Introduction Household debt among older Americansâincluding mainly residential debt, auto loans, student loans, and credit cardsâhas grown substantially from 1989 to 2016. The proportion of households headed by individuals aged 65 and older (hereinafter referred to as elderly households ) who held any debt increased from 37.8% to 61.1%, and the real median household debt among elderly households with debt increased from $7,463 to $31,050 (in 2016 dollars). The increase in debt among older Americans has raised concerns about financial security for people near or during retirement for several reasons. First, Americans aged 65 and older represent a large and growing proportion of the U.S. population. Over the next 20 years, the share of the U.S. population aged 65 and older is expected to increase from about 17% to 22%. The increase in debt, together with the aging population, suggests that a large group of older Americans are not retiring debt free. Second, many older Americans, especially low-income people, rely on Social Security or other government-sponsored income transfers as their major sources of income. Increases in household debt might require retirees to devote a larger share of their fixed income and savings toward paying debt. Excessive debt payments may put more seniors, especially those living on limited incomes, at greater risk of financial insecurity. Third, researchers have shown that higher levels of debt may increase psychological stress and decrease physical health. These effects may be exacerbated for older people, as they usually have fixed income and limited ability to offset higher monthly debt obligations by working more. This report presents evidence of the increase in debt from 1989 to 2016 among households headed by those aged 65 and older, using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data. The discussion focuses on changes in the percentage of households holding debt; in median and average household debts; in selected types of debt; and in relative measures, such as the debt payments-to-income ratio and the total debt-to-asset ratio. This report also analyzes how household debt among older Americans varies across different age groups and asset distributions, and it explores various groups of elderly households with the largest debt burdens. Major types of debt discussed in this report mainly include residential debt, auto loans, student loans, and credit card balances. Nonloan debtâsuch as medical debt, past-due utility and other bills, and government-assessed fines and feesâis not covered in this report, because the population with those debts tends to be underrepresented in the SCF. Household Debt by Age Traditional life-cycle theories predict that people tend to borrow in young adulthood when incomes are low but some costs such as education and housing are high, continue to borrow but at a slower pace during middle age as income and expenses converge, and then slowly deleverage through old age as they pay down debt. The SCF data show that Americans' debt experiences have generally conformed to life-cycle theories' predictions. During 1989 to 2016, the share of households who held any debt and the median and average level of household debts were highest among those headed by Americans aged 35 to 54 and lower among younger and older ages. In the past three decades, debt among households headed by individuals aged 65 and older grew faster than that among households headed by those aged 64 and younger. In 2016, average household debt increased from $59,134 in 1989 to $110,204 (in 2016 dollars) for households whose head was between the ages of 20 and 64, an increase of 86%, whereas the average household debt grew from $11,278 to $53,269 (in 2016 dollars) for households headed by those aged 65 and older, an increase of 3 72%. The average household debt nearly doubled for households in age groups younger than age 60, but it increased by about 4 times for the age groups 60-64, 65-69, and 70-74; by about 7 times for the age group 75-79; and by more than 10 times for the age group 80 and older (see Figure 1 ). Trends in Household Debt Among Older Americans From 1989 to 2016, debt increased among households whose head was aged 65 and older. Both the share of elderly households with any debt and the median and average levels of debt have increased. Household debt includes mortgages, auto loans, student loans, and credit cards, as well as other debt products. Share of Elderly Households Holding Debt and Median and Average Debt From 1989 to 2016, the share of households headed by individuals aged 65 and older who held debt increased, as did median and average household debt among elderly households with debt (see Figure 2 ). In 1989, about 37.8% of elderly households held debt, whereas in 2016 the share increased to 61.1%. The median debt of those elderly households with debt increased from $7,463 to $31,050 (in 2016 dollars) during the same time, and the real average debt increased from $29,918 to $86,797. The median debt lies at the middle of the debt distribution, and the average debt is generally higher than the median debt because a relatively small percentage of people have very high debt. The share of elderly households holding any debt has generally trended upward from 1989 to 2016. However, median and average debt peaked in 2010, the year after the 2007-2009 economic recession, and declined from 2010 to 2016. In 2016, the median amount of debt was about the same as in 2007, before the economic recession, and the average amount of debt was at about the midpoint of the averages in 2004 and 2007. The financial crisis might have had a profound effect on the older population for several reasons. First, older people are likely to have been affected by employment instability. Research suggests that when the elderly lose jobs, it takes them significantly longer to find new ones, and their new jobs, if any, typically pay less than their previous jobs. Second, defined contribution (DC) retirement plans have replaced defined benefit (DB) plans, and they have become an important source of income for older Americans. Unlike DB plans, which provide a steady stream of income during retirement, DC plans fluctuate in value with the financial market, and their value depends in part on employees' investment skills. Employees generally bear the risk in DC plans. A recent study indicates that individuals' retirement account mismanagement and the large drop in the stock market during the financial crisis reduced potential retirement income for many older Americans during the past decade. Components of Debt The growth in average household debt between 1989 and 2016 largely came from mortgages (see Figure 3 ), including both debt secured by a primary residence (from $12,970 to $57,943 in 2016 dollars) and debt for other residential properties (from $2,970 to $11,446 in 2016 dollars). In addition, the increase in auto loans (from $2,437 to $5,262) may explain part of the growth in household debt among elderly households. In 2016, primary residential mortgages accounted for 66.8% of overall elderly household debt on average, other residential debt for 13.2%, auto loans for 6.1%, student loans for 1.5%, credit card balances for 3.5%, and other debts for 8.9%. Residential loans are usually considered long-term wealth builders, as the residence's market value may increase over time, which is generally not true for auto loans or credit card debt. Researchers have found that both residential and nonresidential debt may contribute to debt-related stress for older households, but residential debt is much less stressful than other debt, such as credit card debt. Selected Components of Debt The share of elderly households who held certain selected types of debt, such as debt on a primary and other residences, auto loans, student loans, and credit card balances, increased from 1989 to 2016. The median amounts of those types of debt have also increased among elderly households with those debts. Debt Secured by Residential Properties19 The share of elderly households who held debt secured by a primary residence increased from 15.4% in 1989 to 33.4% in 2016 (see Table 1 ). During the same time, the median primary residential debt among those households with residential debt increased from $16,793 to $72,000 in real 2016 dollars (see Table 2 ). Studies suggest that much of the growth through 2007 might have resulted from the increased availability of mortgage credit during the build-up to the financial crisis. Some research indicates that millions of older Americans are carrying more mortgage debt than ever before, and recent cohorts have taken on more mortgage debt mostly because they purchased more expensive homes with smaller down payments. Since 2010, some scholars argue that tightening mortgage underwriting standards have made it more difficult for young borrowers to qualify for mortgages. Consequently, this trend has resulted in a shift of new mortgage originations toward older borrowers and an increase in the ages of borrowers with existing debt. A small proportion of elderly households held debt secured by other residential properties, such as a second house or a vacation property. The share of elderly households who held other residential debt slightly increased from 2.7% to 4.4% between 1989 and 2016, and the median debt on other residences increased from $23,323 to $98,000. Those types of debt were primarily concentrated among relatively higher-income elderly households. Auto Loans Auto loans also increased among households headed by individuals aged 65 and older from 1989 to 2016. The share of elderly households who held any auto loan increased from 10.3% to 21.2%, and the median auto loan grew from $7,463 to $11,000 (in 2016 dollars) for those households with auto debt. Rising auto loan debt among elderly households may have partly resulted from rising vehicle costs and longer auto loan maturities. Student Loans A small share of elderly households held student loans, but the proportion increased over time. About 0.5% of elderly households held some student loans in 1989, and this share increased to 2.4% in 2016. Among those elderly households who held student loans, the median amount in 2016 dollars was $7,463 in 1989, which increased to $12,000 in 2016. Although the number of student loan borrowers aged 65 and older is much smaller than the younger population, elderly borrowers are more likely to default than their nonelderly counterparts. Student loan debt can be especially problematic for older Americans because, in the event of default on federal student loans, a portion of the borrower's Social Security benefits can be claimed to pay off the loans. The number of individuals aged 65 and older whose Social Security benefits were offset to pay student loans increased from about 6,000 in FY2002 to 38,000 in FY2015. Most of these federal student loans were incurred primarily for older Americans' own education rather than for their dependents' education. Credit Card Balances Credit card balances among elderly households increased from 1989 to 2016, and they were the most common type of debt for elderly households in 2016. From 1989 to 2016, the share of elderly households who held some credit card debt increased from 10.0% to 35.1%, and the median credit card balance increased from $952 to $2,400 (in 2016 dollars) among those with credit card debt. Studies suggest that credit card and other noncollateralized debt tends to carry higher interest rates than other types of credit, so with rising credit card debt, older Americans may need to dedicate more of their income to servicing their debt. Credit card debt is a leading reason for bankruptcy filings among older consumers. One study shows that elderly debtors in bankruptcy carried 50% more credit card debt than younger debtors, and the elderly cited credit card interest and fees as the main reason for filing bankruptcy. Relative Measures Related to Debt Measures of outstanding household debt say little about how much of a burden the debt is or how much risk it poses to the population's financial health. The debt payment-to-income ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio are relative measures commonly used to address the degree of debt burden on households. The Debt Payment-to-Income Ratio One measure of debt burden is calculated by comparing required debt payments to the income available to make those paymentsâthe debt payment-to-income ratio. The ratio can measure the effects of interest rate changes and loan sizes on a household's liquidity. The debt payment-to-income ratio among elderly households who had some debt increased from 8.7% in 1989 to 16.7% in 2010, and then it declined to 12.4% in 2016 (see Figure 4 ). This ratio among elderly households was much lower than that for nonelderly households in 1989 (8.7% for elderly households compared with 16.1% for nonelderly households), but the difference in the ratio between elderly households and nonelderly households decreased over time. In 2016, the debt payment-to-income ratio for nonelderly households was 13.8%, compared with 12.4% for elderly households. Delinquency on loan payments (e.g., the percentage of debtors with debt payment past due 60 days or more) can also suggest trouble meeting debt obligations. About 3.9% of households headed by individuals aged 65 and older with any debt had some payments past due 60 days or more in 2016 (see Figure 4 ). The share fluctuated between 1% and 5% from 1989 to 2016, and it did not show an increasing trend over time for older Americans. The share is generally higher for young households (around 10% for households headed by those aged between 18 and 34) and decreases as the head of household ages. These data suggest that although the debt payment-to-income ratio for elderly households is rising, this pattern might not indicate trouble meeting debt obligations. The Debt-to-Asset Ratio Another measure of debt burden is the debt-to-asset ratio. In addition to income, households can use assets to guard against financial risks. In general, the more assets a household has, the less likely it is to default on its debt. As predicted by the life-cycle model, the debt-to-asset ratio is generally lower for elderly households than for nonelderly households, but from 1989 to 2016, the ratio grew more quickly for elderly households than for nonelderly households. According to the SCF, the debt-to-asset ratio increased from 5.1% in 1989 to 9.0% in 2016 for elderly households with debt (see Figure 5 ), whereas the ratio remained relatively stable for nonelderly households, at around 20%, during the same time. Among all debt types, the residential debt-to-asset ratio, which increased from 2.7% in 1989 to 7.4% in 2016, contributed to a large proportion of the growth in the debt-to-asset ratio for elderly households. The debt-to-asset ratio reached 11.7% in 2010, including a residential debt-to-asset ratio of 10.0%, which might have resulted from the increased availability of mortgage credit through 2007. In addition to the rise in the debt-to-asset ratio, the proportion of elderly households whose debt-to-asset ratio was greater than 50% increased from 7.4% in 1989 to 11.2% in 2016. Bankruptcy Among Older Americans In addition to the increase in the debt-to-asset ratio, researchers have found a rise in the percentage of older Americans filing for relief under the bankruptcy code. Individuals may file for bankruptcy when they cannot meet their debt obligations. Scholars find that the proportion of bankruptcy filers aged 65 and older increased from 2.1% in 1991 to 12.2% in 2013-2016 (approximately 97,600 households), and the elderly cohort is the fastest-growing age demographic even after adjusting for the aging of the population. Those studies also suggest that although both younger (under age 65) and older (age 65 and older) bankruptcy debtors are financially struggling, older filers overall are in worse financial shape than younger filers in terms of secured and unsecured debt, income, assets, and the debt-to-income ratio. Bankruptcy can be even more problematic for older debtors than younger debtors because it is generally harder for them to accumulate assets postbankruptcy. For example, compared with younger debtors, elderly debtors are less likely to find well-paying jobs because of perceptions of decreasing productivity and are less likely to build retirement savings because they have less time to accumulate wealth. Scholars argue that if the debtors filed bankruptcy as a result of chronic illness, bankruptcy does not improve their health or access to affordable healthcare or prescriptions. For this and other reasons, research suggests that older bankruptcy filers are significantly more likely to continue to struggle financially than younger filers. Increased Debt Among Elderly Households by Age Groups Although household debt rose over the past three decades for elderly households overall and on average, the oldest Americans experienced the largest increase in debt. Among all elderly households, those headed by people aged 80 and older saw the fastest growth in the share of households with any debt, the median household debt, and the debt-to-asset ratio. Share of Elderly Households Holding Debt and Median Debt Figure 6 displays the share of elderly households who held any debt among four age groups from 1989 to 2016. In general, the proportion of elderly households with any debt declined with age for most survey years. For example, in 2016, about 70% of households headed by individuals aged 65-74 held debt, but the proportion was 61% for households in the 75-79 age group and 42% for those in the age group 80 and older. Over time, the proportion of elderly households with any debt increased for all age groups. In 2016, the share of households headed by those aged 65-69 with debt increased from 54.0% in 1989 to 69.8%, from 44.6% to 70.7% for the age group 70-74, from 27.6% to 60.7% for the age group 75-79, and from 12.5% to 41.5% for the age group 80 and older. Among all age groups, the largest growth was for the oldest age groups, aged 75-79 and aged 80 and older. Figure 7 shows median household debt among elderly households who had some debt by age groups from 1989 to 2016. Median household debt generally increased over time for each age group and peaked around the financial crisis. For households headed by those aged 80 and older, real median debt (in 2016 dollars) was $933 in 1989 and increased to $20,000 in 2016, almost 20 times greater. Average Debt and Components of Debt On average, elderly households in all age groups hold more debt today than did similar households three decades ago in real dollars (see Table 3 ). Among all types of debt, primary residential debt experienced the largest growth, increasing by between 315% and 536% within the four elderly age groups. Following primary residential debt, elderly households experienced growth in other residential debt, auto loans, credit card balances, and student loans. Elderly households held almost no student loans in 1989, but the average amount in 2016 increased to more than $2,000 for households headed by those aged 65 to 69 and more than $1,000 for households headed by those aged 70 to 79. The Debt-to-Asset Ratio The debt-to-asset ratio increased for all age groups among elderly households from 1989 to 2016, and the ratio increased the most among households headed by people aged 80 and older (see Figure 8 ). The debt-to-asset ratio among elderly households with any debt increased from 4.0% to 9.9% for households headed by those aged 65 to 69, from 7.1% to 9.8% for the age group 70-74, from 5.3% to 8.2% for the age group 75-79, and from 2.4% to 7.2% for the age group 80 and older. Residential debt explains the majority of the growth in total debt for every elderly household age group. Increased Debt Among Elderly Households by Quintile of Total Assets This section discusses changes in debt from 1989 to 2016 for elderly households with different asset levels. It is important to analyze changes in debt across the household asset distribution for several reasons. First, a small group of wealthy households hold high levels of assets and debt; thus, average measures may not accurately reflect less wealthy households' financial situations. Second, elderly households are more likely than their nonelderly counterparts to draw down existing assets, such as withdrawing from retirement savings accounts and other investment accounts. Asset measurement may provide an important view of an elderly household's ability to afford debt obligations. The change in household debt among elderly households from 1989 to 2016 varies widely across the household asset distribution. During this time period, elderly households in the middle of the asset distribution had a relatively larger growth in the probability of holding any debt, and those in the middle and the top of the asset distribution had the largest growth in median and average household debt. Elderly households in the bottom of the asset distribution usually held the least debt, but had the largest debt burden as reflected in the debt-to-asset ratio, whereas elderly households in the top of the asset distribution held the most debt, but had the smallest debt-to-asset ratio. Share of Elderly Households Holding Debt and Median Debt Table 4 presents data on household debt by quintile of the total asset distribution among the elderly household population. Each quintile represents 20% of the elderly household population. The first quintile depicts the 20% of the elderly household population with the least assets, and the fifth quintile depicts the 20% of elderly households with the most assets. The share of elderly households that held some debt generally increased from 1989 to 2016 for all asset quintiles. Elderly households in the first asset quintile were generally least likely to hold debt, and the share of those households who held any debt increased from 36.2% to 49.5%. Elderly households in the second, third, and fourth quintiles of total assets had the largest growth in the probability of holding any debt, with an increase of about 30 percentage points. The share of elderly households in the highest 20% of the asset distribution that held debt also increased from 37.3% in 1989 to 54.9% in 2016, but the increase was not as large as that among households in the middle of the asset distribution. Table 5 presents median debt among elderly households with any debt by quintile of total assets from 1989 to 2016. Median debt generally increased for elderly households in all asset quintiles, with a larger percentage increase for elderly households in the middle of the asset distribution. Real median debt (in 2016 dollars) increased by about three times for elderly households in the first and the fifth asset quintiles, and it increased by about four times or more for elderly households in the second, third, and fourth quintiles. Average Debt and Components of Debt Average debt generally increased from 1989 to 2016 for elderly households across the asset distribution, but the magnitude of growth differed among asset quintiles (see Table 6 ). Real average debt (in 2016 dollars) for elderly households in the lowest asset quintile was approximately twice as much in 2016 compared to 1989, whereas average debt for elderly households in the second through the fourth asset quintiles was generally three times as much in 2016 as in 1989. Average debt for households in the highest asset quintile also doubled, with the largest real increase of about $135,000. For households in the lowest asset quintile, the growth in average debt mainly resulted from growth in primary residential debt, credit card debt, and auto loans. From 1989 to 2016, the increase in average primary residential debt contributed to 54% of the growth in average debt. The increase in average credit card debt explained about 30% of the growth in average debt among elderly households in the bottom asset quintile, and the increase in average auto loans explained almost 20% of the growth in average debt among those households. The growth in debt among middle- and high-asset elderly households also mainly resulted from growth in residential debt. For higher-asset households, mortgage debt for second homes was also a part of this increase in debt. For households in the second through the fourth quintiles of total assets, growth in debt secured by primary residences generally accounted for about 80% of the growth in average debt. For households in the top asset quintile, growth in primary residential debt explained almost 70% of the growth in average debt, and the remaining 30% came mostly from other residential debt. In addition, elderly households in the bottom asset quintile were more likely to have a higher proportion of debt held in other debt, including lines of credit, installment loans, loans against pensions or life insurance, margin loans, and miscellaneous, but the proportion decreased from 1989 to 2016. Elderly households in the first asset quintile on average held about 45% of their debt in other debt in 1989, and this proportion has declined to 20% in 2016. The Debt-to Asset-Ratio Figure 9 displays the debt-to-asset ratio among elderly households with debt by total asset quintiles in 1989 and 2016, decomposed into residential and nonresidential debt-to-asset ratios. The debt-to-asset ratios for households in the lowest asset quintile decreased during this time, although the residential debt-to-asset ratio slightly increased. In 2016, however, elderly households in the bottom 20% of the asset distribution still had a 43% debt-to-asset ratio, and most of the debt was based on nonresidential loans, such as credit card debt, auto loans, and student loans, which are usually considered as less effective long-term wealth builders than residential loans. Among households in the second through the fourth asset quintiles, the debt-to-asset ratio generally increased by around 10 percentage points from 1989 to 2016, with most of the increase in the residential debt-to-asset ratio. The debt-to-asset ratio increased slightly for elderly households in the top asset quintile, primarily because of growth in the residential debt-to-asset ratio, including debt on both the primary residence and other residences. Conclusion Debt among households headed by individuals aged 65 and older has increased substantially over the past 30 years. The share of elderly households who held any debt almost doubled, and median debt among households with debt increased by about four times. Much of the rise in debt among older Americans is not necessarily associated with financial insecurity in retirement. Much of the change in debt among elderly households, across some age groups and through most of the asset distribution, is well balanced by their assets. As shown earlier, from 1989 to 2016, the debt-to-asset ratio among elderly households with debt increased from 5.1% to 9.0%. Individuals may also adjust behavior to meet their debt obligations. For instance, one study finds that both the presence and the level of debt increase the likelihood that older adults work and reduce the likelihood that they are retired. Data from the SCF also show that the percentage of elderly households with either the head of the household or a spouse working increased from 19.8% in 1989 to 29.7% in 2016. Rising debt among certain elderly households, however, has shown signs of an increase in debt burden. For example, the debt-to-asset ratio among households headed by individuals aged 80 and older increased by 5 percentage points between 1989 and 2016, and the ratio among elderly households with middle asset levels increased by more than 10 percentage points during the same time. Rising debt might be more problematic for persons aged 80 and older because they might be more vulnerable to income risks, as they are more likely to have lower or no earnings (as they phase out of the labor force), exhaust existing retirement resources, have reduced purchasing power in certain defined benefit pensions, and incur higher medical expenses. In addition, older Americans now hold historically high levels of housing debt, which might make them more vulnerable to housing market swings than previous cohorts of retirees. Therefore, in addition to retirement income and saving adequacy, debt management may also be an important determinant of retirement security.


Introduction In 1883, following the assassination of President James A. Garfield by disgruntled job seeker Charles Guiteau, the Pendleton Act was signed into law by President Chester A. Arthur to ensure that "government jobs be awarded on the basis of meritâ¦." The Pendleton Act ended the spoils system to ensure that qualified individuals were hired into federal service and to prevent the President from being "hounded by job seekers." With the advent of the merit system, federal employees found themselves serving longer in government while also being attracted to private-sector jobs related to their federal employment. The movement of employees between the private sector and government is often referred to as the revolving door . Generally, the revolving door is described as the movement of individuals between the public and private sector, and vice versa. Individuals may move because they possess policy and procedural knowledge and have relationships with former colleagues that are useful to prospective employers, either in government or in the private sector. Some observers see the revolving door as potentially valuable to both private-sector firms and the government; other observers believe that employees leaving government to join the industries they were regulating, or leaving the private sector to join a relevant government agency, could provide an unfair representational advantage and create the potential for conflicts of interest. While Congress has passed laws regulating the revolving door phenomenon in the executive branch, there has to date been little data available about the underlying phenomenon. This report provides data on the movement into and out of government by executive branch personnel in President George W. Bush's and President Barack Obama's Administrations. Using a dataset of executive branch Cabinet department officials compiled by graduate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in partnership with CRS, this report provides empirical data about the use of the revolving door by a subset of federal officials, with a particular focus on those who were registered lobbyists either before or after their government service. This report begins with an overview of existing revolving door laws and regulations that affect executive branch personnel. It next examines the potential advantages and disadvantages of the revolving door phenomenon. Data collected in partnership with the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University are then presented and analyzed. The data provide an empirical picture of the executive branch revolving door as it relates to registered lobbyists. This analysis is followed by a discussion of select issues for potential congressional consideration. The Revolving Door in the Executive Branch Revolving door provisions, which can include laws, regulations, and executive orders, are often considered as a subset of conflict-of-interest provisions that govern the interaction of government and nongovernmental individuals. While most historic revolving door provisions generally addressed individuals exiting government for work in the private sector, some have also addressed individuals entering government. Overall, revolving door conflict-of-interest laws have existed since the late 19 th century. The first identified conflict-of-interest provision was enacted in 1872. This provision generally prohibited a federal employee from dealing with matters in which they were involved prior to government service. In 1919, the first restrictions were placed on individuals who had specifically served as procurement officials from leaving government service "to solicit employment in the presentation or to aid or assist for compensation in the prosecution of claims against the United States arising out of any contracts or agreements for the procurement of supplies â¦ which were pending or entered into while the said officer or employee was associated therewith." Similarly, the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 649) included a provision making it Unlawful for any person employed in any Government agency â¦ during the period such person is engaged in such employment or service, to prosecute or to act as counsel attorney or agent for prosecuting, any claim against the United States, or for any such person within two years after the time when such employment or serve has ceased, to prosecute, or to act as counsel, attorney, or agent for prosecuting, any claim against the United States involving any subject matter directly connected with which such person was so employed or performed duty. In 1962, portions of the current statutory provision at 18 U.S.C. Â§207 were enacted as part of a major revision of federal conflict-of-interest laws. Since the 1960s, postemployment restriction laws have been amended several times, including by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to add certain one-year "cooling off" periods for high-level executive branch personnel and limit executive branch official postemployment advocacy (i.e., lobbying) activities; by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989; and by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, which extended the "cooling off" period to two years for "very senior" executive branch officials. Revolving door provisions, including conflict-of-interest laws and "cooling off" periods, were initially designed to protect government interests against former officials using proprietary information on behalf of a private party and current officials against inappropriately dealing with matters on which they were involved prior to government service. Additionally, they attempted to limit the possible influence and allure of potential private arrangements by federal officials when they interact with prospective private clients or would-be future employers while still employed by the government. Historically, the decision to adopt, or amend, revolving door and conflict-of-interest provisions has been balanced against the potential deterrent of restricting the movement of individuals between the public and private sector. For example, in 1977, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs reported a bill that would have amended the existing revolving door provisions. As part of its justification for the measure, the committee explained the need to balance the appearance of impropriety against the need to attract skilled government workers. Its report noted the following: 18 USC Â§207, like other conflict of interest statutes, seeks to avoid even the appearance of public office being used for personnel or private gain. In striving for public confidence in the integrity of government, it is imperative to remember that what appears to be true is often as important as what is true. Thus government in its dealings must make every reasonable effort to avoid even the appearance of conflict of interest and favoritism. But, as with other desirable policies, it can be pressed too far. Conflict of interest standards must be balanced with the government's objective in attracting experienced and qualified persons to public service. Both are important, and a conflicts policy cannot focus on one to the detriment of the other. There can be no doubt that overly stringent restrictions have a decidedly [sic] adverse impact on the government's ability to attract and retain able and experienced persons in federal office. The revolving door allows movement in both directions, with individuals both entering and exiting government. Some past researchers have argued that those who enter government with prior industry experience are more supportive of regulated industry than those without industry experience. Similarly, two studies have concluded that the lure of private-sector employment has led regulators to support the regulated industry during their time in government. Whether or not the revolving door on net helps or hinders the functioning of government agencies may depend, however, on the potential benefits of transitioning individuals between government and the private sector versus the potential for conflicts of interest to develop on the part of those individuals. Some studies have identified positive aspects of the revolving door and the relationships developed between regulators and the regulated. Other studies find that government agencies are better run with stable leadership that does not often utilize the revolving door and keeps some distance between the agency and the regulated industry. Existing Revolving Door Laws and Executive Orders Current laws and regulations generally govern the movement of federal employees from the government to the private sector and vice versa. These provisions can be divided into three categories: broadly applicable postemployment laws, supplemental regulations, and executive order requirements. Revolving door provisions, however, do not necessarily apply to all instances of an employee leaving government service. Rather, they are specific to covered officials (see below) who leave government and are then involved with an issue they were also involved in while a federal employee. For some circumstances, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) "has emphasized that the term [ particular matter ] typically involves a specific proceeding affecting the legal rights of the parties, or an isolatable transaction or related set of transactions between identified parties." Postemployment Laws Initially enacted in 1962, 18 U.S.C. Â§207 provides a series of postemployment restrictions and was enacted "to prevent former Government employees from leveraging relationships forged during their Government service to assist others in their dealings with the Government." These include a lifetime ban on "switching sides" on a particular matter involving specific parties on which any executive branch employee had worked personally and substantially while with the government; a two-year ban on "switching sides" on a somewhat broader range of matters that were under the employee's official responsibility; a one-year restriction on assisting others on certain trade or treaty negotiations; a one-year "cooling off" period for certain "senior" officials, barring representational communications before their former departments or agencies; a two-year "cooling off" period for "very senior" officials, barring representational communications and attempts to influence certain other high-ranking officials in the entire executive branch of government; and a one-year ban on certain officials performing some representational or advisory activities for foreign governments or foreign political parties. Current law focuses on postemployment restrictions of former federal employees rather than on individuals entering government. These postemployment laws focus on "representational" activities of former federal employees and are "designed to protect against the improper use of influence and government information by former employees, as well as to limit the potential influence that a prospective employment arrangement may have on current federal officials when dealing with prospective private clients or future employers while still in government service." One study found the appeal of postemployment contact with the government to be strong, especially when there is a "demand for the personnel credentials" of former officials within an industry, and when former officials can move from a regulatory agency to the regulated industry. The revolving door restrictions are in addition to statutes that apply more broadly to all individuals engaged in certain representational activities, regardless of whether they ever worked for the federal government. These restrictions, found primarily in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), however, do not prohibit any particular behavior. Rather, they require registration as a foreign agent or lobbyist and the periodic disclosure of information about influence activities. Supplemental Regulations Regulations for the implementation of revolving door provisions are issued by OGE. Found at 5 C.F.R. Â§2641, these regulations provide an overview and definitions for current revolving door, postemployment conflict-of-interest restrictions; list prohibitions covered by the regulations and the law; and provide a summary of statutory exceptions and waivers. The OGE regulations pertain only to postemployment restrictions found at 18 U.S.C. Â§207 and only to executive branch employees. In some cases, agencies have issued additional regulations that supplement OGE's regulations. For example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance on the application of postemployment restrictions to all government employees, whereas the Federal Housing Finance Agency provides specific additional postemployment restrictions for its employees. Executive Order Ethics Pledges In several instances, the President has issued an executive order to influence the interactions and relationships between the public and the executive branch. For example, President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order (E.O. 10939) that included provisions for behavior by government employees. In the years after President Kennedy's Administration, other Presidents also issued ethics executive orders to address postgovernment revolving door restrictions. These executive orders were issued by President Lyndon Johnson, President Richard Nixon, President Ronald Reagan, and President George H. W. Bush. In more recent Administrations, three Presidents have each issued an executive order that included additional revolving door restrictions for certain Administration appointees. They are President Clinton (1993), President Obama (2009), and President Trump (2017). Each of these executive orders contained an ethics pledge that provided additional conflict-of-interest requirements for executive branch personnel leaving the government and for individuals entering government. Each also extended statutory and regulatory revolving door provisions, included additional restrictions on lobbyists entering government and lobbying back government upon departure, and in two instances (Clinton and Trump) contained restrictions on former appointees leaving the government to represent a foreign principal. For a more detailed discussion of executive order ethics pledges, see CRS Report R44974, Ethics Pledges and Other Executive Branch Appointee Restrictions Since 1993: Historical Perspective, Current Practices, and Options for Change , by Jacob R. Straus. Revolving Door: Advantages and Disadvantages Discussion of whether revolving door restrictions are positive or negative generally focuses on whether former government employees, when they switch jobs, have an inherent or perceived conflict of interest. Though legislation often treats the revolving door as a negative trend, the movement of individuals between the government and private sector may also present multiple potential benefits. One argument in favor of the revolving door, for example, is that the promise of future private-sector employment could potentially improve the quality of candidates applying for government jobs. Further, direct connections with government officials are important, but a close relationship is not necessarily what drives postemployment activities. Although some believe that government employees contemplating a move to the private sector will be friendly to industry interests at the expense of the public interest, two studies have also concluded that regulators instead may engage in more aggressive actions, regardless of their future job prospects. Additionally, the flow of personnel between the public and private sectors may increase the knowledge base of both sectors. Critics of the revolving door and the movement of employees between the government and private sector often advocate for longer "cooling off" periods and stronger restrictions related to conflicts of interest. Additionally, critics often assert that the revolving door has negative effects for the transparency and efficiency of government. These critics see existing bias between those in government and their connections with lobbying firms and the potential for those connections to be exploited when the individual is employed by the private sector. Additional criticism of the revolving door focuses on the worth of a former government employee over time. One study has concluded that a majority of revenue generated by private lobbying firms was directly attributable to employees with previous government experience. Another study found that "'who you know' rather than 'what you know' drives a good proportion of lobbying revenues." Research Design and Methodology In every Administration, executive branch officials arrive from, and depart to, the private sector. The movement between the government and the private sector touches on many industries and professions. When such movement occurs, it is possible that conflicts of interest could arise for current and former government officials. Data on executive branch employees entering and exiting the government have historically been difficult to compile. During the 2017-2018 academic year (September 2017 to May 2018), CRS partnered with graduate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University to collect and analyze data on the revolving door. Data were collected on the subset of former executive branch officials who were listed in the United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (the Plum Book ). Published every four years, the Plum Book "lists over 7,000 Federal civil service leadership and support positions â¦ that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment, nationwide. Data covers positions such as agency heads and their immediate subordinates, policy executives and advisors, and aides who report to these officials." The positions listed in the Plum Book are political appointments, which represent a subset of executive branch employees. Therefore, this report presents data on that subset of individuals who have worked in these executive branch positions. Additionally, since the Plum Book is published only once every four years, it is a "snapshot" of a given Administration's appointees and includes only individuals who were serving at the time of publication. Four Plum Books were used to build a dataset of political appointees who served in President George W. Bush's and President Barack Obama's Administrations. Overall, 6,665 federal appointees were included spanning the two Administrations. Table 1 reports the number of appointees from each Administration included in this dataset. If an appointee served in more than one Administration, data reported are for the most recent Administration served. Appointees were not included in the dataset twice. Further, if an appointee left the Administration prior to the Plum Book 's publication, then they do not appear in the data. Political appointees included in the dataset represented 15 Cabinet departments and were paid at the GS-13 level or higherâa pay rate generally considered to have supervisory authority in the executive branch. Table 2 lists the Cabinet departments included in this study and the number of employees from that Cabinet department included in the dataset. For most individuals and industries, data on both pregovernment and postgovernment service is not readily obtainable from public sources. Therefore, this report uses official Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) data on registered lobbyists to gain insight into the revolving door phenomenon. Administered by the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate, LDA registration data are required by law to be published online. The LDA database includes all registration and disclosure statements for lobbyists and is searchable by name, lobbying firm, or lobbying client. Since the Plum Book provides the names of former executive branch officials, the LDA database was searched to match pregovernment and postgovernment service of individuals registered as lobbyists. Appointees were classified as lobbyists if they were registered under LDA at any time before or after their government service, regardless of the duration of their registration. These data, which reflect a subset of people who move between employment in the private sector and government in either direction, are the focus of this report's analysis. Revolving Door Lobbyists in the Executive Branch Overall Patterns Of Bush and Obama Administration executive branch appointees in the dataset, approximately 92% (6,159) were never registered as lobbyists, while 8% (506) were registered either before, after, or both before and after their government service. Of those registered as lobbyists, approximately 36.5% registered before joining the government, 55.1% registered after leaving their executive branch jobs, and 8.3% registered both before and after their federal service. Overall, these numbers generally appear to be in line with other studies of the executive branch, which suggest that most high-level federal appointees were not employed as lobbyists either prior to, or after, their government service. Examining the number and percentage of lobbyists in the dataset by Administration ( Table 3 ) shows that the overall levels of registered lobbyists either before or after government service is relatively low in both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration, however, had more of its appointees who were registered lobbyists before their government service than after their government service, while the Bush Administration had more of its appointees who were registered lobbyists after their government service than before their government service. As shown in Table 3 , the total number of registered lobbyists in the dataset from the Bush Administration (340) was higher overall than from the Obama Administration (166), although the number of lobbyists serving in either Administration is not particularly large compared to the total number of appointees included in the dataset. During his Administration, President Obama instituted an executive order to restrict the number of lobbyists entering the Administration, a policy that did not exist in the Bush Administration. The number of individuals who were registered lobbyists before serving in President Obama's first term is similar to the first term of the Bush Administration. The number of lobbyists entering government, however, was higher in President Obama's second term than in either the Bush Administration or President Obama's first term. For individuals leaving the Administration, the number of registered lobbyists is lower in the Obama Administration than in the Bush Administration. Department Trends In the dataset, Cabinet departments differed greatly in the number of officials who were registered lobbyists either before or after their federal service. Some departments had few individuals who were registered lobbyists either before or after their time in government, whereas others had more. Figure 1 reports the percentage of registered lobbyists by department in the dataset collected by the Bush School of Government and Public Service and CRS. As shown in Figure 1 , the percentage of federal appointees in the dataset who registered as lobbyists before their government service, after their government service, or both ranges from a high of 18% (Department of Commerce) to a low of 1% (Department of Justice). The figures for other agencies ranges between 2% and 17%. The overall percentages of Cabinet department officials in the dataset who have ever been registered lobbyists might raise some questions for future research on the connections between government agencies and regulated industries. For example, some agencies appear to have a higher percentage of lobbyists than other agencies. Could a high percentage of lobbyists indicate stronger links to regulated industries? Similarly, how might lobbyists entering government differ in their government-industry connection than lobbyists leaving government? Might maintaining government-industry connections allow for better outreach by government agencies and access to information and resources by interest groups? The timing of when lobbyists registered may provide additional insight into how often federal officials in the dataset utilized the revolving door between government and lobbying. Figure 2 shows the percentage of LDA-registered officials at various agencies divided by when they registeredâbefore their service, after their service, or both. As Figure 2 shows, every Cabinet department for which data were gathered had some number of officials listed in the Plum Book who registered as lobbyists either before or after their government service, or both. The number of officials in the dataset identified as registered lobbyists is noted on the left-hand side of Figure 2 next to the name of the federal department at which they worked. As the figure shows, each department had a different mix of the percentage of its officials in the dataset identified as registered lobbyists who registered to lobby before their government service, after their government service, or both. The percentage of the total number of lobbyists who worked at a particular agency who were registered lobbyists before their government service ranged from 10% in the Department of Labor to 61% in the Department of Veterans Affairs. The percentage of the total number of lobbyists who worked at a particular agency who were registered lobbyists after their government service ranged from 39% in the Department of Veterans Affairs to 82% in the Department of Transportation. Additionally, all departments included in the data except the Department of Veterans Affairs had individuals who were registered lobbyists before and after their government service. For the Department of Labor, half of officials who were lobbyists registered both before and after their government service. For other agencies, the percentages ranged from 1% (Department of State) to 19% (Department of Housing and Urban Development). Conclusions and Selected Considerations for Congress In every Administration, individuals move between the public and private sectors. In recent years, there has been greater focus on potential additional restrictions that might be placed on individuals entering and exiting government through the introduction of legislation to amend current revolving door restrictions and the issuance of executive orders to temporarily increase the "cooling off" period for executive branch appointees. Current law compartmentalizes the revolving door by placing distinctive postemployment restrictions on different types of government employees. For example, restrictions on government officials engaged in contracting do not necessarily apply to nonprocurement or noncontracting employees. Such varying restrictions were enacted because "the present complexity and size of Executive departments require occasional separate treatment of certain departmental agencies and bureaus. It would be patently unfair in some cases to apply the one year no contact prohibition to certain employees for the purpose of an entire departmentâwhen, in reality, the agency in which he worked was separate and distinct from the larger entity." Amending "Cooling Off" Periods In past Congresses, legislation has been introduced to lengthen revolving door "cooling off" periods. Those measures often propose extending "cooling off" periods to as few as two years to instituting a lifetime ban. If enacted, increased restrictions could serve to diminish the interaction between former government officials and government agencies and could reduce the appeal of leaving the government for a private-sector position. Additionally, such additional restrictions might "eliminate the appearance of favoritism a former official may have in lobbying his or her former office, and â¦ prevent a former official from financially benefiting from the use of confidential information obtained while working for the Federal Government." Conversely, extending the "cooling off" period could possibly be seen as an unreasonable restriction on postemployment and "curtailing an individual's constitutional right of free association." Alternatively, Congress could reduce or eliminate the "cooling off" period. Having a shorter "cooling off" period, or eliminating it altogether, might arguably increase the talent pool available both inside and outside the government. Finally, Congress could codify past executive branch ethics pledges that generally placed additional restrictions on executive branch appointees. Codifying ethics pledge provisions would have the effect of making those changes permanent, and not subject to being revoked by a future executive order. This could allow for permanent changes to existing ethics and conflict-of-interest provisions. Administration of the Revolving Door Administration and enforcement of revolving door provisions are spread among several entities. For example, each agency is responsible for collecting financial disclosure statements from individual employees and ensuring that they comply with conflict-of-interest provisions, including revolving door restrictions. Potential violations of revolving door laws, however, would likely be prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Congress could amend current law to consolidate the administration and enforcement of conflict of interest and revolving door provisions. Consolidation could provide a single office to help ensure compliance and enforcement of existing laws. Consolidation, however, would potentially add an additional layer to the collection and evaluation documents used to identify potential conflicts-of-interest or revolving door concerns. Since each agency collects financial disclosure forms from its employees, those forms would still need to be transmitted to a central location. Ethics enforcement, including the review of financial disclosure forms for potential conflicts of interest, has historically been conducted at the agency level, as each agency is often in the best position to determine whether a real or perceived conflict exists for its employees. Maintain Current Revolving Door Standards Congress might determine that current revolving door laws and regulations are effective or that the potential costs of changes outweigh potential benefits. Instead of amending existing revolving door provisions, Congress could continue to use existing law and regulations to govern the movement of individuals between the federal government and private sector. Changes to the revolving door could be made on an as-needed basis through modifications to executive branch regulations or executive orders.