Registering for and Receiving Assistance from FEMA and Its Partners Posed Challenges for Individuals with Disabilities Following the 2017 Disasters Aspects of FEMA’s Application Process for Assistance Created Challenges for Individuals with Disabilities To receive FEMA assistance under FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program, through which disaster survivors can receive help with housing and other needs, individuals must register by answering a standard series of intake questions. In our May 2019 report, we found that some individuals with disabilities may have faced long wait times and unclear registration questions, and that FEMA’s internal communication across its programs about survivors’ disability-related needs was ineffective. Long wait times: Individuals who tried to apply for assistance using the helpline confronted long wait times, which may have posed greater challenges for those with disabilities. In the days after Hurricane Maria affected Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands— when survivors from Harvey and Irma were concurrently contacting the helpline—up to 69 percent of calls went unanswered and the daily average wait time for answered calls peaked at almost an hour and a half, according to our analysis of FEMA data. While long wait times could be burdensome for all individuals, state officials and disability advocates we interviewed said long wait times were especially burdensome for people with certain disabilities, such as those with attention disorders or whose assistive technology prevents multi- tasking when waiting on hold. Unclear registration questions: FEMA’s registration process did not give individuals a clear opportunity to state they have a disability or request an accommodation because the registration did not directly ask registrants to provide this information. According to FEMA officials at the time, information about disability-related needs can help FEMA staff match individuals with disabilities with appropriate resources in a timely and efficient manner and target additional assistance, such as help with the application process. However, individuals with disabilities may not have requested accommodations or reported their disability and related needs during FEMA’s registration-intake due to the unclear questions. As a result, the registration process may have under-identified people with disabilities. For example, in Puerto Rico, an estimated 21.6 percent of people have disabilities, according to 2017 Census data. However, less than 3 percent of all registrants in the territory answered “yes” to the disability-related question in response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Ineffective communication across FEMA programs: Individuals may have faced challenges receiving necessary assistance because FEMA did not effectively track and communicate information about individuals’ disability-related needs across its assistance programs after such needs were identified. FEMA officials we interviewed for the May 2019 report explained that accommodation requests and disability-related information identified after registration-intake are recorded in a general “notes” section of a registrant’s case file, which can be easily overlooked as a case file is passed along to subsequent FEMA officials. In our May 2019 report we recommended that FEMA implement new registration-intake questions to improve FEMA’s ability to identify and address survivors’ disability-related needs. FEMA concurred with this recommendation, and officials reported that in May 2019 the agency updated the questions to directly ask individuals if they have a disability. According to FEMA’s analysis of applications for assistance following recent disasters, which used the updated questions, the percentage of registrants who reported having a disability increased. FEMA officials stated this increase gives them confidence the change has improved FEMA’s ability to identify and address disability-related needs of individuals affected by disasters. We also recommended that FEMA improve its communication of registrants’ disability-related information across FEMA programs, such as by developing an alert within survivor files that indicates an accommodation request. FEMA did not concur with this recommendation, explaining that the agency lacks specific funding to augment the legacy data systems that capture and communicate registration information. In its comments on our May 2019 report, FEMA stated that it began a long- term initiative in April 2017 to improve data management and exchange, and improve overall data quality and standardization. After FEMA completes this initiative, which officials said will be in 2024, FEMA expects that efforts to share and flag specific disability-related data will be much easier. We believe that in the interim, FEMA could explore other cost-effective ways to improve communication, such as through agency guidance that encourages program officials to review registrants’ case file notes. As FEMA moves ahead with its initiatives to improve data, we encourage it to consider and ultimately implement technology changes, such as developing an alert within files that indicates an accommodation request, to help improve communication across FEMA programs. Officials Reported that Individuals with Disabilities Faced Challenges Obtaining Critical Goods and Services State, territorial, and local governments are primarily responsible for response and recovery activities in their jurisdictions, including those involving health and safety. In our May 2019 report, we found that the substantial damage caused by the 2017 hurricanes prevented or slowed some individuals with disabilities from obtaining food and water. According to territorial and nonprofit officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as survivors we interviewed in the U.S. Virgin Islands, this was due to centralized distribution models, in which the majority of food and water was distributed to centralized locations around the islands. Officials from one governmental agency in Puerto Rico said this posed a major barrier to people with mobility challenges or without caregivers receiving food and water because they had to rely on home delivery, which took time and in some cases, did not happen. We also found that Hurricane Maria survivors faced challenges obtaining needed medication and oxygen in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, according to territorial and nonprofit officials. State, territorial, and local agencies are also primarily responsible for administering shelters, when necessary, for those affected by a disaster. We found in our May 2019 report that individuals with disabilities affected by the 2017 hurricanes may have faced challenges accessing basic services from local shelters, including restrooms and food, according to state, territorial, local, and nonprofit officials in Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. For example, nonprofit officials in Florida and Puerto Rico described instances of shelter residents with impairments that prevented them from accessing shelter restrooms. We also found that transportation was especially challenging for those who relied on public transportation or were unable to walk long distances, such as people with disabilities, according to state, territorial, local, and nonprofit officials we interviewed. For example, Florida state officials reported that few public transportation services, including paratransit, were functional following Hurricane Irma. This may have prevented some people with disabilities from maintaining their health and wellness—such as by shopping for groceries or going to medical appointments—after the storm, according to state officials. Officials we interviewed from Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico for our May 2019 report said they had difficulty obtaining FEMA data that could help them deliver assistance to individuals, including those with disabilities. The officials explained that data—including names and addresses— showing who has registered for and received assistance from FEMA can help local governments and nonprofits identify who in their community needs assistance. To better facilitate authorized nonfederal partners obtaining these needed data, we recommended that FEMA develop and publicize guidance for partners who assist individuals with disabilities on how to request and work with FEMA staff to obtain the data, as appropriate. FEMA concurred with this recommendation and officials told us in July 2019 that the agency plans to publish data-sharing guidelines on its website, among other actions. FEMA Had Taken Limited Steps to Effectively Implement Its New Disability Integration Approach FEMA Began Implementing Changes without Communicating Objectives to Regional Staff. Before initiating its new approach to disability integration, ODIC distributed an explanatory memorandum and other documentation to FEMA staff. For example, an April 2018 memorandum to FEMA Regional Administrators outlined a proposal to add new disability integration staff in each FEMA region to foster day-to-day relationships with state, territorial, and local emergency managers and disability partners. Also, ODIC distributed a document that described FEMA’s new approach to deployments. Under the new approach, fewer disability integration staff are to be deployed to disasters and all deployable staff and staff in programmatic offices are to receive training on disability issues during response and recovery deployments. However, in our May 2019 report, we found that these documents did not articulate objectives that could help the agency define success for the new approach. We concluded that without a set of common objectives for FEMA’s new disability integration approach, FEMA risks inconsistent application across its regions. In our report, we recommended that FEMA establish and disseminate a set of objectives for the new approach. FEMA concurred with this recommendation, and in July 2019 officials provided us with the draft of ODIC’s strategic plan for 2019-2022, which includes strategic goals and objectives that the new disability integration approach can help achieve. ODIC officials told us they will be working throughout 2019 with FEMA’s Office of External Affairs to disseminate the plan agency-wide and to nonfederal partners. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s progress toward sharing the objectives of its new approach to disability integration with critical stakeholders. FEMA Had Not Documented Plans for Training All Deployed Staff on Disability Competencies, but Has Taken Steps to Offer Training to Nonfederal Partners To implement FEMA’s new deployment model, which will shift the responsibility of directly assisting individuals with disabilities from disability integration staff to all FEMA staff, FEMA planned to train all deployable staff and staff in programmatic offices on disability issues. We reported in May 2019 that FEMA officials emphasized the need to integrate disability competencies throughout FEMA’s programmatic offices and deployable staff. However, we found that the agency did not have written plans—including milestones, performance measures, or a plan for monitoring performance—for developing new comprehensive training for all staff. Starting in the 2018 hurricane season, FEMA had taken initial steps toward training some deployed staff on disability issues. For example, FEMA required all staff to complete a 30-minute training on basic disability integration principles and offered targeted “just-in-time” training to deployed staff. We concluded that developing a training plan would better position FEMA to provide training to all staff to help achieve FEMA’s intended goals. In our May 2019 report, we recommended that FEMA develop a plan for delivering training to FEMA staff that promotes competency in disability awareness. In its letter commenting on our May 2019 report, FEMA stated that ODIC is developing a plan to introduce the disability competency in FEMA’s position task books for all deployable staff. The letter explained further that ODIC’s plan will describe how FEMA will communicate the disability integration competency throughout the agency, establish milestones for measuring how effectively the competency is integrated across the agency, and outline how ODIC will monitor and measure integration of the competency across the deployable workforce. In July 2019, FEMA officials told us ODIC plans to hire new staff to focus on integrating the disability competency FEMA-wide. According to the officials, after the position task books are updated, ODIC will work with FEMA’s training components to ensure that disability-related training is consistent with the content of the position task books. FEMA officials also noted that the Field Operations Division, and not ODIC, is responsible for measuring how effectively the disability competency is integrated across FEMA. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s progress toward developing a plan for delivering training to promote competency in disability awareness among its staff. As noted in our May 2019 report, the plan for delivering such training should include milestones, performance measures, and how performance will be monitored. In our May 2019 report, we found that deploying a smaller number of disability integration staff and shifting them away from providing direct assistance to individuals with disabilities may result in nonfederal partners (such as state, territorial, and local emergency managers) providing more direct assistance to individuals with disabilities than they did previously. In February 2017, we reported that the comprehensive introductory training course on disability integration that FEMA offered to its nonfederal partners included substantial information on how to incorporate the needs of people with disabilities in emergency planning. However, according to officials, FEMA stopped offering this 2-day course in September 2017. ODIC officials told us during our 2019 review they had determined that the course, as designed, did not provide actionable training to emergency management partners to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities and planned to replace it. However, we found in May 2019 that although officials had plans to replace the course with new training, they had not provided a timeline, which would help ensure that partners are provided with timely information on inclusive emergency management practices. We recommended that FEMA develop a timeline for completing the replacement course and, in June 2019, FEMA officials said they had begun procuring external consulting services to redevelop it. According to the officials, ODIC had evaluated alternatives to the suspended course and determined that an in-person, exercise-based course with remote participation capabilities would be an appropriate replacement. FEMA officials said the course will take about 1 year to develop and will be ready to field by August 2020. In conclusion, FEMA has taken a number of steps toward addressing our recommendations related to how it supports individuals with disabilities in obtaining disaster assistance. ODIC’s draft strategic plan for 2019-2022, which articulates objectives for the new approach to disability integration, is likely to help facilitate consistent implementation agency-wide. In addition, we are hopeful that FEMA’s revised registration-intake questions, as well as data sharing guidance for nonfederal partners, will help FEMA and its partners better identify and assist registrants with disabilities. However, we continue to believe that implementing changes to disability integration before staff have been fully trained may leave FEMA staff ill-prepared to identify and address the challenges that individuals with disabilities face while recovering from disasters. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s actions as it makes additional progress toward addressing our recommendations. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Elizabeth Curda, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at (202) 512-7215 or curdae@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Sara Schibanoff Kelly (Assistant Director), Sara Pelton (Analyst-in-Charge), and David Reed. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


Role of Congress Congress is responsible for funding, establishing rules regulating the Army, and conducting oversight of a number of functions including manning, equipping, training, and readiness. On an annual basis, shortly after the President's Budget Request is transmitted to Congress, congressional defense authorizing committees and subcommittees typically hold three separate oversight hearings focused on (1). the Army's budget request; (2). the Army's posture; and (3). Army modernization. In addition to these three hearings, Congress sometimes conducts additional hearings on a wide variety of topics to include specific weapons systems under development and other Army efforts, programs, or initiatives. The Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy, intended to guide Army modernization efforts through at least 2035, is arguably ambitious and proposes the development of a number of new weapons systems and capabilities that could also have implications for force structure as well. In its oversight role of the Army's modernization process, Congress may consider a common oversight architecture that provides both an element of continuity for hearings and a standard by which Congress might evaluate the efficacy of the Army Modernization Plan. What is the Purpose of the Army's Modernization Strategy?1 The 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) aims to transform the Army into a force that can operate in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains (i.e. multi-domain), by 2035. The previous 2018 AMS Report to Congress introduced the Army's six materiel modernization priorities (see below). The 2019 AMS expands the Army's approach beyond those six priorities, outlining a more holistic approach to modernization while maintaining the Army's six Materiel Modernization Priorities from the 2018 AMS. Army Modernization involves modernizing 1) how they fight (doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures); 2) what they fight with (equipment); and 3) who they are (Army culture and personnel). This report will focus on the "what they fight with" component of Army Modernization as well as associated force structure issues. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)3 The Army wants to transform itself into a force capable of implementing its new proposed operational concept referred to as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) described below. MDO Challenges 9 According to the Army, in order to successfully execute MDO, the Army will need to change how it physically postures the force and how it organizes units. In addition, the Army says it will require new authorities and the ability to employ new capabilities and emerging technologies. The Army, in addition to integrating fully with the other Services, will need access to national-level capabilities and require a high level of day-to-day Interagency involvement to successfully prosecute MDO. In this regard, MDO would require not only Department of Defense (DOD) "buy in" and resources, but would also need similar support from the other members of the Interagency and Congress as well. National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Army Strategy11 The Army's Modernization Strategy is part of a hierarchy of strategies intended, among other things, to inform the Service's respective modernization plans. These strategies include: National Security Strategy (NSS): published by the Administration, it is intended to be a comprehensive declaration of global interests, goals, and objectives of the United States relevant to national security. National Defense Strategy (NDS): published by DOD, it establishes objectives for military planning in terms of force structure, force modernization, business processes, infrastructure, and required resources (funding and manpower). National Military Strategy (NMS): published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), it supports the aims of the NSS and implements the NDS. It describes the Armed Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. The NMS is a classified document. The Army Strategy : articulates how the Army achieves its objectives and fulfills its Title 10 duties to organize, train, and equip the Army for sustained ground combat. The Army Strategy provides guidance for budget planning and programming across multiple Future Year Defense Programs (FYDP). All strategies share a common theme, that of "return to great power competition" which posits that "Russia and China are competitors to the United States and both nations are looking to overturn the current rules-based international order." This requires the U.S. military to focus its doctrine and resources on countering this perceived threat. In this regard, the aforementioned strategies also re-focus the Service's modernization efforts towards defeating the perceived Chinese and Russian military threat. A Potential Oversight Framework As previously noted, the possibility exists for a variety of Army Modernization-hearings spanning a number of different Congresses. In this regard, a common oversight architecture could potentially provide both an element of continuity and a means by which Congress might evaluate the progress of the Army's modernization efforts. Such a potential architecture might examine: Is the Army's Modernization Strategy appropriate given the current and projected national security environment? Is the Army's Modernization Strategy achievable given a number of related concerns? Is the Army's Modernization Strategy affordable given current and predicted future resource considerations? To support this potential oversight architecture, a number of topics for discussion are provided for congressional consideration. Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Appropriate? Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Support the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies? The Army contends its modernization strategy addresses the challenges of the future operational environment and directly supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy's (NDS) line of effort, "Build a More Lethal Force." The congressionally established Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States (Section 942, P.L. 114-328 ) questions this assertion, noting: We came away troubled by the lack of unity among senior civilian and military leaders in their descriptions of how the objectives described in the NDS are supported by the Department's readiness, force structure, and modernization priorities , as described in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and other documents. (Emphasis added.) While the Commission's finding is directed at DOD as a whole, it suggests there are questions concerning how modernization priorities and plans support the National Defense Strategy and, by association, the National Security and Military strategies as well. While the aforementioned strategic documents all feature the central theme of "return to great power competition" vis-Ã -vis Russia and China, it is not readily apparent to many observers how the Army's modernization priorities directly support this goal. In this regard, a more detailed examination of the Army's new Modernization Strategy's alignment with the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies could prove beneficial to policymakers. Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Address the Military Strategies of Peer Competitors? While it can be considered essential that the Army's Modernization Strategy aligns with and supports the National Security, National Defense, and National Military strategies of the United States, it can be argued that of equal importance is whether the Army's Modernization Strategy takes into account the military strategies of peer competitors. A May 2019 study offers a summary of Russian and Chinese strategies and suggests a U.S. response: The core of both countries' challenge to the U.S. military lies in what are commonly called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems: in more colloquial terms, a wide variety of missiles, air defenses, and electronic capabilities that could destroy or neutralize U.S. and allied bases, surface vessels, ground forces, satellites, and key logistics nodes within their reach. Both China and Russia have also developed rapidly deployable and fearsomely armed conventional forces that can exploit the openings that their A2/AD systems could create. Despite these advances, both China and Russia still know that, for now, they would be defeated if their attacks triggered a full response by the United States. The key for them is to attack and fight in a way that Washington restrains itself enough for them to secure their gains. This means ensuring that the war is fought on limited terms such that the United States will not see fit to bring to bear its full weight. Focused attacks designed to pick off vulnerable members of Washington's alliance network are the ideal offensive strategy in the nuclear age, in which no one can countenance the consequences of total war. The most pointed form of such a limited war strategy is the fait accompli. Such an approach involves an attacker seizing territory before the defender and its patron can react sufficiently and then making sure that the counterattack needed to eject it would be so risky, costly, and aggressive that the United States would balk at mounting itânot least because its allies might see it as unjustified and refuse to support it. Such a war plan, if skillfully carried out in the Baltics or Taiwan, could checkmate the United States. The U.S. military must shift from one that surges to battlefields well after the enemy has moved to one that can delay, degrade, and ideally deny an adversary's attempt to establish a fait accompli from the very beginning of hostilities and then defeat its invasion. This will require a military that, instead of methodically establishing overwhelming dominance in an active theater before pushing the enemy back, can immediately blunt the enemy's attacks and then defeat its strategy even without such dominance. From an operational perspective, new systems developed as part of the Army's Modernization Strategy would potentially need to not only provide a technological improvement over legacy systems but also support the Army's operational conceptâin this case Multi Domain Operations (MDO)âintended to counter Russia and China. A detailed examination of how these systems directly counter Russian and Chinese military capabilities and strategies could prove beneficial to policymakers. Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Relevant to Other Potential Military Challenges? In February 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told West Point Cadets; We can't know with absolute certainty what the future of warfare will hold, but we do know it will be exceedingly complex, unpredictable, andâas they say in the staff collegesâ"unstructured." Just think about the range of security challenges we face right now beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism and terrorists in search of weapons of mass destruction, Iran, North Korea, military modernization programs in Russia and China, failed and failing states, revolution in the Middle East, cyber, piracy, proliferation, natural and man-made disasters, and more. And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and moreâwe had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged. If former Secretary of Defense Gates' admonition that we have never accurately predicted our next military engagement holds true, it is a distinct possibility that a direct conventional confrontation with Russia or China posited by the National Security Strategy might not come to pass. In the case of China, it has been suggested it is more likely U.S. and Chinese interests will clash in the form of proxy wars and insurgencies as opposed to a great power war. The recent U.S.âIranian confrontation is an example of such a non-great power military challenge with the potential for a rapid escalation or a protracted proxy war. With this in mind, some may consider any strategy not relevant to other potential military challenges other than great power war to be ill-conceived. To insure the Army's new Modernization Strategy is relevant, an examination of how its applies to potential adversaries other than China and Russia as well as other possible military challenges not related to great power competition could be useful to policymakers. Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Complement the Other Service's Modernization Strategies? According to the Army's Strategy: The Army Missionâour purposeâremains constant: To deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force. As part of this Joint Force, it can be argued the Army's Modernization Strategy should complement the modernization strategies of the other Services and vice versa. In order for the Service's modernization strategies to complement one another, a joint war-fighting concept is essential and, at present, no such a concept is agreed by all Services. According to the Army: A Joint war-fighting concept would provide a common framework for experimentation and validation of how the joint force must fight, what capabilities each of the services must have, and how the Joint force should be organizedâfurther allowing civilian leaders to make cross-service resource decisions. While the Army favors and is promoting MDO for adoption by the other Services, the Air Force is focusing on Multi Domain Command and Control, the Navy on Distributed Maritime Operations, and the Marine Corps on the Marine Corps Operating Concept. While these operating concepts share some common themes such as great power competition and a need to be able to operate in a variety of domains, they differ in approach but not to an extent where a common joint warfighting concept could not be agreed upon. Despite this lack of a common joint warfighting concept, the Army claims its modernization programs are aligned with the other Services. Army leadership has noted that "the three of us [Army, Air Force, and the Department of the Navy] are completely aligned," citing the "development of a hypersonic weapon as a good example." While the Army might be collaborating now more than ever with the Air Force and Navy as it claims, collaborating at the programmatic level does not necessarily constitute a complementary relationship of the Service's modernization strategies. In this regard, Congress might decide to examine the relationship between the Service's modernization strategies to insure they are complementary. Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Achievable? What is the Scope of the Army's Modernization Strategy? Army officials reportedly have identified 31 modernization initiativesânot all of them programs of recordâintended to support the Army's six modernization priorities. The Army notes that "there are interdependencies among the 31 initiatives which need to fit together in an overall operational architecture." Examples of a few of the higher-visibility initiatives grouped by modernization priority include: Long Range Precision Fires: Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC). Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA). Next Generation Combat Vehicle: (NGCV) : Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV): 3 variants. Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF). Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP). Future Vertical Lift: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Future Attack Unmanned System (FUAS). Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. Air And Missile Defense: Maneuver Short-Range Air defense (M-SHORAD). Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC). Soldier Lethality: Next Generation Squad Weapons â Automatic Rifle (NGSW-AR). Next Generation Squad Weapons â Rifle (NGSW-R). While some of these initiatives are currently in development and procurement, others are still in the requirements definition and conceptual phase. With so many initiatives and interdependencies, it is reasonable to ask "can the Army's modernization effort survive the failure of one or more of the 31 initiatives?" Another potential way of gauging if the Army is "overreaching" would be to establish how much modernization is required before the Army considers itself sufficiently modernized to successfully implement MDO as currently envisioned. One question for the Army might be "What are the Army's absolute "must-have" systems or capabilities to ensure the Army can execute MDO at its most basic level?" Are the Army's Modernization Priorities Correct? In March 2019 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, then Secretary of the Army Mark Esper and Chief of Staff of the Army Mark Milley stated: To guide Army Futures Command, the Army established a clear set of modernization priorities that emphasize rapid maneuver, overwhelming fires, tactical innovation, and mission command. Our six modernization priorities will not change , and they underscore the Army's commitment to innovate for the future. We have one simple focusâto make Soldiers and units more capable and lethal. Over the last year, we identified $16.1B in legacy equipment programs that we could reinvest towards 31 signature systems that are critical to realizing Multi-Domain Operations and are aligned with these priorities. While the Army's prioritization of and commitment to its modernization initiatives can be viewed as essential to both resourcing and executing the Army's Modernization Strategy, some defense experts have questioned the Army's modernization priorities. For example, the Heritage Foundation's August 2019 report "Rebuilding America's Military Project: The United States Army," suggests different modernization priorities: Given the dependence of MDO on fires and the poor state of Army fire systems, the inclusion and first placement of long-range precision fires is logical. Based on the importance of the network to MDO and the current state of Army tactical networks, logically the network should come next in priority. Third, based on the severely limited current capabilities, should come air and missile defense, followed by soldier lethality in fourth. Next-generation combat vehicles are fifth; nothing has come forward to suggest that there is a technological advancement that will make a next-generation of combat vehicles significantly better. Finally, the last priority should be future vertical lift, although a persuasive argument could be made to include sustainment capabilities instead. Nowhere in the MDO concept is a compelling case made for the use of Army aviation, combined with the relative youth of Army aviation fleets. Aside from differing opinions from defense officials and scholars, world events might also suggest the need to re-evaluate the Army's modernization priorities. One example is the September 14, 2019 attack against Saudi Arabian oil facilities, believed to have been launched from Iran, which employed a combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles. It has been pointed out U.S. forces are ill-prepared to address this threat although the Army has a variety of programs both underway and proposed to mitigate this vulnerability. If the September 14, 2019 attacks are replicated not only in the region but elsewhere by other actors, it might make a compelling case to reprioritize Army air and missile defense from fifth out of six modernization priorities to a higher level to address an evolving and imminent threat. Apart from the Army's stated modernization priorities, there might also be other technologies or systems that merit inclusion based on changing world events. How will the Army Manage its Modernization Strategy? First established in 2018, Army Futures Command (AFC) is intended to: Modernize the Army for the future-will integrate the future operational environment, threat, and technologies to develop and deliver future force requirements, designing future force organizations, and delivering materiel capabilities. According to the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy: Modernization is a continuous process requiring collaboration across the entire Army, and Army Futures Command brings unity of effort to the Army's modernization approach. AFC, under the strategic direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), develops and delivers future concepts, requirements, and organizational designs based on its assessment of the future operating environment. AFC works closely with the Army's modernization stakeholders to integrate and synchronize these solutions into the operational force. While this broad statement provides a basic modernization management concept, it does not address specific authorities and responsibilities for managing Army modernization. Many in Congress have expressed concerns with the relationship between AFC and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology (ASA (ALT)) who has a statutory role in the planning and resourcing of acquisition programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee's report accompanying it's version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, directs the Army to clearly define modernization responsibilities: ARMY ACQUISITION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES The Committee has supported efforts by the Army to address modernization shortfalls and deliver critically needed capabilities to the warfighter through establishment of Cross-Functional Teams [CFTs] and ultimately the stand-up of Army Futures Command [AFC]. However, questions remain on the roles and responsibilities of AFC and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) [ASA(ALT)]. As an example, the Committee recently learned of a newly created Science Advisor position within AFC, which seems to be duplicative of the longstanding role of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology. Additionally, the Committee was concerned to learn that funding decisions on investment accounts, to include science and technology programs, would be directed by AFC rather than ASA(ALT). While the Committee supports AFC's role in establishing requirements and synchronizing program development across the Army, it affirms that ASA(ALT) has a statutory role in the planning and resourcing of acquisition programs. The ASA(ALT) should maintain a substantive impact on the Army's long-range investments, not just serve as a final approval authority. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report that outlines the roles, responsibilities, and relationships between ASA(ALT) and AFC to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days after enactment of this act. The report shall include a clear description of the responsibilities of each organization throughout the phases of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of resources . (Emphasis added.) While the Army has placed significant emphasis on the "revolutionary" nature of AFC and its role in modernization, questions may remain about whether AFC will provide a significant level of "value added" to Army modernization and not encroach on the statutory responsibilities of the ASA (ALT) as well as other major Army organizations having a role in modernization. How Long Will It Take to Fully Implement the Army's Modernization Strategy? According to the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy, the Army plans to build a "MDO ready force by 2035." In order for this goal to be achieved, the Army assumes that: The Army's budget will remain flat, resulting in reduced spending power over time. Demand for Army forces will remain relatively constant while it executes this strategy. Research and development will mature in time to make significant improvements in Army capabilities by 2035. Adversary modernization programs will stay on their currently estimated trajectories in terms of capability levels and timelines. It is not clear if "MDO ready" equates to a "fully modernized" Army or if a certain undefined level of modernization is sufficient for the Army to successfully execute MDO. Originally, Army officials were hoping to field the M-2 Bradley replacementâthe Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)âby 2026. They also planned to field one brigade's worth of OMFVs per yearâmeaning that it would have taken until 2046 to field OMFVs to all Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). On January 16, 2020, the Army decided to cancel the current OMFV solicitation and revise and re-solicit the OMFV requirements on a competitive basis at an unspecified time in the future. Given this cancellation, it may take longer than 2046 to field all OMFVs unless significant budgetary resources are applied to the program. With the Army's somewhat optimistic assumptions about the budget, demand for forces, mature research and development, and the pace of adversary modernization, as well as the scope and complexity of overall Army Modernization, some policymakers may raise questions about whether a full realization of Army modernization initiatives is possible by 2035. What Kind of Force Structure Will Be Required to Support Modernization? In order to support MDO, Army officials reportedly noted in March 2019 that the Army was preparing to make major force structure changes within the next five years. These force structure changes will also be needed to support Army Modernization as new weapons systems could likely require new units and might also mean that existing units are deactivated or converted to different kinds of units. Potential questions for policymakers include: What kinds of new units will be required as a result of Army Modernization? Will existing units be deactivated or converted to support Army Modernization? Will additional endstrength be required to support Army Modernization or will fewer soldiers be needed? Will new Military Operational Specialties (MOSs) be required to support Army Modernization? How will new units be apportioned between the Active and Reserve Components? Where will these new units be stationed in the United States and overseas? Will new training ranges or facilities be required to support Army Modernization? Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Affordable? Army officials have said they eliminated, reduced, or consolidated almost 200 legacy weapon systems catalogued in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) as part of an effort to shift more than $30 billion to programs related to the "Big Six" modernization priorities. The budget review process, known as "Night Court," was initiated by then-Army Secretary Mark Esper. Army officials have said additional reviews will yield lower levels of savings. They have also acknowledged uncertainty in budget assumptions, including total projected funding for the service and long-term costs for modernization priorities as they shift from research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to procurement activities. Army Lieutenant General James Pasquarette, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Programs (G-8), has said: Our strategy right now assumes a topline that's fairly flat. I'm not sure that's a good assumption. So, when the budget does go down ... will we have the nerve to make the hard choices to protect future readiness? Often that's the first lever we pullâwe try and protect end-strength and current readiness at the cost of future readiness.... We don't really have a clear picture of what those bills are right now [for long-term costs of modernization priorities].... There are unrealized bills out there that we're going to have to figure out how to resource and so, right now, I think they're underestimated. Some policymakers and observers have raised questions about the affordability of the Army's modernization strategy. This section seeks to provide context to this question by detailing the Army's requested funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities for FY2020 and the accompanying FYDP, historical and projected funding for the service's RDT&E and procurement efforts in real terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted dollars), changes in the service's budget allocations over time, and planned funding for the service's major defense acquisition programs. Selected Army Modernization Funding in the FY2020 Budget Request According to information provided by the Army, the service requested $8.9 billion in RDT&E and procurement funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities in FY2020. This amount reflects an increase of $3.9 billion (78%) from the FY2019 enacted amount of $5 billion. See Table 1 for a breakdown of projected funding by priority. For FY2020, the Army requested a total of $38.7 billion for its acquisition accounts, including $12.4 billion for RDT&E and $26.3 billion for procurement. Notably, for FY2020, funding requested for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, $8.9 billion, accounted for less than a quarter (23%) of its overall acquisition budget request. Potential questions for policymakers include: How has the Army identified funding to pay for programs related to its six modernization priorities? What officials and organizations have been involved? What is the status of these reviews? How can the Army provide more transparency in identifying sources of funding from these reviews? Why does funding for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities account for a relatively small share of its overall acquisition budget? Should the Army devote a larger share of its overall acquisition budget to its six modernization priorities? What would be some challenges in doing so? When does the Army expect to fully resource programs related to its modernization priorities? How much of the Army's overall acquisition budget should go toward modernization priorities, current acquisition programs, and legacy programs? Some programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, such as Future Vertical Lift, saw a higher percentage increase in requested funding for FY2020 than others, such as Air and Missile Defense. Do the percentage increases reflect the level of priority the Army is assigning these individual programsâor rising costs associated with new stages of development? The Army's FY2020 unfunded priorities list included $242.7 million for "modernization requirements" and $403.9 million for "lethality requirements," among funding for other requirements. Why was the service unable to fund these requirements in its regular budget request? Selected Army Modernization Funding in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) The service projected $57.3 billion in RDT&E and procurement funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities over the FYDP from FY2020 through FY2024. This amount, if authorized and appropriated by Congress, would reflect an increase of $33.1 billion (137%) from projections for the five-year period in the FY2019 budget request. See Table 2 for a breakdown of the projected cost by program. For the five-year period through FY2024, the Army projected a total of $187.5 billion for its acquisition accounts (in nominal dollars), including $58.7 billion for RDT&E and $128.8 billion for procurement. Notably, for the FY2020 FYDP, funding for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities accounts for less than a third (31%) of its overall acquisition budget. In addition to the previous list, potential questions for policymakers include: How realistic are the Army's assumptions for funding programs related to its six modernization priorities, given uncertainty about their long-term costs and the projected decrease in real terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted dollars) in Army procurement and RTD&E funding over the Future Years Defense Program? Should the level of planned funding change for certain programs to reflect different priorities? What additional tradeoffs or divestments does the Army plan to make to its current acquisition programs or legacy weapon systems in order to fund programs related to its six modernization priorities? What programs may be cut? Army RDT&E and Procurement Funding: A Historical Perspective55 Taken together and adjusted for inflation (in constant FY2020 dollars), the Army's acquisition accountsâincluding RDT&E and procurementâhave experienced several buildup and drawdown cycles in past decades, with some of the biggest increases occurring during periods of conflict. See Figure 1 . For example, the service's acquisition budget spiked in FY1952 during the Korean War, again in FY1968 during the Vietnam War, and again in FY2008 during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The FY2008 peak was driven in part by the service's procurement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and other programs intended to protect troops in combat zones from roadside bombs. In terms of a non-war peak, the Army received a combined total of $48.7 billion (in constant FY2020 dollars) for RDT&E and procurement in FY1985 during the Cold Warâan era in which the service's "Big Five" acquisition programs entered service, including the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter (1979), M1 Abrams tank (1980), M2 Bradley fighting vehicle (1981), Patriot air defense system (1981), and AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (1986). The Army projects combined RDT&E and procurement funding will continue to decline in real dollars. The combined level of funding for these accounts is projected to decline from $38.7 billion in FY2020 to $34.3 billion in FY2024 (in constant FY2020 dollars), a decrease over the FYDP of $4.4 billion (11%). Even so, the FY2024 level would remain higher than the Army's historical average of $32.2 billion (in constant FY2020 dollars) for RDT&E and procurement. Potential questions for policymakers include: How may the projected decrease in RDT&E and procurement funding in constant FY2020 dollars over the Future Years Defense Program impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? If the Army's overall acquisition budget is projected to decrease (in real terms), and funding for programs related to its modernization strategy is projected to increase, what kinds of tradeoffs or divestments does the Army plan to make to its current acquisition programs or legacy weapon systems? How much, if any, of the increase in RDT&E and procurement funding in FY2018 went to programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities? To what extent will projected costs for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities increase as they shift from RDT&E to procurement activities? Changes in Army Budget Allocations The share of funding that the Congress has allocated to Army appropriations accounts has changed over time. Because every dollar spent on military personnel, operation and maintenance, and military construction is a dollar that cannot be spent on RDT&E or procurement, Army budget allocation decisions may impact the service's ability to execute its modernization strategy. For example, the Army uses funds from its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account to pay the salaries and benefits of most of its civilian employees, train soldiers, and purchase goods and services, from fuel and office supplies to health care and family support. (Today, the account also covers most of the service's costs for Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO. ) In FY1985, during the Reagan-era buildup, O&M accounted for a smaller share of the Army budget (28%) than it does today (41%) and than it has historically (36%). In the same year, procurement accounted for a larger share of the Army budget (26%) than it does today (14%) and than it has historically (16%). See Figure 2 . Potential questions for policymakers include: What changes in spending on military personnel could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy, particularly if the service increases end-strength? What changes in spending on operations and maintenance could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? What changes in spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? How is the Army reviewing potential ways to control military personnel or operations and maintenance costs to be able to spend more on RDT&E and procurement in support of programs related to its modernization strategy? Planned Funding for Current Army Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) Including funding planned for FY2020 and FY2021 as part of the FY2020 President's budget request, the Army has an outstanding balance of $120.6 billion (in then-year dollars) for current major defense acquisition programs. Programs with balances greater than $10 billion include the following: CH-47F . The CH-47F Chinook Block II modernization program is intended to increase the carrying capacity of the cargo helicopter in part by upgrading its rotor blades and flight control and drive train components (estimated balance: $25.9 billion); Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) . 59 This program is intended to replace a portion of the Humvee fleet with a new light-duty vehicle (estimated balance: $20.8 billion, $3 billion of which is projected to come from services other than the Army); and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). 60 This program is intended to replace the M113 armored personnel carrier family of vehicles with a new armored vehicle (estimated balance: $11.7 billion). For the cumulative funding status of each of the Army's current major defense acquisition programs as of the FY2020 President's budget re quest, including prior-year amounts and outstanding balances, see Figure 3 . For projected funding for each of the Army's current major defense acquisition programs as of the FY2020 President's budget request, see Figure 4 . As part of the FY2020 President's budget request, the Army proposed reducing funding for some current modernization programs, including the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), in part to pay for modernization priorities. As previously discussed, DOD has not yet designated many of the programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities as major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). However, DOD appears to have designated as pre-major defense acquisition programs (pre-MDAPs) some programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, such as Future Vertical Lift. When possible, the Army plans to begin equipping units with technology on a limited basis in coming years in advance of fully equipping units to take advantage of new technologies as soon as practicable. See Table 3 . Potential questions for policymakers include: How do programs included in the Army's six modernization priorities relate to current major defense acquisition programs? Should the Army fund certain current major defense acquisition programs, such as Integrated Air and Missile Defense, at higher levels to better conform to programs related to its six modernization priorities? How may resourcing requirements for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities impact funding for its current major defense acquisition programs? Given the rapidly changing and unpredictable security challenges facing the United States and the scope of the Army's modernization program, congressional oversight could be challenged in the future as the Army attempts to develop and field an array technologies and systems. A potential oversight framework which constantly evaluates the relevance, the feasibility, and affordability of the Army's modernization efforts could benefit both congressional oversight and related budgetary activities.