Introduction The U.S. government administers multiple international food assistance programs that aim to alleviate hunger and improve food security in other countries. Some of these programs provide emergency assistance to people affected by conflict or natural disaster. Other programs provide nonemergency assistance to address chronic poverty and hunger, such as by providing food to people during a seasonal food shortage or training communities on issues related to nutrition. U.S. international food assistance programs originated in 1954 with the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), also referred to as P.L. 480 . Historically, the United States has provided international food assistance primarily through in-kind aid , whereby U.S. commodities are shipped to countries in need. Congress typically funds in-kind food aid programs through the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Actâknown as the Agriculture appropriations bill. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. In 2010, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) began providing market-based assistance to supplement in-kind aid in emergency and nonemergency situations. Market-based assistance provides cash transfers, vouchers, or local and regional procurement (LRP)âfood purchased in the country or region where it is to be distributed rather than purchased in the United States. Congress funds most market-based assistance through the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bill. The SFOPS appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and other non-defense foreign policy agencies. For FY2020, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided approximately $4.091 billion for U.S. international food assistance programs. This was an 11% decrease from the $4.581 billion provided in FY2019. Division B of P.L. 116-94 provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs in Agriculture appropriations, including $1.725 billion for the Food for Peace (FFP) Title II program and $220 million for the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. Division G of P.L. 116-94 provided an estimated $2.146 billion for international food assistance programs in SFOPS appropriations. This included an estimated $2.066 billion for the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and $80 million for the Community Development Fund (CDF). This report provides an overview of accounts in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that fund international food assistance programs. It summarizes the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request for international food assistance. The report then details the international food assistance provisions in the FY2020 enacted Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations billsâDivision B and Division G of P.L. 116-94 , respectively. International Food Assistance Programs Congress funds most U.S. international food assistance programs through two annual appropriations billsâthe Agriculture appropriations bill and the SFOPS appropriations bill. The following sections detail each account in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that funds international food assistance and the programs funded through these accounts. Table 1 lists each international food assistance account along with the respective appropriations bill, funded programs, primary delivery method, and implementing agency. Figure 1 depicts each U.S. international food assistance program by authorizing and appropriations committee jurisdiction and implementing agency. Agriculture-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts Some international food assistance programs under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture appropriations committees receive discretionary funding, while other programs receive mandatory funding. Congress authorizes discretionary funding levels in authorizing legislation. A program's receipt of any of the authorized funding then awaits congressional discretion in annual appropriations. With mandatory funding, Congress authorizes and provides funding in authorizing legislation. Thus, programs with mandatory funding do not require a separate appropriation. The Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480) is the primary authorizing legislation for international food assistance programs funded through agriculture appropriations. Congress reauthorizes discretionary and mandatory funding levels for these programs in periodic farm bills, most recently the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334 ). Congress provides discretionary funding for international food assistance programs through three accounts in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title of the Agriculture appropriations bill: the Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account, the Food for Peace Title II Grants account, and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants account. Congress has periodically provided additional discretionary funding for international food assistance in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture appropriations bill. Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program Account The Food for Peace (FFP) Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account provides administrative expenses for the FFP Title I and Food for Progress programs. FFP Title I provides concessional sales âsales on credit terms below market rates (loans)âof U.S. commodities to governments of developing countries and private entities. USDA administers FFP Title I. Congress has not appropriated funds for new FFP Title I sales since FY2006 but continues to appropriate funds to administer the FFP Title I loans provided before FY2006. Food for Progress donates U.S. agricultural commodities to governments or organizations to be monetized âsold on local markets in recipient countries to generate proceeds for economic development projects. Congress has authorized Food for Progress to receive both mandatory and discretionary funding. This account receives annual appropriations to cover administrative expenses. Congress primarily funds programmatic activities through mandatory funding. Food for Peace Title II Grants Account The Food for Peace Title II Grants account funds the FFP Title II program. FFP Title II donates U.S. agricultural commodities to recipients in foreign countries. FFP Title II provides both emergency and nonemergency aid. Typically, the majority of FFP Title II funds support emergency aid. USAID administers FFP Title II. Congress appropriates FFP Title II funds to USDA, which then transfers the funds to USAID. Since the mid-1980s, FFP Title II has received the majority of funds appropriated to international food assistance in the Agriculture appropriations bill. FFP Title II also receives some funding for nonemergency assistance from the Community Development Fund in the SFOPS appropriations bill (see " SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts "). McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants Account This account funds the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. McGovern-Dole donates U.S. agricultural commodities to school feeding programs and pregnant or nursing mothers in qualifying countries. USDA administers McGovern-Dole. Since FY2016, Congress has set aside a portion of McGovern-Dole funds for LRP. The 2018 farm bill authorized USDA to use up to 10% of annual McGovern-Dole funds for LRP. The Farmer-to-Farmer Program Set-Aside Congress funds the Farmer-to-Farmer Program, also known as FFP Title V, through a set-aside of the total appropriation for Food for Peace Act programs. This program finances short-term placements for U.S. volunteers to provide technical assistance to farmers in developing countries. USAID administers the Farmer-to-Farmer Program. Statute sets minimum program funding as the greater of $10 million or 0.5% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs and maximum program funding as the greater of $15 million or 0.6% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs. Programs with Mandatory Funding Congress has authorized certain U.S. international food aid programs to receive mandatory funding. Food for Progress relies primarily on mandatory funding financed through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Food for Progress does not typically receive discretionary funding beyond funding for administrative expenses provided by the FFP Title I account. However, in FY2019, Congress provided discretionary funding for Food for Progress in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture Appropriations Act. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is a reserve of funds held by the CCC. USDA can use BEHT funds to supplement FFP Title II activities, especially when FFP Title II funds alone cannot meet emergency international food needs. If USDA provides aid through BEHT, Congress may appropriate funds to the CCC in a subsequent fiscal year to reimburse the CCC for the value of the released funds. USDA did not release funds from BEHT in FY2019, and Congress did not appropriate any BEHT reimbursement funds to the CCC in FY2020. SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts Congress funds international food assistance programs through two funding accounts in the SFOPS appropriation using discretionary funds. International Disaster Assistance The International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding account provides for EFSP, which USAID first employed in FY2010 to supplement its emergency FFP Title II in-kind aid. Congress permanently authorized the program in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-195 ). Congress does not specify the exact funding level for EFSP in its annual appropriation; rather, USAID determines the allocation of IDA funds in response to humanitarian need in any given year. Between FY2015 and FY2019, EFSP represented an average of 47% of the whole IDA appropriation. Development Assistance Congress designates funding within the Development Assistance (DA) account for CDF. CDF funds complement FFP Title II nonemergency programs. USAID first used CDF in FY2010 to reduce its reliance on monetization âthe practice of implementing partners selling U.S. commodities on local markets and using the proceeds to fund programs. As with EFSP, CDF offers USAID the flexibility to pursue market-based interventions including cash transfers, food vouchers, and LRP. Today, CDF continues to complement FFP Title II nonemergency programming but is no longer needed to offset monetization, as the practice is no longer a legislative requirement. Congress designates the level of CDF in its reports accompanying annual appropriations (often referred to as a "soft earmark"). For more information on CDF, see CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs , by Emily M. Morgenstern. The Administration's FY2020 Budget Request For the third year in a row, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposed eliminating McGovern-Dole and FFP Title II. However, unlike in the FY2018 and FY2019 requestsâin which the President proposed shifting all funding for international food assistance to the IDA account within the SFOPS appropriations billâthe President's FY2020 request proposed creating a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. The proposed IHA account would have consolidated four humanitarian assistance accountsâthe IDA, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts that are funded in SFOPS appropriations, along with FFP Title II within Agriculture appropriationsâinto a single account within the SFOPS appropriations bill. The FY2020 budget request also repeated past proposals to eliminate Food for Progress and merge the DA account with the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Democracy Fund (DF), and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) accounts to create a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) within SFOPS appropriations. Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, or Food for Progress or create the new combined IHA and ESDF accounts. The following section summarizes the Administration's FY2020 budget requests for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills. FY2020 Agriculture Funding Request For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested discretionary funding for one international food assistance program account. The Administration requested $135,000 for the FFP Title I account to carry out existing FFP Title I loans and Food for Progress projects. This amount would have been $14,000 less than the FY2019 enacted amount for the FFP Title I account. The Administration's FY2020 budget request stated that the workload to administer FFP Title I was "significantly less than previously estimated" and that "funds were redirected to meet higher priorities." The FY2020 request also repeated the FY2018 and FY2019 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, and McGovern-Dole and the FY2019 proposal to eliminate Food for Progress. Regarding FFP Title II, the Administration stated "To replace the inefficient food aid provided through Title II, the 2020 request includes funding for emergency food needs within the new, more efficient International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account." Eliminating FFP Title II would fund all emergency food assistance through the SFOPS appropriations rather than jointly between the SFOPS and Agriculture appropriations bills. Regarding the proposed elimination of McGovern-Dole, the Administration's FY2020 request stated, "In kind food aid is associated with high transportation and other costs and is inefficient compared to other types of development assistance. In addition, the McGovern Dole program has unaddressed oversight and performance monitoring challenges." Food for Progress primarily receives mandatory funding. The FY2020 request proposes to eliminate mandatory funding authority, estimating that this would result in $1.7 billion in savings over 10 years. FY2020 SFOPS Funding Request The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal included a combined IHA account that would have consolidated the four humanitarian assistance accounts. According to budget documents, the IHA account would have supported "all aspects of humanitarian assistance, including shelter, protection, emergency health and nutrition, the provision of safe drinking water, livelihoods supports, emergency food interventions, rehabilitation, disaster risk reduction, and transition to development assistance programs," among other activities. The account would have been managed by the newly consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Bureau at USAID but with a "senior dual-hat leader" under the policy authority of the Secretary of State reporting to both the Secretary of State and the USAID administrator. The Administration proposed $5.97 billion for the IHA account, a 37% decrease from the combined FY2019 appropriations for IDA, FFP Title II, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance. The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal also included a combined ESDF account that would have merged the DA, ESF, DF, and AEECA accounts. The FY2020 proposal included $5.23 billion for ESDF, a 32% decrease from the FY2019 appropriations for the four accounts combined. Potential Implications of the FY2020 Funding Request Moving funding from FFP Title II to a new IHA could have changed how the United States delivers food assistance to recipient countries. Statute requires that nearly all assistance distributed under FFP Title II be in-kind aid. By contrast, EFSP, which Congress currently funds through the IDA account but which the Administration proposed to fund through the new IHA, does not have a statutory requirement to provide a portion of assistance as in-kind aid. EFSP can provide in-kind aid or market-based assistance. Therefore, under current statutes, shifting international food assistance funding from FFP Title II to IHA would have meant this funding would not have needed to adhere to the FFP Title II requirement to provide in-kind aid. This could have increased the portion of food assistance provided as market-based assistance rather than in-kind aid and would have shifted implementation from USDA to USAID. Proposals to shift U.S. international food assistance funding from in-kind food aid to market-based food assistance are not new. Both the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations proposed increasing the portion of U.S. international food assistance delivered as market-based assistance. Some proponents of increasing the use of market-based assistance argue that it could improve program efficiency. However, some interested parties assert that the Trump Administration's proposed decrease in overall funding for international food assistance could offset potential efficiency gains, resulting in fewer people receiving assistance. Some opponents of increasing the share of food assistance that is market-based rather than in-kind maintain that in-kind aid ensures that the United States provides high-quality food to recipients. Certain stakeholders, such as some agricultural commodity groups, may also oppose such changes due to their implications for U.S. government purchase of U.S. commodities. In addition to the implications above, there are a number of international food assistance issues in which Members of Congress have expressed interest. These include the share of in-kind and market-based food assistance, cargo preference requirements, and congressional jurisdiction, among others. For more information on the broad range of international food assistance-related issues, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview , by Alyssa R. Casey. Congressional Appropriations The FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act provided funding for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V). This included funding for FFP Title II and McGovern-Dole. The act also provided funding for administrative expenses to manage existing FFP Title I loans that originated while the FFP Title I program was active. Unlike in FY2019, Congress did not provide discretionary funding in FY2020 for the Food for Progress program. The FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations Act provided funding for international food assistance programs in Bilateral Assistance (Title III). Figure 2 shows funding trends for international food assistance programs for FY2015-FY2020. Table 2 details appropriations for international food assistance programs for FY2018-FY2020, including proposed funding levels in the FY2020 Administration's request and House and Senate Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills. FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 , Div. B) provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs, roughly level with the FY2019 enacted amount of $1.942 billion. The FY2020 enacted amount was less than the $2.085 billion in the House-passed Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3055 ) but more than the $1.926 billion in the Senate-passed bill ( H.R. 3055 ). Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposal to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, and Food for Progress. The FY2020 act provided $1.725 billion for FFP Title II, a 0.5% increase from the $1.716 billion provided in FY2019. In FY2020, Congress provided all FFP Title II funding in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V) of the Agriculture appropriations bill. This was a change from FY2019, when Congress provided the majority of FFP Title II funding ($1.5 billion) in the Foreign Assistance title but provided additional funding for FFP Title II ($216 million) in the bill's General Provisions title (Title VII). The FY2020 act provided $220 million for McGovern-Dole, a 5% increase from the FY2019 enacted amount of $210. Congress directed a minimum of $20 million of McGovern-Dole funding and a maximum of 10% of total program funding ($22 million) be set aside for LRP. This was an increase from the $15 million set-aside in FY2019. The FY2020 act also provided $142,000 for FFP Title I and Food for Progress administrative expenses, equal to the FY2019 enacted amount. Unlike in FY2019, the FY2020 act did not provide discretionary appropriations for Food for Progress. Congress typically funds this program through mandatory funding. The 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 , Â§3302) authorized new pilot agreements within the Food for Progress program to directly fund economic development projects rather than funding the projects through monetizing commodities. The 2018 farm bill authorized $10 million per year for FY2019-FY2023 for pilot agreements, subject to annual appropriations. Congress did not appropriate funding for Food for Progress pilot agreements in FY2019 or FY2020. FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations Division G of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided funds for international food assistance programs appropriated under the SFOPS measure. The enacted IDA appropriation level grew by 0.2%, from $4.385 billion in FY2019 to $4.395 billion in FY2020. As in prior fiscal years, the measure did not determine a specific level for EFSP. IDA funds are designated to "carry out the provisions of section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for international disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance." Because the account is meant to respond to international emergencies, Congress tends to appropriate funds in a lump sum instead of directing funds toward specific countries or crises. As in previous fiscal years, the final FY2020 act included $80 million for CDF under DA. Policy-Related Provisions In addition to providing funding, the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills may contain policy-related provisions that direct the executive branch how to spend certain funds. Provisions included in appropriations act text have the force of law but generally only for the duration of the fiscal year for which the act provides appropriations. Policy-related provisions generally do not amend the U.S. Code . Table 3 compares select policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs (Title V) and General Provisions (Title VII) titles of the FY2019 and FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Acts. There was no language from the SFOPS bills for a similar table. The explanatory statement that accompanies the appropriations act, as well as the committee reports that accompany the House and Senate committee-reported bills, can provide statements of support for certain programs or directions to federal agencies on how to spend certain funding provided in the appropriations bill. While these documents generally do not have the force of law, they can express congressional intent. The committee reports and explanatory statement may need to be read together to capture all of the congressional intent for a given fiscal year. Table 4 compares selected policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act. Table 5 compares one selected policy-related provision pertaining to U.S. international food assistance programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 SFOPS appropriation.


Introduction The U.S. government's Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows eligible nationals from 39 countries to enter the United States for stays of fewer than 90 days for tourism or business purposes without applying for a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate (see Figure 1 ). Originally established in 1986 as a pilot program, the VWP was made permanent in 2000. VWP countries now account for the largest group of visitors to the United States other than travelers from neighboring Canada and Mexico. In FY2018, 22.8 million VWP visitors were admitted to the United States, the largest number of people ever to enter under the program in a single year, up almost 30% from 17.6 million in FY2008. Countries that want to join the VWP must meet strict criteria, including signing on to information-sharing agreements, issuing tamper-proof travel documents, and upholding security standards at their borders. Travelers from VWP countries are not automatically guaranteed admission into the United States. Every VWP traveler must obtain preclearance to board a flight or ship to the United States through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). This web-based application checks the traveler's information against relevant law enforcement and security databases and determines eligibility for travel under the VWP. In addition, as with all international travelers, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers may deny entry to a VWP traveler upon arrival. This report offers an overview of the VWP. It discusses the potential effects on national security and considers the likely economic effects on the U.S. travel and tourism industries if more countries were to be added to the program. The report also reviews legislative proposals in the 116 th Congress related to the expansion and implementation of the VWP, and legislation targeting U.S. travel promotionâânamely the Brand USA program, which is partially funded by ESTA. Visa Waiver Program Designation The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Department of State (DOS), has the authority to designate participants into the VWP. The Secretary of State must formally make the nomination; DHS then conducts a final review and certifies that the aspiring participant meets all the requirements. To be eligible, a country must comply with an extensive list of conditions specified in several different laws. It must offer reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens; have had a nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate of less than 3% for the previous year or a lower average percentage over the previous two fiscal years; issue electronic, machine-readable passports that contain a biometric identifier (known as e-passports ); certify that it issues tamper-resistant, machine-readable visa documents that incorporate biometric identifiers, which are verifiable at the country's port of entry; certify that it has in place mechanisms to validate machine-readable passports and e-passports at each port of entry; enter into an agreement with the United States to report or make available through INTERPOL information about the theft or loss of passports no later than 24 hours after a theft or loss is reported to the VWP country; certify, to the maximum extent allowed under its laws, that it is screening each foreign national who is admitted or departs, using relevant INTERPOL databases and notices, or other means designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security (this requirement only applies to countries that have an international airport); accept the repatriation of any citizen, former citizen, or national against whom a final order of removal from the United States is issued no later than three weeks after the order is issued; enter into and fully implement an agreement with the United States to share information regarding whether a national traveling to the United States represents a threat to U.S. security or welfare; and be determined, by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, not to compromise the law enforcement or security interests of the United States by its inclusion in the program. As of March 2020, 31 European countries, 7 Asia-Pacific countries, and 1 country in South America are in the program (see Figure 1 ). Nonimmigrant Visitor Visa Refusal Rate Versus Overstay Rate One of the VWP criteriaâthe nonimmigrant, or temporary, visitor visa refusal rateâhas been the subject of scrutiny by Congress. This rate represents the proportion of individuals whose applications for tourist or business visas have been rejected by U.S. consular officials in their home countries. When the VWP was conceived, some legislators argued that the number of nonimmigrants who overstay the terms of their entry under the VWP would be a better standard for future program participation, as the nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate is not based on the actual behavior of nonimmigrants. However, DHS is not able to calculate overstay rates accurately; because it relies on information from passenger manifests, persons entering by air or sea but exiting at a land port of entry may be mischaracterized as overstays. Advocates of expanding the VWP contend that the 3% nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate criterion, which has been a significant barrier to entry into the VWP, should be replaced with the overstay rate, or the refusal rate threshold should be raised and used in conjunction with the overstay rate. Some advocates have called for the return of the nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate waiver, which was available from October 2008 to July 2009. The waiver allowed DHS to admit into the VWP countries that had met all of the security requirements if they had a low overstay rate and a declining nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate that was below 10% in the previous fiscal year. Due to this waiver, eight countries that otherwise would not have qualified for the VWP were added in 2008. For current aspiring VWP countries, a complicating factor is that the Secretary of Homeland Security's authority to waive the nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate is suspended until the airline passenger exit system is able to match an alien's biometric information with relevant watchlists and manifest information . In FY2018, all the VWP countries had DHS-estimated overstay rates of less than 0.5% (Poland, which had not yet been admitted to the VWP, had a DHS-estimated overstay rate of less than 1%). The worldwide DHS-estimated overstay rate for non-VWP countries in FY2018 was 2%. Figure 2 shows the most recently available nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rates and the DHS-estimated overstay rates for selected aspiring VWP countries. All of these countries (except Brazil) had a nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate of less than 10% in FY2019, and all of them had a DHS-estimated overstay rate of less than 2% in FY2018. Adding Countries to VWP Since the establishment of the VWP, the number of participating countries has been increased several times and two countries have been removed. The United Kingdom was the first country to be admitted, in July 1988, followed by Japan in December of the same year (see Figure 3 ). Six countries were added in 1989. An additional 13 countries were admitted in 1991, and another eight countries joined from 1993 to 1999. There was a gap until 2008, when another eight countries were admitted. In the past 10 years, Chile, Greece, Taiwan, and, most recently, Poland have been added. Adding countries to the VWP is done through bilateral negotiations, and membership is often perceived as evidence of close ties with the UnitedÂ States. Argentina and Uruguay are the only two countries that have been removed from the program, in 2002 and 2003, respectively.  Aspiring VWP Countries Since 2010, DHS has admitted four countries into the VWP ( Figure 3 ). Many other countries would like to join the program to make it easier for their nationals to travel to the United States. In 2005, the George W. Bush Administration began providing countries interested in joining the VWP with road maps to aid them in meeting the program's criteria. The original 13 aspiring countries were Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Of these, 10 have since been admitted. This report examines a selected list of aspiring VWP countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Israel, Romania, and Uruguay (see Figure 1 ). Four currently aspiring countriesâBulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romaniaâare in the European Union (EU). They are the only EU countries not in the VWP. U.S. citizens are permitted to travel to all the EU member states for short-term business or tourism purposes without a visa, whereas citizens of the four EU countries outside the VWP need a visa to travel to the United States. The European Commission has pointed out that the United States is the only country on the EU's visa-free list that does not fully reciprocate, adding that "visa reciprocity is a fundamental principle of the European Union's common visa policy." The European Union considered suspending its visa waiver for U.S. nationals in 2017, but decided not to do so. Israel has also been vocal about wanting to enter the VWP, but it has faced challenges meeting certain criteria. For instance, Israel's Biometric Database Law prohibits sharing fingerprint data with foreign authorities, though reportedly the United States and Israel came to an agreement to share data for those with a criminal background. Another hurdle for Israel is that to become a VWP member, foreign countries must treat all American visa applicants equally; however, Israel has been accused of discriminating against Arab Americans. Moreover, Israel has yet to meet the 3% nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate criterion; its rate was 5.33% in FY2019. Brazil is often included in reports about aspiring VWP countries. It has recently made changes to its visa policy for U.S. citizens. In June 2019, Brazil introduced visa-free entry for U.S. citizens and citizens of three other countries, reportedly to stimulate tourism. Countries Removed from the VWP A country can be terminated from the program if the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that a country's participation in the VWP undermines U.S. law enforcement, including immigration enforcement. Argentina and Uruguay are former members of the VWP. Argentina joined in 1996, but the United States removed it in 2002 after poor economic conditions in the country led to an increase in the number of Argentine nationals entering the United States without visas and remaining illegally past the 90-day period of admission. Uruguay joined in 1999, but it was removed in 2003 because a recession led to an increasing number of Uruguayan citizens entering the United States under the VWP to live and work illegally. National Security National security is a key goal of the VWP. Over the years, Congress has continued to add security criteria for VWP participation. One of the VWP's most significant security additions was ESTA, which was put in place in 2009 and is administered by DHS. In addition, several laws require VWP partner countries to share information with the United States and to set standards for travel documentation. Nevertheless, debate remains as to whether the VWP sufficiently vets individual travelers prior to arrival at a U.S. port of entry. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) Before traveling to the United States, a VWP traveler must submit biographical information through DHS's ESTA. This web-based application checks the traveler's information against relevant law enforcement and security databases and determines eligibility for travel under the VWP. ESTA alerts the foreign national whether he or she has been approved to travel. If not approved, the individual must obtain a visa prior to coming to the United States. This normally involves making an appointment for an interview with a U.S. consular official, a process that could delay the individual's departure for the United States. ESTA became fully operational for all VWP visitors traveling to the United States by airplane or cruise ship on January 12, 2009. Prior to the implementation of ESTA, the first time a foreign national traveling under the VWP to the United States was screened was after checking in for a flight to the United States at a foreign airport. Under the current system, at the time a foreign national submits an ESTA application (at least 72 hours before travel), he or she is screened against a number of security databases, including the Terrorist Screening Database; TECS (not an acronym), a system used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers to screen arriving travelers to the United States; the Automated Targeting System; and INTERPOL's Lost and Stolen Passport database. Appendix B offers an explanation of these systems and databases. An ESTA authorization is generally valid for multiple entries over a period of two years. Throughout this period, the ESTA system continually vets approved individuals' information against these databases. DHS can immediately revoke an ESTA approval if new derogatory information is discovered. In addition, the validity period can be shortened at any time for any reason. ESTA only screens against biographical security databases; VWP travelers do not submit biometric information (e.g., fingerprints and photographs) until they reach a U.S. port of entry, at which point their biometrics are run through multiple security databases. Notably, a determination under ESTA that a foreign national is eligible to travel to the United States does not constitute a determination that the individual is admissible. The foreign national may still be deemed inadmissible and denied entry by CBP inspectors upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry. Travelers who use ESTA pay a $14 fee, which was instituted in September 2010. The fee includes $4 to cover the costs of administering ESTA and $10 for the travel promotion fee established by Congress in the Travel Promotion Act of 2009. In December 2019, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 directed that the ESTA fee be raised to $21 (see section on " The VWP and U.S. Travel Promotion Efforts "). This fee increase has not been put into effect. Security Debate Although there tends to be agreement that the VWP benefits the U.S. economy by facilitating tourism ( see section on " U.S. Travel and Tourism Economy ") , disagreement exists about VWP's effect on national security. The VWP contains provisions that affect national security at two levels: country-to-country security agreements and individual traveler security screening. Country-to-Country Security Agreements To participate in the VWP, countries must agree to share extensive information with the United States about lost passports, known and suspected terrorists, and serious criminals. Since 2015, the Secretary of Homeland Security had been authorized to immediately suspend a country's participation in the VWP if the country fails to provide information related to security threats. The VWP also sets standards for participating foreign countries' passports, visas, and border security. As previously mentioned, VWP countries must issue biometric e-passports and tamper-resistant, machine-readable visa documents. Furthermore, since December 2017, DHS requires VWP countries to use U.S. counterterrorism information to screen travelers crossing their borders and to implement certain aviation security measures. Moreover, foreign countries' participation in the VWP allows the United States to monitor their border operations. Since 2002, DHS is statutorily obligated to assess and report on VWP countries' compliance with VWP criteria every two years. Thus, to remain in the program participating countries are subject to regular audits of their security operations, which include "rigorous and thorough inspection of airports, seaports, land borders, and passport production/issuance facilities as well as continuous monitoring." According to DHS, "no other program enables the U.S. Government to conduct such broad and consequential assessments of foreign partners' border security operations." The possibility of joining the VWP is an incentive for aspiring VWP countries to share such information and improve their border security. According to DHS, "many countries not in the VWP complete program requirements in the hope of joining the program." For participating countries that wish to remain in the VWP program, DHS contends that "VWP requirements provide our allies with the impetus to implement security measures that can sometimes be politically challenging for them, like amending legislation and updating their data privacy frameworks." Individual VWP Traveler Screening The vetting of VWP travelers contains some features absent from the traditional screening required to receive a nonimmigrant visitor visa for business and tourist travel. As previously mentioned, ESTA screens the data of those authorized for VWP travel on a daily basis throughout ESTA's two-year validity period; new derogatory information could result in a denial of ESTA authorization. In contrast, many nonimmigrant visitor visas are valid for 10 years and are not continuously vetted. Moreover, travelers entering under the VWP must present e-passports, which tend to be more difficult to alter than other types of passports. VWP travelers do not undergo the same screening required of travelers from most countries to receive a nonimmigrant visitor visa, which typically includes a personal interview with a U.S. consular officer. As such, VWP travelers' first face-to-face encounter with U.S. officials could be at a port of entry. Additionally, ESTA is a name-based system and cannot be used to run checks against databases that use biometrics, such as the Automated Biometric Identification System and Next Generation Identification. However, when VWP travelers enter the United States, CBP takes their fingerprints and photographs and checks them against these biometric systems. Finally, visitor visa applicants are required to submit social media identifiers, but this is optional for VWP travelers. Another concern, following a number of high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years perpetrated mainly by European citizens, has been the possible threat posed by nationals from VWP countries who are aligned with the Islamic State. A focus had been on radicalized citizens of VWP countries who could have fought in the Middle East for the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. Conceivably, these individuals may have been able to travel to the United States under the VWP if there was no derogatory information about them in U.S. biographic databases. In response, Congress passed the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act, enacted as part of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act. This makes citizens of VWP countries ineligible for admission to the United States under the VWP if they are dual nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria or had been present in any of those countries, or in Libya, Somalia, or Yemen, at any time on or after March 1, 2011 (with limited exceptions). These individuals can still apply for a visa to travel to the United States. Another point of contention is whether the VWP threatens the United States' immigration enforcement interests. As of December 2017, VWP countries that have an overstay rate of over 2% must initiate a public information campaign to educate their citizens about the conditions for admission to the United States. If this does not reduce overstay violations, a country could be removed from the program, as occurred with Argentina and Uruguay in 2002 and 2003, respectively. U.S. Travel and Tourism Economy A principal objective of the VWP is to boost the U.S. travel and tourism sectors by encouraging travel from high-volume and low-risk countries to the United States. The number of international visitors arriving in the United States totaled 79.3 million in 2019, down slightly from a record high of 79.7 million in 2018. Because of the sharp decline in international travel in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many international flights have been cancelled and visitor volume is likely to fall sharply in 2020. In 2018, the travel and tourism sectors accounted for 2.9% of U.S. gross domestic product, a larger share than many other industries, including agriculture, mining, or utilities, and they directly and indirectly employed 9.2 million workers. Every dollar international visitors spend in the United States counts as an export. Collectively, foreign visitors spent about $256 billion in 2018 on domestic passenger fares aboard U.S. airlines and on travel-related goods and services, which makes tourism the United States' single-largest services sector export. Every year since 1989, the U.S. travel and tourism industries have posted a trade surplus, which in 2018 was $69.6 billion. Travel- and tourism-related exports accounted for 31% of all U.S. services exports and 10% of total exports in 2018. Each overseas visitor spends, on average, about $4,200 per trip in the United States on travel activities such as shopping, lodging, dining, and sightseeing. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), international travelers account for a disproportionate amount of all travel and tourism spending in the United States. One reason for this is that international visitors have relatively longer stays than domestic visitors, spending, on average, 18 nights in the United States. Travelers from VWP countries are among the highest in spending and visitor volume (see Table 1 ). However, an increasing number of overseas visitors come from non-VWP countries, notably China, Venezuela, Brazil, and India. Combined, these four non-VWP countries accounted for nearly 6.7 million visitors to the United States in 2019, down 4% from a year earlier. Travelers from these countries spent more than $5,000 on average per trip during their visits to the United States, with visitors from China leading in country-level travel spending. Spending in the United States by visitors from large source markets has risen substantially in recent years, up 45% from China and 78% from India since 2013. Global Competitiveness of the U.S. Travel and Tourism Sectors Although the number of foreign visitors to the United States has continued to rise, the U.S. share of total global tourism arrivals declined from 6.4% in 2015 to 5.7% in 2017, the most recent year for which statistics are available. One reason for this declining market share is that it is now much easier for travelers to visit many parts of the world, including Asia and Africa, compared to a few years ago. In 2012, the Obama Administration established a Task Force on Travel and Competitiveness, which set a goal of welcoming 100 million international visitors in 2021. Among other things, the task force recommended expediting visa processing for tourists from certain emerging economies, such as China and Brazil, and adding countries to the VWP in order to encourage tourism. Before the advent of the global pandemic (COVID-19) in 2020, the U.S. government had forecasted that the volume of tourist arrivals would not meet the task force's goal, with the number of total international visitors to the United States expected to reach close to 82.9 million in 2021. It is too early to know what the repercussions of shutting down a significant share of overseas travel to the United States may mean for the U.S. travel and tourism industries. Current indications suggest that the stated goal in overseas travelers to the United States is beyond reach by 2021 as potential visitors modify their travel plans. Economic Impact of Visitors from VWP Countries Determining whether the VWP has directly led to increased travel to the United States is not straightforward because many factors affect international travel, including general economic conditions, currency exchange rates, and even the nature of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the VWP could be a factor that has encouraged more visits to the United State because it arguably reduces uncertainty, inconvenience, and costs associated with a visa application. Of the 37 nations in the VWP as of 2012, all but 10 recorded an increase in the volume of tourists and business visitors to the United States from FY2013 to FY2018. Three-fourths of the top 20 countries by number of VWP visitors recorded double-digit growth rates in VWP admissions over this period, including Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, and New Zealand, although the annual change for VWP countries has been uneven. Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Japan are among the 20 VWP countries that posted drops in U.S. VWP admissions between FY2013 and FY2018 (see Table 2 ). Economic Impact of Adding New Countries to the VWP U.S. Travel, an advocacy group for the travel industry, has produced several analyses of the effects of adding countries to the VWP. All of the organization's reports conclude that adding new countries to the program would yield positive results. For example, in a 2014 report U.S. Travel estimated that if Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Israel, Poland, Romania, and Uruguay were included in the program, annual visitation from those countries would increase by more than 500,000, adding $5.3 billion per year to the U.S. economy and supporting 31,600 additional jobs in the United States. Likewise, an economic analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce data on travel and tourism from 1980 to 2013 found that the VWP had a "meaningful impact driving increases in U.S. tourist volumes." In a 2019 report, U.S. Travel predicted that over the first three years of Poland's participation in the VWP, travel spending by Polish visitors to the United States would increase by $312 million, the number of Polish arrivals would rise by 97,000, and visitors from Poland would support 4,200 American jobs. Visitors from the four non-VWP EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania), who currently enter the United States on nonimmigrant visitor visas, accounted for approximately 1% of total EU visitor spending in the United States in 2018 (approximately $580 million). This seems to suggest that the overall economic effect of adding these four countries to the VWP would likely be relatively small. According to an estimate by U.S. Travel, the number of arrivals in the United States from these countries would increase by nearly 73,000 visitors at the end of the first three years after joining the VWP. In a separate report, U.S. Travel projected that if Romania were to become a VWP country, annual arrivals from the country would increase by 38,000 and bring $128 million in additional travel spending to the United States. Both reports were prepared before the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted international travel in 2020. According to figures from the Department of Commerce spending by Israeli visitors in 2018 in the United States on passenger fares and travel-related goods and services was nearly $1.8 billion. U.S. Travel estimated in 2019 that if Israel were admitted to the VWP, an additional 450,200 Israeli travelers would visit the United States over a three-year period, generating $1.2 billion in travel spending. The U.S. travel and tourism industries support expanding the VWP to other countries, especially populous countries such as Brazil. Brazil was the fifth-largest tourism source market for the United States, with 2.1 million Brazilians visiting in 2018. As shown in Table 1 , average spending per Brazilian visitor to the United States was $5,200 in 2018, among the highest of all source countries. The number of visitors from Brazil is projected to reach 2.6 million by 2024 even if Brazil is not admitted to the VWP. In November 2019, the United States announced that Brazil will soon join the Global Entry program, which will reduce waiting time for approved Brazilian visitors arriving at U.S. airport immigration checkpoints. The VWP and U.S. Travel Promotion Efforts The VWP is closely related to the promotion of foreign tourism to the United States. The United States no longer has a central agency to promote travel to it; the National Travel and Tourism Office (NTTO), within the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, mainly provides official tourism statistics. Travel promotion is the responsibility of Brand USA (formally known as the Corporation for Travel Promotion), a nonprofit public-private entity that also is charged with communicating U.S. visa and entry policies to overseas visitors. Brand USA was established under the Travel Promotion Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-145 ) and began operations in May 2011. In addition to private funding, since 2010 Brand USA has received $10 of the $14 fee paid by each prospective visitor from a VWP country who requests approval to travel to the United States through ESTA. In 2019, Congress approved raising the ESTA fee from $14 to $21, while reducing the amount available to Brand USA to $7 per traveler. Of the remainder, $4 will continue to go to CBP to cover the costs of administering ESTA, and $10 will be directed to the U.S. Treasury for the general fund. The effective date of the new ESTA fee has not yet been announced. Brand USA is not without controversy. The Trump Administration's FY2021 budget called for ending the federal grant that matches the private sector contributions to Brand USA and making the revenue available to the U.S. Treasury to reduce the federal deficit. Brand USA remains controversial among other travel and tourism stakeholders too, with some critics asserting that promotion of tourism should be left to the private sector. For example, Airlines for America, an airline industry group representing U.S. carriers, opposed Brand USA's reauthorization, asserting that ESTA funds would be better spent by CBP on border security, vetting travelers and refugees, and modernizing entry and exit processes. In another effort to promote travel and tourism, the United States has indicated that it is considering rejoining the United Nations' World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), which was established in 1975 to promote tourism worldwide. The United States was one of its founding members, but withdrew in 1996 after Congress stopped funding the United States Travel and Tourism Administration. In June 2019, the Trump Administration announced that the United States may rejoin the UNWTO. The announcement met with some criticism, and the Administration has subsequently taken no action. Other countries with large travel and tourism sectors that are not members of the UNWTO include the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Legislation in the 116th Congress Proposals introduced in the 116 th Congress would give DHS greater flexibility to admit countries into the VWP that do not meet the criteria discussed above. Representative Mike Quigley introduced the Jobs Originated through Launching Travel (JOLT) Act ( H.R. 2187 ) , which would reinstate DHS's authority to grant a waiver for the nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate. That bill would also change the name of the VWP to Secure Travel Partnership. H.R. 1996 , also introduced by Representative Quigley, would solely rename the VWP to Secure Travel Partnership. Representative Dan Lipinski introduced the Allied Nations Travel Modernization Act ( H.R. 2946 ), which would allow countries to be designated into the VWP if, instead of a low nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate, they have a low visa overstay rate and agree to spend 2% of their gross domestic product on defense; according to the sponsor, the bill was drafted "to create an alternative pathway into the program for NATO nations like Poland." As noted above, Poland was recently designated into the VWP. In previous Congresses, numerous bills have been introduced to designate Israel and Hong Kong into the VWP. Senator John Cornyn introduced the Humanitarian Upgrades to Manage and Assist our Nation's Enforcement (HUMANE) Act of 2019 ( S. 1303 ); among other provisions, it seeks to deter VWP overstays by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act's terms and conditions of admission for VWP travelers, the VWP waiver of rights, and the detention and repatriation of visa waiver violators. The 116 th Congress also addressed the spending of ESTA funds. Senator Mike Enzi introduced the Responsibly Enhancing America's Landscapes Act ( S. 2783 ), which would establish the National Park Service Legacy Restoration Fund to help with the backlog of maintenance projects in national parks. This fund would be paid for by increasing the ESTA fee by $16, along with an increase in nonimmigrant visitor visa fees by $25 and a park fee increase of $5. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ), which passed in December 2019, extended the authority for Brand USA to receive fees from the VWP through the end of September 2027 and raised the ESTA fee (as described in " The VWP and U.S. Travel Promotion Efforts " section above). The private sector still must provide at least $100 million per year in in-kind contributions and cash to the Brand USA program in order for it to receive these federal funds. Appendix A. Temporary Visitors to the United States for Business or Pleasure from Selected Aspiring VWP Countries Appendix B. Selected Immigration Inspections Databases and Systems


Introduction The United States and Liberia have maintained diplomatic relations for more than 150 years. Close ties endured in the 20th centuryâunderpinned by U.S. investment in the rubber sector and robust political, development, and defense cooperation during the Cold Warâbut they came under strain during Liberia's two civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003). The United States provided substantial humanitarian assistance in response to those conflicts and helped mediate an end to each war, and the U.S. military briefly deployed a task force to assist peacekeepers and support aid delivery after the conflict. U.S.-Liberia ties improved considerably during the tenure of former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (in office 2006-2018) and have remained close under current President George Weah (inaugurated in 2018). Congress has shown enduring interest in Liberia and has held periodic hearings on the country. Since the end of the second civil war, Congress has appropriated over $2.4 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered assistance to support Liberia's stabilization, recovery, and development. Such aid has centered on promoting good governance, strengthening the rule of law, reforming the security sector, improving service delivery, and spurring inclusive economic development. Congress provided roughly $600 million in additional State Department- and USAID-administered assistance to help combat the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in Liberia, where the U.S. governmentâin collaboration with Liberian authorities and U.N. agenciesâplayed a lead role in the response. In recent years, several Members of Congress have sought to adjust the immigration status of over 80,000 Liberian nationals resident in the United States, some of whom originally came to the United States as refugees. Members regularly travel to Liberia, including under a House Democracy Partnership legislative engagement program initiated in 2006. Historical Background The United States and Liberia established diplomatic relations in 1864, nearly two decades after Liberia declared independence from the American Colonization Society, a U.S. organization that resettled freed slaves and freeborn African-Americans in Liberia. A small elite dominated by "Americo-Liberians," descendants of this settler population, held a monopoly on state power until a 1980 military coup d'Ã©tat. Under President Samuel Doe, economic mismanagement, corruption, and repression along ethnic lines characterized much of the ensuing decade. In 1989, Charles Taylor, a Liberian former civil servant who had fled to the United States after falling out with Doe, launched a rebellion from neighboring CÃ´te d'Ivoire. Factional violence soon engulfed the country. Hundreds of thousands died and "virtually all" Liberians fled their homes at some point during Liberia's first civil war. After a series of abortive ceasefires, the war ended in a peace accord and general elections in 1997, which Taylor won by a wide margin. In 1999, an incursion by Liberian rebels based in neighboring Guinea grew into a second nationwide conflict that pitted Taylor's army against two insurgent factions. After years of fighting, a rebel assault on the capital, Monrovia, and mounting international pressureâincluding U.N. sanctions and a public demand from President George W. Bush that Taylor resignâultimately forced Taylor to step down in 2003. Days later, a peace agreement officially ended the conflict and laid the foundations for a transitional government. The U.N. Security Council established a peacekeeping mission, the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in September 2003 to help stabilize the country. Liberia's wars impeded social service provision, devastated the economy, and destabilized the broader region. Notably, Taylor provided material support to rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone during that country's civil war (1991-2002). In 2006, Taylor was arrested in Nigeria (where he had been granted asylum upon stepping down in 2003) on a warrant issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), a U.N.-mandated judicial body created to prosecute crimes perpetrated during the Sierra Leonean civil war. In 2012, the SCSL convicted Taylor of war crimes in relation to his support for Sierra Leonean rebels; he is now serving a 50-year sentence in a prison in the United Kingdom. To date, a similar tribunal to prosecute atrocities committed during Liberia's wars has not been established, spurring perceptions of impunity and mounting calls by civil society and some legislators for the creation of a war crimes court for Liberia (see " Postwar Transitional Justice Efforts "). Taylor's ex-wife and several former associates remain active in Liberian politics, as do figures formerly associated with various armed factions. The Sirleaf Administration (2006-2018) President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a Harvard-educated former Finance Minister and U.N. official, won election in 2006, putting an end to a three-year transitional government led by Taylor's vice president. During her two terms in office, Sirleaf won praise for overseeing a postwar transition marked by political stability and, until the Ebola outbreak in 2014, rapid economic growth. Africa's first elected female head of state, Sirleaf bolstered confidence among donors, drawing large inflows of U.S., Chinese, and multilateral assistance. Such aid financed the rehabilitation of infrastructure and a range of other development and stabilization efforts. Sirleaf also secured almost $5 billion in external debt relief and oversaw an expansion in state revenues. The United Statesâlong the largest bilateral donor to Liberiaâprovided significant assistance to Sirleaf's administration, funding programs to spur economic growth and development, reform the security sector, promote good governance, and build state capacity (see " U.S. Relations and Assistance "). The Sirleaf administration took steps to rehabilitate Liberia's global standing. The U.N. Security Council had imposed various sanctions in response to Liberia's civil wars, including embargoes on imports of arms into the country and on exports of rough diamonds and timber of Liberian origin. As Liberia stabilized and the Sirleaf government enacted sectoral reforms, these sanctions were gradually lifted. The Security Council lifted the last arms embargo, on non-state actors, in 2016, ending the U.N. sanctions regime. (The Obama Administration lifted U.S. targeted sanctions on Taylor and key associates in late 2015.) Also in 2016, UNMIL officially transferred national security duties to Liberian authorities in anticipation of full withdrawal in 2018. Sirleaf's international standing arguably surpassed her popularity among Liberians. Despite rapid economic growth, her administration struggled to meet high expectations for Liberia's postwar trajectory. Extreme poverty remained widespread throughout her tenure, and her government failed to implement key recommendations of Liberia's postwar Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), such as the creation of a war crimes court. Several corruption scandals arose during her tenure, and she drew criticism for appointing her sons to state posts. Her administration's response to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak reportedly featured financial irregularities and a heavy-handed approach by security forces. Some of these shortcomings reasonably could be attributed to structural challenges, such as corruption, low institutional capacity, deficiencies in education and health service provision, and infrastructure gaps. The October 2017 presidential and legislative polls were Liberia's third set of postwar general elections. Constitutional term limits barred Sirleaf from seeking reelection. Approaching the polls, the opposition Congress for Democratic Change party, led by professional soccer star-turned-politician George Weah, allied with the National Patriotic Party of Jewel Howard-Taylor (an ex-wife of Charles Taylor) to form the Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC). Weah won the presidency with 62% of votes in a runoff against incumbent Vice President Joseph Boakai of Sirleaf's Unity Party (UP). Despite some violence and a short-lived legal challenge over alleged fraud in the first round of polls, election observers from the U.S. National Democratic Institute (NDI) lauded the election as a "historic achievement for the country." Concurrent House of Representatives elections resulted in a slim plurality for Weah's party, which took 21 out of 73 seats, ahead of the UP, which took 20. Ten parties and thirteen independents claimed the rest. The United States, the European Union (EU), and other donors provided substantial support for the 2017 elections. U.S. support included the $17 million, USAID-funded Liberia Elections and Political Transition (LEPT) project, under which the U.S. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and NDI provided technical assistance to the National Elections Commission (NEC), supported voter education initiatives targeting women and people with disabilities, and enhanced civil society oversight of voting and other electoral processes. The Weah Administration (2018-Present) President Weah, who took office in January 2018, gained prominence as a European league soccer star prior to his foray into politics. His lack of formal education was a point of criticism during an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 2005; he went on to earn a high school diploma and, later, an undergraduate business degree in the United States. In 2014, he won a Senate seat representing Montserrado County, which surrounds Monrovia. His choice of then-Senator Jewel Howard-Taylor as his running mate in the 2017 election hinted at the enduring influence of Charles Taylor and his associates in Liberia's politics. As a legislator, Howard-Taylor sparked controversy by attempting to make homosexuality a felony punishable by death and to amend the constitution to declare Liberia a Christian state, despite its sizable Muslim minority. Goodwill surrounding Weah's inaugurationâwhich marked Liberia's first electoral transfer of power since 1944 and paved the way for UNMIL's withdrawalâhas dissipated as several high-profile corruption scandals have undermined his political standing. Weah initially drew criticism for failing to disclose his assets prior to taking office, as required of all senior public officials. He ultimately declared his assets in 2018, though the disclosure has remained confidential. Since Weah's inauguration, a number of his associates reportedly have been awarded public contracts, including for large infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, Weah's attempt to nominate a political ally, former Speaker of the House Alex Tyler, to the board of ArcelorMittal, Liberia's largest iron ore producer, prompted significant pushback in local media, given an open inquiry into bribery allegations against Tyler. Weah ultimately withdrew the nomination. (Tyler was later acquitted.) Among the highest-profile scandals that have arisen under Weah was the reported disappearance, in late 2018, of a shipping container holding 15.5 billion Liberian dollars ($104 million). Officials issued contradictory statements about the "missing millions," which the Sirleaf government had procured but whose delivery to Liberia extended into the Weah administration. A U.S. Embassy-contracted inquiry by Kroll Associates, a corporate investigations firm, found no evidence that banknotes had disappeared but documented "discrepancies at every stage" of the procurement and delivery processes. The review also raised concerns regarding the "potential misappropriation of banknotes" and "opportunities for money laundering" in the course of the Weah government's mid-2018 infusion of $25 million U.S. dollars into the monetary system to replace Liberian dollars in an effort to control inflation. (Liberia has two official currencies, the Liberian dollar and the U.S. dollar.) Several former central bank officials, including former President Sirleaf's son, have been charged in the scandal. A USAID technical assistance program, to be implemented by Kroll Associates, aims to enhance the Central Bank's currency management processes. Concerns also have centered on the Weah administration's management of donor assistance, a key source of financing for development efforts. In mid-2019, the U.S. ambassador to Liberia and several foreign counterparts sent a joint letter to the government signaling discontent with the Weah administration's use of aid funds for unintended purposes. The Weah administration publicly acknowledged that it had used aid funds to pay state salaries, but claimed that it had later restored donor accounts. Separately, press reports emerged that the U.N. Resident Coordinator in Liberia had sent a letter to the government over concerns about delayed and inaccurate financial reporting on U.N.-funded activities. In late 2019, the World Bank reportedly demanded that the government refund certain ineligible expenses identified during a project review. According to the State Department's congressionally mandated fiscal transparency report, "foreign assistance receipts, largely project-based, were neither adequately captured in the budget nor subject to the same audit and domestic oversight as other budget items" in 2018, the latest reporting year. In June 2019, simmering discontent over alleged corruption and mismanagement by the Weah administration gave way to large-scale anti-government protests in Monrovia. Headed by the Council of Patriots (COP), a coalition of opposition politicians and activists, the demonstrators called for an audit of all state ministries and petitioned Weah to publicly disclose his assets. The government drew criticism for its response to the protests, during which it blocked social media access. In January 2020, thousands of protesters joined COP-led demonstrations in Monrovia, which police dispersed with tear gas. The Independent National Commission on Human Rights, a state body, has called for an inquiry into allegations of excessive force by security forces. In a joint statement, the ambassadors of the United States, EU, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lauded the security forces' management of the demonstrations but noted "with regret" the government's decision to disperse peaceful protesters without warning. Human rights groups and press freedom advocates have condemned what they have described as a crackdown on COP leader Henry Costa, a radio host who currently lives in the United States. The Economy and Development Issues Annual GDP growth averaged 7.4% over the decade following the end of Liberia's second conflict, as substantial donor assistance helped power a fragile postwar recovery and modest development gains. Foreign direct investment (FDI) significantly increased under President Sirleaf, mostly concentrated in the mining, palm oil, rubber, and timber industries. The 2014 Ebola outbreak and a simultaneous slump in global commodity prices cut short this expansion: Liberia's economy contracted by 1.6% in 2016 before rebounding to 2.5% growth the following year owing to expanded gold, rubber, and palm oil exports. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects a contraction of 1.4% in 2019 due to slowing aggregate demand, followed by a recovery to 1.4% growth in 2020 due to an expected rise in consumption. Since 2017, a weakening of the Liberian dollar (which depreciated by 26% in 2018) and rising inflation (which stands at around 30%) have undermined local purchasing power and living standards. The World Bank projects a rise in the household poverty rate from 42% in 2018 to 44% by 2021; the rural poverty rate, estimated at 72%, is more than double that of urban areasâa longstanding pattern. The IMF predicts average annual growth of 3.0% between 2020 and 2023, a rate likely insufficient to raise living standards adequately for a population growing at 2.6% per year. Infrastructure gaps, low electricity access (estimated at 17% nationally and 3% in rural areas), poor service delivery, corruption, and an uncompetitive business climate all threaten growth prospects. Liberia ranked fifth lowest globally in the World Bank's 2018 Human Capital Index (HCI), a survey of health and education indicators. The government has struggled to marshal donor assistance for its ambitious Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development (PAPD, 2018-2023), which centers on infrastructure investments and social service improvements. The government relies heavily on exports of rubber, gold, iron ore, diamonds, and palm oil for state revenues and foreign exchange, but these sectors have created minimal local employment. The multinational firms ArcelorMittal and Firestone, which are engaged in the extraction of iron and rubber, respectively, are among Liberia's largest private sector actors, though low global commodity prices have prompted both companies to downsize operations in recent years. Most working-age Liberians remain engaged in subsistence agriculture. According to the World Bank, infrastructure gaps, high transport costs, limited market information, and inadequate public sector support have discouraged a shift toward more productive agricultural activity. At the same time, few households produce enough food for family consumption, and Liberia depends on imports of key staple foods, such as rice and cassava, despite ample rainfall and fertile land. Rural poverty drives high rates of food insecurity and malnutrition. Liberia ranked 112 out of 117 countries surveyed on the International Food Policy Research Institute's 2019 Global Hunger Index, a composite ranking of undernourishment and related indicators. A 2018 analysis by the Liberian government and international partners found that 18% of Liberians faced moderate to severe food insecurity, meaning they regularly lack food and consistently do not consume a diet of adequate quality. Roughly 36% of children under five years old are "stunted," or too short for their ageâa risk indicator of impaired cognitive and physical development. Low global oil prices and a poor business climate have dimmed interest in Liberia's nascent oil and gas sector. Several U.S. oil firms, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Anadarko Petroleum, have relinquished licenses to offshore blocks, in some cases following unsuccessful exploration activities. According to the State Department, foreign investors have cited corruption as a key obstacle to engagement in Liberia, with graft perceived to be "most pervasive in government procurement, contract and concession awards, customs and taxation systems, regulatory systems, performance requirements, and government payments systems." Human Rights According to State Department monitors, key human rights challenges in 2018 included extrajudicial killings by police, arbitrary and prolonged detention, and harsh and overcrowded prison conditions. Additional challenges included discrimination and violence against women and marginalized communities. While Weah earned plaudits for supporting a new press freedom act, which repealed various criminal statutes that had been used to harass and arrest journalists, his government also has targeted opposition media figures and shuttered critical news outlets. Reporters have faced harassment and violence from government officials, including members of the national legislature, and press outlets self-censor to evade persecution. Sexual and gender-based violence is widespread; the State Department reports that rape remains "a serious and pervasive problem" despite efforts to address the issue by successive governments as well as nongovernmental organizations operating in Liberia. Access to justice is constrained by an under-resourced, uneven, and often ineffective justice system in which judicial corruption is common, and by social practices and attitudes that discourage reporting and prosecution. In August 2019, President Weah signed into law the Domestic Violence Act, which criminalizes various forms of intimate partner violence, including spousal rapeâlong excluded from legal definitions of sexual assault. That legislation ultimately did not include a provision that would have criminalized female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), which Liberia's legislature has not prohibited despite considerable pressure from the Sirleaf and Weah administrations, donors, and domestic and international civil society groups. The practice remains widespread and is politically sensitive. Same-sex relations are illegal under Liberian law, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex individuals face violence, discrimination, harassment, and hate speech. Interethnic grievances over access to land and other resources have been a source of social and political tension and conflict. Surrounding the 2017 polls, NDI election observers documented derogatory statements and other forms of discriminatory behavior targeting Liberia's Muslim community (roughly 12% of the population) and the largely Muslim Mandingo ethnic group (3%), some of whom were barred from registering or voting. Mandingo mobilization formed the backbone of the 1997-2003 insurgency against Taylor. Since 2017, Liberia has ranked as a Tier 2 Watch List country on the State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, submitted pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386 ). Per the TVPA, failure to improve from Tier 2 Watch List ranking for three consecutive years results in a downgrade to Tier 3 (worst) status, which may carry restrictions on access to certain types of U.S. assistance. The Administration granted Liberia a waiver from such a downgrade in 2019 because the State Department found that Liberia's "government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards" for TIP elimination. Postwar Transitional Justice Efforts Accountability for wartime human rights violations in Liberia remains a highly sensitive topic. A postwar Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which operated between 2005 and 2010, recommended the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, but no such court has been established. This is partly attributable to opposition from former combatants and others likely to be targeted by such a tribunal, some of whom are current or former elected officials. The TRC recommended the prosecution of at least three members of the current legislature. Such individuals wield influence not only within the legislature but also as vote mobilizers at the national level; for instance, Senator Prince Johnson, one of two former armed faction leaders currently serving in Liberia's legislature, arguably was critical to President Weah's winning 2017 political coalition. Opponents of a possible war crimes court also include former President Sirleaf, whom the TRC identified as having provided financial support to Charles Taylor in the early years of Liberia's first civil war. Some Liberians may oppose potential transitional justice measures out of a reluctance to revisit wartime atrocities or fear of rekindling social tensions. In September 2019, President Weah appeared to endorse the establishment of a war crimes court and requested that the legislature advise him on the issue. After Weah's announcement, a resolution calling for a war crimes tribunal quickly garnered the two-thirds support required for passage in Liberia's House of Representatives. Weah subsequently walked back his support for the court, however, and it remains to be seen whether Weah's announcement paves the way for the creation of a court and/or the implementation of other transitional justice measures. U.S. Judicial Responses Some perpetrators of wartime atrocities have faced justice abroad, including in the United States. In 2009, Charles Taylor's U.S.-born son, Roy M. Belfast Jr. (AKA Charles "Chuckie" Taylor), was sentenced to 97 years in prison by a U.S. District Court for wartime acts of torture. Belfast remains the only individual prosecuted in the U.S. judicial system specifically for atrocities committed during Liberia's conflicts. Others have faced immigration-related charges, however, often in relation to fraud or perjury linked to nondisclosure of involvement in wartime abuses in applications for U.S. asylum, residency, or citizenship. Several Liberian nationals have been convicted on such offenses, which can carry lengthy prison sentences and/or result in deportation and loss of citizenship or residency permission. Former armed faction leader George Boley was deported from the United States in 2012 in connection with his involvement in the use of child soldiers. This marked the first deportation under the Child Soldiers Accountability Act ( P.L. 110-340 ), which made use of child soldiers a ground for deportation from the United States. U.S. Relations and Assistance As noted above, the United States played a key role in Liberia's founding, and bilateral ties generally have been close, characterized by substantial U.S. assistance. U.S. engagement in Liberia expanded significantly during the administration of President Sirleaf, under successive U.S. Administrations and with bipartisan support from Congress. Sirleaf addressed a joint session of Congress in 2006, and between FY2006 and FY2018, Congress appropriated over $2.1 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered aid to Liberia to support stabilization, development, security sector reform, and health programs. This total does not include assistance provided via other U.S. agencies and substantial Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid funding (see below). It also excludes U.S. funding for UNMIL provided through assessed contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, as well as U.S. support for Liberia's Ebola response or programs funded through regionally or centrally managed programs. The Trump Administration has expressed support for strong U.S.-Liberia ties. In late 2019, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy hosted the fourth U.S.-Liberia Partnership Dialogue, a high-level diplomatic engagement that most recently focused on "youth engagement, trafficking in persons, economic growth, and strengthening health and education systems." Congress has continued to appropriate sizable bilateral foreign assistance for the country (see below), and has held hearings on its development and governance prospects. Congress also has fostered relations through a House Democracy Partnership (HDP) program with the Liberian legislature, which is one of 21 HDP partner legislatures worldwide. Launched in 2006, the Liberia HDP program has focused on the development of Liberian parliamentary capacity, including through peer-to-peer visits. In October 2019, five Members of Congress visited Liberia, where they met with various legislators and President Weah. Immigration Issues. Liberian immigration to the United States has played a significant role in bilateral relations. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were roughly 85,000 foreign-born individuals from Liberia living in the United States in 2018 (latest available). Liberians in the United States first received Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1991 during the first civil war. In the years since, qualifying Liberians have been granted TPS and/or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED)âtemporary blanket relief from removal provided by the Presidentâin the context of Liberia's conflicts and, later, the Ebola outbreak. Efforts to extend the immigration status of Liberians eligible for such protections have drawn bipartisan congressional support. In March 2019, three days before DED was to expire for certain Liberians resident in the United States since 2002, President Trump reaffirmed the termination but extended the wind-down period through March 30, 2020. In his memorandum, President Trump stated that "Extending the wind-down period will preserve the status quo while the Congress considers remedial legislation" to provide Liberian DED beneficiaries with relief from removal. Congress ultimately granted such relief in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ), which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to adjust the status of eligible Liberian applicantsâthose continuously present in the United States since November 20, 2014, or the immediate family of such individuals, among other criteriaâto lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Current U.S. Assistance Appropriated State Department and USAID-administered assistance for Liberia totaled $112.3 million in FY2018 and $96.5 million in FY2019. Recent U.S. aid largely has focused on health system strengthening and support for public service delivery, civil society capacity building, agriculture sector development, and justice sector improvements. Most U.S. development assistance is implemented by nongovernmental organizations, but the United States has a direct government-to-government financing agreement with Liberia's Ministry of Health that supports health service delivery. The State Department has funded programs to train, equip, advise, and professionalize the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which was established with U.S. support after Liberia's second civil war, and to build the capacity of civilian law enforcement. DOD has conducted periodic trainings for AFL personnel and provided support to Liberia's defense ministry. Liberia also benefits from a State Partnership Program with the Michigan National Guard. The country hosts 94 Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) working on projects related to education and health. In December 2019, the U.S. Embassy withdrew PCVs from several regions due to liquidity challenges associated with withdrawing money from local banks. FY2020 aid allocations for Liberia pursuant to P.L. 116-94 have yet to be made public. The Administration requested $32.6 million in State Department- and USAID-administered aid for Liberia in FY2021, which would represent a 66% decrease from FY2019 appropriations. In successive years, Congress has appropriated aid for Liberia far in excess of the levels proposed in the Trump Administration's budget requests. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Engagement Liberia is currently implementing a five-year, $256.7 million MCC C ompact that entered into force in 2016. The Compact targets two constraints to economic growth: (1) a lack of access to reliable and affordable electricity, and (2) inadequate road infrastructure. The energy project seeks to provide a new hydropower turbine to the Mt. Coffee Hydropower Plant, train electricity sector personnel, and support the creation of an independent energy sector regulator. The roads project aims to build the capacity of Liberian authorities to plan road maintenance. Liberia previously benefitted from a $15 million MCC Threshold Program (2010-2013) focused on expanding girls' access to education, enhancing land rights and access, and promoting trade. In FY2019 and FY2020, Liberia did not secure a passing grade on half of its MCC Scorecardâa prerequisite for a potential second compact. According to its FY2020 scorecard, Liberia failed to meet standards in fiscal and trade policy, regulatory quality, inflation control, land rights and access, government effectiveness, rule of law, and a range of human development measures. Outlook Pressures on Weah's administration are likely to mount. State finances are under increasing strain due to weak economic growth, poor tax administration, declining donor aid, and the departure of UNMIL, which came to play a key role in Liberia's economy. At a time when the government faces popular expectations for dividends from Liberia's postwar transitionâincluding for better infrastructure, improved public services, job creation, and poverty reductionâsurging inflation and a depreciation of the Liberian dollar have contributed to falling purchasing power, rising poverty, and a mounting food security crisis. The IMF has welcomed austerity measures on the part of the government, including cuts to the public sector wage bill, and in late 2019 approved a four-year, $213.6 million program to support macroeconomic adjustments and other reforms. Austerity policies are likely to be domestically unpopular, however, and it remains to be seen whether the Weah administration continues to pursue reforms that may be politically challenging. Efforts to address corruption and other governance demands are likely to encounter pushback from key segments of Liberia's political landscape. Corruption has been a longstanding concern in Liberia and remains prevalent throughout the government, according to the State Department, which has documented a "culture of impunity" in the civil service. Any attempts to enact meaningful anti-corruption measures may thus founder on a lack of political will from legislators and other officials who profit from the current system. Meanwhile, Weah's stated commitment to address mounting calls from civil society and some legislators for postwar transitional justice measures has met with opposition from some legislators who are central to his political coalition. Recent protests and instances of inflammatory rhetoric have raised concerns over political tensions in the country. In May 2019, the U.S. Embassy condemned ethnically divisive statements by politicians, reproaching those who "incite unlawful acts through ill-considered rhetoric that could jeopardize Liberia's hard-won peace and security." The U.S. Embassy also has warned Liberia's opposition against using charged rhetoric, as it has called on the Weah administration to respect political freedoms. Mounting socioeconomic pressures and calls for governance reform and postwar accountability are key challenges facing Liberia's fledgling democracy; how the country's political class responds to such forces will have implications for Liberia's trajectory. U.S.-Liberia ties remain close, and the United States appears poised to continue supporting the country's development, albeit with potentially lower aid allocations than in past years. The United States continues to exert significant influence in the country, and Liberian authorities appear receptive to U.S. engagement, as suggested by President Weah's recent suspension of an official whom the U.S. ambassador had accused of promoting societal divisions. At the same time, the Weah administration's mismanagement of donor assistance may be of concern to some Members of Congress, as may enduring corruption, rising political tensions, persistent institutional weaknesses, and continued inaction on transitional justice measures. Members of Congress may continue to debate the relative effectiveness of various tools for advancing U.S. interests in Liberia, including diplomacy, foreign assistance, and possible punitive measures.