sufficient. Significant USPS expenses are concentrated in employee compensation—72 percent of its costs in fiscal year 2018—and USPS has taken actions to decrease these costs. GAO was asked to review issues related to USPS's employee compensation. This report examines: (1) recent trends in postal employee compensation, (2) the results of recent USPS efforts to manage compensation and (3) potential effects of proposed changes to employee compensation that would require legislative change. GAO analyzed USPS employee payroll data from fiscal years 2009 through 2018 to determine compensation trends and impacts of management efforts to manage compensation. GAO reviewed relevant legal documents, USPS policy documents and collective bargaining agreements. GAO assessed four broad reviews of USPS including recommendations for legislative change related to pay, benefits and required workhours. GAO also interviewed USPS officials, officials representing USPS employee unions, and industry and mailer stakeholders. Compensation costs for current United States Postal Service (USPS) employees are $9 billion lower than 10 years ago, when adjusted for inflation (see fig). Most of the decline happened in fiscal years 2009 through 2014 as a result of reductions in the number of USPS employees and the hours they worked. While compensation costs have increased in recent years, USPS reports that more work hours were necessary to handle growth in delivery points and labor intensive packages. In recent years, USPS has also failed to make required payments for retiree health and pension benefits—a total unfunded liability of about $110 billion. Compensation Costs for Current USPS Employees for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2018 USPS estimates a savings of about $9.7 billion from fiscal years 2016 through 2018 as a result of paying new employees less, among other efforts. GAO substantiated about $8 billion in savings, and found that USPS's cost savings estimates are likely overstated because they do not fully account for changes in work hours or tenure of employees. Also, USPS did not account for other costs such as increased turnover rates among lower-paid employees. USPS lacks guidance on what factors to consider in its cost savings estimates, and as a result may make future changes to employee compensation based on incomplete information. Changes to employee compensation that would require legislative change could save USPS billions, but the amount saved is dependent on USPS overcoming implementation challenges. If USPS could reduce delivery frequency and associated work hours, GAO estimated USPS could save billions a year. However, other recent USPS reductions in service have not fully achieved planned work hour reductions due to, among other things, issues with management of work hours and lack of union agreement. Changing employee pay and benefit requirements could also achieve significant long-term savings, but saving depends on USPS overcoming challenges, such as potential increases in turnover and reduced productivity resulting from decreases in pay and benefits.


USPS manages over 31,000 retail facilities, which help it provide postal services throughout the country. However, USPS faces financial challenges. In general, USPS is prohibited by statute from providing nonpostal products and services (i.e., services not directly related to mail delivery) unless approved by the Postal Regulatory Commission. But given the ubiquity of the retail network, some stakeholders have suggested that offering additional nonpostal products and services could help USPS generate revenue and provide benefits for consumers and communities. GAO was asked to review opportunities to enhance the value of USPS's retail facilities. This report examines: (1) the costs, revenues, and other benefits associated with USPS's retail facilities; (2) USPS's nonpostal efforts since 2008 at retail facilities and the outcomes; and (3) considerations of new nonpostal efforts at retail facilities. GAO analyzed USPS retail facility costs and revenue data from fiscal years 2017 and 2018 (the only years available); reviewed relevant documents and reports from USPS and others; conducted a non-generalizable survey of USPS postmasters who managed rural, suburban, and urban retail facilities; and interviewed USPS officials, and stakeholders, including postal employee unions, industry and consumer groups, and federal agencies that partner with USPS to obtain views on current and potential nonpostal efforts. GAO is making no recommendations. USPS, in its comments, reiterated that it faces various constraints to new offerings at retail facilities. In 2018, U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) retail facilities, such as post offices, generated about $10.5 billion in revenue and cost approximately $5 billion to operate, making them profitable overall. While such facilities accounted for about 15 percent of USPS's total fiscal year 2018 revenues, and about 7 percent of its total costs, stakeholders identified other benefits that retail facilities provide for communities—particularly in rural areas—such as local access to government information and services. Since 2008, USPS has offered a variety of nonpostal products and services at its retail facilities that have generated some revenue and other benefits. USPS data show that the nonpostal products and services for which USPS captures revenue data, such as money orders, generated about $431 million in total revenue in fiscal year 2018 and were profitable overall. Stakeholders said many of these nonpostal products and services also provided other benefits, such as enhanced convenience for customers, and postmasters GAO surveyed said some offerings, such as passport services, were highly valued in their communities. Offering additional nonpostal products and services at USPS retail facilities could provide consumer, government, or community benefits, but viability may be limited. Stakeholders said new offerings, such as expanded financial products or government services could, for example, enhance consumers' access and government efficiencies. In particular, some noted that USPS could provide a viable banking alternative for those lacking banking services. However, USPS officials, postmasters GAO surveyed, and stakeholders GAO interviewed said that additional offerings may generate minimal revenue and that USPS may face factors limiting the viability of these offerings. For example, groups representing states' licensing agencies said offering state hunting and fishing licenses could be problematic given different state requirements. Also, stakeholders said USPS may not have the expertise nor the required capital to enter the market of some of these new offerings. Given such concerns, USPS and policy makers need to carefully weigh costs, benefits, and limitations of any new offerings.


CRAs collect data from various sources, such as banks and credit card companies, to create consumer reports that they sell to third parties. The three largest CRAs hold information on more than 200 million Americans. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, enacted in 2018, included a provision for GAO to examine issues related to the consumer reporting market. This report examines, among other objectives, the causes of consumer report inaccuracies and how CFPB has overseen CRAs. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency documents related to CRA oversight. GAO interviewed representatives of federal agencies and stakeholders, including a nongeneralizable selection of state agencies from four states that had laws or oversight activities involving CRAs and seven CRAs selected based on size and the type of consumer reports produced. GAO also interviewed groups representing state agencies, consumers, and CRAs selected to reflect a range of stakeholders or based on their work related to CRAs. Businesses and other entities use consumer reports to make decisions about consumers, such as whether they are eligible for credit, employment, or insurance. Consumer report inaccuracies can negatively affect such decisions. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and other stakeholders identified various causes of consumer report inaccuracies, such as errors in the data collected by consumer reporting agencies (CRA) and CRAs not matching data to the correct consumer. In 2010, CFPB was granted supervisory and enforcement authority over CRAs. In using its oversight authorities, CFPB has prioritized CRAs that pose the greatest potential risks to consumers—such as those with significant market shares and large volumes of consumer complaints—for examination. CFPB's oversight has generally focused on assessing compliance with Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requirements regarding accuracy and the investigations CRAs conduct in response to consumer disputes. For example, since 2013, CFPB has conducted examinations of several CRAs and directed specific changes in CRAs' policies and procedures for ensuring data accuracy and conducting dispute investigations. CFPB has not defined its expectations for how CRAs can comply with key statutory requirements. FCRA requires CRAs (1) to follow reasonable procedures for ensuring maximum possible accuracy and (2) to conduct reasonable investigations of consumer disputes. CFPB has identified deficiencies related to these requirements in its CRA examinations, but it has not defined its expectations—such as by communicating information on appropriate practices—for how CRAs can comply with these requirements. Absent such information, staff from four CRAs GAO interviewed said that they look to other sources, such as court cases or industry presentations, to understand what CFPB will consider to be noncompliant during examinations. A 2018 policy statement issued by CFPB and other regulators highlighted the important role of supervisory expectations in helping to ensure consistency in supervision by providing transparent insight to industry and to supervisory staff. By providing information to CRAs about its expectations for complying with key FCRA requirements, CFPB could help achieve its goal of accurate consumer reporting and effective dispute resolution processes. Such information also could help to promote consistency and transparency in CFPB's supervisory approach.


Unauthorized migration across the U.S. Southwest border poses considerable challenges to federal agencies that apprehend and process unauthorized migrants (aliens) due to changing characteristics and motivations of migrants in the past few years. Unauthorized migration flows are reflected by the number of migrants apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In FY2000, total annual apprehensions at the border were at an all-time high of 1.64 million, before gradually declining to 303,916 in FY2017, a 45-year low. Apprehensions then increased to 396,579 in FY2018 and 851,508 in FY2019, the highest level since FY2007. More notably, the character of unauthorized migrants has changed during the past decade. Historically, unauthorized migrant flows involved predominantly single adult Mexicans, traveling without families, whose primary motivation was U.S. employment. As recently as FY2011, Mexican nationals made up 86% of all apprehensions, and relatively few requested asylum. In FY2019, however, "Northern Triangle" migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras comprised 81% of all apprehensions that year. Economic migrants exclusively seeking employment no longer dominate the unauthorized migrant flow, which is now driven to a greater extent by asylum seekers and those escaping violence and domestic insecurity, or those with motivations involving a mixture of protection and economic opportunity. CBP classifies apprehended unauthorized migrants into single adults, family units (at least one parent/guardian and at least one child), and unaccompanied alien children (UAC). In 2012, single adults made up 90% of apprehended migrants at the Southwest border. In FY2019, however, persons in family units and UAC together accounted for 65% of all apprehended migrants that year. In FY2019, CBP apprehended a record 473,682 persons in family units, exceeding all apprehensions of family unit members from FY2012-FY2018 combined. Mothers headed almost half of all family units apprehended in FY2019. In addition, apprehended persons in family units shifted from mostly Mexican nationals (80%) in FY2012 to mostly Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran nationals (91%) in FY2019. Similar changes occurred in the origin countries of unaccompanied alien children, whose total apprehensions also reached a record (76,020) in FY2019. The changing character of the migrant flow has led to logistical and resource challenges for federal agencies, particularly CBP. These include a general capacity shortfall in CBP holding facilities, the lack of appropriate facilities to detain families in Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) detention centers, the reassignment of some CBP personnel who monitor the border to process and respond to migrants in holding facilities, and rapidly expanding immigration court backlogs that delay expeditious proceedings. The changing underlying motivations and border migration strategies of recent migrants also makes apprehension data less useful than in the past for measuring border enforcement. Because many unauthorized migrants now actively seek out U.S. Border Patrol agents in order to request asylum, increases or decreases in apprehension numbers may not reflect the effectiveness of border enforcement strategies. In response, the Trump Administration has changed existing policies for apprehended migrants, including implementing the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known as the "remain in Mexico" immigration policy, which allow DHS to return migrants seeking U.S. admission to the contiguous country from which they arrived on land, pending removal proceedings. Options for Congress could include legislative responses to the series of policies that the Administration has developed to address the changing flow of migrants at the Southwest border. Some proposals may consider changes to the appropriations of agencies charged with processing unauthorized migrants to reshape the system from one that was designed to apprehend and return single unauthorized adults from Mexico with no claims for protection, to one that can more quickly adjudicate those seeking humanitarian protection. Other options may include greater supervision of unauthorized migrants who are released into the United States, and mandating the collection and publication of more-detailed and timely data from CBP to more completely assess the flow of unauthorized migrants, including those in the MPP program, and their impact on border enforcement and the immigration court system.


Unconventional IRA investments—such as real estate, certain precious metals, private equity, and virtual currency—can introduce risks to account owners who assume greater responsibility for navigating the complex rules that govern tax-favored retirement savings. IRS enforces tax rules relating to IRAs and can assess additional taxes. GAO was asked to examine the challenges associated with enforcing rules governing IRAs invested in unconventional assets. This report examines (1) the extent to which IRS offers guidance to help taxpayers understand the rules governing unconventional IRA assets; and (2) the challenges IRS faces in enforcing those rules. GAO identified and analyzed IRS information to help taxpayers understand four compliance areas. GAO reviewed IRS analysis of nonmarket IRA assets reported by IRA custodians, and IRS audit procedures and training materials; and interviewed relevant IRS officials to identify enforcement challenges. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Publications 590-A and 590-B serve as a general handbook for millions of taxpayers with individual retirement accounts (IRA). However, the two-part publication provides limited information for IRA owners with unconventional assets surrounding complex tax rules in four compliance areas: (1) barred investments, (2) prohibited transactions, (3) unrelated business income, and (4) fair market value. GAO found other limited information about these topics on IRS's website. With only about 2 percent of IRAs invested in unconventional assets, adding more pages to Publications 590-A and 590-B may not be practical. By assessing options for informing IRA owners investing in unconventional assets, such as directing them to web pages with specialized information and technical regulations, IRS could better help them comply. Noncompliance involving unconventional IRA assets is difficult to detect and time consuming for IRS to pursue. Whereas IRS relies on automated enforcement for IRAs invested in conventional assets held by custodians and trustees, enforcement for IRAs invested in unconventional assets or under IRA owner control requires labor-intensive audits of individual taxpayers. Using newly compiled information, IRS identified about 2 million IRAs that held certain types of hard-to-value assets as of 2016; however, about 20 percent of the forms were missing fair market value amounts for these assets (see fig.). IRS officials said this type of reporting alone may be inadequate for audit selection and identifying potentially abusive IRAs. When IRS lacks sufficient data to detect abusive transactions, IRS can require taxpayers to self-report certain transactions that have been used by other taxpayers to avoid taxes. Additional taxpayer or custodian disclosure of potentially abusive IRA transactions coupled with IRS analysis of reported details may help IRS to select IRA owner tax returns to audit. Fragmented responsibility among IRS divisions creates challenges for examiners who need to share expertise and collaborate on IRA enforcement. The division responsible for tax-exempt entities trains its examiners on how to determine if an employee retirement plan has engaged in business activities subject to taxation. However, examiners in the division that audits complex individual tax returns, including those involving IRAs, do not receive such training. Training for those examiners could help improve collaboration on IRA enforcement.


Under Section 219 of the 1992 Water Resources Development Act, as amended, Congress authorized the Corps to provide assistance for the design and construction of environmental infrastructure projects, known as Section 219 projects. Such projects include the development of water transmission lines. Congress typically provides a lump sum appropriation for the Corps' construction account, out of which Section 219 and other environmental infrastructure projects are funded. GAO was asked to review projects carried out under the Section 219 program. This report examines (1) the number and type of Section 219 projects and expenditures from fiscal years 2013 through 2017, and (2) how the Corps prioritizes funding for Section 219 projects. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and agency guidance; analyzed agency data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the most recent time period for which data were available; and interviewed agency officials at headquarters, three divisions, and three districts–selected based on geographic distribution and the amount of Section 219 project expenditures. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the most recent available data, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) spent approximately $81 million on 29 Section 219 projects to develop drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater infrastructure. For example, through the St. Croix Falls, Wisconsin Section 219 project, the Corps assisted with improvements to a wastewater treatment plant. Of the 29 projects, the Corps spent over half of the funding during this period on four projects: (1) Calumet Region, Indiana; (2) Desoto County, Mississippi; (3) Jackson County, Mississippi; and (4) Lakes Marion and Moultrie, South Carolina. The Corps generally follows its standard budget prioritization process—which involves districts, divisions, and headquarters ranking each project and headquarters making final funding decisions—to prioritize Section 219 funding. However, the Corps has not developed criteria to guide this process. GAO found the Corps varies in the factors it uses to rank Section 219 projects. For example, one district considers whether a project can be completed within the fiscal year, while another considers the level of congressional support and dollar value of the project. Headquarters officials said the agency views Section 219 projects as outside its core mission areas and therefore has not developed written criteria. Congressional direction has indicated that the Corps is to consider characteristics—such as projects with the greater economic impact—in prioritizing Section 219 project funding. While aware of this direction, Corps officials said they do not consider it when ranking projects. Federal standards for internal control states that agencies should use quality information to achieve their objectives. By establishing written criteria, the Corps would have greater assurance that its Section 219 project selections align with a clear set of priorities, such as those identified by recent congressional direction.


Under the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-334 , 2018 farm bill), U.S. farm program participantsâwhether individuals or multiperson legal entitiesâmust meet specific eligibility requirements to receive benefits under certain farm programs. Some requirements are common across most programs, while others are specific to individual programs. In addition, program participants are subject to annual payment limits that vary across different combinations of farm programs. Since 1970, Congress has used various policies to address the issue of who should be eligible for farm payments and how much an individual recipient should be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional policy has focused on tracking payments through multiperson entities to individual recipients (referred to as direct attribution), ensuring that payments go to persons or entities actively engaged in farming (AEF), capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year, and excluding farmers or farming entities with large average incomes from payment eligibility. Every participating person or legal entity that participates in a farm program must submit identification information. Other eligibility requirementsâwhich may vary across programsâinclude U.S. citizenship; the nature and extent of an individual's participation (i.e., AEF criteria), including ownership interests in multiperson entities and personal time commitments (whether as labor or management); means testing (persons with combined farm and nonfarm adjusted gross income [AGI] in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits); and conservation compliance requirements. For example, under the FY2019 Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act ( P.L. 116-20 ), the AGI requirement as it applies to payments under the Market Facilitation Program may be waived if at least 75% of AGI is from farming, ranching, or forestry-related activities. In general, foreign persons (or foreign legal entities) are eligible to participate in farm programs if they meet the eligibility requirements. Exceptions are the four permanent disaster assistance programs created under the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) and the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance program (NAP), which exclude nonresident aliens. Current law requires tracking payments through four levels of ownership in multiperson legal entities to the individual recipients. Current payment limits include a cumulative limit of $125,000 for all covered commodities under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) support programs, with the exception of peanuts, which has its own $125,000 limit. Only one permanent disaster assistance programâthe Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP)âis subject to a payment limit ($125,000 per crop year). NAP is also subject to a $125,000 per crop year limit per person for catastrophic coverage. Family farms receive special treatment with respect to payment limitsâevery adult member (18 years or older) is deemed to meet the AEF requirements and is potentially eligible to receive farm program payments in an amount up to the individual payment limit. Furthermore, the 2018 farm bill extended the definition of family member to include first cousins, nieces, and nephews. Thus, a family farm with a single active farm operator may still qualify for multiple payment limits based on the number of immediate and extended adult family members. Congress addresses program eligibility and payment limit issues in periodic farm legislation. Supporters of payment limits contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller, family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. In addition, they argue that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits counter that all farms need support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. Further, critics argue that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness. Congress may continue to address these issues, as well as related questions, such as: How does the current policy design of payment limits relate to their distributional impact on crops, regions, and farm size? Is there an optimal aggregation of payment limits across commodities or programs? Do unlimited benefits under the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program reduce the effectiveness of overall payment limits?


Under the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) of 1986, Congress may authorize commemorative works to be placed in the District of Columbia or its environs. Once a commemorative work has been authorized, Congress continues to be responsible for statutorily designating a memorial site location. This report provides a status update on 12 in-progress memorials and 6 memorials with lapsed authorizations. For each monument or memorial, the report provides a rationale for the work as expressed in the Congressional Record or a House or Senate committee report; its statutory authority; the group or groups sponsoring the commemoration; and the memorial's location (or proposed location), if known. A picture or rendering of each work is also included, when available. For more information on the Commemorative Works Act, see CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report R43241, Monuments and Memorials in the District of Columbia: Analysis and Options for Proposed Exemptions to the Commemorative Works Act, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report R43743, Monuments and Memorials Authorized and Completed Under the Commemorative Works Act in the District of Columbia, by Jacob R. Straus.


Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or the Act; 16 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1531-1544), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (together, the Services) determine which species to "list" as "endangered species" or "threatened species," terms defined in the Act. Species, subspecies, and distinct population segments (DPSs) may all be listed as "species" under the Act. Listing a species invokes certain protections under the Act and a requirement that the Services develop a recovery plan to conserve the species. Listed species may be reclassified by the Services from threatened to endangered or vice versa. The Services may also remove a species from the list, often called delisting, if it no longer meets the definition of an endangered or threatened species. The Services list, reclassify, and delist species pursuant to statutory criteria and definitions through the agency rulemaking process. Persons mayâand often doâchallenge the legality of those final rules through litigation. When such challenges succeed, the court remands the rule to the applicable Service for further proceedings and may vacate the challenged rule. The gray wolf ( Canis lupus ) presents a useful example of the legal issues that arise with listing and delisting species as threatened and endangered under the ESA and how FWS has addressed them. FWS first listed the gray wolf as endangered in 1967 under the Endangered Species Preservation Act (ESPA), a predecessor of the ESA. The gray wolf's status and regulation under the ESA and its predecessors have been the subjects of numerous FWS rules and court opinions. FWS's gray wolf rules show how the agency's approach to interpreting and implementing the ESA has evolved and highlight hurdles that may arise with species' status determinations. As American pioneers settled the West, hunting and other human-caused mortality, spurred by federal and state bounties, brought the gray wolf to near extinction. By the 1960s, the only population remaining in the lower 48 states was in the northern Minnesota forests. FWS listed the eastern timber wolf ( C. lupus lycaon , a gray wolf subspecies found in Minnesota) as endangered under the ESPA. By 1976, three more gray wolf subspeciesâthe Mexican wolf ( C. lupus baileyi ), the northern Rocky Mountain wolf ( C. lupus irremotus ), and the Texas wolf ( C. lupus monstrabilis )âwere listed as endangered under the ESA. In 1978, FWS combined all gray wolf subspecies listings into one listing for the entire gray wolf species in the lower 48 states except Minnesota, which was listed as endangered, and a separate listing for the gray wolf in Minnesota as threatened. In the next few years, FWS created subspecies recovery plans that outlined management strategies and recovery criteria. In the 1990s, FWS reintroduced gray wolves to the northern Rocky Mountains and the Southwest as experimental populations under the ESA. Protected under the ESA from human-caused mortality, which FWS identified as the greatest threat to the species, gray wolf populations increased. In the 2000s, FWS tried on multiple occasions to reclassify or delist gray wolf DPSs it had determined were no longer in risk of extinction, but courts vacated many of the agency's rules. As of January 2020, the gray wolf is listed as endangered or threatened in the lower 48 states, except for a population in the northern Rocky Mountains. FWS's efforts to recover the gray wolf under the ESA exemplify the regulatory and legal challenges that arise when listing and delisting species under the Act. From initial listing to recovery and reintroduction efforts to more recent attempts to delist the gray wolf, FWS has addressed in its regulatory actions such issues as uncertainties in gray wolf taxonomy, ambiguous statutory terms (e.g., "foreseeable future" and "significant portion of its range"), and the adequacy of state management plans. Stakeholders have questioned FWS's choices in comments to the proposed rules and have challenged many of the agency's gray wolf rules in court. Many of the legal challenges to FWS's delisting rules have succeeded, with courts vacating the rules and remanding them to the agency. The history of FWS's regulation of the gray wolf under the ESA and related litigation serve as a useful case study in how regulatory and legal challenges have shaped FWS's interpretation and application of key terms when listing and delisting species under the Act.


Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress exercises the "power of the purse." This power is expressed through the application of several provisions. The power to lay and collect taxes and the power to borrow are among the enumerated powers of Congress under Article I, Section 8. Furthermore, Section 9 of Article I states that funds may be drawn from the Treasury only pursuant to appropriations made by law. The Constitution, however, does not prescribe how these legislative powers are to be exercised, nor does it expressly provide a specific role for the President with regard to budgetary matters. Instead, various statutes, congressional rules, practices, and precedents have been established over time to create a complex system in which multiple decisions and actions occur with varying degrees of coordination. As a consequence, there is no single "budget process" through which all budgetary decisions are made, and in any year there may be many budgetary measures necessary to establish or implement different aspects of federal fiscal policy. This report describes the development and operation of the framework for budgetary decisionmaking that occurs today and also includes appendices that provide a glossary of budget-process-related terms and a flowchart of congressional budget process actions. Since the early years of the Republic, procedures and practices concerning the consideration, enactment, and execution of budgetary legislation have evolved to meet changing needs and circumstances. Many aspects of the framework for budgetary decisionmaking were established in the early years, including the idea that appropriations be considered separate from general policy legislation. The 19 th century also saw Congress take action in several ways to exercise control over how federal agencies spent money. One approach involved enacting increasingly specific appropriations legislation to direct the use of funds. General restrictions on agency discretion were also imposed by statute. For example, beginning in 1870, antideficiency acts were enacted to prevent agencies from exceeding appropriations made by Congress for any fiscal year or obligating payments in anticipation of future appropriations. In the 20 th century, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created a statutory role for the President by requiring agencies to submit their budget requests to him and, in turn, for him to submit a consolidated request to Congress. Other important changes included the advent of direct (mandatory) spending and the enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which provided Congress with a vehicle for making decisions about overall fiscal policy and priorities and also established the House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office. Since 1985, budgetary decisionmaking has also been subject to various budget control statutes designed to restrict congressional budgetary actions or implement particular budgetary outcomes. Altogether, this evolution has resulted in the framework in which budgetary decisionmaking occurs today. Many budgetary actions result from permanent or long-term statutes, but the cycle for decisionmaking remains based on a characteristically annual timetable. The President is required to submit a budget request to Congress early in the legislative session. The President's budget is only a request to Congress, but it establishes the President's wishes regarding the direction of national policies and priorities and often influences the direction of congressional revenue and spending decisions. Congress can coordinate various budget-related actions (such as consideration of revenue and spending measures) through the adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget to set aggregate budget policies and functional spending priorities for at least the next five fiscal years. Because a concurrent resolution is not a lawâthe President cannot sign or veto itâthe budget resolution does not have statutory effect, so no money is raised or spent pursuant to it. Revenue and spending levels set in the budget resolution, however, do establish the basis for enforcement of congressional budget policies through points of order. In recent years, the use of a budget resolution has often been supplanted by the use of various deeming provisions that use alternate means to establish the basis for budgetary enforcement actions. Budget policies are subsequently implemented through action on individual revenue and debt limit measures, annual appropriations acts, and direct spending legislation. If Congress agrees to a budget resolution, it may later consider reconciliation legislation pursuant to reconciliation instructions included in the budget resolution. Reconciliation legislation is subject to expedited procedures that can be used to bring existing revenue and direct spending laws into conformity with policies established in the budget resolution. Action on annual appropriations measures allows Congress to set the level of discretionary spending annually. Congress passes three main types of appropriations measures: regular appropriations to provide budget authority to fund programs and agency activities for the next fiscal year, s upplemental appropriations to provide additional budget authority during the current fiscal year if the regular appropriation is insufficient or to finance activities not provided for in the regular appropriation, and c ontinuing appropriations (often referred to as continuing resolutions or CRs) to provide interim (or sometimes full-year) funding to agencies for activities or programs not yet covered by a regular appropriation.


Under the U.S. Constitution, the House of Representatives has the power to formally charge a federal officer with wrongdoing, a process known as impeachment. The House impeaches an individual when a majority agrees to a House resolution containing explanations of the charges. The explanations in the resolution are referred to as "articles of impeachment." After the House agrees to impeach an officer, the role of the Senate is to conduct a trial to determine whether the charged individual should be removed from office. Removal requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The House impeachment process generally proceeds in three phases: (1) initiation of the impeachment process; (2) Judiciary Committee investigation, hearings, and markup of articles of impeachment; and (3) full House consideration of the articles of impeachment. Impeachment proceedings are usually initiated in the House when a Member submits a resolution through the hopper (in the same way that all House resolutions are submitted). A resolution calling for the impeachment of an officer will be referred to the Judiciary Committee; a resolution simply authorizing an investigation of an officer will be referred to the Rules Committee. In either case, the committee could then report a privileged resolution authorizing the investigation. In the past, House committees, under their general investigatory authority, have sometimes sought information and researched charges against officers prior to the adoption of a resolution to authorize an impeachment investigation. Impeachment proceedings could also be initiated by a Member on the floor. A Member can offer an impeachment resolution as a "Question of the Privileges of the House." The House, when it considers a resolution called up this way, might immediately vote to refer it to the Judiciary Committee, leaving the resolution in the same status as if it had been submitted through the hopper. Alternatively, the House might vote to table the impeachment resolution. The House could also vote directly on the resolution, but in modern practice, it has not chosen to approve articles of impeachment called up in this fashion. Instead, the House has relied on the Judiciary Committee to first conduct an investigation, hold hearings, and report recommendations to the full House. Committee consideration is therefore typically the second stage of the impeachment process. In recent decades, it has been more common than not that the Judiciary Committee used information provided from another outside investigation. The committee might create a task force or a subcommittee to review this material and collect any other information through subpoenas, depositions, and public hearings. Impeachment investigations are governed by the standing rules of the House that govern all committee investigations, the terms of the resolution authorizing the investigation, and perhaps additional rules adopted by the committee specifically for the inquiry. If the committee determines that impeachment is warranted, it will mark up articles of impeachment using the same procedures followed for the markup of other legislation. If the Judiciary Committee reports a resolution impeaching a federal officer, that resolution qualifies for privileged consideration on the House floor; its consideration is the third stage of the impeachment process. The resolution can be called up at the direction of the committee and considered immediately under the hour rule in the House. If called up this way, amendments could be precluded if a majority voted to order the previous question. A motion to recommit, with or without instructions, is in order but is not subject to debate. Alternatively, the House might alter these procedures by unanimous consent to, for example, set a longer time for debate or to allow brief debate on a motion to recommit. A resolution reported from the Rules Committee could also be used to structure floor debate. If the House approves the impeachment resolution, it will appoint managers to present and argue its case against the federal officer in front of the Senate.


Unwanted phone calls, which may also involve spoofing, consistently rank among the top consumer complaints to FCC and FTC. In recent years, consumers have lost millions of dollars—and been deceived into providing financial or other sensitive information or purchasing falsely advertised products—due to schemes using these calls. FCC, FTC, and DOJ have efforts aimed at combatting the fraudulent use of caller ID spoofing. Recently enacted federal legislation included a statutory provision for GAO to review federal efforts to combat the fraudulent use of caller ID spoofing. This report examines (1) what is known about caller ID spoofing schemes, including any recent trends; (2) federal agency enforcement and consumer education efforts; and (3) the status of industry efforts to develop technologies to combat spoofing, and FCC's role in these efforts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed consumer complaint data from FCC and FTC from 2015 through 2018; reviewed investigation and enforcement information from FCC, FTC, and DOJ; and interviewed agency officials and representatives from 23 nonfederal stakeholders, including industry associations, voice service providers, call blocking and analytics services, mobile phone manufacturers, consumer groups, and a standards body. GAO also reviewed relevant agency documentation and assessed agency efforts against key practices for consumer education and interagency collaboration identified in GAO reports. Transmitting fake caller ID information with a phone call, also referred to as “spoofing,” is in many cases illegal—and is used in schemes to obtain money and personal information or generate telemarketing leads. Complaints submitted to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), both of which work to protect consumers from spoofing, suggest that spoofing is a growing issue. FCC, FTC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified 62 enforcement cases they have brought since 2006 involving spoofing. Enforcement can be challenging, as it can be difficult to identify the source of spoofed calls, and scammers may be based overseas. Nevertheless, GAO found that the agencies prioritize their spoofing-related enforcement actions based in part on the level of harm perpetrated against the public and generally follow key practices identified by GAO for effective collaboration. Additionally, FCC and FTC have proposed changes to law to enhance the effectiveness of their enforcement efforts, such as a change that would allow FCC more time to bring certain enforcement actions. Furthermore, FCC's and FTC's consumer education efforts related to spoofing align with key practices for collaboration and consumer education. For example, FCC and FTC have developed consistent and clear messages related to spoofing. Several major telecommunications carriers are taking key steps to put an industry-developed technical system in place designed to reduce spoofing by December 2019, which FCC has encouraged in line with federal guidance. This system is intended to enable carriers to verify whether a caller has a right to use the caller ID being transmitted with the call. Carriers can use this information to better determine whether to block or warn consumers about the incoming call. Stakeholders cautioned that the system cannot determine whether a caller has fraudulent intentions but only whether the caller is using a spoofed number. FCC has followed relevant federal guidance in participating in the development of this system by, for example, encouraging industry to accelerate deployment of the system, monitoring industry's progress, and providing input into the process.


Use of solar energy for electricity generation is growing in the United States and globally. In the United States, solar energy overall accounted for 2.2% of total electricity generation in 2018, up from 0.7% in 2014. This report addresses a dozen frequently asked questions that may be of interest to lawmakers as the growing use of solar energy potentially affects a variety of areas of congressional interest. The first set of questions looks at different technologies that use solar energy to generate electricity and their costs and prevalence over time. Costs for all components of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, including cells, modules, inverters, and other related equipment, have generally declined in recent years. Assessing solar energy costs for consumers is challenging because there are many local factors to consider. Another question considers whether using solar energy is a reliable form of electricity generation given its variable nature. The second set of questions discusses federal and state policies aimed at promoting deployment of solar energy in the United States. At the federal level, tax incentives reduce the after-tax cost of investing in solar property, thereby encouraging taxpayers to invest in more solar property than they would have absent tax incentives. Federal tax incentives include an investment tax credit for businesses, eligibility for accelerated depreciation for businesses, and a residential energy efficient property tax credit for individuals. At the state level, renewable portfolio standards (or, more broadly, electricity portfolio standards) require electric utilities to procure a specified amount of electricity from designated, eligible sources. Twenty-nine states, three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are implementing electricity portfolio standards. All of these policies include solar energy as an eligible source. Utility-scale solar systems typically benefit from electricity portfolio standards, while commercial- and residential-scale systems typically benefit from a different state policy called net metering. Net metering allows individual electricity consumers to receive payment for the electricity produced by systems installed on their property (or, in some cases, systems not installed on their property but with which consumers have a contractual arrangement). Another set of questions considers the U.S. manufacturing base for solar products and U.S. tariffs, which have been applied over the years on imports of solar equipment. The results on the nation's solar manufacturing industry have been mixed. Different parts of the solar PV supply chain have responded differently to the tariffs. For some components, such as the assembly of solar modules, domestic production has increased since the imposition of tariffs. By one count, about 20 factories assembled PV modules in the United States in 2018. For other components, such as solar cell production, tariffs have not had this effect. At present, there is one major domestic producer of crystalline-silicon solar cells; several producers of solar cells have closed U.S. plants since 2012. A related question discusses the number of U.S. jobs supported by the domestic solar industry, which employed more than 240,000 full-time equivalent workers in 2018. Of these positions, 64% involved two solar sectors, the installation of solar systems and project development. The final questions address some potential environmental considerations associated with the use of solar energy, such as land use. Standard metrics for measuring land use impacts for different energy technologies do not exist. When considering total land area occupied, solar typically requires more land to produce the same amount of electricity than many other sources. Other aspects of land requirements affect comparisons among energy sources, including technology developments over time, land cover change, and time-to-recovery. Po ssible effects on agricultural production are also discussed. Some farmers view solar energy favorably as an income supplement, but others raise concerns about long-term damage to soil health and agricultural productivity. Some researchers are investigating options for dual-use solar PV systems known as agrivoltaics, in which the same land could be used for simultaneous crop production and electricity generation.


CRAs collect, maintain, and sell to third parties large amounts of sensitive data about consumers, including Social Security numbers and credit card numbers. Businesses and other entities commonly use these data to determine eligibility for credit, employment, and insurance. In 2017, Equifax, one of the largest CRAs, experienced a breach that compromised the records of at least 145.5 million consumers. This statement is based on GAO's February 2019 report on the CRA oversight roles of FTC and CFPB. This statement summarizes (1) measures FTC has taken to enforce CRA compliance with requirements to protect consumer information, (2) measures CFPB has taken to ensure CRA protection of consumer information, and (3) actions consumers can take after a breach. In its February 2019 report, GAO found that since 2008, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has settled 34 enforcement actions against various entities related to consumer reporting violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), including 17 actions against consumer reporting agencies (CRA). Some of these settlements included civil penalties—fines for wrongdoing that do not require proof of harm—for FCRA violations or violations of consent orders. However, FTC does not have civil penalty authority for violations of requirements under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which, unlike FCRA, includes a provision directing federal regulators and FTC to establish standards for financial institutions to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security of customer records. To obtain monetary redress for these violations, FTC must identify affected consumers and any monetary harm they may have experienced. However, harm resulting from privacy and security violations can be difficult to measure and can occur years in the future, making it difficult to trace a particular harm to a specific breach. As a result, FTC lacks a practical enforcement tool for imposing civil money penalties that could help to deter companies, including CRAs, from violating data security provisions of GLBA and its implementing regulations. Since 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has had five public settlements with CRAs. Four of these settlements included alleged violations of FCRA; and three included alleged violations of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices provisions. CFPB is also responsible for supervising larger CRAs (those with more than $7 million in annual receipts from consumer reporting) but lacks the data needed to ensure identification of all CRAs that meet this threshold. Identifying additional sources of information on these CRAs, such as by requiring them to register with the agency through a rulemaking or leveraging state registration information, could help CFPB ensure that it can comprehensively carry out its supervisory responsibilities. After the Equifax breach, CFPB used its existing supervisory authority to examine the data security of certain CRAs. CFPB's process for prioritizing which CRAs to examine does not routinely include an assessment of companies' data security risks, but doing so could help CFPB better detect such risks and prevent the further exposure or compromise of consumer information. Consumers can take actions to mitigate the risk of identity theft—such as implementing a fraud alert or credit freeze—and can file a complaint with FTC or CFPB. However, consumers are limited in the direct actions they can take against CRAs. Consumers generally cannot exercise choice in the consumer reporting market—such as by choosing which CRAs maintain their information—if they are dissatisfied with a CRA's privacy or security practices. In addition, according to CFPB, consumers cannot remove themselves from the consumer reporting market entirely.


VA continues to focus on the use of community care to address challenges with veterans' access to health care services at VA medical facilities. In fiscal year 2019, VA plans to consolidate the Veterans Choice Program and several other community care programs under a single new Veterans Community Care Program. GAO and others have previously reported on past challenges VA has faced regarding the reliability, transparency, and consistency of its budget estimates for health care. GAO was asked to review VA's use of community care and efforts to develop budget estimates for this care. This report describes (1) trends in obligations for and utilization of VA's community care programs since fiscal year 2014, (2) how VA develops its community care budget estimate and any subsequent changes made to this estimate, and (3) how VA's actual obligations for community care compared with estimated obligations for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. GAO reviewed actual obligation and utilization data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, as well as estimated obligations for fiscal years 2019 through 2021. GAO also reviewed available VA documentation on the methods and data used to develop VA's community care budget estimate that informed the President's budget request for fiscal years 2017 through 2019. GAO also interviewed VA officials and contractors responsible for developing these estimates, and OMB staff responsible for the federal budget. VA and OMB reviewed a draft of this report. VA's technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. To help ensure that veterans are provided timely and accessible health care services, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) may purchase care from non-VA providers, known as community care. VA obligated $14.9 billion for community care in fiscal year 2018, an increase of $6.7 billion (about 82 percent) since fiscal year 2014. The number of veterans authorized to use community care increased from 1.3 million to 1.8 million during this period. By fiscal year 2021, VA estimated obligations to increase to $17.8 billion, and officials estimate at least 1.8 million veterans will continue to use this care. Note: VA estimated obligations for fiscal year 2019 to reflect $1.8 billion in anticipated savings as a result of a VA policy change regarding the timing of certain community care obligations. VA uses a projection model to estimate the majority of resources needed to provide health care services. Beginning with the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request, VA updated its model to estimate the resources needed to purchase over 40 community care services accounting for over 75 percent of VA's community care budget estimate. These services include outpatient and inpatient care, among others. For the remainder of its community care budget estimate, which includes nursing care in state-operated homes, VA uses other methods based on historical utilization. VA's budget estimate is successively reviewed at VA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to inform the President's budget request. VA identified several changes made during the review process to its budget estimate for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to reflect more current information related to utilization and costs, among other factors. VA's actual obligations for community care for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 were $1.2 billion and $2.2 billion higher, respectively, than originally estimated. According to VA officials, this occurred for several reasons, including policy changes and increased costs for the Veterans Choice Program. To support higher obligations, VA requested and received additional funding for the Veterans Choice Program outside the annual appropriations process and used other funding sources, such as unobligated amounts from prior fiscal years.


VA is responsible for providing benefits and services to veterans, including health care, disability compensation, and various types of financial assistance. In fiscal year 2019, VA received a total budget of $201.1 billion and a discretionary budget of $86.6 billion—the largest in VA's history—to carry out its mission. GAO, along with the VA Inspector General and other entities, continues to identify significant deficiencies in VA's governance structures and operations—all of which can affect the care provided to our nation's veterans. This testimony focuses on the status of VA's efforts to address GAO's high-risk designations and open GAO recommendations in the following areas: VA health care, acquisition management, and disability claims workloads and benefit eligibility criteria, among other areas. It is primarily based on GAO's March 2019 high-risk update and a body of work that spans more than a decade. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has longstanding management challenges. As a result, GAO added several VA programs to its High-Risk List. This list focuses attention on government operations that are most vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement, or in need of transformation. These include managing risks and improving VA health care, VA acquisition management, and improving and modernizing VA disability programs, including managing claims and updating eligibility criteria. VA health care was designated high risk in 2015 due to concerns about VA's ability to ensure the cost-effective and efficient use of resources to improve the timeliness, quality, and safety of health care for veterans. GAO identified five areas of concern: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes; (2) inadequate oversight and accountability; (3) information technology challenges; (4) inadequate training for VA staff; and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. VA's efforts to address each of these areas have been impeded by leadership instability. However, since his July 2018 confirmation, Secretary Wilkie has demonstrated his commitment to address the department's high-risk designations. His actions to date have allowed the department to maintain its leadership commitment rating of partially met in GAO's 2019 High-Risk update. VA also partially met the action plan criteria. As of March 2019, it did not meet the other three criteria for removal from the High-Risk List (agency capacity, monitoring, and demonstrated progress). This is, in part, because GAO continues to have audit findings that illustrate that the five areas of concern have not been fully addressed. For example: In a series of reports from 2012 through 2018, GAO found VA's wait time data unreliable for primary and specialty care as well as for care in the community. GAO also found that VA did not measure the full wait times that veterans experience in obtaining care across these settings. In November 2017, GAO reported that VA medical center officials did not always conduct or document timely required reviews of providers when allegations of wrongdoing were made against them. In April 2019, GAO found that VA's governance plan for modernizing its electronic health record system was not fully defined, potentially jeopardizing its fourth attempt at modernization. In April 2019, GAO reported that VA's appraisal process for assessing medical center director performance relies heavily on a system with long-identified deficiencies that remain unaddressed, thus diminishing VA's ability to hold officials accountable. In its 2019 High-Risk Report, GAO added VA acquisition management as a high-risk area in light of the department's numerous contracting challenges and the significant federal investment in serving veterans. To date, GAO has identified challenges in the following areas: (1) outdated acquisition regulations and policies; (2) lack of an effective medical supplies procurement strategy; (3) inadequate acquisition training; (4) contracting officer workload challenges; (5) lack of reliable data systems; (6) limited contract oversight and incomplete contract documentation; and (7) leadership instability. For example, as of May 2019, VA does not have updated acquisition regulations and officials expect to have a full update by 2021; a process which has been in place since 2011. GAO designated improving and modernizing federal disability programs, including VA's program, as high risk in 2003. GAO identified two areas of concern related to VA: (1) managing disability claims workload and (2) updating disability benefit eligibility criteria. As a result of these concerns, veterans may not have their disability claims and appeals processed in a timely manner. GAO reported in March 2018 that VA is making a major effort to reform its appeals process by onboarding new staff and implementing new technology. However, its appeals planning process does not provide reasonable assurance that it will have the capacity to successfully implement the new process and manage risks. VA agreed with GAO's recommendation to better assess risks associated with appeals reform. VA leadership has committed to addressing GAO's high-risk concerns and has launched several transformational efforts. For example, VA is currently implementing the Veterans Health Administration Plan for Modernization, a framework that aims to modernize the department, as well as the VA MISSION Act of 2018. This Act requires VA to consolidate programs that allow veterans to receive care outside VA. If successful, these efforts could be transformative for VA. However, such success will only be achieved through sustained leadership attention and detailed action plans that include metrics and milestones to monitor and demonstrate VA's progress. Sustained congressional oversight will also be essential.


VA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation and provides billions of dollars in benefits and services to veterans and their families. However, VA faces serious and long-standing problems with management challenges and veterans' access to care and disability benefits. For example, as of December 2018, VA reported an overall staff vacancy rate of 11 percent at VHA medical facilities, including vacancies of more than 24,000 medical and dental positions, and around 900 human resource positions. Ensuring VA, VHA, and VBA have a pipeline of talent to fill leadership positions and mission-critical occupations is key to addressing these challenges. The VA Choice and Quality Employment Act of 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review succession planning policies and guidance at VA and its administrations. This report addresses the extent to which succession planning policies and procedures at VA, VHA, and VBA are consistent with key leading practices. GAO reviewed agency documents related to succession planning for leadership positions and mission-critical occupations, and interviewed agency officials. To identify key leading practices, GAO reviewed GAO’s past work and Office of Personnel Management guidance. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) have not fully incorporated key succession planning leading practices (see table). Legend: ● Met ◒ Partially Met ○ Not Met Source: GAO analysis of VA's, VHA's, and VBA's succession planning efforts. │ GA O-20-15 VA lacks a current, department-wide succession plan. According to VA officials, VA has not produced a department-wide succession plan since 2009 due to leadership turnover. VA officials said the 2009 plan does not reflect their current succession planning efforts. Establishing a succession plan would help VA identify and develop high-potential staff to meet VA's mission over the long term. VHA's succession plan is consistent with some leading practices, but our prior work found that VHA's physician staffing data are incomplete. Also, VHA performs limited monitoring and evaluation of its plans. Additional monitoring and evaluation could help VHA assess the effectiveness of its strategies in achieving its goals. VBA's plan includes some analysis of workforce gaps for mission-critical occupations. However, VBA's plan does not address leadership positions or fully incorporate key leading practices for mission-critical occupations, such as veterans claims examiners. Developing a succession planning process for leadership positions and fully incorporating key leading practices into its existing processes could help VBA better meet its current and future workforce needs. VA has not updated its succession planning directive since 2003 and VA officials told us that the directive does not incorporate legal requirements put in place since then. The directive establishes requirements and responsibilities for succession planning across VA. VA officials stated that they have not updated the directive because of leadership turnover and changes in legal requirements. Updating the directive could help to ensure it reflects relevant legal requirements. In addition, we found that VA, VHA, and VBA do not follow all of the requirements outlined in the directive. Updating the directive could help to clarify and recommunicate succession planning roles and responsibilities across the department.


VA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation and provides billions of dollars in benefits and services to veterans and their families. However, VA faces serious and long-standing problems with management challenges and veterans' access to health care and disability benefits. These issues contributed to GAO's decision to list several areas involving VA on GAO's High-Risk List, including managing acquisitions, managing risk and improving veterans' health care, and improving and modernizing VA's disability programs. This testimony discusses (1) human capital challenges facing VA and its components, (2) GAO recommendations addressing some of those challenges, and (3) how those challenges are related to a broader set of government-wide human capital problems. This testimony is based on GAO's work on VA issued since 2017, as well as GAO's work on government-wide strategic human capital management issued since July 2014. To conduct these studies, GAO reviewed key agency documents and government-wide employment data and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials and managers, as well as subject matter specialists. Serious human capital shortfalls are undermining the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) ability to provide veterans with quality and timely services. Over the past two decades, GAO has identified major challenges with VA human capital practices. For example, in March 2019, GAO found large staffing shortages, including physicians and registered nurses, at the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) 172 medical centers. In December 2016, GAO found that high attrition, increased workload, and burnout among VHA's human resources (HR) staff, along with ineffective internal controls to support its HR operations, have impeded VHA's ability to serve the nation's veterans (see figure). Continued leadership attention to addressing GAO's recommendations could help VA better execute its mission. GAO has made numerous recommendations to VA, 40 of which were designated as priorities because they could significantly improve VA's operations. Twelve of the 40 were aimed at strengthening VA's human capital management efforts. Of these, six have been addressed. However, VA still needs to take additional actions on the other six, such as developing a modern and effective performance management system. Beyond these priority recommendations, VA can use key talent management strategies that GAO has identified for acquiring, incentivizing, and engaging employees and thus be more competitive for a high-performing workforce in a tight labor market. Some of the challenges facing VA are part of a larger set of human capital issues affecting government as a whole. Although Congress, the Office of Personnel Management, and individual agencies have made improvements in recent years, human capital management in general remains a high-risk area because of mission-critical skills gaps within the federal workforce. Structural issues impede the ability of agencies to recruit, retain, and develop workers, including outmoded position classification and pay systems, ineffective recruiting and hiring processes, and challenges in dealing with poor performers.


VA provides health care services to approximately 9 million veterans and their families and relies on its health information system—VistA—to do so. However, the system is more than 30 years old, is costly to maintain, and does not fully support exchanging health data with DOD and private health care providers. Over nearly 2 decades, VA has pursued multiple efforts to modernize the system. In June 2017, the department announced plans to acquire the same system—the Cerner system—that the Department of Defense is implementing. VA plans to continue using VistA during the department's decade-long transition to the Cerner system. GAO was asked to summarize its report that is being released today which discusses, among other things, (1) the extent to which VA has defined VistA and (2) the department's annual costs to develop and sustain the system. In preparing the report on which this testimony is based, GAO analyzed documentation that defines aspects of VistA and identifies components to be replaced; and evaluated the reliability of cost data, including funding obligations associated with the development and sustainment of VistA for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has various documents and a database that describe parts of the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA); however, the department does not have a comprehensive definition for the system. For example, VA has identified components that comprise VistA, identified interfaces related to the system, and collected system user guides and installation manuals. VA has also conducted analyses to better understand customization of VistA components at various medical facilities. Nevertheless, the existing information and analyses do not provide a thorough understanding of the local customizations reflected in about 130 versions of VistA that support health care delivery at more than 1,500 sites. Program officials stated that they have not been able to fully define VistA due to the decentralization of the development of the system for more than 30 years. Cerner's contract to provide a new electronic health record system to VA calls for the company to conduct comprehensive assessments to identify site-specific requirements where its system is planned to be deployed. Three site assessments have been completed and additional assessments are planned. If these assessments provide a thorough understanding of the 130 VistA versions, the department should be able to define VistA and be better positioned to transition to the new system. VA identified costs for VistA and its related activities adding up to approximately $913.7 million, $664.3 million, and $711.1 million in fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively—for a total of about $2.3 billion over the 3 years. However, of the $2.3 billion, the department was only able to demonstrate that approximately $1 billion of these costs were sufficiently reliable. In addition, the department omitted VistA-related costs from the total. The lack of a sufficiently reliable and comprehensive total cost for VistA is due in part to not following a well-documented methodology that describes how the department determined the costs for the system. As a result of incomplete cost data and data that could not be determined to be sufficiently reliable, the department, legislators, and the public do not have a complete understanding of how much it has cost to develop and maintain VistA. Further, VA lacks the information needed to make decisions on sustaining the many versions of the system.