Background Explosives and Their Production Explosives include high explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics. Propellants and pyrotechnics are sometimes referred to as low explosives. All three types of explosives serve essential functions in nuclear weapons. Figure 1 illustrates key explosive-containing components found in a generic nuclear weapon as well as the types of explosives these components contain. High explosives are the most common explosive by volume in nuclear weapons. There are two classes of high explosives used in nuclear weapons: insensitive high explosives (IHE) and conventional high explosives (CHE). An IHE is less susceptible to accidental detonation than a CHE and less violent upon accidental ignition, therefore it is safer to handle. NNSA places a premium on safety throughout all phases of explosives activities, including research and development, testing, production, and storage, because handling any explosive material is inherently dangerous, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. Producing a high explosive material generally follows four steps, as shown in figure 2: (1) synthesis—producing raw explosive molecules; (2) formulation—mixing raw explosive molecules with binding ingredients to form an explosive mixture; (3) pressing—compacting formulated explosives into shapes of the required density; and (4) machining— cutting away excess material to achieve the final shape. Analytical, mechanical, safety, and performance testing are to occur after each step. During synthesis, technicians use chemicals to produce fine, powder-like raw explosives. During formulation, technicians combine the explosive powder with plastic binder ingredients to produce a mixture that exhibits the physical and performance properties desired. Formulated explosives used by NNSA often appear like small, irregularly shaped pebbles, known as prills, as shown in figure 3. During pressing, the third step, technicians compact formulated explosives into a solid form. During machining, the fourth step, technicians use computer-controlled equipment to cut and shape the explosive into its final shape. After the explosive has been machined, technicians join explosive and non-explosive parts into functional components during subassembly. Small-scale synthesis and formulation and production-scale pressing, machining, and subassembly activities are carried out at multiple NNSA sites. After each step of the production process, NNSA’s sites conduct tests to ensure that explosives meet NNSA’s safety and performance requirements. During safety testing, scientists conduct a variety of tests to ensure that explosives meet DOE’s safety requirements. Regarding performance testing, scientists conduct other tests that require specialized equipment. For example, scientists use scanning equipment, like heat flow sensors, for thermal testing on formulated explosive material. Scientists also conduct tests using X-ray imaging equipment to evaluate weapon characteristics by detonating a “mockup.” The mockup uses a high explosive main charge—the explosive material that surrounds the nuclear core, known as the pit—and a nonfissile surrogate material that has similar physical properties to plutonium. The mock implosion is called a hydrodynamic test because the surrogate material and other components become hot enough to flow like fluid. Explosive Molecules and Formulations Used in Nuclear Weapons High explosive molecules used in U.S. nuclear weapons include but are not limited to high melting explosive (HMX), pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB). First fielded in conventional weapons in World War II, HMX and PETN were later introduced into several components in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and are still used in them today. DOE first introduced TATB into the nuclear stockpile in 1979, and it is still the only molecule that DOE considers to be an IHE (see sidebar). In all U.S. nuclear weapons, the main charge is made of formulations of HMX or TATB. DOD also uses HMX and TATB in certain conventional weapons. TATB: NNSA’s Key Insensitive High Explosive Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) is a key insensitive high explosive that is currently used in National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DOD) military applications, including nuclear and conventional weapons. Scientists first synthesized TATB in 1888 but did not initially recognize it as an explosive. In 1966, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed the industrial method for synthesizing TATB. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, two domestic manufacturers supplied TATB to DOD and NNSA. However, when the Cold War ended and a U.S. nuclear test moratorium began, the demand for TATB declined, and both manufacturers ceased production by 1993. DOD then acquired TATB from a U.K.-based firm until its plant closed in 2005. Beginning in 2007, DOD and NNSA collaborated to re-establish a manufacturing capability for TATB in the United States. Specifically, DOD’s Holston Army Ammunition Plant (Holston), which is located in Kingsport, Tennessee, began producing TATB in 2014. DOD has qualified the Holston-produced TATB for use in conventional weapons but NNSA has not yet qualified it for use in nuclear weapons because the material properties of the formulated material are not yet up to NNSA standards, according to NNSA documentation. available binding ingredient to create a plastic bonded explosive. Each explosive formulation is designed for a specific application. The performance requirements for explosive formulations in nuclear weapons are more stringent than those for conventional weapons for DOD formulations to ensure both performance and safety. Explosives scientists commonly use the term “recipe” to describe the ingredients and many variables in the process—such as the temperature, mixing speed, or container size—used to make explosive molecules and formulations that meet specific performance requirements. Ongoing and Planned LEPs and NNSA’s Other Modernization Plans In December 2018, NNSA completed the last production unit for the W76- 1 LEP, marking the completion of warhead production for the first LEP in which NNSA undertook full-scale design activities for weapon systems since 1982. Five other LEPs and stockpile modernization efforts were ongoing as of January 2019, as shown in table 1. As we concluded in an April 2017 report, this is a particularly challenging time for NNSA, as the agency plans to simultaneously execute LEPs and modernization efforts along with major construction projects, such as efforts to modernize NNSA’s uranium and plutonium manufacturing capabilities. NNSA’s Sites, Infrastructure, and Workforce Levels for Explosives Activities NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise consists of eight government-owned sites managed and operated by seven contractors. Five of these sites conduct explosives activities: Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pantex, and Nevada. In addition to these sites, NNSA relies on several third-party suppliers of explosive materials and related equipment. The largest of these is Holston, which is a government-owned, contractor-operated facility that primarily produces explosives for DOD. Holston is NNSA’s sole supplier of explosives used in main charges. The infrastructure that supports NNSA’s explosives activities consists of thousands of real property assets, which are to be tracked in FIMS. The database is managed for NNSA missions by its Office of Safety, Infrastructure and Operations. According to NNSA officials and DOE documents, FIMS helps managers understand the current state of NNSA infrastructure and inform infrastructure modernization funding decisions. We have previously reported on concerns about the accuracy of the FIMS database with respect to certain data fields that were not assessed as part of this review. DOE has taken sufficient steps to address recommendations we have previously made about FIMS. Workforce levels for explosives activities have generally increased in recent years, which contractor representatives attribute to the increase in workload because of LEP and modernization efforts. Table 2 shows NNSA contractor representatives’ estimates for actual full-time equivalents (FTE) and percentages of FTEs engaged in explosives activities at each of the five sites over the last 5 fiscal years. Selected Leading Practices in Federal Strategic Planning The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as amended (GPRA) requires, among other things, that federal agencies develop strategic plans. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to federal executive branch agencies on how to prepare their agency-wide strategic plans in accordance with GPRA requirements, as updated and expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. We have reported that these requirements also can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives. In addition, we have reported in the past on federal agencies’ strategic planning efforts and have identified additional useful practices to enhance agencies’ strategic plans. The leading practices in federal strategic planning that we selected are: (1) involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments, or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes, which helps ensure that their expectations and interests are met and that resources and efforts are targeted at the program’s highest priorities; (2) assessing external and internal forces, which helps managers anticipate future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems become crises; and (3) covering at least a 4-year period while making adjustments as needed to reflect the operating environment. Further, our past work has shown that effective strategic plans should include several specific elements. These elements include: (1) a comprehensive mission statement that explains why a program exists and what it does; (2) long-term goals and objectives that specify how an agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected from the program; (3) strategies to achieve the goals and objectives that are specific enough to allow an agency to assess whether the strategies will help achieve those goals; (4) a description of how performance measures will be used to assess progress toward long-term goals; and (5) the identification of external factors that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals. NNSA’s Sites Conduct a Range of Interdependent Explosives Design and Production Activities, and NNSA Has Adopted a Centralized Approach to Managing Them NNSA’s five sites involved in explosives conduct interdependent activities to design and produce explosives and about 100 different nuclear weapon components that contain explosive materials. Each of the sites assumes primary responsibility for certain explosives activities—such as Livermore conducts design, research, and development of new IHE main charge formulations; Pantex produces all main charges; Los Alamos conducts design and production of main charge detonators as well as explosives research and development; Sandia conducts design and production of nonnuclear explosive components; and Nevada conducts large experimental explosive shots to support design activities. However, most of these activities require the participation of multiple sites. The following examples illustrate some of the collaborative, interdependent activities that NNSA’s sites and their suppliers undertake to design and produce explosive components found in nuclear weapons. Main charge for the W80-4 LEP. Livermore manages design activities for the W80-4 LEP, including for its main charge. The main charge used in the W80-4 warhead will consist of newly synthesized TATB, formulated with a new binding ingredient, according to contractor representatives. As NNSA officials and contractor representatives explained during our site visits to Livermore and Pantex, Livermore scientists redeveloped the specific process for TATB synthesis and formulation that is being used in the W80-4 LEP, first in small test batches and then in larger amounts. Next, Livermore sent its specifications for synthesis and formulation to Holston, which has produced successively larger batches. As the design and cost study phase of the W80-4 LEP continues, Livermore and Pantex continue to receive and test these batches of formulated explosive and work with Holston to ensure that production lots meet NNSA specifications. In coordination with Livermore, Pantex will press and machine the finished main charges for the W80-4 when the LEP reaches the production phase. Pantex will receive formulated TATB from Holston and conduct its own tests to ensure the quality of the initial production lots and pressing, machining, and subassembly processes. Detonators. The design and production of main charge detonators involves several NNSA sites and their suppliers. According to contractor representatives, Livermore and Los Alamos share the responsibility for designing the main charge detonators, and Los Alamos will produce all the detonators. As part of production, Los Alamos reprocesses the PETN used in detonators from a stockpile of DOD-grade material purchased 30 years ago. Other detonator parts come from third-party suppliers and from NNSA’s Kansas City National Security Campus, another NNSA site that does not have a role in designing or producing explosives, according to contractor representatives. Los Alamos produces and tests completed detonators and then sends them to Pantex for weapon assembly, according to contractor representatives. Spin rocket motors. Sandia plays the primary role in designing spin rocket motors. Spin rocket motors use pyrotechnics and propellants and are a key component in the B61 and B83 bombs. Contractor representatives at Sandia said that they supply the explosives to third- party suppliers, who produce the motors. The completed spin rocket motors are sent to Sandia for inspection and testing, and after Sandia approves the components, they are shipped to Pantex for weapon assembly, according to contractor representatives. Component manufacturing research. In addition to designing and producing components for LEPs and modernization efforts, NNSA sites also collaborate on other explosives research and development programs, such as on component manufacturing processes. For example, Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia, and Pantex are collaborating on additive manufacturing processes for explosives. Additive manufacturing differs from traditional manufacturing in that it builds components by depositing material rather than by cutting material away during machining. This research effort seeks to introduce additive manufacturing into the explosives production process, producing explosive parts with highly complex geometries while meeting NNSA’s safety and performance requirements, according to a contractor representative. In May 2018, according to NNSA documentation, NNSA began implementing a new enterprise-wide approach to improve the management and coordination of explosives activities across its sites. In the past, each program that used explosives—such as an LEP or a research and development program—developed or procured them independently of other programs, without formal coordination to ensure each program’s awareness of other programs’ requirements or time frames. Under the new enterprise-wide approach, NNSA has taken several steps to centralize management at an enterprise level and to coordinate explosives activities across its sites. Specifically: In May 2018, NNSA established the Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager (enterprise manager) position to help coordinate NNSA’s explosives activities. The agency issued a May 2018 memorandum formally establishing the position, signed by the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. The memorandum specified that the enterprise manager should encourage collaboration among the sites and programs that conduct explosives activities. In September 2018, the enterprise manager established NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee (coordinating committee) to identify coordination challenges across the enterprise and emerging needs for critical explosive materials, among other purposes. The coordinating committee is composed of NNSA officials and contractor representatives from NNSA’s sites, is chaired by the enterprise manager, and is expected to meet at least once a year. According to NNSA documents, the coordinating committee met twice in 2018 and identified a number of future actions requiring input from the sites, such as defining future needs associated with the production of main charge explosive materials. In December 2018, NNSA issued the strategic plan for energetic materials. This strategic plan states that it will help NNSA organize its efforts to meet weapon delivery schedules for the overall energetics community. Prior to the strategic plan’s final issuance, the enterprise manager provided a draft to coordinating committee members to solicit their comments. However, more recent action taken by NNSA indicates that the enterprise approach to managing high explosives is continuing to evolve. First, according to NNSA officials, in 2019 NNSA is planning to reorganize the Office of Defense Programs—which is responsible for all stockpile activities. This reorganization could affect the approach to managing high explosives activities. Specifically, officials said part of this reorganization is the creation of a new organization for production activities, which is expected to divide production activities into several groups oriented around different weapons components. It is currently unclear under which production group explosives activities will fall because there are production activities associated with explosives for both nuclear and nonnuclear components, according to NNSA officials. Second, in December 2018, NNSA officials indicated that they are considering elevating high explosives to a “strategic material” and managing it more similarly to NNSA’s existing approach for managing other strategic materials, such as plutonium. NNSA’s strategic materials managers are overseen by a senior NNSA official and appointed to manage each material as a program, with a budget and dedicated staff, according to NNSA documentation. NNSA does not consider the high explosives enterprise manager to be managing a program; therefore, the enterprise manager does not have an explosives budget or dedicated staff, according to NNSA officials. NNSA officials said they anticipate issuing an analysis of alternatives study in spring 2019 that will contain a recommendation to the NNSA Administrator on how explosives activities should be managed going forward, which could reflect a shift toward managing high explosives as a strategic material. NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Management Challenges for Explosives-Related Activities and Have Taken Some Actions in Response, but Have Not Addressed Issues Affecting the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data NNSA officials and contractor representatives have identified a number of challenges related to NNSA’s supply of explosive materials, infrastructure, and staff recruitment and training. First, NNSA’s supply of certain highly specialized explosive materials is dwindling, and NNSA officials and contractor representatives stated that it is challenging to reproduce or procure these materials. Second, officials and contractor representatives identified infrastructure that is aging and deteriorating, inaccurate information on that infrastructure, and storage areas filled to near capacity as challenges. Finally, according to NNSA contractor representatives, there are difficulties in recruiting and training qualified staff. NNSA has taken some actions to address these challenges, such as starting to recreate “recipes” for specialized materials and modernize aging infrastructure, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. However, taking additional steps to improve the quality of information about its explosives infrastructure would give the agency more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions. NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Challenges in Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Specialized Explosive Materials and Have Taken Some Actions to Address Them NNSA’s Challenges Producing Fogbank The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has had challenges in the past producing materials other than explosives that are essential to the successful operation of nuclear weapons. In 2000, NNSA began a life extension program (LEP) to replace or modernize components for W76 warheads, which are delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missile systems. NNSA had to delay production of the refurbished warheads when it encountered problems in manufacturing an important material that NNSA refers to as “Fogbank.” In March 2009, we reported that NNSA had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s, and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency, leaving the production process for Fogbank dormant for about 25 years. As we reported, NNSA’s loss of the technical knowledge and expertise to manufacture Fogbank resulted in a 1-year delay in the W76-1 LEP and an unexpected cost increase of nearly $70 million. According to NNSA officials, production challenges with Fogbank have since been resolved, and the last production unit for the W76-1 LEP was completed in December 2018. NNSA’s supply of certain highly specialized explosive materials is dwindling. These materials have specific chemical and physical characteristics that fulfill precise performance requirements in nuclear weapons, such as detonation within nanoseconds, according to contractor representatives. One such material, titanium sub-hydride potassium perchlorate (THKP), is used in actuators to open valves, among other things, according to contractor representatives. TATB, the IHE molecule used in main charges, is another such material, according to contractor representatives. In some cases, contractor representatives said that only one container or production lot of specialized material was ever produced that met NNSA’s specifications. The inventories of these materials have dwindled as ongoing LEPs, modernization efforts, and research and development activities draw on them. For example, only a small container of THKP remains. Additional inventory will be required to meet the needs of four of the five ongoing LEPs and modernization efforts, as well as for any future needs, according to contractor representatives from Sandia. Similarly, although Pantex has a stockpile of legacy TATB for the B61-12 LEP, contractor representatives said that new material will be needed to meet the requirements of planned and future LEPs and modernization efforts. NNSA officials stated that reproducing and procuring these highly specialized materials presents challenges for the agency. According to NNSA documents and officials, lost recipes and a fragile supplier base contribute to these challenges (see sidebar). Lost Recipes Some specialized materials were created decades ago, and the knowledge base to successfully produce them is now gone. According to NNSA documents, technical knowledge of material production processes can be lost when long intervals occur between production orders. In some cases, processes were not well documented or were infrequently practiced and proven. Thus, NNSA sites must spend considerable effort to recreate the recipes and techniques for producing these materials. Sandia representatives explained that sometimes a single company or even an individual created these materials and has since ceased production or is now deceased. For example, THKP was produced exclusively for Sandia by DOE’s Mound Site near Dayton, Ohio, which closed in 1994. The THKP production process was designed by an individual at the Mound Site who is now deceased. In some cases, according to contractor representatives, a single container of explosives (or a single production lot) met anticipated future needs for quality and quantity when it was originally produced, so production was discontinued. Contractor representatives explained that replicating the material exactly is nearly impossible because of the large number of variables, such as the mixing speed and temperature, that must be controlled for, even if the ingredients are identical to those used many years ago, which is not often the case. To address the challenge of lost recipes, Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, and Pantex are all working to reproduce materials with performance and physical properties similar to those of legacy materials and prepare for their full-scale production. For example, Livermore scientists said they are conducting research to synthesize new TATB that is uniquely suited to NNSA’s needs. According to NNSA contractor representatives, the synthesis process will be refined until it can be replicated by Holston for the W80-4 LEP. Additionally, Los Alamos scientists are researching the formulation process with legacy TATB for the B61-12 main charges. The chemical formulation of binder material used in the past has slightly changed, affecting the structural strength of formulated TATB. Without the proper strength, this formulated explosive cannot be pressed effectively, according to contractor representatives. Sandia is also working to re-establish the THKP production process. NNSA is also working to address the challenge of lost recipes by developing a comprehensive master list for explosive materials. The list tracks information such as the suppliers involved and specific production challenges. According to NNSA and contractor officials, collecting and sharing such information across the sites related to explosive production processes, specifications, and performance will help prevent lost recipes in the future. Fragile Supplier Base Even if the sites can replicate lost recipes for explosive materials, NNSA’s supplier base for those materials is fragile. As previously reported and according to NNSA documentation, finding suppliers willing and able to provide required parts and materials can be difficult. Contractor representatives told us that this difficulty arises because of the small quantities of explosive parts and materials NNSA procures, the irregular nature of NNSA’s procurements, and the agency’s exacting performance requirements. For example, neutron generators contain explosive parts that Sandia orders irregularly, in batches numbering only in the hundreds. These parts have such exacting requirements for size and timing that they are hand-made under microscopes. Sandia contractor representatives explained that sometimes the laboratory’s part and material orders may represent only 1 to 3 percent of a company’s total production. To address this challenge, NNSA is working to purchase materials more consistently to ensure that companies can rely on NNSA as a steady customer and be comfortable working to meet NNSA’s exacting requirements. Contractor representatives said that ensuring consistency in production can help maintain the expertise needed to avoid having to reconstitute a specialized process, which can be costly. For example, the effort to restart TATB synthesis and formulation cost approximately $13 million and added 3-1/2 years to the original TATB production schedule, according to Los Alamos contractor representatives. Contractor representatives at Pantex and Los Alamos said that they plan to support continuous production of synthesized TATB and formulated explosives at Holston in the future to avoid delays in restarting production (see sidebar). A Fragile Supplier Base for Other Material The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has identified challenges with a fragile supplier base for other specialized materials that are used in explosives-related experiments and research. For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in New Mexico requires highly specialized test vessels to conduct essential nuclear weapons research. Specifically, Los Alamos’s Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) uses X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of mock nuclear materials that are imploded using explosives. The exploding components are contained in steel vessels. This facility is unique because it is the world’s most powerful X-ray machine for analysis of these implosions (called hydrodynamic tests). The vessels used at DARHT are made of specialized steel that does not need to be heat-treated during repairs, allowing the laboratory to easily repair them after explosive testing. There is currently a small supplier base (domestic and international) for manufacturing these vessels. Los Alamos contractor representatives are concerned with vendor availability, capability, and willingness to produce vessels because of the small number the laboratory has purchased in the past—they currently have seven operational vessels. Also, contractor representatives said they are concerned that the workforce which knows how to create this specialized steel is nearing retirement. To help ensure a continued future supply of the vessels, Los Alamos is working with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Nevada National Security Site, which use similar vessels, to develop a multi-year procurement plan to encourage suppliers to continue to produce the specialized steel used in their manufacture. NNSA supplier challenges are complicated further when a supplier is foreign or there is only one domestic supplier. According to NNSA documentation, using a foreign supplier may leave NNSA vulnerable to a potential national security risk. Even when the only supplier is domestic, single-point failure is a concern should that supplier delay or cease production, according to contractor representatives. NNSA officials provided an example involving Holston, NNSA’s sole supplier of TATB. According to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, Holston also serves DOD customers that order far larger quantities of explosives, and Holston is required to prioritize those customers’ orders using DOD procurement priority ratings, which may mean that NNSA orders are delayed. For example, Livermore placed an order for the W80-4 main charge explosives at Holston that was to be fulfilled by March 2019, but that order was delayed while the plant worked to finish a DOD order with a higher-priority rating. In addition to this delay, Livermore’s order will be further delayed because Holston had an explosive incident in January 2019 and ceased operations for 3 weeks, according to Livermore and DOD contractor representatives. As a result of both these delays, the W80-4 LEP will have to postpone a hydrodynamic test and other studies, complicating an already tight design and development schedule. This will delay the W80-4 LEP at least 2 months, according to Livermore officials. To minimize the potential for future production delays at Holston, NNSA is working to elevate the priority of all its orders for explosives. Some DOD nuclear weapon delivery platforms have the highest-priority DOD rating, and NNSA officials said they have received permission from DOD to apply this rating to the DOE explosives orders for the nuclear warheads associated with those delivery platforms, including explosive orders for the B61-12 LEP. NNSA officials said they cannot currently use the highest-priority rating for orders associated with the W80-4 LEP because the delivery platform for that LEP does not have the highest-priority rating. NNSA officials are working with DOD and DOE attorneys to obtain permission for using DOD’s highest-priority rating. A contractor representative at Livermore said that in addition to NNSA’s efforts, the Air Force is working separately to obtain permission to use the highest- priority rating for this delivery platform. If the Air Force is successful, NNSA could use that delivery platform’s new high-priority rating for its W80-4 LEP orders. The Livermore contractor representative said that they believe the Air Force will receive permission to use the highest- priority rating before NNSA does. In situations where a supplier cannot or will not produce a specialized material or related component, NNSA is exploring options for producing those materials or components itself. NNSA officials said that they are conducting an analysis of alternatives to meet synthesis, formulation, and production requirements to be completed by the spring of 2019. The analysis will include an option for in-house production of TATB at Pantex. NNSA documentation indicates that Pantex could independently produce the TATB needed for current and future LEPs and modernization efforts with a substantial investment, exact figures for which may be reported upon completion of the analysis of alternatives. Similarly, contractor representatives from Sandia said that in the absence of qualified suppliers, they are working to produce explosive materials, such as THKP as discussed above. NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified Infrastructure and Workforce Challenges and Are Taking Actions to Address Them, but NNSA Has Not Fully Addressed the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data NNSA has also identified challenges with its explosives infrastructure, infrastructure data, and workforce. Specifically, NNSA’s infrastructure is aging and deteriorating, some infrastructure data are inaccurate, and some storage areas are near capacity. In addition, recruiting and training qualified staff have presented a challenge to NNSA. As we have previously reported, these challenges are shared across the nuclear security enterprise and are not confined to explosives activities. NNSA is taking several actions to address these challenges, as described below, but data inaccuracies remain related to NNSA’s explosives-related assets. Infrastructure Is Aging and Deteriorating According to NNSA documentation, no mission risk is greater than the state of the agency’s aging infrastructure. The NNSA 2019 Master Asset Plan states that 40 percent of the explosives infrastructure of NNSA’s sites is insufficient to meet mission needs, which can lead to contamination of explosive products or limit the use of facilities. Contractor representatives told us that such contamination has occurred. For example, Pantex contractor representatives said that batches of explosives have been contaminated in its main formulation building by rust falling from the rafters and grass blowing through cracks in the walls. Similarly, Los Alamos contractor representatives said that detonator subassemblies have been rejected at the laboratory because of contamination from foreign debris, such as dust particles that enter through cracks in exterior doors. In addition, older facilities were not built to modern safety standards and pose risks to explosives activities and employees, according to contractor representatives and NNSA documents. At Los Alamos, the design of several older facilities is insufficient to meet current needs, which negatively affects both productivity and safety. For example, the Los Alamos’s High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory is a 1950s era building that is difficult to adapt to modern instrumentation, and electrical and other system failures cause approximately 20 percent downtime, according to contractor representatives. This building is also under a state of continuous limited operation because the laboratory must work under a decreased net explosive limit to keep employees safe while handling explosive materials because the facility lacks adequate blowout walls, according to contractor representatives. Contractor representatives at Los Alamos said that the decreased explosive limits in this facility have hampered their productivity levels. Contractor representatives at Pantex stated that the intrusion of water in key facilities poses electrocution risks, can damage expensive equipment, and can affect production because of downtime when explosives activities must be suspended because of severe weather. Further, we observed facilities at Pantex with water leaks in the roof and floor; some of these facilities house expensive equipment that must be stored under plastic sheeting to prevent water damage. One such facility is Pantex’s Analytics and Chemistry Laboratory, built in 1943 and shown in figures 4 and 5. NNSA and its sites have taken some actions to address this infrastructure challenge. For example, Los Alamos plans to replace its High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory by 2026, and Pantex recently constructed a new building to replace an aging pressing facility and has plans to begin construction on a new analytical laboratory and a formulation building in the 2020s. NNSA documentation states that the new pressing facility will improve operational safety and security thereby enhancing the quality and efficiency of operations. Pantex’s planned analytical laboratory and formulation buildings, however, will not be completed in time to support the currently scheduled B61-12 LEP and W88 alteration modernization effort. Further, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, site infrastructure modernization plans are budget dependent and funding for infrastructure modernization efforts is not always certain. Some Infrastructure Data on Explosives-Related Assets Are Inaccurate Contractor representatives told us and we observed during site visits that some of the data on explosives-related assets in the FIMS real property database were inaccurate and out of date. NNSA policy and the FIMS user’s guide state that NNSA and sites should review and update the capabilities, or programmatic mission(s) associated with each asset, such as being explosives-related, every 5 years, or more frequently if mission requirements change or there are changes in an asset’s physical condition or use. However, 8 of the 22 randomly selected assets from the four sites that we observed contained data in FIMS that were inaccurate because either the information on an asset was out of date or the asset should never have been listed as explosives-related. Some contractor representatives told us that they did not understand why some of their sites’ assets had been characterized as primary assets related to the high explosives mission. For example, an inert storage closet at Pantex and a tool shed at Livermore were labeled as primary explosives-related assets, but according to contractor representatives, they can no longer be used to store explosives because they do not meet appropriate safety standards. Figure 6 illustrates the inert storage at Pantex, which officials said had not been used for any explosives operations for at least 20 years, despite “explosives storage” labeling on the door, but was still characterized as a primary explosives-related asset. However, according to NNSA officials, NNSA was, at the time of our review, in the process of revising guidance on how to associate capabilities with assets. The contractor representatives may not have been aware of the initial guidance the asset was characterized under or of the change underway at the time of our site visit. In other cases, contractor representatives told us that the asset name did not indicate its current use. For example, FIMS data on explosives-related assets at Los Alamos has a “plastics building” that had not been used for manufacturing and assembling plastics for 20 years. Although it currently houses explosives-related work, the building’s name in FIMS had not been updated. Additionally, Los Alamos’s FIMS data indicated that the site had a “day room” that to contractor representatives’ knowledge had never been used for any explosives activities although its purpose has changed over time. We found additional inaccuracies related to various measures of explosives-related assets reported in FIMS. For example, we found at least 94 erroneous entries on the gross square footage of the 1,266 assets identified as having some type of explosives-related capability. For example, FIMS data indicated that a road at Livermore, a bunker at Sandia, and an asset named “recreational/fitness” at Pantex were 3, 1, and 2 gross square feet, respectively. The data listed replacement values of at least $1 million for each of these assets. Los Alamos’s data contained similar errors, such as electrical cables recorded as measuring zero square feet. NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified potential causes for inaccuracies in the FIMS data. For example, contractor representatives who work on explosives activities do not enter explosives- related asset information in FIMS, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. Instead, FIMS administrators, who manage information on infrastructure across NNSA sites, said they update FIMS using information that subject matter experts or building managers provide to them, typically in an annual data call. FIMS administrators may therefore not be aware of information that is dated or otherwise incorrect for explosives-related assets. In addition, entering information in certain data fields in FIMS was difficult for assets that were not buildings, according to one FIMS administrator. For example, piping and other utilities may be replaced or updated in sections over time, and it can be difficult to know which date to record for age in FIMS. Because our review included only a limited sample of explosives-related assets, we could not determine the full extent of the FIMS data inaccuracies. NNSA managers use data from FIMS for planning purposes on infrastructure modernization decisions. According to NNSA officials, data from FIMS feeds into other databases that are used to inform infrastructure funding decisions, such as developing the Integrated Priority List that helps NNSA determine the most critical infrastructure modernization projects. While NNSA relies on these data to make planning and funding decisions, our observations of explosives-related assets shows that these data may not be useful in informing the agencies’ infrastructure modernization decisions. Federal internal control standards state that managers should make decisions using quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. By taking steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data— such as by reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with their primary and secondary programmatic missions, ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide, and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for assets that are not buildings— NNSA would have more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions on explosives-related activities. Storage Areas for Explosives Are Filled to or Near Capacity DOE’s requirements for explosives storage limit the amount and type of explosives that can be stored in a single location, since certain explosives may react when stored together. Explosives must be properly stored throughout their life cycles, from the synthesis of raw explosives to their use in weapon assembly or testing. According to a senior NNSA official and site contractor representatives, some sites are running out of space where they can safely store explosives. As contractor representatives from Pantex told us and we observed on our site visit, bunkers for storing explosives are filled to or near capacity, especially for storage in high- security areas. According to contractor representatives, this is problematic because Pantex has the greatest need of all NNSA sites for explosives storage because of its role in producing explosives, receiving and holding explosive parts from across the nuclear security enterprise prior to weapon assembly, and assembling and disassembling weapons. Contractor representatives from Los Alamos also voiced concern about being near their capacity to store detonator cable assemblies and other explosives awaiting shipment for installation in weapons or for testing. NNSA officials and contractor representatives said that they are tracking the shortage of sufficient explosives storage and in some cases have plans to expand current capacity. Los Alamos contractor representatives also said that they are moving forward with constructing a small staging facility that will be collocated with their detonator production facility. It is expected to cost less than $5 million so it will not affect larger line item infrastructure projects. Contractor representatives at Pantex explained that although some storage areas have been identified for replacement, they are, as yet, unfunded projects. In the near term, contractor representatives said that they have other, more pressing infrastructure modernization project needs than explosives storage. They said that they are closely monitoring their storage capacity and expect ongoing modernization efforts to free up some storage space as weapons are assembled. Difficulties in Contractors Recruiting and Training Skilled Staff According to NNSA documents and contractor representatives, the contractor workforce at NNSA sites needs to grow to meet the demands of ongoing and future explosives work, but contractors face difficulty recruiting and training qualified new staff to perform this specialized work, which often requires a security clearance. In 2018, Pantex estimated that it needed 211 FTE contractor staff to adequately carry out the site’s explosives activities. However, Pantex contractor representatives indicated that as of November 2018, they had 172 FTEs on board. A major recruitment challenge is competition from industry. Contractor representatives at multiple sites told us that they often compete with large corporations and industries in the local area that offer well-paying jobs for qualified new staff, such as for engineers. For example, site contractor representatives told us that Los Alamos and Sandia compete with Facebook in Albuquerque to attract qualified staff; and Pantex competes with various oil and gas companies in Texas. To address this challenge, contractor representatives from Pantex have recently expanded outreach to local colleges and universities, and NNSA has held job fairs to attract new staff. Lengthy training and clearance processes that are required for specialized explosives work present another challenge. Pantex representatives said recent graduates are required to undergo on-the-job training that can take years before they are ready to safely engage in certain explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor representatives said that this training challenge is exacerbated by the delays in processing security clearances. NNSA contractor representatives said that some new hires have waited more than a year, and some more than 2 years, to receive clearances to conduct required work or training. In December 2017, we identified delays in obtaining personnel security clearances as a government-wide risk. We also added this issue to our March 2019 High-Risk List. To mitigate this challenge, contractor representatives from Pantex said that they are hiring students before they finish college so that security clearances can be granted by the time students are ready to begin their first day on the job or at least closer to that time. Los Alamos has decided to hire and train individuals without clearances, who must wear red vests and be escorted at all times while their clearances are finalized. We observed numerous workers in this temporary and escorted status during our site visit. Contractor representatives at Livermore said that they also use escorts for new staff without clearances. However, contractor representatives said that requiring additional staff as escorts is costly, can decrease productivity, and has safety impacts because additional staff must be present during activities involving high explosives. NNSA’s Strategic Plan for Explosives Does Not Describe Some Management Challenges and Is Not Fully Consistent with Leading Practices for Strategic Planning NNSA’s 2018 strategic plan for energetic materials describes some identified explosives-related challenges discussed above, as well as further actions to address these challenges, but does not describe other challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified. This strategic plan incorporates some leading practices for strategic planning. However, some of the strategic plan’s elements have not been fully developed consistent with selected leading practices for strategic planning. NNSA’s Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials Describes Some Challenges NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified but Not Others The strategic plan for energetic materials, which includes comments from coordinating committee members, describes some of the challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified in conducting explosives activities, which we discussed above. Specifically, it describes some challenges related to the supply of explosive materials and to infrastructure modernization, including the following: Supply of explosive materials. The strategic plan describes both the supply of explosive materials as well as the supply of pre-cursor ingredients as a challenge facing NNSA. The strategic plan also identifies a number of actions NNSA is taking to bolster the supply chain, such as re-establishing the capability to manufacture THKP. Infrastructure modernization. The strategic plan notes that explosives-related “facilities require recapitalization to support LEP activities, improve efficiencies, reduce downtime, and maintain baseline capabilities.” It also identifies several interrelated actions NNSA is taking to address infrastructure challenges, such as re- purposing some facilities and eliminating others that are inadequate, too costly to maintain, or no longer needed. In addition, the strategic plan describes the challenge of adequate storage for explosives and includes actions to annually monitor and track storage conditions at the sites as well as provide long-term, low-temperature, moisture-free storage for explosives. However, based on our review of the strategic plan, it does not discuss three of the challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives had identified: the quality of data on infrastructure information, workforce levels, and safety. First, the data quality challenge related to infrastructure information, such as inaccuracies in FIMS, is not discussed in the strategic plan, although NNSA officials and contractor representatives we interviewed identified it as a challenge that may affect its planning and decision-making related to explosives activities. Second, the strategic plan does not discuss workforce challenges. While the strategic plan states that NNSA “recognize(s) that staffing is an important aspect for supporting energetics, it assumes that ongoing efforts across the nuclear security enterprise related to workforce are successful.” Since the enterprise manager does not track workforce levels across the enterprise, as previously noted, it is unclear how NNSA can determine if its contractors’ workforce efforts across the enterprise are successful and whether levels are adequate to achieve the goals of the strategic plan for explosives over time. Third, outside of infrastructure improvement, the strategic plan also does not directly discuss the challenge of safety, although it affects all explosives activities and challenges that NNSA has identified. Because of the inherent danger of explosives activities, safety is important, and even when protocols are followed, unintended events can occur that affect human safety—as illustrated by a safety incident last year. The incident occurred at a Los Alamos facility in April 2018 when a small explosive pellet deflagrated during pressing, causing two people to incur short-term hearing loss. One of those people was an escort and was only required to be present because of the delay in security clearance processing, a challenge discussed above. According to a December 2018 Los Alamos document, pressing operations had resumed at the facility. Although the cause of the incident is still unclear, it provided an opportunity to make safety improvements in the facility at Los Alamos, according to contractor representatives. According to a Los Alamos document about the incident, a key lesson learned was that safety records like maintenance logs, blast calculations, and materials safety testing results need to be archived and readily accessible to staff before the start of any work activities. The inherent challenge of safety in explosives and key lessons learned, such as this one, are not discussed in the strategic plan. NNSA officials said that they are planning to revise the strategic plan for energetic materials in 2020 but did not state that they would include the challenges of data quality, workforce, or safety. All three of these challenges may impede NNSA’s ability to achieve the goals described in the plan for explosives activities. We have previously identified selected leading practices in strategic planning. These practices specify that agencies should define strategies that address management challenges that threaten an agency’s ability to meet its long-term strategic goals. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing the data, workforce, and safety challenges it faces and the actions it plans to address them, as appropriate, or documenting the rationale for why the challenges were not included, NNSA would have better assurance that its strategies address these challenges. NNSA Followed Leading Practices for Strategic Planning, but Some Elements Present in Effective Strategic Plans Have Not Been Fully Developed In developing its strategic plan for energetic materials, NNSA followed several key leading practices in strategic planning that we have identified in our past work, including the following: Involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments, or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes helps ensure that their expectations and interests are met and that resources and efforts are targeted at the program’s highest priorities. When developing the strategic plan, NNSA shared a draft with members of the coordinating committee and incorporated their comments to ensure that their interests and expectations were met. Assessing external and internal forces helps managers anticipate future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems become crises. For example, external forces (e.g., emerging technological trends and new statutory requirements) and internal forces (e.g., culture, management practices, and business processes) may influence the program’s ability to achieve its goals. When developing the strategic plan, NNSA officials and coordinating committee members considered external and internal forces. For example, the officials and members discussed the availability of explosives from external suppliers, such as Holston, compared to the potential costs or challenges related to internal NNSA production of explosives. Covering at least a 4-year period, while making adjustments as needed to reflect significant changes to the operating environment, is also a key strategic planning practice. The strategic plan covers more than 4 years of explosives activities. For example, there is a performance goal to re-establish a reliable THKP supply by 2024. In addition, NNSA officials have discussed their intention to update the plan as their operating environment changes. Our past work has also shown that effective strategic plans should include specific elements. We reviewed NNSA’s Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials and found that the strategic plan includes most of these elements, but we also found that some of the strategic plan’s elements have not been fully developed. Specifically: Mission statement. According to leading federal strategic planning practices, a comprehensive mission statement should explain why a program exists and what it does. The strategic plan does not clearly identify a mission statement but includes an overarching “strategy to ensure the availability of energetic materials and products for the stockpile.” When asked to identify the energetics mission statement, the two contractor representatives who led the development of the strategic plan told us that they consider this “strategy” to be the energetics mission. However, a strategy cannot be a mission, since a strategy is how a mission may be achieved. Long-term strategic goals and objectives, strategies, and performance goals. There are several interrelated elements on long- term strategic goals, objectives, strategies, and performance goals, according to leading strategic planning practices. These include that long-term strategic goals and objectives should specify how an agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected from the program. The strategic plan includes four long-term strategic goals for meeting its mission, some strategies for achieving its goals, and some performance goals to assess progress related to ensuring the availability of explosives. They are also logically linked to each other. For example, the strategic plan’s goal to sustain and modernize the energetics infrastructure relates to the strategic plan’s strategy to eliminate facilities that are inadequate, too costly to maintain, or no longer needed. However, we found that responsibilities for achieving the strategic plan’s four goals are not clearly assigned within NNSA, and the four goals are not consistently quantifiable. For example, the third goal is to “manage the energetics supply chain,” but the strategic plan does not specify who is responsible for achieving this goal within NNSA. Further, this long-term strategic goal is not quantifiable because it describes a general process and does not define the expected results, which may make it difficult for NNSA to assess progress in meeting the goal. According to leading strategic planning practices, strategies should be specific enough to allow an assessment of whether they will help achieve those goals, such as by describing the resources needed, including the staff responsible to achieve a program’s goals and objectives. We found that the strategic plan contains several strategies for achieving goals, but some of them are not specific enough to clearly identify the types of resources required, such as the parties responsible for achieving them. For example, under the goal of managing the energetics supply chain, there is a strategy to “plan, track and assess the energetics strategic posture,” but the strategic plan does not specify what is meant by the energetics strategic posture or who is responsible for undertaking these actions. This strategy is also limited because it does not describe the resources needed to achieve the broader goal. According to leading strategic planning practices, performance goals should be used to assess progress toward long-term goals and should include (1) the specific activities within the program that will be assessed for performance and (2) the level of performance to be achieved for each measure. We found that the strategic plan has 50 performance goals, most of which were quantifiable—or able to be assessed for performance or progress. However, some were not quantifiable, such as to “enhance or advance energetics formulations for additive manufacturing.” This performance goal also does not set milestones, such as a time frame for completion, or staff assigned to achieve it, contrary to leading strategic planning practices. Further, the level of performance for some goals was not fully developed. For example, the performance goal “to reduce substandard mission- critical facilities below 10 percent” does not clarify whether the goal is to reduce the current number of inadequate and substandard facilities by 10 percent (a change of about 50 facilities) or reduce the total number of inadequate and substandard facilities to be less than 10 percent of all facilities (a change of about 500 facilities). This performance goal also does not set time frames for measuring performance or list responsible parties associated with it. Another performance goal that was not fully developed is to “manage the energetics supply chain,” which falls under the long-term strategic goal of “sustaining and modernizing the infrastructure.” In addition, this performance goal is identical to a long-term strategic goal in the strategic plan titled “manage the energetics supply chain.” A performance goal should not replicate a strategic goal, since long- term strategic goals are broader in nature than performance goals. Moreover, this particular performance goal is not quantifiable, does not set a time frame for completion, and does not list a responsible party to carry out specific activities to achieve the goal. External factors. According to leading strategic planning practices, external factors that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals, such as economic trends or actions by Congress, state and federal agencies, or other entities, should be identified. The strategic plan identifies some external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals. Specifically, the strategic plan notes that DOD’s demand for explosives from Holston could affect NNSA’s ability to achieve its goals. According to NNSA officials and documents, DOD’s demand for explosives is increasing, and Holston is already struggling to meet DOD’s needs. According to Holston contractor representatives, DOD is expanding Holston’s production capabilities for HMX, research development explosive (RDX), and insensitive munitions explosive (IMX) which when completed will relieve pressure on TATB production. In addition, the strategic plan identifies challenges to its supplier base, such as the difficulty of sourcing explosive materials from non-U.S. suppliers and that the small size of NNSA’s orders provides limited economic incentive for commercial vendors. However, the strategic plan does not identify other external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals, such as actions taken or not taken by Congress. Specifically, modernizing the explosives infrastructure will require appropriations for the significant capital investment needed, but the uncertainty of future appropriations in a challenging fiscal environment is an external factor not identified in the strategic plan. In addition, the strategic plan does not acknowledge that other NNSA programs may compete for funds or affect infrastructure modernization priorities at a given site. NNSA officials, including the enterprise manager, stated that they are aware that the strategic plan for energetic materials has limitations, such as performance goals that are not specific or are difficult to quantify. NNSA officials said that they released the strategic plan quickly as it was the first of its kind for explosives activities, and they believed the explosives community would receive the most benefit it if it was published as soon as possible, though it was not fully complete. Further, they said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in the next year or so. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, including fully developed elements of an effective plan—such as a clear mission statement and quantifiable performance goals that set time frames for completion and list responsible parties who will carry out specific activities for all strategic goals—would help NNSA make the strategic plan useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability. Conclusions NNSA is undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons, and explosives are essential to the functioning of these weapons. Five NNSA sites conduct a range of interdependent activities to design and produce explosives. NNSA has identified several challenges in carrying out these activities and is taking actions to address them. For example, NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified challenges related to producing highly specialized materials and are working to re-establish their supply. However, NNSA managers may be relying on inaccurate FIMS data on infrastructure related to explosives activities to make modernization decisions, because we found a number of inaccuracies in FIMS data on explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified a few potential causes for these inaccuracies; however, because our review included only a limited sample of explosives-related assets, we could not determine the full extent of the FIMS data inaccuracies. According to NNSA officials, NNSA has taken some initial steps to revise guidance, which we find encouraging as these revisions may help improve accuracy of FIMS data. By taking additional steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data—such as reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with their primary and secondary programmatic missions, ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide, and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for assets that are not buildings—NNSA would have more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions on explosives-related activities. In addition, the strategic plan for energetic materials—which represents a positive step toward managing explosives in a forward-looking, enterprise-wide approach—does not discuss three of the significant challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified related to explosives activities. NNSA officials said that they are planning to revise the strategic plan in 2020 but did not state that they would incorporate data quality, workforce, or safety challenges. As the agency revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing these challenges and actions planned to address them, as appropriate, or documenting the rationale for why the challenges were not included, NNSA would have better assurance that it is effectively managing challenges that present risks to achieving its objectives. The strategic plan for energetic materials also does not contain fully developed elements that we have previously reported that effective strategic plans should include, such as a fully developed mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities. NNSA officials said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in 2020. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by including fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan—such as a fully developed and clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, have time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals— NNSA would help make the strategic plan more useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making the following three recommendations to NNSA: NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA’s infrastructure supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with primary and secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1) NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2) NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for review and comment. In its written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix I, NNSA concurred with the report’s recommendations and described actions that it intends to take in response to our recommendations. NNSA also provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated in our report as appropriate. DOE did not comment on our findings and recommendations. In response to our first recommendation, NNSA stated that it recognizes the need to improve infrastructure data consistency and accuracy and intends to complete several actions by March 31, 2020 to improve its infrastructure data. For example, DOE’s Infrastructure Executive Committee is conducting a comprehensive review of the existing 178 data elements in FIMS and has proposed deleting or adjusting 66, which it believes will sharpen its focus on data quality for the remaining data elements. In addition, among other actions, NNSA stated it is implementing the Mission Dependency Index 2.0 initiative, which is expected to provide greater consistency and accuracy on reporting asset capability and determining consequence to mission. In response to our second and third recommendations, NNSA stated that it is planning to revise its Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials by October 31, 2019. NNSA stated that the update to its plan will include a discussion of the identified challenges to explosives activities as well as fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or at bawdena@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), Eric Bachhuber (Analyst in Charge), Natalie Block, Scott Fletcher, Ellen Fried, Rob Grace, and Dennis Mayo made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Cindy Gilbert, Penney Harwell Caramia, Dan C. Royer, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Khristi Wilkins.