Introduction Article III, Section I of the Constitution provides that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Consequently, Congress determines through legislative action both the size and structure of the federal judiciary. For example, the size of the federal judiciary is determined, in part, by the number of U.S. circuit and district court judgeships authorized by Congress. Congress has, at numerous times over the years, authorized an increase in the number of such judgeships in order to meet the workload-based needs of the federal court system. The Judicial Conference of the United States, the national policymaking body of the federal courts, makes biennial recommendations to Congress to assist it in identifying any U.S. circuit and district courts that may be in need of additional judgeships. The most recent recommendations for new U.S. circuit and district court judgeships were released by the Judicial Conference in March 2019. U.S. Circuit Courts U.S. courts of appeals, or circuit courts, take appeals from U.S. district court decisions and are also empowered to review the decisions of many administrative agencies. When hearing a challenge to a district court decision from a court located within its geographic circuit, the task of a court of appeals is to determine whether or not the law was applied correctly by the district court. Cases presented to U.S. circuit courts are generally considered by judges sitting in three-member panels (circuit courts do not use juries). The nation is divided into 12 geographic circuits, each with a U.S. court of appeals. There is also one nationwide circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has specialized subject matter jurisdiction. Altogether, 179 judgeships for these 13 circuit courts are currently authorized by law (167 for the 12 regional circuits and 12 for the Federal Circuit). The First Circuit (comprising Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico) has the fewest number of authorized judgeships, 6, while the Ninth Circuit (comprising Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) has the most, 29. U.S. District Courts U.S. district courts are the federal trial courts of general jurisdiction. These trial courts determine facts and apply legal principles to resolve disputes. Trials are conducted by a district court judge (although a U.S. magistrate judge may also conduct a trial involving a misdemeanor). Each state has at least one district court (there is also one district court in each of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). States with more than one district court are divided into judicial districts, with each district having one district court. For example, California is divided into four judicial districtsâeach with its own district court. Altogether there are 91 U.S. district courts. There are 673 Article III U.S. district court judgeships currently authorized by law. Congress has authorized between 1 and 28 judgeships for each U.S. district court. Specifically, the district court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma (Muskogee) has 1 authorized judgeship, the smallest number among U.S. district courts. The district courts located in the Southern District of New York (Manhattan) and the Central District of California (Los Angeles) each have 28 authorized judgeships, the most among U.S. district courts. The Role of Congress in Creating New Judgeships Congress first exercised its constitutional power to determine the size and structure of the federal judiciary with passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The act authorized 19 judgeships, 13 for district courts and 6 for the Supreme Court. Congress, however, began expanding the size of the judiciary almost immediatelyâadding two additional district court judgeships in 1790 and another in 1791. Changes in the Number of U.S. Circuit and District Court Judgeships from 1891 through 2018 As the population of the country increased, its geographic boundaries expanded, and federal case law became more complex, the number of judgeships authorized by Congress continued to increase during the 19 th and 20 th centuries. By the end of 1900 Congress had, under Article III, authorized a total of 28 U.S. circuit court judgeships and 67 district court judgeships. By the end of 1950, there were an additional 37 circuit court judgeships authorized (for a total of 65) and 145 additional district court judgeships (for a total of 212). By the end of 2000, there were a total of 179 circuit court judgeships and 661 district court judgeships. At present, there remain 179 circuit court judgeships, while the number of district court judgeships has increased to 673. Figure 1 shows the change, over time, in the number of U.S. circuit and district court judgeships authorized by Congress from 1891 through 2018. U.S. Circuit Court Judgeships The largest increase in the number of circuit court judgeships occurred in 1978 during the 95 th Congress when the number of judgeships increased by 35, from 97 to 132. The second-largest increase occurred in 1984 during the 98 th Congress when the number of judgeships increased by 24, from 144 to 168. The next-largest increase in circuit court judgeships also occurred during the 97 th Congressâin 1982 the number of circuit court judgeships increased by 12, from 132 to 144. The 12 judgeships authorized by Congress in 1982 were for the newly established U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The number of circuit court judgeships increased to 179 in 1990 during the 101 st Congress and has remained at that number to the present day. This represents the longest period of time since the creation of the U.S. courts of appeals in 1891 that Congress has not authorized any new circuit court judgeships. U.S. District Court Judgeships The largest increase in the number of district court judgeships occurred in 1978 during the 95 th Congress when the number of judgeships increased by 117, from 394 to 511. The next-largest increase in district court judgeships occurred in 1990 during the 101 st Congress when the number of judgeships increased by 74, from 571 to 645. The third-largest increase in the number of district court judgeships occurred in 1961 during the 87 th Congress when the number of judgeships increased by 62, from 241 to 303. The number of permanent district court judgeships increased to 663 in 2003 during the 108 th Congress and has remained at that number to the present day. This represents the longest period of time since district courts were established in 1789 that Congress has not authorized any new permanent district court judgeships. Ratio of District Court Judgeships to Circuit Court Judgeships The ratio of the number of authorized district court judgeships to circuit court judgeships has also varied during this period. In 1899 there were 2.3 district court judgeships authorized for every circuit court judgeship (this was the lowest value in the ratio of district to circuit court judgeships). In contrast, in 1970 there were 4.1 district court judgeships authorized for every circuit court judgeship (this was the highest value in the ratio of district to circuit court judgeships). The median ratio of district court judgeships to circuit court judgeships during the entire period (from 1891 through 2018) was 3.5. Most recently, for each year from 2010 through 2018, there were 3.8 district court judgeships for every circuit court judgeship authorized by Congress. Temporary Judgeships In some instances, Congress has authorized the creation of temporary judgeships rather than permanent judgeships. A permanent judgeship , as the term suggests, permanently increases the number of judgeships in a district or circuit, while a temporary judgeship increases the number of judgeships in a district or circuit for a limited period of time. Temporary judgeships are sometimes considered preferable by Congress if a court is dealing with an increased workload deemed to be temporary in nature (e.g., when workload increases as a result of new federal legislation or a recent Supreme Court ruling) or if Congress is uncertain about whether a recent workload increase is temporary or permanent in nature. Once a temporary judgeship is created, Congress may later choose to extend the existence of a temporary judgeship beyond the date it was initially set to lapse or expire. When extending a temporary judgeship, Congress specifies the number of years the judgeship will continue to exist. Congress can also convert a temporary judgeship to a permanent one. If Congress does not extend a temporary judgeship or change it to a permanent one, the temporary judgeship eventually lapses. If a judgeship lapses it means that, for the court with the temporary judgeship, the first vacancy on or after a specified date is not filled. By not filling the first vacancy that arises after a temporary judgeship lapses, the number of judgeships for a court returns to the number authorized by Congress prior to the authorization of the temporary judgeship. At present, there are 179 permanent U.S. circuit court judgeships and no temporary circuit court judgeships. Additionally, there are 663 permanent U.S. district court judgeships and 10 temporary district court judgeships. These temporary judgeships are listed alphabetically by state in Table 1 . Legislation Creating New Judgeships Since 1977 Congress has a variety of legislative vehicles at its disposal to establish new U.S. circuit and district court judgeships. Legislation that authorizes new judgeships must pass both the House and Senate (and is also subject to a presidential veto). Such legislation does not always involve either or both of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. As discussed further below, Congress has sometimes used the appropriations process to provide the judiciary with additional district court judgeships. Omnibus Judgeship Bills If it desires to create a relatively large number of judgeships at one time, Congress may choose to use an "omnibus judgeships bill." An omnibus judgeships bill, for the purposes of this report, is either a stand-alone bill or a title of a larger bill concerned exclusively or mostly with the creation of federal judgeships. Since 1977 Congress has enacted three omnibus judgeship bills, with the most recent omnibus bill enacted in 1990. Information related to these three pieces of legislation is presented in Table 2 . Each of the three omnibus bills was first introduced in the House and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 passed the House in its final form by a vote of 292-112 and the Senate by a vote of 67-15. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 passed the House in its final form by a vote of 394-0 and the Senate by voice vote. Most recently, the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 passed both the House and Senate in its final form by voice vote. Each of the three bills was passed in a different political context (in terms of whether there was unified or divided party control of the presidency and Congress). In 1978, there was unified Democratic control of the presidency, the Senate, and the House. In 1984, there was divided party controlâwith Republicans controlling the presidency and Senate while Democrats were the majority party in the House. Finally, in 1990, there was also divided party controlâwith Republicans controlling the presidency and Democrats holding majorities in both the Senate and House. Since the last omnibus judgeships bill passed Congress in 1990, the overall workload of U.S. circuit and district courts has increased. From 1990 through the end of FY2018, filings in the U.S. courts of appeals increased by 15%, while filings in U.S. district courts increased by 39%. In terms of specific types of cases, civil cases increased by 34% during the same period, and cases involving criminal felony defendants increased by 60%. For civil cases, the greatest growth occurred in cases related to personal injury liability; many of these filings are part of multidistrict litigation actions involving pharmaceutical cases. Appropriations and Authorization Bills In the past, Congress has at times created a relatively smaller number of judgeships through other legislative vehicles. In recent years this has been the most common method of creating new judgeships, with Congress authorizing a relatively small number of new judgeships using appropriations and authorization bills. This has occurred on three occasions in the past 19 years and has involved only the creation of new district court judgeships (not circuit court judgeships). Overall, 34 new district court judgeships were created between 1999 and 2003 using appropriations and authorization bills. Information related to these three pieces of legislation is presented in Table 3 . The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 received final approval in the House by a vote of 296-135 and in the Senate by a vote of 74-24. The District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2001 passed in its final form in the House by a vote of 206-198 and in the Senate by a vote of 48-43. The 21 st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act passed in its final form in the House by a vote of 400-4 and in the Senate by a vote of 93-5. Each of the three bills was passed during periods of divided party control. In 1999 and 2000, Democrats held the presidency while Republicans held both the House and Senate. In 2002, Republicans held the presidency and were the majority party in the House while Democrats were the majority party in the Senate. Congress has also routinely used appropriations bills to extend temporary district court judgeships that were initially authorized in prior years. Additionally, Congress has used an authorization bill to convert several temporary district court judgeships to permanent ones. Bills That Restructure the Judiciary Finally, Congress may choose to establish new judgeships when passing an act that would, at least in part, restructure the federal judiciary. This occurred, for example, in 1982 when Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The creation of the Federal Circuit was a partial restructuring of the judiciary by Congress, as it led to merging the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Claims to create the new Federal Circuit. In creating the new court, Congress authorized 12 permanent circuit court judgeships. Biennial Recommendations by the Judicial Conference for New Judgeships While Congress is constitutionally responsible for determining the size and structure of the federal judiciary, the judiciary itself can recommend legislation that alters or affects the size and structure of the federal court system. This includes legislation to increase the number of U.S. circuit and district court judgeships (and to identify which judicial circuits and districts are most in need of new judgeships). The Judicial Conference of the United States, the national policymaking body for the federal courts, is the institutional entity within the judiciary that is responsible for making the judiciary's recommendations for new judgeships. The Judicial Conference may recommend to Congress that new judgeships be either permanent or temporary. Additionally, the Judicial Conference may recommend that a temporary judgeship be extended or converted into a permanent one, or that a judgeship serving multiple districts be assigned to a single judicial district or dual districts. The Judicial Conference makes its judgeship recommendations biennially, typically in March or April at the beginning of a new Congress. Process Used to Evaluate Need for New Judgeships In long-standing practice, the Judicial Conference, through its committee structure, periodically reviews and evaluates the judgeship needs of all U.S. circuit and district courts. Specifically, the Conference uses a formal survey process to determine if any courts require additional judges in order to appropriately administer civil and criminal justice in the federal court system. The multistep survey process is conducted biennially by the Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics and takes into account current workload factors and the local circumstances of each court. The process is very similar for both the courts of appeals and the district courts. First, a court submits a detailed justification for additional judgeships to the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics. The subcommittee then reviews and evaluates the court's request and prepares an initial recommendation that is given to both the court and the judicial council for the circuit where the requesting court is located. The circuit judicial council itself then reviews the new judgeship request and makes its recommendation to the subcommittee (which subsequently does a second analysis using the most recent caseload data). The subcommittee prepares its final judgeship recommendation for approval by the Committee on Judicial Resources. The committee's recommendation is then provided to the Judicial Conference for final approval (prior to being transmitted to Congress). This multistep evaluation and recommendation process is used for each court that submitted a new judgeship request to the subcommittee. Factors Used to Evaluate the Need for New Judgeships In evaluating a court's judgeship request the Judicial Conference examines whether certain caseload levels have been met, as well as court-specific information that might uniquely affect the court making the request. Filings per Authorized Judgeship The caseload levels of the courts determine the standards by which the Judicial Conference begins to consider any requests for additional judgeships. The caseload level of a court is expressed as filings per authorized judgeship, assuming all vacancies on the court are filled. The specific measure or statistic related to case filings that the Judicial Conference examines for U.S. circuit courts is called adjusted filings per panel . The standard used by the Judicial Conference as its starting point for evaluating any judgeship request by a circuit court is 500 adjusted filings per panel (based on authorized judgeships). The specific measure related to case filings that the Judicial Conference examines for U.S. district courts is called weighted filings per authorized judgeship . The standard used by the Judicial Conference as its starting point for evaluating any judgeship request by a district court is 430 weighted filings per authorized judgeship after accounting for any additional judgeships that would be recommended by the Conference. For smaller district courts, however, with fewer than 5 authorized judgeships, the standard used is current weighted filings above 500 per judgeship (since accounting for any new judgeships in the calculation would often reduce, for these smaller courts, the weighted filings per authorized judgeship below the 430 level). Other Considerations While caseload statistics are important in evaluating a court's request for additional judgeships, the Judicial Conference also considers court-specific information that might affect the judgeship needs of a particular court. According to the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, "other factors are also considered that would make a court's situation unique and provide support either for or against a recommendation for additional judgeships." These factors include the availability of senior, visiting, and magistrate judges to provide assistance; geographic factors; unusual caseload activity; temporary increases or decreases in a court's workload; and any other factors that an individual court highlights as important in the evaluation of its judgeship needs. Most Recent Recommendations for New Judgeships (116th Congress) The Judicial Conference's most recent recommendations to Congress for new circuit and district court judgeships were made in March 2019. The Conference recommended that Congress authorize 5 new circuit court judgeships and 65 new permanent district court judgeships (as well as convert 8 existing temporary district court judgeships to permanent status). Judicial Circuits Recommended for New Judgeships The Judicial Conference recommended that Congress establish five new judgeships for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit given its "consistently high level of adjusted filings [per three-judge panel]" and the court's "heavy pending caseload." In June 2018, the Ninth Circuit had 740 adjusted filings per panel (the third highest among the 11 regional circuits). Congressional authorization of 5 additional judgeships for the Ninth Circuit would increase the number of authorized judgeships for the circuit from 29 to 34 and increase the total number of circuit court judgeships, nationally, from 179 to 184. Judicial Districts Recommended for New Judgeships The Judicial Conference recommended that Congress establish 65 new judgeships for 27 judicial districts (with more than one judgeship recommended for some districts) and convert 8 temporary district court judgeships to permanent positions. Figure 2 shows the 27 judicial districts for which the Conference has recommended new judgeships. Of the 27 districts, the Conference recommended the creation of more than one new judgeship in 15 (or 56% of districts). The greatest number of new judgeships, 10, was recommended for the Central District of California (composed of Los Angeles County and six other counties). The Central District of California is the most populous judicial district in the country, with a population of nearly 19.5 million. Of the 73 new district court judgeships recommended by the Judicial Conference (which includes converting 8 temporary judgeships to permanent positions), 45 (or 62%) are recommended for district courts located in the country's three most populous statesâCalifornia, Texas, and Florida. Of the 45 judgeships, 23 are recommended for district courts in California, 11 for courts in Texas, and 11 for courts in Florida. Altogether, there are 10 new judgeships recommended for district courts located in four southwestern states (Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico). There are also nine new judgeships recommended for district courts located in three northeastern states (Delaware, New Jersey, and New York). The remaining nine judgeships are recommended for courts located in other states. Many of the U.S. district courts recommended to receive new judgeships hold court in some of the nation's most populous citiesâincluding, but not limited to, Dallas (Northern District of Texas); Houston (Southern District of Texas); Jacksonville (Middle District of Florida); Los Angeles (Central District of California); New York City (Southern District of New York); Phoenix (District of Arizona); San Antonio (Western District of Texas); San Diego (Southern District of California); San Francisco (Northern District of California); and San Jose (Northern District of California). U.S. District Courts Identified as Having Urgent Need for New Judgeships During the Judicial Conference's March 2011 proceedings, the Conference authorized the Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to pursue separate congressional legislation for Conference-approved additional judgeships for certain district courts meeting a designated threshold of weighted filings. The purpose of such a policy change was to enable the Director "to focus Congress' attention on those courts determined to have the greatest need based on specific parameters." The Conference's most recent recommendations identified six district courts with an urgent need for new judgeships, stating that these particular courts "continue to struggle with extraordinarily high and sustained workloads." These district courts include the Western District of Texas, Eastern District of California, Southern District of Florida, Southern District of Indiana, and the Districts of New Jersey and Delaware. The "severity of conditions" in these districts, according to the Conference, "require immediate action." Consequently, the Conference urged Congress "to establish, as soon as possible, new judgeships in those districts." The Conference's final judgeship recommendations describe select caseload statistics for each of these six district courts. These descriptions, provided in part below, are based upon the biennial survey process conducted by the Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics. The Conference's recommendations, quoted at length below, note the change in different types of filings that occurred between September 2017 and June 2018. The September 2017 date was used as the "cut-off date" by the subcommittee to make its initial judgeship recommendations (it was the most recent date for which the subcommittee had caseload data prior to the start of the survey process). The June 2018 reporting date was used by the subcommittee to make its final judgeship recommendations (it was the most recent date for which the Conference had caseload data available prior to submitting its recommendations to Congress). Western District of Texas . From September 2017 to June 2018, overall filings in the court increased by 13% "due to an increase in criminal felony filings. Criminal filings rose 28 percent due to a 48 percent increase in immigration filings. The increase was partially offset by moderate declines in drug and fraud prosecutions. Criminal filings are now the highest in the nation at 644 per judgeship. The number of civil cases filed fell three percent as declines in prisoner petitions and private contract litigation more than offset increases in tort actions, copyright litigation, and patent filings." The Conference also notes that the number of supervised release hearings declined 11% but is currently more than twice the national average at 109 per judgeship. Eastern District of California . The "number of civil cases filed [excluding contract actions related to a multidistrict litigation action] rose four percent as cases related to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act more than doubled and prisoner petitions rose substantially, more than offsetting a decline in real property litigation. Civil filings continue to exceed 700 per judgeship, among the highest in the nation [even if the multidistrict litigation action is excluded]. The number of criminal felony filings rose 12 percent as a result of increases in most types of offenses, the largest of which occurred in firearms prosecutions." The Conference also notes that criminal filings in the Eastern District of California, at 99 per judgeship, remain below the national average. Southern District of Florida . The overall filings in the district "rose two percent due to moderate increases in both civil and criminal filings. The number of civil cases filed rose three percent as increases in insurance contract cases, torts filings, and civil rights litigations were partially offset by declines in Fair Labor Standards Act cases, prisoner petitions, cases related to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and social security appeals....The number of criminal felony filings increased two percent as increases in most offense types, the largest of which occurred in fraud prosecutions, more than offset" a decline in drug, burglary, larceny, and theft filings. The Conference also notes that the district court's pending caseload "remains substantially below the national average." Southern District of Indiana . Since September 2017, "the court experienced an influx of over 2,200 personal injury product liability filings related to a multidistrict litigation (MDL) action in which the district serves as the transferee court. Apart from these cases, overall filings fell two percent as a decline in civil filings was partially offset by an increase in criminal filings. The number of civil cases filed decreased four percent as declines in social security appeals, civil rights cases, and federal prisoner petitions were partially offset by an increase in state prisoner petitions. The number of criminal felony filings rose 16 percent due almost entirely to a 63 percent rise in firearms prosecutions." The Conference also notes, however, that criminal filings in the Southern District of Indiana, at 108 per judgeship, remain "slightly below" the national average. District of New Jersey . Excluding certain types of cases, "overall filings rose 10 percent due to increases in both civil and criminal felony filings. The number of civil cases filed ... also rose 10 percent due primarily to increases in copyright litigation, civil rights actions, ERISA filings, land condemnation cases, and social security appeals. A 27 percent increase in criminal filings results from higher number of firearms, drug, fraud, and immigration prosecutions." Additionally, the pending caseload for the court "nearly doubled as a result of the influx of personal injury product liability cases." The Judicial Conference also notes that "despite the increase, criminal filings are among the lowest in the nation at 36 per judgeship." District of Delaware . From September 2017 to June 2018, "overall filings rose seven percent due to an increase in civil filings. The number of civil cases filed rose eight percent due almost entirely to a 20 percent increase in patent litigation. The court has the highest number of patent filings in the nation, which have risen substantially since the Supreme Court's May 2017 decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC , which modified the venue standards for patent infringement lawsuits.... Civil filings are now well above the national average at 518 per judgeship." In contrast, the "number of criminal felony filings declined ... as filings of all offense types remained relatively stable." Additionally, in its recommendation, the Judicial Conference states that criminal filings in the District of Delaware "are the 2 nd lowest in the nation at 21 per judgeship." Weighted Case Filings of Judicial Districts Recommended for New Judgeships As discussed above, the specific statistic used by the Judicial Conference to compare caseloads across U.S. district courts is the number of weighted filings per authorized judgeship for each court. Figure 3 shows the number of weighted filings per judgeship for each of the 27 district courts included in the Conference's most recent recommendation to Congress. The national average of 521 weighted filings per authorized judgeship is shown by the reference line in the figure. For the 27 district courts where the Judicial Conference recommends additional judgeships (including conversion of existing temporary judgeships to permanent status), weighted filings averaged 646 per authorized judgeship. Of the 27 district courts recommended to receive additional judgeships, 5 courts have caseloads that fall below 500 weighted filings per authorized judgeship; 6 have 500 to 599 weighted filings; 8 courts have 600 to 699 weighted filings; 4 courts have 700 to 799 weighted filings; 1 court has 800 weighted filings; and 3 courts have more than 1,000 weighted filings. The five districts listed in Figure 3 with the greatest number of weighted filings are among the six U.S. district courts discussed above as having the most urgent need for additional judgeships (the remaining district, the Southern District of Florida, has the seventh-highest number of weighted filings). A plurality of the U.S. district courts listed in Figure 3 last had a permanent judgeship authorized in 1990 (10 of 27, or 37%). Another 8 district courts last had a permanent judgeship authorized prior to 1990 (2 in 1984, 5 in 1978, and 1 in 1954). And 9 district courts last had a permanent judgeship authorized after 1990 (1 in 1999, 5 in 2000, and 3 in 2002). Several of the courts listed in the figure have weighted filings that fall below the national average (521 weighted filings per judgeship), including the District of Nevada, Northern District of Iowa (Cedar Rapids), District of Puerto Rico, Western District of North Carolina (Charlotte), and the District of Kansas. As noted previously, a court's caseload is not the only factor the Judicial Conference considers in evaluating a court's judgeship needs. Consequently, the Conference's recommendations can be based, in part, on additional factors. For example, in its evaluation of the judgeship needs for districts where weighted filings are below the national average, the Conference identifies various reasons why it recommends additional judgeships. Some of the reasons include a substantial decline in senior judge assistance in handling cases, the geographic challenges associated with managing workload imbalances between different courthouses in the district, a high pending caseload relative to other district courts in the nation, and a number of criminal filings that is well above the national average. Options for Congress As discussed above, Congress determines through legislative action the size of the federal judiciary. Consequently, creating additional U.S. circuit and district court judgeships requires congressional authorization of such judgeships. Such authorization can be accomplished by passing legislation devoted solely to judgeships (i.e., "omnibus judgeships bills") or by including the authorization in an appropriations bill or other legislative vehicle. Congress may decide not to authorize additional circuit and district court judgeships. If Congress were to authorize such judgeships, it has several options available to it. These include (but are not limited to) the following: Adopting all of the most recent recommendations of the Judicial Conference by creating 5 additional permanent judgeships for the Ninth Circuit and 65 additional permanent judgeships for the district courts specified by the Conference (as well as converting 8 temporary district court judgeships to permanent status). Adopting, in part, the recommendations of the Judicial Conference by creating additional permanent circuit and/or district court judgeships for some of the courts identified by the Conference's biennial review process as needing additional judgeships. Adopting, in part, the Conference's recommendations by authorizing new judgeships only for the six U.S. district courts identified by the Conference as having the most urgent need for such judgeships. It might also include only adopting the Conference's recommendations for converting eight temporary judgeships to permanent status. As presented in Table 1 , each of the current temporary judgeships is set to lapse in 2020 if not further extended or made permanent by Congress. Authorizing new judgeships for circuit and/or district courts that were not recommended for additional judgeships by the Judicial Conference (such judgeships might be permanent or temporary). Congress might conclude on the basis of its own review that there is a need for such judgeships in other courts not included in the Conference's most recent recommendations. For example, the Judicial Conference only assesses a circuit court's need for additional judgeships if at least a majority of active judges serving on the court approve of a request for additional judgeships. Congress may nonetheless decide to authorize additional judgeships for circuit courts where this threshold has not been met. Authorizing new judgeships for some of the courts recommended by the Judicial Conference as needing new judgeships, as well as authorizing new judgeships for other courts not included in the Conference's most recent recommendations.


Introduction As Congress continues to consider reforms to secure the Social Security program's solvency, a related discussion has e merged around targeted reforms for vulnerable groupsâwidows, low earners, caregivers, older beneficiaries, spouses, and never-married individualsâwho may deserve targeted benefit enhancements as part of a broader Social Security reform package. This report focuses on widows and Social Security policy levers to aid them. Researchers and policymakers have commented on both benefit adequacy and benefit equity in the context of Social Security benefits for widows. Concerns about the adequacy of Social Security benefits for widows stem from the fact that the widow has outlived the spouse and likely contends with a reduced monthly income after the spouse's death. The widow also may confront significant medical or long-term care expenses associated with the deceased spouse's end-of-life care. In addition, on average, women outlive men and today's widows face increased life expectancy relative to earlier birth cohorts, thus increasing the possibility of outliving their retirement resources and incurring significant expenses for their own long-term care. Benefit equity concerns stem from Social Security program rules that provide higher benefits to one-earner couples than to two-earner couples with identical lifetime earnings and payroll tax contributions. Social Security was designed in the era of a traditional family with a working husband and a wife devoted to home production. Marital patterns, gender roles, and work patterns have changed substantially since the 1930s. Benefit equity would be improved by providing equal benefits for equal contributions. This report seeks to discuss current-law Social Security provisions pertaining to widows; describe the characteristics of Social Security widow beneficiaries; illustrate the benefit adequacy and benefit equity concerns leading to a perceived need for targeted benefit enhancements for widows; explain policy levers that may be modified to aid widows; outline legislative proposals and proposals in the literature concerning widows, highlighting their projected effects on program solvency and estimated distributional effects; and identify other Social Security reform options that would indirectly benefit widows. Social Security Widow Benefits3 Overview Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the family members of deceased workers. Workers become eligible for Social Security benefits by working in Social Security covered employment. A worker generally needs 40 earnings credits (10 years of covered employment) to obtain insured status and become eligible for a Social Security retired-worker benefit. Employers and employees each contribute payroll taxes of 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit on taxable earnings ($132,900 in 2019). Monthly benefits are based on the worker's career-average earnings in covered employment. Full retired-worker benefits are available at the full retirement age (FRA), currently age 66 and gradually increasing to age 67 in 2022 for individuals born in 1960 or later. Reduced retired-worker benefits are available beginning at age 62. Workers who claim benefits after the FRA are eligible for delayed retirement credits up to age 70. The spouse of a retired worker may receive a spousal benefit of up to 50% of the retired worker's basic benefit amount, called the primary insurance amount (PIA). The widow of a deceased worker may receive a survivor benefit of up to 100% of the deceased worker's PIA. Spousal and survivor (widow) benefits are subject to adjustments based on the (surviving) spouse's age at entitlement, the retired or deceased worker's age at entitlement, the receipt of a Social Security benefit based on the (surviving) spouse's own work record, earnings prior to the FRA above certain thresholds, and earnings from employment not covered by Social Security. Widow Benefits4 Survivor benefits are derived from the deceased worker's Social Security insurance status and lifetime covered earnings. Spouses and former spouses of fully insured deceased workers (those with 40 or more earnings credits) are eligible for survivor benefits as long as they meet the other requirements for those benefits. For example, the surviving spouse (widow) must be aged 60 or older (sometimes referred to as a nondisabled widow ) and must not have remarried before age 60. A surviving spouse with a qualifying disability who has not remarried before age 50 may begin to receive survivor benefits at age 50 (referred to as a disabled widow ). The surviving spouse also may receive disabled widow benefits if disabled within 7 years after the death of the fully insured spouse, or before age 60, whichever is earlier. A divorced surviving spouse (divorced widow) who has not remarried before age 60 (age 50 if disabled) can claim a survivors benefit beginning at age 60 (age 50 if disabled) based on a marriage that lasted at least 10 years. The widow benefit is a specified percentage of the deceased worker's PIA, depending on the widow's age and relationship to the deceased worker. If a widow qualifies for a retirement benefit based on the widow's own work record and the deceased spouse's work record, the widow has dual entitlement and receives the higher amount of the two benefits. In essence, if the widow's own worker benefit is lower than the deceased spouse's worker benefit, the widow receives the widow's own worker benefit plus a reduced widow benefit equal to the difference between the full widow benefit and the widow's retired worker benefit. Monthly benefits are adjusted each year by the cost-of-living adjustment that is applied to all Social Security benefits. Widow benefits are payable in the month of the deceased spouse's death, regardless of when the death occurred during the month. Reductions for Early Claiming A widow's benefit is affected by both the widow's own claiming age and the deceased spouse's claiming age. A widow who begins to collect a widow benefit at the FRA will receive 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA. A widow who begins collecting benefits before the FRA will receive reduced benefits. A nondisabled widow who claims benefits at age 60 or a disabled widow who claims at age 50 will receive 71.5% of the deceased worker's PIA, the largest reduction possible. If the deceased worker claimed reduced benefits before the FRA, the widow benefit will be reduced as well, because it cannot exceed the deceased worker's reduced benefit amount. This provision is referred to as the widow(er)'s limit , under which the widow benefit may be reduced to a floor of 82.5% of the deceased worker's full PIA. Conversely, if the deceased worker claimed benefits after the FRA, the deceased worker's delayed retirement credits increase the widow benefit. In considering the reduction for the widow claiming benefits before the widow's FRA and the widow(er)'s limit reduction if the deceased worker claimed benefits before the deceased worker's FRA, the widow receives the smaller of the two benefit amounts. Among nondisabled widow beneficiaries in December 2018, about 52.2% had their benefits reduced by claiming benefits before their own FRA, about 23.1% had their benefits reduced because their deceased spouse claimed benefits before the FRA, and about 4.1% had their benefits reduced because both the widow and the deceased spouse claimed benefits before their respective FRAs. Other Benefit Adjustments The total amount of survivor benefits paid on a deceased worker's account to qualifying family members is capped at 150% to 188% of the deceased worker's PIA, depending on the value of the PIA. If total survivor benefits exceed this family maximum , each person's benefit is reduced proportionately. In addition, if a widow claims benefits before the FRA and is working, the benefit may be reduced by the retirement earnings test, depending on the amount of earnings. Finally, widows with earnings not covered by Social Security may face reduced benefits due to the government pension offset. Characteristics of Social Security Widow Beneficiaries14 In December 2018, 3.91 million individuals received Social Security widow benefits, representing about 6.2% of the 62.9 million Social Security beneficiaries ( Table 1 ). Women accounted for 96.3% of widow beneficiaries. More than 41% of nondisabled widow beneficiaries are aged 80 or older. In total, Social Security paid $5.26 billion in widow benefits in December 2018, averaging $1,388 per month for nondisabled widows and $747.41 per month for disabled widows ( Table 1 ). Among nondisabled widow beneficiaries, 12.1% had a monthly benefit less than $750, whereas 11.2% had a monthly benefit of $2,000 or more. About 79.4% of nondisabled widow beneficiaries aged 65 or older had their monthly benefit reduced because of their own early retirement (52.2%), early retirement by their deceased spouse (23.1%), or both (4.1%). Perceived Need for Targeted Benefit Enhancements for Widows Researchers and policymakers have raised concerns about both benefit adequacy and benefit equity in the context of Social Security benefits for widows. Concerns about benefit adequacy stem from the facts that the widow has outlived the spouse, may contend with a reduced monthly income after the spouse's death, may confront significant medical and long-term care expenses associated with the deceased spouse's end-of-life care, and is at risk of outliving retirement resources and incurring significant expenses for long-term care. Concerns about benefit equity stem from Social Security program rules that provide higher benefits to one-earner couples than to two-earner couples with identical lifetime earnings and Social Security payroll tax contributions. More equitable program rules, reflecting changes in family structure and the work patterns of husbands and wives, would provide equal benefits for equal contributions. Benefit Adequacy Concerns A widow is at risk of a substantial income reduction after the spouse's death, compared with the couple's total income prior to the spouse's death. The widow's Social Security benefit may be 33% to 50% lower than the combined couple's Social Security benefit. The deceased spouse's pension from work may be lost or cut in half. The widow also may confront depleted assets from the deceased spouse's medical or long-term care expenses. In addition, on average, women outlive men and today's widows face increased life expectancy relative to earlier cohorts, potentially incurring significant expenses for their own long-term care and increasing the risk of outliving their retirement resources. These factors contribute to high observed poverty rates among widows and concerns about the adequacy of Social Security benefits in widowhood. Table 2 provides hypothetical examples of the differing benefit reductions experienced by widows depending on the relative earnings of the husband and wife. In Example 1, spouse A (worker) in a single-earner couple receives a Social Security benefit at the FRA of $1,770 per month and spouse B (nonworker) receives a Social Security spouse benefit at the FRA of $885 per month (50% of the worker's benefit). The combined couple's retirement benefit is $2,655, or 150% of the worker's PIA (100% of the worker's PIA plus a spouse benefit equal to 50% of the worker's PIA). After the worker's death, the widow (spouse B) receives a widow benefit equal to 100% of the deceased worker's benefit, which is 67% of the combined couple's benefit while both were alive (or a 33% reduction). For the two-earner couple in Example 2, where spouse A and spouse B have equal earnings and both claim benefits at the FRA, their combined benefit is 200% of either worker's PIA ($1,120 for spouse A plus $1,120 for spouse B equals $2,240 combined for the couple). After spouse A's death, the widow (spouse B) continues to receive a worker benefit (which is equivalent to the widow benefit from the deceased husband). The total monthly benefit is 50% of the combined couple's benefit while both spouses were alive (or a 50% reduction). Example 3 shows a two-earner couple with unequal earnings. Spouse A receives a Social Security retirement benefit at the FRA of $1,770 per month. Spouse B, with lower earnings, receives a worker benefit at the FRA of $1,120 per month. The combined couple's benefit is $2,890 per month. Upon spouse A's death, the widow (spouse B) continues to receive a worker benefit, increased by the widow benefit to equal $1,770 per month, or 100% of the deceased worker's benefit. The widow's monthly benefit is 61% of the combined couple's benefit while both were alive (or a 39% reduction). Placing the Social Security benefit reduction experienced by a widow upon the spouse's death in the broader context of benefit adequacy requires assessing a single person's consumption needs relative to a couple's. Clearly, a single person's consumption (and thus income) needs are lower than a couple's. The precise amount of the reduction depends upon the extent of economies of scale experienced by a couple relative to a single person, that is, the degree to which a single person needs more than half the income of a couple to sustain the same standard of living. One way to operationalize this concept is to look at the differences between poverty thresholds for one-person and two-person families. The federal poverty threshold in 2018 for a one-person family over the age of 65 was 79% of the federal poverty threshold for a two-person family over the age of 65. The Census Bureau's Supplemental Poverty Measure results in a threshold for a one-adult family equal to about 70% of the threshold for a two-adult family. These measures suggest that Social Security widow benefits equaling between 50% and 67% of the combined couple's benefit while both spouses were alive may not be sufficient to sustain the widow's consumption. In addition to reduced Social Security benefits, widows are likely to lose partâor in some cases, allâof any private pension payments that were received by the deceased spouse. Prior to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) reforms in 1974, the default pension payout scheme was a single-life annuity that ended upon the retired worker's death. ERISA changed the default to a joint-and-survivor benefit that would continue payments to the widow, albeit at a reduced rate (typically 50%). Further reforms under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 require the signatures of both the worker and the spouse when choosing a single-life benefit instead of the (default) joint-and-survivor benefit. In either case, the reduction in pension income upon widowhood can be substantial. Pension income also tends to decrease in real value over time, with very few private-sector defined-benefit pensions offering postretirement cost-of-living adjustments. Widows may experience significant reductions in wealth and private savings following their spouse's death because of medical and long-term care expenses at the end of life. One study finds that end-of-life out-of-pocket medical expenses are large both in absolute terms and relative to income. Among those in the lowest 25% of the income distribution, end-of-life medical expenses were found to equal roughly 70% of income. On average, women live longer than men, and women today live longer than women from earlier cohorts. Remaining life expectancy at retirement is projected to be 2.5 years greater for women reaching age 65 in 2019 compared with men reaching age 65 in 2019. In addition, remaining life expectancy at retirement has increased substantially across birth cohorts. For example, remaining cohort life expectancy for a woman reaching age 65 in 2019 is projected to be 21.5 years, compared with 20.0 years for a woman reaching age 65 in 1999 and 18.8 years for a woman reaching age 65 in 1979. However, these life expectancy gains are not shared equally by all men and women. Greater improvements in life expectancy have been experienced by those in the upper portions of the income distribution relative to those with lower incomes, resulting in a growing gap in life expectancy by income. With that as background, consider that in 2017, about 18% of all individuals aged 60 or older were widows; however, nearly 26% of individuals aged 60 or older who lived in families with income below the federal poverty threshold were widows, as shown in Table 3 . Table 4 shows the poverty rate in 2017 among individuals aged 60 or older by Social Security beneficiary status and marital status. Among individuals aged 60 or older, the poverty rate among widows was 13.7%, compared with 9.5% for all individuals, 4.4% for married individuals living together, 17.6% for divorced or separated individuals, and 23.7% for never-married individuals. Poverty rates were lower across the board for individuals aged 60 or older who receive Social Security benefits, but still relatively high for widows (10.1%). Never-married individuals had the highest poverty rate among Social Security beneficiaries aged 60 or older, at 19.8%, whereas 2.4% of married individuals living together and receiving Social Security benefits lived in poverty. Although considerably smaller in number, non-Social Security beneficiaries aged 60 or older had substantially higher poverty rates, reaching 30.5% among widows (not shown). Older womenâin general and among Social Security beneficiaries; among widowed women in particular as well as women who are divorced or separatedâhad higher poverty rates than older men. In 2017, the poverty rate was 14.6% for widowed women aged 60 or older and 10.8% for widowed women aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits, compared with 10.5% and 7.7%, respectively, for men aged 60 or older (see Table 5 ). Table 5 also provides the poverty rate for widows and widowers aged 60 or older, and widows and widowers aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits by age, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, and earnings in 2017. The poverty statistics provide clear evidence that widows are more vulnerable than widowers across all subgroups. The poverty statistics also show that receipt of Social Security benefits reduces poverty overall and, for many subgroups, narrows the gap in poverty rates between widows and widowers. Focusing on widows receiving Social Security benefits, young widows (aged 60-64) have a higher poverty rate (19.5%), and older widows (aged 75 or older) have moderately higher poverty rates (10%-11%), compared with widows aged 65-74 (roughly 8%). White, Asian, and non-Hispanic widows aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits have substantially lower poverty rates (around 9%) than black and Hispanic widows aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits (20.4% and 19.6%, respectively). Better-educated widows aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits have lower poverty rates. Among the small fraction of widows aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits who had any earnings in 2017, the poverty rate was 0.9%. Considering changes in all income sources, studies find that widows experience an income reduction of 35% to 40% upon their spouse's death. The reduction in income leads to significant increases in poverty rates among widows, the effects of which may compound over time for women who become widowed at younger ages and experience widowhood for longer time periods. Moreover, a substantial fraction of older adults living alone (which may include widows as well as divorced or separated individuals and never-married individuals) has income above the poverty threshold but still below a level that achieves long-term economic stability. Estimates from the CPS show that, in 2017, 16.7% of all widows aged 60 or older and 18.3% of all widows aged 60 or older receiving Social Security benefits lived in near poverty , meaning their family income is above the federal poverty threshold but below 150% of the federal poverty threshold. Benefit Equity Concerns Changes over the past 80-plus years in family structure and the work patterns of husbands and wives are not reflected in current Social Security program rules, leading to some concerns about benefit equity. Benefit equity suggests that equal lifetime earnings should yield equal benefits. However, under existing program rules, some two-earner couples with substantially higher earnings and contributions receive only slightly higher retirement and widow benefits than traditional one-earner couples with a working husband and a wife devoted to home production. Social Security benefits for a spouse with no labor market earnings were designed to be relatively generous. Thus, a traditional one-earner couple receives higher benefits than a two-earner couple with identical lifetime earnings and payroll tax contributions. Consider the examples in Table 6 , which follow the same couples from Table 2 but add detail about their underlying earnings and Social Security payroll taxes paid. As before, the examples assume that both spouses retire at their full retirement age and receive unreduced benefits. Example 1 is the traditional one-earner couple, where spouse A earns wages in the workforce and spouse B specializes in home production (no wage earnings). Example 2 is a two-earner couple, with the same total annual earnings and payroll taxes as in Example 1, earned and paid in equal proportions by spouse A and B. Despite paying equal payroll taxes, the couple in Example 2 receives lower Social Security benefits during retirement and the total monthly benefit to the widow (spouse B) is substantially lower. In Example 3, spouse A's earnings are the same as in Example 1, but now spouse B also has earnings and makes payroll tax contributions. Although the combined benefit in retirement is somewhat higher in Example 3 than in Example 1, reflecting spouse B's earnings, the total monthly benefit to the widow is equal in both examples. Spouse B's earnings in example 3 do not increase the total monthly benefit in widowhood. Social Security Policy Options to Aid Widows Driven by concerns about Social Security benefit adequacy and benefit equity for widows, researchers, advocates, and policymakers have considered several approaches to modifying Social Security benefits to aid widows. One approach is to adjust the Social Security program policy levers that most directly affect widows. These levers include the fraction of the deceased worker's PIA that the surviving spouse would receive under the widow(er)'s limit, the provision of credits for delayed claiming, the parameters around benefits for disabled widows, and the lump-sum death benefit. Another approach is to develop an alternative widow benefit, envisioned as a percentage of the couple's combined Social Security benefits while both were alive, with the widow receiving the higher of this alternative benefit amount and the current-law widow benefit. This section looks to the research and policy literature, and previously introduced legislation in some cases, to describe policy options. The discussion identifies potential effects on benefit adequacy and benefit equity, and highlights projected effects on program solvency and estimated distributional effects. Widow(er)'s Limit As described earlier, the widow(er)'s limit reduces the widow benefit by as much as 17.5%, to a floor of 82.5% of the deceased worker's full PIA, if the deceased worker claimed reduced benefits before the FRA. The idea behind the widow(er)'s limit is that the widow's benefit cannot exceed the deceased worker's reduced benefit amount. The widow(er)'s limit also provides incentives for married workers to delay claiming Social Security benefits. However, it negatively affects benefit adequacy for widows, some of whom may have limited access to non-Social Security sources of income. Although the widow(er)'s limit is a little-known feature of the Social Security program, it affected the benefits of about 27% of Social Security nondisabled widow beneficiaries aged 65 or older in December 2018, or 857,135 beneficiaries. The effects of eliminating or modifying the widow(er)'s limit were estimated in a 2001 Social Security Administration (SSA) study, with data pertaining to the mid- to late 1990s. Eliminating the widow(er)'s limit would produce the largest estimated effects, increasing the total amount of widow benefit payments by about 5%. For widows who experience the maximum benefit reduction of 17.5% under the widow(er)'s limit, eliminating the widow(er)'s limit would substantially improve benefit adequacy. However, the SSA study estimated that only 14% of the increased benefit payments would be received by widows in poverty and that 40% would be received by widows near poverty (with income under 150% of the federal poverty threshold). Adjustments to the widow(er)'s limit could be designed to direct more of the increased benefit payments to widows in or near poverty, but then would affect fewer widows and would do less to improve benefit adequacy. Other options explored in the SSA study to modify the widow(er)'s limit, again affecting fewer widows, focus on individuals who are widowed before the FRA or cases in which the worker dies before the FRA. Eliminating the widow(er)'s limit would mean that the widow would receive better survivor protection from Social Security than the (deceased) worker, considering that, if the spouse were to die before the worker, the worker would continue to receive a reduced worker benefit (for claiming before the FRA). None of the potential changes to the widow(er)'s limit address the equity concerns with current-law widows benefits. Credits for Delayed Claiming Two billsâ S. 345 and H.R. 4123 âhave been introduced in the 116 th Congress that would provide credits, or increased benefits, for widows who delay claiming or temporarily suspend receipt of benefits on their deceased spouse's work record. Among other changes, S. 345 would modify widow benefits as follows: For widows whose current-law benefit would be less than 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA, it would increase benefits by between 0.34% and 0.39% per month (up to 4.1% to 4.7% annually), depending on the widow's FRA, for each month of delayed claiming or suspension beyond age 60, up to 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA. For widows whose current-law benefit would be equal to or greater than 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA, it would increase monthly benefits at the retired-worker delayed retirement credit rate (0.67% per month, up to 8% annually, for individuals born in 1944 and later) for each month of delayed claiming or suspension, up to 124% of PIA if the deceased spouse's FRA was 67 or 132% of PIA if the deceased spouse's FRA was 66. Under H.R. 4123 , monthly widow benefits would be increased at the retired-worker delayed retirement credit rate (0.67% per month, up to 8% annually, for individuals born in 1944 and later) for widows who delay claiming or suspend benefits beyond their FRA, up to age 70. SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimated the financial effects on Social Security of S. 3457 , a 115 th Congress version of S. 345 . The estimates are based on the 2018 Trustees Report's intermediate assumptions and address the policy change's effects on the combined reserves of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. OCACT estimated that Section 4 of S. 3457 , pertaining to the increased widow benefits for delayed or suspended claiming described above, would worsen the Social Security program's actuarial balance by 0.02% of taxable payroll and would have resulted in about 400,000 widow beneficiaries receiving higher monthly benefits in 2018 if the provision had always been in effect. OCACT estimates of H.R. 4123 are not available. Both bills would improve benefit adequacy for affected widows, but would not address the equity concerns with current-law widow benefits. Benefit Parameters for Disabled Widows Three bills introduced in the 116 th Congress would adjust the parameters for disabled widow benefits. S. 345 , H.R. 4122 , and H.R. 4125 would expand eligibility for disabled widow benefits by eliminating the requirements that a disabled widow be at least 50 years old and that, if not disabled at the time of the spouse's death, the widow become disabled within seven years of the spouse's death (or by age 60, whichever is earlier). The bills would enhance benefits by eliminating the reduction of disabled widow benefits for those claiming before their FRA, effectively establishing a floor for disabled widow benefits equal to 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA. OCACT's estimates of S. 3457 's financial effects (mentioned above in " Credits for Delayed Claiming ") found that Section 2 of the bill, pertaining to the expanded eligibility and benefit enhancements for disabled widow benefits described above, would worsen the Social Security program's actuarial balance by 0.02% of taxable payroll and would have resulted in about 600,000 widow beneficiaries receiving higher monthly benefits, or additionally receiving benefits, in 2018 if the provision had always been in effect. Although not directly addressed in the OCACT estimates, these eligibility expansions and benefit expansions could induce some widows with disabilities to apply for benefits who would not have done so under current law. OCACT did not produce estimates for H.R. 4122 and H.R. 4125 . These bills would improve benefit adequacy for affected disabled widows, but would not address the equity concerns with current-law widow benefits. Lump-Sum Death Benefit38 When a Social Security-insured worker dies, the surviving spouse who was living with the deceased worker is entitled to a one-time, lump-sum death benefit of $255. The dollar value of the lump-sum death benefit has not changed since 1954, meaning that its real value, after adjusting for inflation, has eroded significantly over time. Over the years, proposals have been put forward to modify or eliminate the lump-sum death benefit, including several proposals to increase it. In the context of aiding widows as a vulnerable group, even a substantial increase in the lump-sum death benefit would provide only partial reliefâthrough a one-time paymentâfor the deceased spouse's end-of-life expenses (medical and burial). As such, it would address the adequacy concerns with current-law widow benefits in only a limited fashion. As an across-the-board increase for all widows, it would not be targeted to those in poverty or near poverty. Moreover, it would not alleviate the equity concerns with current-law widow benefits. An Alternative Widow Benefit Another approach to modifying Social Security benefits to aid widows is to calculate an alternative widow benefit. Many authors in the research and policy literature envision the alternative widow benefit as a percentage of the sum of the widow's own worker benefit (including any actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits) and the deceased spouse's PIA (potentially including any actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits). The widow would receive the higher of this alternative benefit amount and the current-law widow benefit. This approach is thought to both increase benefit adequacy and improve benefit equity. The alternative widow benefit could be capped at a specified level to improve targeting to low- and moderate-income widows and reduce cost. Current-law spouse benefits also could be reduced to offset the alternative widow benefit's cost. When calculating the combined benefit, the widow's own worker benefit would be reduced for claiming before the FRA, if applicable. Some proposals include the spouse benefit for this portion of the calculation as well, while others use only the widow's own worker benefit. Including the spouse benefit would broaden eligibility to include single-earner couples and provide greater improvements to benefit adequacy. Using only the widow's worker benefit would do more to improve the proposal's effects on benefit equity. If the deceased spouse claimed benefits before the FRA, the calculation could use the deceased spouse's reduced worker benefit, or it could use the full PIA as if the deceased spouse had claimed benefits at the FRA. The latter approach would effectively eliminate the widow(er)'s limit for those who receive the alternative widow benefit, and is more effective at improving benefit adequacy for lower earners. Most proposals for an alternative widow benefit specify that the widow would receive the greater of 75% of the couple's combined worker benefits when both were alive and the current-law widow benefit, as illustrated in Table 7 following the example couples from Table 2 and Table 6 . For the single-earner couple in Example 1a, assuming that both spouses claim benefits at the full retirement age, the alternative widow benefit would be 75% of $1,770, or $1,327.50. Since the alternative widow benefit is less than the current-law widow benefit of $1,770, the widow would continue to receive the current-law amount (equal to 67% of the combined couple's benefit). Note that if spouse benefits were included in the alternative widow benefit computation, and assuming that both spouses claim benefits at the full retirement age, the widow in Example 1b would receive 75% of the combined couple's benefit of $2,655, or about $1,991.25 per month, compared with 67% of the combined couple's benefit while both were alive under current law. For a two-earner couple where the husband and wife have equal earnings, and again assuming that both spouses claim benefits at the full retirement age, the widow benefit would increase from 50% of the combined couple's benefit while both spouses were alive to 75%, as shown in Example 2. The monthly widow benefit would increase from $1,120 under current law to $1,680 under the alternative widow benefit proposal. Example 3 shows a two-earner couple where the husband and wife have unequal earnings. Again assuming that both spouses claim benefits at the full retirement age, the widow benefit would increase from 61% of the combined couple's benefit while both spouses were alive to 75%. Although the monthly widow benefit would increase from $1,770 under current law to $2,167.50 under the alternative widow benefit proposal, the percentage increase in the widow benefit would be smaller than for the couple with equal earnings. The examples in Table 7 show that the alternative widow benefit proposal, which does not include the value of the spouse benefit, would not improve widow benefits for nonworking survivors in single-earner couples. It would provide the greatest benefit to two-earner couples with roughly equal earnings. Including spouse benefits in the alternative widow benefit calculation would magnify the favorable treatment of nonworking spouses under current law. From the perspective of benefit equity, excluding the spouse benefit would allow the widow's own worker benefit to contribute to the alternative widow benefit on an equal footing with the deceased spouse's worker benefit. Without a cap on the alternative widow benefit, one study found that most of the proposal's benefits would go to higher-earning couples. Imposing a cap on the alternative widow benefit can improve benefit adequacy by targeting benefit increases to widows at the lower end of the income distribution. Several approaches are available, such as setting the cap at the PIA of a career average earner, the average benefit of all retired workers, or the average benefit of newly retired workers. The solvency and distributional analyses below impose a cap based on the PIA of a career average earner who becomes eligible for retired worker benefits in the same year the deceased spouse became entitled to worker benefits. As explained in detail below, based on SSA analysis, the alternative widow benefit's cost is modest and the distributional effects point to improvements in both benefit adequacy and benefit equity. The alternative widow benefit proposal would not reduce benefits for anyone. Thus, no transition period would be needed and it could be applied to new widow beneficiaries as well as current widow beneficiaries. If other changes to the Social Security program were desired to offset the alternative widow benefit's cost, policymakers could consider raising revenue (e.g., increasing the payroll tax), reducing cost (e.g., reducing spouse benefits, other benefit reductions), or both. However, depending on the alternative widow benefit's exact formulation, some approaches may be less desirable. For example, if the widow's spouse benefit is not included in the alternative widow benefit calculation, then offsetting the proposal's cost by reducing spouse benefits would not be appropriate. Additional solvency and distributional analyses could help policymakers to refine the details of any formal proposals. Cost and Solvency Effects Three bills introduced in the 116 th Congress contain a provision for the alternative widow benefit, constructed largely as described above. OCACT estimated the financial effects on Social Security of previous versions of two of these bills. OCACT also updates alternative widow benefit estimates after the Trustees Report is released each year. The estimates are based on the Trustees Report's intermediate assumptions and address the policy change's effects on the combined reserves of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. OCACT's latest estimates of the alternative widow benefit proposal's cost and solvency effects reflect the 2019 Trustees Report's intermediate assumptions. The estimates assume the proposal would be implemented for widows receiving benefits at the beginning of 2021 and those becoming eligible after 2021. The alternative widow benefit estimated by OCACT would be 75% of the couple's combined worker benefits when both were alive (the widow's own worker benefit and the deceased worker's PIA). It would apply actuarial reductions or delayed retirement credits to the widow's own worker benefit and the deceased spouse's PIA. Finally, it would impose a cap defined by the PIA of a hypothetical worker who earns the SSA average wage index every year and becomes eligible for retired worker benefits in the same year the deceased spouse became entitled to worker benefits. Under these alternative widow benefit parameters, the long-range actuarial balance would worsen by 4%. However, the changes are not large enough to change the year of reserve depletion, estimated to be 2035 in the 2019 Trustees Report under both current law and the alternative widow benefit proposal. Distributional Effects SSA's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (ORES) estimated the alternative widow benefit proposal's distributional effects using the same underlying proposal parameters modeled by OCACT. The ORES estimates are derived from the Modeling Income in the Near Term, Version 7 (MINT7) microsimulation model. The estimates pertain to current-law beneficiaries aged 60 or older in 2030, 2050, and 2070. Outcomes of interest from the ORES MINT estimates include changes in benefits, household income, and poverty, among all beneficiaries and affected beneficiaries, disaggregated by gender, marital status, educational attainment, and household income quintile. Among current-law beneficiaries aged 60 or older in 2030, the ORES MINT estimates suggest that 8% of beneficiaries will experience higher benefits under the alternative widow benefit relative to current law, including 10% of female beneficiaries, 11% of beneficiaries whose education was limited to high school, and 14% of beneficiaries with less than a high school education. The proposal would result in higher benefits for nearly one-third of current-law widow beneficiaries, with gains concentrated among those in poverty and in the bottom two-fifths of the household income distribution (due to the cap at the PIA of a career average wage worker). Similar, though slightly stronger, results are obtained for current-law beneficiaries aged 60 or older in 2050 and 2070. Among beneficiaries affected by the alternative widow benefit in 2030, the median benefit increase is 17%, again with the largest gains among those in poverty. The poverty rate is estimated to decrease by 10.2% (or 0.5 percentage points) among all current-law beneficiaries aged 60 or older in 2030, and by 38% (or 1.9 percentage points) among current-law widow beneficiaries aged 60 or older in 2030. In 2070, 43% of current-law widow beneficiaries aged 60 or older are estimated to experience a benefit increase. While the gains continue to be concentrated among the lowest income quintiles in 2050 and 2070, the poverty effects are muted in 2070 relative to 2030 and 2050. Gains relative to payable benefits (rather than scheduled benefits) in 2050 and 2070 are orders of magnitude larger but follow the same general patterns. When considering the alternative widow benefit's distributional effects, some of the proposal's limitations are worth noting. First, a person must have a qualifying marital history to receive widow benefits. As such, the alternative widow benefit would not improve benefit adequacy for a growing group of women who do not have a marital history that would qualify for widow benefits, including never-married women, who have a high poverty rate ( Table 4 ). Further, if the alternative widow benefit is based only on the widow's own worker benefit (not also including the spouse benefit), then both members of the couple would need to have a work history sufficient to earn Social Security worker benefits. Under this scenario, the alternative widow benefit would not improve benefit adequacy for nonworking survivors in single-earner couples. Finally, a higher Social Security widow benefit could lead to reduced or lost Supplemental Security Income payments for some widows, which in turn could lead to lost eligibility for other means-tested programs, such as Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as Food Stamps), and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Policymakers may wish to consider offsets or exclusions (hold-harmless provisions) in these programs to prevent loss of eligibility. Other Policy Changes That May Benefit Widows Several other policy changes proposed for other vulnerable groups would aid widows who are members of those targeted groups. Brief descriptions follow, along with references for more detailed information. Enhanced Benefits for Low Earners Under current law, the Social Security program has a special minimum benefit (SMB) for workers with many years of low earnings. However, the SMB grows with prices rather than wages, and thus affects fewer beneficiaries every year. In December 2018, 35,505 beneficiaries received the SMB, with an average monthly benefit of just over $900. In addition, the SMB is computed based on years of coverage, rather than lifetime earnings. The earnings threshold for a year of coverage in 2019 is $14,805 (by comparison, in 2019 a worker earns four quarters of coverage for traditional Social Security benefits with annual earnings of $5,440). A worker must have at least 11 years of coverage to qualify for the SMB, and the maximum SMB is obtained with 30 years of coverage. Proposals to improve benefit adequacy by providing an enhanced minimum benefit under Social Security take many forms and may serve to increase retirement income and reduce poverty among some older women and widows. Some proposals would reform the SMB to apply to a larger group of workers with substantial work histories and low earnings. The initial SMB could be tied to wage growth rather than price growth, the amount of earnings required for a year of coverage could be reduced, partial years of coverage could be allowed, and the amount of the SMB could be tied to a fraction of the federal poverty threshold, increasing with the number of years of coverage. Others point out that workers with shorter working careers are a larger group at greater risk of poverty in older age and would not be aided by a reformed SMB. Some options to address this group include (1) creating a new basic minimum benefit as a supplement to traditional Social Security benefits for low-income beneficiaries above the FRA and (2) revising the bend points and PIA factors in the traditional Social Security benefit formula to increase benefits for low earners and improve progressivity. Older women and widows from birth cohorts currently of retirement age may be well represented among workers with shorter working careers, given traditional propensities to leave the workforce for raising children and potentially for providing elder care. However, recent research suggests that women's labor force participation patterns are changing, with higher levels of employment early in life, motherhood coming later in life, motherhood's impact on employment lessening, and women working longer at older ages. Among women who worked at some point during their pregnancy, the fraction who reported quitting their jobs around the time of the birth decreased substantially for those having their first child in the early 2000s compared with those having their first child in the 1980s, whereas the fraction taking paid leave increased substantially and the fraction taking unpaid leave remained constant. Cohorts of women born in the 1950s and later are expected to enter their retirement ages with more work experience and more steeply sloped earnings patterns. Reduced Marriage Duration Requirements for Divorced Spouse and Divorced Widow Benefits Under current law, a divorced spouse may claim Social Security spouse and/or survivor benefits if the marriage lasted at least 10 years and the person claiming benefits is unmarried. Divorced spouse benefits may be claimed beginning at age 62, whereas divorced survivor benefits may be claimed beginning at age 60 (or age 50 if disabled). Divorced spouses are entitled to the same spouse and survivor benefits as a married spouse, including applicable reductions when benefits are claimed before the divorced spouse's FRA. As shown in Table 3 , divorced individuals made up 16.6% of the population aged 60 or older in 2017, but 30.7% of the population aged 60 or older in poverty. The poverty rate among all divorced individuals aged 60 or older was 17.6% in 2017 ( Table 4 ), and 19.0% among divorced women aged 60 or older (not shown). Two studies found that the fraction of women aged 50-59 and 60-69 who are divorced from a marriage of less than 10 yearsâand thus not eligible for Social Security divorced spouse and divorced survivor benefits under current lawâincreased substantially between 1990 and 2004/2009. Since the 1950s, the age of first marriage (among women and men) has increased markedly, whereas the prevalence of divorce doubled between the 1960s and 1970s, with the probability of divorce substantially higher for those with some college or a high school degree compared with college graduates. Reducing the duration-of-marriage requirement for divorced spouses and survivors, for example to five, seven, or nine years, has been discussed as a way to reduce the poverty rate among this vulnerable population. One study found that, although such a policy change would affect a relatively small fraction of female retirees, the greatest potential income gain (and thus poverty reduction) would accrue to low-income divorced widows with marriages that lasted between five years and nine years. Increased Benefits for Older Beneficiaries As noted earlier, women tend to outlive men and remaining cohort life expectancy for a woman attaining age 65 has increased by nearly 2 years over the past 40 years, reaching 21.5 years in 2019 (compared with a greater gain of 4.4 years over the past 40 years for men, reaching 19.0 years for men attaining age 65 in 2019). With increased life expectancy comes greater risk of outliving one's non-Social Security retirement resources and, consequently, greater reliance on Social Security benefits. Poverty rates also increase with age, particularly among women (although Table 5 shows an even higher poverty rate among young widows aged 60-64). Some have outlined a modest longevity increase in Social Security benefits (specified as a percentage of the individual's benefit or a fixed dollar amount within a given retiree cohort) starting around age 80 to 85, or after 18 years to 20 years of benefit receipt. One proposal would target the benefit increase to low-income beneficiaries. Another would provide a delayed annuity for older beneficiaries whose benefit is below some minimum level relative to the federal poverty threshold and increase it with years of covered earnings. Estimates of an option to increase benefits by 5% for beneficiaries aged 85 or older (about 64% of whom are widows) in 2030 point to modest reductions in poverty. Proposals to increase the Social Security cost-of-living adjustment, for example by using the experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans 62 years of age and older (CPI-E) instead of the Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W), also tend to favor older beneficiaries. Caregiver Credits and Paid Family Leave Providing earnings credits for periods out of the labor force or with reduced earnings due to caregiving responsibilities has been proposed in many forms. Although not targeted toward widows, such policies would result in enhanced benefits for widows to the extent that the enhanced benefits were available for periods out of the labor force while caring for young children or elderly parents, or perhaps caring for a now-deceased spouse. Women are more likely than men to experience time out of the workforce while raising children. In March 2017, the labor force participation rate was 63.1% for mothers with children under the age of 3, 65.1% for mothers with children under the age of 6, and 76.0% for mothers with children aged 6 to 17. Comparable rates for men were 95.1%, 94.4%, and 91.5%, respectively. Women also are more likely than men to be caregivers, provide more hours of care, and provide more hands-on care. Women caregivers are less likely to be in the labor force than women who are not caregivers, whereas among men, the labor force participation rate for caregivers is essentially the same as the labor force participation rate for noncaregivers. Options include providing caregivers with a number of dropout years (e.g., up to five years) to be excluded from the Social Security benefit formula, providing earnings credits (e.g., tied to a fraction of the average wage index for a given year or a fraction of the worker's prior earnings) to caregivers for years of caregiving (e.g., up to five years), and supplementing the retired worker benefit for caregivers in households with limited income (e.g., up to 125% of the federal poverty threshold). Related are ongoing policy discussions about establishing a system for paid family leave, which refers to partially or fully compensated time away from work for specific and generally significant family caregiving needs, such as the arrival of a new child or serious illness of a close family member. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) conferred a paid parental-leave benefit on certain federal employees covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-3 , as amended). Employer provision of paid family leave in the private sector is currently voluntary, and in March 2019 such leave was available to 18% of private-industry employees, according to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As of January 2020, five statesâCalifornia, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington Stateâhave active programs. Four additional programsâthose in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Oregonâawait implementation. Several bills have been introduced in the 116 th Congress to establish a national paid family leave program. Some would implement paid family leave through the Social Security program, either by creating a new program component in which covered workers and employers pay into the program and covered workers with periods of qualified caregiving draw benefits from the program, or by allowing eligible caregivers (parents) to receive some months of Social Security benefits in exchange for deferred claiming of retirement benefits to cover the caregiver benefit's costs.