Background NVRA Overview In passing the NVRA in 1993, Congress found that unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in federal elections. The NVRA was intended, in part, to establish procedures to increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in federal elections, as well as to protect the integrity of the electoral process and ensure accurate and current voter registration rolls. As such, the NVRA includes provisions focusing on both increasing opportunities for voter registration and improving voter registration list maintenance. Table 1 below includes a summary of these provisions. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which amended the NVRA, requires states to implement an interactive computerized statewide voter registration list and perform regular list maintenance. HAVA requires states to perform regular list maintenance by comparing their voter registration lists against state records on felons and deaths. HAVA also established the Election Assistance Commission to assist the states regarding HAVA compliance and to serve as a national clearinghouse of election administration information, among other purposes. DOJ Role in NVRA and Election Fraud Enforcement In the United States, the authority to regulate elections is shared by federal, state, and local officials. DOJ is responsible for (1) civil investigations and enforcement under federal voting rights laws, such as the NVRA, and (2) criminal investigations and prosecutions under federal election crime statutes, such as those prohibiting double voting or voting by noncitizens. With regard to enforcement of NVRA provisions: the Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section (Voting Section), within DOJ, enforces the civil provisions of federal laws that protect the right to vote, including provisions of the NVRA, as well as HAVA, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, among others. In addition to DOJ’s role in enforcing the NVRA, the law also allows a private party (a person or organization) who is aggrieved by a violation of the NVRA to bring a civil action against the state or local agency responsible for voter registration. With regard to enforcement of federal election crime statutes: the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section supervises DOJ’s nationwide response to election crimes, such as voter fraud and campaign finance offenses, and reviews all major investigations and criminal charges proposed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices relating to election crime. Public Integrity Section attorneys investigate and prosecute selected cases involving alleged corruption (including election crimes) by federal, state, or local government officials. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices investigate and prosecute a wide range of criminal activities, including federal election fraud, within their respective federal judicial districts. Each U.S. Attorney exercises wide discretion in the use of his or her resources to further the priorities of the local jurisdictions and needs of their communities. DOJ’s civil and criminal enforcement actions are recorded in case management systems which differentiate between matters and cases. A matter is defined as an activity, such as an investigation of an allegation, that has not yet resulted in the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information in court. A matter may eventually become a case, or may be closed without further action. A case is defined as an activity that has resulted in the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information in court. Cases typically start as matters. The process for initiating matters and filing cases varies across the three DOJ components we reviewed. For example, within the Criminal Division, staff are to open a matter when they have worked on an investigation for a minimum of 30 minutes. State and Local List Maintenance Roles and Responsibilities Under the NVRA States are responsible for the administration of state and federal elections, and states regulate various aspects of elections including, for example, registration procedures, absentee and early voting requirements, and Election Day procedures. Within each state, responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections is largely a local process, residing with about 10,500 local election jurisdictions nationwide. Under the NVRA and HAVA, states are required to have a voter registration list maintenance program, and state and local election jurisdictions are responsible for ensuring that the registration lists are accurate, and that ineligible voters are lawfully removed. The NVRA specifies certain categories under which jurisdictions may remove registrants from voter registration lists, including: if a registrant has moved outside of a jurisdiction and either (1) confirmed the move in writing or (2) failed to respond to address confirmation mailings and failed to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing; death of the registrant; criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided for in state law; and mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided for in state law. State and local election officials can only remove registrants from the voter registration list after meeting certain requirements outlined in the act. Specifically, the NVRA stipulates that list maintenance activities must be uniform, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act; and that programs to systematically remove ineligible voters must not be undertaken within 90 days of a federal election, except under certain circumstances. As noted above, election officials may remove a registrant from the voter registration list for change of residence if the registrant confirms the move in writing, or fails to respond to an address confirmation notice and fails to vote in two subsequent federal general elections following the mailing of the address confirmation notice. While state procedures differ, states generally designate registrants who are sent an address confirmation notice or fail to respond to the address confirmation notice in a timely manner as “inactive.” The “inactive” status generally indicates that the election officials may need to receive information from the registrant or other sources to confirm the registrant’s address. See figure 1 for an illustration of the NVRA confirmation and removal process for registrants who may have moved outside of the jurisdiction. States and local jurisdictions use different data sources and different processes and procedures to obtain information under the NVRA removal categories and to maintain accurate voter registration lists. For example, election offices in some states collaborate with their state’s motor vehicles agencies—such as a Department of Motor Vehicles—to acquire information on changes to registrants’ addresses or other identifying information. Some states also participate in interstate exchanges—such as the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) and Crosscheck—to compare information from their voter registration lists and other state and local sources. States may also use national databases— such as the U.S. Postal Service’s NCOA database or the Social Security Administration’s public DMF—to identify registrants who have moved to another jurisdiction or state, or who have died. Multiple factors such as state laws, costs, the security of voter registration information, and related privacy considerations play a role in election officials’ list maintenance activities and procedures. In some states, the state maintains the responsibility for matching some data sources (such as data on deaths and moves) against the voter registration list and removing certain ineligible voters; whereas in other states, local jurisdictions have a larger role in the list maintenance process. DOJ Engaged in Various Efforts to Enforce the NVRA and Address Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017 DOJ’s Voting Section Initiated Matters, Participated in Cases, and Engaged in Other Efforts to Enforce the NVRA’s Registration Opportunity and List Maintenance Requirements Within DOJ, the Voting Section has the authority to initiate a matter or pursue a case under the NVRA, among the other voting laws for which it is responsible. According to Section officials, the Section identifies potential NVRA violations through several means, including reviewing publically available federal elections and other data, reviewing publically available federal and third party reports, receiving complaints, and conducting compliance investigations that may include visits to state and local offices. Officials stated that after initiating and conducting an investigation (or matter), the Section makes a recommendation to the head of the Civil Rights Division who then decides which action to take, such as pursuing litigation by filing a case against a state or local election jurisdiction. The Voting Section categorizes its NVRA-related matters and cases as related to providing registration opportunities for voters (registration opportunities), or related to the rules regarding maintenance of voter registration lists under specified conditions, which includes both wrongful removals of eligible voters and failure to remove ineligible voters (list maintenance). In addition to enforcing the NVRA through initiating matters and filing cases, the Voting Section participated in NVRA cases as an amicus curiae or “friend of the court,” entered into settlement agreements with states to address issues related to NVRA provisions, and engaged in other efforts to assess compliance with NVRA requirements. More NVRA Registration Opportunity Matters than List Maintenance Matters Initiated According to Civil Rights Division data we analyzed, the Voting Section initiated 1,295 matters from fiscal years 2001 through 2017 to investigate issues related to provisions of statutes such as the NVRA, HAVA, and the Voting Rights Act. Of these 1,295 matters, 99 involved allegations under the NVRA. As shown in figure 2, the Section initiated the largest number of NVRA matters during this period in fiscal years 2008 (15) and 2011 (25). In initiating matters under the NVRA, the Voting Section investigated issues related to state and local jurisdiction efforts to provide registration opportunities for voters and issues related to list maintenance. Specifically, of the 99 NVRA matters the Voting Section initiated, 58 matters involved registration opportunity issues, 17 involved list maintenance issues, and 5 involved both registration opportunity and list maintenance issues. As shown in figure 3, the Section initiated registration opportunity matters in each year except fiscal year 2007. The Section initiated the most registration opportunity matters in fiscal years 2008 (13), 2011 (10), and 2013 (7). The Section did not initiate any list maintenance matters in some years, and initiated between one and four in other years. From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Voting Section participated in 234 cases, including those with claims brought under statutes such as the NVRA, HAVA, and the Voting Rights Act. Of the 234 total cases, 23 involved claims brought under the NVRA. Figure 4 shows the total number of cases, and the number of NVRA related cases, in which the Section participated, by fiscal year. In contrast to matters, the Voting Section filed more cases related to list maintenance allegations under the NVRA than cases related to registration opportunities. Of the 23 cases where the Section took action to enforce the NVRA, the Section was the plaintiff or plaintiff intervenor in 14 cases. As shown in figure 5, eight of the 14 NVRA cases the Section filed as the plaintiff or plaintiff intervenor involved allegations under the law’s list maintenance provisions, and two involved allegations under both the list maintenance and registration opportunity provisions. The remaining four cases involved allegations under the law’s registration opportunity provisions. Of the 10 total cases involving list maintenance allegations, eight were filed between fiscal years 2002 and 2007. See appendix II for a summary of each NVRA related case the Section filed from fiscal years 2001 through 2017. With regard to list maintenance cases, as shown in figure 5, the Voting Section filed 10 such cases from fiscal years 2001 through 2017. NVRA list maintenance cases may involve two types of allegations: (1) in conducting a required program to remove ineligible voters from the voter registration list, a state or local jurisdiction did not incorporate certain safeguards, thus unlawfully removing eligible voters; and (2) a state or local jurisdiction did not have an adequate program to remove ineligible voters from the voter registration list. We reviewed the allegations in each of the 10 cases involving NVRA list maintenance claims and found that: Four of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017) involved claims that the state or local jurisdiction unlawfully removed voters from registration lists. For example, in one case the Section alleged that the state systematically removed voters from its voter registration rolls within 90 days of a federal election, in violation of the NVRA, among other claims. Four of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007) involved claims that the state or local jurisdiction did not have an adequate program to remove ineligible voters from registration lists. For example, in one case the Section alleged that a state failed to conduct a program that makes a reasonable effort to identify and remove ineligible voters from the state’s registration list, and that, as a result, the state had counties with excessively high registration totals compared to the voting age population. Two of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2004 and 2006) involved both types of claims. For example, in one case the Section alleged that a number of local jurisdictions in one state did not regularly remove persons who died from their voter registration lists, resulting in ineligible voters remaining on the lists. The Section further alleged that local jurisdictions in the state did not always follow NVRA notice and timing requirements with respect to voters who may have moved, resulting in the unlawful removal of voters from voter registration lists. With regard to registration opportunities, the Voting Section filed six cases involving allegations under the NVRA’s registration opportunities provisions from fiscal years 2001 through 2017. We reviewed the allegations in each of these six cases and found that: Three of the six cases involved claims that the state failed to offer voter registration opportunities in public assistance offices and offices that provide state-funded programs primarily serving persons with disabilities. For example, in one case the Section alleged that employees in state offices that provide public assistance, and employees in state-funded programs serving persons with disabilities, failed to distribute voter registration applications. The Section also alleged that such offices failed to train and monitor their employees to ensure that they distribute voter registration applications to clients and transmit completed applications to the state and local election offices. One of the six cases involved claims that the state failed to offer voter registration opportunities in both motor vehicle and public assistance offices. Specifically, the Section alleged that the state did not provide a voter registration form with the state’s driver’s license application form. The Section further alleged that employees in state offices that provide public assistance, and employees in state-funded programs serving persons with disabilities, failed to distribute voter registration applications, among other claims. Two of the six cases involved claims that local election jurisdictions failed to process and register voter registration applicants. For example, in one case the Section alleged that a local election office did not process voter registration applications submitted by applicants at least 30 days before an election in a timely manner, which resulted in eligible applicants not being able to vote in their appropriate precincts in that election. DOJ officials have provided various perspectives on the department’s NVRA enforcement efforts. For example, in October 2009, we reported that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division prioritized NVRA list maintenance cases from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. Specifically, we reported that, according to Voting Section officials, the department focused during this period on both ensuring states had a list maintenance program and ensuring that such programs incorporated required safeguards. In a 2013 report, the DOJ Office of Inspector General reported that Civil Rights Division leadership initiated an effort to enforce the NVRA’s list maintenance provisions in late 2004. The report further noted that Civil Rights Division leadership placed a higher priority on the enforcement of the NVRA’s ballot access, or registration, provisions between 2009 and 2012. Section officials we interviewed for this review did not identify any overall Section-wide priorities between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2017 that focused specifically on either list maintenance or registration. These officials explained that the Section cycles through the various NVRA provisions over time, but provided limited details and did not directly attribute any increase in matters or cases over time to Section initiatives or priorities. Officials further noted that the Section pursued fewer NVRA related cases after 2010 in part due to resource limitations and other priorities within the Section. For example, officials stated that the Section handled a number of Voting Rights Act cases during this time, which required a significant amount of staff time and resources. NVRA Amicus Participation Increased Since Fiscal Year 2012 In addition to initiating matters, and filing NVRA cases as a plaintiff, the Voting Section engaged in efforts to enforce the NVRA’s registration opportunity and list maintenance provisions by participating as an amicus curiae or “friend of the court” in eight NVRA cases from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2017. The Section participated in seven of these eight cases between fiscal years 2012 and 2017. Four of the eight cases involved registration opportunity complaints and four involved list maintenance complaints. According to Voting Section officials, amicus participation increased in these years in part because it was a way for the Section to participate in cases in a manner which did not require a significant amount of resources. Specifically, officials stated that filing an amicus brief takes considerably less time and fewer staff resources than litigating a case. Out-of-Court Settlement Agreements with States Addressed NVRA Registration Opportunities The Voting Section entered into five out-of-court settlement agreements with states (in lieu of filing a case) to address allegations of NVRA non- compliance between fiscal years 2008 and 2017. All five of the agreements were related to the law’s registration opportunity provisions. For example, in one settlement agreement, a state agreed to make modifications to its internet site and the forms, procedures, and electronic system used at its motor vehicle offices in order to meet the requirements of section 5 of the NVRA, which stipulates that states offer voter registration opportunities at state motor vehicle agencies. The state further agreed to produce a compliance plan to meet these goals and to develop and implement a mandatory NVRA training program, among other things. The agreement included monitoring procedures, such as requiring the state to provide DOJ with quarterly reports of the number of in-person driver’s license applications received and completed voter registration forms accepted and transmitted to county boards of elections. According to Voting Section officials, the determination of the appropriate type of enforcement action in a matter, such as a settlement agreement or court order, can depend on a range of factors. For example, officials stated that relevant factors can include the nature, scope, and length of the violation, the level of cooperation by relevant actors regarding remedies, and the authority of relevant officials under state law to take remedial actions. The NVRA settlement agreements we reviewed are all multi-year agreements and Section officials noted that they try to collaborate with the state or jurisdiction regarding the appropriate steps (e.g., generating monthly, quarterly or biannual reports) for measuring and monitoring compliance during the period of the agreement. Section attorneys monitor settlement agreements by reviewing each required report and conferring with managers about progress towards compliance. Efforts to Assess Compliance with NVRA Requirements According to Voting Section officials, the Section engaged in various efforts to assess state and local jurisdiction compliance with NVRA registration opportunity and list maintenance requirements, including conducting reviews of federal election administration and other data, and compliance investigations. Specifically, Section officials said that they conduct periodic reviews of the U S. Election Assistance Commission’s biennial Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) to assess compliance with different NVRA provisions. For example, officials noted they may review EAVS data summarizing states’ motor vehicle agency driver license and voter registration transactions to help determine whether states are following NVRA section 5. In addition to using EAVS data, officials said they review publically available third party reports, which often include state specific registration data and other qualitative information about state processes. Section officials said this information can help them identify states that are potentially not in compliance with the NVRA. Officials also said that Section investigators have conducted observations at motor vehicle agencies and social services agencies as part of their efforts to assess and enforce NVRA compliance. Section officials noted that these efforts are not conducted on a regular schedule; rather, they are conducted periodically, on an intermittent, rolling basis. These officials said such efforts may lead them to request additional information from states, conduct compliance investigations, and initiate enforcement actions if necessary. For example: The DOJ Office of Inspector General reported that, in 2004, the Voting Section reviewed census and voter registration data for all 50 states to determine which states had more people registered to vote than the voting-age population. The Inspector General further reported that, based on the results of the research, the Section sent letters to 12 states requesting information on their efforts to remove ineligible voters from their registration lists, and ultimately filed two cases as a result of this enforcement initiative. In June 2017, the Voting Section sent letters to the 44 states subject to the NVRA requesting information related to states’ compliance with the law’s list maintenance provisions. Section officials stated that, as of March 2019, two actions have resulted from this effort: (1) the Section became a plaintiff-intervenor in a June 2018 case against Kentucky for having an inadequate list maintenance program; and (2) the Section entered into a February 2019 memorandum of understanding with the state of Connecticut regarding its efforts to identify registered voters who have died. Officials noted that the effort begun in 2017 does not have any specific time frames, goals, or objectives but that the Section is reviewing the data states provided and focusing detailed reviews on states whose data suggest possible non-compliance. Section officials said that in general, assessing compliance with NVRA section 8 (list maintenance) is more challenging than for the other sections, such as section 5 (voter registration opportunities at motor vehicles agencies). For registration opportunity provisions, they can send an investigator to the agency to observe whether the agency is offering people the opportunity to register as part of their standard transactions. However, officials noted there is no observation they can conduct to determine if list maintenance is occurring as required. As such, officials stated that DOJ is uniquely dependent on information and data from the states and local jurisdictions to indicate whether list maintenance efforts are taking place and what type. Officials further noted that they may have reduced time to analyze data or otherwise pursue more general enforcement efforts in time periods where the Section is overseeing a high number of defensive cases (ones in which the U.S. government is the defendant). DOJ’s Public Integrity Section and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Initiated Matters and Filed Cases to Address Potential Election Fraud Federal, state, and local authorities share responsibility for addressing allegations of election fraud. Within the federal government, DOJ has jurisdiction over election fraud investigations and prosecutions in elections where a federal candidate is on the ballot. In the absence of a federal candidate on the ballot, DOJ may have jurisdiction where facts exist to support the application of federal criminal laws that potentially apply to both federal and non-federal elections. According to DOJ officials, federal authorities would ordinarily defer to state and local authorities in deciding who would pursue an election fraud investigation or case because of states’ primary authority over the election process. DOJ’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses states that election fraud usually involves the corruption of one of three processes: the obtaining and marking of ballots, the counting and certification of election results, or the registration of voters. Within DOJ, the Public Integrity Section and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices maintain certain data on the election fraud matters and cases they initiate and prosecute. Within their respective databases, DOJ attorneys select a program category for each matter and case, which helps define the type of criminal act being investigated or prosecuted, for example, election fraud or health care fraud. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices use the program category “election fraud” for all election related charges; attorneys in the Public Integrity Section use either “election fraud” or “election crime other.” According to DOJ officials, categorization of matters and cases as election fraud (or any other category) is at the discretion of the investigating or prosecuting attorney based upon an examination of the facts. We refer to matters and cases that were either categorized as election fraud or election crime other, or included individual charges we identified as “election fraud related.” Election fraud related matters and cases in the DOJ databases we reviewed included charges brought under a wide variety of statutes, including those related to providing false information in registering or voting and vote buying (52 U.S.C. § 10307(c)) and voting by noncitizens (18 U.S.C. § 611), as well as more general charges such as the general federal conspiracy charge (18 U.S.C. § 371). The Public Integrity Section Initiated 33 Matters and Filed 19 Cases Related to Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017 From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Public Integrity Section initiated 1,408 matters, of which 33 were election fraud related, or about two percent of its overall matters. As shown in figure 6, the Section initiated 10 of the 33 election fraud related matters in fiscal year 2011, six in fiscal year 2013, four in fiscal year 2003, and four in fiscal year 2012. From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Public Integrity Section filed 695 cases; of which 19 were election fraud related, or about three percent of its overall caseload. As shown in figure 7, the Section filed election fraud related cases in five of those fiscal years, with seven of the 19 cases filed in fiscal year 2003 and five filed in fiscal year 2014. Public Integrity Section officials stated that the Section’s involvement in election fraud related matters and cases may vary over time depending on a variety of factors, including the number of complaints received and staffing levels within the Section. Officials stated that the Section allocates attorneys to work on election related matters and cases as needed, if resources allow. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are required to consult with the Public Integrity Section with regard to all federal criminal matters that focus on corruption of the election process, in addition to federal patronage and campaign finance-related crimes. The Section reviews this information and consults with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices on their elections related work. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices may also request assistance with a case if they lack sufficient resources to prosecute a complex case, or if the office needs to recuse itself. If the Section does not have sufficient staff available, officials stated that they may not have the ability to offer assistance in investigating matters and prosecuting cases. In these circumstances, officials said that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would likely proceed with the case without the Section’s assistance, except in recusal cases. The Public Integrity Section initiated at least one election fraud related matter in 11 of 12 regional federal circuits as shown in figure 8. The Section initiated the most matters in the Sixth Circuit (10 of 33) and the Fifth Circuit (seven of 33). The Public Integrity Section filed election fraud related cases in four of the 94 federal judicial districts nationwide. These four districts are located in three states: Kentucky, Texas, and Massachusetts. Specifically, the Section filed 11 of its 19 cases in the Eastern District of Kentucky; five cases in the Southern District of Texas; two cases in the Western District of Kentucky; and one case in the District of Massachusetts. The Public Integrity Section prosecuted election fraud related cases with charges under six statutes. As shown in table 2, the Section most frequently brought charges under 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c) which was charged in 17 of the 19 cases the Section filed. This statutory provision prohibits giving false information for purposes of registering or voting, vote buying, and conspiring to vote illegally. Public Integrity Section officials stated the Section did not focus its efforts on particular types of election fraud, but vote buying (generally charged under 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c)) was the most frequent type of election fraud related crime the Section prosecuted during the period of our review. Officials said vote buying is the most common type of election fraud related crime that has come to their attention in recent decades and noted that it tends to occur in communities that are more insular and isolated and have higher levels of poverty. For example, officials observed that in rural communities with high levels of poverty, some residents may be more vulnerable to vote-buying efforts due to their difficult circumstances or the power of local officials who seek to buy votes to provide or cut off needed services. Officials stated that matters and cases tend to be geographically concentrated because, while the Section does not have any formal initiatives in particular circuits or districts, they are in close contact with U.S. Attorney’s Offices nationwide and can offer additional assistance in those areas that may be more vulnerable to recurring or frequent election fraud. Example of Public Integrity Section Election Fraud Prosecutions Seven cases filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky in fiscal year 2003, in which 10 defendants were charged, concerned the 1998 primary election for multiple Knott County government positions and candidates, including county judge executive (the county executive) and county clerk. The 1998 primary election also included a contest for federal office (U.S. Senator). The presence of a candidate for federal office on a ballot is sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under most election fraud related statutes as the federal candidate’s election could be, or could appear to be, tainted by the fraud. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Initiated 525 Matters and Filed 185 Cases Related to Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017 From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated more than 2.2 million criminal matters (i.e., investigations), of which 525 were election fraud related, or 0.02 percent of their overall matters. As shown in figure 9, U.S. Attorney’s Offices initiated between 11 and 65 election fraud related matters each year during this time period. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated the most election fraud related matters in fiscal years 2003 (44), 2004 (53), 2005 (65), and 2011 (46). The percentage of election fraud related matters of all matters initiated ranged from 0.01 percent to 0.06 percent. From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed just over 1 million criminal cases. Of these, 185 cases were election fraud related, or 0.02 percent of their overall caseload. According to officials from EOUSA, which provides guidance, direction, and oversight to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, election fraud was one of the least frequent crimes addressed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. In fiscal year 2017, the most frequent felony cases filed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were for immigration, drugs, and violent crime offenses. Officials further noted that election fraud related cases were taken seriously and thoroughly investigated when facts supporting such charges were uncovered. As shown in figure 10, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed the most election fraud related cases in fiscal years 2003 through 2005, and in fiscal years 2007 and 2017, with 15 or more cases filed each fiscal year. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed fewer than five election fraud related cases during fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2015. The percentage of election fraud related cases of all cases filed ranged from less than 0.01 percent to 0.03 percent. From fiscal years 2001 through 2017 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated at least one election fraud related matter in 85 of the 94 federal judicial districts. As shown in figure 11, three districts cumulatively accounted for 145 out of 525 matters, or approximately 28 percent of all election fraud related matters initiated. Of these three, two judicial districts, the Southern District of Florida and the Eastern District of Kentucky accounted for nearly one quarter of all election fraud related matters U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated. About half of the 185 election fraud related cases filed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices occurred in three of the 94 federal judicial districts. As shown in figure 12, the Southern District of Florida filed 42 cases (23 percent), the Eastern District of Kentucky filed 36 cases (19 percent), and the Eastern District of Wisconsin filed 15 cases (eight percent). U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed the remaining cases (92 cases, or 50 percent) in 42 federal judicial districts; of these, 20 districts had only one election fraud related case during the time period. EOUSA officials said that there could be a number of reasons why cases occurred more frequently in some districts than others. These officials noted that individual U.S. Attorneys utilizing their prosecutorial discretion may have taken an interest in election fraud or encountered evidence of a series of election fraud related crimes that generated a number of matters or cases. For example, according to the respective U.S. Attorneys’ Offices: In the Southern District of Florida, a 2004 case involving allegations of noncitizen voting resulted in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services referring a series of additional similar investigations to the U.S. Attorney’s Office; In the Eastern District of Kentucky, a drug investigation in 2003 revealed evidence of vote buying that led to a series of vote buying cases; and In the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 14 of the 15 cases filed were uncovered in a joint investigation regarding the results of the 2004 presidential election, which showed a discrepancy between the number of ballots counted and individuals voting in one Wisconsin county. That investigation ultimately determined the discrepancy was caused by clerical error, but also uncovered 10 individuals who voted despite being ineligible due to their felon status and four who voted more than once. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices utilized approximately 100 different statutes in bringing charges in election fraud related cases. Table 3 shows the statutes charged in 15 or more election fraud related cases filed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The most frequently charged statute was 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (prohibited voting acts), charged in 52 cases, with subsection (c) (false information in registering or voting and vote buying) charged in 38 of those cases. The next three statutes of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), and 18 U.S.C. § 611 (voting by noncitizens) were each charged in 38 or more cases. EOUSA officials explained that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices select charges based on the specific facts and circumstances of a case. These officials noted that the offices may use some statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001, more frequently in cases due to their generality, which makes them widely applicable to different types of criminal conduct. Selected Data Sources on Moves, Deaths, and Convictions Used to Maintain Voter Registration Lists, and Their Reported Benefits and Limitations Each of the selected data sources we reviewed is one tool election officials may use to maintain their voter registration lists. These selected data sources are used to identify (1) registrants who move—U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address (NCOA), Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (Crosscheck), and returned mail; (2) deceased registrants—the public version of the Social Security Administration Death Master File (DMF) and state vital records; and (3) registrants with disqualifying felony convictions—U.S. Attorneys’ records on felony convictions. State and local election officials may use a variety of other databases or lists (data sources) to identify ineligible registrants who should be removed from voter registration lists, and state policies and procedures for using various data sources to identify and remove registrants from voter lists vary. Despite variations, election officials with whom we spoke stated that list maintenance—including the use of the selected data sources—provides benefits such as cost savings, smoother Election Day processes, reductions in administrative burden, and fewer opportunities for election fraud. Moreover, election officials told us that each of the selected data sources helps improve voter registration list accuracy, despite some limitations. For example, officials identified benefits from using these data sources, such as helping reduce the number of address errors on voter registration lists and helping identify and remove registrants who have moved outside of the election jurisdiction, are deceased, or have a disqualifying criminal conviction from voter registration lists. Officials also identified limitations with using these selected sources. In particular, three of the six selected data sources consist of administrative records collected for purposes other than voter registration, which can present some challenges when election officials use these sources to maintain their voter registration lists. For example, election officials noted that such data sources may inaccurately indicate that registrants moved unless election officials conduct additional work to verify the information. In addition, these data sources may not include the records for some registrants who are deceased and should be removed from the voter registration lists. Appendix III includes a description of a range of data sources states may use to maintain their voter registration lists. With regard to possible election fraud, state officials from all five selected states we visited noted that list maintenance activities in general help to identify or prevent election fraud because accurate and complete voter registration lists make it more difficult for individuals to commit fraud. Specifically, duplicate registrations—more than one registration for the same person across election jurisdictions—and ineligible registrations, such as those for deceased individuals, if present in voter registration lists, may provide opportunities for a person to vote more than once or vote using someone else’s identity. Thus, registration lists that contain one registration for each eligible registrant with accurate and current identifying information help to prevent election fraud from occurring. The majority of election officials we interviewed did not specify any one data source used to identify election fraud; however, state officials from Michigan and Oregon noted that the limited instances of election fraud in their states, in their view, is in part the result of their strong voter registration list maintenance efforts which have helped to reduce opportunities for fraud. In using data sources as a tool for maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election offices utilize data-matching procedures by which attributes of one registration record are compared to attributes of another record from another database or list to identify registrants who should be removed from voter registration lists under the NVRA’s removal categories. States are required to have computerized statewide voter registration lists, which allow election officials to conduct electronic data matching of their voter registration list to other databases or lists. These other databases or lists may include federal or state administrative records, interstate databases, and local lists or other information. Information on Data Matching Procedures Procedures for determining that a voter registration record is a “match” to another record may vary across states, local election offices, and interstate data matching programs. In general, a “match” should accurately identify the same individual across the two data sources being matched. However, data matching may result in improper indications of a match when a non-match should be indicated (false positives). False positive matches pose risks that election officials may improperly remove registrants from voter registration lists. Data matching can also result in improper indications of a non-match when a match should be indicated (false negatives), posing risks that election officials may fail to remove ineligible registrants from voter registration lists. According to a National Academy of Sciences report, the quality of the underlying data (from either the voter registration list or other data sources used for matching) may contribute to false positive or false negative matches. National Academy of Sciences, Improving State Voter Registration Databases, The National Academies Press, 2010. Further, matching procedures may differ with regards to how data in specific data fields are compared across databases to determine a match. For example, some procedures may require that the name from the voter registration list exactly match the name from the other data source (e.g. each letter, hyphen, space, or apostrophe must match). An exact match requirement would not accept as a match the name entries “Mary Jones-Smith” and “Mary Jones Smith”, even if all other data fields match across data sources and the entries represent the same individual, thus resulting in a false negative match. Below we discuss in detail the selected data sources and their benefits and challenges, as identified by literature we reviewed and election officials with whom we spoke. Data Sources Used to Identify Registrants Who Move According to reports we reviewed, registrants who move from one election jurisdiction to another jurisdiction within the state or to another state account for the majority of ineligible registrants and duplicate registrations on voter registration lists. When individuals register to vote, their voter registrations are linked to their residential address. This connection between a voter’s registration and residence is intended to ensure reliable and accurate voter registration lists, and to ensure that voters only vote for races and ballot questions that affect the communities in which they live. According to the 2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), the most common reason for a registrant’s removal from the rolls was cross-jurisdiction change of address (31.1 percent of removals), followed by registrants failing to respond to a confirmation notice sent as part of the NVRA process and subsequently not voting in the following two federal elections (26.1 percent of removals). As previously discussed, under the NVRA, data that indicate a registrant’s change of address and a potential move can be used to start the address confirmation notice process, but cannot, on their own, result in the automatic removal of registrants from voter registration lists. U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address (NCOA) The NCOA database comprises change-of-address records with the names and addresses of individuals, families, and businesses who filed a change of address with the U.S. Postal Service. Election officials can access the NCOA data by obtaining a license to directly receive the data from the U.S. Postal Service or having their voter registration list processed by a licensed third-party service provider. Election officials in the five states we visited compare selected records or the entire voter registration list against the NCOA database at the state or local level and at varying frequency to identify registrants who have potentially moved and to start the address confirmation and registrant removal process. For example Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia state election officials said that they compare their statewide voter registration lists to NCOA on a bi-annual, monthly, and annual basis, respectively, to identify registrants who have potentially moved. In contrast, Florida and Michigan officials said they do not use NCOA data at the state level, though state laws provide local election officials the option of comparing their local jurisdiction’s voter registration list to NCOA when they conduct list maintenance activities related to changes in address. Although initial data comparisons of NCOA with the voter registration lists can be conducted at either the state or local level, in all of the states we visited when the results of the NCOA data-matching indicated a potential move, local election officials managed the results of the confirmation notices that were sent to registrants to confirm their address. Local election officials subsequently updated addresses on the voter registration lists with responses they received from the confirmation notices, or flagged registrants for potential removal if the registrants did not respond to the confirmation notice or the notice was returned undeliverable. State election officials from Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia, and local officials from five of the jurisdictions we visited, reported that the primary benefit to using NCOA data is that it helps them to maintain accurate voter registration lists by (1) providing current and accurate addresses for their registrants, and (2) identifying registrants who have potentially moved and no longer reside in the voting jurisdiction. For example, local officials in one jurisdiction reported that they mailed approximately 60 percent fewer confirmation notices in 2017 compared to 2010 due to improvements in the accuracy of address information in their voter registration lists after using NCOA data during this period. Local officials in another jurisdiction reported they used the NCOA data as part of a one- time list maintenance effort, which generated over 100,000 confirmation mailings and resulted in the removal of a number of ineligible voters who no longer resided in the jurisdiction. Election officials also noted that using NCOA data to update voter registration lists may result in administrative efficiencies such as a more efficient election administration process and cost savings. For example, state officials from Oregon, a vote-by-mail state, said that NCOA data help them to maintain clean voter registration lists by providing current and accurate addresses for their registrants, which reduces mailing costs incurred from sending ballots to individuals who have moved out of the state. Further, local officials from one jurisdiction said that using NCOA data helped to reduce the number of address errors in the poll books and, as a result, decrease the number of registrants voting by provisional ballots on Election Day. A report we reviewed and election officials we interviewed cited a number of limitations to using NCOA data for voter registration list maintenance purposes. Specifically, in 2015 the U.S. Postal Service Office of the Inspector General reported that the NCOA data do not capture all change of address information because people do not always notify the U.S. Postal Service when they move. As a result, election officials may not be able to identify registrants who do not report changes of address to the U.S. Postal Service. Another limitation election officials cited is that an indication of a change in address in NCOA data does not necessarily reflect a change in residence, which is what determines the eligibility of a registrant to vote in a given election jurisdiction. According to U.S. Postal Service officials, the main purpose of the NCOA database is to maintain current and updated addresses for mail delivery and a change of address form may reflect a change in mailing address rather than a permanent change in residence. Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia state officials and officials from three local jurisdictions reported that they have difficulty determining whether a registrant’s change in address as indicated in the NCOA data is a permanent change in residence or a change in mailing address due to a temporary move or other mailing needs. For example, military personnel may prefer to maintain their voter registration at their home of record. Upon assignment to another duty location they may file a change of address with postal authorities for mailing purposes, even if it is not a change of residence for voting purposes. Officials from two local jurisdictions reported similar issues for individuals who retain residency in the jurisdiction while attending college outside the jurisdiction. Further, registrants who had vacation homes outside the jurisdiction in the summer or winter months could be identified as registrants who potentially changed residences on a permanent basis using the NCOA data, according to Nebraska election officials. As a result of the potential difference between mailing and residential addresses, Virginia state election officials and election officials from two local jurisdictions reported that registrants may be inaccurately flagged for confirmation mailings. They told us that registrants would not be automatically removed after being flagged for confirmation mailings; however, they would be required to respond to the mailing or vote in one of the next two federal elections, as prescribed by the NVRA, to stay on the voter registration list. Officials also told us that they may have to take additional steps to use NCOA data to identify registrants who potentially moved and to update voter registration lists. For example, officials from one local jurisdiction that matches its county voter registration list to NCOA data noted that it can take a significant amount of time and resources to standardize their voter registration data to the NCOA format and to calibrate their data matching procedures to avoid false positive matches. Such false positive matches would inaccurately indicate an address change. These local officials said that they take steps to ensure that they do not get an indication of a change in address based on the standardization of an address (e.g. a “Street” to “ST” difference in address between the two data sources). Oregon state election officials and officials from one local jurisdiction further noted that they may have to do additional work to determine the appropriate election jurisdiction to which the address in the NCOA data should be assigned. Officials explained that some street addresses or buildings, like apartment complexes, cross election jurisdiction boundaries, which makes it difficult to determine within which election jurisdiction an address or a specific unit of an apartment complex falls. Oregon state officials said that local tax assessor data may help election officials reconcile these jurisdictional boundary issues. Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (Crosscheck) Crosscheck is an interstate data sharing program that compares participating states’ voter registration lists against one another to identify registrants who are registered in more than one state, which may indicate a move, and to identify individuals who may have voted in more than one state. The Crosscheck program began in 2005 with four participating states—Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska—and had grown to include 31 participating states by 2016. To participate in the Crosscheck program, each state signs a memorandum of understanding upon joining the program. Then, in January of each year, member states provide information such as full name, date of birth, and address for registered voters, as well as turnout data for the previous calendar year to Crosscheck program administrators—the Kansas Secretary of State’s office—in a prescribed format. Using the information provided by member states, Crosscheck program administrators return to each participating state a list of registrations in that state that share the same first name, last name, and date of birth, with a registration in another participating state. Crosscheck results also include other identifying information that varies depending on whether the member states provided the data. There are no membership or annual fees associated with joining or participating in Crosscheck. Of the states we visited, Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia participated in the Crosscheck program for multiple years, while Oregon and Florida each participated once in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Oregon and Florida state officials explained that they did not use the Crosscheck data they received to conduct any voter registration list maintenance activities. Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia state officials said that they received and processed Crosscheck data at the state level before sending a subset of results to the local jurisdictions to conduct additional verification and list maintenance activities. According to some state and local election officials we interviewed, Crosscheck data can be beneficial as one of the data sources used to identify registrants who may have moved out of state or whose moves are not captured by other data sources. Specifically, officials from four local jurisdictions told us that using Crosscheck data in conjunction with other data sources, such as the NCOA, helps keep voter registration lists accurate. Further, state election officials from Virginia and election officials from one jurisdiction reported that the fact that neighboring states participate in the Crosscheck program is particularly beneficial to them because their residents are more likely to move to neighboring states and the Crosscheck data may capture the change in residence if these residents also registered to vote in the neighboring states. Nebraska state officials also noted that Crosscheck data complement the NCOA change of address data. In particular, Crosscheck data can provide information on registrants who did not record change of address information under NCOA, who had not responded to a notice sent as a result of NCOA data and had moved a second time, or whose moves were not recent and may not be captured in the most recent change of address information provided by NCOA. Nebraska state officials noted that the Crosscheck data were particularly helpful in this manner the first year that Nebraska participated in Crosscheck and whenever a new state joined the program. In addition, election officials from Nebraska and state officials from Michigan identified Crosscheck data on possible instances of double voting as a source which could potentially help determine whether an individual might have voted in two or more states. For example, officials from two local jurisdictions said that they identified a few potential instances of double voting using Crosscheck data. They referred these instances of potential double voting to their Secretary of State. According to reports we reviewed and state officials we interviewed in all five states we visited, Crosscheck data contain numerous matches when a non-match should be indicated (false-positive matches) because the program uses matching criteria that rely on data elements, such as names and birth dates, that may be shared by more than one person. Specifically, the Crosscheck program matches participating states’ voter registration information by comparing registrants’ first name, last name, and date of birth. However, according to reports we reviewed, the odds are sufficiently high that two registrants could have the same name and birth date in groups as large as statewide (or multistate) voter registration lists. Nebraska state officials noted that when there were four participating Crosscheck states in 2005, a match indicating a duplicate registration was more likely to be a valid match (rather than a false positive); however as the number of participating states increased, the quality of the matched results has dropped substantially. Oregon state officials told us that they submitted data to the Crosscheck program in 2012 and that many of the resulting 20,000 potential duplicate registration matches were false-positive matches. Florida state officials also expressed concern about the reliability and quality of the matching criteria, in addition to the number of false positive matches in the data they received. In addition, a study on double voting found that Crosscheck data may not provide enough information for election officials to determine whether a match indicating potential duplicate registrations or double voting is valid. As previously discussed, Crosscheck results for potential duplicate registrations are based on a match of the first name, last name, and date of birth. Crosscheck results provided to participating states may also include additional information—such as registrants’ middle name, suffixes, registration address, and the last four digits of a registrant’s Social Security number, if available—which election officials can use to help determine whether a match is a valid indication of a duplicate registration. In particular, the last four digits of the Social Security number can help distinguish between two distinct individuals who happen to share the same first name, last name, and date of birth. Using Crosscheck data returned to Iowa in 2012 and 2014, the study found that two-thirds of potential duplicate registrations identified by Crosscheck data did not include the last four digits of the Social Security number associated with at least one of the registration records in the match. Thus, the study concluded that more often than not, an election administrator would not have enough information to distinguish which matches are valid indications of duplicate registrations. Further, Nebraska state officials noted that the reliability of the data provided by participating states can affect the reliability of Crosscheck information on double voting. For example, Nebraska state officials reported that one state incorrectly sent Crosscheck its 2014 voting history data the year participating states were to provide their 2016 data to the Crosscheck program. These officials noted that the incorrect voter history data made it appear as though many people had double voted. Nebraska officials said that once they identified this issue, they omitted any matched results involving the state that had provided the 2014 data from their review of registrants who potentially double voted. According to the Crosscheck 2014 Participation Guide, processing the duplicate registrations and researching possible double votes require a commitment of time from state and local officials. State election officials from Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia and officials from two local jurisdictions told us that they have spent a significant amount of time and staff resources to review the Crosscheck data and determine which matched records represent valid matches. State officials from the three states that participated in Crosscheck for multiple years (Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia) said they implemented additional criteria to refine the Crosscheck data they received in order to identify valid matches of potentially duplicate registrations and send confirmation notices, according to the NVRA requirements. For example, Michigan state officials said that they further filter the Crosscheck results they receive to determine valid potential matches of duplicate registrations. Specifically, they filter Crosscheck results to include duplicate registrations where the registrants’ first names, middle initials, last names, dates of birth, and last four digits of Social Security numbers are an exact match. In addition, state election officials review the registration dates provided in the Crosscheck results to confirm that the registrant’s most recent voter registration activity occurred outside of Michigan before providing a refined list of valid potential matches to responsible local officials who conduct the address confirmation process. In its June 2017 Annual List Maintenance Report, Virginia state officials reported that they also review whether the last four digits of the Social Security number on Crosscheck results they receive match, to determine valid potential matches of duplicate registrations. While election officials from two jurisdictions we visited identified Crosscheck as a source which helped them identify potential instances of election fraud, such as instances of double voting, Nebraska state officials also noted the data were not generally reliable for these purposes without additional investigation. According to one study we reviewed, Crosscheck data on both double voting and duplicate registrations yield a high number of false-positive matches. Additionally, in another report, the New Hampshire Department of State found that of approximately 90,000 match records of duplicate registrations New Hampshire received from Crosscheck in 2017, only a small portion of the records were considered potential instances of double voting. Election officials can use the returned mail from targeted list maintenance mailing efforts and returned “undeliverable” mail from other mailings to registrants to send address confirmation notices to registrants who have potentially moved outside the election jurisdiction. These confirmation notices are subsequently used to update addresses on the voter registration lists with results of the confirmation mailing or flag registrants for potential removal. Specifically, targeted list maintenance mailing efforts may include sending a notice to all or a group of registrants in order to determine whether the registrant may have moved from the address on record. For example, Florida law states that local election officials can send notices to registrants who have not voted in the last 2 years and who have not made a written request that their registration be updated during the two year period. Targeted list maintenance mailing efforts may result in either a response from the registrants or returned undeliverable mail. Returned undeliverable mail occurs when the U.S. Postal Service cannot deliver mail to the address specified on the label, indicating a potential change in the registrant’s address and therefore residence. In addition to targeted list maintenance mailings, election offices may send other notices—such as sample ballots, or information about changes in polling locations—which may also generate returned undeliverable mail. See figure 13 for an example of other voter registration notices (not part of a targeted list maintenance effort) that may be returned to election officials as undeliverable and therefore indicate a potential move. Election officials from all five states we visited use returned mail from targeted list maintenance mailing efforts, or from other mailings to voters, to update registrants’ addresses or to send a notice to the registrants to confirm their address. According to Nebraska state election officials, returned undeliverable mail is a valuable tool for identifying registrants who may have moved. Local election officials we spoke with also said that returned undeliverable mail can provide them with a timely indication that a registrant has potentially moved. Furthermore, election officials told us that because mailings can be conducted on a periodic basis, processing returned mail at the time of receipt can help election officials distribute the list maintenance workload throughout the year. Specifically, election officials from four local jurisdictions said that returned undeliverable mail from voter notices sent to registrants periodically throughout the year is usually a more recent indicator of registrants’ changes in address compared to largescale list maintenance activities such as an annual mailing based on NCOA data. Further, officials from one local jurisdiction also noted that staying on top of returned undeliverable mail throughout the year helps reduce the workload during the state’s annual NCOA confirmation mailing, which would otherwise be too big to manage if the jurisdiction only processed address changes once a year. According to reports we reviewed as well as officials we interviewed, returned undeliverable mail may not be a reliable indicator that a person has moved, which can result in an inflation of the number of registrants who are flagged as inactive. For example, in 2015, the U.S. Postal Service Office of the Inspector General reported that approximately 60 percent of returned undeliverable mail is a result of the mail not getting delivered by postal service employees or insufficient address information on the mail, as opposed to the registrant having moved without notifying the U.S. Postal Service. Further, according to one report we reviewed, a registrant may not have received the mailing, or the mailing may be returned undeliverable for a number of reasons, including that the registrant may be temporarily away from his/her permanent residence; may not be listed on the mailbox of the residential address such as when the registrant shares an address with roommates or family members; or may live in a non-traditional residence such as homeless shelter or government building that will not accept mail for residents. In addition, Virginia state officials noted that using returned undeliverable mail can inflate the number of registrants who are flagged as inactive and can also result in additional costs. Specifically, these state election officials told us that they usually have a low response rate from registrants for mailings, including targeted mailings for list maintenance purposes or confirmation mailings. Registrants who are sent a confirmation notice or do not respond to confirmation mailings are then generally flagged as inactive. Nebraska state officials said that having inactive registrants on the registration lists has resulted in costs to local jurisdictions in the past because local officials were formerly required to mail a ballot to all registered voters, including those that were on the inactive list, when a special election was conducted by mail. Further, local election officials in one state said that inflated numbers of inactive registrants on voter registrations lists may result in fewer than needed voting precincts, to the extent that election officials determine the number of precincts based only on the number of active registrants on the lists. Data Sources Used to Identify Deceased Registrants The NVRA provides for states to remove deceased registrants from registration lists by reason of death. This may be carried out by the state’s department of elections, local election jurisdictions, or a combination of the two, as provided by state law. According to the 2016 EAVS, states removed over 4 million registrants due to death from November 2014 through November 2016, which accounted for 24.6 percent of the total number or registrants removed from voter registration lists. According to a National Association of Secretaries of State 2017 report, in most states, information on deceased registrants is provided by a state office of vital statistics, the state department of health, or a similar state-level entity. Additionally, the report notes that a number of states permit election officials to remove a deceased registrant using information from sources such as obituary notices, copies of death certificates, and notification from close relatives. Social Security Administration’s Public Death Master File (DMF) The public version of the DMF contains nearly 101 million records of deaths reported to the Social Security Administration from 1936 through March 1, 2019. It is a subset of the Social Security Administration’s full death file; it does not include state-reported death data, but includes other death data reported by family members, funeral directors, post offices, financial institutions, and other federal agencies such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The public DMF accounts for about 19 percent fewer death records than the full death file. The Social Security Act limits the sharing of the full death file to federal benefit-paying agencies, and other specifically enumerated purposes. Generally, DMF records include the Social Security number, full name, date of birth, and date of death of deceased individuals. Agencies or other entities, including election administrators, having a legitimate business purpose for the information can purchase the DMF from the National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, which is authorized to distribute the DMF. Subscribers to the DMF are required to purchase monthly or weekly updates to the DMF to ensure that the records are up-to-date. Of the five states we visited, Florida, Michigan, Oregon, and Virginia compare their statewide voter registration list against DMF data on a regular basis, and Nebraska used the data once in 2014, to identify and remove registrants who had died. Specifically, Florida and Michigan directly receive the DMF data and conduct data-matching with their state’s voter registration list to identify deceased registrants on a weekly basis. Oregon and Virginia use DMF data through their participation in the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) program. On a monthly basis, ERIC provides Oregon and Virginia state election officials a report on their deceased registrants based on matches of DMF data with these states’ voter registration lists. States’ procedures for removing deceased registrants from the voter registration list vary, depending on requirements outlined in state law. For example, Virginia state law provides that local election officials have the authority to determine the qualification of an applicant for registration. Further, the Virginia law requires election officials to send a cancellation notice once a voter registration record is cancelled due to death. As a result, Virginia state officials forward all valid matches of potentially deceased registrants to the responsible local official who reviews the match, marks the registrant as deceased in the voter registration database, cancels the registration, and sends a cancellation notice. In contrast, Michigan law allows either state or local officials to cancel a voter registration upon receipt of reliable information that the registrant is deceased. In addition, according to Michigan state election officials we met with, there is no legal requirement for officials to send notices of cancellation due to death. Michigan state election officials told us that they cancel voter registrations based on data-matching with DMF data at the state level. State election officials from all five selected states and officials from one local jurisdiction reported that they have found DMF data to be useful for identifying registrants who have died. Further, state election officials from four selected states stated that the DMF data are accurate and reliable. For example, officials said that they have experienced very few instances where they have had to reverse cancelled registrations because a registrant was incorrectly identified as deceased based on DMF data. Nebraska and Oregon state officials also noted that DMF data are particularly useful for identifying registrants who died out of state. Officials said that out-of-state death information would not be captured by other data sources they use, such as state vital records data. In addition, Michigan state officials noted that historically they would receive notification of a person’s death closer to the date of death when using DMF data than when using death data from the state vital records office. We previously reported that state-reported deaths, which the DMF does not include, are expected to account for a larger proportion of all Social Security Administration death records over time. As a result, we reported that agencies that purchase the DMF, including election offices, will likely continue to access fewer records over time as compared with those government agencies that obtain the Social Security Administration’s full death file. We also reported that because the deaths reported by states are generally more accurate than other death information reported to the Social Security Administration by post offices, financial institutions, and other government agencies, it is likely that agencies using the DMF could encounter more errors than agencies using the Social Security Administration’s full death file. According to Social Security Administration officials, Social Security death data are accurate when used to administer the Social Security Administration benefit programs, which includes removing deceased individuals from the beneficiary rolls and informing surviving spouses and children of their eligibility for benefits. Virginia state officials further noted that DMF death information can be less timely in identifying an individual as deceased when compared to state death records because state records are collected during the death certification process while the Social Security Administration relies on the transmission of information after the death certification from other entities, such as other government agencies, to identify an individual as deceased. State Vital Records Election officials can also use state vital records to identify and remove registrants who are deceased from their voter registration lists. Due to the federal requirement for state election officials to coordinate with the designated state agency responsible for compiling records of deaths, most states receive state level information on deceased registrants from their state office of vital statistics. State death records are collected electronically by most states, and maintained in each state’s Electronic Death Registration System. As of December 2018, 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico used an Electronic Death Registration System to collect and maintain death data within their jurisdiction. All five states we visited receive data on deceased individuals at varying intervals from their state vital records office and match these records to the statewide voter registration list to identify and remove deceased registrants. For example, on a daily basis, Florida state election officials receive state death data electronically from the Florida Bureau of Vital Statistics. They use the information to identify potentially deceased registrants and provide a list of these individuals to local election officials. Nebraska state election officials receive state death data from their state department of health on a weekly basis, Oregon and Virginia receive death information from their respective state departments of health on a monthly basis, and Michigan officials said they receive the information periodically, on either a weekly or bi-weekly basis. According to state election officials from Florida, Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia and local election officials from four of the jurisdictions we visited, state vital records on deceased individuals are generally accurate and reliable, in part because state vital records data are reviewed and validated. Specifically, state vital records data on deceased individuals are linked to information on the death certificate which is validated by authorized persons, such as physicians and funeral directors, during the death certification process. Virginia state officials said that in comparison, other sources such as the Social Security DMF data may include reported deaths that are not directly linked to the death certification, from entities such as post offices and financial institutions. Additionally, officials from one jurisdiction told us that state death records are helpful in identifying people who died in another jurisdiction in the state. Further, officials from this jurisdiction noted that in the past they reviewed obituaries to identify deceased registrants, but that they have seen a decline in the use of obituaries to announce deaths and state death records help fill the information gap previously provided by obituaries. Nebraska state officials also noted that state death records can help prevent fraudulent registrations because state officials are able to check new registrations against death records received from the state health department. Nebraska state officials and officials from two local jurisdictions said that one limitation of state death records is that they generally only include information on deaths that have occurred in the state, and as a result election officials lack death records for residents who died out of state. From our interviews with the state vital records officials in the states we visited and information we reviewed on national death sources, we learned that, in some states, state death records may include information on deaths that occurred out of state, through the state’s participation in interstate data exchanges. Additionally, while some state officials found state death records timely for updating voter registration lists, Michigan state officials said their state death records were not as timely as DMF data. Specifically, Michigan state election officials said they used to receive notification approximately six months after a person’s death when using state death records, compared to within two weeks of death using DMF data. Officials explained that the lag in the death notification when using the state death records was due to low participation rates in the state’s Electronic Death Registration System when the system was first implemented. Michigan state election officials noted that state death records have improved and are timelier as the participation rate in the state Electronic Death Registration System has increased in recent years. Oregon state officials also noted that state death records may be less timely than the data counties receive from their local health departments, and thus local election officials may have received notice of an individual’s death from the county health department prior to receiving the state vital records data. Data Source Used to Identify Registrants with Disqualifying Felony Convictions State laws regarding the voting eligibility of individuals with a felony conviction vary. In some states, individuals who were previously convicted of a felony are not permitted to vote unless they are pardoned, or their voting rights are specifically restored by the government; in other states, the right to vote is reinstated automatically at the end of the individual’s sentence or after a designated period of time following the end of the sentence. Additionally, in some states, individuals with felony convictions may vote if they are on probation or have been granted parole; and, in two states, felons are allowed to vote even while incarcerated. Election officials are generally required to remove registrants with a felony conviction from voter registration lists, in accordance with state law. U.S. Attorneys’ Records on Felony Convictions U.S. Attorneys are required by law to notify the states’ chief election officials of felony convictions in federal court. The notices must contain a person’s name, age, residence address, date of entry of the judgment, a description of the offenses of which the individual was convicted, and the sentence imposed by the court. Election officials from all five states we visited said that they receive records from U.S. Attorneys on residents who are convicted of a federal felony. Florida, Nebraska, and Virginia use this information to remove registrants from their voter registration lists given the nature of their state laws, which restrict voting eligibility after a felony conviction until rights are restored or for a period after completion of the sentence. Michigan and Oregon prohibit individuals from voting while serving their sentences after conviction, but voting rights are automatically reinstated once a person is released from prison. As such, state officials from Michigan told us that they do not use U.S. Attorneys’ records to remove voters from their voter registration lists. Oregon officials noted they use U.S. Attorneys’ records on federal felony convictions to change a registrant’s status to “inactive.” Election officials from three states in our review that use U.S. Attorneys’ felony conviction records to remove registrants from voter registration lists said that this information was valuable, as they would not be able to acquire information about federal convictions from state sources. While federal conviction information can be helpful to election officials, an official from one local jurisdiction said that it can be difficult to determine whether the individual identified by a U.S. Attorney’s Office as having a federal conviction is the same person as the registrant. This is because criminals may have used aliases or provided incorrect Social Security numbers when registering to vote, which results in a less confident match. In addition, the information state and local officials receive on federal convictions is not required to include an individual’s projected date of release or date of sentence completion, which state and local officials from Florida and Nebraska said could help them determine whether the registrant is ineligible to vote and thus should be removed from voter registration lists. This makes it difficult for election officials to determine if the registrant’s sentence was already completed by the time they receive the information. In Nebraska, where voting rights are reinstated two years after a sentence is completed, election officials said it is initially difficult to know whether the individual’s voter registration is valid without the date of release or sentence completion. To mitigate limitations related to the lack of a projected release date or sentence completion date, Florida election officials said that they review case judgments which provide the details of the case, including date of sentence completion, to determine if the registrant’s sentence was completed and then check if the registrant’s rights were restored. Nebraska state election officials said they review court records and also noted that they would contact the local U.S. Attorney’s Office to obtain the federal release date for a particular registrant. Agency and Third Party Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the Social Security Administration, the Election Assistance Commission, the Crosscheck program, and election offices in the five states and ten local jurisdictions we visited. DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the Election Assistance Commission, and the Crosscheck program did not provide written comments. The Social Security Administration submitted a letter noting that it did not have any substantive comments, which is reproduced in appendix IV. We incorporated technical comments from DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the Social Security Administration, Crosscheck, and state and local officials as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Social Security Administration, the Election Assistance Commission, election offices in the five selected states and ten local jurisdictions that participated in our research, appropriate congressional committees and members, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: National Voter Registration Act of 1993 Cases Filed by Private Parties In addition to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) role in enforcing the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), the law allows a private party (a person or organization) who is aggrieved by a violation of NVRA provisions to bring a civil action against a state or local agency responsible for voter registration. In some cases, DOJ may participate in these private party cases by intervening on behalf of the plaintiff (as a plaintiff intervenor) or defendant, or by filing an amicus brief. The NVRA includes provisions that focus on both increasing opportunities for voter registration and improving voter registration list maintenance. Table 4 includes a summary of these provisions. Methodology To identify cases filed by private parties that included a claim under the NVRA, we searched an online legal database (Lexis Advance) for U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions from fiscal years 2008 through 2018 that contained the term “National Voter Registration Act.” We reviewed the decisions and also obtained and reviewed related case documents, including district court decisions, dockets, and complaints, to determine whether a claim had been filed under the NVRA and the nature of the claim, among other case information. We focused on cases that reached the federal appellate level because decisions issued by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals create binding precedent for all of the districts in that circuit, among other considerations. Summary of NVRA Cases Filed by Private Parties that Reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals from Fiscal Year 2008 through Fiscal Year 2018 We identified 19 cases that were filed by private parties with claims under the NVRA that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals (federal appellate level) from fiscal years 2008 through 2018. Eleven of the 19 cases included claims that were related to NVRA provisions that require states to provide registration opportunities. Six cases included claims related to the NVRA requirement to remove voters from registration lists under specified conditions (list maintenance). Registration Opportunity Cases Private parties filed 11 cases involving claims under the NVRA’s registration opportunity provisions that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. We reviewed the claims in each of the 11 cases and found that: five of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 5 related to voter registration opportunities at motor vehicle offices; four of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 7 related to registration opportunities at public assistance offices; two of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 6 related to mail-in registration application forms; and one of the 11 cases involved claims under section 8 related to the requirement that states register voters whose applications are received at least 30 days before an election. List Maintenance Cases Private parties filed six cases involving list maintenance claims under the NVRA that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. NVRA list maintenance cases may involve two types of allegations under section 8: (1) in conducting a required program to remove ineligible voters from the voter registration list, a state or local jurisdiction did not incorporate certain safeguards, with the potential effect of unlawfully removing eligible voters; and (2) a state or local jurisdiction did not have an adequate program to remove ineligible voters from the voter registration list. Five of the six cases included a claim under section 8 related to the potential unlawful removal of voters from voter registration lists. The sixth case included a claim under section 8 related to the inadequate removal of ineligible voters from voter registration lists. DOJ Participated in Nearly Half of All NVRA Private Party Cases that Reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2018 DOJ submitted an amicus brief or statement of interest in nine of the 19 NVRA cases filed by private parties that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals between fiscal years 2008 through 2018. Five of the nine cases in which DOJ participated involved issues related to registration opportunities: DOJ participated in all four of the cases that included a claim under section 7 related to registration issues involving public assistance offices. For example, in one case, plaintiffs alleged that the state of New Mexico failed to provide voter registration forms to applicants for public assistance who did not decline, in writing, to register to vote. DOJ submitted a brief in support of the plaintiffs. DOJ participated in one case that included a claim under section 6 related to mail-in voter registration application forms. DOJ also participated in one case under section 8 that related to the public disclosure of records concerning voter registration list maintenance activities. The remaining three cases involved issues related to list maintenance, specifically allegations that an election jurisdiction’s list maintenance program did not have appropriate safeguards to protect against the unlawful removal of eligible voters. For example, in one case, plaintiffs alleged that the state of Ohio violated the NVRA by using failure to vote as the sole trigger to start the confirmation process for removing voters from registration rolls based on a change of residence. In 2016, DOJ filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. In 2017, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the department reversed its original position and filed a brief supporting the state’s list maintenance practices. In June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld Ohio’s process for removing voters on change-of-residence grounds and ruled that failure to vote could serve as evidence that a registrant had moved. Appendix II: Cases with National Voter Registration Act of 1993 Claims Filed by the Department of Justice, Voting Section Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section enforces the civil provisions of federal laws that protect the right to vote, including the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), the Help America Vote Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, among others. From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Voting Section participated in 234 cases, including 14 cases involving NVRA claims in which the Section was the plaintiff or the plaintiff intervenor. Cases with NVRA claims included allegations related to providing registration opportunities for voters, and allegations related to the requirement to remove voters from registration lists under specified conditions (list maintenance). Table 5 below provides a brief summary of the allegations in each case. Appendix III: Data Sources and Site Selection Methods To address how selected data sources are used at the state and local level and to obtain perspectives on how these sources help maintain voter registration lists, we selected and reviewed six commonly received data sources that may be used to remove ineligible voters who have moved, died, or committed a disqualifying criminal conviction. We also selected state and local election offices in five states and conducted interviews with election officials to obtain information on policies and procedures for using selected data sources, and perspectives on their benefits and limitations. This appendix describes our data source and site selection methodologies, and additional information on the data sources and sites we selected. Data Source Selection To determine which data sources to include in our review, in June 2018 we sent a structured questionnaire to state election directors for each of the 49 states and the District of Columbia with voter registration requirements to identify commonly received data sources which states can potentially use to conduct voter registration list maintenance. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) specifies certain categories under which election officials may remove registrants from voter registration lists including: 1. if a registrant has moved outside of a jurisdiction and either (a) confirmed the move in writing or (b) failed to respond to an address confirmation mailing and failed to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing; 2. death of the registrant; 3. criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided for in state law; and 4. mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided for in state law. We asked state election directors to identify the sources from which data were received at either the state or local level at any point between January 2017 and May 2018. We summarized responses from election directors in 35 states and the District of Columbia to identify commonly received data sources. Table 6 provides a summary of responses to the structured questionnaire, with the data sources organized according to the NVRA categories that may be used to remove registrants from voter lists. From the list of commonly received sources above, we then selected six data sources that can be used to address the following NVRA categories for removing registrants—move outside election jurisdiction, death, and, disqualifying criminal conviction. These categories each account for more than 1 percent of total removals from voter registration lists nationwide, based on the most recent data reported to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. We did not select any data source that addresses the “disqualifying mental incapacity” NVRA removal category since it accounted for less than 1 percent of total removals nationwide for this time period. Specifically, we selected three sources that address moves, two sources that address deceased registrants, and one source that addresses disqualifying criminal convictions, to generally reflect recent data reported on the distribution of registrant removals, by removal category, from voter registration lists nationwide. We also selected (a) at least one nationwide source that captures data from all states; (b) at least one source that only includes data specific to the particular state or local jurisdiction that receives data from the source; and (c) one interstate data exchange that involves the sharing of data between multiple states. We selected sources from each of these categories in order to identify potential issues that may arise when election officials match their voter registration data with various other types of data sources. Table 7 presents the data sources we selected for further review. State and Local Jurisdiction Selection To obtain information on policies and procedures for using selected data sources for voter registration list maintenance, and election officials’ perceptions on the benefits and limitations of using them, we selected five states that indicated in their responses to our questionnaire that they have received data from at least five of the six selected data sources between January 2017 and May 2018. We also considered variation in states’ population size, when possible, and geographic diversity in order to capture possible regional differences in election administration practices. See table 8 for a list of the states we selected and a summary of the selected data sources received by each state. For each of the five selected states, we selected two local election jurisdictions (counties or cities/towns)–one with a larger population and one with a smaller population–based on the recommendation of the state election officials, population size, and other factors. See table 9 for demographic information on the states and local jurisdictions we visited. Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Tom Jessor (Assistant Director), David Alexander, Justine Augeri, Colleen Candrl, Jamarla Edwards, Jonathan Ferguson, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, Amanda Miller, Heidi Nielson, Kevin Reeves, Christine San, Janet Temko-Blinder, Jeff Tessin, and Sarah Turpin made key contributions to this report.