The Federal Government Has Invested in Projects That May Convey Some Climate Resilience Benefits but Does Not Have a Strategic Investment Approach As we reported in October 2019, the federal government has invested in projects that may enhance climate resilience but does not have a strategic approach for investing in high-priority climate resilience projects. Some federal agencies have made individual efforts to manage climate change risk within existing programs and operations, and these efforts may convey climate resilience benefits. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ civil works program constructs flood control projects, such as sea walls, that could convey climate resilience benefits by protecting communities from storms that may be exacerbated by climate change. However, even with individual agency efforts, federal investment in projects specifically designed to enhance climate resilience to date has been limited. As we stated in our Disaster Resilience Framework, most of the federal government’s efforts to reduce disaster risk are reactive, and many revolve around disaster recovery. As a result, we reported in October 2019 that additional strategic federal investments may be needed to manage some of the nation’s most significant climate risks because climate change cuts across agency missions and presents fiscal exposures larger than any one agency can manage. Our analysis shows the federal government does not strategically identify and prioritize projects to ensure they address the nation’s most significant climate risks. In addition, our October 2019 report discusses our past work that shows an absence of government-wide strategic planning for climate change. For example, in our March 2019 update to our high-risk list, we reported that one area of government-wide action needed to reduce federal fiscal exposure is in the federal government’s role as the leader of a strategic plan that coordinates federal efforts and informs state, local, and private- sector action. For this 2019 update, we assessed the federal government’s progress since 2017 related to climate change strategic planning against five criteria and found that the federal government had not met any of the criteria for removal from the high-risk list. Specifically, since our 2017 high-risk update, four ratings regressed to “not met” and one remained unchanged as “not met.” Also, although we have made 17 recommendations that address improving federal climate change strategic planning, as of August 2019, no action had been taken toward implementing 14 of those recommendations—including one dating from 2003. Our enterprise risk management framework calls for reviewing risks and selecting the most appropriate strategy to manage them. However, no federal agency, interagency collaborative effort, or other organizational arrangement has been established to implement a strategic approach to climate resilience investment that includes periodically identifying and prioritizing projects. Such an approach could supplement individual agency climate resilience efforts and help target federal resources toward high-priority projects. Six Key Steps Provide an Opportunity for the Federal Government to Strategically Identify and Prioritize Climate Resilience Projects Six key steps provide an opportunity for the federal government to strategically identify and prioritize climate resilience projects for investment, based on our review of reports (including a National Academies report and the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s Fourth National Climate Assessment) that discuss adaptation as a risk management process, as well as on international standards, our past work (including our enterprise risk management criteria), and interviews with stakeholders. The six key steps are (1) defining the strategic goals of the climate resilience investment effort and how the effort will be carried out, (2) identifying and assessing high-risk areas for targeted resilience investment, (3) identifying potential project ideas, (4) prioritizing projects, (5) implementing high-priority projects, and (6) monitoring projects and climate risks. (See fig. 1.) In our October 2019 report, we used one domestic and one international example to illustrate these key steps: Louisiana’s Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) coastal master planning effort and Canada’s Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund (DMAF). In the domestic example, to address the lack of strategic coordination, in 2005 the state of Louisiana consolidated coastal planning efforts previously carried out by multiple state entities into a single effort, led by CPRA. CPRA periodically identifies high-priority coastal resilience projects designed to address two primary risks: flooding and coastal land loss. To identify potential projects, CPRA sought project proposals from citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and others. To prioritize projects, CPRA used quantitative modeling to estimate project outcomes under multiple future scenarios of varied climate and other conditions and coordinated with stakeholders to understand potential project impacts. CPRA has published three coastal master plans in which it identified and evaluated potential projects. For example, in its 2017 Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, CPRA identified $50 billion in high- priority projects to be implemented as funding becomes available. In the international example, in 2018 the Canadian government launched the DMAF, a financial assistance program, to provide $1.5 billion (in U.S. dollars) over 10 years for large-scale, nationally significant projects to manage natural hazard risks, including those triggered by climate change. Infrastructure Canada, the entity responsible for administering the DMAF, seeks project ideas from provinces and territories, municipal and regional governments, indigenous groups, and others. These entities apply directly to Infrastructure Canada for funding. According to Canadian officials, two committees of experts—one composed of experts from other federal departments and the other composed of nonfederal experts (e.g., urban planners and individuals with regional expertise)—provide feedback on potential projects. These projects are prioritized based on multiple criteria such as the extent to which they reduce the impacts of natural disasters. Options for Focusing Federal Funding on High-Priority Climate Resilience Projects Have Strengths and Limitations, and Opportunities Exist to Increase Funding Impact As we reported in October 2019, on the basis of our review of relevant reports and our past work, interviews with stakeholders, and illustrative examples, we identified two options—each with strengths and limitations—for focusing federal funding on high-priority climate resilience projects. The options are (1) coordinating funding provided through multiple existing programs with varied purposes and (2) creating a new federal funding source specifically for investment in climate resilience. In addition, our analysis of these sources identified opportunities to increase the climate resilience impact of these two funding options. A strength of coordinating funding from existing sources is access to multiple funding sources for a project. For example, one stakeholder we interviewed whose community used federal funding to implement large- scale resilience projects said that having multiple programs is advantageous because when funding from one program is not available— such as when the project does not match that program’s purpose or when there are insufficient funds—funds could be sought from another program. The state of Louisiana’s coastal master planning effort also uses multi-program coordination to fund projects. Specifically, funding for high-priority resilience projects identified in the master plan is provided via several federal and nonfederal programs designed for wetlands restoration, hurricane risk reduction, oil spill recovery, and community development, among other purposes. A limitation of that option, according to CPRA officials, is that coordinating funding from multiple sources could be administratively challenging and could require dedicated staff to identify programs, assess whether projects meet program funding criteria, apply for funds, and ensure program requirements are met. Alternatively, one strength of creating a new federal funding source, such as a federal financial assistance program that could provide loans or grants or a climate infrastructure bank, is that it could encourage cross- sector projects designed to achieve benefits in multiple sectors. For example, according to one stakeholder, such a funding source could allow experts from multiple sectors—such as infrastructure, housing, transportation, and health—to collaborate on projects, leading to more creative, comprehensive approaches to enhance community resilience. However, such a new funding source would have to be created, which would require congressional authorization. In addition, we identified opportunities to increase the climate resilience impact of federal funding options based on our review of our past work, related reports, an international standard, and the Louisiana and Canadian examples, as well as interviews with stakeholders: Using both existing and new funding options. Several stakeholders told us that using both funding options—multiple, existing federal programs with varied purposes and a new funding source for high-priority climate resilience projects—in a strategic, coordinated way could help increase the impact of federal investment. Two stakeholders told us that in practice, multiple, existing federal funding sources that are not specific to climate resilience could be coordinated to fund projects when their purposes and rules align and adequate funding is available. A funding source specifically for climate resilience could be used to fund proposed projects when no related program exists or when existing programs do not have sufficient funding available, according to these and other stakeholders. Helping ensure adequate and consistent funding. Several stakeholders we interviewed identified the need for adequate and consistent funding to implement high-priority climate resilience projects. For example, according to one stakeholder we interviewed, inconsistent, inadequate funding makes it difficult to complete large- scale projects and can lead to additional costs if significant delays occur during which existing work deteriorates. In addition to adequate and consistent funding, funding options should be designed to accommodate long-term projects since high-priority climate resilience projects can take multiple years to design and implement, according to two stakeholders we interviewed. Encouraging nonfederal investment. Several stakeholders we interviewed told us that the federal government could use a federal climate resilience investment effort to encourage nonfederal investment in high-priority climate resilience projects, thereby increasing the impact of federal investment. For example, several stakeholders identified the importance of a cost-share component so that funding recipients are invested in a project’s success. Canada’s DMAF encourages nonfederal investment by partially funding projects of national significance and requiring different levels of cost-share from funding recipients, ranging from 25 percent for indigenous recipients to 75 percent for private-sector and other for-profit recipients. Several stakeholders also identified potential funding mechanisms—for example, public-private partnerships and loan guarantees—that could leverage federal dollars to encourage additional investment in climate resilience projects by nonfederal entities, including the private sector. Encouraging complementary resilience activities. To increase the impact of federal investment in climate resilience, a federal investment effort presents an opportunity to encourage complementary resilience activities by nonfederal actors such as states, localities, and private- sector partners, based on interviews with several stakeholders, the Canadian example, and reports we reviewed. For example, this could include establishing conditions that funding recipients must meet in exchange for receiving federal funding. Alternatively, the federal government could use incentives (e.g., providing greater federal cost- share or giving additional preference in the project prioritization process) to encourage complementary resilience activities by nonfederal actors. Our Disaster Resilience Framework states that incentives can make long-term, forward-looking risk reduction investments more viable and attractive among competing priorities. The federal government could use these conditions and incentives to encourage several types of complementary resilience activities by nonfederal actors. For example, the federal government could encourage the use and enforcement of building codes that require stronger risk-reduction measures. In addition, a federal investment effort could provide an opportunity to encourage communities to limit or prohibit development in high-risk areas to minimize risks to people and assets exposed to future climate hazards. One example of this would be through zoning regulations. Another stakeholder suggested that communities receiving federal funding for resilience projects should be adequately insured against future climate risks so they have a potential source of funding for rebuilding in the event of a disaster. Allowing funds to be used at various stages of project development. Several stakeholders suggested that federal funds be used for multiple stages of project development—such as project design, implementation, or monitoring—to increase the impact of federal funds. For example, two stakeholders we interviewed told us that resilience projects can require significant amounts of design work to develop an implementable and effective project concept and that making funds available for project design could improve the quality of project proposals, thereby maximizing the impact of federal funds. In addition to providing federal funds for project design, one stakeholder suggested making federal funding available to measure project outcomes (e.g., how effectively projects increased resilience) to improve future decisions by both the federal government and others making resilience investments. Based on the findings of our October 2019 report, we recommended that Congress consider establishing a federal organizational arrangement to periodically identify and prioritize climate resilience projects for federal investment. Such an arrangement could be designed using the six key steps for prioritizing climate resilience investments and the opportunities to increase the climate resilience impact of federal funding options that we identified in our report. Chairwoman Castor, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the Select Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this testimony and the underlying report are Joseph “Joe” Thompson (Assistant Director), Celia R. Mendive (Analyst in Charge),Taiyshawna Battle and Paige Gilbreath. Also contributing to this report were Alicia Puente Cackley, Colleen M. Candrl, Kendall Childers, Steven Cohen, Christopher Curry, Cindy Gilbert, Kathryn Godfrey, Holly Halifax, Carol Henn, Susan Irving, Richard Johnson, Gwendolyn Kirby, Joe Maher, Gregory Marchand, Diana Maurer, Kirk Menard, Tim Persons, Caroline N. Prado, William Reinsberg, Oliver Richard, Danny Royer, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, Sarah Veale, Patrick Ward, Jarrod West, Kristy Williams, Eugene Wisnoski, and Melissa Wolf. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. 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Background DHS’s 2012 Memorandum on Addressing Allegations of Unlawful Profiling In 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum directing TSA to take a number of actions in response to allegations of profiling by behavior detection officers. These actions included, among others, working with the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to (1) review, and revise as necessary, behavior detection officer training policies, training curriculum, and supervisory guidance to ensure they adequately address and train against profiling; (2) enhance data collection to facilitate appropriate supervision and monitoring of behavior detection activities; and (3) ensure passengers are aware of complaint mechanisms and ensure complaints are appropriately handled. TSA has taken some actions to address these directives. For example, TSA has revised its standard operating procedures and training materials to more clearly instruct personnel trained in behavior detection and other TSA personnel on how to avoid unlawful profiling; initiated a study to collect data on the race and national origin of passengers referred for behavior detection screening and examine whether disparities exist in the referral trends, and if so, whether these differences suggest discrimination or bias in the referral process; and issued a Management Directive establishing TSA policy and procedures for receiving, documenting, and referring passenger screening complaints resulting from the application of TSA security screening policies and procedures, including processes for all involved offices in headquarters and the field that handle passenger complaints. TSA’s Use of Behavior Detection The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation’s civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passengers and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft. At the approximately 440 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft or entering the sterile area of an airport pursuant to statutory and regulatory requirements and TSA-established standard operating procedures. TSA began using behavior detection in 2006 as an added layer of security to identify potentially high- risk passengers. Through the end of fiscal year 2016, TSA’s behavior detection screening process was a stand-alone program that used specially trained behavior detection officers to observe passengers at the screening checkpoint and engage them in brief verbal exchanges. During this period, behavior detection officers had brief interactions with passengers in the queue leading up to the screening checkpoint. If the behavior detection officers determined during this interaction that a passenger exhibited a certain number of behavioral indicators, the behavior detection officer was to refer the passenger for additional screening or, if circumstances warranted, contact a law enforcement officer. According to TSA procedures, if a passenger was referred for additional screening, one behavior detection officer conducted a pat-down of the passenger and search of his or her personal property while another checked documents and conversed with the passenger, attempting to understand why the behavioral indicators were being displayed and continuing to look for additional behavioral indicators. If a passenger did not exhibit a certain number of additional indicators, he or she was allowed to proceed to the boarding gate. If the passenger did exhibit a certain number of additional indicators, or other events occurred, such as the discovery of a fraudulent document, the behavior detection officer was to call a law enforcement officer. The law enforcement officer then would determine next steps, which could include questioning the passenger or conducting a criminal background check. The law enforcement officer then determined whether to release the passenger, refer the passenger to another law enforcement agency, or arrest him or her. In fiscal year 2017, consistent with the Aviation Security Act of 2016, TSA eliminated the stand-alone behavior detection officer position. TSA transferred the former behavior detection officers to serve as part of the screener workforce and began assigning them to the checkpoint to screen passengers. According to TSA officials, when screeners trained in behavior detection are assigned to a position, TSA policies and procedures permit them to use behavior detection when applicable. Furthermore, TSA’s checkpoint standard operating procedures do not currently include the use of behavior detection, as behavior detection’s use continues to be guided by its own policies established in 2016. However, some screeners trained in behavior detection continue to use behavior detection to support passenger screening canine teams as part of expedited screening. As part of this process, screeners trained in behavior detection work in conjunction with canine teams to observe passenger behavior and identify passenger behaviors that may indicate that a passenger poses a higher risk to the aviation system. Overview of Optimized Behavior Detection Training The Training and Development Division (Training Division), within TSA headquarters, oversees the development, delivery, and evaluation of training programs for TSA employees. The National Training Plan, developed annually by the Training Division and Security Operations, contains the core curriculum for screeners to meet their yearly training requirements. In addition, Security Operations works with the Traveler Engagement Division to develop and deliver specific training on topics such as disability profiling, racial profiling, and screening transgender persons. In August 2017, TSA began training screeners on its new behavioral indicators. TSA revised the behavioral indicators by eliminating and combining some of the indicators used to observe passenger behavior, which TSA refers to as Optimized Behavior Detection. According to TSA officials, Optimized Behavior Detection includes 36 revised behavioral indicators—which TSA pared down from a list of 96 indicators. As of January 2019, TSA officials told us out of the approximately 43,000 screeners nationwide, a total of 2,541 screeners had been trained at 117 airports in Optimized Behavior Detection. Screeners must be trained in passenger and accessible property screening before they are eligible to attend Optimized Behavior Detection training. Upon successful completion of Optimized Behavior Detection training, screeners are permitted to utilize behavior detection in accordance with the standard operating procedures, such as when operating in conjunction with canine teams or screening airport and airline workers. In addition, screeners must complete all requirements in the National Training Plan which includes elements of training on TSA’s mechanisms for preventing unlawful profiling. TSA’s Oversight of Behavior Detection TSA’s Security Operations is responsible for overseeing the use of behavior detection. TSA’s behavior detection policies and procedures prohibit screeners from selecting passengers for additional screening based on race, ethnicity, religion, and other factors, whether through behavior detection or other security measures. This responsibility includes overseeing officers trained in behavior detection to ensure they conduct behavior detection without regard to race/ethnicity, color, gender/sex, gender identity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability, in accordance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and other legal and DHS policy requirements to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals. Although the stand-alone behavior detection officer position was eliminated and the program ended in 2017, the requirement to conduct oversight and verify compliance with TSA policies still applies when behavior detection is used, such as when behavior detection is used in conjunction with passenger screening canine teams. According to TSA’s policies and procedures, supervisors must conduct oversight observations of behavior detection activities a minimum of 8 hours every 14 days to verify and document compliance with behavior detection policies, standard operating procedures, the handbook, and training, among other things, and submit a compliance checklist documenting the review to TSA Security Operations. Passenger Complaint Review and Referral Process The TSA Contact Center (TCC) is the primary point of contact for collecting, documenting, and responding to public questions, concerns, or complaints regarding passengers’ screening experience; reports and claims of lost, stolen, or damaged items; and complaints submitted by TSA employees. The TCC may refer screening complaints for resolution to other TSA headquarters offices, depending on the specific allegation. For example, complete complaints alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties, which include allegations implicating color, race, ethnicity, gender, genetic information, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and parental status, must be referred to the Multicultural Branch. Figure 1 describes the TCC’s complaint review process. TSA’s Multicultural Branch is responsible for collecting, monitoring, and adjudicating passenger complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations at the passenger screening checkpoint, including complaints alleging unlawful profiling and discrimination, among other things. The Multicultural Branch receives complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations from several sources within TSA including the TCC. When TCC officials determine a complete complaint involves a potential civil rights or civil liberties violation, they are to forward the complaint to the Multicultural Branch where staff are to input the complaint into a database and track the resolution of each complaint they receive. The Multicultural Branch, in consultation with Security Operations, determines whether a screener followed standard operating procedures while screening the complainant by reviewing available video of an incident or interviewing witnesses who saw the incident. Depending on the nature and severity of the allegation, TSA airport staff may also elevate the complaint and evidence to the airport’s Assistant Federal Security Director (FSD) for Screening. If the investigation finds fault with the screener, the screener’s supervisor or manager is to determine the corrective action to be taken. Corrective actions specified in TSA’s guidelines for disciplinary actions to address misconduct range from mandating that the screener take additional training to correct the behavior to terminating the screener’s employment for multiple repeat offenses or a single egregious action. Following the outcome of the complaint review and any resulting corrective actions, the TSA headquarters unit or the TSA customer support manager at the airport is to communicate the status of the resolution, if any, to the complainant— such as by using a template letter that explains TSA’s policies and procedures or issuing an apology. According to Multicultural Branch protocols for reviewing passenger complaints, complaints may be resolved in three ways: Closed-Administratively: If the complainant does not respond within 10 days to the Multicultural Branch’s first contact for additional information, such as a request for additional information on the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation, the complaint is to be closed. Closed-No Jurisdiction: Complaints that are not within the Multicultural Branch’s jurisdiction, such as complaints involving rude and unprofessional conduct that are not related to allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations, are to be closed and referred to other TSA offices or the TSA designated point of contact at the airport for further handling. Closed-Resolved: Following the outcome of the investigation, the Multicultural Branch is to send a letter to the complainant summarizing the allegations reviewed, explaining whether TSA procedures were followed, and in some cases, issuing an apology or informing the complainant of the type of training offered to the screener(s). The Multicultural Branch may recommend training and provide refresher training materials for distribution at the airport to the screener(s) involved, if identified, or for all screeners at the airport’s checkpoint at which the complaint originated. According to TSA officials, the Multicultural Branch recommends training when standard operating procedures for screening were not followed or when it determines that the proactive measure of refresher training would be useful. According to TSA, the designated TSA point of contact at the airport is required to verify when the training is completed. Screeners Using Behavior Detection Receive Basic and Recurrent Training Related to Profiling, and TSA Evaluates Training Effectiveness Using the Kirkpatrick Model Screeners Conducting Behavior Detection Receive Training on TSA’s Policies and Procedures That Prohibit Unlawful Profiling Before screeners are eligible to conduct any behavior detection activities, they must first complete a 5-day Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course, and undergo on-the-job training at their local airport. This course includes an overview of DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling, and trains screeners to apply behavioral indicators to passengers without regard to race/ethnicity, color, gender/sex, gender identity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability. Participants must complete the Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course and pass a 40 question job knowledge test at the end of the class, in addition to completing 32 hours of on-the-job training under the supervision of an officer already trained in behavior detection. If a participant fails the job knowledge test, he or she is to receive 1 hour of remedial training before retaking the test. Screeners must pass the test in two attempts to be eligible to conduct behavior detection activities. In the four Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training courses we attended, the training instructors covered TSA’s policies on prohibiting unlawful profiling on day one of the course, and explained that profiling passengers based on discernible traits was not only illegal, but that such practices are ineffective at identifying potentially high-risk passengers. In addition, the course manual included a copy of DHS’s 2013 memorandum defining racial profiling, which all participants were required to review. To test their understanding of TSA policy and the Optimized Behavior Detection Standard Operating Procedures, the instructors presented various scenarios to engage participants in practicing how they would apply behavior detection at the checkpoint. The 2018 National Training Plan required behavior detection–trained screeners to complete four recurrent technical training courses related to behavior detection, including two that contain material reinforcing DHS’s and TSA’s policies prohibiting unlawful profiling. Screeners participate in each of the four interactive training courses using a computer and the courses contain knowledge checks that the participant must answer correctly before completing the training. Table 1 describes the training courses screeners trained in behavior detection are required to complete and appendix I includes a list of additional training related to unlawful profiling. TSA Evaluates Training Courses Using the Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model TSA determines the effectiveness of particular training programs using the Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model, a commonly accepted training evaluation model endorsed by the Office of Personnel Management and used throughout the federal government. In May 2018, TSA updated its training standards based on the ADDIE model, a methodology comprising five phases: Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation (ADDIE). TSA uses the Kirkpatrick model as part of the evaluation stage of ADDIE. The Kirkpatrick model consists of a four-level approach for soliciting feedback from training course participants and evaluating the impact the training had on individual development, among other things. TSA conducts Levels 1 and 2 evaluations on selected training courses. Table 2 provides an overview of the Kirkpatrick model and the evaluation levels for courses related to behavior detection and unlawful profiling. TSA officials told us they will continue to evaluate the Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course and Level 3 evaluations are under development, as they roll out their training evaluation process. According to TSA’s Training Standards, a review team determines the frequency of curriculum review, which should occur at least once every 5 years. As part of this review, TSA plans to leverage data reported in evaluations at Kirkpatrick Levels 1 through 3. TSA Has Oversight Policies for Behavior Detection and Prohibits Unlawful Profiling but Does Not Specifically Assess Whether Profiling Occurs TSA’s 2016 Optimized Behavior Detection Program Handbook and Operational Oversight Compliance Guidance require supervisors to conduct routine checks of behavior detection operations to monitor compliance with standard operating procedures. TSA’s behavior detection Operational Oversight Compliance Guidance outlines seven specific assessments of behavior detection operations and includes a checklist for each assessment for managers to document completion of these routine oversight tasks. According to TSA officials, these assessments should occur when screeners use behavior detection in conjunction with canine operations and while screening airline and airport workers, among other activities. When conducting these assessments, supervisors are to conduct 1-hour observations and use detailed checklists to document how screeners trained in behavior detection perform the behavior detection in practice. For example, one checklist requires supervisors to observe how screeners trained in behavior detection monitor passenger flow and communicate with passengers while observing for behavioral indicators, such as ensuring screeners using behavior detection do not ask passengers intrusive or offensive questions, among other activities related to the use of behavior detection. However, our review of the oversight checklists found that they do not specifically instruct supervisors to monitor for compliance with procedures intended to prohibit unlawful profiling. According to TSA officials, TSA’s guidance and checklists do not include this type of monitoring for unlawful profiling because officials believe that the training screeners receive, adherence to the standard operating procedures, and the general supervisory oversight in place are sufficient to prevent unlawful profiling and could alert supervisors to situations where unlawful profiling happens. However, the 2013 DHS memorandum on DHS’s policy on unlawful profiling states that each component, including TSA, should both implement specific policy and procedures on racial profiling, and ensure all personnel are trained and held accountable for meeting the standards set forth in DHS policy. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish and implement activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results, as well as remediate identified internal control deficiencies. Such a mechanism could be an item added to a checklist for supervisors to document, based on their observations, whether screeners selected individuals for additional scrutiny in a manner consistent with policies and procedures. Another oversight mechanism, as noted in DOJ’s guidance on the use of race and other factors, could be studying the implementation of policies and procedures that prohibit unlawful profiling through targeted, data- driven research projects. As previously discussed, in 2013, TSA initiated a study and collected data through October 2017 on passengers referred for secondary screening to monitor compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. TSA discontinued the study and did not analyze the data collected because the stand-alone behavior detection program ended in November 2017. As a result of not conducting the analysis, TSA does not know what the data would have shown regarding compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. TSA officials said they plan to update the behavior detection and checkpoint screening policies, procedures, and guidance during fiscal year 2019. As a part of this update, TSA officials told us they plan to include language in the standard operating procedures reinforcing the use of behavior detection simultaneously with other checkpoint duties, such as the document checker position. However, TSA officials told us they are not planning to add an oversight mechanism specific to profiling as part of the updates because, as previously noted, they believe screener training, adherence to the standard operating procedures, and general supervisory oversight are sufficient. Developing a specific oversight mechanism, such as a checklist or a data-driven study, to monitor screeners’ compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling would provide TSA with greater assurance that its personnel are adhering to these policies when using behavior detection, and better position TSA to identify potential incidents of unlawful profiling. TSA Received About 3,700 Complaints Alleging Violations of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties from October 2015 to February 2018 and Recommended Screener Training to Address Complaints The TCC Received 3,663 Complaints Related to Passenger Screening and a Majority of the Complaints Alleged Discrimination or Profiling Based on Personal Attributes and Characteristics The TCC received 3,663 complaints related to passenger screening alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties from October 2015 through February 2018. These complaints are not specific to behavior detection activities and generally reflect alleged conduct occurring at the screening checkpoint through the application of screening measures. We analyzed the 3,663 complaints and found that the majority (2,251 of 3,663) of the complaints alleged discrimination or profiling based on personal attributes and characteristics. For example, the TCC received complaints alleging discrimination that involved assertions by passengers that they had been selected for pat-downs based on race and ethnicity, among other reasons, when the passengers believed they did not trigger an alarm prompting the pat-downs. The TCC also received complaints related to passengers’ transgender identity alleging selection for additional screening because of their transgender status. Additionally, the TCC received passenger complaints alleging that screening procedures were aggressive or inappropriate for senior citizens. Table 3 provides a list of complaint types based on our analysis. In addition, appendix II provides additional detail about our content analysis of complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations, and appendix III provides a list of 10 airports most often identified in the complaints. As TSA’s primary point of contact for passenger complaints, the TCC is responsible for the initial review and referral of all complaints that involve allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations to the Multicultural Branch. According to the TCC standard operating procedures, TCC analysts review the complaints to ensure that they contain the necessary information to be considered complete, including the airport, passenger’s name, date of the incident, and description of the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation. In addition, complaints reported over the phone or made on behalf of another person without the person’s consent are initially considered incomplete. For complaints that are not complete, the TCC sends the passenger a document request for information when the passenger has provided correct contact information. According to TCC officials, passengers often do not provide the correct contact information or do not respond with the necessary information to complete the complaint. TCC officials said that incomplete complaints are typically sent to the Multicultural Branch for informational purposes. Multicultural Branch officials told us that they consider information from incomplete complaints to inform its policy and training initiatives, and to improve how TSA engages with the public. From October 2015 through February 2018, the TCC referred 51 percent (1,865) of the 3,663 complaints it received to the Multicultural Branch for review. The TCC reported that 48 percent (1,764) of the 3,663 complaints did not have complete information necessary for further review, such as the airport and date of the incident. According to TSA officials, these complaints were sent to the Multicultural Branch for informational purposes. TCC’s passenger complaint data show that the remaining 1 percent (34) of the complaints were from TSA employees and were referred to other TSA offices for review. TSA’s Multicultural Branch Reviewed More Than 2,000 Complaints and Recommended a Range of Screener Training TSA’s Multicultural Branch receives and reviews complete complaints related to allegations of violations of civil rights and civil liberties that are referred to it from the TCC, DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, TSA’s Disability Branch, and TSA personnel at airports. From October 2015 through February 2018, the Multicultural Branch received 2,059 complaints alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties, as shown in figure 2. Multicultural Branch officials stated that the majority of these complaints were referred from the TCC. As shown in figure 2, for 1,066 (52 percent) of the complaints, Multicultural Branch staff found indications of potential discrimination, such as instances of rude or unprofessional conduct that included the use of race or other protected characteristics. According to Multicultural Branch staff, to resolve the 1,066 complaints, they recommended a range of refresher training. Multicultural Branch staff explained that when issues are identified, their policy is to address the issues through screener training. Multicultural Branch officials reported that these trainings were provided through National Shift Briefings, which were circulated across TSA, or through training provided at a particular airport. For example: In one of the complaint cases we reviewed, a passenger alleged profiling based on headwear. Multicultural Branch officials used camera recordings and statements from officers involved in the encounter to substantiate that screening procedure violations had occurred. As a result, Multicultural Branch officials recommended refresher training to the airport on headwear screening protocols for all screeners at the airport to review. In another complaint case we reviewed, a passenger alleged profiling based on the use of a tribal-issued photo identification card. In response, Multicultural Branch officials sent refresher training on verifying tribal identification and the screening of Native American passengers to the TSA designated point of contact at the airport involved for distribution to TSA personnel identified in the complaint. In a third complaint reviewed, a passenger alleged being profiled at the screening checkpoint, without including any additional details. According to TSA officials, based on the particular allegations of the complaint and the lack of details, TSA was unable to substantiate the allegations made in the complaint. As a result, Multicultural Branch sent National Shift Briefings on TSA’s policies and procedures that prohibit unlawful profiling and inappropriate comments to the TSA designated point of contact at the airport involved for distribution to TSA personnel identified in the complaint. As shown in figure 2, there were 993 complaints that the Multicultural Branch reviewed but did not address through training. The Multicultural Branch closed 121 of these complaints because it determined that the complainant did not provide sufficient information about the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation for Multicultural Branch review and the complainant did not respond with additional information requested by the Multicultural Branch within 10 days. The Multicultural Branch determined that the remaining 872 complaints were not substantiated based on its review of the camera recording of the alleged incident, or were not within its jurisdiction. For the complaints not within its jurisdiction, the Multicultural Branch referred them to other TSA offices, to TSA officials at the airport or airports identified in the complaints for review, or to other federal agencies (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Transportation, or the Federal Aviation Administration) as appropriate. These complaints involved allegations of unprofessional conduct and other issues that did not involve allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations. According to Multicultural Branch guidance, the designated TSA point of contact at the airport along with the Multicultural Branch analyst are to determine appropriate next steps for resolving complaints, such as preparing a briefing for screeners that is tailored to address the concerns raised by the complainant. TSA officials stated that resolutions to the complainant are tailored to reflect the allegation, type of inquiry conducted, and investigation of the facts and evidence underlying the complaint. TSA’s responses to the complainant include, but are not limited to, apologizing for the screening experience or informing the complainant about the next steps such as the agency’s plans to address the complaint or underlying conduct that gave rise to the complaint. For example, in a letter we reviewed, TSA apologized for the “unprofessional and inappropriate personal questions” the passenger experienced during screening, and stated that refresher training would be distributed to screeners at the airport involved. According to documentation we reviewed related to this complaint, the Multicultural Branch sent refresher training materials on avoiding inappropriate comments to the designated TSA point of contact at the airport involved. In addition, TSA’s office of Human Capital Employee Relations reported that it took a range of disciplinary actions—from letters of reprimand to termination—for 100 screeners from October 2015 through February 2018, in part in response to passenger complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations. TSA’s Multicultural Branch Analyzes and Shares Passenger Complaint Data to Inform Screener Training TSA’s Multicultural Branch regularly collects and analyzes data on passenger civil rights and civil liberties and discrimination complaints and their resolution status, and shares this information with TSA executive leadership, TSA airport customer service managers, and screeners in the field, among others. Multicultural Branch officials told us their staff are assigned to specific airports based on geographic region, and they continually analyze passenger complaints referred to their office from the TCC to identify trends. Staff members meet weekly to discuss trends in complaints for their geographic regions, and they review weekly, quarterly, and annual reports on the number and category of complaints referred to their office by the TCC. In addition, Multicultural Branch officials track the resolution of the cases for which they have jurisdiction and submit this information to their senior leadership each week. Specifically, the Multicultural Branch uses a database to track complaints by type, airport, submission date, and resolution status, such as how many cases are open, closed, or whether they have been resolved. Multicultural Branch officials share trends in complaints throughout TSA in several ways, including conference calls, monthly briefings, reporting metrics to TSA executive leadership, and on-site training events at airports each year. For example, Multicultural Branch officials hold monthly conference calls with customer service managers at airports to review complaint trends, upcoming on-site airport trainings, and job aids they have developed to help screeners understand issues, such as screening passengers wearing religious headwear. Multicultural Branch officials stated they also share information with screeners and supervisors through National Shift Briefings that are distributed at all airports, and focus on bringing awareness to screeners on events they need to be aware of when screening passengers, such as religious observances occurring that month. According to TSA officials, the Multicultural Branch uses its analysis of passenger complaints and the results of complaint investigations to develop training aids and materials on areas where they determine screeners need more training, such as multicultural awareness or screening of transgender passengers. For example, the Multicultural Branch has developed briefings focusing on unlawful profiling and unconscious bias which reiterated that unlawful profiling is against TSA policy, defined unconscious bias, and provided scenario-based examples. Additionally, members from the Multicultural Branch hold on-site training for screeners at selected airports each year based on complaint data analysis and other factors. These training sessions last three days, include topics stemming from complaint data TSA has analyzed, and can include webinars, role-playing, and other forms of instruction. Conclusions DHS and TSA have policies prohibiting unlawful profiling—using race, ethnicity, gender, or other protected characteristics to identify passengers for additional screening—when using behavior detection, as well as other screening measures. While TSA has oversight guidance and checklists to monitor screeners’ use of behavior detection, these policies and procedures do not include a specific mechanism to monitor whether screeners may be using behavior detection to unlawfully profile passengers. Although TSA officials report that they are working to update the standard operating procedures in 2019, they currently have no plan to add a specific mechanism to monitor compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. Developing a specific oversight mechanism would provide TSA with greater assurance that screeners are adhering to such policies and help TSA identify any potential incidents of unlawful profiling. Recommendation for Executive Action We are making the following recommendation to TSA. The TSA Administrator should direct Security Operations to develop a specific oversight mechanism to monitor the use of behavior detection activities for compliance with DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. (Recommendation 1) Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in appendix IV. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions planned to address it. Security Operations, TCC, and the Multicultural Branch also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS correctly noted in its letter that GAO’s analysis of civil rights and civil liberties complaints related to every aspect of TSA’s passenger and baggage screening and is not specific to behavior detection. We agree with DHS’s observation, as this analysis provides information on what passengers alleged in their complaints and how TSA addressed them. It is important to note that the complaint data provided by TSA did not preclude behavior detection activities as a potential contributing factor to any number of the complaints submitted. With regard to our recommendation, that the TSA Administrator should direct Security Operations to develop a specific oversight mechanism to monitor the use of behavior detection activities for compliance with DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling, DHS stated that TSA plans to take additional steps to continue to ensure behavior detection activities adhere to polices that prohibit unlawful profiling. In fiscal year 2019, TSA plans to modify existing oversight checklists used by managers and supervisors to include specific terminology for monitoring unlawful profiling. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by September 30, 2019. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact William Russell at (202) 512-8777 or RussellW@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Additional Training Related to Unlawful Profiling The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided examples of refresher training materials that are provided to screeners on TSA’s prohibition on the use of unlawful profiling at the passenger screening checkpoint. Table 4 provides information on these materials, including the methods used to distribute the materials to screeners. Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Complaints Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration Contact Center From October 2015 through February 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center (TCC) received 3,663 complaints that it classified as alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties. Of the 3,663 complaints, the TCC received 707 complaints, or about 19 percent, by phone. Table 5 summarizes our analysis of the complaints the TCC received. Appendix III: GAO Analysis of Complaints Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration Contact Center by Airport From October 2015 through February 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center (TCC) received 3,663 complaints that it classified as alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties. The TCC received 707 of these complaints, or about 19 percent, by phone. Of the 3,663 complaints, Los Angeles International Airport was identified most often in the complaint data. Table 6 lists the 10 airports most often identified in these complaints. Appendix IV: Agency Comments Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact William Russell, (202) 512-8777 or RussellW@gao.gov. Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Ellen Wolfe (Assistant Director), Natalie Maddox (Analyst in Charge), Saida Hussain, and Brendan Kretzschmar made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Alyssa Bertoni, David Dornisch, Ben Emmel, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Tom Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sam Portnow, Rachel Stoiko, and Adam Vogt.


The Federal Government Is on an Unsustainable Fiscal Path By the end of fiscal year 2019, the federal debt held by the public had climbed to 79 percent of GDP. By comparison, such debt has averaged 46 percent of GDP annually since 1946. If current trends continue, debt as a share of GDP will exceed the historic high 1946 level of 106 percent of GDP within 11 to 14 years. In 2050, it will be nearly twice that level and about four times its post-World War II average. Figure 1 shows that in GAO, CBO, and 2019 Financial Report projections, debt held by the public as a share of GDP grows substantially over time. Spending Outlook Is Driven by Health Care and Net Interest on the Debt Under GAO, CBO, and the 2019 Financial Report projections, spending for the major health and retirement programs grows more rapidly than GDP in coming decades. This is a consequence of both an aging population and projected continued increases in health care costs per beneficiary. Medicare spending is expected to exceed $1 trillion per year by fiscal year 2026, and Social Security spending already exceeds $1 trillion per year. However, according to the projections, these spending categories will eventually be overtaken by spending on net interest, which primarily consists of interest costs on the federal government’s debt held by the public. In recent years, persistently low interest rates have resulted in lower interest costs for the government than previously projected. Despite these low interest rates, spending on net interest grew from $263 billion in 2017 to $376 billion in 2019. That $376 billion is 8.4 percent of total federal spending, which exceeded combined spending on agriculture, transportation, and veterans’ benefits and services. Going forward, both interest rates and the debt are projected to grow, which means spending on net interest is projected to grow faster than any other component of the budget. In 2032, spending on net interest is projected to exceed $1 trillion annually. Over the past 50 years, net interest costs have averaged 2 percent of GDP but these costs are projected to increase to 7.2 percent by 2049. As figure 2 shows, we project that as a share of GDP, net interest spending will exceed Medicare spending in 2041, Social Security spending in 2044, and total Discretionary spending in 2049. Interest costs will also depend in part on the outstanding mix of Treasury securities. The Department of the Treasury issues securities in a wide range of maturities to appeal to a broad range of investors to support its goal of borrowing at the lowest cost over time. Treasury refinances maturing debt by issuing new debt in its place at the prevailing interest rate. At the end of fiscal year 2019, 61 percent of the outstanding amount of marketable Treasury securities held by the public (about $9.9 trillion) was scheduled to mature in the next 4 years. If interest rates are higher, Treasury will have to refinance these securities at the higher interest rates, adding to the interest costs of the growing federal debt. Action Is Needed to Address an Unsustainable Fiscal Path Impending financial challenges for major programs and fiscal risks are both straining the federal budget and contributing to the growing debt. Sustaining key programs will require changes (see fig. 3). The President’s Budget, CBO, and the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System all make it clear that rising federal debt could have long-term consequences for the economy. For example it could: constrain Congress’s ability to support the economy or address other national priorities, restrain private investment and thereby reduce productivity and overall growth, and erode confidence in the U.S. dollar. In addition, it may increase the risk of a fiscal crisis, in which investors would lose confidence in the U.S. government’s financial position, and interest rates on Treasury securities would increase abruptly. To change the long-term fiscal path, policymakers will need to consider policy changes to the entire range of federal activities, both revenue (including tax expenditures) and spending (entitlement programs, other mandatory spending, and discretionary spending). As Congress considers changes in revenue and spending policies to improve the federal government’s long-term fiscal path, it will also need to consider other approaches for managing the level of debt. As currently structured, the debt limit is a legal limit on the total amount of federal debt that can be outstanding at one time. The debt limit does not restrict Congress’s ability to pass spending and revenue legislation that affects the level of debt, nor does it otherwise constrain fiscal policy. Without legislation to suspend or raise the debt limit, Treasury cannot continue issuing debt to finance the decisions already enacted by Congress and the President. We have reported on the negative impacts of uncertainty around the debt limit which include (1) increased Treasury borrowing costs, (2) decreased demand for Treasury securities, and (3) constrained Treasury cash management. We have reported numerous times that the full faith and credit of the United States must be preserved. We have also recommended that Congress consider other approaches to the current debt limit to avoid seriously disrupting the Treasury market and increasing borrowing costs and to allow it to better manage the federal government’s level of debt. A number of bills have been introduced in this Congress to address this issue. The Senate Budget Committee’s proposal to reform the Congressional budget process would automatically adjust the debt limit to conform to levels established in the budget resolution. In contrast to the debt limit, fiscal rules can support efforts to achieve fiscal sustainability by imposing numerical limits or targets on the budget to guide fiscal policy. Fiscal rules are intended to influence decisions about spending and revenue as they are made. The Senate Budget Committee’s proposal to reform the Congressional budget process is an example of one such approach. This legislation would specify target ratios for debt as a share of GDP and track legislation against that target. As Congress continues to consider options, two key points should be emphasized. An agreed-upon goal can help policymakers justify and frame their choices. With that in mind, a fiscal target that establishes a common goal for controlling the size of the federal debt relative to the economy—as well as well-designed rules that put the federal government on a path to achieve that target—could form part of a long-term fiscal plan to put the government on a sustainable fiscal path. The longer action is delayed, the greater and more drastic the changes will have to be, placing an additional burden on future generations. While changes in spending and revenue to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability require legislative actions to alter fiscal policies, executive agencies can also take actions to contribute toward a sustainable fiscal future. Although executive actions alone cannot put the U.S. government on a sustainable fiscal path, it is important for agencies to act as stewards of federal resources. These actions include reducing improper payments, which agencies estimate totaled $175 billion in fiscal year 2019; addressing the $381 billion annual net tax gap; better managing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government; and improving information on federal programs and fiscal operations to aid agency decision-making. Chairman Enzi, Ranking Member Sanders, and Members of the Committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. GAO Contacts For further information on this testimony, please contact Susan J. Irving, Senior Advisor to the Comptroller General, Debt and Fiscal Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-6806 or IrvingS@gao.gov; Robert F. Dacey, Chief Accountant, who may be reached at (202) 512-3406 or daceyr@gao.gov; or Dawn B. Simpson, Director, Financial Management and Assurance, who may be reached at (202) 512-3406 or simpsondb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs offices may be found on the last page of this statement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. 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The Nation Faces Ongoing Challenges Across the Biodefense Enterprise Our past work has identified five key challenges related to the nation’s ability to detect and respond to biological events that transcend what any one agency can address on its own. They include: (1) enterprise-wide threat determination, (2) situational awareness and data integration, (3) biodetection technologies, (4) biological laboratory safety and security, and (5) emerging infectious disease surveillance. The complexity and fragmentation of roles and responsibilities across numerous federal and nonfederal entities presents challenges to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness across the entire biodefense enterprise. In September 2018, the White House issued the National Biodefense Strategy and through NSPM-14 established a governance structure to guide its implementation. The activities and responsibilities assigned to the interagency governance body by the strategy and NSPM-14 may create new opportunities to make progress on these longstanding and complex issues. However, because implementation of the Strategy and NSPM-14 are in early stages, it remains to be seen how or to what extent they are able to do so. We have ongoing work assessing the strategy and early efforts to implement it. We plan to report in fall 2019. Enterprise-Wide Threat Determination Needed to Help Leverage Resources and Inform Resource Tradeoffs We reported in October 2017 that opportunities remain to enhance threat awareness across the entire biodefense enterprise, leverage shared resources, and inform budgetary tradeoffs among various threats and agency programs. As depicted in figure 1, we reported in October 2017 that key biodefense agencies, including DHS, DOD, HHS, USDA, and EPA, rely on intelligence and global surveillance information, scientific study of disease agent characteristics, and analysis to better understand threats and help make decisions about biodefense investments. These activities are often conducted to support the agencies’ mission or to understand a specific threat. Additionally, to facilitate collaboration among government partners, federal agencies with key roles in biodefense share biological threat information through many different mechanisms including interagency bodies, working groups at the agency and executive level, formalized agreements, colocation, joint projects and funding efforts, and shared expertise (see figure 2). The collaborative mechanisms in which the key agencies in our October 2017 review participated may facilitate information sharing in support of specific federal activities and in individual programs, or in response to specific biological events after they begin to unfold. However, as we reported in October 2017, there was no existing mechanism that could leverage threat awareness information to direct resources and set budgetary priorities across all agencies for biodefense. The nation faces many biological threats, including naturally occurring diseases that affect human, animal, and plant health, and biological weapons used by state or nonstate actors. Without a mechanism that is able to assess the relative risk from biological threats across all sources and domains, the nation may be limited in its ability to prioritize resources, defenses, and countermeasures against the most pressing threats. The Strategy and NSPM-14 outline requirements for participating agencies that lay the ground work for a more systematic, cross- government examination of existing programs. The effort offers the potential for the nation to progress toward more integrated and enterprise-wide threat awareness and to use that information to identify opportunities to leverage resources, but this will take time and entails a change in the way participating agencies have traditionally operated. Because implementation of the strategy is in its early stages, it is too soon to assess how, if at all, it might address this challenge. Ongoing Challenges to Fulfill Enhanced Situational Awareness and Data Integration Requirements We have reported that DHS’s National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), which was created to integrate data across the federal government with the aim of enhancing detection and situational awareness of biological events, has suffered from long-standing issues related to its clarity of purpose. In 2009, we reported that some of NBIC’s partners were not convinced of the value that working with NBIC provided because NBIC’s mission was not clearly articulated. We also reported that NBIC was not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacked key resources—data and personnel—from its partner agencies, which may have been at least partially the result of collaboration challenges it faced. In the 2009 report, we recommended that NBIC develop a strategy for addressing barriers to collaboration and develop accountability mechanisms to monitor these efforts. DHS agreed, and in August 2012 NBIC issued the NBIC Strategic Plan, to provide its strategic vision, clarify the center’s mission and purpose, and articulate the value that NBIC seeks to provide to its partners, among other things. In September 2015, we reported that despite NBIC’s efforts to collaborate with interagency partners to create and issue a strategic plan that would clarify its mission and efforts, a variety of challenges remained. We identified options for policy or structural changes that could help a federal data integrator like NBIC better fulfill its mission, given the complexity and difficulty inherent in achieving truly integrated situational awareness that makes new meaning out of disparate data, but we did not make specific recommendations. The National Biodefense Strategy identified biosurveillance data integration among several information sharing activities that need to be enhanced. Interagency attention to the goals, opportunities, and challenges of enterprise-wide data integration offers the potential for the nation to better define what kind of integrated situational awareness is possible, what it will take to effectively and efficiently achieve it, and what value it has. However, it remains to be seen how or whether the interagency efforts to implement the Strategy will be able to address ongoing situational awareness and data integration challenges. Challenges Determining Optimal Biodetection Technology Solutions Since 2012, we have reported that DHS has faced challenges in clearly justifying the need for the BioWatch program and its ability to reliably address that need (to detect aerosolized biological attacks). In September 2012, we found that DHS approved a next-generation BioWatch acquisition in October 2009 without fully developing knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision making and pursuit of optimal solutions. We recommended that before continuing the acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible alternatives based on cost-benefit and risk information. DHS concurred and in April 2014, canceled the acquisition because an alternatives analysis did not confirm an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost. DHS continues to rely on the currently-deployed BioWatch system for early detection of an aerosolized biological attack, but in 2015 we found that DHS lacked reliable information about the current system’s technical capabilities to detect a biological attack, in part because DHS had not developed technical performance requirements for the system. We reported in September 2015 that DHS commissioned tests of the current system’s technical performance characteristics, but without performance requirements, DHS could not interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system’s ability to detect attacks. At the time of our report in October 2015, DHS was considering upgrades to the Gen-2 system, but we recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades until it establishes technical performance requirements to meet a clearly defined operational objective and assesses the system against these performance requirements. DHS concurred and reported it was working to address the recommendation. DHS has since begun to acquire a different type of biodetection system, BioDetection 21 (or BD21), intended to replace BioWatch. BD21 is currently in a pilot phase; therefore we cannot yet determine how it will be implemented in the future or what decisions DHS will ultimately make regarding the existing BioWatch system. Multiplex Point-of-Care Technologies In August 2017, we reported that from a homeland security and public health perspective, threats of bioterrorism, such as anthrax attacks, and high-profile disease outbreaks, such as Ebola and emerging viruses like dengue, chikungunya, and Zika, highlight the continued need for diagnostic tests that provide early detection and warning about biological threats to humans. Multiplex point-of-care technologies are technologies that can simultaneously test for more than one type of human infectious disease pathogen from a single patient sample (such as blood, urine, or sputum) in one run at or near the site of a patient. Multiplex point-of-care technologies can be used for diagnosing different diseases, including more common diseases such as influenza, emerging infectious diseases, or diseases caused by select agents in minutes to a few hours. We further reported that, while potential benefits of these technologies include more appropriate use of antibiotics and improved ability to limit the spread of disease, among others, developers and users disagreed on the strength of evidence showing the extent of multiplex point-of-care technologies’ improvement on patient outcomes and identified the need for more clinical studies to establish the benefits of these technologies. Additionally, implementation challenges include lack of familiarity with such technologies, cost considerations, false positive results for rare diseases, and the challenges related to the regulatory review process for developers to get approval or clearance to market their technologies. The National Biodefense Strategy and its interagency governing leadership offer the potential for the nation to better define the role of detection technologies in a layered national biodefense capability to help those that pursue these technologies better articulate the mission needs and align requirements and concepts of operation accordingly. Because implementation of the strategy is in its early stages, it remains to be seen how or whether the interagency will be able engage on this issue in a way that helps to drive informed investment tradeoff decisions about technology alternatives. Continued Oversight Needed to Enhance Biological Laboratory Safety and Security Addressing Safety Lapses at Laboratories We—along with Congress and various federal committees—have, for many years, identified challenges and areas for improvement related to the safety, security, and oversight of high-containment laboratories. These laboratories conduct research on hazardous pathogens—such as the Ebola virus and the bacteria that causes anthrax—and toxins that may pose a serious threat to humans, animals, or plants. In 2008 and 2009, we found a proliferation of high-containment laboratories across the United States, with the number of such laboratories in the government, academic, and private sectors increasing since 2001. We recommended that the National Security Advisor name an entity charged with government-wide strategic evaluation of high-containment laboratories. National Security Staff disagreed with this recommendation. After reporting on these issues again in 2013, the Office of Science and Technology Policy implemented this recommendation. In January 2013, we also found that, for the subset of these laboratories subject to federal oversight, the oversight was duplicative, fragmented, and dependent on self-policing. We recommended that HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service work with DHS and DOD to coordinate inspections and ensure consistent application of inspection standards; the departments generally agreed with our recommendations and noted various actions they had already taken, or planned to take, to coordinate inspection efforts, such as conducting joint inspections. More recently, in response to reported lapses in laboratory safety at HHS and DOD in 2014 and 2015, we examined how federal departments oversee their high-containment laboratories. In March 2016, we found that most of the 8 departments and 15 agencies that we reviewed had policies that were not comprehensive or were not up to date. Also, while the departments and agencies we reviewed primarily used inspections to oversee their high-containment laboratories, some of them were not routinely reporting inspection results, laboratory incidents, and other oversight activities to senior officials. We made 33 recommendations in total, including that departments develop and update policies to include missing elements and ensure that oversight activity results are reported to senior officials. To date, 12 of the 33 recommendations have been implemented—including updating policies and reporting requirements. We continue to monitor agency progress in implementing the 21 that remain open. In response to several incidents involving the shipment of improperly inactivated pathogens, in August 2016 we reported on issues related to the inactivation of pathogens in high-containment laboratories and found that both the science and the federal guidance around pathogen inactivation are limited and inconsistently implemented. Additionally, we found that federal officials did not know how many incomplete inactivation incidents have occurred because laboratories do not have to identify them in incident reports, and are only required to report incidents involving certain pathogens. We made 11 recommendations to HHS and USDA that they improve the oversight of inactivation by revising reporting forms, improving guidance for development and validation of inactivation protocols, and developing consistent criteria for enforcement of incidents involving incomplete inactivation. To date, 6 of the 11 recommendations have been addressed and we continue to monitor the 5 that remain open. Safety lapses continued to occur at laboratories in the United States that conduct research on hazardous pathogens, raising concern about the efficacy of federal oversight. In October 2017, we found that the Federal Select Agent Program—jointly managed by HHS and USDA—oversees laboratories’ handling of certain hazardous pathogens known as select agents, but the program does not fully meet all key elements of effective oversight. For example, the Federal Select Agent Program was not independent from all laboratories it oversees, and it had not assessed risks posed by its current structure or the effectiveness of its mechanisms to reduce organizational conflicts of interest. We made 11 recommendations for the Federal Select Agent Program, including to (1) assess risks from its current structure and the effectiveness of its mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest and address risks as needed, (2) assess the risk of activities it oversees and target reviews to high-risk activities, and (3) develop a joint workforce plan; to-date, 5 of 11 recommendations have been addressed and we continue to monitor the progress for the 6 that remain open. DOD’s Biosafety and Biosecurity Program In September 2018 we found that DOD had made progress by taking a number of actions to address the 35 recommendations from the Army’s 2015 investigation report on the inadvertent shipment of live anthrax; however, DOD had not yet developed an approach to measure the effectiveness of these actions. Additionally, we reported that although DOD had implemented a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Biosafety and Biosecurity Program to improve management, coordination, safety, and quality assurance, DOD had not developed a strategy and implementation plan for managing the program. Also, we found that the Army had not fully institutionalized measures to ensure that its biological test and evaluation mission remains independent from its biological research and development mission so that its test and evaluation procedures are objective and reliable. Finally, DOD had not completed a required study and evaluation of its Biological Select Agents and Toxins infrastructure that will affect the future infrastructure of the Biological Select Agents and Toxins Biosafety and Biosecurity Program. DOD officials had no estimated time frames for when DOD will complete the study and evaluation. We recommended that DOD develop an approach to assess the effectiveness of the recommendations, a strategy and implementation plan for its Biological Select Agents and Toxins Biosafety and Biosecurity Program, measures to ensure independence, and time frames to complete a study. To date, all of these recommendations remain open. In agency comments, DOD concurred with all four of our recommendations and discussed the actions the department intended to take to address them, including finalizing the development of a long-term strategy and implementation plan by September 1, 2019. The National Biodefense Strategy highlights the need for continuous improvement of biosafety and biosecurity for laboratories and other facilities. However, it is not yet known how, if at all, the strategy will drive interagency partners to develop additional oversight or other practices to mitigate the risk of bioincidents at high containment laboratories, because implementation of the strategy is in its early stages. Challenges Building and Maintaining Emerging Infectious Disease Surveillance We have reported that establishing and sustaining biosurveillance capabilities can be difficult for a myriad of reasons. For example, maintaining expertise in a rapidly changing field is difficult, as is the challenge of accurately recognizing the signs and symptoms of rare or emerging diseases. Additionally, we reported in October 2011 that funding targeted for specific diseases does not allow for focus on a broad range of causes of morbidity and mortality, and federal officials have said that the disease-specific nature of funding is a challenge to states’ ability to invest in core biosurveillance capabilities. Further, we reported in May 2018 that although the awards funded by supplemental appropriations have allowed state and local public health departments, laboratories, and hospitals to surge during a threat—for example, the H1N1influenza and Zika viruses—most of the 10 non-federal stakeholders we interviewed, as well as HHS officials said that the timing of these awards can result in challenges to carrying out preparedness and response activities during infectious disease threats. An effective medical response to a biological event depends in part on the ability of individual clinicians and other professionals to identify, accurately diagnose, and effectively treat diseases, including many that may be uncommon. For example, in May 2017, we reported that because Zika virus disease was a newly emerging disease threat in the United States and relatively little was known about the virus prior to 2016, HHS and state and local public health agencies were not fully equipped with information and resources needed for a rapid response at the outset of the recent outbreaks. They faced challenges establishing and implementing surveillance systems for Zika virus disease and infection and its associated health outcomes. Additionally, in March 2019, we reported that USDA would likely face surveillance challenges that could delay detection of the first cases in a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in livestock, which could have a devastating impact on our economy and trade agreements. For example, foot-and-mouth disease can spread without detection as signs can be difficult to notice in some species, take up to 4 days to manifest after an animal is infected, and infection in wild animals could go undetected and continue to spread the virus. In 2011, while reporting on nonfederal biosurveillance efforts, we found state and local agriculture, public health, and wildlife departments were completely or largely dependent on federal funding for biosurveillance- related activities. At that time, we also reported that the common federal approach of disease-specific funding—for example, West Nile virus— limited nonfederal efforts to develop core capabilities that could provide surveillance capacity that cut across health threats and for emerging- disease threats. According to federal, state, and local officials, early detection of potentially serious disease indications nearly always occurs first at the local level, making the personnel, training, systems, and equipment that support detection at the state and local level a cornerstone of our nation’s biodefense posture. In May 2018, we reported that officials from HHS told us that their grant awards funded by annual appropriations are intended to establish and strengthen emergency preparedness and capacity building, but may not fully support the need for surge capacity that states and other jurisdictions require in order to respond to an infectious disease threat. We reported that during recent infectious disease threats, HHS received supplemental appropriations to respond to Zika in 2016, Ebola in 2014, and H1N1 pandemic influenza in 2009. However, as mentioned above, officials also said that the timing of these awards can result in challenges to carrying out preparedness and response activities during infectious disease threats. HHS officials, as well as all 10 selected non-federal stakeholders, also noted in May 2018 that a funding mechanism to fund rapid response activities when additional support is needed would be beneficial and could help address timing challenges. However, we reported that concerns were also raised about (1) when such a mechanism for funding infectious disease threats should be used, and (2) that any type of emergency fund should not be used to make up for a lack in investments at all levels of government for current preparedness and capacity-building activities. We did not make recommendation as part of this work. However, part of our May 2018 reporting included perspectives from various stakeholders on such a fund. Stakeholders cited six factors that may be considered for a new emergency response fund: (1) who determines when to use an emergency fund, (2) what factors would trigger the use of an emergency fund, (3) methods to determine the amount of available funding, (4) activities to fund with an emergency fund, (5), accountability for use of an emergency fund, and (6) whether an emergency fund would be specific to infectious disease threats. The National Biodefense Strategy and its interagency governance structure offer the opportunity to design new approaches to identifying and building a core set of surveillance and response capabilities for emerging infectious diseases. However, it is too early into implementation to determine how effective, if at all, the new strategy will be in addressing this challenge. How and to what extent implementation of the Strategy is able to efficiently leverage and effectively sustain capacity across both nonfederal and federal stakeholders will affect how prepared the nation is to more quickly gear up for whatever challenges emerge when outbreaks of previously non-endemic diseases threaten the nation. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice, and Members of the Subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any question you may have at this time. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments If you or your staff has any questions concerning this testimony, please contact Christopher P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. 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