Introduction When Congress considers legislation, it takes into account the proposal's potential budgetary effects . This helps Members to weigh the legislation's merits, and to consider whether it complies with the budgetary rules that Congress has created for itself. While information on the potential budgetary effects of legislation may come from numerous sources, the authority to determine whether legislation complies with congressional budgetary rules is given to the House and Senate Budget Committees. In this capacity, the budget committees generally rely on estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). As described in the following section, cost estimates provided by CBO and JCT are guided by certain requirements that Congress has articulated in different forms. These requirements are not completely prescriptive, however, and as a result both CBO and JCT adopt practices and conventions that guide the creation of cost estimates. Generally, CBO and JCT estimates include projections of the budgetary effects that would result from a proposed policy and incorporate anticipated individual behavioral responses to the policy. The estimates, however, do not typically include the macroeconomic effectsâeffects on the overall size of the economyâof those individual behavioral responses. Congress has sometimes required that JCT and CBO provide estimates that incorporate such macroeconomic effects. These estimates are often referred to as dynamic estimates or dynamic scores . This report provides information on the authorities and requirements under which cost estimates are prepared, as well as a summary of the debate surrounding dynamic cost estimates, and previous rules and requirements related to dynamic estimates. Currently, no congressional rules explicitly require dynamic estimates, and Congress may examine what rules changes, if any, are needed in the area of dynamic estimates. This report, therefore, includes information on options for the creation of dynamic scoring rules, and general considerations for Congress related to dynamic estimates. Authorities and Requirements Under Which Cost Estimates are Prepared Cost estimates provided by CBO and JCT are guided, in part, by certain requirements that have been articulated by Congress in different forms, as described below. The Congressional Budget Act The Congressional Budget Act (CBA) requires that CBO prepare cost estimates for all bills reported from committee, "to the extent practicable." The CBA also requires that (1) CBO rely on estimates provided by JCT for revenue legislation and (2) CBO include in its estimates "the costs which would be incurred" in carrying out the legislation in the fiscal year in which the legislation is to become effective, as well as the four following years, together with "the basis for such estimate." The Baseline When conducting cost estimates, CBO and JCT measure the budgetary effect of a legislative proposal in relation to projections of revenue and spending levels that are assumed to occur under current law, typically referred to as baseline levels. This means that the way a policy is reflected in the baseline will affect how CBO and JCT estimate a related policy. In calculating the baseline, CBO makes its own technical and economic assumptions, but the law generally requires that CBO assume that spending and revenue policies continue or expire based on what is currently slated to occur in statute. For example, CBO's baseline must assume that temporary tax cuts such as those enacted in 2017 actually do expire. The baseline, therefore, shows an increase in the level of revenue expected to be collected after the tax cut provisions expire in law. Therefore, a legislative proposal to continue those tax cut provisions would be scored as increasing the deficit. Although baseline calculations generally require that direct (mandatory) spending program levels reflect what is scheduled to occur in law, important exceptions exist for many direct spending programs. In particular, any program with estimated current year outlays greater than $50 million is assumed to continue to operate under the terms of the law at the time of its expiration. This means that some programs that are slated in law to expire are assumed to continue in the baseline. A legislative proposal that sought to merely continue those expired programs would therefore not be scored as new spending. Scorekeeping Guidelines When creating cost estimates, CBO adheres to scorekeeping guidelines, which are "specific rules for determining the budgetary effects of legislation." These general guidelines are used by the scorekeepersâthe House and Senate Budget Committees, CBO, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)âto ensure that each group uses consistent and established practices. The 17 scorekeeping guidelines include general principles, such as a requirement that mandatory spending provisions included in appropriations bills be counted against the Appropriations Committee spending allocation, and direction on how asset sales are to be scored. The guidelines have been revised and expanded over the years, and any changes or additions to the scorekeeping guidelines are first approved by each of the scorekeepers. Chamber Rules and the Budget Resolution Congress sometimes directs the creation and content of cost estimates through chamber rules and provisions contained in budget resolutions. As described subsequently, House rules have sometimes explicitly required CBO and JCT to include in cost estimates information on a policy proposal's projected macroeconomic feedback effects. Similarly, Congress has also used the budget resolution to provide direction on how a policy ought to be estimated. For example, budget resolutions have included provisions requiring that transfers from the Treasury's general fund to the Highway Trust Fund be counted as new spending. Similarly, budget resolutions have stated that certain policies cannot be counted as offsets, such as Federal Reserve System surpluses transferred to the Treasury's general fund, as well as increases or extensions of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae guarantee fees. The Budget Committees and Tax Committees Congressional committees may also shape the content or creation of cost estimates. The House and Senate Budget Committees have jurisdiction over CBO, and the CBA specifies that CBO's "primary duty and function" is to assist the budget committees. Oversight of CBO, as well as the creation and content of cost estimates is, therefore, under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Budget Committees, and the budget committees provide related guidance to CBO. For the JCT, the creation and content of its estimates may be shaped by the committee itself, or by guidance or assumptions of the tax committeesâthe House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. Overview of Dynamic Estimating Generally, CBO and JCT estimates include projections of the budgetary effects that would result from proposed policy changes, and incorporate anticipated individual behavioral responses to the policy. The estimates, however, do not typically include the macroeconomic effects of those individual behavioral responses (such as changes in labor supply and the capital stock) that would alter GDP. For example, if an increase in the corporate tax rate caused corporations to use more debt, conventional estimates would take into account the loss of revenue since the returns from debt are taxed more lightly than the returns from equity, and this loss in revenue would offset the revenue gain calculated by multiplying the change in the tax rate by corporate income. The conventional estimate would not, however, take into account the lost revenue from a reduction in income if the rate increase caused a decline in investment, which affects production. These estimates without macroeconomic effects are sometimes imprecisely referred to as "static," but are referred to in this report as conventional estimates because they take into account many behavioral responses. In contrast, a dynamic score aims to account for legislation's macroeconomic effect, by incorporating changes to (1) aggregate demand for goods and services to increase output in an underemployed economy and/or (2) aggregate supply of goods and services ( supply - side effects ) to increase potential output. For example, dynamic scoring can include fiscal stimulus effects that increase aggregate demand. These effects occur when the economy is underemployed (for example, during and after a recession), and increased spending either by the government or from taxpayers after a tax cut can expand the economy through multiplier effects and cause output to move closer to potential output. These effects are referred to subsequently as demand - side effects . Supply-side effects occur if potential output is altered due to changes in investment or savings that increase the capital stock, labor supply, or productivity. The crowding-out (or -in) effect occurs when an increase (or decrease) in the deficit reduces (or increases) funds available for private investment and hence reduces (or increases) the capital stock. Increased Interest in Dynamic Estimating Congressional interest in dynamic estimating has increased in recent decades. This interest may be attributed to the increase in the number of House and Senate rules restricting budgetary legislation. Because bills and resolutions are expected to comply with these congressional rules, estimates of a measure's fiscal impact arguably become more important. Interest in dynamic scoring is also likely related to recent advancements in economic analysis and economic modeling that make estimating macroeconomic feedback effects possible. Views on Dynamic Estimating Both proponents and opponents of dynamic estimating point to accuracy and consistency as their primary objectives. Some have suggested that dynamic scoring is useful, but only under certain circumstances. Arguments for Dynamic Estimating Arguments in favor of dynamic scoring include the view that dynamic scoring provides a more accurate assessment of budgetary impact than conventional scoring, particularly for some types of legislative proposals, and that conventional estimating methods produce a projection that does not reflect the actual expected impact on revenues. Under this argument, dynamic scoring makes use of all available information, and excluding macroeconomic feedback effects "amounts to throwing away valuable information." It has also been argued that including macroeconomic effects can improve Congress's ability to compare competing policy proposals. Arguments in favor of dynamic scoring state that these estimates are required for the sake of consistency, especially for large legislative packages that would likely affect the economy. As stated above, a legislative proposal's budgetary impact is measured against a baseline, and that baseline takes into account macroeconomic assumptions. It is, therefore, argued that certain legislative proposals should also take into account economic assumptions. If such legislation were to be enacted into law, CBO would then build that policy into its baseline, and would have to make assumptions about the macroeconomic feedback effects that would be expected to occur under those policies. It is only consistent, the argument goes, to use macroeconomic feedback effects in the initial estimate of the legislation as well. Advocates for dynamic scoring also state that not using a dynamic approach to measure the impact of policy changes biases the legislative process against policy proposals that are designed to encourage productive economic activity. Some have argued that under conventional estimating methods, the impact of a cut in the marginal tax rates, for example, is viewed (through the lens of budgetary outcomes) less favorably than it should be. It has also been argued that, methodologically, the production of quality dynamic estimates is now possible due to technical advances in modeling and analysis, and an increase in evidence showing public responses to policy changes. Some have pointed out that both CBO and JCT are capable of producing dynamic estimates, and JCT staff have stated that, with regard to macroeconomic estimates, "we think we have been producing reasonable results for over a decade (though we welcome comments and discussion)." Arguments Against Dynamic Estimating Likewise, arguments against dynamic estimates also point to concerns about accuracy and consistency. Those who oppose the use of dynamic scoring argue that projected macroeconomic feedback effects are too uncertain to be relied upon as accurate projections of budgetary outcomes. Projecting macroeconomic feedback effects requires economic modeling, and it has been said that "because reasonable people can disagree about what model, and what parameters of that model, are best, the results from dynamic scoring will always be controversial." Previous macroeconomic analyses by CBO and JCT have yielded a range of estimates depending on what type of model is used and the underlying behavioral assumptions in each model. With assumptions about the behavioral responses that determine macroeconomic feedback being so uncertain, it has been argued that there is consistency in assuming, for all legislative proposals, that GDP remains the same, regardless of changes in tax or spending policy. Arguments against dynamic scoring often point to potential problems with cost estimating in general, but note that under dynamic scoring these vulnerabilities may be exacerbated. For example, as mentioned above, all cost estimates are inherently uncertain. Dynamic estimates are always subject to more uncertainty, even for relatively simple tax changes, because of the uncertainty of taxpayer responses (such as consumer spending and labor supply). In contrast, many conventional estimates (such as the effect of rate changes in the tax code or changes to exemptions and deductions) may be estimated quite precisely because data are readily available on income levels and family characteristics. Similarly, while cost estimates generally might always have the potential to be perceived as subject to manipulation by political forces, it has been argued that this possibility is exacerbated with dynamic scoring, which might damage the budget process's credibility. Arguments for Dynamic Estimating Under Certain Circumstances Some have argued that dynamic estimates would be useful for Congress but only in certain situations. It has been argued that dynamic estimates should be provided by CBO and JCT but only for "major proposals" such as those that have a large estimated budgetary impact or those designated as "major" by either majority or minority committee and/or chamber leadership. (Recent dynamic scoring rules [discussed below] used a similar threshold.) It has been stated that neither CBO nor JCT have sufficient time or staff to carefully estimate the macroeconomic effects of every proposal for which they must conduct an estimate. (To this end, it has also been argued that dynamic estimates should be conducted only when CBO and JCT have the time and tools necessary to conduct the analysis.) Further, it has been stated that dynamic estimates should be conducted for spending as well as revenue proposals because each have the potential to produce notable macroeconomic effects. (As stated below, in some years dynamic estimates were required only for revenue legislation.) It has also been argued that dynamic estimates should be provided for discretionary spending as well as direct/mandatory spending. As stated below, even when dynamic scoring requirements applied to spending as well as revenue, these rules excluded discretionary spending legislation (i.e., appropriations legislation). Previous Dynamic Scoring Rules and Requirements While committees and Members continue to have the ability to request that CBO or JCT provide dynamic estimates for certain policies or legislative proposals, for the first time in decades there are no explicit congressional rules or requirements that pertain specifically to the preparation or use of such estimates. As described below, rules related to dynamic estimates have varied over the years. 1997-2002 In January 1997, the House first adopted a rule that explicitly mentioned dynamic estimates. It stated that a dynamic estimate provided by JCT could be included in the committee report accompanying "major tax legislation" (as designated by the House majority leader), but that the estimate could be used "for informational purposes only." The rule, which was in effect through 2002, defined a dynamic estimate as "a projection based in any part on assumptions concerning probable effects of macroeconomic feedback" and required that the estimate include a statement identifying all such assumptions. When the new rule was adopted in January 1997, JCT staff hosted a symposium entitled "Modeling the Macroeconomic Consequences of Tax Policy." According to JCT This symposium presented the results of a year-long modeling experiment by economists noted for their work in developing models of the U.S. economy. The purpose of this experiment was to explore the predictions of a variety of models regarding the macroeconomic feedback effects of major changes in the U.S. tax code with a focus on evaluating the feasibility of using these types of results to enhance the U.S. budgeting process. 2003-2014 In January 2003, the House replaced its previous dynamic scoring rule with a more extensive rule, which remained in effect through 2014. Whereas the previous rule had permitted a dynamic estimate to be included in a committee report, the new House rule required it. Further, whereas the previous rule had applied only to bills designated as "major tax legislation," the new rule applied to any bill reported by the House Committee on Ways and Means that proposed to amend the Internal Revenue Code. The new rule also omitted the previous provision that explicitly required the estimate be "used for informational purposes only." The new rule no longer used the term "dynamic estimate" but instead used the term "macroeconomic impact analysis," which the rule defined as an estimate provided by JCT "of the changes in economic output, employment, capital stock, and tax revenues expected to result from enactment of the proposal." The estimate was required to identify critical assumptions and the source of data underlying that estimate. Around the time of the rule's adoption in 2003, the JCT released a report providing an overview of the joint committee's efforts to model macroeconomic effects of proposed tax legislation. While varying in length and detail, the macroeconomic analyses provided by JCT during this period (2003-2014) included information on the expected macroeconomic effects (if any) of the proposed legislation, provided general conclusions, and sometimes provided a range of potential budgetary effects using different models and different assumptions within models. The analyses did not include a specific dollar amount or point estimate . These analyses also reported details of the effects on different aspects of the economy (such as labor supply, output, and capital stock). In addition, the estimates often referenced the model(s) used for the analysis. During this time the JCT used four different types of models. Crucially, all of these models incorporated the impact of supply-side effects in their dynamic estimates. Only the MEG and GI model also incorporated demand-side effects (for a brief discussion of these effects, see " Overview of Dynamic Estimating "). The models are briefly described below: 1. MEG: a macroeconomic growth (MEG) model that incorporates aggregate demand effects similar to those in most economic forecasting models and includes labor and savings responses. (This model falls into a class of steady state growth models called Solow models, discussed below.) 2. OLG: an overlapping generations (OLG) life-cycle model that assumes that generations of individuals optimize choices of consumption and leisure over a lifetime and cannot include demand-side effects. 3. GI: a Global Insight (GI) private econometric forecasting model that captures demand-side effects. 4. DSGE: a domestic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that assumes that individuals optimize over infinite lifetimes and often does not, without modification, capture aggregate demand effects to decrease unemployment. In the past the JCT also had different behavioral responses within models (e.g., a high and low labor supply response in MEG). During this period, the JCT prepared five published macroeconomic estimates of legislative proposals: one (in 2003, for the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, P.L. 108-27 ) that used MEG, GI, and OLG; two that used MEG only (the 2009 economic stimulus legislation and the 2009 Affordable Care Act) and two that used MEG and OLG (a bill extending bonus depreciation in 2014 and the Tax Reform Act of 2014). Several bills were examined but were too small for a macroeconomic analysis. The GI model was dropped after 2003, and the DSGE model was introduced in 2006. That model did not allow unemployment. None of the published analyses of legislation used the DSGE model. The JCT also provided illustrative analysis for different types of proposals on two occasions: to compare individual rate cuts, corporate rate cuts, and increases in the personal exemption in 2005 and to examine a revenue-neutral tax cut that broadened the individual income tax base and lowered the rate in 2006. The first analysis used MEG and the second used the MEG, OLG, and DSGE models. 2015-2018 During this period, dynamic estimates were required to be conducted for revenue and mandatory spending legislation that met the threshold of "major legislation" under both a House rule and budget resolutions. House Rule In 2015, the House replaced its former rule with House Rule XIII, clause 8. The new rule, which was in effect through 2018, expanded the type of legislation for which dynamic estimates were to be conducted to include not just revenue proposals, but also mandatory spending proposals. This meant that the rule now required dynamic estimates from CBO as well as JCT, but only for "major legislation," which was defined as (1) legislation that would be projected (in a conventional cost estimate) to cause an annual gross budgetary effect of at least 0.25% of projected U.S. GDP, (2) mandatory spending legislation designated as major legislation by the chair of the House Budget Committee, or (3) revenue legislation designated as major legislation by the chair or vice chair of the JCT. Although not explicitly stated in the new rule, the rules change resulted in dynamic estimates, for the first time, including a point estimate (i.e., a specific dollar amount) as opposed to a range of potential budgetary outcomes. Under this rule, the estimates would incorporate the budgetary effects of changes in economic output, employment, capital stock, and other macroeconomic variables resulting from such legislation. The estimate was, to the extent practicable, to include a qualitative assessment of the long-term budgetary effects and macroeconomic variables of such legislation, and to identify critical assumptions and the source of data underlying the estimate. Budget Resolutions During this period, Congress also used the budget resolution to direct CBO and JCT to provide dynamic estimates. The budget resolutions agreed to by both the House and Senate for fiscal years 2016 and 2018 included provisions that required dynamic estimates in both houses for the 114 th and 115 th Congresses. The requirements included in these provisions were very similar to the House rule described above. The dynamic estimates were required to be conducted for revenue and mandatory spending legislation that met the threshold of "major legislation." Major legislation was again described as legislation that would be projected (in a conventional cost estimate) to cause an annual gross budgetary effect of at least 0.25% of projected U.S. GDP, but this version of the rule excluded any legislation that met this criterion as a result of a timing shift. To accommodate the Senate's constitutional authority to approve treaties, the rule expanded the definition of major legislation to include any treaty with an impact of at least $15 billion in that fiscal year. And the definition of major legislation also included any mandatory spending legislation designated as major legislation by the chair of the House or Senate Budget Committee, or revenue legislation designated as major legislation by the chair or vice chair of the JCT. As with the House rule, these estimates were required to incorporate the budgetary effects of changes in economic output, employment, capital stock, and other macroeconomic variables resulting from such legislation. The estimate was, to the extent practicable, to include a qualitative assessment of the long-term budgetary effects and macroeconomic variables of such legislation, and to identify critical assumptions and the source of data underlying the estimate. For the Senate provision applying to the 115 th Congress, the estimates were to include the distributional effects across income categories, to the extent practicable. Although not explicitly stated in the provisions, the requirements resulted in dynamic estimates, including a point estimate (i.e., a specific dollar amount) as opposed to a range of potential budgetary outcomes. Although the House and Senate Budget Committees might presumably have used such point estimates as the official estimate for the purposes of budget enforcement (under the authority granted by Section 312 of the CBA), the Senate Budget Committee communicated that the dynamic estimates would be used for informational purposes only. Estimating Practices Estimates during the 2015-2018 period included a point estimate that provided a conventional estimate and the macroeconomic effects for a 10-year period. The JCT currently uses the three models previously discussed: MEG, OLG, and DSGE. In the past the JCT also had different behavioral responses within models (e.g., a high and low labor supply response in MEG). In 2014 JCT had only the MEG and OLG models; the first introduction of the DSGE model in a published estimate for legislation was in 2017. Discussions of the DSGE model in 2018 suggested that it now allowed unemployment. CBO has two models that assume full employment. One is a long-term model that CBO refers to as a "Solow growth model" and the other is a life cycle model. (The Solow growth model is similar to the long-term growth aspects of MEG and the life cycle model is an OLG model. The similarities reflect the way they incorporate behavioral responses.) The Solow model has stronger and weaker labor supply responses and the OLG model has alternative assumptions about how the model was to be closed and whether local or worldwide interest rates predominated. CBO also has a separate short-term model that can capture fiscal stimulus that reduces unemployment, while JCT combines short-term and long-term effects in its MEG and DSGE models. Beginning in 2003, JCT and CBO presented results from more than one model and with different behavioral assumptions within models. Beginning in 2015, when point estimates were provided, the JCT reported a single estimate that was a weighted average of the various models' point estimates. JCT provided information on the weights used, but did not separately report the different models' point estimates when more than one model was used. Also, in contrast to past informational macroeconomic modeling, there was no reported sensitivity analysis within the models (sensitivity analysis effectively measures how macroeconomic effects may change under different behavioral assumptions, such as how much a change in tax rates affects labor supply). In the four analyses that JCT reported on, in the first two cases (in 2015) only MEG, with the high rather than the low labor response assumption, was used. In the case of the major 2017 tax revision, MEG was weighted at 40%, OLG at 40%, and DSGE at 20%. In the final case, MEG was weighted at 40% and OLG and DSGE were each weighted at 30%. CBO and JCT jointly estimated the effects of some bills associated with repeal of the Affordable Care Act or modification of that act (JCT estimated certain tax provisions and CBO estimated the other provisions). JCT used the MEG model and CBO used its Solow model along with its short-term model, each with a single set of labor supply responses. CBO had been preparing macroeconomic analyses of the President's budget since 2003, reporting the results from multiple models and assumptions. When CBO prepared its standard analysis of the President's budget in 2015 and 2016, the analysis continued to report the results from both models, along with estimates of immigration's effect on productivity, with sensitivity analysis within the models leading to 16 different estimated effects on GDP over 10 years ranging from 0.7% to 2.8%. CBO has not prepared any subsequent macroeconomic analyses of the President's budget. Considerations for Congress Currently, no House or Senate rules explicitly require the preparation or use of dynamic estimates, and Congress may choose to examine what rules changes, if any, are needed in the area of dynamic estimates. While committees and Members continue to have the ability to request that CBO or JCT provide dynamic estimates for certain policies or legislative proposals, at some point Congress may choose to reinstitute explicit rules related to such dynamic estimates. These requirements could be articulated as formal direction from the committees of jurisdiction or leadership to JCT and CBO. Alternatively, as was done previously, these requirements might be included in chamber rules or in budget resolutions, or might be included in a standing order or in statute. If Congress were to reinstitute explicit rules related to dynamic estimates, it may choose to consider many facets of such potential rules: Will there be a threshold for the creation of such estimates? Should the proposal also allow the legislation to be designated as "major" by either majority or minority committee and/or chamber leadership? Should CBO and JCT provide dynamic estimates only for "major proposals," such as those that have a large estimated budgetary impact? If so, what will be the threshold for major? Past rules have used a measure equal to 0.25% of GDP. Would the effect on GDP be measured by the entire legislation, or would it be triggered by an individual provision or group of provisions (such as revenue raisers or revenue losers in a tax bill) that met the threshold? The latter approach would capture revenue-neutral legislation that nevertheless made significant changes that could affect GDP. Should rules for dynamic estimates apply to spending as well as revenue proposals since both have the potential to cause notable macroeconomic effects? And if the rule applies to spending, will it apply to discretionary spending that varies from the baseline as well as direct/mandatory spending? What information should be included in such estimates? Practices prior to 2015 provided insight into how sensitive the results were to choice of model and parameters. The JCT has also continued to present information on the parameters of its models that lead to behavioral responses. The justification for assigning model weights might also be addressed in more detail. Should dynamic estimates be used only for informational purposes, or also for enforcement purposes? Dynamic estimates allow Congress to weigh the merits of the legislationâshould they also be used to determine whether the legislation complies with the budgetary rules that Congress has created for itself? Should additional resources be provided to CBO and JCT so that they might develop greater capacity for providing dynamic estimates?


Background Confucius Institutes are entities that seek to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries. Their establishment is guided by Hanban, which is headquartered in Beijing, China, and, according to various sources, is affiliated with the Chinese government’s Ministry of Education. The first Confucius Institute in the United States was established in 2004, and there were approximately 525 institutes worldwide as of September 2018, according to Hanban’s website. Most Confucius Institutes in the United States are based at colleges and universities. We identified 96 Confucius Institutes in operation at U.S. colleges and universities in 44 states and the District of Columbia as of January 2019. See our February 2019 report on Confucius Institutes for a full list of the schools and their locations. Figure 1 shows U.S. states with one or more Confucius Institute on college or university campuses. Additionally, in recent years, some U.S. universities have partnered with Chinese universities to establish degree-granting institutions in China approved by the country’s government. The Chinese government requires that U.S. universities seeking to establish such an education arrangement in China partner with a Chinese university, and establish written agreements with the Chinese university defining the academics, governance, operations, finances, and other aspects of the arrangement. At the time of our review in August 2016, the 12 institutions we reviewed ranged from fewer than 40 to more than 3,000 students. More than 90 percent of the students across the 12 institutions were Chinese, and less than 6 percent were U.S. citizens. Confucius Institute Arrangements Vary Across Universities, and Stakeholders Have Identified Related Benefits, Concerns, and Suggestions for Improvement Confucius Institute Management, Operations, and Agreements Vary by School Management In February 2019, we reported that Confucius Institutes in the United States that we reviewed were established as a partnership between a U.S. school and a Chinese college or university, funded and arranged in part by Hanban. Management of the institutes varies by school. Some Confucius Institutes at U.S. schools are part of an academic department or an administrative office, while others report directly to the school president or other school leadership. Confucius Institute personnel generally consist of a Confucius Institute director or directors, Confucius Institute teachers, and a board of directors. At the 10 case study schools that were part of our review, the Confucius Institute director was a U.S. school employee—either a school administrator, faculty member, or professional hired to manage the Confucius Institute. In addition, several case study schools had a Chinese assistant director, who reported to the Confucius Institute director from the United States, and often was an employee at the Chinese partner university. School Officials, Researchers, and Others Identified Both Benefits and Concerns, and Suggested Ways to Improve Confucius Institutes Perspectives on Institute Benefits In February 2019, we reported that officials we interviewed from case study schools stated that Confucius Institutes’ benefits include opportunities for schools to forge international connections and receive funding and other resources for China-related programs. These officials noted that because Hanban pays the salaries of Confucius Institute teachers who teach language and assist with Chinese programs at schools, sparing the schools these costs, these schools could offer Chinese language courses even when enrollment was low. Case study school officials also stated that Confucius Institutes provide valuable resources and opportunities to increase knowledge of and exposure to China and Chinese culture within the school and in the broader community. Perspectives on Concerns Related to Institutes Case study school officials, researchers, and others we interviewed also offered various perspectives on whether having Confucius Institutes on campuses could bring about undue Chinese influence. These parties discussed the potential for or absence of Chinese interference in events and activities at the institute and on campus. They also expressed views on Confucius Institute teacher hiring, and quality of those teachers. Several school officials, researchers, and others we interviewed expressed concerns that hosting a Confucius Institute could limit events or activities critical of China—including events at the institute and elsewhere on campus. Two officials who expressed these concerns were faculty members at one case study school who have not applied for Confucius Institute funding for a research project because they believed Hanban would not approve of the topic. In contrast, officials at multiple case study schools noted that U.S. school faculty members make all decisions regarding conference themes, guest speakers, and topics for events at their institute. Officials at some schools offered examples of events and activities their Confucius Institute had sponsored that addressed topics that could be considered critical of China. Specifically, they reported hosting a conference discussing intellectual property in relation to China and events on Tibet, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and religion in China. In addition, multiple researchers and others we spoke with expressed concerns with the Confucius Institute teacher selection process whereby Hanban or the Chinese partner school accepts initial applications from potential Confucius Institute teachers and proposes candidates to the U.S. school. These individuals noted that the Chinese entities could use such a process to effectively screen out candidates based on inappropriate criteria, such as political or religious affiliation. Officials we interviewed at multiple case study schools that had Confucius Institute teachers, however, expressed no concerns about the process for hiring teachers. School officials stated that they believed their school generally controlled the hiring process and were thus satisfied with it. Most officials emphasized that while institute teachers often come from the Chinese partner university, and are referred by the partner or Hanban, the U.S. school makes the final hiring selection. Suggestions for Improvement Case study school officials, researchers, and others also suggested ways to improve the institutes, including changing the language in agreements governing Confucius Institutes and policies for sharing these agreements. These parties stated that schools should remove the confidentiality section of their agreements and make the agreements publicly available online. Several researchers and others also emphasized that making the agreements publicly available would dispel questions and concerns over their contents. Several representatives of higher education institutions told us that they believed the confidentiality language in agreements was unnecessary and schools should consider removing it from their agreements. A few case study school officials, researchers, and others we interviewed stated that schools should include stronger language in the agreements to make it clearer that the U.S. school has executive decision-making authority. School officials and others we interviewed suggested other steps that schools could take to ensure they protect against undue Chinese influence. Several school officials stated that the schools should clearly delineate between the Confucius Institutes’ programs and their own Chinese language programs, such as by locating the institute apart from these departments within the school’s organizational structure. A few school officials and others noted that Confucius Institute teachers should not teach credit-bearing courses, even if those courses use curriculum developed by the school’s language department. One school administrator, who stated that his school’s Confucius Institute would never have a Chinese assistant director because the position suggests an excessive degree of Chinese influence, recommended that other schools remove the Chinese assistant director position from their institutes. Officials from two case study schools and others we interviewed stated that schools should organize events through the institute specifically intended to address what some might perceive as a topic sensitive to Chinese interests to demonstrate the school and institute were not subject to undue Chinese influence. U.S. Universities in China Emphasized Academic Freedom but Faced Internet Censorship and Other Constraints U.S. Universities Reported Receiving Support from Chinese Entities, with Limited U.S. Support In August 2016, we reported that the 12 U.S. universities we reviewed generally reported receiving support for their institutions in China from their Chinese partner universities and from Chinese government entities, with limited funding from U.S. government agencies and private donors. Most universities reported being granted land, resources for construction of buildings, and the use of the Chinese university’s campus facilities. The amount of support reported by the universities varied widely and was in some cases substantial. For example, one university reported receiving nearly 500 acres of land and a commitment from the Chinese provincial and local governments to spend about $240 million for construction and development of facilities. Five of the 12 universities reported receiving federal funding, which in most cases consisted of federal financial aid to U.S. students. Agreements between U.S. and Chinese Partners and Other Policies Generally Outlined Academic Freedom Protections At the time of our review, most universities we reviewed included language in their written agreements or other policies that either embodied a protection of academic freedom or indicated that the institution in China will adhere to academic standards commensurate with those at their U.S. campus. Six universities in our review included language in either their written agreements or other university policies that indicated a protection of academic freedom, such as permitting students to pursue research in relevant topics and allowing students to freely ask questions in the classroom. For example, one university’s agreement stated that all members of and visitors to the institution in China will have unlimited freedoms of expression and inquiry and will not be restricted in the selection of research, lecture, or presentation topics. Another three universities’ written agreements included language indicating that the institution in China will adhere to academic standards commensurate with either the U.S. campus or the university’s accrediting agency or other authoritative bodies. Fewer agreements addressed other types of protections at the time of our review. About half of the universities GAO reviewed addressed access to information, such as providing faculty and students with access to physical or online libraries, though a few universities’ agreements and policies include language protecting internet access. Written agreements and policies for about half of the universities we reviewed included language that suggested a protection of at least one of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion or worship, though the number of universities addressing each freedom varies. For example, regarding freedom of speech, student and faculty handbooks at a few of these universities contained language indicating that students have the ability to discuss sensitive topics. Regarding freedom of religion or worship, several of the universities included language in their policy documents indicating that religious practices will be protected. U.S. University Members Generally Indicated They Experienced Academic Freedom, but Internet Censorship and Other Factors Posed Challenges The more than 130 faculty and students we interviewed from universities’ institutions in China during our 2016 review generally reported that academic freedom had not been restricted. Faculty told us they did not face academic restrictions and could teach or study whatever they chose. For example, several faculty members asserted that neither they nor their colleagues would tolerate any academic restrictions, and one faculty member told us he and his colleagues intentionally introduced class discussions on politically sensitive topics to test whether this would trigger any complaints or attempted censorship. Students also generally indicated that they experienced academic freedom and could study or discuss any topic. Some students who had also studied or knew others who studied at Chinese universities contrasted their experiences at a U.S. institution in China, noting that they could have interactive dialogue with faculty, discuss sensitive topics, and freely access information at the U.S. institution but not at a Chinese university. Through interviews and responses to our questionnaire, university administrators reported that academic freedom was integral to their institutions in China. Administrators at several universities told us that academic freedom was nonnegotiable, while others noted that the same curriculum used in the United States also applied to their institution in China. However, fewer than half of the universities we reviewed had uncensored internet access at the time of our review. We visited universities with and without uncensored internet access, and observed university members accessing search engines, newspapers, and social media sites that have been blocked in China—such as the New York Times, Google, and Facebook—at some universities but not others. At several universities that lacked uncensored internet access, students and faculty told us that, as a result, they sometimes faced challenges teaching, conducting research, and completing coursework. For example, one faculty member told us that she sometimes asked others outside of mainland China to conduct internet research for her because they can access information she could not. Several students at another university told us their ability to conduct academic research was constrained by the internet limitations. We also reported in August 2016 that additional factors that could create obstacles to learning at U.S. universities in China, including self- censorship and constraints specific to Chinese students. Administrators, faculty, and students representing more than half of the universities we reviewed gave examples of self-censorship, including some cases where individuals were advised by teachers or others in positions of authority to avoid certain topics. For example, an administrator at one university noted that he believed it was advisable, as a guest of China, to refrain from insulting China, while an administrator at another university noted that the university advised teachers to avoid discussing sensitive subjects in class. In addition, we found that some conditions specific to Chinese students may constrain their academic experience. For example, some noted that Chinese students may know or suspect that their Chinese classmates are government or Communist Party monitors and will report on whatever the students say. An administrator at one university told us that he assumed there were Chinese students and faculty in the institution who reported to the government or the Communist Party about the activities of other Chinese students. Faculty members at several universities told us that they understood there were Chinese students in class who intended to report on the speech of faculty or Chinese students. Finally, we also observed that three of the 12 universities we reviewed that were approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education as having independent legal status shared characteristics that may be correlated with greater academic and other freedoms on campus. We found that these three universities had campuses built specifically for the joint institution that were located relatively far away from their Chinese university partner’s campus, generally controlled their own day-to-day operations, had uncensored internet access, and offered extensive campus and student life programs. In contrast, the other nine universities we reviewed did not consistently share these characteristics at the time of our review. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 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