Congress established the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System (NWSRS) in 1968 through the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA; P.L. 90-542) to preserve free-flowing rivers for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations and to complement the then-current national policy of constructing dams and other river structures that altered flow. Designated rivers usually are referred to as wild and scenic rivers (WSRs). The WSRA established three classes of WSRsâwild, scenic, and recreationalâreflecting the characteristics of the rivers at the time of designation and affecting the type and amount of subsequently allowable development. The system now includes 226 river units comprising over 13,400 miles in 41 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. WSRs may come into the NWSRS either by congressional designation or by state nomination to the Secretary of the Interior. WSRs may be located on federal lands, nonfederal lands, or a combination of both. Some WSRs on nonfederal land are referred to as partnership wild and scenic rivers (or partnership WSRs). The WSRA does not define this term; it is an umbrella term used to describe WSRs with generally similar characteristics, such as nonfederal management and land ownership, but partnership WSRs can vary. WSRs on nonfederal land also may be added to the NWSRS through an administrative process, wherein states may apply to the Secretary of the Interior for inclusion of a state-protected river. Rivers added to the system through state nomination, or rivers designated by Congress that run through both federal and nonfederal lands, generally are not referred to as partnership WSRs. In the case of congressionally designated rivers, Congress may first direct in legislation that a study be conducted to determine whether the river area is suitable for wild and scenic designation. Congress generally specifies in the designating legislation that either the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the Interior administer the WSR. If the designated WSR contains federal land, the Secretary then manages the river through the federal land management agency of jurisdictionâthe Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service (NPS), or the Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department of the Interior or the Forest Service within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The relevant local jurisdiction manages partnership WSRs and state-nominated WSRs, with certain administrative functions carried out at the federal level. WSRs are administered to protect and enhance the values for which the rivers were included in the system and to preserve the rivers' free-flowing condition. The agency, or the relevant local jurisdiction for WSRs on nonfederal land, prepares a comprehensive resource management plan (CRMP) to guide management. The WSRA prohibits federally licensed or assisted water resources projects that would have a "direct and adverse" effect on the values for which a river was established and prohibits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from licensing projects on or directly affecting a designated river segment. The agency of jurisdiction enforces this provision; on partnership WSRs and state-nominated WSRs, NPS enforces this provision. In addition to the provisions of the WSRA, management of WSRs on federal lands differs based on the statutory management criteria for each agency's lands. Each federal land management agency specifies policies regarding river management at varying levels of detail. Agencies typically provide the most protection to wild rivers. For congressionally designated rivers on federal lands, Congress provides funds for operations and maintenance through annual appropriations for the relevant agencies. Agencies sometimes provide funding separately for individual rivers or provide funding through broader budget activities, not specific to an individual river. Rivers added to the NWSRS through state nomination typically do not receive federal funding. However, partnership WSRs receive funding through NPS. The WSRA authorizes federal agencies to provide technical assistance to states and their political subdivisions (such as counties, townships, and others), landowners, organizations, or individuals in planning, protecting, and managing WSRs. Designation of wild and scenic rivers has been controversial in some cases, especially for WSRs containing nonfederal lands. Initially following enactment of the WSRA, Congress designated rivers primarily on federal land. Over the past 20 years, Congress has designated or authorized for study an increasing number of partnership WSRs. Opinions regarding the balance of federal and local control over partnership WSRs have varied. Some have observed that Congress intended the state nomination authority to be the primary means for rivers on nonfederal lands to be included in the system, but this designation method has not been used in recent years. Congress may consider whether it is preferable to encourage use of the state-nominated process, which includes a set of fixed provisions, or to continue to establish partnership WSRs through individual designating statutes, whose provisions vary.


Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) as a legislative branch agency by the Office of Technology Assessment Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-484). OTA was created to provide Congress with early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of technology applications. OTA's work was to be used as a factor in Congress' consideration of legislation, particularly with regard to activities for which the federal government might provide support for, or management or regulation of, technological applications. The agency operated for more than two decades, producing approximately 750 full assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop proceedings spanning a wide range of topics. In 1995, amid broader efforts to reduce the size of government, Congress eliminated funding for the agency. Although the agency ceased operations, the statute authorizing OTA's establishment, structure, functions, duties, powers, and relationships to other entities (2 U.S.C. Â§Â§471 et seq.) was not repealed. Since OTA's defunding, there have been several attempts to reestablish OTA or to create an OTA-like function for Congress. During its years of operations, OTA was both praised and criticized by some Members of Congress and outside observers. Many found OTA's reports to be comprehensive, balanced, and authoritative; its assessments helped shaped public debate and laws in national security, energy, the environment, health care and other areas. Others identified a variety of shortcomings. Some critics asserted that the time it took for OTA to define a report, collect information, gather expert opinions, analyze the topic, and issue a report was not consistent with the fast pace of legislative decisionmaking. Others asserted that some of OTA's reports exhibited bias and that the agency was responsive only to a narrow constituency in Congress, that reports were costly and not timely, that there were insufficient mechanisms for public input, and that the agency was inconsistent in its identification of ethical and social implications of developments in science and technology. In debate leading to OTA's defunding, a central assertion of its critics was that the agency duplicated the work of other federal agencies and organizations. Those holding this position asserted that other entities could take on the technology assessment function if directed to do so by Congress. Among the entities identified for this role were the Government Accountability Office (then the General Accounting Office), the Congressional Research Service, the National Academies, and universities. Congress has multiple options for addressing its technology assessment needs. Congress could opt to reestablish OTA by appropriating funds for the agency's operation, potentially including guidance for its reestablishment in the form of report language. If it pursues this option, Congress would need to reestablish two related statutorily mandated organizations: the Technology Assessment Board (TAB), OTA's bipartisan, bicameral oversight body; and the Technology Assessment Advisory Council (TAAC), OTA's external advisory body. In 2019, the House included $6.0 million for OTA in the House-passed version of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2020 ( H.R. 2779 ); no funding was provided in the final act. Congress might also opt to amend OTA's authorizing statute to address perceived shortcomings; to revise its mission, organizational structure, or process for initiation of technology assessments; or to make other modifications or additions. Alternatively, Congress could choose to create or develop an existing technology assessment capability in another legislative branch agency, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or Congressional Research Service. Since FY2002, Congress has directed GAO to bolster its technology assessment capabilities. From 2002 to 2019, GAO produced 16 technology assessments. In 2019, GAO, at the direction of Congress, created a new office, Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics (STAA), and announced plans to increase the number of STAA analysts over time from 49 to 140. In addition, Congress could increase its usage of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine by funding an expanded number of congressionally mandated technology assessments. Alternatively, Congress could opt to take no action and instead rely on current sources of informationâgovernmental and nongovernmentalâto meet its needs. In 2018, Congress directed CRS to contract with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) for a study to "assess the potential need within the Legislative Branch to create a separate entity charged with the mission of providing nonpartisan advice on issues of science and technology. Furthermore, the study should also address if the creation of such entity duplicates services already available to Members of Congress." The NAPA study recommended bolstering the science and technology policy efforts of CRS and GAO, as well as the establishment of an Office of the Congressional Science and Technology Advisor (OCSTA) and a coordinating council. NAPA stated that it did not evaluate the option of reestablishing OTA due to Congress' efforts since 2002 to build a technology assessment capability within GAO.


Congress frequently faces questions about whether and how to commemorate people and events that have influenced the nation's history. Congress often has chosen to do so by establishing national memorials or by conferring a national designation on existing state, local, or private memorials. The National Park Service (NPS) defines national memorials within the National Park System as "primarily commemorative" works that need not be at sites historically associated with their subjects. The Commemorative Works Act (CWA; 40 U.S.C. §§8901-8910) was enacted to govern the establishment process for memorials located in the District of Columbia (Washington, DC) or its environs that are under the jurisdiction of the NPS or the General Services Administration. The CWA includes provisions related to memorial location, design, construction, and perpetual maintenance. Memorials in Washington, DC, include those with the word national in the name and those that are essentially national memorials but do not bear that title. For memorials outside the District of Columbia, no specific law or set of regulations governs their establishment. Congress has established a number of federally administered national memorials throughout the nation, most often as units of the National Park System but also under management of other federal agencies. Various nonfederal entities undertaking commemorative efforts also have petitioned Congress for assistance or statutory recognition, and some individual memorial organizers have titled their works as national memorials without congressional recognition. To clarify options for Congress when considering commemoration of individuals, groups, and events through memorials, this report discusses several types of congressional involvement in memorials outside the District of Columbia. For purposes of the report, these are characterized as high federal involvement (e.g., congressional establishment of a national memorial under federal agency administration); medium federal involvement (e.g., congressional authorization for a memorial to be located on federal property or to receive federal funds); low federal involvement (e.g., statutory recognition without additional federal support); and no federal involvement (e.g., a self-declared national memorial). The report provides examples of memorials of each type and discusses some options for Congress, with regard to both individual memorial designations and consideration of whether to systematize criteria for memorials outside Washington, DC, similar to the CWA's provisions for District of Columbia memorials. Because this report focuses specifically on memorials outside the District of Columbia, please see CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice, by Jacob R. Straus, for discussion of memorials governed by the CWA in Washington, DC, and its environs.


Congress frequently requires the President, departments, agencies, and other entities of the federal government to transmit reports, notifications, studies, and other information on a specified timeline. Reporting requirements may direct agency officials to notify Congress or its committees of forthcoming actions or decisions, describe actions taken on a particular matter, establish a plan to accomplish a specified goal, or study a certain problem or concern. Reporting requirements may be designed to serve a range of purposes that facilitate congressional oversight of the executive branch and inform congressional decisionmaking. Required reports may help legislators monitor executive activity, ensure compliance with legislative intent, focus agency attention on matters of importance to Congress, and assess the effectiveness of existing programs and policies. Certain reports on complex or emerging issues may also help originate or inform legislative proposals. This report discusses the potential benefits and challenges of reporting requirements, and analyzes a number of statutory reporting requirements enacted during the 115 th Congress. (Patterns gleaned from these data may not be generalizable to requirements enacted in other years.) This report analyzes features common to legislative language establishing reporting requirements. In general, most identified statutory reporting provisions specify the information that must be contained in the report; the identity of the official or agency responsible for submission; the recipient of the report; the deadline by which the report must be submitted; and whethe r the requirement is for a one-time or recurring report. Depending on the type of reporting requirement, the reporting provision may also include language detailing whether the information reported to Congress must also be made publicly available, and how any potentially classified material contained in the report ought to be handled. Some provisions also permit certain activities only upon the submission of a report or notification to Congress, such as the waiver of sanctions, or the transfer or reprogramming of appropriated funds.


Congress has authorized projects and programs through various federal agencies to address water supply needs. Since 1980, Congress has authorized the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), among other agencies, to develop municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply projects in rural areas and on tribal lands. Congress has authorized these projects, known as rural water supply projects, for several locations throughout the West. From 1980 through 2009, Congress authorized Reclamation to undertake the design and construction, and sometimes the operations and maintenance (O&M), of specific rural water supply projects intended to deliver potable water supplies to rural communities in western states. These projects are largely located in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and New Mexico. The rural communities served by these projects included tribal reservations and nontribal rural communities with nonexistent, substandard, or declining water supply or water quality. Many rural water projects are large in scopeâtaking water from one location and moving it across long distances to tie to existing systems. Although M&I portions of most Reclamation water supply facilities require 100% repayment with interest, Congress has authorized rural water projects that receive some or all costs from the federal government on a nonreimbursable basis (i.e., a de facto grant). For example, the federal government pays up to 100% of costs for tribal rural water supply projects, including O&M. For nontribal rural water supply projects, the federal cost share for current projects ranges from 75% to 80%. The Rural Water Supply Act of 2006 (Title I of P.L. 109-451 ) created the Rural Water Supply Program, a structured program for developing and recommending future rural water supply projects. This program was to replace the previous process of authorizing projects individuallyâoften without the level of analysis and review (e.g., feasibility studies) required for Reclamation's other projects. Under the Rural Water Supply Program, Congress authorized Reclamation to work with rural communities and tribes to identify M&I water needs and options to address such needs through appraisal investigations and feasibility studies. Congress would then consider feasibility studies recommended by the Administration before authorizing specific project construction in legislation. Ultimately, Reclamation did not recommend and Congress did not authorize any projects through this process, and the authority for the program expired in 2016. Members have introduced legislation in the 116 th Congress to reauthorize the Rural Water Supply Program through FY2026: the Water Justice Act ( H.R. 4033 ) and the Securing Access for the Central Valley and Enhancing (SAVE) Water Resources Act ( H.R. 2473 ). Other bills would authorize individual activities (i.e., a feasibility study and a project) previously considered by the Rural Water Supply Program or would address rural water needs by creating authorities for rural water grants or water technology programs. Reclamation continues to construct rural water projects (and to provide O&M assistance for some tribal components) authorized and initiated outside of the Rural Water Supply Program. Enacted funding for rural water supply projects in FY2020 provided $145.1 million for construction and O&M at seven authorized rural water projects, which was $117.4 million above the Administration's FY2020 budget request. Five projects received construction funding in FY2020: Garrison Diversion Unit of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program, Fort Peck Reservation/Dry Prairie Rural Water System, Lewis and Clark Rural Water System, Rocky Boy's/North Central Montana Rural Water System, and Eastern New Mexico Water Supply. For FY2021, the Administration requested $30.3 million for rural water projects. As of early 2020, Reclamation reported that $1.2 billion was needed to construct authorized, ongoing rural water projects.


Congress has pursued acquisition reforms to make DOD's acquisition process more efficient and timely. Some statutes have directed DOD to revise or consider revising its acquisition regulations. The House Armed Services Committee's report accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's regulatory implementation of acquisition-related provisions in the NDAAs from fiscal years 2010 through 2018. This report (1) determines how DOD implements acquisition-related NDAA provisions in the DFARS and communicates with stakeholders throughout that process, and (2) identifies the status of implementation of provisions enacted in the specified NDAAs. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed DOD officials regarding the process for implementing acquisition-related NDAA provisions. GAO also analyzed DOD's data and reports on the implementation status of provisions enacted in NDAAs for fiscal years 2010 through 2018. GAO selected 12 of these provisions as case studies based on factors such as year enacted and time taken for implementation to obtain a mix of older and newer provisions, and shorter and longer implementation timeframes. The staff of the Defense Acquisition Regulations System are responsible for making changes in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)—the Department of Defense's (DOD) regulation augmenting the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which guides government purchases of products and services. They begin their process by first tracking legislation that may affect acquisition regulations before Congress enacts the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). After enactment, they identify which provisions to implement through regulatory changes and which to implement through other means. In certain circumstances, rather than change the DFARS, DOD can issue a class deviation, which allows its buying organizations to temporarily diverge from the acquisition regulations. The figure below shows the primary means DOD uses to implement NDAA provisions, and the mechanisms DOD uses to make information on the status of any changes available to the public and others. Department of Defense's (DOD) Methods to Implement and Report on Actions Taken on National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Provisions DOD does not have a mechanism to clearly communicate to Congress, industry, and other interested parties the status of regulatory or other changes based on NDAA provisions. Using only publicly-available reports and information, it is difficult for an interested party to find the implementation status of any given acquisition-related NDAA provision. This is because no single DOD source communicates the status of regulatory or other changes in a manner that links the changes to specific NDAA provisions. As a result, interested parties are not always aware of what provisions have been implemented and when. This information is important for congressional oversight and to industry for planning and compliance purposes. Federal internal control standards state that management should address the communication expectations of external users. GAO found that DOD has taken action to address 180 acquisition-related provisions since 2010. On average, implementation was completed within 1 year from enactment. Some complicated provisions took more than 2 years to implement. For example, a fiscal year 2016 NDAA provision, directing a regulatory change for commercial item procurements, took more than 2 years to implement because DOD was reconciling a prior year's related but different NDAA commercial item provision into one DFARS change.


Congress is considering federal funding for infrastructure to revive an economy damaged by Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Congress previously provided infrastructure funding for economic stimulus in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). Enacted on February 17, 2009, ARRA was a response to the "Great Recession" that officially ran from December 2007 through June 2009. This report discusses the economic impact of the transportation infrastructure funding in ARRA. ARRA provided $48.1 billion for programs administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), with more than half, $27.5 billion, authorized for highways. Other funding included $8.4 billion for public transportation, $8.0 billion for high-speed rail, $1.3 billion for Amtrak, $1.3 billion for aviation programs, and $1.5 billion for Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants, which could be used for a wide range of transportation projects. Most of the ARRA funding was distributed by DOT agencies to their usual grantees via existing formula programs. The high-speed rail funding and TIGER grants required the establishment of two new discretionary programs. Based on approximately a decade or more of program and other data, the following are among the observations that can be made with regard to the economic effects of ARRA funding for transportation infrastructure: Infra structure s pending wa s s lower than o ther t ypes of s timulus . ARRA transportation funding was expended more slowly than other types of assistance, such as unemployment compensation. About 9% of DOT funding was spent within the first six months of availability compared with 44% of unemployment compensation. The majority of DOT's ARRA funding was spent in FY2010 (37%) and FY2011 (24%). Characteristics of i nfrastructure f unding a ffect ed e xpenditure t iming. Funding that was distributed by DOT agencies to their usual grantees via existing formula programs was expended relatively quickly. This included most of the funding for highways, public transportation, aviation, and maritime transportation. Discretionary funds for programs established in the law, such as for the high-speed rail program and TIGER grants, took much longer to expend on construction because DOT had to design the programs, issue rules, advertise the availability of funds, and wait for applications from state and local agencies, which then had to complete their own contracting procedures to get work under way. The l evel of i nfrastructure i nvestment d epend ed on n onfederal e ntities. State and local expenditures make up around 75% of transportation infrastructure expenditures. In some sectors, such as highways, the growth in federal spending due to ARRA was accompanied by a decline in state and local government spending. Maintenance-of- e ffort r equirements we re d ifficult to e nforce. The federal share of transportation projects using ARRA funds was generally 100%, but states were required to certify that they would spend amounts already planned. These maintenance-of-effort requirements in transportation were challenging to comply with and to administer. Employment e ffects w ere m odest . Employment in highway construction, for example, rose slightly in the year following the passage of ARRA. A sustained increase in employment did not begin until 2015. Financing i nfrastructure did l everage s tate r esources . ARRA included the Build America Bond (BAB) program, which permitted state and local governments to issue tax credit bonds for any type of capital investment. The attractiveness of BABs may have accelerated the timing of capital financings and, thus, capital investment. BABs had a relatively generous subsidy rate, but compared with ARRA grants, the issuance of BABs for infrastructure ensured a state funding match of 65%. Stimulus- f unded p rojects c an p rovide t ransportation b enefits . Most ARRA transportation funding went to routine projects such as highway paving and bus purchases that were quick to implement. According to DOT estimates, such projects often have higher benefit-cost ratios than large "game changing" projects that build new capacity.


Congress made at least $2 billion available to agencies annually for democracy assistance abroad in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State and USAID are the primary U.S. agencies funding democracy assistance. This assistance supports activities related to enhancing rule of law, good governance, political competition and consensus building, civil society, independent media, and human rights. Congress included a provision in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2015 Continuing Appropriations Act for GAO to review agencies' roles and responsibilities in promoting democracy abroad. This report examines (1) State's and USAID's democracy assistance allocations, (2) State's and USAID's roles in providing democracy assistance and the extent to which their projects in selected countries are consistent with their defined roles, and (3) how State and USAID coordinate on democracy assistance. GAO reviewed State and USAID data and documents for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. GAO selected these countries because they received relatively high amounts of democracy assistance funding from State and USAID, among other factors. The Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated more than $8.8 billion for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. a According to agency officials, language in the 2015 appropriations act permitted State and USAID to allocate less than the full amount directed to democracy programs by the act. State and USAID have defined roles for democracy assistance and have obligated funding for projects in selected countries accordingly. State has identified its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) as the U.S. lead for promoting democracy and protecting human rights abroad and has identified its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) as the lead for promoting the rule of law. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, DRL's and INL's obligated funding for democracy assistance in the countries GAO reviewed—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—generally reflected their defined roles. For example, 24 to 77 percent of DRL's obligated funding in these countries supported human rights, and at least 90 percent of INL's obligated funding for democracy assistance in the countries supported the rule of law. USAID's democracy assistance strategy states that USAID has the leading role in U.S. development assistance. USAID's obligations for democracy assistance in the four countries supported multiyear, multimillion-dollar projects, consistent with what USAID officials told GAO was needed for long-term development. State and USAID coordinate on democracy assistance in various ways, but embassy officials reported gaps in information about DRL assistance. Examples of coordination mechanisms include budget allocation discussions at headquarters and working groups at embassies to help avoid project duplication. However, State officials in all four selected countries said they generally lacked information about DRL democracy assistance projects, including project descriptions and funding amounts. State's existing information-sharing mechanisms, including data systems and strategies, do not consistently address these gaps. Overseas officials' lack of complete information about DRL's projects may inhibit State's efforts to coordinate with other agencies, implementing partners, and other donors.


Congress plays an overarching role in shaping outdoor recreation throughout the nation through legislation and oversight. As Congress continues to debate outdoor recreation issuesâincluding provision of federal resources, planning efforts, and fundingâdata on the size, distribution, and relative importance of the outdoor recreation economy may inform these debates. Both historical and recent legislative and executive efforts centered on outdoor recreation have identified the economic importance of outdoor recreation. In 2016, Congress passed the Outdoor Recreation Jobs and Economic Impact Act ( P.L. 114-249 ), which directed the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the Department of Commerce to create an account that would measure the outdoor recreation economy. BEA released the first official Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account (ORSA) statistics in September 2018 and updated them in September 2019. According to the ORSA statistics, in 2017, the current-dollar value added of the outdoor recreation economy was $427Â billion, or 2.2% of gross domestic product (GDP). ORSA statistics show that supporting activities, such as construction and travel and tourism expenses, accounted for approximately half of value added. Conventional outdoor recreation activities, as defined by BEA, accounted for another 30.7% of real outdoor recreation gross output; o ther recreation accounted for 19.3%. The outdoor recreation economy grew by 3.9% in 2017, faster than the 2.4% growth for the overall U.S. economy, and has grown approximately 9.9% since 2012. Real gross output, real compensation, and real employment all grew faster in the outdoor recreation economy than in the overall economy in 2016. BEA reports that the "arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services industry" was the largest contributor to the outdoor recreation economy in 2017, accounting for $112.9 billion of current-dollar outdoor recreation value added, followed by retail trade. These two sectors were also the largest industries included in the ORSA statistics for both compensation ($67.3 billion) and employment (2.1 million) in 2017. BEA released prototype statistics for states, which found that Hawaii, Montana, Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming had the five highest proportions of state GDP generated from outdoor recreation in 2017. In addition to the ORSA statistics, which are measured for the nation as a whole or for individual states, federal agencies sometimes measure the specific economic impact of federal lands. According to some studies, visitors to federal lands generated $55 billion in value added in FY2012 and $53.9 billion in value added in FY2016 (FY2017 dollars). Differences in methods, data, and assumptions mean any comparison between these figures and the ORSA statistics can be highly general at best. It is difficult to precisely measure the total amount of outdoor recreation that Americans engage in, due to differences in data collection, measurement, definitions, and other factors between sources. One source, the National Survey on Recreation and the Environment (NSRE), measures the number of people who engage in 17 different outdoor activities and how often they do so. According to the NSRE, over 194 million respondents (approximately 82% of respondents) engage in the most popular form of outdoor recreation (visiting developed sites) in a given year. Americans report engaging in the most popular surveyed activity, viewing nature, over 32.4 billion times in a given year, although this activity is a major outlier. Rates of participation in surveyed activities vary substantially and can depend on geographic location, proximity to recreation resources, demographic factors, and other influences. In FY2017, lands managed by the four federal land management agencies (the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, and National Park Service) had approximately 596 million visits. Lands managed by other federal agencies (the Bureau of Reclamation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and United States Army Corps of Engineers) also had significant visitation. Visits to the lands of these other agencies sometimes exceeded visits to lands managed by the four federal land management agencies. Although publicly owned lands (including federal lands) generally have the greatest amount of recreation visits, private lands can dominate certain types of recreation, particularly in the eastern United States.


AOC is organized into 10 jurisdictions that operate and maintain the buildings and grounds of the U.S. Capitol complex. For projects such as renovations and repairs, the jurisdictions can use their own employees, a contractor, or AOC's Construction Division, which is staffed with trade workers such as electricians and plumbers. Most of the Division's staff are employed on a temporary basis and paid with funds the Division receives from the jurisdictions for projects it executes on their behalf. In March 2017, AOC laid off 30 of the Division's approximately 190 temporary employees, citing a lack of work from the jurisdictions. GAO was asked to review the Division's operations. This report examines the jurisdictions' use of the Division and the Division's management of its workforce, among other issues. GAO analyzed information on projects the Division completed during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, reviewed AOC policies, visited the sites of six projects that are illustrative of the work the Division performs for the jurisdictions, and interviewed AOC staff, including officials from AOC's 10 jurisdictions and five of the employees AOC laid off in 2017. The Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) Construction Division (hereafter the Division) is designed to serve as a flexible option that the 10 operational jurisdictions that comprise AOC can use to meet their facility needs. In their efforts to manage the buildings and grounds of the U.S. Capitol complex, AOC's jurisdictions have used the Division for projects that vary widely in cost, complexity, and duration (see figure). For example, over the last 5 fiscal years, the jurisdictions have used the Division for projects ranging in cost from about $1,000 to about $10 million and in scope from hazardous material testing to multiyear lighting-system upgrades. Jurisdiction officials cited the Division's flexibility in adjusting to scope and other changes to keep a project on schedule as one of the reasons they may decide to use the Division instead of an outside contractor. While jurisdiction officials said they were generally satisfied with the Division's services, officials from two jurisdictions suggested that the Division consider changing how it operates—for example, by transferring some positions to its parent organization in an effort to lower what it charges the jurisdictions. According to AOC officials, making changes such as this one to the Division's operations could have varying effects, such as increasing how much funding AOC would require from other sources beyond the jurisdictions. The Division has taken steps to strategically manage its workforce to help ensure that it has the right number and composition of staff to meet the jurisdictions' needs but has not formalized the process it uses for collecting information on the jurisdictions' construction priorities each month. Because the Division's workload is driven by projects the jurisdictions hire it to perform, such things as changes in projects' priorities and work to be performed make determining future workforce needs challenging. The Division's approach to managing its workforce generally aligns with practices that GAO has previously identified that help agencies strategically manage their human capital. This approach includes having strategies to address gaps if the size and composition of an agency's workforce are not aligned with its workload requirements. However, because the Division has not formalized the process it uses to collect information each month on the jurisdictions' construction priorities it may miss opportunities to obtain information that is critical to making informed decisions. The Division also cannot provide reasonable assurance to AOC management and Congress that it is taking the steps necessary to manage its workload and that it is basing its workforce projections on the most current information available.


Congress, in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified electronic warfare (EW) as a critical capability supporting military operations to fulfil the current National Defense Strategy. Collectively, DOD considers procurement appropriations and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations as part of its investment accounts. Using programs identified by the EW Executive Commission (EW EXCOM), this report traces funding for three of the military services (Air Force, Army, and Navy) along with several defense agencies (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense Operational Test and Evaluation, and U.S. Special Operations Command). This report compares DOD's funding requests for FY2019, FY2020, and FY2021 to assess if DOD seeks to increase the funding of the EW portfolio (by increasing funding), decrease its funding, or keep the portfolio relatively unchanged. Insights into EW Program Funding This report tracks DOD funding requests for approximately 65 research and develop program elements and 30 procurement line items across FY2019 and FY2021. Reviewing these three fiscal years request allows for comparisons across the EW portfolio and provides insights into how EW was prioritized relative to the overall DOD budget. In addition to tracking funding requests in each of the respective fiscal years and identifying what Congress appropriated in FY2019 and FY2020, this report looks at the future years defense program (FYDP) to identify potential trends in the EW portfolio. This report looks at the combination of the procurement and RDT&E budget requests to provide a comprehensive, unclassified overview of the total EW program requests within DOD. DOD requested at least $10.1 billion in FY2019, $10.2 billion in FY2020, and $9.7 billion in FY2021 for EW, an amount analogous to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program ($10.7 billion in FY2019) or a Ford-class aircraft carrier ($12.5 billion in total ship-building procurement). Based on statements by several senior defense officials and the conclusions of the National Defense Strategy Commission, it could be expected that DOD is likely to substantially increase funding for EW programs. CRS assesses that DOD requested 11.5% more funding for EW RDT&E in FY2021 than what was projected in the FY2019 budget, but 1.7% less than what was projected in the FY2020 budget. Comparing the procurement budget, the FY2021 request seeks to increase funding by 2.2% compared to FY2019 projections, but decrease funding by 10.3% compared to what was projected in the FY2020 request. From a portfolio perspective, CRS assesses that the Administration projects $51.7 billion over the FY2021 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), $259 million less than the FY2020 FYDP, but $4.5 billion more than the FY2019 FYDP. Overall, it appears the Administration is prioritizing research and development for EW programs, while decreasing procurement, which aligns with the overall FY2021 DOD budget request. Potential Issues for Congress Based on this analysis, this report identifies three potential issues for Congress Is DOD appropriately funding the EW portfolio? How does DOD use appropriated funds for EW programs? Is DOD potentially buying new capabilities with research and development funds, when it should use procurement funding? Does DOD understand what it is developing and procuring within the EW portfolio?


Congressional commissions have been established for a variety of purposes, and can help serve a critical role by informing Congress, providing expert advice on complex or controversial issues, and generating policy recommendations. In general, commissions hold hearings, conduct research, analyze data, and/or make field visits as they carry out their duties. Most complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or advice in the form of a written report to Congress. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) was created to "examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," and to "investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism," among other duties. The commission ultimately submitted a final report to Congress and the President containing its findings and conclusions, along with 48 policy recommendations. A variety of factors c an contribute to the overall cost of a commission. For instance, many commissions hire paid staff, and are often able to request detailees from federal agencies, hire consultants, and obtain administrative support from one or more federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. Additionally, most commissions reimburse the travel expenditures of commissioners and staff, and some compensate commission members. The duration of a commission may also significantly affect its cost; past congressional commissions have been designed to last anywhere from several months to several years. Using a dataset of congressional commissions that were established from the 101 st Congress (1989-1990) through the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), this report analyzes methods used to fund 153 congressional commissions. Additionally, this report analyzes actual amounts provided for commissions in appropriations acts, and expenditure patterns of congressional commissions for which data are readily available because they appear in the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) database. When specifying how a commission is funded, most commission statutes either authorize appropriations for commission expenses, authorize the use of funds from other appropriations or accounts, or direct that private donations be the sole source of funding for the commission. Most statutes establishing noncommemorative commissionsâcommissions that are generally designed to conduct a study, investigate an event, and/or make policy recommendationsâeither authorize appropriations for commission expenses, or authorize the use of funds from other appropriations or accounts. By contrast, statutes establishing commemorative commissionsâcommissions designed to celebrate an individual, group, or eventâtypically authorize appropriations, and/or provide the commission the authority to receive donations, including donations of money, property, and volunteer services. Although commission statutes typically specify a method by which the commission will be funded, most do not actually provide funds for the commission; funds may be provided in annual appropriations acts, or by other means. Actual funding levels appropriated for past congressional commissions vary from several hundred thousand dollars to several million dollars. No single data source comprehensively documents commission funding or expenditures. Among those congressional commissions whose expenditures are reported in the FACA database, the total amount reportedly spent by any individual commission ranges from several hundred thousand dollars to over $13 million. Payments to federal staff and consultants frequently comprise a significant portion of commission expenditures. Many commissions also incur travel expenses, payments to commission members, and other expenses. For an overview of congressional commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations , by Jacob R. Straus. For additional information on the design of congressional commissions, see CRS Report R45328, Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress , by William T. Egar. For additional information on commemorative commissions, see CRS Report R41425, Commemorative Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Funding , by Jacob R. Straus. For additional information on commission membership structures, see CRS Report RL33313, Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups , by Jacob R. Straus and William T. Egar.


Constructing surface transportation projects can be long endeavors and involve multiple DOT offices. The 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) required DOT to establish a finance bureau to consolidate certain funding and financing programs. The FAST Act further required that DOT improve procedures for evaluating applications for these programs—including providing a clear rationale for decisions and streamlining the process. The FAST Act also gave this finance bureau other responsibilities such as promoting best practices for innovative financing. In response, DOT opened the Build America Bureau in July 2016. The FAST Act included a provision for GAO to review the Bureau. This report assesses, among other things, (1) progress DOT made to establish the Bureau and carry out its responsibilities, (2) the Bureau's process for evaluating applications, and (3) whether the Bureau provided a clear rationale for decisions in that process. GAO reviewed federal laws and Bureau documents and interviewed DOT officials and selected stakeholders, including 28 project sponsors selected so projects varied by mode, cost, and outcome. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken initial steps to establish the Build America Bureau's (Bureau) organizational structure and to create a process to help the Bureau carry out some of its responsibilities since it was created in 2016. However, the Bureau lacks a plan to guide its ongoing and future efforts. Initial steps included creating a consolidated process to evaluate applications for three financing programs: Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF), and Private Activity Bonds (PAB). DOT largely based this consolidated process on prior practices used for individual programs but also sought to improve and streamline the process. For example, DOT formed a decision-making body that meets more frequently than a predecessor group to quickly address issues and to decide when to advance projects through the process. However, progress has been more limited in implementing other responsibilities, such as promoting best practices for innovative financing. While some of the lack of progress can be attributed to factors such as changes in leadership and staff, the Bureau lacks a plan with implementation goals and a timeline to guide its ongoing and future efforts and also lacks performance indicators to assess its progress. Without these tools, the Bureau may face difficulties prioritizing work to carry out other responsibilities and maintaining momentum throughout continued implementation efforts and any future changes in leadership and staff. While the Bureau has taken steps to improve and streamline the application evaluation process, it does not have a mechanism to assess how well the process works—including what is challenging and what works well. Project sponsors GAO interviewed had mixed views on the Bureau's application evaluation process and whether it was streamlined. Selected sponsors that applied for TIFIA and RRIF financing identified challenges with the process, including the length of the process and changes to requirements or terms for a loan. For example, sponsors said the Bureau took longer than it had estimated to procure external advisors to help conduct its evaluation of applications. According to the sponsors, such delays and uncertainty led to cost increases for two projects and construction delays for one project. Bureau officials noted that many factors outside the Bureau's control influence the length of the application evaluation process, such as changes to a project's scope and construction cost estimates. However, the Bureau has not taken steps, such as consistently soliciting feedback from sponsors, to assess how to further improve and streamline its process. Without taking such steps, the Bureau is missing an opportunity to further streamline the process and to ensure that any challenges do not discourage sponsors from seeking the Bureau's financing programs. GAO found that the Bureau provided a clear rationale for decisions to advance or approve projects in the TIFIA and RRIF programs but did not do so for the PAB program. While DOT did document the decisions made in each step of the application evaluation process for the PAB program, the lack of a documented rationale to support these decisions leaves that program open to questions about the integrity of its process, as it is not immediately clear how the Bureau determined that an application satisfied requirements and what information was used to support decisions that advanced projects.


Consumer finance refers to the saving, borrowing, and investment choices that households make over time. These financial decisions can be complex and can affect households' financial well-being both now and in the future. Safe and affordable financial services are an important tool for most American households to avoid financial hardship, build assets, and achieve financial security over the course of their lives. Understanding why and how consumers make financial decisions is important when considering policy issues in consumer financial markets. Households borrow money for the following common reasons: investmentsâsuch as a home or educationâto build future wealth, consumption smoothing (i.e., paying later to consume things now), and emergency expenses. Most households rely on credit to finance some of these expenses, because they do not have enough money saved to pay for them. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mortgage debt is by far the largest type of debt for households, accounting for approximately 67% of household debt. Student debt is the second-largest household debt, followed by auto loans and credit cards. Consumer financial markets generally share similar market dynamics. In all of these markets, consumers often act in similar ways when making financial decisions and firms tend to act in comparable ways to attract consumers. Therefore, the government tends to consider similar policy interventions when regulating in these markets. Competitive free markets generally lead to efficient distributions of goods and services to maximize value for society. Yet sometimes, free markets are inefficient when particular issues arise. Common issues in consumer financial markets include (1) information asymmetries between financial firms and consumers and (2) behavioral biases that predictably bias consumers when making financial decisions. In these cases, government policy can potentially correct market failures to bring the market to a more efficient outcome, maximizing social welfare. In consumer finance, three types of policy interventions are common: (1) standardized consumer disclosures; (2) regulation to prevent deceptive, unfair, or abusive financial institution practices; and (3) regulation to prevent discrimination in consumer-lending markets. Yet, policymakers need to be aware of unintended consequences of proposed policies, and often find it challenging to determine whether a policy intervention will help or harm a particular market's efficiency. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203 ) established the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law while ensuring consumers can access financial products and services. The CFPB's authorities fall into three broad categories: rulemaking , writing regulations to implement laws under its jurisdiction ; supervision , the power to examine and impose reporting requirements on financial institutions; and enforcement of various consumer protection laws and regulations. The CFPB generally has regulatory authority over providers of an array of consumer financial products and services. The major consumer financial markets include mortgage lending, student loans, automobile loans, credit cards and payments, payday loans and other credit alternative financial products, and checking accounts and substitutes. In addition, two important market structures allow these consumer financial products to be offered: (1) the consumer credit reporting system and (2) the debt collection market. These aspects of the consumer credit system facilitate the pricing of credit offers and the resolution of delinquent consumer credit products for most consumer credit markets.


Corporate boards take actions and make decisions that not only affect the lives of millions of employees and consumers, but also influence the policies and practices of the global marketplace. Many organizations and businesses have recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining women and minorities for key positions to improve performance and better meet the needs of a diverse customer base. Academic researchers and others have highlighted how diversity among board directors increases the range of perspectives for better decision making, among other benefits. Prior GAO reports have found challenges to increasing diversity on boards and underscored the need to identify strategies that can improve or accelerate efforts to boost representation of women and minorities. These include reports examining the diversity of publicly-traded company boards and the boards of federally chartered banks, such as the FHLBanks. This statement is based on two GAO reports, issued in December 2015 and February 2019, on the representation of women on corporate boards and the representation of women and minorities on the boards of FHLBanks, respectively. Information about the scope and methodologies used can be found in the original reports. This statement focuses on (1) the extent of diversity on such boards (2) factors that hinder diversity on these boards, and (3) strategies to promote board diversity on corporate and FHLBank boards. Prior GAO reports found limited diversity on both publicly-traded company boards (corporate boards) of directors and Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) boards. For example, GAO's 2019 report on FHLBank boards found women's board representation was at 23 percent in 2018; in 2015 it had been 18 percent. In a 2015 report on corporate boards, GAO projected the representation of women into the future—assuming that women join boards in equal proportion to men—and estimated it could take more than 40 years for the number of women directors to match the number of men directors. GAO's report on FHLBank boards also showed an increase in FHLBank directors from some minority groups, including African-American, Hispanic, and Asian since 2015, but they still reflected a small portion of these boards. The size of the increases in minority directors on FHLBank boards was less clear than for women directors due to incomplete board member demographic data. Similar factors may limit corporate and FHLBank boards' efforts to increase diversity, according to stakeholders, board members, and others GAO interviewed. These factors include not prioritizing diversity in board recruitment efforts, limitations of the traditional board candidate pipeline, and low turnover of board seats. GAO identified a number of strategies for increasing the representation of women and minorities on corporate and FHLBank boards based on a review of relevant literature and discussions with researchers and corporate and government officials (see figure).


Corrosion negatively affects DOD equipment and infrastructure and can lead to reduced asset availability, deterioration in performance, and increasing weapon system and infrastructure costs. According to a study contracted by DOD, the cost impact of corrosion to DOD in fiscal year 2016 was $20.6 billion. Senate Armed Services Committee Report 115-262 accompanying a bill for the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision for GAO to review aspects of the DOD Corrosion Office. This report examines (1) how the restructuring within the Office of the Secretary of Defense has affected DOD's Corrosion Office, including its performance of its statutory roles and responsibilities; and (2) what actions, if any, DOD has taken or has planned to implement recommendations GAO made from calendar years 2003 through 2018 related to corrosion management. GAO analyzed DOD documents, such as guidance and required reports provided to Congress, and interviewed DOD officials to address these objectives. GAO also assessed DOD's actions against its prior recommendations to determine the extent to which DOD had addressed the recommendations or has actions underway to address those recommendations. The Department of Defense (DOD) relocated the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) within the restructured acquisition and sustainment organization in fiscal year 2018. Prior to the restructure, the Corrosion Office reported directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As part of the restructure, DOD relocated the Corrosion Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, where it reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Materiel Readiness. It continues to perform its statutory roles and responsibilities under the new oversight organization. For instance, it is continuing to develop and recommend corrosion policy guidance; develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion; review corrosion programs and funding levels proposed by the military departments, and submit related recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; and monitor and ensure that corrosion prevention and mitigation are incorporated into acquisition and maintenance processes. DOD is also making or planning changes to the operation of the Corrosion Office, specifically planning to increase corrosion advocacy throughout DOD, oversight of the Corrosion Office, corrosion accountability of the military departments, and corrosion transparency and its alignment with materiel readiness. DOD's Corrosion Office has taken or planned actions to implement most recommendations GAO made in calendar years 2003 through 2018 related to corrosion management. Specifically, GAO made 35 recommendations to the Corrosion Office in 11 corrosion-related products on topics such as strategic planning, performance management, and mandatory oversight reports. In comments on these products, DOD concurred with 16 of those recommendations, partially concurred with eight, and non-concurred with 11. As of March 2019, DOD had taken action or planned to take action on most of GAO's prior recommendations (see figure). Specifically, DOD's Corrosion Office had taken action on 18 recommendations. Corrosion Office officials also described to GAO their plans to take action to implement 12 additional recommendations. These planned actions include, among other actions, updating existing guidance and developing new policy or processes. DOD stated that the Corrosion Office does not plan to take action on the remaining five recommendations. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid.


Countering the threat that a terrorist could smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national security priority. In fiscal year 2007, DHS initiated the STC program to reduce the risk of the deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon by establishing capability in state and local agencies to detect and deter such threats. Since the program began, five participating cities have spent almost $145 million in program funds. GAO was asked to review the STC program. This report examines (1) the extent to which DHS tracks cities' use of program funds and assesses their performance; (2) what assurance DHS has that cities can sustain capabilities gained through the STC program and the challenges, if any, that cities face in sustaining such capabilities; and (3) potential changes to the STC program and how DHS plans to implement them, the basis for these changes, and the extent to which DHS has communicated with cities about the impact of making changes. GAO reviewed DHS documents, conducted site visits to all cities in the program, and interviewed DHS and city officials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not collect information to fully track cities' use of Securing the Cities (STC) program funds for approved purposes and to assess their performance in the program. To reduce the risk of successful deployment of nuclear or radiological weapons in U.S. cities, the program establishes local threat detection and deterrence capabilities. DHS tracks cities' spending of program funds and some performance data through cities' quarterly reports but does not collect other data on itemized expenditures and to assess how effectively cities achieved performance metrics and program milestones or how they performed in drills that simulate a threat. For example, DHS does not compare information on expenditures to the purchase plans it approved for cities. As a result, DHS does not know the dollar amounts cities actually spent on program purchases. Expenditure data GAO requested show that cities spent most funds on detection equipment—that is, $94.5 million of the $144.8 million cities spent through June 30, 2018. By regularly collecting expenditure information from cities and comparing it to approved purchase plans, DHS could better ensure these funds were spent consistent with program goals. DHS does not have assurance that cities can sustain threat detection and deterrence capabilities gained through the STC program. DHS has not enforced planning requirements for sustaining those capabilities and has taken limited action to help cities do so, although encouraging sustainment is one of its primary program goals. Officials from the five cities in the program told GAO that they anticipate funding challenges that will adversely impact their ability to sustain capabilities over time. For example, several city officials said they cannot rely on other DHS or federal grant programs or local sources of funding once STC funding ends. Unless DHS analyzes risks related to sustainment, works with cities to address these risks, and enforces sustainment-planning requirements for cities in the program in the future, program participants could see their radiological detection programs and related capabilities deteriorate. DHS has not (1) fully developed potential changes or documented a plan for making changes to the STC program; (2) identified the basis for such changes; and (3) consistently communicated with cities, raising concerns about how the changes will impact them. DHS officials told GAO that the agency is considering several potential changes to the STC program that would broaden its geographic reach and scope and centralize acquisition of detection equipment, among other things, but it has not fully developed or documented these changes and does not have a strategy or plan for implementing them. A law enacted in December 2018 requires DHS to develop an implementation plan for the STC program. The law's requirements would provide DHS an opportunity to identify the basis for potential changes, and assessing such changes would provide more reasonable assurance that they would strengthen the program. Further, most city officials GAO interviewed said that in an August 2018 meeting, DHS provided a high-level overview of potential changes and little detail on how such changes would be implemented or affect city operations. If DHS does not clearly communicate to cities how the program will operate under potential changes, these cities could face difficulties planning for the future and achieving the program's detection and deterrence objectives.


Covered entities can receive substantial discounts on outpatient drugs through the 340B Program, an estimated 25 to 50 percent of the cost of the drugs, according to HRSA. Additionally, Medicaid drug rebates are an important source of savings for states and the federal government, saving more than $36 billion in fiscal year 2018. However, ensuring that manufacturers are not subject to both discounts requires coordination within HHS, and between covered entities and states. GAO was asked to provide information on the prevention of duplicate discounts. Among other things, this report examines HHS's efforts to ensure compliance with the prohibition on duplicate discounts. GAO reviewed documentation, including federal policies and those from all 50 states and Washington, D.C. on preventing duplicate discounts. GAO also interviewed officials from CMS, HRSA, and 16 covered entities from four states selected to obtain variation in the types of entities and other factors. The 340B Drug Pricing Program (340B Program) and the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program require manufacturers to provide discounts on outpatient drugs in order to have their drugs covered by Medicaid. These discounts take the form of reduced sales prices for covered entities participating in the 340B Program—eligible hospitals and federal grantees—and rebates on drugs dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries, shared by states and the federal government. However, federal law prohibits subjecting manufacturers to “duplicate discounts” in which drugs provided to Medicaid beneficiaries are subject to both 340B Program discounted prices (i.e., are 340B drugs) and Medicaid rebates. To prevent duplicate discounts, state Medicaid programs must know when covered entities dispense 340B drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries, so the state programs can exclude those drugs from their Medicaid rebate requests. GAO found that limitations in the Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS) oversight of the 340B and Medicaid Drug Rebate Programs may increase the risk that duplicate discounts occur. HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conducts limited oversight of state Medicaid programs' efforts to prevent duplicate discounts. CMS does not track or review states' policies or procedures for preventing duplicate discounts, and GAO found that the procedures states used to exclude 340B drugs are not always documented or effective at identifying these drugs. As a result, CMS does not have the information needed to effectively ensure that states exclude 340B drugs from Medicaid rebate requests. CMS also does not have a reasonable assurance that states are seeking rebates for all eligible drugs, potentially increasing costs to state and federal governments due to forgone rebates. HHS's Health Resources and Services Administration's (HRSA) audits of covered entities do not include reviews of states' policies and procedures for the use and identification of 340B drugs. As a result, the audits are unable to determine whether covered entities are following state requirements, and taking the necessary steps to comply with the prohibition on subjecting manufacturers to duplicate discounts. GAO reported in 2018 that HRSA had not issued guidance on, and did not audit for, duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care and recommended the agency do so as the majority of Medicaid enrollees, prescriptions, and spending for drugs are in managed care. HRSA is working to determine next steps to address these recommendations. In this report, GAO found that, unlike Medicaid fee-for-service, when duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care claims are identified, HRSA does not require covered entities to address them or work with manufacturers to repay them. As a result, manufacturers may be subject to duplicate discounts for drugs provided under managed care. Given these limitations in federal oversight, HHS does not have reasonable assurance that states and covered entities are complying with the prohibition on duplicate discounts.


Credit unions make loans to their members, other credit unions, and corporate credit unions that provide financial services to individual credit unions. Historically, credit unions have faced statutory restrictions on their lending activities, including restricting lending activities to their members. Other lending restrictions include a 15% statutory loan interest rate ceiling, with some authority to operate above the cap under certain circumstances; a 15-year maturity limit on most loans (with some exceptions, such as residential mortgages); and an aggregate limit on an individual credit union's member business loan (MBL) activity (in the form of outstanding loan balances) and on the amount that can be loaned to any one member. Congress passed the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 (FCU Act; 48 Stat. 1216) to create a class of federally chartered financial institutions to "promote thrift among its members and create a source of credit for provident or productive purposes." The original concept of a credit union stemmed from small lending cooperatives that not only provided a low-cost source of credit for but also promoted thriftiness among their members. Since their inception, credit unions have been granted additional lending authorities as the marketplace has evolved. Nevertheless, the credit union system still faces more restrictions than the commercial banking system. Credit union industry advocates argue that lifting lending restrictions to make the system more comparable with the banking system would increase borrowers' available pools of credit. Community banks, which often compete with credit unions, argue that policies such as raising the business lending cap, for example, would allow credit unions to expand beyond their congressionally mandated mission and could pose a threat to financial stability. By amending the FCU Act several times to expand permissible lending activities, Congress arguably recognizes that the credit union system has evolved into a more sophisticated financial intermediation system. In addition to various FCU Act amendments over the past several decades, Congress has recently passed various legislation that would allow credit unions to expand their lending activities. For example, P.L. 115-174 revised the MBL definition, allowing credit unions to extend loans to one-to-four family dwellings regardless of whether the dwellings are primary residences. In the 116 th Congress, H.R. 1661 has been introduced and, if enacted, would amend the FCU Act to allow the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)âthe primary regulator of federally insured credit unionsâthe flexibility to extend loan maturities for all loans, including MBLs and student loans. Recognizing credit unions' primary mission as meeting consumers' credit and savings needs, Congress emphasized prudential safety and soundness concerns when it established the statutory cap on MBLs and a capital supervisory framework for the credit union system. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the federal bank prudential regulators (i.e., the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) enhanced their prudential capital requirements to increase the U.S. banking system's resilience to systemic risk events. Likewise, the NCUA initially proposed in 2014 to increase capital (net worth) requirements particularly for large credit unions (those with $500 million or more in assets); however, the proposal has been revised and delayed and is currently scheduled to become effective in January 2022. In the meantime, the NCUA has implemented and proposed rules to support expanding lending activities that would increase financial transactions volumes (economies of scale), thus increasing the array of loan product offerings for members and potential revenues for the credit union system. Likewise, Congress has been monitoring the extent to which the adoption of enhanced prudential capital requirements for the credit union system has kept pace with the bank prudential regulatory regime.


Crude oil price volatility has consequences for the U.S. and global economy. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the U.S. stockpile of petroleum, has played a role in U.S. energy policy for over 40 years. The need for a stockpile of petroleum to help protect against supply disruptions became apparent after the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo, during which time the average price of imported crude oil tripled. The oil embargo also fostered the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an intergovernmental organization, and the development of coordinated plans and measures among IEA members for emergency responses to energy crises. Strategic petroleum stock holdings are one policy included in the agency's International Energy Program (IEP) agreement. As an IEA member and IEP signatory, the United States must meet certain stock holding thresholds and be prepared for a coordinated response during an emergency. In 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163 ) authorizing the creation of the SPR for storage of petroleum products to reduce the impact of supply disruptions and to carry out IEP obligations. The United States uses the SPR to meet its IEP requirements. The U.S. federal government, through the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), manages the SPR. EPCA authorizes the SPR to hold stocks of crude oil or any refined petroleum product. However, the SPR currently only holds crude oil. Since 1975, Congress has enacted several laws that have expanded the role of the SPR. Through 2019, the SPR has released over 230 million barrels of crude oil for various authorized purposes. Presidents have ordered releases on three occasions in response to severe energy supply interruptions in coordination with other IEA member countries. Other sales authorized for various reasons (e.g., to generate revenue to reduce the budget deficit as well as to modernize the SPR) have reached around 88 million barrels through 2019. Three test sales have confirmed SPR operability. The Secretary of Energy has several authorized methods to acquire petroleum for the SPR: direct purchases, royalty-in-kind transfers (RIK), deferrals and exchanges, or other means. Government analysis indicates that the United States has been a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products from September 2019 through January 2020. The IEP does not require net exporters to maintain a petroleum stockpile. IEA members can use both public and commercial stocks to meet their obligation. Both public and privately held oil stocks have important roles to play in providing security in times of oil market disruptions. Similarly, both public and private oil stocks have some role in oil price determination and movements. However, there may be benefits to maintaining SPR oil stockpiles, as the oil market can often be unpredictable, as demonstrated by dramatic demand/supply shifts and subsequent low oil prices experienced in early 2020. Several signs have suggested oil markets may be more able to adjust to supply disruptions (though not necessarily an oversupply). The changing role of the United States in world petroleum markets has driven a debate on how best to utilize the SPR. Congress's motivation in creating the SPR focused on a deliberate and dramatic physical supply disruption and on mitigating the economic effects of a shortage stemming from international events. As market conditions continue to evolve, and the United States experiences new market conditions, Congress may consider options for utilizing the SPR in an oversupplied, low oil price environment.


About 13 percent of children aged 3 through 21 enrolled in public schools received special education services in school year 2015-16, and about 3 percent of children from birth through age 2 received special education services. The percentage of the population served under IDEA varies across states. For example, in fall 2016, the percentages of the population aged 6 through 21 served in individual states ranged from 6.4 percent to 15.1 percent. Concerns about the difficulties identifying and evaluating children for special education have been raised by the media, experts, and special education advocates. GAO was asked to examine how states implement Child Find and how Education monitors it. This report examines (1) factors that may account for differences in the percentage of children receiving special education services across states, and (2) how Education and selected states monitor and support Child Find efforts. GAO reviewed federal special education data, agency documentation, federal laws and regulations, and selected state laws; and interviewed Education officials, officials from four state agencies and 15 school districts in those states (Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, and New York), and representatives of organizations that advocate for families of individuals with disabilities as well as special education subject matter specialists. GAO selected the four states based on a variety of factors, including the percentage of special education students. Differences in states' eligibility criteria and the difficulty of identifying and evaluating some children suspected of having disabilities may contribute to differences in the percentages of children receiving special education services across states. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the primary federal special education law, requires states to have policies and procedures in place to ensure that all children with disabilities residing in the state who need special education services are identified, located, and evaluated. These policies and procedures—known as “Child Find”—are generally implemented by local school districts (see fig.). IDEA gives states some latitude in setting eligibility criteria and defining disability categories. In addition, states may determine their own processes for identifying and evaluating children. As a result, a child eligible for services in one state might be ineligible in another. According to advocates, special education subject matter specialists, and state and local officials GAO interviewed, a number of challenges related to correctly identifying and evaluating children suspected of having a disability can affect eligibility decisions. For example, school district officials in all four states GAO visited cited challenges in properly identifying and evaluating English Learner students, as districts do not always have staff who are conversant in a child's first language and skilled in distinguishing language proficiency from disabilities. The Department of Education (Education) monitors and supports Child Find efforts primarily by reviewing states' annual performance data and providing professional development and technical assistance. The four states GAO visited reported monitoring and supporting school districts' efforts in a similar manner to Education's.


Currently in the United States, almost 1 million lawfully present foreign workers and their family members have been approved for, and are waiting to receive, lawful permanent resident (LPR) status (a green card ). This employment-based backlog is projected to double by FY2030. It exists because the number of foreign workers whom U.S. employers sponsor for green cards each year exceeds the annual statutory green card allocation. In addition to this numerical limit, a statutory 7% per-country ceiling prevents the monopolization of employment-based green cards by a few countries. For nationals from large migrant-sending countriesâIndia and Chinaâthe numerical limit and per-country ceiling have created inordinately long waits for employment-based green cards. New prospective immigrants entering the backlog (beneficiaries) outnumber available green cards by more than two to one. Many Indian nationals will have to wait decades to receive a green card. The backlog can impose significant hardship on these prospective immigrants, many of whom already reside in the United States. It can also disadvantage U.S. employers, relative to other countries' employers, for attracting highly trained workers. Solutions for addressing the employment-based backlog have been introduced in Congress. In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 1044 , the Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act. Currently under consideration by the Senate ( S. 386 , as amended), the bill would eliminate the 7% per-country ceiling. Supporters of the bill argue it would ultimately treat all prospective immigrants more equitably regardless of origin country. Opponents contend it would allow nationals from a few countries, and their U.S. employers, to dominate most employment-based immigration. They argue that S. 386 ignores the fundamental issue of too few employment-based green cards for an economy that has doubled in size since Congress established the current limits in 1990. This report describes the results of a CRS analysis that projects the 10-year impact of eliminating the 7% per-country ceiling on the first three employment-based immigration categories: EB1, EB2, and EB3. It models outcomes under current law and under the provisions of S. 386 , as amended. The bill would phase out the per-country ceiling over three years and reserve green cards for certain foreign workers, but it would not increase the current limit of 120,120 green cards for the three employment-based immigration categories. The analysis projects similar outcomes for all three employment-based categories: Indian, and to a lesser extent Chinese, nationals in the backlog would experience shorter wait times under S. 386 compared with current law. The bill would eliminate current EB1, EB2, and EB3 backlogs in 3, 17, and 7 years, respectively, with modest differences by country of origin. Subsequently, new prospective immigrants would receive green cards on a first-come, first-served basis with equal wait times within each category, regardless of origin country. By FY2030, EB1, EB2, and EB3 petition holders could expect to wait 7, 37, and 11 years, respectively. Maintaining the 7% per-country ceiling, by contrast would substantially increase the already long wait times for Indian and Chinese nationals, but it would continue to allow those from elsewhere to receive green cards relatively quickly. S. 386 would not reduce future backlogs compared to current law. Given current trends, the analysis projects that by FY2030, the EB1 backlog would grow from an estimated 119,732 individuals to an estimated 268,246 individuals; the EB2 backlog would grow from 627,448 to 1,471,360 individuals; and the EB3 backlog, from 168,317 to 456,190 individuals. The total backlog for all three categories would increase from an estimated 915,497 individuals currently to an estimated 2,195,795 individuals by FY2030. These outcomes would occur whether or not S. 386 is enacted, because the bill maintains the current limit on number of green cards issued. Some legislative options include one or more of the following: maintaining current law, removing the per-country ceiling, increasing the number of employment-based green cards, and reducing the number of workers entering the employment-based immigration pipeline. Broadly restructuring the entire employment-based immigration system could involve merit-based or place-based approaches.


Cyber threats to the nation's critical infrastructure (e.g., financial services and energy sectors) continue to increase and represent a significant national security challenge. To better address such threats, NIST developed, as called for by federal law, a voluntary framework of cybersecurity standards and procedures. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 included provisions for GAO to review aspects of the framework. The objectives of this review were to determine the extent to which (1) SSAs have developed methods to determine framework adoption and (2) implementation of the framework has led to improvements in the protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats. GAO analyzed documentation, such as implementation guidance, plans, and survey instruments. GAO also conducted semi-structured interviews with 12 organizations, representing six infrastructure sectors, to understand the level of framework use and related improvements and challenges. GAO also interviewed agency and private sector officials. Most of the nine agencies with a lead role in protecting the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, as established by federal policy and referred to as sector-specific agencies (SSAs), have not developed methods to determine the level and type of adoption of the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (framework), as GAO previously recommended. Specifically, two of the nine SSAs had developed methods and two others had begun taking steps to do so. The remaining five SSAs did not yet have methods to determine framework adoption. Most of the sectors (13 of 16), however, noted that they had taken steps to encourage and facilitate use of the framework, such as developing implementation guidance that links existing sector cybersecurity tools, standards, and approaches to the framework. In addition, all of the 12 selected organizations that GAO interviewed described either fully or partially using the framework. Nevertheless, implementing GAO's recommendations to the SSAs to determine the level and type of adoption remains essential to the success of protection efforts. The 12 selected organizations using the framework reported varying levels of resulting improvements. Such improvements included identifying risks and implementing common standards and guidelines. However, the SSAs have not collected and reported sector-wide improvements. The SSAs and organizations identified impediments to doing so, including the (1) lack of precise measurements of improvement, (2) lack of a centralized information sharing mechanism, and (3) voluntary nature of the framework. NIST and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have initiatives to help address these impediments. Precise measurements: NIST is in the process of developing an information security measurement program that aims to provide the tools and guidance to support the development of information security measures that are aligned with an individual organization's objectives. However, NIST has not established a time frame for the completion of the measurement program. Centralized sharing: DHS identified its homeland security information network as a tool that was intended to be the primary system that could be used by all sectors to report on best practices, including sector-wide improvements and lessons learned from using the framework. Voluntary nature: In April 2019, NIST issued its NIST Roadmap for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity , version 1.1, which included a tool for organizations to self-assess how effectively they manage cybersecurity risks and identify improvement opportunities. While these initiatives are encouraging, the SSAs have not yet reported on sector-wide improvements. Until they do so, the extent to which the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are better protecting their critical infrastructures from threats will be largely unknown.


DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department in the federal government, employing more than 240,000 staff in a broad range of jobs, including countering terrorism and homeland security threats, providing aviation and border security, emergency response, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has faced challenges with low employee morale and engagement. Federal surveys have consistently found that DHS employees are less satisfied with their jobs compared to the average federal employee. For example, DHS's scores on the FEVS and the Partnership for Public Service's rankings of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government® are consistently among the lowest for similarly-sized federal agencies. This statement addresses our past and ongoing work monitoring human capital management and employee morale at DHS and select work on employee engagement across the government. This statement is based on products GAO issued from September 2012 through May 2019 as well as GAO's ongoing efforts to monitor employee morale at DHS as part of GAO's high-risk work. For these products, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and other documents related to DHS's efforts to address its high-risk areas, interviewed DHS officials, conducted analyses of FEVS data, and interviewed officials from other federal agencies that achieved high employee engagement scores, among other things. GAO provided a copy of new information in this statement to DHS for review. DHS confirmed the accuracy of this information. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has undertaken initiatives to strengthen employee engagement through efforts at its component agencies and across the department. For example, at the headquarters level, DHS has instituted initiatives to improve awareness and access to support programs, benefits, and resources for DHS employees and their families. In 2019, DHS improved its employee engagement scores, as measured by the Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)—a tool that measures employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency. As shown below, DHS increased its scores on a measure of employee engagement, the Employee Engagement Index (EEI), across 4 consecutive years, from a low of 53 percent in 2015 to 62 percent in 2019. While DHS has made progress in improving its scores, in 2019 it remained six points below the government-wide average for the EEI. For several years, DHS and its component agencies have identified root causes for their engagement scores including concerns about leadership accountability and understaffing, among others. This statement discusses nine recommendations related to DHS employee engagement and workforce planning. DHS implemented all but one of these recommendations—to review and correct its coding of cybersecurity positions and assess the accuracy of position descriptions. Finally, filling vacancies could help ensure continued leadership commitment across DHS's mission areas.


DHS plays a key role in federal cybersecurity. FISMA authorized DHS, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, to develop and oversee the implementation of compulsory directives—referred to as binding operational directives—covering executive branch civilian agencies. These directives require agencies to safeguard federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk. Since 2015, DHS has issued eight directives that instructed agencies to, among other things, (1) mitigate critical vulnerabilities discovered by DHS through its scanning of agencies' internet-accessible systems; (2) address urgent vulnerabilities in network infrastructure devices identified by DHS; and (3) better secure the government's highest value and most critical information and system assets. GAO was requested to evaluate DHS's binding operational directives. This report addresses (1) DHS's process for developing and overseeing the implementation of binding operational directives and (2) the effectiveness of the directives, including agencies' implementation of the directive requirements. GAO selected for review the five directives that were in effect as of December 2018, and randomly selected for further in-depth review a sample of 12 agencies from the executive branch civilian agencies to which the directives apply. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a five-step process for developing and overseeing the implementation of binding operational directives, as authorized by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA). The process includes DHS coordinating with stakeholders early in the directives' development process and validating agencies' actions on the directives. However, in implementing the process, DHS did not coordinate with stakeholders early in the process and did not consistently validate agencies' self-reported actions. In addition to being a required step in the directives process, FISMA requires DHS to coordinate with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure that the directives do not conflict with existing NIST guidance for federal agencies. However, NIST officials told GAO that DHS often did not reach out to NIST on directives until 1 to 2 weeks before the directives were to be issued, and then did not always incorporate the NIST technical comments. More recently, DHS and NIST have started regular coordination meetings to discuss directive-related issues earlier in the process. Regarding validation of agency actions, DHS has done so for selected directives, but not for others. DHS is not well-positioned to validate all directives because it lacks a risk-based approach as well as a strategy to check selected agency-reported actions to validate their completion. Directives' implementation often has been effective in strengthening federal cybersecurity. For example, a 2015 directive on critical vulnerability mitigation required agencies to address critical vulnerabilities discovered by DHS cyber scans of agencies' internet-accessible systems within 30 days. This was a new requirement for federal agencies. While agencies did not always meet the 30-day requirement, their mitigations were validated by DHS and reached 87 percent compliance by 2017 (see fig. 1). DHS officials attributed the recent decline in percentage completion to a 35-day partial government shutdown in late 2018/early 2019. Nevertheless, for the 4-year period shown in the figure below, agencies mitigated within 30 days about 2,500 of the 3,600 vulnerabilities identified. Agencies also made reported improvements in securing or replacing vulnerable network infrastructure devices. Specifically, a 2016 directive on the Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices addressed, among other things, several urgent vulnerabilities in the targeting of firewalls across federal networks and provided technical mitigation solutions. As shown in figure 2, in response to the directive, agencies reported progress in mitigating risks to more than 11,000 devices as of October 2018. In addition, GAO reviewed DHS policies and processes related to the directives and assessed them against FISMA and Office of Management and Budget requirements; administered a data collection instrument to selected federal agencies; compared the agencies' responses and supporting documentation to the requirements outlined in the five directives; and collected and analyzed DHS's government-wide scanning data on government-wide implementation of the directives. GAO also interviewed DHS and selected agency officials.