Background When complete, JWST will be a large, deployable space telescope, optimized for infrared observations. It is the scientific successor to the aging Hubble Space Telescope launched 29 years ago. JWST is being designed for a 5-year mission to find the first stars, study planets in other solar systems, search for the building blocks of life elsewhere in the universe, and trace the evolution of galaxies from their beginning to their current formation. JWST is intended to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5 million kilometers—or 1 million miles—from Earth. With a 6.5-meter (21.3 foot) diameter mirror, JWST is expected to operate at about 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble Space Telescope. Its science instruments are designed to observe faint infrared sources and therefore are required to operate at extremely cold temperatures. To help keep these instruments cold, the JWST project will rely on a multi-layered, tennis court-sized sunshield to protect the mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat. The JWST project is divided into three major segments: observatory, ground, and launch. When complete, the observatory segment will include several elements (Optical Telescope Element, Integrated Science Instrument Module, and spacecraft) and major subsystems (sunshield and cryocooler). Additionally, JWST is dependent on software to deploy and control various components of the telescope, and to collect and transmit data back to Earth. The elements, major subsystems, and software are being developed through a mixture of NASA, contractor, and international partner efforts. See figure 1 for the elements and major subsystems of JWST and appendix I for more details, including a description of the elements, major subsystems, and instruments. JWST depends on more deployment events—steps after launch that configure the observatory for its mission and place it in orbit—than a typical science mission. Due to the observatory’s large size, it is nearly impossible to perform deployment tests of the fully assembled observatory in a thermal vacuum chamber to simulate the space environment, so the verification of deployment elements is accomplished by a combination of lower level component tests in flight-simulated environments; ambient deployment tests for subsystem, element, and observatory levels; and detailed analysis and simulations at various levels of assembly. Figure 1 shows the multiple layers of integration and testing for major components of the JWST observatory. For the majority of work remaining, the JWST project is relying on two contractors: Northrop Grumman and the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy’s Space Telescope Science Institute. Northrop Grumman plays the largest role, developing the sunshield, the Optical Telescope Element, the spacecraft, and the Mid-Infrared Instrument’s cryocooler, in addition to integrating and testing the observatory. Space Telescope Science Institute’s role includes soliciting and evaluating research proposals from the scientific community, and receiving and storing the scientific data collected, both of which are services that the Institute currently provides for the Hubble Space Telescope. Additionally, the Institute is developing the ground system that manages and controls the telescope’s observations and will operate the observatory on behalf of NASA. JWST will be launched on an Ariane 5 rocket, provided by the European Space Agency. History of Cost Growth and Schedule Delays The JWST program has a history of significant schedule delays and project cost increases, which resulted in both the 2011 and 2018 replans. Prior to approving the project’s development, cost estimates for JWST ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with expected launch dates ranging from 2007 to 2011. Due to early technical and management challenges, contractor performance issues, and low levels of cost reserve, the JWST program experienced schedule overruns, launch delays, and cost growth. The program underwent a replan in September 2011 and then a rebaseline; further, Congress placed an $8 billion cap on the formulation and development costs for the project. However, in June 2018, after a series of launch delay announcements due to technical and workmanship issues identified during spacecraft element integration, NASA notified Congress that it had revised the JWST program’s cost and schedule estimates again. NASA estimated that it would now require $828 million in additional resources over the program’s lifecycle and 29 more months beyond the estimates agreed to in the 2011 rebaseline to complete the project. Since the project’s costs and schedule were baselined in 2009, costs have increased by 95 percent and its launch date has been delayed by over 6.5 years. Prior to this more recent replan, NASA established an Independent Review Board (IRB) in April 2018, comprised of technical experts from outside the JWST program to evaluate all factors that may affect the successful completion of remaining mission steps. The board released its final report in May 2018 in which it made 32 recommendations that address a range of technical, organizational, and other factors. The IRB took into account varying technical and workmanship errors, human mistakes, adequacy of integration and test staff, and other considerations when it analyzed the project’s organizational and technical issues. The IRB recommended, among other actions, that the project conduct an audit to identify potential embedded design flaws; establish corrective actions to detect and correct human mistakes during integration and testing; establish a coherent, agreed-upon, and factual narrative on project status and communicate that status regularly across all relevant stakeholders; and, finally, augment integration and test staff to ensure adequate long-term staffing and improve employee morale. These recommendations also included reconsidering the proposed launch date. In March 2019, we found that NASA had considered many of the program’s risks while developing its 2018 replan schedule and cost baseline but recommended that additional analysis be completed to provide NASA and Congress with better insight into project resourcing and affordability. A Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level is an integrated analysis of a project’s cost, schedule, risk, and uncertainty, the result of which indicates a project’s likelihood of meeting cost and schedule targets. The project did not complete such an analysis as part of its second replan. NASA policy says this tool may be used to inform planning. Though not required by NASA policy, we recommended that one be conducted given the long history of program challenges and the significant and complex integration events that still needed to be completed. NASA agreed with our recommendation and completed this analysis in October 2019. GAO plans to conduct a separate, more detailed engagement on this analysis and its findings in the future. See appendix II for more information on this and other GAO recommendations. Schedule and Cost Reserves for NASA Projects The JWST project, like other complex development efforts we have reviewed, faces numerous risks and potential unforeseen technical challenges, which often become apparent during integration and testing. To accommodate unanticipated challenges and manage risk, projects include extra time in their schedules, referred to as schedule reserve, and extra funds in their budgets, referred to as cost reserve. Schedule reserve is allocated to specific activities, elements, and major subsystems in the event of delays or to address unforeseen risks. Each JWST element and major subsystem has been allocated schedule reserve. When an element or major subsystem exhausts schedule reserve, it may affect schedule reserve on other elements or major subsystems whose progress is dependent on prior work being finished. Cost reserve is additional funding within the project manager’s budget that can be used to address and mitigate unanticipated issues for any element or major subsystem. Goddard—the NASA center with responsibility for managing JWST— issued procedures detailing the cost and schedule reserve requirements for formulating and executing spaceflight programs. When NASA constructed its 2018 replan for the JWST project, it took into account the remaining integration and test activities planned prior to launch, known technology challenges that presented risks to schedule, as well as potential future risks. The project’s replan reflected a planned schedule reserve above the level indicated by Goddard policy, which would have been approximately 5 months at that time. Instead, the new schedule included a total of 293 days or 9.6 months of schedule reserve, with approximately 6 months of this reserve to be managed at the project level and the remainder held by the program at NASA headquarters. Following the replan, the project and the contractor worked toward a launch date in November 2020, which would have required none of the schedule reserve managed at the NASA headquarters level. However, the committed launch date under the replan, where all available schedule reserve is utilized, is now March 2021. JWST’s Use of Award Fees NASA’s cost-plus-award-fee contract with Northrop Grumman has spanned approximately 17 years, during which time there have been significant variances in performance. These types of contracts are suitable when uncertainties in scope of work or cost of services prevent the use of contract types where prices are fixed. Award fee contracts provide contractors the opportunity to obtain additional fee beyond the costs charged to the government for enhanced levels of performance in areas identified in the contract’s award fee plan. Award fees may be used when key elements of performance cannot be defined objectively, and, as such, require the project officials’ judgment to assess contractor performance. For JWST’s contract with Northrop Grumman, these areas include cost, schedule, technical, and business management and are established in the contract’s award fee plan, which allows for the award of a scaled fee based on assessed performance. This plan has been revised over the life of the contract to incentivize performance in certain areas, but it has always required Northrop Grumman to meet a minimum standard to receive any award fee. Over the course of the JWST contract, nearly $250 million dollars will have been available to Northrop Grumman through this incentive. We have found that when NASA and the contractor have made revisions to fee evaluation criteria to focus on certain aspects of performance, the contractor has been responsive to the new criteria during its work on the JWST project. Little Margin for Error Remains with Challenging Integration and Test Work Ahead Though the JWST project has made significant progress since our last report in March 2019, technical challenges have required the use of most of the project’s available schedule reserve. According to NASA officials, the contractor has found ways to replenish reserve, but NASA is still reviewing some of these methods and the project continues to work through significant integration and testing events with less than a quarter of the schedule reserve allotted to it in June 2018. The technical challenges have resulted in prolonged employment of the contractor workforce, which is the primary driver for increased costs. NASA Has Completed Key Testing and Integration Steps and Continues to Address Known Risks Following the June 2018 replan, the project has achieved a number of integration and testing milestones and has taken steps to address previously identified technical challenges. Since our March 2019 JWST report, the program has completed testing on the individual component elements of the observatory and has integrated them to start observatory level testing, the last of five phases of integration and testing. Leading up to observatory integration, the project completed thermal vacuum testing of the spacecraft element in May 2019. This testing helped to ensure that JWST hardware will function properly in the vacuum of space and withstand significant temperature variations during deployment and operation, and provided data to corroborate modelling on which the observatory’s mission is based. Further, the project completed the last major testing milestone for optical telescope and science instrumentation elements—deployment of the secondary mirror assembly—in August 2019. This secondary mirror focuses the light collected by the 18 hexagonal primary mirrors of JWST into a beam and directs it toward scientific equipment aboard the observatory. Integration of the observatory components was completed in August 2019, and the program has deployed the sunshield as part of observatory integration and testing. NASA has also taken steps to address challenges noted in our previous reports. For example, In February 2018, we found that Northrop Grumman planned to modify the design of the sunshield’s membrane tensioning system in response to a risk of a cable snagging during deployment. NASA approved this redesign in May 2019 and employed a new approach to cable management that involves modification and replacement of certain cable clips and routing cables differently to manage slack that could cause snags. We found in March 2019 that the project office identified concerns that trapped air in the folded sunshield membrane could put too much stress on the observatory when the launch vehicle fairing depressurizes—the fairing is the part of the rocket that encapsulates JWST during flight. NASA, Northrop Grumman, European Space Agency, and European vendors responsible for operating and producing the launch vehicle have worked together to study this issue and have designed vents for the fairing that will mitigate the risk of damage to JWST. The new fairing vent design is expected to be tested aboard a rocket planned to launch in the spring of 2020. Technical Challenges Have Significantly Reduced Schedule Margin, with Considerable Integration and Testing Ahead Despite the major accomplishments of the past year, the program has identified new technical issues that present risk for meeting the 2018 replan’s schedule requirements. Multiple technical issues have contributed to the use of schedule reserve since the June 2018 replan, but two identified in March and April 2019 have had the most significant effect. The program identified two significant anomalies during pre-testing events for the spacecraft element’s thermal vacuum testing, which first delayed thermal vacuum testing and then required additional time for investigation and implementation of solutions. Specifically, a traveling wave tube amplifier and a command and telemetry processor had errant powering issues during testing. These are important components of the observatory’s communication systems that enable JWST to send large amounts of science data and telemetry to the ground segment at high speed. Though the anomalies occurred at the same time and were both power- related, NASA does not believe they are related and has initiated separate review boards to determine solutions. The amplifier failure is attributed to workmanship issues on the part of a subcontractor. As of October 2019, the exact cause of the processor anomaly remained under investigation, but the electrical problem had been isolated to faults within specific circuit cards. NASA has taken steps to address the risks presented by both anomalies: it has received replacement amplifiers and has upgraded and tested an engineering model processor to replace the faulty one aboard the observatory if necessary. As a result of technical issues discovered since the June 2018 replan, the JWST program has had to use significantly more schedule reserve than it planned to and has been working towards the replan’s formally committed launch date of March 2021. As of October 2019, the project had used 224 days of schedule reserve, or about 76 percent of the total project and program-held schedule reserve incorporated into the June 2018 replan. All project-held schedule margin was used by March 2019, a point at which the project would have retained approximately 4 months of reserve according to its original plan. At one point since our March 2019 report, the project had as little as 18 percent of its total schedule reserve left, but contractor-led corrective action plans regained time through found efficiencies. As a result of these challenges, the project’s reserve fell below what is indicated by Goddard policy. NASA determined in May 2019 that the November 2020 launch date that the project had hoped to achieve was no longer feasible, and switched focus to meeting the committed launch date of March 2021. Figure 2 shows the level of planned reserve for JWST, reserve indicated by Goddard policy, and the project’s actual use of schedule reserve. Since then, however, the JWST project has determined that the March 2021 launch readiness date may not be feasible either, based on a detailed assessment of risks, costs, and schedule. In October 2019, the project completed a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis in response to a GAO recommendation made in a previous report on the JWST program. Because of schedule delays resulting from technical challenges coupled with remaining risks faced by the project, the analysis assessed only a 12 percent confidence level for the project’s ability to meet the March 2021 launch readiness date. NASA typically establishes its cost and schedule baseline commitments at 70 percent confidence level. According to the analysis, this 70 percent baseline confidence level is associated with a July 2021 launch date. The project does not currently intend to change the launch readiness date in response to this analysis alone, but plans to assess the feasibility of the launch readiness date again in spring 2020 after significant technical tasks are completed. NASA and Northrop Grumman have a plan to recover schedule reserve but certain portions of the plan remain under technical review. Following the amplifier and processor anomalies, Northrop Grumman developed a corrective action plan to recover schedule reserve, and the contractor and NASA continue to look for ways to gain efficiencies. In June 2019, Northrop Grumman suggested a number of potential schedule optimization steps that were reviewed by NASA management. Northrop Grumman has begun to be implement some of these steps. If all steps are taken, the contractor estimates 65 days of project schedule will be recovered, nearly doubling the amount of reserve available to the project when the anomalies were discovered. Among the efforts described in this corrective action plan are to streamline aspects of vibration testing and to modify build and repair schedules so that a major panel on the spacecraft will only have to be opened once. Combined, these two steps would save an estimated 46 days. However, officials noted that for the plan for a single panel opening to remain viable, corrective actions for the amplifier and processor replacements would need to remain on schedule. The project continues to review some of Northrop Grumman’s proposed efficiencies, but more than half of these schedule savings have already been incorporated into the schedule reserve forecast. The project also continues to identify and monitor risks that could potentially result in further use of schedule margin. As suggested by the IRB, the project has led a number of audits looking for embedded risks. As of November, most of the audits planned have been completed and NASA identified some new risks. The following are some of the risks the project is monitoring that could affect schedule: The project found that certain bolts, determined to be deficient on another Northrop Grumman program, were used during the construction of the observatory. A study of this issue found that the bolts used did not meet specifications and could pose a mechanical strength risk. The unused bolts have been identified and isolated, but 501 were installed in the observatory. NASA is performing strength testing to determine if the bolts are strong enough, but some of the deficient bolts may need to be replaced, pending the findings of these tests. The project reported in August 2019 that grounding straps on the spacecraft’s momentum flap came loose during vibration testing. This flap will act as balance against solar pressure that could cause unwanted movement of the observatory while in orbit. Observatory- level vibration testing cannot begin until the flap is removed, repaired, and replaced aboard the spacecraft. In September 2019, the project found that a non-explosive actuator on one of its membrane retention devices did not fire as planned. These devices, which help to unfurl the sunshield of the spacecraft, are supposed to be electrically redundant, but only one of the two mechanisms used to fire the actuator worked during the test. The program reports that there are approximately 180 actuators on the JWST and the failure of any one of these actuators could result in the total loss of JWST science mission objectives. If the redundancy for the actuators is reduced, it would have a major impact on system reliability. The project is evaluating whether it needs to replace certain membrane retention devices that may not be able to withstand the coupled pressure placed upon them by the launch and newly designed fairing ventilation. Testing in the past did not account for all aspects of the pressures placed upon this hardware during launch and spaceflight. The project indicated that it is completing an analysis to determine if stronger devices need to be installed. The JWST project office reviews and reports on these and other risks monthly. As of October 2019, the project is tracking 50 risks—three more than when we last reported on JWST—of which 12 continue to be assessed as moderate concerns. Of the 50, 23 have been assessed to be at acceptable levels of risk but continue to be monitored should changes affect their status. For example, the risk associated with cabling within the sunshield was elevated in October 2019 when the project found that further testing was needed to ensure slack did not present an unacceptable threat to the spacecraft during deployment. Finally, nine of the 50 risks currently tracked by the project are related to the more than 300 single points of failure aboard the observatory. The project must conduct significant integration and testing activities in the coming months that could present further challenges. Our previous work on major NASA acquisition programs found that integration and testing is the phase when challenges are most likely to be found and schedules can slip. The science elements and the spacecraft have only recently been integrated. NASA will have to manage seven top-level integration and testing steps between October 2019 and December 2020 to include observatory-level vibration testing, sunshield deployment and stow, and electrical testing and repairs. Currently, this will all have to be completed with a diminished amount of schedule reserve. Northrop Grumman and NASA officials we interviewed agreed that no other major complication, such as those on the scale of the traveling wave tube amplifier and command and telemetry processor anomalies, can happen without putting the March 2021 launch date in jeopardy. Technical Challenges May Also Drive Additional Costs for the Project As we found in March 2019, changes to JWST project’s life-cycle cost estimate are principally driven by schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor’s workforce longer than expected to complete integration and testing. We also found that NASA’s cost estimate for the 2018 replan was based on a more gradual workforce reduction schedule than previously used by the Northrop Grumman. NASA continues to forecast an overall reduction in contractor and government workforce following the project’s launch readiness date with continued, steady support by the Space Telescope Science Institute during remaining development and post-launch phases of the program (see figure 3). The program reports that cost reserve is generally sufficient for planned work but technical challenges could cause workforce costs to increase. The cost and schedule analysis completed by the project in October 2019 indicated that the project will not exceed the cost commitment established in the 2018 replan even if launch is delayed further by a few months. According to officials, funding is sufficient to continue work even if the launch date slips 3-4 months past the March 2021 launch date. However, the technical issues identified during integration and testing activities have required the contractor workforce to remain engaged, instead of drawing down as planned. Rather than see a temporary drop in contractor work hours as hardware deliveries were completed ahead of observatory-level testing and integration activities, the project has maintained contractor workforce levels to address the issues described above. The contractor now forecasts approximately 15 percent more workforce hours between 2019 and 2022, the year following launch (see figure 4). Approximately $133 million in cost reserve funding will be used by the project over the next 2 fiscal years to accommodate increasing workforce retention costs. NASA Has Addressed Recommendations and Sustained Oversight Improvements Since 2018 Since the June 2018 replan, NASA has taken steps to improve the JWST project by implementing Independent Review Board (IRB) recommendations, pursuing other oversight initiatives, and continuing to incentivize contractor performance through the use of award fees. NASA addressed all IRB recommendations even though the agency did not always agree with the IRB on the specific steps needed to address the recommendations. Further, NASA has sustained, and in some cases expanded, the oversight initiatives that were started prior to our last report. The cost plus award fee contract used for JWST development efforts provides the project with a means to incentivize contractor performance related to cost, schedule, technical, and business management goals. Since the 2018 replan, Northrop Grumman’s award fee evaluations have improved but remain below its average for the contract. NASA Has Completed Its Implementation of IRB Recommendations NASA assessed all IRB recommendations as closed in October 2019. The IRB made 32 recommendations covering a range of topics from improving communication with stakeholders to identifying embedded problems. NASA implemented its recommendation to establish March 2021 as the committed launch date for JWST through the June 2018 replan. Responsibility for implementing the remaining 31 recommendations was split among headquarters, the program office, and the project. The 10 headquarters- and program-level recommendations covered high-level recommendations dealing with entities outside of the project or communication between upper-level NASA management and the project. The remaining 21 recommendations were implemented at the project level and included lower-level actions related to assessing, preparing for, and improving day-to-day work. NASA assessed most recommendations as implemented prior to an IRB follow-up assessment, but the IRB found that more work was required for some to completely align with the board’s intent. In February 2019, the IRB found that the steps NASA took for approximately one-third of its recommendations were either inadequate or needed additional work, with the remainder found to be appropriate. Specifically, the IRB categorized 21 of the recommendation responses as appropriate, eight responses as appropriate with additional work needed, and three responses as inadequate. The IRB’s monitoring of the JWST project ended with the February 2019 follow up (see figure 5). Though NASA agreed with the intent of all the IRB recommendations, it took a different approach than described in the IRB report when implementing the three recommendations where the agency’s response was assessed to be inadequate. NASA conducted additional work for the majority of recommendations assessed by the IRB to be incomplete. However, NASA determined that a few of the IRB recommendations managed at the headquarters level should not be implemented the way they were delineated in the IRB report. Specifically, The IRB found that the JWST reporting structure was complex, confusing, and ineffective. The IRB made two recommendations for NASA to update its reporting chain. The IRB believed the Science Mission Directorate Associate Administrator should have responsibility of the entire JWST program and the Goddard Space Flight Center Director should be responsible for all aspects of the JWST project. The IRB asserted that restricting the involvement of the Goddard director will reduce the probability of JWST success. NASA agreed that it is important to have clear organizational roles and responsibilities but had a difference of opinion about the best course of action. In November 2018 and July 2019, NASA announced updates to the JWST reporting structure. However, both times it reduced the role of the Goddard director in favor of more direct line of accountability from the JWST program to the Science Mission Directorate Associate Administrator and the NASA Associate Administrator. NASA asserts that these changes will provide more clear accountability for program performance and allow for expedited decision making. The IRB recommended that NASA’s Launch Services Program should have accountability for the JWST launch. NASA has taken actions to increase the involvement of the Launch Services Program but NASA maintains that it is not prudent or possible for the Launch Services Program to be accountable for the launch because the European Space Agency is contributing the launch vehicle and managing the launch. The IRB recognized the unique circumstances of using an international launch vehicle but continued to assert the importance of Launch Services Program accountability. A minority of IRB members were of the opinion that NASA took appropriate action. NASA Has Sustained Key Oversight Improvements and Made Additional Improvements Since 2018 NASA has sustained increased oversight and involvement with Northrop Grumman following the announcement of an anticipated cost cap breach in March 2018. Previously reported improvements included both the implementation of IRB recommendations and the pursuit of self-initiated activities, like greater NASA on-site coverage and Northrop Grumman’s culture change campaign designed to shift focus toward quality assurance. Our March 2019 report, provided examples of these changes and initiatives. Table 1 below provides a summary of our previous report findings and the current status of the changes NASA and Northrop Grumman made in providing oversight and ensuring quality. Since we last reported in March 2019, NASA has made additional oversight changes to further enhance communication with and oversight of the contractor. Most of these changes emphasize greater involvement of NASA specialists in meetings and reviews. NASA officials reported that its increased presence with the contractor has had positive effects for both ensuring project outcomes and increasing morale of the government and contractor workforce. For example, NASA integration and testing leadership is present and embedded in Northrop Grumman’s meetings— directly participating in planning sessions, reporting, and reviews of failures and anomalies. As a result, the project was able to plan for early integration of the observatory and completed key integration activities without being the primary driver of the project’s schedule. According to officials, expanded participation has helped to ensure more realistic exercises that include procedural concerns as well as engineering considerations. NASA officials said that the increased participation has allowed NASA input to be incorporated early—potentially reducing issues in the future. Further, NASA officials believe that the consistent presence of NASA personnel has improved morale—an item highlighted by the IRB—and helped foster greater unity of effort between government and contractor workforces. Contractor Award Fee Has Fluctuated over Time, but Performance Has Improved Recently NASA has regularly assessed contractor performance through award fee assessments since the beginning of the contract in 2002. Award fee documentation over the course of the Northrop Grumman contract indicates that contractor performance was assessed as below its average before periods of significant cost and schedule growth. On average, Northrop Grumman has been rated as very good with about three-fourths of evaluations assessing its performance as either excellent or very good. For the award fee evaluations that fall below Northrop Grumman’s average score, cost performance has contributed to the majority of these dips and schedule performance has contributed to almost half. In particular, schedule performance has reduced the contractor’s overall evaluation for all award fee periods since April 2017. The latest dip below the contractor’s average preceded lifecycle cost growth of $828 million and schedule growth of nearly 2.5 years (see figure 6). Since our March 2019 report, Northrop Grumman’s ratings have improved but remain below its average. For the award fee period from October 2017 through March 2018, Northrop Grumman received an unsatisfactory rating, which resulted in the contractor receiving no award fee for the first and only time in the life of the contract. The unacceptable rating was driven by cost and schedule performance—including the anticipation of breaching the $8 billion congressional cost cap established in response to the 2011 rebaseline. In the following two periods, Northrop Grumman has improved its evaluation, but schedule performance remains a concern. During the last award fee period assessed, NASA was internally managing to a November 2020 launch date. Shortly after the award fee period ended, the project found it could no longer support the November 2020 date and began managing to the March 2021 launch date. Agency Comments and our Evaluation We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to NASA for comment. NASA provided technical comments that, among other things, clarified implementation of schedule recovery steps and updated progress on observatory repairs. We incorporated suggested technical changes as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the NASA Administrator, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory Appendix II: Status of Previous GAO Recommendations on Management of the James Webb Space Telescope Program In its previous reports on the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), the GAO has made several recommendations. These recommendations are listed below. Comments reflect the status of the program at the time GAO closed the recommendation. Appendix III: List of Independent Review Board (IRB) Recommendations Appendix III: List of Independent Review Board (IRB) Recommendations Telescope (JWST) launch success at the same level of responsibility they have for U.S. launches, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) should contract with Aerospace Corporation for similar accountability. 2 The Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard) and Northrop Grumman Project Offices should be established as consistent and factual source of all JWST mission status 3 Communications of status and details appropriate for stakeholders need to be presented clearly and frequently. 4 NASA headquarters should be responsible for developing a “communication plan” (messaging strategy) for JWST. 5 Communicating complexity, risk, and science return for JWST is critically important. 6 Use the same criticality and assessment charts for all JWST reporting. 7 NASA should implement a JWST reporting structure where the Science Mission Directorate Associate Administrator has responsibility for the entire JWST program and the Goddard Space Flight Center Director is responsible for all aspects of the project. 8 NASA should revise NASA policy directives to be consistent with the recommendation. 9 Assure consistent, sustained and meaningful engagement of the Science Working Group (SWG). 10 Appoint an executive committee of NASA-selected members of the SWG to act as conduits to the broader community on mission challenges. 11 NASA should designate a Commission Manager. 12 NASA should implement sunshield hardware and simulation elements to aid in sunshield anomaly identification and resolution. 13 Northrop Grumman should establish corrective actions in1) processes, 2) training, 3) personnel certification, 4) discipline to ensure individual accountability and 5) a failure-proof “safety net” through a robust testing, analysis, and inspection process. 14 Goddard and Northrop Grumman should conduct an audit including forensic engineering, hardware pedigree assessment, drawing checks, etc., to identify potential embedded problems. 15 Goddard should conduct an audit of the JWST project residual risk, reviewing the objective evidence of (a) the completed Test As You Fly and Single Point Failures mitigation plans, and (b) failure corrective action effectiveness to determine the “as built” residual risk. 16 The project should reconcile the “as built” residual risk with the expected “as designed” residual risk. 17 NASA should define security requirements and plan for JWST transport to launch site. 18 Develop contingency operations and sparing plan for spacecraft/launch site operations. 19 Develop “pathfinder” JWST simulator and contamination protection systems for integration “dry runs.” 20 Assess shipping vessel contamination environment and develop contingency plans for off-nominal shipping operation. 21 It is critically important that Goddard JWST Project Office maintain responsibility and provide adequate support to ensure Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) mission operations readiness 22 The Project should review all simulators/testbeds and required usage against pre-launch tests and rehearsals, post-launch deployment anomaly resolution, fault isolation, and correction. 23 The Goddard JWST Project Office should develop a staffing plan that meets the needs of integration and test and operational readiness. 24 The project should develop and approve a transition plan that defines the level of mission operations responsibility for STScI as a function of time with independent gate reviews at transition points. 25 Management should unambiguously emphasize the priority of mission success to “working level” personnel. 26 Employees must feel empowered to stop or slow down if the pace or procedures can jeopardize mission success. 27 NASA should assess “top ten” mission success enhancements and implement where appropriate. 28 Responsible Design Engineers should be involved and responsible for their element through the successful commissioning of the observatory. 29 The project should augment integration and test staff; this is critically important to execute the integration and test program. 30 Augment integration and test staff to achieve more realistic work schedules. 31 Implement strategies for improving team morale, such as periodic science lectures for Northrop Grumman personnel and families. 32 The Webb IRB recommends the launch date be established as March 2021 (based upon the Project’s 5/18 assessment of the impact of the membrane cover assembly acoustic anomaly). Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Raj Chitikila (Assistant Director), Christina Cota-Robles, Carrie Rogers, Ajani Skeete, Jay Tallon, and Thomas Twambly made key contributions to this report. Assistance was also provided by Hannah Brookhart, Brian Bothwell, Lorraine Ettaro, Emile Ettedgui, Laura Greifner, Kaelin Kuhn, Christine Pecora, Roxanna Sun, and Alyssa Weir.


Background While U.S. airlines’ business practices were largely deregulated following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, a number of consumer protections are in place at the federal level. For example, some consumer protections are required by federal statute, such as the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA), as amended, which prohibits airlines from discriminating against individuals based on a disability. Federal statutes have also authorized DOT to regulate certain areas affecting passengers. For example, DOT has the authority to stop airlines from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices, or unfair methods of competition, and promulgates consumer protection regulations under its statutory authorities. Under these authorities, DOT issued three final rules on Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections from 2009 through 2016. These rules have addressed long tarmac delays, increased compensation amounts for passengers who are involuntarily denied boarding, and required certain airlines to post information about their fees and on-time performance on their websites. Airlines’ Operational Performance Has Generally Improved, but Passengers Filed More Complaints and May Experience a Range of Inconveniences Rates of Mishandled Baggage and Denied Boardings Generally Declined From 2008 Through 2017, While Airlines’ On-Time Performance Remained Relatively Steady In 2018, we found that airlines’ operational performance—as measured by DOT data on denied boardings; mishandled baggage; and late, cancelled, or diverted flights—generally improved from 2008 through 2017, the most recent data available at the time of our review. While rates of voluntary and involuntary denied boardings and mishandled baggage generally declined, airlines’ on-time performance stayed about the same (fig. 1). For example, over the 10-year period of our review, the lowest rate of involuntary denied boardings occurred in 2017. Specifically, in 2017, airlines involuntarily denied boarding to about .003 percent of all passengers (or about 23,000 of more than 680 million passengers)—a slight decrease from prior years. Our more recent work on airlines’ denied boarding practices found that even fewer passengers were denied boarding involuntarily in 2018. Rates of mishandled baggage also generally declined in recent years. For example, in 2017 airlines posted a rate of 2.5 mishandled bags per 1,000 passengers (a rate of .25 percent of mishandled bags per passenger enplanement), compared to a rate of 5.25 mishandled bags per 1,000 passengers in 2008. In 2019, we identified a number of factors that can cause airlines’ operational issues. For example, passengers might be denied boarding when airlines overbook their flights (i.e., intentionally sell more seats than are available on a flight) or have to substitute smaller aircraft than what was originally scheduled due to maintenance issues. We also found that outages associated with airline IT systems—which are used for flight and crew planning, passenger reservations or check-in, or for providing flight information to the Federal Aviation Administration—can cause flight delays and cancellations. While we found some outages caused minimal issues, the impact of others was more substantial. For instance, in 2016, an outage in one airline’s system that is used to check in and board passengers resulted in the cancellation of 2,300 flights over 3 days. The Rate of Passenger Complaints Generally Increased From 2008 Through 2017 While airlines’ operational performance generally improved, we found in 2018 that the number of passenger complaints reported to DOT, relative to passenger boardings, generally increased from 2008 through 2017 for 12 selected airlines, peaking in 2015 and declining somewhat in later years. Specifically, in that work we found that the rate of passenger complaints reported to DOT, relative to passenger boardings, increased about 10 percent, from about 1.1 complaints per 100,000 passengers in 2008 to 1.2 complaints per 100,000 passengers in 2017. Complaints about operational issues discussed above—which make up three of DOT’s 15 complaint categories—accounted for about half of all complaints for the 12 selected airlines from 2008 through 2017. More specifically, in 2018 we found: Flight problems generally accounted for an average of about 33 percent of all complaints. This category includes complaints related to delays, cancellations, and missed connections, among other things. From 2008 through 2017, the rate of complaints in this category generally increased. Baggage issues generally accounted for an average of about 15 percent of total complaints. Complaints were largely related to lost, delayed, or damaged bags. The rate of baggage complaints generally decreased over our time period. Denied boardings generally accounted for an average of about 4 percent of total complaints. Complaints were related to airlines’ failure to solicit volunteers or providing compensation below the required amount. Rates of complaints about denied boardings generally stayed constant over our time period. Two of the remaining 12 complaint categories tracked by DOT accounted for about a quarter of passenger complaints. One category related to reservations, ticketing, and boarding, and the other related to customer service—such as airline staff having a poor attitude or refusing to provide assistance, and unsatisfactory seat assignments. Each of these categories generally accounted for an average of about 13 percent of all complaints over the 10-year period. Representatives from Selected Airlines Cited Technological and Other Actions Taken to Improve Service Our previous work identified actions taken by airlines or DOT in response to such operational issues. DOT’s actions are primarily related to establishing regulations about operational issues. For example, while DOT does not prohibit airlines from overbooking flights, it has set compensation amounts for passengers denied boarding involuntarily. DOT has also issued regulations related to returning mishandled baggage within 24 hours, tarmac delays, and prohibiting chronically delayed flights. Examples of airlines’ actions are listed below. Reducing denied boardings. In 2019, we reported that selected airlines have taken a range of actions, aimed at reducing involuntary denied boardings. Some of these actions also provide additional incentives for passengers to volunteer to be denied boarding. Actions include reducing or eliminating overbookings; improving software to better predict passenger no-shows; requesting volunteers earlier (e.g., at check-in instead of at the gate); increasing compensation for volunteers; and conducting reverse auctions to solicit volunteers. Less mishandled baggage. As we reported in 2018, representatives from almost all airlines we interviewed reported investing resources to improve baggage-handling efforts and minimize the effects to passengers whose bags are lost or delayed. Among other actions, airline representatives told us they upgraded baggage technology; modernized the claims process, so passengers could complete forms on-line; and instituted replacement baggage programs, where passengers can get a replacement bag at the airport. One airline also invested several million dollars to use radio frequency identification technology to track bags, as well as allowing passengers to track their baggage via an application on their smartphone. Efforts to minimize flight disruptions. In 2018, we also reported that selected airlines had taken numerous actions to improve on-time performance or mitigate challenges for passengers associated with flight delays and cancellations. For example, one airline began tracking flights that were “at-risk” of meeting DOT’s definition of a chronically delayed flight, so it could, among other things, swap crews or substitute aircraft and avoid these types of delays. Other airlines told us they use technology, such as text-messaging updates, to communicate with passengers during delays and cancellations or increased the number of circumstances for which passengers are compensated during delays and cancellations. Passengers May Experience Inconveniences When Operational Issues Occur Our prior work has shown that passengers may be affected to varying degrees by airline operational issues, and that incidents can be costly and disruptive for some passengers. Airlines are required by DOT regulations to provide compensation or certain amenities to inconvenienced passengers under certain circumstances. For example, some passengers who are denied boarding involuntarily are entitled to compensation, with the amount varying based on certain factors. Airlines are also required by DOT’s interpretation of the statutory prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices to provide refunds for canceled and significantly delayed flights, if a passenger chooses to cancel his or her trip. Beyond those requirements, DOT officials previously told us that airlines are not obligated to provide accommodations for flight disruptions, such as cancellations and delays, unless specified in an airline’s contract of carriage, although as mentioned above, some voluntarily choose to do so in certain situations. This may result in significant inconveniences for passengers, who may incur costs for lodging, meals and transportation. However, according to our prior work, available information about the number and magnitude of these effects is largely anecdotal and cannot be quantified. Furthermore, our review of selected airlines’ contracts of carriage in February 2019 showed variation in the types of accommodations airlines provide and circumstances in which they will be provided, when operational issues occur. Civil Rights Complaints Have Recently Increased, and DOT and Most Airlines Have Training Efforts Disability-Related Complaints Have Increased Steadily, While Discrimination-Related Complaints Have Seen a Recent Increase Disability Complaints According to the 2010 U.S. Census, 57 million Americans (roughly 1 in 5) have a disability, and more than half of those 57 million Americans have mobility issues. Furthermore, older Americans are representing an increasing share of the U.S. population. As the population continues to age, the likelihood of this group needing assistance may increase. Without accommodations—such as effective communication of flight information, accessible seats, appropriate boarding assistance, and careful handling and stowage of wheelchairs and other assistive devices—people with accessibility or mobility issues may face challenges when flying, or they may be unable to fly altogether. As previously mentioned, the ACAA prohibits airlines operating in the U.S. from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability in the provision of air transportation. Under this law, DOT has promulgated regulations requiring that airlines provide passengers with disabilities (1) assistance in enplaning and deplaning; and (2) compensation for lost, damaged, or delayed wheelchairs or other assistive devices. In contrast to all other complaints that passengers submit directly to airlines, DOT regulations require that airlines report annually to DOT the number of all disability-related complaints they received. In our May 2017 report, we provided information showing that disability complaints reported to airlines and DOT generally increased from 2005 through 2015. More recent data shows that passenger complaints reported to U.S. airlines continued to increase (see table 1). In particular, we found that complaints reported to airlines on disability issues increased by about 50 percent from 2010 (19,347) to 2017 (29,662), the most recent year for which data are available. Based on our review, the vast majority of passengers chose to file their disability complaints directly to the airlines. Notably, the number of passenger complaints on disability issues reported to DOT from 2010 through 2019 ranged from 572 to 944 and averaged about 780 complaints per year. Complaints reported to DOT rose in 2019, after peaking in 2015 and declining the three following years. In 2017, the last year data are available for both, complaints reported to airlines and DOT were most commonly related to failure of airline staff to provide assistance, seating accommodation issues, and service animal issues. As we have previously reported, the number of complaints may not fully reflect the inconvenience experienced by passengers or would-be- passengers with accessibility issues. Some may choose not to fly and others may have to take inconvenient or uncomfortable precautionary measures to avoid using the aircraft lavatory. For example, in our recent work examining the accessibility of aircraft lavatories, stakeholders we interviewed told us that some passengers severely limit their food and fluid intake in advance of the flight, risking dehydration; use a catheter; or wear a protective undergarment. Furthermore, because lavatories accessible by the aircraft’s onboard wheelchair are not required on most aircraft (i.e., single-aisle aircraft) and there may not be an expectation that the lavatory be accessible by an onboard wheelchair, passengers may not see grounds to complain or may not take the time to submit a complaint. More generally, in our prior work, we found that complaint data are inherently limited because a substantial portion of dissatisfied individuals do not submit complaints and are therefore not represented in the complaint data. Discrimination Complaints A number of federal statutes also prohibit or have been interpreted by DOT to prohibit airline discrimination against airline passengers. Federal statute also allows airlines to refuse to transport any passenger if the airline determines that the passenger is, or might be, a threat to safety. According to DOT guidance, this determination is made by the pilot in command of the aircraft or certain other specified airline personnel and cannot be arbitrary, but must be based on specific facts and circumstances known at the time. In its guidance, DOT has unequivocally provided that a passenger’s status in a protected class (e.g., race, ancestry, national origin, or religion) cannot be the determinative factor in an airline’s decision to deny boarding or remove a passenger from a flight. Our August 2019 report showed that the total number of passenger complaints reported to DOT against U.S. airlines alleging discrimination generally declined from 2010 through 2015, but began to increase starting in 2016. Moreover, updated data for 2019 show a further increase, with 96 complaints filed (table 2). According to our analysis, from 2010 through 2019, DOT received, on average, 80 discrimination- related complaints a year, most commonly about racial discrimination. Despite the recent increase in the total number of discrimination complaints, they account for a small percentage of total passenger complaints DOT receives, as well as total passenger boardings. For example, in 2019, of the 9,547 complaints DOT received against U.S. airlines, 96 alleged discriminatory treatment. As noted above and previously reported, DOT’s discrimination complaint data does not capture passenger complaints reported directly to airlines. In 2018, we reported that DOT officials estimated that, across all complaint categories, for every passenger complaint they receive, airlines receive about 50. While we have previously requested discrimination complaint data from selected airlines, they have generally declined, citing the proprietary nature of this information. Since 2017, DOT has disaggregated discrimination complaints into sub-categories, such as racial or religious discrimination, and published this data in its Air Travel Consumer Report. DOT and Airlines Have Ongoing Training Efforts on Disability and Discrimination Issues We previously identified actions that DOT and airlines have taken that are intended to ensure that no passengers are discriminated against on the basis of disability or other protected class. Our work primarily examined airlines’ efforts to train staff and contractors. However, our work also identified other airline actions (both proactive and reactive) taken to enhance compliance with consumer protections in these areas. For example, one airline developed a wheelchair tracking system in response to a DOT enforcement action to help reduce incidents of lost or mishandled wheelchairs. DOT requires that airlines provide their employees and contractor staff who interact with the traveling public training on the proper and safe operation of equipment used to accommodate passengers with a disability, as well as on boarding and deplaning assistance. While not required, DOT encourages airlines to implement comprehensive non- discrimination trainings to help prevent discrimination. DOT has also developed training materials, available on its aviation consumer protection website, for airline employees and contractor staff. These materials include brochures, digital content, and videos on the rights of passengers with disabilities, as well as tips on providing wheelchair assistance at airports and onboard aircraft. In 2017, DOT also developed guidance for airline personnel on non-discrimination topics. The material included scenarios for recognizing discriminatory behavior and provided examples of how to ask additional questions or conduct additional screening in a non-discriminatory manner. Training on Disability Issues In 2017 we reviewed disability training programs for 12 selected airlines and found that they all had disability-related training requirements for their staff and contractors, with some variations in the content and format. Over the course of that work, each airline demonstrated that it had, as required, initial and recurrent training for its employees, contractors, and complaint resolution officers (CRO). All 12 selected airlines used a mix of training, including classroom-based training, computer-based training, situational scenarios, and hands-on training, such as wheelchair handling and lifting passengers into aisle seats to assist in boarding for specific groups. We also found that these selected airlines generally consulted with disability organizations when developing ACAA training programs. Some airlines also voluntarily implemented quality assurance programs to improve and sustain their disability-training programs’ performance. Another step some airlines have taken, though not required by the ACAA or its implementing regulations, is the creation of a disability board, which serves as a forum for increasing awareness among their workforce about disability issues. Training on Non-Discrimination Issues In 2019, we reported that representatives from all six U.S. airlines we selected for review told us they provide non-discrimination training to employees, although not all contractor staff receive that training. These representatives told us they provide initial non-discrimination training to newly hired employees who interact with passengers—including, for example, pilots, flight attendants, and customer service representatives— and that most regularly update the training based on current events or changes in policy. Airline representatives provided high-level examples describing the content of their trainings, but with one exception, they declined to provide more specific information, citing the sensitive or business proprietary nature of such materials. We found some similarities and differences in what representatives reported their trainings covered. For example, representatives generally stated that non-discrimination trainings—which were typically embedded in larger training programs and combined in-person and web-based modules—emphasized treating all individuals fairly and without bias, regardless of race, ancestry, or religion, among other things. Most also said trainings covered implicit bias—a term that refers to attitudes or stereotypes about groups of people that unconsciously affect a person’s understanding, actions, and decisions—and half said they have used DOT’s guidance discussed above, with some airline-specific modifications. Airlines and DOT Have Taken Initial Steps in Other Consumer Protection Areas In our recent work on aircraft lavatories, we found that some U.S. airlines voluntarily installed lavatories accessible by the aircraft’s onboard wheelchair for some of their single-aisle aircraft. However, we found that these aircraft only constituted about 4.5 percent of the eight selected airlines’ combined single-aisle fleet. According to airline representatives, providing lavatories accessible by the aircraft’s onboard wheelchair may reduce the number of revenue generating seats in the aircraft cabin, which can increase airlines’ costs and result in higher fares for consumers. In lieu of lavatories accessible by the aircraft’s onboard wheelchair, airline representatives said they have added certain features—such as assist handles or grab bars, and accessible call buttons or door locks—designed to increase access to certain lavatory functions. DOT has recently issued three notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) designed to improve the accessibility of aircraft lavatories, regulate service animals, and clarify DOT’s authority to stop airlines from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices. For example, in January 2020, DOT issued an NPRM to solicit comments on short-term accessibility improvements on single-aisle aircraft through the installation of accessibility features within the lavatory, such as those mentioned above, without changing the size of lavatories. In addition, DOT announced its intention to issue an advance NPRM to address long-term accessibility improvements and to solicit comments and gather information on the costs and benefits of requiring airlines to increase the size of the single- aisle lavatory on new aircraft models to accommodate a wheelchair as well as an assistant. In 2008, DOT noted that accessible lavatories on single-aisle aircraft would benefit passengers with disabilities, but also expressed concerns that revenue loss and other cost impacts could be too great for the airlines. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a number of ongoing requirements for DOT in the airline consumer protection area. For example, DOT is responsible for developing leading non-discrimination practices for airlines, in consultation with airlines and other consumer advocates. In addition to our recently published work, we have ongoing work examining airport accessibility for passengers with disabilities, as well as DOT’s enforcement approach to consumer protections. We anticipate issuing reports on the results of this work later this year. Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared remarks. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Jonathan Carver, Assistant Director, Geoffrey Hamilton, Delwen Jones, Josh Ormond, Amy Suntoke, Melissa Swearingen, and Elizabeth Wood. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


Background While the core mission of protecting federal facilities has remained constant as FPS has moved from one agency to another, its responsibilities have changed. In the 1970s, GSA created FPS as part of its Public Buildings Service (PBS). While in GSA’s PBS, FPS was responsible for protecting GSA’s held or leased facilities, providing both physical security and law enforcement services. To protect buildings, FPS officers developed physical security risk assessments, installed security equipment, and oversaw contract guard services. As a part of its law enforcement services, among other duties, FPS officers enforced laws and regulations aimed at protecting federal facilities and the persons in such facilities and conducted criminal investigations. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted. It created DHS and moved FPS from GSA to the new department, effective in March 2003. Within DHS, FPS was placed in U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), where its responsibilities grew beyond solely protecting GSA buildings to include homeland security activities such as implementing homeland security directives and providing law-enforcement, security, and emergency- response services during natural disasters and special events. In 2009, DHS proposed transferring FPS from ICE to NPPD. In explaining this transfer in DHS’s fiscal year 2010 budget justification to Congress, DHS stated that having FPS and NPPD’s Office of Infrastructure Protection in the same organization would further solidify NPPD as DHS’s lead for critical infrastructure protection. FPS was placed in NPPD and continued to lead physical security and law enforcement services at GSA- held or GSA-leased facilities and continued its efforts in homeland security activities. In November 2018, legislation was enacted that reorganized NPPD to an organization that had a greater statutory focus on managing cyber risks and authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine the appropriate placement for FPS within DHS and begin transfer of FPS to that entity. Throughout FPS’s organizational placements in DHS, we have reported on persistent challenges it faced in meeting its mission to protect facilities. In 2011, we reported on FPS’s challenges in transferring mission support functions from ICE to NPPD. While FPS was in NPPD, we reported on FPS’s challenges related to managing and overseeing contract guards and collaborating with GSA and the United States Marshals Service (Marshals) on facility security. We made recommendations to help address these challenges and FPS has made progress on some of these recommendations. For example, in September 2018, FPS and GSA established a formal agreement on roles and responsibilities related to facility protection, as we recommended. However, in our January 2019 report, we identified challenges related to other aspects of overseeing contract guards and collaboration with other agencies on physical security that had persisted. As of June of 2019, FPS continues to work on establishing a contract guard-management system. However, FPS is unable to assess its guards’ capabilities across its portfolio because the system is not fully implemented nor does it interact with its training system. As of 2019, federal physical security continues to be part of our federal real-property management’s high-risk area. Key Criteria for Evaluating Placement Options In 2002, we reported on organizational and accountability criteria for establishing DHS. From this prior work, we identified key criteria that are relevant to assessing potential placement options for FPS, as shown in table 1. Considerations for FPS’s Placement in DHS’s Management Directorate For our January 2019 report, we applied these key criteria for evaluating organizational placement to eight agencies that could be potential placement options for FPS. We found that none of the selected agencies met all the organizational placement criteria; thus, any of the organizational placement options could result in both benefits and trade- offs. In instances where placing FPS within DHS met our criteria (that is, instances where DHS was similar to FPS), FPS could experience benefits. In those instances where the criteria were not met, we reported it would be incumbent upon any agency to consider and address any potential trade-offs in order to ensure the decision was successful. We reviewed FPS as a “standalone” entity reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS and found this placement option met several key criteria. Table 2 below summarizes our analysis. For the first four criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2) responsibilities; (3) organizational culture; and (4) information sharing and coordination—we determined that DHS met the criteria if the agency or its subcomponents had any similarities to FPS. For the last criterion— mission support—we determined that DHS met the criterion if the agency or its subcomponents had similarities to FPS or could provide FPS needed mission support. Mission, Goals, and Objectives. In January 2019, we reported that FPS’s mission focused on the protection of federal facilities and the people working in and visiting those facilities. DHS was similar to FPS in that its mission statement and goals as stated in its strategic plan include an explicit focus on the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities. Our prior work found that placing an agency into an organization that has a similar mission might help ensure that the agency’s mission receives adequate funding, attention, visibility, and support. Our January 2019 work reported that one of DHS’s goals—as noted in its strategic plan covering fiscal years 2014 to 2018—was to reduce risk to the nation’s critical infrastructure. DHS and FPS share objectives that focus on mitigating risks and responding to incidents. Responsibilities. In January 2019, we reported that FPS has facility- protection and physical-security responsibilities and law-enforcement, and contract-guard oversight responsibilities. DHS was similar to FPS as it had responsibilities for physical security and performed law enforcement functions. As a part of its physical security activities, FPS conducted facility security assessments, identified countermeasures (e.g., equipment and contract guards) best suited to secure a facility, and oversaw contract guards. As a part of its law enforcement activities, FPS proactively patrolled facilities, responded to incidents, and conducted criminal investigations. FPS also provided additional operational law enforcement support, at the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to address emerging threats and homeland security incidents. One of FPS’s most critical activities was overseeing about 13,500 contract guards who were posted at federal facilities and were responsible for controlling access to facilities, responding to emergency situations involving facility safety and security, and performing other duties. FPS was responsible for ensuring, among other things, that these guards are performing their assigned duties and have the necessary training and certifications. DHS, however, only used a limited number of contract guards and therefore had less responsibility. At the time of our review, DHS officials told us they procured about 130 guards. Organizational Culture. In January 2019, we reported that while there are many areas relevant to organizational culture, law enforcement was a key aspect of FPS’s organizational culture, according to officials we interviewed from an association of security companies and a former, high- ranking official in NPPD. DHS had a similar culture in that it was a law enforcement agency. Information Sharing and Coordination. In January 2019, we reported that Component Intelligence Programs (CIP) were organizations in DHS that collected, gathered, processed, analyzed, produced, or disseminated information related to national homeland security. In 2016, DHS designated a division within FPS as a CIP, a move that allowed FPS more access to information on threats other DHS agencies have identified and actions they plan to take. While DHS, like FPS, had access to and could share information related to national homeland security, DHS did not have joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with FPS. Rather, FPS shared this responsibility with GSA, and these two agencies and Marshals had joint responsibility for protecting courthouses. FPS has faced challenges with coordinating with these agencies in the past. For example, in September 2011, we reported that FPS, Marshals, and other agencies involved in protecting courthouses (i.e., GSA and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) faced challenges related to coordination, such as in the implementation of roles and responsibilities and the use or participation in existing collaboration mechanisms. Mission Support. In January 2019, we reported that mission support was comprised of financial management, human capital, information technology systems for financial management, and law enforcement training. FPS owned and used many of the key operational and business- related information technology (IT) systems and applications it needs to carry out its mission. However, FPS received some mission support services from other agencies in DHS, such as human capital and some aspects of information technology. We found that if FPS changed its organizational placement it would need mission support in these areas. For example, FPS did not have delegated examining authority to allow it to fill competitive civil service jobs and relied on NPPD to provide this service. DHS had the authority to fill competitive service jobs that could support FPS needs. Further, FPS used a financial management IT system owned by ICE. DHS could provide FPS access to financial management systems that can support FPS. Finally, FPS offered its own training courses and would still need access to DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. In our January 2019 report, we did not assess FPS as a placement within DHS’s Management Directorate. Further, we recommended DHS (1) identify the specific goals of a change in FPS’s placement—that is, what DHS expects to achieve by moving FPS to another agency, and (2) fully evaluate placement options for FPS based on what DHS expects to achieve by changing FPS’s placement, an assessment of FPS’s current placement, and other best practices such as an analysis of alternatives assessing the benefits and trade-offs. DHS agreed with our recommendations. In May 2019, FPS officials told us that the Acting Secretary’s decision to place FPS within the Management Directorate was based upon an assessment of placement options within DHS using criteria and analyzing the trade-offs. GAO has not yet received DHS’s assessment of placement options. We will assess the actions DHS has taken in response to our recommendations when we receive DHS’s assessment. Steps to Transition FPS Our prior work offers valuable insights for agencies to consider when evaluating or implementing a reorganization or transformation, and can provide insights for making any transition regarding FPS. These include considering (1) key questions for consolidations and (2) leading practices when implementing an organizational change. Two sets of considerations for organizational transformations provide insights for making any FPS organizational placement. First, in May 2012, we reported on key questions for agency officials to consider when evaluating and implementing an organizational change that involves consolidation. Table 3 provides a summary of these key questions. Answering these questions would help provide FPS with assurance that important aspects of effective organizational change are addressed. Second, we reported in July 2003 on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations. The practices we noted are intended to help agencies transform their cultures so that they can be more results oriented, customer focused, and collaborative in nature (see table 4). In summary, the questions and practices for organizational change that we previously identified could provide insights to DHS and FPS for any transition. . Madam Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Member Crenshaw, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments If you or your staff has any questions concerning this testimony, please contact Lori Rectanus at 202-512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the contacts named above: Amelia Bates Shachoy (Assistant Director); Roshni Davé; George Depaoli (Analyst-in-Charge); Geoffrey Hamilton; Kelly Rubin; Sarah Veale; and Amelia Michelle Weathers made key contributions to the testimony. Other staff who made contributions to the reports cited in the testimony are identified in the source products. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.