Introduction Under the terms of the U.S. Constitution, it is the responsibility of the House to impeach (meaning, formally accuse) a federal officer of high crimes and misdemeanors, and the responsibility of the Senate to try and then possibly convict that officer. The Senate therefore does not initiate impeachment proceedings, but instead acts after the House has charged a federal officer with wrongdoing. The Constitution grants the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments, and establishes four requirements for an impeachment trial in the Senate: (1) the support of two-thirds of Senators present is necessary to convict; (2) Senators must take an oath or an affirmation; (3) the punishments the Senate can issue cannot extend further than removal from office and disqualification from holding future office; and (4) in the case of a presidential impeachment trial, the Chief Justice, and not the Vice President or a Senator, is the presiding officer. All other trial procedures are left to the Senate to determine itself. Indeed, in 1993, the Supreme Court ruledâin response to a claim by an impeached federal judge that his trial was unconstitutional because the Senate relied, in part, on a committee to collect evidenceâthat the judicial branch did not have a role to play in assessing the validity of Senate impeachment procedures. According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution placed a few specific requirements on the trial, and "their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings." In each of the 15 impeachment trials the Senate has completed since 1789, the Senate has therefore determined its method of proceeding. Although attention was certainly paid to past precedent, the Senate established unique procedures for each trial to some extent, and sometimes the decisions reached regarding process were consensual or even unanimous. Notably, of the 5 full trials conducted in the last 80 years, 4 were of federal judges. In these four cases the Senate appointed a trial committee, composed of an equal number of Senators from each party, to hear and consider evidence and report it to the Senate. This history did not provide the Senate with a robust set of precedents to look to for guidance on how to conduct a modern trial, particularly if a committee will not be used. Trial committees were not intended to be used for presidential impeachments, and the only trial since 1936 conducted without a committee was that of President William Jefferson Clinton. That trial illustrates the many procedural decisions reached that were tailored for that particular set of circumstances. This report summarizes the existing rules and some past practices of the Senate related to an impeachment trial of a federal official. It does not discuss possible grounds for impeachment or other Constitutional or legal issues which are addressed in CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution , by Legislative Attorneys Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. The information presented in this report is drawn from published sources of congressional rules and precedents, as well as the public record of past impeachment trial proceedings. It provides an overview of the procedures and should not be treated or cited as an authority on congressional proceedings. Consultation with the Office of the Senate Parliamentarian is always advised regarding the possible application of rules and precedents. History of the Impeachment Rules of the Senate The Senate adopted a set of impeachment rules in 1868, recommended by a select committee appointed for that purpose, in anticipation of the trial of President Andrew Johnson. These were not the first rules regarding impeachment ever agreed to in the Senate. The Senate had agreed to rules for its two earliest impeachment trials (Senator William Blount, 1798-1799, and District Judge John Pickering, 1803-1804), but it seems to have considered the rules to apply only to the trial of that particular individual. For the third impeachment trial, that of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase (1804-1805), the Senate approved 19 impeachment rules, and these rules appear to have been used in the next two trials (District Judge James H. Peck, 1831-1832, and District Judge West H. Humphreys, 1862). The 1868 select committee in the Johnson impeachment was explicit in its intent to recommend permanent rules, deeming it "proper, to report general rules for the trial of all impeachments." The select committee recommended 25 rules, many of which were the same as those adopted for the Chase trial, and some of which codified practices from previous trials. The rules reported by the 1868 select committee in the Johnson impeachment chiefly concerned the mode and manner of preparing for a trial. Some Senators argued that impeachment rules should not be too prescriptive regarding the actual trial proceedings, believing such decisions to be best made after the Senate had convened for the trial. They recognized that the outcome of a trial could depend "upon the rulings and mode of proceeding during the trial." But the lack of detail in the rules also reflected the nature of Senate proceedings in the middle of the 19 th century. Without designated party floor leaders and with very few staff, Senators were accustomed to discussing procedures on the floor, effectively working out a method of proceeding on legislation as they went along. The Senate adopted the rules reported by the select committee, and they have operated as the rules for impeachment trials since 1868, with very few changes. During the Johnson trial, when disputes arose about the interpretation of the rules, the Senate agreed to three changes to clarify their intent. Despite calls to revise the rules for the impeachment trials conducted early in the 20 th century, the impeachment rules were not changed again until 1935. At that time, the Senate, in response to reported low attendance by Senators during the 1933 trial of district judge Harold Louderback, agreed to the current Rule XI, which allows for the establishment of a committee to receive evidence and hear testimony from witnesses (see discussion of trial committees below). The Senate next reviewed its impeachment rules in 1974, when the House was expected to impeach President Richard Nixon. (The House had not impeached a federal officer since 1936.) At that time, the Senate directed the Committee on Rules and Administration to examine Senate impeachment rules and precedents with a view toward recommending necessary revisions for the conduct of a trial. The Committee met twice to discuss the rules and to pose questions to the Senate Parliamentarian and his assistant, and over two additional days it also heard testimony from Senators regarding the rules. The Majority Leader wrote a letter to the Rules Committee proposing significant changes to the impeachment rules, and the Committee discussed these proposed changes as well. The Rules Committee reported an original resolution (S.Res. 390, 93 rd Congress) proposing adjustments to 13 of the 26 rules. Of the suggested changes, nearly all were meant to clarify the meaning of the rule or to codify what had been the practice in past trials. The Committee did not recommend any major changes to the rules or report any new rules. As the accompanying committee report explained, "there appeared to be a consensus among the Members that for the most part the existing rules should be retained and that amendments thereto should be proposed only with the most valid justification." The Senate, however, never took up the resolution reported by the Rules Committee in 1974 because President Nixon resigned before being impeached by the House. Twelve years later, when the House next impeached an officer, the Senate again directed the Rules and Administration Committee to review the rules. The Rules Committee in 1986 recommended the changes that had been approved by the committee in 1974, and the Senate agreed to them. No further changes have been made to the impeachment rules. The rules, formally titled the "Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on the Trial of Impeachments" are printed in the Senate Manual as well as in a 1986 Senate document that also describes precedents and practices at an impeachment trial, Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate. Impeachment Trial Procedures and Practice Brief Overview When the Senate conducts an impeachment trial, it does so in a procedural mode that is distinct both from legislative session (where bills and resolutions are considered) and from executive session (where nominations and treaties are considered). The differences are significant, but precedent does dictate that if the impeachment rules are silent, the regular Standing Rules of the Senate, where applicable, may guide proceedings. The impeachment rules prescribe a series of steps for the start of the trial, which are described below. The Senate follows these steps to organize itself for the trial and then requests written statements from the impeached officer and from the House regarding the charges. The next stage is the receipt and presentation of evidence, and the impeachment rules provide little guidance regarding this process. Actions taken at this stage have varied from trial to trial. Arguments are made on the Senate floor by House managers (Members of the House selected to prosecute the case in the Senate) and counsel for the impeached officer (an attorney or attorneys who were chosen by the accused). The Senate could decide to request documents and hear testimony from witnesses, who could receive questions from the House managers, counsel for the impeached officer, and Senators. Senators are expected to attend the trial, but their individual participation in open session is limited. They can submit questions in writingâfor a witness, House manager, or counsel for the impeached officerâbut the Presiding Officer of the trial, not the Senator, reads the question, announcing which Senator posed it. Debate among Senators is not allowed during the trial unless the Senate, by majority vote, goes into closed session, where the length of time each Senator can speak is limited. The Senate impeachment rules refer to opportunities for both Senators and the parties to the case to place proposals before the Senate for a vote; in modern practice, however, the Senate has structured the order of considering proposals, either by unanimous consent or by agreeing to a resolution by majority vote. Votes can occur in open or closed session on procedural questions, such as those that might set the schedule for the trial, structure time for arguments and questions, and arrange for witnesses. In previous trials, the vote on the final question of whether or not to convict has always occurred in open session. Conviction requires a vote of two-thirds of Senators present on any article of impeachment. Receipt and Presentation of Articles of Impeachment The impeachment rules establish a timeline for the Senate to take several actions after it receives formal notice from the House regarding an impeachment. Specifically, under Impeachment Rule I, Senate action is triggered by the receipt of notice from the House "that managers are appointed" and "are directed to carry articles of impeachment to the Senate." The House, in modern practice, first agrees to articles of impeachment in the form of a simple resolution (H.Res.), and then agrees to another privileged resolution (or sometimes multiple resolutions) that serves to instigate action in the Senate as prescribed by the rule. In this second resolution (or series of resolutions), the House selects Representatives who serve as "impeachment managers." These Members of the House will argue the case for impeachment before the Senate. The resolution also grants authority to the House managers to take actions to prepare and conduct the trial in the Senate. Finally, the resolution directs that a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that managers have been appointed. In practice, after receipt of the message from the House, the following actions take place in the Senate: The Senat e, by unanimous consent, establishes a time for the House Managers to prese nt the articles of impeachment to the Senate . Impeachment Rule I provides that the "Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the managers." Instead of following the letter of the rule, however, the Senate reaches a unanimous consent agreement that sets a specific time for the Secretary to invite the House managers to appear. The time agreed upon in modern trials has been within a day or two of receipt of the House message. Scheduling a time is more convenient for all Senators, and these unanimous consent agreements have been reached within the context of a rule that appears to require immediate action. A House manager reads the articles of impeachment aloud on the Senate floor, sometimes after a live quorum call to bring Senators into the chamber. The impeachment rules require that the articles of impeachment be "exhibited," which means read before the Senate. At a time arranged by unanimous consent, and sometimes after a live quorum call to ascertain the presence of Senators, the House Managers arrive on the floor of the Senate, are announced by the Secretary to the Majority or the Sergeant at Arms, and are escorted by the Sergeant at Arms to seats assigned to them in front of the Senate rostrum. The Presiding Officer then directs the Sergeant at Arms to make a proclamation required by Impeachment Rule II: "All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of United States articles of impeachment against _____." A House Manager, typically the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, then reads the articles in full before the Senate. The House Manager also makes a statement that the House reserves the right to amend the articles of impeachment. The Presiding Officer then announces, again using language from Impeachment Rule II, that the Senate will "take proper order on the subject of impeachment" and notify the House. The House Managers then exit the Senate chamber. Organizing for the Trial Impeachment Rule III provides that after the articles are presented by the House managers, the Senate will proceed to consider the articles at 1 o'clock the next day (unless the next day is a Sunday), or sooner if ordered by the Senate. In modern trials, the Senate has most often taken the steps necessary to organize for an impeachment trial on the same day that the articles of impeachment were read on the floor. After the presentation of the articles, the Senate takes the following steps to organize for a trial: The Presiding Officer of the trial takes the oath of office. The Constitution requires that Senators be "on Oath or Affirmation" when sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment. The Senate developed the practice of first swearing in the presiding officer of the trial, who then administers the oath to all Senators. In the case of a presidential impeachment, the Chief Justice acts as presiding officer. Impeachment Rule IV requires that notice be given to the Chief Justice of the time and place of the trial. It further provides that the Chief Justice is to be administered the oath by the "Presiding Officer of the Senate." The Chief Justice takes the same oath as the Senators (see below for text). Although the Vice President of the United States, as President of the Senate, could act as Presiding Officer of the Senate and administer the oath to the Chief Justice, in the Clinton impeachment trial, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate administered the oath to the Chief Justice. In the Clinton trial the Senate also agreed by unanimous consent that a bipartisan group of six Senators escort the Chief Justice to the dais. Senators are administered the oath of office. The Presiding Officer of the Trial administers the following oath to Senators, as provided in Impeachment Rule XXV: [Do you] solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of____, now pending, [you] will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws: So help [you] God. In modern practice, the Chief Justice asks all Senators, who are standing at their desks, to raise their right hands as he reads the oath, and Senators respond, all together, "I do." Senators also sign an official oath book, which serves as the permanent record of the administration of the oath. Senators are required to take the oath before participating in the trial, and Senators who might be absent at the time the oath is administered en masse inform the presiding officer as soon as possible so that they can take the oath separately. At this point, any Senator wishing to be excused from participating in the trial could ask to be excused from this service. In the past, the Senate has excused Senators from service in an impeachment trial only at their request. The Senate issues a " s ummons" and request s an "answer" from the impeached official and a "replication" (or response) from the House Managers. It is a necessary early step of an impeachment trial that the impeached officer be informed of the charges through an official process. Impeachment Rule VIII states that after the articles have been presented and the Senate has organized for a trial, "â¦a writ of summons shall issue to the person impeachedâ¦" The Senate accomplishes this by agreeing to an "order," sometimes in the form of a resolution, directing that a summons be issued. Impeachment Rule XXV provides the language of the summons, which, in accordance with Rule VIII, includes the articles of impeachment. The Senate, when it adopts an order for a summons, also directs the accused official to file a written answer to the articles of impeachment. The Senate determines the date by which this answer must be filed. Under long-standing practice, the Senate also sets a date by which the House Managers can file a formal written response to the impeached officer's answerâwhich is called a "replication"âwith the Senate. The length of time the Senate provides for the impeached officer to file an answer and for the House managers to file a replication has varied in modern practice, from a few days to several weeks. An order or resolution regarding the summons and replication is not subject to debate, pursuant to Impeachment Rule XXIV, but is subject to amendment. The order or resolution can be approved by a majority of Senators voting, a quorum being present. On the day that the Senate majority has established for the return of the summons, Impeachment Rule IX provides that the Senate convene the trial at 12:30 p.m. The officer who served the summons (typically the Sergeant at Arms under Impeachment Rule VI) swears an oath, administered by the Secretary of the Senate, that the service was performed. Other administrative and organization al decisions. Impeachment Rule VII states that "The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber." Note that this is the regular presiding officer of the Senate, as these arrangements could be made in advance of the trial. In practice, the Senate, through a unanimous consent agreement or a resolution, makes decisions regarding such matters as staff access to the floor and the placement of furniture and equipment in the well to be used for trial presentations. The Senate might take such actions in legislative session before the trial, or the actions could be taken shortly after the Senate convenes for the trial. For example, in the Clinton impeachment trial, the Senate agreed to guidelines specifying which Senate staff with official impeachment duties would have access to the floor. It did so by unanimous consent in legislative session before the start of the trial. Additional unanimous consent agreements granted privileges of the floor to the counsel and assistants to counsel for the President, as well as to assistants to the Chief Justice and to the House Managers. The Senate also, by unanimous consent, established a method for allocating tickets to the Senate gallery. Determining Trial Proceedings: Orders of the Senate While the previously identified steps have occurred, with minor variations, in every Senate impeachment trial, actions subsequent to organization have varied considerably. To establish impeachment trial procedures, the Senate could reach unanimous consent agreements or vote on propositions offered by Senators, House Managers, or counsel for the impeached officer. When adopted, these procedural agreements are referred to as "orders" of the Senate. Impeachment Rule XXIV contains the provision that, when the Senate is convened to conduct a trial, "orders and decisions" of the Senate shall be voted on "without debate." This prohibition on debate applies when the Senate trial is meeting in open session; if a majority of Senators wished to discuss a proposed order, they could agree to do so in closed session, and in that forum each Senator would be limited to speaking only once, and for a maximum of 10 minutes. (See "Closed Deliberations by Senators" section below.) Furthermore, Impeachment Rule XXI provides further that "all preliminary or interlocutory questions, and all motions, shall be argued for not exceeding one hour (unless the Senate otherwise orders) on each side," which means that, in some cases, the Senate could hear arguments from House Managers and counsel for the impeached on procedural proposals for up to two hours. In contrast, under the regular rules of the Senate, most matters are not subject to any debate restrictions. As a result, a cloture processârequiring the support of three-fifths of the Senate on legislation and most other itemsâis sometimes necessary to end debate and reach a vote. It is for this reason that the support of three-fifths of the Senate (or 60 Senators, assuming no more than one vacancy) is usually considered to be necessary for the Senate to reach a decision that cannot be reached by consensus. The limits on debate when the Senate is sitting for an impeachment trial, however, allow the Senate to reach decisions without the threat of a filibuster. Without the need for cloture, most questions voted on during a Senate impeachment trial can be approved with the support of a majority of Senators voting. The major exception to this, of course, is that conviction requires the support of two-thirds of Senators present. Because cloture is not required, a Senate majority can agree to orders that affect the proceedings in a trial. It is not clear, however, how quickly a majority could do so in the absence of broad agreement among Senators and the parties to the case. Orders proposed by Senators are subject to amendment offered by other Senators. For example, in the trial of Secretary of War William W. Belknap, Senators offered multiple amendments to a series of orders that the Senate considered. In a more recent example, during the Clinton impeachment trial, the Minority Leader offered two amendments to a resolution ( S.Res. 30 ) to establish trial procedures offered by the Majority Leader. (Both amendments, which attempted to shorten the trial, failed.) Senators cannot, in open session, debate amendments to orders proposed by Senators. Furthermore, in past trials Senators have demanded the division of an "order," and the division of amendments to an order, that contained substantive, separate directions for a trial. Under regular Senate procedures, both amendments and resolutions containing separate provisions are susceptible to division. If any single Senator demanded a division, each provision would be considered separately for amendment and voted upon. Finally, there is little guidance in Senate published precedents as to what constitutes a proper "order" that would be eligible to be called up expeditiously and decided by majority vote during an impeachment trial. The impeachment rules mention several rules that could be altered by an "order": the time the Senate meets for the first day of the trial (Rule XII), and other days of meeting thereafter (Rule XIII); the length of time for the House Managers and counsel for the impeached officer to argue propositions before the Senate (Rule XXI); the number of people who may make opening and closing arguments (Rule XXII); and who may serve a summons (Rule XXV). Impeachment Rule XXVI permits the Senate to adopt a non-debatable order to fix the date and time for considering articles, even if it had missed a previously scheduled meeting. Impeachment Rule XI, which, as noted above, the Senate approved in 1935 to allow the use of committees to receive evidence, also states such committees can be created by order. The Senate, however, while sitting for an impeachment trial, has agreed to many other orders that are not directly mentioned in the impeachment rules. During the Clinton trial in the 106 th Congress, for example, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 16 and S.Res. 30 , which structured most aspects of proceedings by establishing deadlines for filings, allotting time for arguments, and making certain motions in order at specific points in the trial. If these resolutions constituted "orders" under Impeachment Rule XXIV, they were among the most comprehensive orders agreed to for a trial. Thus, based on Senate practice, it appears that "orders" of the Senate during impeachment trials can affect many more procedures than those specifically delineated in the impeachment rules. Senate precedents, however, might limit what can be included in such an order. In the absence of broad agreement regarding how to proceed with a trial, Senators might contest the inclusion of particular provisions of an orderâfor example, those that appear to be in direct conflict with the impeachment rules or past practice, or those that Senators argue are unconstitutional. While Senators can be expected to consult the precedents for guidance, ultimately a Senate majority will decide these questions, using the process for interpreting procedures discussed below. If all Senators are voting, the majority necessary to approve an order of the Senate is 51 Senators; tie votes fail in the Senate. If all Senators are not voting, however, this number changes. The vote necessary for approval is a majority of those voting, assuming a quorum is present. The quorum required for an impeachment trial is 51 Senatorsâthe same as in regular Senate proceedings. During impeachment trials, however, the party leaders often implore Senators to attend all sessions, and committee meetings are unlikely to be scheduled during times the Senate is expected to be sitting for the trial. This is due to past criticisms of the Senate for light attendance at trials when evidence was presented, including from counsel of impeached officers who feel Senators must be present to listen to arguments before they vote. Consideration and Collection of Evidence The actions taken by the Senate to consider and collect evidence in each trial have varied considerably. The impeachment rules provide guidance only on a few particulars, necessitating that the Senate determine, each time it organizes for a trial, the manner of proceeding from that point forward. It is therefore not possible to describe, in the same manner as above, the parliamentary steps the Senate is expected to take to consider evidence in a trial. This section instead reviews the impeachment rules related to this stage of the trial, how these rules have been interpreted, and how their terms have been modified in past practice. Because in most modern trials the Senate has relied on a trial committee to consider and collect evidence, it then describes how these committees are established and some of their practices. What the Impeachment Rules Provide Opening and Closing Arguments by the House Managers and Counsel for the Impeached Officer During an impeachment trial in the Senate, Senators spend most of the time listening to arguments presented by the House Managers and the counsel for the impeached officer. Impeachment Rule XV states that counsel for the parties "shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an impeachment." The impeachment rules further reference both opening and closing arguments that would be made by the parties to the case. Specifically, Impeachment Rule XXII states that the House of Representatives will provide opening remarks first, followed by the counsel for the impeached. It also provides that the case shall be opened "by one person" on each side, but in practice opening remarks have been divided among multiple managers and multiple counsel for the impeached. With regard to closing arguments, Rule XXII provides that the House Managers will speak last, and permits two House Managers and two people for the impeached officer to make closing arguments. The number of individuals allowed to participate in closing arguments has been modified in past trials by order of the Senate. The impeachment rules do not place a time limit on opening and closing statements, although in past trials the Senate has agreed to place such limits on the parties. The Senate has also allowed the side speaking first to reserve time for rebuttal. Arguments by the House Managers and Counsel for the Impeached Officer on Questions and Motions Impeachment Rule XXI limits the time for arguments that can be made during the trial on any "questions" or "motions" that might arise to one hour on each side, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate. The impeachment rules provide no guidance regarding what particular questions or motions can be raised by the parties to the case. Rule XVI simply requires that all such motions (and "objections, requests, or applications") should be addressed to the Presiding Officer and put in writing if demanded by any Senator or the Presiding Officer. Examples of questions that have been argued pursuant to this rule include, from the 1868 trial of President Johnson, a motion by the defense that the trial be postponed for 40 days to allow for preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment and, from the 1936 trial of Judge Ritter, a motion by the counsel for the impeached to strike an article deemed repetitive. In general, in past trials, the Senate has controlled, through the adoption of orders, what propositions can be placed before the body and voted on while it is sitting for an impeachment trial. The impeachment rules do not address which side speaks first on questions and motions, but it is by practice the side proposing the motion. The Senate has altered the time available for such arguments by unanimous consent or other order of the Senate. The side speaking first has asked to reserve time for rebuttal. It is important to note that there appears to be a distinction between motions filed and argued by the parties to the case in an impeachment trial, and motions offered by Senators. When House managers or counsel for an impeached officer propose a "motion," they are requesting that the Senate reach a judgement (perhaps by agreeing to an order on the subject). They are not necessarily forcing Senate action on their proposal as written. During an impeachment trial, the Senate, at least in modern practice, has generally controlled when and what motions are proposed before the full Senate by the parties to the case, and it also determines the method of responding to such motions (which might not be a direct vote on the question). For example, in the 2010 trial of Judge Porteous, counsel for the impeached filed three motions that were argued by the parties to the case: a motion to dismiss Article 1, a motion to dismiss Article 2, and a motion to dismiss all articles because they aggregated multiple charges. The Senate heard arguments from each side (pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement that limited arguments on all motions to two hours, equally divided) and deliberated in closed session. When the Senate reconvened in open session, rather than act directly on the propositions as presented, the Majority Leader moved to hold preliminary votes on individual allegations within the articles. This motion was defeated 94-0. Effectively, it served as a response to the three motions filed by the defense and argued by the parties to the case. In another modern example, the Senate heard arguments by the parties, under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement, regarding a motion by the impeached officer that Impeachment Rule XI, allowing the creation of a trial committee, was unconstitutional and that there be a full and free trial before the Senate and witnesses be subpoenaed for that purpose. After deliberating in closed session, the Senate returned to open session and the Majority Leader moved that the Senate not hear additional witnesses in the case. The motion was agreed to 61-32 (7 Senators not voting), and served as a response to the arguments by counsel for the impeached officer that the full Senate, not the trial committee, should receive evidence. Motions or Orders Offered by Senators Are Not Debatable in Open Session and Are Acted upon Without Objection or by the Yeas and the Nays Impeachment Rule XXIV refers to "orders and decisions" of the Senate, which in practice have been proposed by Senators, not by the parties to the case. As discussed above, such "orders" are sometimes offered in the form of resolutions. In impeachment trials, however, it appears that such resolutions were proposed as if they were motions and were not subject to layover requirements, or taken up by a motion to proceed, which is the usual way that the Senate would process a resolution. Impeachment Rule XIX requires any motion or order proposed by a Senator (except a motion to adjourn) be in writing and put by the Presiding Officer. Impeachment Rule XXIV prohibits debate on orders of the Senate in open session, but the Senate could vote to go into closed session, in which case each Senator could speak for up to 10 minutes on the motion or order. Impeachment Rule XXIV also provides that orders of the Senate can be agreed to by unanimous consent but, short of unanimous consent, the vote on an order must be by the yeas and the nays (a roll call vote). An exception is made for the motion to adjourn, which could be voted on by voice vote or division (or if the yeas and nays are ordered, by roll call vote, as under regular Senate procedures). Otherwise, the impeachment rules do not reference proposals offered by Senators. In the 19 th and early 20 th century trials, it appears that a variety of propositions regarding procedure were proposed by Senators. In the modern trials, some motions were permitted pursuant to a previously-agreed-to resolution, or under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement. For example, in the 1999 trial of President Clinton, a Senator offered a motion to dismiss the articles that was permitted under the terms of S.Res. 16 . Similarly, later in the same trial, the Minority Leader offered a motion that the Senate proceed to closing arguments, and this motion appears to have been permitted under the terms of S.Res. 30 . In other modern instances, however, Senators appear to have offered motions that were not explicitly allowed under a previous order and presumably were permitted by the standing impeachment rules and precedents. For example, during the trial of President Clinton, a Senator moved that Senators be permitted to insert statements they made in the closed session into the Congressional Record . In another example, during the 1986 trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, a Senator moved to postpone the decision on motions filed by the defendant. It is also possible that such motions were effectively offered by a kind of tacit unanimous consent, and if any Senator had objected, they could not have been considered. Unanimous consent cannot always be required for a Senator to propose a motion or order, however, as that would allow a single Senator to block procedural decisions. Neither the impeachment rules nor the published precedents provide explicit guidance on what propositions can be offered by Senators while sitting on an impeachment trial. There is also no guidance regarding precedence among the various motions, although the Senate precedents establishing that the Majority Leader is entitled to priority in recognition, followed by the Minority Leader, presumably continue to apply in an impeachment trial. Still other motions have been offered pursuant to the regular standing rules of the Senate. In 1999, for example, several Senators moved to suspend certain impeachment rules (to allow for unlimited debate on questions in open session). To suspend the rules, Senators must provide one calendar day's notice in writing of their intent to offer a motion to suspend. Adoption of such a motion requires a two-thirds affirmative vote. During the Clinton trial, the Senate considered motions to suspend under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement or a resolution, and it is not entirely clear from the proceedings or published precedents when such motions would otherwise be in order. Witnesses The impeachment rules contain little guidance in relation to the calling and questioning of witnesses. Impeachment Rule XVII states that witnesses shall be examined first by the side who requested them, and then cross-examined by the other side. It also specifies that only one person from each side shall conduct the examination and cross-examination. Witnesses are also required to be sworn by the Secretary of the Senate or other authorized person, in a form provided by Senate Rule XXV: "You, ______, do swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that the evidence you shall give in the case now pending between the United States and ______, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God." Impeachment Rule VI is intended to grant the Senate the ability to compel the attendance of witnesses (and, more generally, to enforce any "orders, mandates, writs, precepts, and judgments" deemed "essential or conducive to the ends of justice"). In modern practice, the Senate has relied on the other branches of government to enforce its subpoenas, as discussed in detail in other CRS reports. For example, in the 1989 trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, when a key witness refused to testify, the Senate in legislative session took up and approved by unanimous consent a resolution directing the Senate Legal Counsel to bring a civil action to enforce the subpoena. Senate Legal Counsel obtained an order from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia directing the witness to testify, and when the witness continued to refuse to do so, he was incarcerated until the end of the trial. The Senate impeachment rules do not address the selection of witnesses. In practice, the Senate determines which witnesses will be heard, if any. (If a trial committee is used, the trial committee selects and subpoenas the witnesses.) The parties to the case do not have the right under the rules to call whom they choose. To be clear, it is the House Managers and counsel for the impeached who know the charges and know what evidence they would like to present, and, in practice, the Senate weighs their requests heavily. In some recent trials, the Senate has requested pretrial statements or trial memoranda from both parties, which discuss possible evidence to be presented, including desired witnesses. On the basis of such requests, the Senate (or the trial committee) decides which witnesses to hear and possibly subpoena. In the modern judicial trials, witnesses were examined in the trial committees, and not on the floor before the full Senate. In the Clinton trial in 1999, the Senate agreed to an order that depositions from three witnesses be taken, but did not agree to hear testimony from any witness on the floor. The last time witnesses were examined and cross-examined on the Senate floor was during the impeachment trial of Judge Ritter in 1936. Questions by Senators During the presentation of evidence by the House Managers and counsel for the impeached officer, Senators are generally expected to attend, but not speak. Impeachment Rule XIX, however, does allow a Senator to question a witness, manager, or counsel of the person impeached. The Senator must put the question in writing and submit it to the Presiding Officer, who then reads the question out loud. In practice, the Presiding Officer identifies the Senator posing the question before reading it. As noted, witnesses have not testified before the full Senate since the 1936 trial of Judge Ritter, so there are no modern examples to look to concerning Senators questioning witnesses on the floor. In trial committees, Senators have submitted questions for witnesses. In addition, resolutions establishing trial committees have explicitly authorized the chair of the trial committee to "waive the requirementâ¦that questions by a Senator to a witness, a manager, or counsel shall be reduced to writing and put by the presiding officer." In modern trials, Senators have posed questions to House managers and counsel for the impeached. In the 1999 trial of President Clinton, the Senate agreed to a resolution ( S.Res. 16 , 106 th Congress) that established procedures in addition to the impeachment rules to structure a period of questioning by Senators. S.Res. 16 provided that after opening arguments by the House Managers and the President's counsel, "Senators may question the parties for a period of time not to exceed 16 hours." During the Clinton trial, Senators directed their questions to one side or the other, and the party leaders asked that questions be submitted to them first, so that they could identify duplications and structure the order of questions (which alternated between Republican and Democratic Senators' questions). The Chief Justice announced that he thought five minutes would be a sufficient time to answer each question, and an effort was made to keep the time used by each side roughly equal. Over 100 questions were posed by Senators over the course of two days. In other modern trials, Senators asked questions of the House Managers and counsel for the accused on the floor, apparently without a unanimous consent agreement or other order of the Senate structuring the questioning process. During the 2010 trial of Judge Porteous, for example, after the trial committee had issued its report, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to limit the time for arguments on all motions filed by Judge Porteous to one hour for each side, and to limit the time for final arguments on all four articles of impeachment to one and a half hours for each side. The agreement did not explicitly address time for questions. Senators, during the arguments, sent questions in writing to the Presiding Officer, who asked the clerk to read them at a time deemed appropriate, including after the expiration of the time limits set by unanimous consent. In this trial, Senators' questions were sometimes directed to both sides. Creation of a Trial Committee Impeachment Rule XI allows for the appointment of a trial committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony on behalf of the Senate for an impeachment. Rule XI does not contain language explicitly limiting the application of trial committees; however, the 1974 Rules and Administration Committee report regarding amendments to the impeachment rules stated that, "nothing but action by the full Senate on all aspects of a presidential impeachment was conceivable" and that the legislative history to the proposed amendments should "clearly reflect" this understanding by members of the Committee. The Senate has chosen to appoint trial committees for every modern impeachment of a judge since the 1980s. Trial committees serve to relieve the full Senate of the potentially lengthy process of these early trial tasks and instead devote time to its legislative workload. Transcripts of all proceedings conducted and evidence received by the trial committee are transmitted to the full Senate when the committee's work is completed. This material provides a potential opportunity to move quickly to closing arguments and deliberation on the final question of whether an impeached officer is guilty or not guilty. Trial committees are typically created by a simple resolution that authorizes the majority and minority leaders to each recommend six Senators, including, more recently, a chair and vice chair, respectively. Impeachment Rule XI does not fix the membership or size of a trial committee, nor does it require party balance; in modern practice, however, the Senate has routinely agreed to a bipartisan 12-member committee. Resolutions creating trial committees also typically include a funding provision, and may authorize a committee to waive certain impeachment rules, direct a committee on what it should report to the Senate, or establish a date at which the committee will terminate. In addition to receiving evidence and testimony, trial committees can reach decisions concerning certain pre-trial requests and motions filed by the parties to the case, and they can question witnesses. Trial committees process motions filed by House Managers in a fashion similar to that which the Senate would use when sitting as a court of impeachment. The committee holds a hearing to receive oral arguments from the trial parties, allots time for questioning by committee members, deliberates in closed session, and ultimately votes to make a determination in relation to the request. Modern trial committees have routinely declined to consider motions to dismiss an article or articles of impeachment, citing a lack of authority to do so. Trial committees also have examined witnesses called by House managers and counsel to the accused. Typically, a witness is first examined by the trial parties, after which committee members have been able to ask their own questions. Under the impeachment rules, questions by Senators are to be submitted in writing, although the Senate has waived this rule to allow for direct questioning by Senators in trial committees. Once a trial committee has completed its work, as previously discussed, it will issue a report to the Senate compiling all evidence, exhibits, and witness testimony it received. That material is considered as having been received and taken before the full Senate for the purposes of delivering a final vote on articles of impeachment. The trial committee's work does not preclude the Senate itself from calling additional witnesses, hearing further testimony, or revisiting motions raised by House managers and counsel for the accused. The full Senate did not choose to hear witnesses or request any further evidence in any of the four completed trials in which a committee was used. Closed Deliberations by Senators Closed door deliberation by the Senate while sitting for an impeachment trial is established through Impeachment Rules XX and XXIV. Rule XX states that a Senate impeachment trial is to be conducted in open session, except for when the doors shall be closed for deliberation. A motion to go into closed door session can be acted upon without objection, or if an objection is raised, by a roll call vote without debate. Note that this method of entering closed session when the Senate is sitting for an impeachment trialâapproving a motion by majority voteâis different from the method used during regular Senate session. Outside of an impeachment trial, a single Senator can move that the Senate go into closed session, and, if the motion is seconded by another Senator, the Senate will proceed to secret session. Rule XXIV specifies, in part, that during closed door deliberations, each Senator may speak only once on each question. Such remarks are limited to 10 minutes per Senator on "interlocutory" questions and to 15 minutes on "the final question," (i.e., whether the impeached officer is guilty or not guilty), regardless of the number of articles of impeachment. In other words, in the final debate, regardless of whether the Senate is considering one article of impeachment or many, each Senator has only one opportunity to speak for no more than 15 minutes. When the Senate enters a closed session, the specific procedures followed are guided by the Senate's standing rules, rather than its impeachment rules. The Sergeant at Arms clears the chamber and galleries of everyone except for Senators and staff designated under Senate Rule XXIX, paragraph 2, who are sworn to secrecy. The Senate rule further provides access for the Senate Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, the Principal Legislative Clerk, the Parliamentarian, the Executive Clerk, the Minute and Journal Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Secretaries to the Majority and Minority, as well as other individuals the Presiding Officer "shall think necessary." During impeachment trials, the Senate has, in practice, extended floor privileges in closed session to additional designated staff by unanimous consent agreement. A record of closed session deliberations is kept, as with all proceedings of impeachment trials, pursuant to Impeachment Rule XIV. Unlike open session records, which are made available to the public, closed session transcripts are kept under an injunction of secrecy unless lifted by the Senate by resolution or unanimous consent. Accordingly, Senators and staff are expected to refrain from public discussion of closed door deliberations. Senate Standing Rule XXIX, paragraph 5, provides for possible expulsion from the Senate (if a Senator) or dismissal from service (if an officer or employee) as punishment for divulging closed door proceedings. In recent Senate impeachment trials, the Senate has allowed Senators to insert their closed session remarks into the Congressional Record . As mentioned above, in the 1999 trial of President Clinton, Senators attempted to allow for open deliberation and debate in an impeachment trial by moving to suspend the impeachment rules. No such proposals were agreed to by the Senate during the Clinton trial, and all deliberation throughout the trial occurred in closed sessions. Voting on Articles of Impeachment Conviction requires a guilty vote on at least one article of impeachment by two-thirds of Senators present. Assuming 100 Senators present, the support of 67 Senators is needed to convict on an article. If fewer Senators are present, the threshold to convict will accordingly be reduced as well (e.g., 97 Senators present would require 65 votes to convict). A response of "present" effectively supports acquittal, as it counts in the denominator against which the threshold to convict is calculated. Following closed door deliberations on the final question of whether to convict or acquit an impeached officer, the Senate reconvenes in open session to vote on the articles of impeachment. Articles are typically voted on in the order they were exhibited by House Managers. It is not in order to further divide an article. Pursuant to Impeachment Rule XXIII, the Presiding Officer puts the question on each article separately, and each vote is required to be by roll call. The legislative clerk is directed to read the article of impeachment aloud and then the roll is called, to which Senators must rise from their seats and answer "guilty" or "not guilty" on the question of impeachment. Voting on the articles of impeachment is to continue without interruption, pursuant to Rule XXII, unless the Senate adjourns the trial. After voting has commenced, adjournments of the trial can be for only one day, or sine die , that is, without a specific date to return, if ever. Under the rule, a motion to reconsider a vote on an article of impeachment is not in order. Under Senate Standing Rule XII, Senators are required to vote upon call of their name unless excused by the Senate or due to a conflict of interest. The question of excusing a Senator from voting is disposed of after the call of the roll is completed but before the result is announced. Senators have been excused from voting on articles of impeachment in past trials due to their absences from arguments or owing to their participation as a witness in the trial. (Senators have also been excused from participating in the trial at all; see above "Organizing for the Trial.") If an officer is convicted by two-thirds of Senators present, "such a vote operates automatically and instantaneously to separate the person impeached from office." The Senate may then choose to take the additional action to move to disqualify a convicted officer from holding further office, although this step is not required. The Senate has established that a vote to disqualify requires a simple majority voting affirmatively, and not two-thirds as with conviction. Senate Interpretation of the Impeachment Rules and the Role of the Presiding Officer The Presiding Officer of an impeachment trial does not possess any more independent control over proceedings than the Presiding Officer does during the more common Senate deliberations on legislation or nominations. While the Presiding Officer, in either case, may rule on the proper interpretation of the rules and procedures of the Senate, that ruling can be challenged by any Senator. In legislative or executive sessions of the Senate, if any Senator appeals a ruling by the Presiding Officer, the full Senate considers the question, "Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the Senate?" Impeachment Rule VII lays out the process of challenging a ruling as it applies during an impeachment trial. It states in part And the Presiding Officer on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of relevancy, materiality, and redundancy of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision without debate; or he may at his option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. In other words, while the impeachment rules grant the Presiding Officer the authority to rule on questions, they also state that a single Senator could instead request that the full Senate vote on any such question. In that case, pursuant to this rule, the question is not debatable, and a majority of Senators voting would determine the outcome. (By precedent, House Managers or counsel for the impeached could not ask that a question be submitted to the Senate. ) The published precedents state that all decisions of the Chair are subject to appeal. If a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence is appealed (or if the Presiding Officer submits such a question), the question put to the Senate is: "Is the evidence admissible?" In the case of other procedural issues the Senate would vote on, the phrasing of the question put to the Senate could vary with the question. For example, in 1986, during the trial of Judge Claiborne, the Presiding Officer ruled, in response to a motion by the defense counsel and at the request of the Majority Leader, "It is the Chair's determination that the question of standard of evidence is for each Senator to decide individually when voting on Articles of Impeachment." A Senator requested that the Senate vote on the question instead, and the Presiding Officer put the question on whether the motion of the counsel for the impeached judgeâthat the Senate establish a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof in the trialâwas "well taken." By a vote of 17 yeas and 75 nays (8 Senators not voting), the Senate voted that the motion was not well taken, effectively agreeing with the ruling of the Presiding Officer. The Senate, in short, is the final arbiter on any procedural questions. Impeachment Rule VII states that "the vote shall be taken in accordance with the Standing Rules of the Senate." That means these questions could be settled by roll call vote, but only if that request for the yeas and nays is supported by 1/5 of a quorum (11 Senators), or, if the Senate recently voted, 1/5 of the Senators who voted. The impeachment rules make several other references to the Presiding Officer of the trial. Impeachment Rule IV restates the constitutional requirement that when the President of the United States has been impeached, the Chief Justice of the United States shall serve as the Presiding Officer. Impeachment Rule III tasks the Presiding Officer with administering the oath to Senators. Rule V grants him general power to execute decisions of the Senate where necessary (which would include, for example, signing a summons the Senate ordered to be issued to the person impeached, or signing a subpoena that the Senate had agreed to issue). Rule XIII directs the Presiding Officer to cause the proclamation to be declared at the start of each day commanding those present to keep silent. Rule XVI requires that the parties to the caseâthe House Managers and the impeached officer and his counselâaddress the Presiding Officer when proposing motions, objecting to proceedings, or making any request related to the trial. As mentioned above, Rule XIX requires the Presiding Officer to read aloud any question submitted in writing by a Senator. The Presiding Officer also puts the question on the vote on the articles of impeachment, pursuant to Rule XXIII and as described above. The Presiding Officer of the trial can vote when he or she is a Senator. If the Vice President is presiding over a trial, and if there is a tie vote, then the Vice President may vote. In presidential impeachment trials, however, the Vice President cannot preside and cannot vote. The Chief Justice, when presiding over an impeachment trial, would not be expected to vote, even in the case of a tie. If a vote on a question results in a tie, the question is decided in the negative. Conducting Legislative and Executive Business When the Senate convenes as a Court of Impeachment, it is in a distinct procedural mode, different from legislation session, where it considers bills and resolutions, and executive session, where it considers treaties and nominations. In addition to having its own set of rules, the Court of Impeachment also keeps a separate Journal. (The Journal is the Constitutionally-required record of parliamentary actions taken by the Senate.) Business in these distinct procedural modes is kept entirely separate. For example, bills and resolutions cannot be introduced when the Senate is in the mode of sitting for the trial, and committee reports cannot be filed. This might mean that the Senate chooses to spend some period of a day meeting in legislative or executive session and also spend a period meeting as Court of Impeachment, in order to provide an opportunity for other actions to occur. For some legislative actions, unanimous consent may effectively be required. Notably, the Senate must have a period for "morning business" in legislative session for various actions to occurâincluding the introduction of legislation and the filing of committee reports. In modern practice, this is provided for in unanimous consent agreements for each day the Senate meets. The Senate would need to reach a similar unanimous consent agreement for legislative sessions held on days during the trial in order for these actions to be allowed. Alternatively, the Senate could agree by unanimous consent to arrange other methods for these actions to occur, even though the Senate has not met that day in legislative session. The impeachment rules provide for the Senate to convene for an impeachment trial at noon (Rule XIII) every day except Sunday after a trial has begun (Rule III). While this might have been the expected schedule in the middle of the 19 th century, the impeachment rules also provide for the Senate to modify this schedule by "order." In modern practice, the Senate has adjusted the meeting days and times. Most often, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to the time of the next meeting. Alternatively, a motion to adjourn the Senate sitting in a trial of impeachment to a time certain is subject to amendment, but it is not debatable and could be agreed to by majority vote. The Senate also could agree to an order altering the default time for the Senate to sit for the trial each day, and this order would not be subject to debate. In short, a numerical majority can determine the day and times of meeting for an impeachment trial. Impeachment Rule XIII also provides that, when the trial adjourns, the Senate resumes consideration of legislative (or executive) business. The Rule states, "(t)he adjournment of the Senate sitting in said trial shall not operate as an adjournment of the Senate." As a result, it is possible for the Senate to convene to conduct business in legislative (or executive) session before noon, convene the trial at noon pursuant to the rules (or at some other time if decided by the Senate), adjourn the impeachment trial for the day and return to legislative (or executive) session to conduct more business. The Senate could also meet for other purposes on days the Senate is not meeting for the trial. In the modern judicial trials and during the Clinton trial, the Senate did conduct other business on some of the days on which it also considered articles of impeachment. Limited legislative business was accomplished during the six weeks of the Clinton trial, but that trial occurred at the very start of the 106 th Congress (1999-2000), while committees were still organizing and legislation may have still been developing. Other factors could certainly affect the ability of the Senate to approve legislation while a trial is being conducted. Bipartisan support is generally necessary to take up most legislation in the Senate, and forming such coalitions could be challenging if the impeachment proceedings are contentious. The attention of Senators and their staff might also be expected to be directed toward impeachment proceedings. In addition, it is not clear how some procedures that apply to the consideration of legislation and nominations in the Senate are impacted when the Senate sits for an impeachment trial. For example, if cloture was filed on a matter in legislative session, and the Senate was sitting in trial when the cloture motion matured, it is not clear if the Senate would vote on the cloture motion at that time, or instead not until it adjourned the trial for the day. It is also not clear how legislation to be considered under expedited procedure statutes, such as the Congressional Review Act, the War Powers Resolution, or the Trade Act (each of which provide for specific Senate actions at times certain) could be impacted by a Senate trial.


Introduction Virtually all societies attempt to remember and memorialize individuals, groups, and events as part of the preservation of shared rhetoric and history. In the United States, there are hundreds, and possibly thousands, of memorials to various individuals, groups, and events. These commemorative works may "engage the population in maintaining memory on a daily basis" in a way that "no documents or records can." Decisions about which people, groups, or events to memorialize are made by many different entities, including Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, and private citizens, among others. For example, for memorials on federal land in the District of Columbia, the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) requires that Congress provide authorization for a new memorial. In other areas, various laws, regulations, and policies may provide for different groups and governments to decide what should be commemorated and how. Once a decision to commemorate is made, decisionmakers face issues related to the location and cost of a memorial. The choice of a memorial's location is significant. Memorials are arguably most meaningful when they are located in a place with a relationship to the individual, group, or event being commemorated. In 2002, for example, a representative from the National Park Service (NPS) testified before Congress about the importance of place: No memorial designed for placement in Washington, D.C. could capture the emotion and awe of visitors to the USS Arizona Memorial, lying where it was sunk in Pearl Harbor. The Oklahoma City National Memorial would not have nearly the power it has if it had been constructed anywhere else but at the site of the Murrah Building. The memorial landscapes of Gettysburg or Antietam National Battlefields still haunt visitors who contemplate what occurred there nearly 150 years ago. Indeed, people from all over the world continue to be drawn to these hallowed grounds to reflect on the historical events that took place at the sites or, perhaps, to pay their respects to those who lost their lives there. This report considers the extent of federal involvement in memorials located outside the District of Columbia (Washington, DC). A distinction is drawn between memorials located within and outside of Washington, DC, because of the exclusive role the CWA gives Congress to authorize new memorials on federal land in the District of Columbia, and the role of federal agencies—primarily NPS and the General Services Administration (GSA)—in maintaining District-based memorials once dedicated. Other CRS reports provide further discussion of memorials within the District of Columbia. Federal Role in Establishing and Maintaining Memorials Outside of Washington, DC No systematic law or set of regulations governs the establishment of memorials outside Washington, DC. While many such works are established without federal involvement, Congress also has established or recognized numerous memorials nationwide, and some have been designated by the executive branch. For purposes of this report, federal involvement in memorials outside the District of Columbia may be classified as "high," "medium," "low," or "none." ( Figure 1 ). 1. Memorials with "high" federal involvement typically are located on federal land; receive federal funds for design, construction, and maintenance; and are managed by federal agencies. These include memorials established by Congress as units of the National Park System or under the administration of another agency. 2. Memorials with "medium" federal involvement typically either are located on federal land but do not receive federal funding, or are located on nonfederal land but receive assistance from a federal agency. Examples include a number of memorials designated as NPS affiliated areas, which remain under nonfederal management but receive assistance from NPS. 3. Memorials with "low" federal involvement are those for which Congress provides statutory recognition, but which are not located on federal land or affiliated with a federal agency, and do not receive federal funds. 4. Memorials with no federal involvement are those that receive no federal recognition, are located on nonfederal land, and for which nonfederal resources were used to design and build the memorial. High Federal Involvement: Federal Agency Management In some instances, Congress authorizes a memorial to be created on federal land and administered by a federal agency. Such memorials have been established primarily as units of the National Park System, but also may be located within the jurisdiction of other agencies. Some of these memorials include multiple facilities such as a visitor center or kiosk in addition to the primary commemorative work. Congress also regularly enacts legislation to place plaques, markers, and similar works at federal sites, or to name federal sites in memory of individuals, groups, or events. In addition to congressional designations, executive-branch officials also have designated some commemorative works on federal land. Some agencies' regulations and policies allow for agency officials to authorize the placement of plaques, markers, and similar works on agency property, and to name structures or features in memory of a person, group, or event. For example, U.S. Army regulations allow for Army officials to approve memorials to certain distinguished individuals, including deceased Army uniformed and civilian personnel with records of outstanding and honorable service, under specified criteria. Memorials Within the National Park System To establish a national memorial as a unit of the National Park System, an act of Congress is required. For example, in the 107 th Congress, P.L. 107-226 established the Flight 93 National Memorial in Pennsylvania to "honor the passengers and crew of United Airlines Flight 93 of September 11, 2001." For a discussion of the process for creating a new NPS unit and associated issues, see CRS Report RS20158, National Park System: Establishing New Units . Table 1 lists national memorials outside the District of Columbia that are National Park System units. The table entries are organized alphabetically by state and the descriptions are adapted from the National Parks Index . Although two of the memorials do not include the word "national" in their names, NPS categorizes them all as national memorials. Although legislation is required to establish a memorial as an NPS unit, agency management policies allow for the NPS director to approve commemorative names and the placement of commemorative works within park units if specified criteria are met, including that there be a "compelling justification" for associating the memorialized person or event with the park in question, and a specified time lapse between the commemoration and the person's death or the event's occurrence. Other Federal Agency Memorials Both Congress and executive-branch officials also have established memorials on property administered by agencies other than NPS, such as the Department of Defense and others. These memorials typically are managed by the administering agency as part of its overall management of a larger site. For example, in 2015, Congress designated the Medicine Creek Treaty National Memorial, which is managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as part of the Billy Frank Jr. Nisqually National Wildlife Refuge in the state of Washington. In 2000, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to designate the Battle of Midway National Memorial in the Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, also administered by FWS. Medium Federal Involvement: Federal Lands or Federal Funds In some instances, Congress has established a memorial on federal land but required it to be financed by a nonfederal entity, or alternatively, has provided federal financial and/or technical assistance to a nonfederal entity for management of a memorial that is not on federal land. NPS has played a large role in supporting these "medium-involvement" commemorative works, but other agencies have participated as well, especially branches of the Department of Defense. Memorials Designated as NPS Affiliated Areas Congress has designated some sites, including several national memorials, as affiliated areas of the National Park Service. These sites are not units of the National Park System and typically remain in nonfederal ownership and management, but receive technical and/or financial assistance from NPS. For example, P.L. 108-199 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, transferred jurisdiction over the Oklahoma City Bombing Memorial from the NPS to the Oklahoma City National Memorial Foundation and provided that the NPS "is authorized to enter into 1 or more cooperative agreements with the Foundation for the National Park Service to provide interpretive services related to the Memorial." The Secretary of the Interior also may designate sites as NPS affiliated areas, but may not provide financial assistance to these sites without an act of Congress. Table 3 lists national memorials that are NPS affiliated areas, including the memorial's name, its location, and a description from the NPS. Other Memorials with Partial Federal Involvement Outside of the NPS affiliated area designation, Congress has sometimes provided for a federal agency to fund or otherwise assist a nonfederally administered memorial. For example, P.L. 107-117 appropriated $4.2 million to the Department of Defense to be used by the Secretary of the Navy as a grant to the U.S.S. Alabama Battleship Foundation, "to be available only for the preservation of the former USS Alabama (BB–60) as a museum and memorial." The same law also provided $4.3 million to the Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Foundation to preserve the former USS Intrepid as a museum and memorial. Congress has also sometimes provided a "medium" level of federal support to a memorial by authorizing its establishment on federal land, but without federal funding. For example, P.L. 115-170 authorized a private organization, Pacific Historic Parks, to establish a commemorative display within a national park unit—the World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument in Hawaii—to honor soldiers who fought in the Pacific theater. The law specified that federal funds could not be used to design, procure, prepare, install, or maintain the commemorative display, although the NPS director is authorized to accept contributions of nonfederal funds and resources for such purposes. Similarly, P.L. 113-66 (§2842) authorized the Secretary of the Navy to allow a memorial to military divers to be established at a suitable location under the Secretary's jurisdiction; however, the law prohibited the use of federal funds to design, procure, prepare, install, or maintain the memorial. The law required the Secretary to approve the memorial's final design and to ensure that an "assured" source of nonfederal funding was established for the memorial's construction and ongoing maintenance. Another example is the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial, which is located on federal land (the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, MD) but does not receive federal funds for maintenance. It is maintained by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, a nonprofit organization. Other variations of federal-nonfederal partnerships have also been established. For example, P.L. 109-163 (§1017) authorized a nonfederal entity, the USS Oklahoma Memorial Foundation, to construct a memorial to the USS Oklahoma on federal land. Although the foundation was required to fund and execute construction of the memorial, the Secretary of the Interior was given ongoing responsibility for its administration. The Silent Heroes of the Cold War National Memorial was dedicated in 2015 by the U.S. Forest Service (FS) at a site in Nevada's Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, administered by FS, but was constructed with private funding. Low Federal Involvement: Statutory Designation of Nonfederal National Memorials On numerous occasions, Congress has designated an existing nonfederal memorial as a "national memorial" without any further federal affiliation. These memorials generally do not receive federal funds or support for maintenance or programming. Legislation designating these national memorials often includes explicit language stating that the memorial is not an NPS unit and that federal funds shall not be provided for the memorial. For example, the statute designating the National Distinguished Flying Cross Memorial in Riverside, CA, stated the following: (c) Effect of Designation.—The national memorial designated by this section is not a unit of the National Park System, and the designation of the national memorial shall not be construed to require or permit Federal funds to be expended for any purpose related to the national memorial. Table 5 lists statutorily designated national memorials outside of Washington, DC, that are not National Park System units, NPS affiliated areas, or associated with other federal agencies. Some of these memorials do not have the word "national" in their name, but are listed in the U.S. Code as national memorials. No Federal Involvement In some cases, memorials located outside of the District of Columbia have been called "national" memorials without being so designated by Congress. For example, the George Washington Masonic National Memorial in Alexandria, VA, and the National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, AL, are privately established and maintained. In cases where nonfederal sponsoring entities have titled works as national memorials without congressional recognition, these works generally do not receive federal funds or support for maintenance or programming. A comprehensive list of such memorials is not currently available. Conclusions and Selected Options Federal involvement with memorials outside of Washington, DC, currently takes a wide variety of forms. Congress has established national memorials that are entirely federally funded and managed, often as units of the National Park System. Congress has also provided for more limited types of federal involvement, such as funding assistance to a nonfederally located memorial or hosting of a nonfederally funded memorial on federal land. Also, Congress has provided statutory recognition to numerous nonfederal memorials without any additional federal involvement. Beyond these federally endorsed memorials, a wide variety of other entities have established and maintained memorials throughout the country with no federal connection, including some titled as "national memorials." For certain types of commemorations, Congress has taken a more systematized approach. For example, the CWA governs the establishment of memorials on federal lands in the District of Columbia, with provisions for the creation, design, construction, and maintenance of such works. If Congress wished to consider a more systematized approach to the establishment and/or funding of national memorials outside the District of Columbia, there are a number of potential options. For example, Congress could establish a statutory definition of a "national memorial" to guide decisionmaking as new proposals for commemoration arise. Congress might consider applying criteria similar to those of the CWA, or to those used by individual agencies for non-CWA memorials, that relate to the types of people and events that may be commemorated, and the amount of time that must pass between an event or individual's death and the commemoration. Congress could potentially limit the number of memorial designations that would be appropriate in a given time period, similar to current limits on the number of commemorative coins the U.S. Mint can issue in a year. For commemorative coins, committee rules have also required a minimum number of cosponsors before a bill might be considered. Creating systematic limitations of this nature for national memorials outside of Washington, DC, could potentially make these designations more valuable (if fewer opportunities for recognition were available) and might allow time to elapse for informed historical judgment before memorials are designated. However, such requirements might also serve to limit the number of contemporary national memorial opportunities and could be seen as reducing Congress's flexibility to make case-by-case decisions about memorials. Conversely, Congress might wish to increase the number of memorials that are nationally recognized outside of Washington, DC, such as through the establishment of a program to identify nonfederal memorials deserving of a national designation. Such a program could potentially include provisions similar to those for the U.S. Civil Rights Network established by P.L. 115-104 , which require the Secretary of the Interior to review studies and take other steps to identify federal and nonfederal sites related to the African American civil rights movement for potential inclusion in the network. Congress also could potentially consider a program to provide grants to nonfederal entities for constructing and/or maintaining national memorials outside of Washington, DC. Such a program could be seen as beneficial in promoting opportunities for public learning and memory, and encouraging suitable maintenance and upkeep of valued commemorative works. Alternatively, it could be opposed (for example, some might claim it would divert federal funds from more highly prioritized uses). Congress might determine that current practices surrounding the creation of national memorials outside the District of Columbia are effective or that the potential cost of changes outweigh the potential benefits. Congress could thus continue to evaluate requests to designate national memorials outside Washington, DC, on a case-by-case basis.