Background Roles and Responsibilities of Depots and Related DOD Organizations Depots are government-owned, government-operated industrial installations that maintain, overhaul, and repair a multitude of complex military weapons systems and equipment for DOD. The military services operate 17 depots that perform depot-level maintenance on a wide range of vehicles and other military equipment, including aircraft, engines, combat vehicles, ships, and software. Of those, the Air Force operates three Air Logistics Complexes and the Navy operates three Fleet Readiness Centers for aviation depot maintenance (see figure 1). For the purposes of this report, we will be referring to them as Air Force and Navy aviation depots. The Air Force’s and Navy’s aviation depots operate through the Air Force and Navy working capital funds. Depot customers are charged for the anticipated full cost of goods and services. Over the past decade, we have audited the services’ working capital funds activities related to carryover, new orders, and revenue that can affect depot maintenance timeliness. For more information on the services’ working capital funds depot maintenance activities, see appendix II. The depots are part of a larger, DOD-wide logistics enterprise that involves a number of different organizations, which are identified in figure 2 and described below. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. This official serves as the principal assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on materiel readiness. Among other responsibilities, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment prescribes policies and procedures on maintenance, materiel readiness and sustainment support. DOD officials report that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Materiel Readiness is responsible for maintenance policy along with the development of a strategic vision for DOD’s organic depot base. Also, the Air Force and Navy each has its own logistics or materiel command component, which provides day-to-day management and oversight of the services’ depots. Air Force Materiel Command. This command develops, acquires, and sustains weapon systems and their components, providing acquisition and life-cycle management services and logistics support, among other things. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center within Air Force Materiel Command is responsible for the life-cycle management of weapon systems from inception to retirement, with a specific program office managing each type of aircraft. Air Force Materiel Command works with the program offices to develop, review, validate and prioritize aircraft depot maintenance workload requirements and associated funding. Naval Air Systems Command. This command is responsible for providing life-cycle support of aircraft, weapons, and systems for the Navy and Marine Corps including, acquisition, repair and modification, and in- service engineering and logistics support. As with the Air Force, a specific program office manages each type of aircraft. According to Navy officials, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers (COMFRC) work with the program offices to plan and approve the maintenance depot work executed at the Navy aviation depots, including obtaining fixed-wing aircraft workload requirements and associated funding. Information on Selected Air Force and Navy Fixed- Wing Aircraft The 36 Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft types we selected for our review ranged from fighters to bombers. These aircraft completed a total of 4,513 depot maintenance events in fiscal years 2014 through 2019. See figure 3 for more information. Air Force and Navy Depot Maintenance Timeliness Has Varied for Selected Fixed-Wing Aircraft with a Range of Factors Affecting Depot Performance For the selected aircraft in our review, the Air Force completed depot maintenance on time or earlier an average of 82 percent of the time during fiscal years 2014 through 2019. However, the Navy completed depot maintenance on time or early in the same period an average of 52 percent of the time. We found that a range of factors, such as unexpected repairs and aircraft operating beyond their designed service life, have affected Air Force and Navy depot maintenance timeliness for fixed-wing aircraft. The Air Force Has Generally Completed Depot Maintenance On Time While the Navy Has Not Our analysis of aggregate depot maintenance data regarding fiscal years 2014 through 2019 shows that: Air Force aviation depots completed depot maintenance of the selected fixed-wing aircraft on time or early in 5 of 6 fiscal years. The annual average percentages for on-time or early-completion maintenance ranged from 78 to 90 percent. In total, selected Air Force fixed-wing aircraft have spent 22,572 fewer days in maintenance than expected since fiscal year 2014. Navy aviation depots were late in completing depot maintenance of the selected fixed-wing aircraft for each of the 6 fiscal years. The annual average percentages for on-time or early-completion maintenance ranged from 45 to 63 percent. In total, the maintenance for selected Navy fixed-wing aircraft has taken over 62,000 more days than expected since fiscal year 2014. Figure 4 shows the percentage of depot maintenance completed on time or early, as well as total days of maintenance delays, if applicable, for the Air Force and Navy. Analyzing the maintenance timeliness data on a per aircraft basis shows similar trends. The Air Force completed depot maintenance on average about 7 days early per aircraft during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, while the Navy completed depot maintenance on average nearly 55 days late per aircraft (see figure 5). In comparing depot maintenance timeliness for specific aircraft types, we found that timeliness varied for both Air Force and Navy aircraft. For example, Air Force aviation depots completed individual KC-135 aircraft maintenance an average of about 28 days earlier than projected and completed F-15E aircraft maintenance an average of almost 35 days later than projected. Navy aviation depots completed individual EA-6B aircraft maintenance an average of about 1 day earlier than projected and completed F/A-18A-D aircraft maintenance on average about 137 days later than projected. Figure 6 shows the average number of days—by aircraft type—that the Air Force and Navy aviation depots completed maintenance earlier or later than projected in fiscal years 2014 through 2019. A Range of Factors Has Affected Air Force and Navy Aviation Depot Maintenance Timeliness Our prior work has identified multiple factors that contribute to depot maintenance delays, including the size and skill of the depot workforce, the condition of weapon systems upon arrival at the depot, the availability of spare parts, and the condition of the depot’s facilities and equipment, among others. In addition, all of these factors can be affected by funding and operational considerations (such as unexpected accidents). DOD officials have stated that disruptions to funding, to include continuing resolutions, also affect the ability to conduct depot maintenance. Over the course of this review, Air Force and Navy officials cited many of these factors as continuing to affect depot maintenance timeliness while offering specific details on issues contributing to the trends we identified above. Air Force’s perspectives on early and late completions: Air Force officials stated a variety of reasons for completing aircraft maintenance earlier than projected, including frequent communication between program offices and depot stakeholders. For example, Air Force Sustainment Center officials told us that they conduct weekly aircraft performance review meetings with commanders and senior staff to provide a comprehensive status update on aircraft maintenance performance that has occurred since the previous meeting. In addition, on the KC-135 depot production line, Air Force officials told us they document tasks that can be done concurrently during a specific phase in the maintenance process, which has helped them meet their timeliness targets. Air Force officials from across the sustainment enterprise agreed that proactive planning for depot maintenance requirements helps the depots provide the appropriate resources to perform aircraft maintenance. Officials cited unexpected repairs or shortage of skilled depot maintainers as reasons for later-than-projected completion of maintenance on an aircraft. Navy’s perspectives on late completions: Navy officials stated various reasons for completing aircraft maintenance later than projected, including growth in the scope of needed work after the aircraft was evaluated (e.g., finding damage that required tailored engineering instructions), a diminishing supply of manufactured parts for aircraft, and aircraft operating well beyond their designed service life—such as the F/A-18A-D fighters and C-2A cargo aircraft. In addition to operating F/A- 18A-Ds longer than originally planned, Navy officials stated that they also had to manage aircraft production delays related to the F-35, which was scheduled to replace the F/A-18A-Ds. Navy officials explained that they have implemented a variety of strategies to improve on-time maintenance. These initiatives primarily focus on mitigating or reducing maintenance delays in the year of execution. For example: Naval Sustainment System initiative: The Navy implemented this initiative at the beginning of fiscal year 2019, which led to the service implementing private industry best practices and employing new strategies such as “swarming,” which refers to many artisans being put to work on a particular aircraft to expedite completion. The initial focus of these strategies was on the F/A-18E-F. During a site visit to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, officials showed us how the initiative prompted reconfiguration of workstations—clearing storage and material areas in the hangar and creating direct line of vision for maintainers—to maximize an artisan’s time spent on an aircraft. Tracking depots efficiency: Officials are using a new software program that enables real-time tracking of the progress of aircraft maintenance, which they told us has led to improved efficiency because it provides increased visibility into aircraft with delays. For example, officials stated over the past 2 years, they have decreased the number of aircraft undergoing maintenance from 390 in 2017 to about 270 across the aviation depots. The Air Force Generally Has Accurately Planned for Aviation Depot Maintenance, but the Navy Has Not Fully Addressed Several Planning Challenges The Air Force has largely accurately planned for aviation depot maintenance requirements for selected fixed-wing aircraft during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, but the Navy has not. Both services have initiatives underway to improve planning for aviation depot maintenance; however, we identified several planning challenges that the Navy has not fully addressed, such as not effectively using historical data to establish accurate planning targets for aircraft depot maintenance packages. The Air Force Generally Has Accurately Planned for Aviation Depot Maintenance Requirements Our analysis of Air Force planned maintenance workload data—estimates of the number of days planned for depot maintenance made 3 years in advance—found that the Air Force largely accurately planned for aviation depot maintenance requirements for selected aircraft for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. The difference between the number of days the Air Force planned in advance that it would need for maintenance and actually needed has been small and trending downward, from 12 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 3 percent in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 (see figure 7). Our analysis shows that, for the 6 fiscal years we reviewed, the Air Force slightly underestimated the amount of time it needed to complete fixed- wing aircraft maintenance by an average of about 6 days per aircraft. To accurately plan for aviation depot maintenance, Air Force Materiel Command officials told us they had implemented three key initiatives including: Conducting early inspections: Air Force officials stated that they have been conducting pre-inspections of selected aircraft a year before scheduled maintenance to check for unplanned maintenance needs, and to ensure the availability of parts. Officials stated that the early inspections can clarify the scope of work and avoid extended delays in completing maintenance. For example, the Air Force has been conducting pre-inspections of its KC-135—an aerial refueling aircraft—by sending Boeing engineers to pre-inspect a sample of KC- 135s that are scheduled for depot maintenance in the following year. The inspections can inform parts orders with long-lead times and initiate developing procedures to resolve any new repairs identified during inspections, Air Force officials stated. Developing and implementing a new metric: To help measure the effectiveness of planning, Air Force officials stated that in 2017 Air Force Materiel Command created a new metric—the Planned Obligations Weighted for Execution Review—comparing which customer orders were planned for funding versus which ones actually received funding. According to Air Force officials, the metric provides visual information to leaders of the degree of variance between the planned and actual aircraft that come into the depots for maintenance. Air Force Materiel Command officials stated that the metric has helped them identify factors affecting the differences between planned and actual aircraft entering the depots for maintenance and to adjust resources when needed to address the workload. Reviewing planning performance and making adjustments: Air Force Materiel Command annually conducts a two-phased planning process to establish the organic Air Force depot-level resources necessary to support the projected funded maintenance requirements for the next 2 fiscal years. Later, the Air Force conducts an after-action review of the performance of the planning process. In addition, command leadership, senior staff, and other members of the aviation depot community hold weekly performance review meetings and make necessary adjustments. This includes reviewing visual information such as standardized charts and graphs that provide the current status of aircraft undergoing depot maintenance, as well as any issues they are monitoring. The Navy Generally Has Not Accurately Planned for Aviation Depot Maintenance Requirements Our analysis of Navy-planned maintenance workload data—estimates of the number of days planned for depot maintenance made 3 years in advance—found that the Navy generally has not accurately planned for aviation depot maintenance requirements for selected fixed-wing aircraft for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. We found a trend of underestimating actual days needed for aircraft maintenance. The difference between the number of days the Navy planned in advance it would need for maintenance and the number actually needed ranged from a low of 3 percent in fiscal year 2014 to a high of 69 percent in fiscal year 2018. However, we found the difference declined to 42 percent in fiscal year 2019. Figure 8 shows the difference between planned and actual work days for selected Navy fixed-wing aircraft in fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Our analysis, for the 6 fiscal years that we reviewed, showed that the Navy underestimated the amount of time it needed to complete fixed-wing aircraft maintenance by an average of about 55 days per aircraft. The Navy has acknowledged that it has not accurately planned for depot maintenance requirements. The Navy conducted risk assessments and internal control assessments in 2018 and 2019 and found material weaknesses, such as a trend of underestimating time needed to address aviation depot maintenance requirements. Specifically, the two risk and internal control assessments stated that Navy policies for defining, costing, and executing maintenance did not allow them to correctly predict cost estimates and duration of depot maintenance. In addition, the Navy’s 2019 risk and internal control assessment highlighted the need to improve planning accuracy; the report stated that internal reviews found workload standards did not accurately capture the required maintenance and that planned maintenance requirements exceeded depot capacity. Navy officials stated that they implemented an initiative in fiscal year 2020 to improve maintenance requirements called Performance to Plan. This initiative is focused on incorporating data collection and analysis to, among other things, improve forecasts of maintenance period durations according to Navy documentation. For example, the approach of Performance to Plan is to incorporate predictive data into planning to improve forecasts of maintenance period durations, according to the same documentation. While this initiative is a positive step, it is still in the early stages of implementation and we identified three reasons that have in part led to inaccurate planning that the Navy has not fully addressed. The Navy Has Not Effectively Used Historical Data to Update Maintenance Planning The Navy measures depot performance using turnaround time as one of the key timeliness metrics. Turnaround time is the overall duration of the maintenance cycle, from when the aircraft is inducted into the depot to when it is provided back to the squadron. According to Navy officials, the Navy reviews historical data to support the maintenance requirements planning process in various ways, including adjusting turnaround time based on historical depot performance. However, we found that the Navy has not effectively used historical data to analyze turnaround time—total days planned for depot maintenance periods—and to update maintenance requirements planning for selected fixed-wing aircraft. Specifically, our analysis of average turnaround time for selected aircraft depot maintenance packages shows that the Navy has not adjusted maintenance planning effectively to account for the actual days needed to perform maintenance. Figure 9 shows that the Navy kept planned turnaround time the same or with minimal changes for maintenance packages for the C-2A, the F/A-18A-D, and the F/A-18E-F, despite worsening trends in maintenance execution during fiscal years 2014 through 2019. C-2A: In fiscal years 2016 through 2019, the Navy did not adjust its planned turnaround time—270 days—while the average number of actual work days to complete maintenance increased from 451 days in fiscal year 2016 to a high of 722 days in fiscal year 2018. Further, the difference between the average planned turnaround time and the average actual number of days needed to complete maintenance increased from 181 days in fiscal year 2016 to 352 days in fiscal year 2019, and peaked at 452 days in fiscal year 2018. F/A-18A-D: In fiscal years 2014 through 2019, the Navy adjusted its planned turnaround time by a total of 82 days, while the average number of actual work days to complete maintenance increased from 148 days in fiscal year 2014 to 694 days in fiscal year 2019, and peaked to 857 days in fiscal year 2018. In addition, the difference between the average planned turnaround time and the average actual number of days needed to complete maintenance increased from 52 days in fiscal year 2014 to 412 days in fiscal year 2019, and peaked at 629 days in fiscal year 2018. F/A-18E-F: In fiscal years 2014 through 2019, the Navy adjusted its planned turnaround time by a total of 28 days, while the average number of actual work days to complete maintenance increased from 51 days in fiscal year 2014 to 92 days in fiscal year 2019. In addition, the difference between the average planned turnaround time and the average actual number of days needed to complete maintenance increased from 10 days in fiscal year 2014 to 23 days in fiscal year 2019, and peaked at 59 days in fiscal year 2016. Naval Air Systems Command Workload Standards Required for the Aircraft and Engine Programs at the Fleet Readiness Centers states that COMFRC should analyze and review naval aviation proposed workload standard packages and compare to actual production and historical data. It also states that the workload standard development process, which includes the estimation and development of turnaround time—is to provide a basis for the identification of resource requirements at the naval aviation depot, such as personnel skills mix and materials, and as a budgetary justification of workload for the repair of aircraft. In addition, the Navy 2014-2019 Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan states that NAVAIR and COMFRC will identify and sustain requisite core maintenance capabilities through a planning process that effectively estimates and monitors near and long-term workload. Navy officials explained that they have worked to incorporate historical data into their maintenance requirements planning process; however, they acknowledged that planning needs to improve and they are in the process of revising how COMFRC and NAVAIR determines planned turnaround time. For example, COMFRC and F/A-18 program office officials said as part of the Naval Sustainment System initiative, COMFRC is moving toward a 60-day fixed turnaround time on some F/A-18E-F depot maintenance packages in an effort to drive depot maintenance efficiency and, ultimately, improve aircraft mission capability rates. According to officials, they plan to apply a fixed turnaround time across all aircraft. As the Navy moves forward, it must ensure that it effectively uses historical data to analyze turnaround time and establish accurate turnaround time targets for fixed-wing aircraft depot maintenance packages. If it does not do so, the Navy will likely continue to underestimate the number of days required to perform depot maintenance and misalign the resources and funding needed at the depots to perform aircraft maintenance, which in part contributes to persistent maintenance delays that reduce the time aircraft are available for operations and training. Navy Depot Planners Do Not Have Direct Visibility of Maintenance Performed Outside Aviation Depots We found that Navy depot maintenance planners do not have direct visibility into fixed-wing aircraft maintenance that is performed outside the Navy aviation depots by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility—information critical to planning for the condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. Navy officials said that data exists on maintenance conducted on an aircraft outside the Navy aviation depots—by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility—and on the condition of an aircraft while deployed with squadrons. However, depot planners do not have direct visibility over squadron-level information because the Navy has not provided depot planners regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the aviation depots. Instead, depot planners can access that data only through a request to the squadron and typically rely on general planning factors rather than aircraft-specific data when estimating maintenance needs. According to Navy officials, the lack of direct visibility into the condition and maintenance history of an aircraft has driven maintenance delays in the past. For example, COMFRC and F/A-18 program office officials said that high turnaround time on certain F/A-18A-Ds undergoing maintenance was due to extended squadron usage on the aircraft combined with a lack of logistics support to address these issues. Furthermore, for aircraft damage that was outside of the depot’s repair capabilities, long lead times on parts procurement and extensive engineering analysis resulted in aircraft being placed in delay for extended periods of time, sometimes years, according to the officials. Figure 10 shows an F/A-18 undergoing depot maintenance at a Navy aviation depot. In other cases, high usage by squadrons can cause unexpected corrosion on many types of fixed-wing aircraft that depots have not prepared to address. For example, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations officials said that some aircraft have panels that are taken off during depot maintenance events. If depot maintainers find unexpected corrosion behind a panel, it may require additional time to repair that aircraft, resulting in an increase in the turnaround time. In addition, a COMFRC official stated an AV-8B arrived at an aviation depot without the engine installed, which prevents full operational checks being performed during disassembly. Once maintenance was completed, the aircraft went through operational checks and officials found canopy seal issues, which could have been identified if the depot had received data from the intermediate-level maintenance facility. The Navy 2014-2019 Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan states that NAVAIR and COMFRC will identify and sustain the necessary capabilities to perform maintenance through a planning process that effectively estimates and monitors near and long-term workload. Navy officials said direct visibility into data on the current condition and maintenance history of an aircraft at the squadron level better prepares COMFRC and NAVAIR to more accurately plan aircraft depot maintenance. This has been corroborated by Naval Sustainment System initiative findings that revealed that the Navy should be better informed about the condition of aircraft in order to improve their maintenance requirements planning. However, depot planners do not have direct visibility over squadron-level information because the Navy has not provided depot planners regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the aviation depots. Without regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the Navy aviation depots by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility, depot planners cannot plan for the condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft, which in part contributes to persistent maintenance delays that reduce the time aircraft are available for operations and training. The Navy Does Not Have Formal Processes and Guidance for Communication and Coordination between Depot Stakeholders to Inform Maintenance Planning We found that the Navy does not have formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. Navy officials explained that depot maintenance stakeholders communicate in a variety of ways to inform maintenance requirements planning. For example, the Navy conducts annual and mid-year workload planning meetings. At the annual workload planning meeting, COMFRC and aircraft program leads provide plans to meet aircraft workload requirements for the current year and the next 2 fiscal years. The mid-year review provides an update on the current year’s performance and the final workload plan for the next 2 fiscal years, according to Navy documentation. Various aircraft program office leads attend both the annual and mid-year planning meetings to provide an update on workload plans—among others—to COMFRC. Navy officials stated that they also informally communicate in a variety of ways to inform maintenance requirements planning. For example, depot maintenance engineers may find extra corrosion on an aircraft, and use those findings to update maintenance plans for other individual aircraft. While these meetings provide opportunities for collaboration and officials utilize other means to informally communicate, NAVAIR and COMFRC do not have formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to ensure they receive input from all key subject-matter experts regarding workload planning. Navy officials noted that not having formal processes and related guidance presents several challenges including: Navy officials said that there is no formal process or guidance for communication and coordination, and that the process instead involves a series of documents that COMFRC receives that are assembled to create a representation of future workload from the Commander, Naval Air Forces and from each of the aircraft program offices, among others. A COMFRC official said that different stakeholders manage various parts of workload planning and without guidance on specific documentation needs and process owners, it is challenging for the Navy to identify accountable stakeholders and discuss specific planning needs. NAVAIR officials said workload planners hold periodic meetings, but attendance by subject-matter experts is not mandatory. For example, subject-matter experts from the Fleet Support Teams—officials who provide engineering and logistics technical support to fleet and aviation depot maintenance organizations—are not required to attend workload planning meetings. Experts may potentially attend via video teleconference, but others, due to time zone differences, may not participate. As a result, workload planning meetings may not consistently include workload input from all relevant subject-matter experts. Navy officials said that once the Naval Sustainment System initiative began focusing on improving depot maintenance on the F/A-18E-F, deficiencies in the workload planning process became more apparent. They noted the challenges of coordinating key stakeholders along the maintenance planning timeline and its impact on planning and budgeting. In particular, Navy officials stated the current depot maintenance planning-time horizon was disconnected from long- range planning, such as the Program Objective Memorandum process. For example, due to a misalignment in the planning and budgeting processes, COMFRC reacts to the outcome of the Program Memorandum Objective process rather than influencing it, which results in many adjustments to their productions plans, such as improper staffing, material management, and facility-usage plans. NAVAIR Instruction 5221.1B, Workload Acceptance states that commanders will establish internal competency guidelines for communication and coordination of workload-related issues. In addition, the Navy 2014-2019 Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan, states the Navy will forge a strong liaison between maintenance activities and the acquisition community to ensure that maintenance requirements and planning are in sync. As a result of the Naval Sustainment System initiative, Navy officials said that COMFRC is developing a new workload planning process to become more proactive in depot maintenance planning and increase information exchanges. This includes ensuring that the new process involves all key depot maintenance stakeholders, such as COMFRC officials, program managers, and fleet officials. For example, NAVAIR officials said that most of the Fleet Support Team scheduled maintenance leads will be the primary point of contact to assist COMFRC with developing the future maintenance requirements planning and will be invited and asked to attend workload planning meetings. If they are unable to attend, they will then ask to have a program office representative attend in their place. However, Navy officials acknowledged that their efforts are still in the developmental stages and that the Navy needs formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. Without these in place, the Navy cannot be assured that all subject-matter expert input is proactively solicited and incorporated into depot workload planning, which in part can contribute to persistent maintenance delays that reduce the time aircraft are available for operations and training. Conclusions The ability of the Air Force and Navy aviation depots to complete maintenance on time directly affects military readiness. Poor planning for depot maintenance contributes to longer delays and reduced unit readiness. The Air Force has generally accurately planned for aviation depot maintenance over the last 6 years and in turn has completed the vast majority of its depot maintenance on time or early over this timeframe. In contrast, the Navy has not accurately planned for aviation depot maintenance over the last 6 years and in turn has completed only half of its depot maintenance on time over this timeframe, which has adversely affected aircraft availability. While the Navy has implemented an initiative to improve maintenance planning, the Navy has not effectively used historical data to analyze turnaround time and establish accurate planning targets for aircraft maintenance packages. In addition, Navy depot planners do not have visibility into aircraft maintenance that is performed outside the depots by an operational unit or other maintenance facility—information critical to planning for the condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. The Navy also has not established formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to ensure they receive input from all key subject-matter experts to inform maintenance planning. Without addressing these challenges, the Navy cannot appropriately plan for depot maintenance workload and may continue to experience maintenance delays that reduce the availability of aircraft for operations and training. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making three recommendations to the Department of Navy. The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers effectively use historical data to analyze turnaround time and establish accurate turnaround time targets for fixed-wing aircraft depot maintenance packages. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Commander, Naval Air Forces and Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific provide depot planners regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the Navy aviation depots by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility to ensure they have information on the current condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers establish formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all three of our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or Asif A. Khan, at (202) 512-9869, or khana@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Senate Report 115-262 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 included provisions for us to examine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) aviation depots and maintenance operations. Our report examines the extent to which 1) the Air Force and Navy aviation depots completed selected fixed-wing aircraft maintenance on time from fiscal years 2014 through 2019, and 2) the Air Force and Navy accurately planned for depot maintenance requirements for selected fixed-wing aircraft from fiscal years 2014 through 2019 and addressed any associated challenges. We have separate ongoing reviews to examine maintenance timeliness and related issues at the Army and Marine Corps key weapons systems depots and Navy shipyards. For objective one, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 18 Air Force and 18 Navy fixed-wing aircraft types, including fighters, bombers, and aerial refuelers, based on information from Navy and Air Force maintenance data and our prior work. These aircraft had maintenance completed in fiscal years 2014 through 2019, at the Navy’s three Fleet Readiness Centers and the Air Force’s three Air Logistics Complexes. We selected this time period so we could identify and obtain insight on historical data trends regarding maintenance timeliness for the selected aircraft. For each aircraft, we collected data on the date maintenance began and was completed for individual aircraft, as well as the original estimate of time (in days) needed to complete maintenance. We also collected updated estimates if available. We used this information to calculate the difference between the number of days planned for maintenance (using the updated estimate if available) and the number of days used for maintenance in order to determine whether the services completed aircraft maintenance on time, early, or late. Additionally, we used the total number of aircraft completed in each fiscal year to calculate a measure of average maintenance timeliness by aircraft type. We presented the data based on aircraft that had maintenance completed in a given fiscal year; however, not all of the maintenance was necessarily completed in that given fiscal year. For example, an aircraft may have had maintenance begun on it in one fiscal year and its maintenance completed in the next fiscal year. In such case, we would count that aircraft in the second fiscal year. The aircraft types we selected were: F/A-18A-D Hornet T-6B Texan II Turboprop In addition, we interviewed DOD and service officials to gain a better understanding of factors influencing fixed-wing aircraft maintenance timeliness and reviewed our prior work on depot maintenance. For objective two, we collected information on the depot maintenance planning processes for Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft. Using the non-generalizable sample of 18 Air Force and 18 Navy fixed-wing aircraft identified in objective one, we analyzed data on maintenance duration for maintenance completed in fiscal years 2014 through 2019, and compared the number of days planned for maintenance to the number of days used for maintenance to determine the extent to which planned and actual numbers aligned. We interviewed DOD, Navy, and Air Force officials to obtain their views on the challenges related to planning, incorporating historical data, and coordinating with stakeholders related to the maintenance requirements planning process for aircraft depot maintenance. For specific challenges identified in the Navy, we reviewed documents including Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) workload standards, applicable Navy guidance, and the Navy depot maintenance strategic plan and interviewed Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers (COMFRC) and NAVAIR officials to determine the extent to which the Navy incorporates historical data into the maintenance requirements planning process and the extent to which Navy depot stakeholders communicate and coordinate to inform this planning process. In addition, we visited one Air Force aviation depot and one Navy aviation depot to interview officials from specific aircraft programs, depot production, and depot business offices to understand challenges associated with planning for depot maintenance. To assess the reliability of the maintenance timeliness and planning data collected for both objectives, we reviewed and evaluated two systems— one for the Air Force and one for the Navy—that are used to collect and track data on depot maintenance. We conducted these assessments by interviewing officials regarding their data-collection processes, reviewing related policies and procedures associated with the collection of the data, examining the data for missing values and other anomalies, and interviewing knowledgeable agency officials regarding their accuracy and completeness. Based on our assessments, we determined that the data used from these systems were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of summarizing trends in selected aircraft maintenance timeliness and planning accuracy for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. We also assessed the reliability of the working capital fund data related to aviation depot maintenance activities included in Appendix II, by (1) reviewing our prior work to determine if there were reported concerns with Air Force and Navy budgetary data, and (2) reconciling the working capital fund data that was previously published in our reports for consistency. Based on our assessment, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting information on the services’ working capital funds activities and budget estimates for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Appendix II: Air Force and Navy Working Capital Funds Used for Aviation Depot Maintenance Activities The U.S. military use working capital funds to procure and provide certain materiel and commercial products and services to its forces. A Working Capital Fund (WCF) is a type of revolving fund that operates as a self- supporting entity conducting a regular cycle of businesslike activities, such as acquiring parts and supplies, equipment maintenance, transporting personnel, research and development. Department of Defense (DOD) WCFs are authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2208 and their amounts are generally available until expended. Ongoing WCF operations and maintenance of a minimum cash balance are funded through reimbursements to the WCF comprised of customer payments for goods or services received from WCF-supported activities, such as Navy and Air Force aviation depots. DOD WCFs operate on a break-even basis, although they may realize gains or losses within each fiscal year. As part of the annual budget submission for each upcoming fiscal year, however, prior year gains and losses are taken into account when new rates are established at levels estimated to recover the budgeted costs of goods and services, including all general and administrative overhead costs. Regardless, WCFs must maintain a net-positive cash balance at all times. Section 2464 of title 10 of the United States Code requires DOD to maintain a core depot-level maintenance and repair capability that is government-owned and operated. Maintaining this capability provides a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources to enable effective and timely response to mobilizations, contingencies, or other emergencies. Additionally, DOD must assign these government- owned and operated facilities (the depots) sufficient workload to ensure cost efficiency and technical competence during peacetime, while preserving the surge capacity and reconstitution capabilities necessary to fully support the strategic and contingency plans prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The three Air Force and three Navy aviation depots operate through the Air Force and Navy working capital funds. Depot customers are charged for the anticipated full cost of requested goods and services. We reviewed the Air Force’s and the Navy’s budget estimates for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 and describe the information at a summary level below: Carryover (funded maintenance work leftover at the end of the fiscal year): Both services’ aviation depots underestimated carryover for most years during fiscal years 2014 through 2019. New orders (funded workload customers place at the aviation depots for maintenance work to be performed on their aircraft): Both services generally underestimated the amount of funds that their aviation depots received from new orders placed by customers and the work performed did not keep pace with those orders from year to year, during fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Revenue (dollar amount of work performed by depots in a single fiscal year): The services have varying trends for revenue for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. In fiscal years 2014 and 2017 through 2019 the Air Force, and for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 the Navy, overestimated the amount of revenue that was actually earned. Conversely, the Air Force underestimated for fiscal years 2015 through 2016, and the Navy underestimated during fiscal years 2018 through 2019. Workload (workload projections are expressed in Direct Production Earned Hours (DPEHs) for the Air Force and Direct Labor Hours (DLHs) for the Navy): A DPEH or DLH is an hour earned by a direct employee against an established work order, and includes civilians, contractors and military personnel. In fiscal years 2014 through 2019, Air Force depots’ workload increased from 21,337,000 DPEHs to 24,511,000 DPEHs—an increase of about 3.2 million (14.9 percent) DPEHs. During those same years, Navy depots’ workload generally increased from 10,161,000 DLHs to 11,668,000 DLHs—an increase of about 1.5 million (14.8 percent) DLHs. Personnel (civilian and military personnel performing depot maintenance at aviation depots and civilian staff performing support functions, such as finance and budgeting and supply and acquisitions): In fiscal years 2014 through 2019 the number of civilian personnel working at the aviation depots has generally increased by around 3,000 for both the Air Force and the Navy. Carryover Each year, customers order billions of dollars of maintenance work that the depots cannot complete by the end of the fiscal year. To the extent that the depots do not complete work at year-end, the work and related funding will be carried into the next fiscal year. DOD refers to this reported dollar value of work that has been ordered and funded (obligated) by customers, but not completed by working capital fund activities at the end of the fiscal year as “Carryover”. DOD allows and the congressional defense committees recognize that some carryover from one fiscal year to the next is needed to ensure a smooth flow of maintenance work during the transition from one fiscal year to the next. However, past congressional defense committee reports have raised concerns that the level of carryover may be more than is needed. DOD has reported that approximately 6 months of carryover is optimal. Excess carryover (i.e., more unfinished work than allowed) may reflect an inefficient use of resources and tie up funds that could be used for other priorities. Excessive amounts of carryover may result in future appropriations or budget requests of depot customers being subject to reductions by DOD and the congressional defense committees during the annual budget-review process. Tables 1 and 2 show Air Force and Navy carryover for fiscal years 2014 through 2019, respectively. New Orders Accurate budgets for the amount of new orders to be received by the depots are essential for them to plan their work, such as determining the right number of personnel, parts, and material needed. For example, if the services include workload in their new order estimates that do not materialize, a depot is at risk of incurring unplanned financial loss because the depot is allocating its overhead costs over less work than planned. These losses may lead the depots to increase their rates for repairing assets. If the customer receives more funding (e.g., Operations & Maintenance or Procurement) than they originally anticipated and they in turn increase their orders with the depots (new orders or just an increase to an existing order), or if operational decisions lead to changes in requirements or priorities, unplanned workload may materialize at the depots resulting in additional carryover. Tables 3 and 4 show Air Force and Navy new orders for fiscal years 2014 to 2019, respectively. Revenue Revenue represents the dollar amount of work performed by depots in a single fiscal year. DOD WCFs conduct businesslike activities to generate revenue from the sale of goods or services to customers, such as the military services or combatant commands, to cover costs expended throughout the year in support of those services. The DOD FMR 7000.14- R directs DOD WCFs to operate on a “break-even” basis (revenue generated equals the cost associated with receiving the revenue). See tables 5 and 6 for Air Force and Navy Depots’ Revenue (Budgeted vs Actual) for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Workload The Air Force and Navy express depot workload projections in Direct Production Earned Hours (DPEHs) for the Air Force, and Direct Labor Hours (DLHs) for the Navy. A DPEH or DLH is an hour earned by a direct employee against an established work order in the performance of depot work on an end item. The Air Force and Navy include direct labor hours worked by civilians, contractors and military personnel in their DPEH and DLH projections. Tables 7 and 8 show Air Force DPEHs and Navy DLHs for fiscal years 2014 through 2019, respectively. Personnel The number of civilian personnel at the Air Force and Navy aviation depots—referred to as end strength—perform the majority of depot-level maintenance activities and are made up of personnel such as artisans and maintainers—welders, machinist, sheet metal mechanics, aircraft mechanics, aircraft electricians, engineers and scientists—performing aviation depot maintenance, but also includes personnel performing support functions such as finance and budgeting. Tables 9 and 10 show total civilian and military personnel employed at the Air Force and Navy aviation depots for fiscal years 2014 through 2019, respectively. As seen in table 9, in fiscal years 2014 through 2019, the number of civilian personnel working at the Air Force aviation depots has grown by over 3,000 civilians (25,540 to 28,576). As seen in table 10, in fiscal years 2014 through 2019, the number of civilian personnel working at the Navy aviation depots has grown by over 3,100 civilians (8,515 to 11,643). Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Diana Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov, or Asif A. Khan at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao.gov. Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contacts listed above, Chris Watson (Assistant Director), Delia Zee (Analyst-in-Charge), John Craig, Sergio Enriquez, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Amanda Manning, Keith McDaniel, Richard Powelson, Benjamin Sclafani, Michael Silver, and Roger Stoltz (Assistant Director) made key contributions to this report. Related GAO Products Military Depots: DOD Can Benefit from Further Sharing of Best Practices and Lessons Learned. GAO-20-116. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2020. Navy Maintenance: Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness. GAO-20-257T. Washington, D.C.: December 4, 2019. Naval Shipyards: Key Actions Remain to Improve Infrastructure to Better Support Navy Operations. GAO-20-64. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2019. F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Faces Challenges in Sustaining a Growing Fleet. GAO-20-234T. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2019. Depot Maintenance: DOD Should Adopt a Metric That Provides Quality Information on Funded Unfinished Work. GAO-19-452. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2019. Military Depots: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions of Facilities and Equipment That Affect Maintenance Timeliness and Efficiency. GAO-19-242. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2019. DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of Their Initiatives to Maintain Critical Skills. GAO-19-51. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2018. Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and Aviation Readiness Will Require Time and Sustained Management Attention. GAO-19-225T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018. Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet. GAO-19-229. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2018. Depot Maintenance: DOD Has Improved the Completeness of Its Biennial Core Report. GAO-19-89. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2018. Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future. GAO-19-120T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2018. Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified. GAO-18-678. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2018. F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency. GAO-18-75. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2017. Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operations. GAO-17-548. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2017. Depot Maintenance: Executed Workload and Maintenance Operations at DOD Depots. GAO-17-82R. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2017. Depot Maintenance: Improvements to DOD’s Biennial Core Report Could Better Inform Oversight and Funding Decisions. GAO-17-81. Washington, D.C.: November 28, 2016. Army Working Capital Fund: Army Industrial Operations Could Improve Budgeting and Management of Carryover. GAO-16-543. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2016. Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations. GAO-16-450. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016. Navy Working Capital Fund: Budgeting for Carryover at Fleet Readiness Centers Could Be Improved. GAO-15-462. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2015. Army Industrial Operations: Budgeting and Management of Carryover Could Be Improved. GAO-13-499. Washington D.C.: June 27, 2013. Marine Corps Depot Maintenance: Budgeting and Management of Carryover Could Be Improved. GAO-12-539. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2012. Air Force Working Capital Fund: Budgeting and Management of Carryover Work and Funding Could Be Improved. GAO-11-539. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2011.


Background Roles and Responsibilities of SOCOM and the ASD- SO/LIC SOCOM has a unique structure and responsibilities in that it has both combatant command responsibilities and military service-like functions for organizing, training, and equipping SOF. Under sections 164 and 167 of Title 10, United States Code, the SOCOM commander is responsible for training and ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces and monitoring the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of SOF assigned to unified combatant commands. In addition, SOCOM is responsible for developing special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics; the employment of forces of the command to carry out assigned missions; requirements validation; acquisition of special operations- peculiar equipment; and formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support, among other things. In its combatant command function, the commander of SOCOM is responsible for and has the authority to conduct the following special operations activities: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) military information support operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Congress initially established the position of the ASD-SO/LIC in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1987. As previously discussed, in 2016 Congress enhanced the role of the ASD-SO/LIC in section 922, which is codified in section 138(b) of Title 10, United States Code. The ASD-SO/LIC’s current statutory responsibilities include overall supervision, including policy and resources, of special operations activities listed above; exercising authority, direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of SOF; and assisting the Secretary of Defense and USD (P) in the development and supervision of policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for irregular warfare, combating terrorism, and special operations activities. DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), first issued in 1995 and most recently updated in 2011, also prescribes the roles and responsibilities for the ASD-SO/LIC. Among other things, the ASD- SO/LIC serves as the principal staff assistant to the USD (P) and the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and counterdrug policy, among others. DOD Directive 5111.10 also establishes responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities for the ASD-SO/LIC on issues such as the coordination and oversight of policy for humanitarian assistance, refugee affairs, and foreign disaster relief activities (e.g., emergency relief for Ebola). Prior to the enactment of section 922, OASD-SO/LIC coordinated regularly with SOCOM on administrative matters, such as reviewing SOCOM’s budget materials. Specifically, the administrative chain of command for SOF-related matters was formally changed by section 922 to give the ASD-SO/LIC more oversight over SOCOM through direct interaction with the Secretary of Defense. Section 922 provided the ASD-SO/LIC with the statutory authority to exercise authority, direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to organizing, training, and equipping SOF. Section 922 did not alter SOCOM’s operational chain of command as a combatant command. DOD’s Report Summarizing Its Progress in Implementing Section 922 Section 1074 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018 directed DOD to submit a report on the progress the department had made in implementing the requirements identified in section 922. Section 1074 specified seven reporting elements, such as the accounting of personnel currently assigned, that DOD’s report should address. DOD submitted its report on March 12, 2018, wherein it identified a high-level summary of actions taken, as shown in table 1 below. DOD Has Made Recommendations, Developed Actions, and Taken Steps to Address Requirements in Section 922 DOD Identified Recommendations and Developed Actions to Address Requirements in Section 922 In 2018, DOD identified 166 recommendations to address the reforms required by section 922 that are aimed at increasing the ASD-SO/LIC’s role in the management of SOF and special operations. To identify these recommendations and support the implementation of service secretary- like responsibilities under section 922, OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM created a “tiger team” to review broad functional areas typically performed by the military service secretariats and determine the need for potential changes to the roles and responsibilities of OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM related to addressing requirements in section 922. The tiger team included five working groups to review potential roles and responsibilities for budget, special access programs, personnel and readiness, program and requirements, and acquisition functions. Two officials, respectively representing OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM, co-led each of these working groups. OASD-SO/LIC established design principles to help the working groups identify new roles and responsibilities for OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM under section 922. These principles included the following three broad categories of authorities that OASD-SO/LIC could be expected to take on: Monitor: This role requires that OASD-SO/LIC be informed, observe, and check the progress or quality of an activity throughout the lifetime of the activity. This includes, for example, monitoring SOCOM’s submission of its presidential budget justification material to Congress. Review and coordinate: This role requires that OASD-SO/LIC review, analyze, and coordinate throughout the lifetime of an activity to ensure compliance with authoritative policy and with statutory and other regulatory issuances, and to ensure achievement of broad program goals. Coordination does not imply authority to compel agreement, however. An example of the review and coordinate role is that OASD-SO/LIC liaises with the military departments on military personnel issues. Approve: This role requires OASD-SO/LIC’s concurrence to give explicit or official sanction, permission, or ratification of an activity. An example of approval authority is that ASD-SO/LIC approves SOCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM). We found the largest share of the 166 recommendations made by the working groups strengthened OASD-SO/LIC’s roles related to monitor and to review and coordinate, as shown in figure 1. Specifically, 80 out of 166 recommendations (48 percent) would strengthen OASD-SO/LIC’s role regarding monitor or review and coordinate. Twenty-two out of 166 recommendations (13 percent) would give OASD-SO/LIC approval authority—requiring OASD-SO/LIC’s concurrence to give explicit or official sanction, permission, or ratification of an activity. Of these 22 recommendations, 16 involved either joint approval—requiring both OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM to jointly approve the action—or partial approval—that is, OASD-SO/LIC would have approval authority on certain aspects of an action item. Sixty-four out of 166 recommendations (39 percent) did not recommend any change to OASD-SO/LIC’s role. In addition, the majority of the recommendations, about 156 out of 166 (about 94 percent) would not change SOCOM’s roles. OASD-SO/LIC used the 166 recommendations to inform the development of 87 actions in OASD-SO/LIC’s monthly reports to Congress. We found that with regard to the 87 actions identified in OASD-SO/LIC’s February 2019 monthly report, 49 percent of the action items (43 out of 87) focused on OASD-SO/LIC’s participation in meetings. For example, prior to the implementation of section 922, OASD-SO/LIC attended Joint Resources Management Board meetings. After implementing section 922, OASD- SO/LIC exercised its review and coordinate responsibility by attending Joint Resources Management Board meetings, thereby formalizing OASD-SO/LIC’s prior role. According to DOD officials, there is a value in adding OASD-SO/LIC as a participant in key meetings and formalizing OASD-SO/LIC’s review and coordinate role. For example, officials explained that, by participating in meetings, OASD-SO/LIC can have more situational awareness about key topics and can better advocate for the SOF enterprise. DOD Has Taken Several Actions to Address Section 922 Requirements DOD, through OASD-SO/LIC, has taken various actions, including changes in roles and responsibilities, related to addressing requirements in section 922. According to OASD-SO/LIC officials, its actions reflect an incremental approach to strengthening OASD-SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities. In February 2019 OASD-SO/LIC reported to Congress that it had completed 56 of its 87 actions. For example, one of the actions identified in the February 2019 monthly report was the need to enhance OASD-SO/LIC’s role in the development and approval of SOF-related program and budget matters. The report further identified a number of actions, including having OASD-SO/LIC approve SOCOM’s POM. According to the report, OASD-SO/LIC was briefed on and approved SOCOM’s POM for fiscal years 2020-2024. As another example, the report identified the need to enhance OASD-SO/LIC’s oversight of SOF- related military construction activities and contingency basing. This included a requirement that OASD-SO/LIC co-chair SOCOM’s Military Construction Summit, which according to officials deals with acquisition- related issues regarding military construction and is used to inform the POM. According to the February 2019 report, OASD-SO/LIC co-chaired the summit for fiscal year 2019, and its formal role as co-chair will be reflected in future updates to SOCOM guidance. The February report also explained that the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a new Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council directive that identified the ASD- SO/LIC as the lead for that council. The Deputy Secretary of Defense also delegated the ASD-SO/LIC with authority to approve waivers to hire civilian personnel during a civilian hiring freeze. Many of the actions taken thus far formalize pre-existing, informal relationships between OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM. According to OASD- SO/LIC officials, a formalization of a pre-existing role occurs when OASD- SO/LIC identifies a role that OASD-SO/LIC performed informally before addressing requirements under section 922 and continues to maintain the role officially under its section 922 responsibilities. Based on the February 2019 report to Congress, we found that 26 out of 56 implemented action items (about 50 percent) formalize ongoing OASD- SO/LIC roles and responsibilities that were previously conducted informally. Officials stated that all of the actions relating to budget execution are formalizations of previously existing informal roles and responsibilities. For example, according to OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials, OASD-SO/LIC had an informal role in reviewing SOCOM’s POM prior to section 922, such as participating in the review of the POM without formal approval authority. According to DOD officials familiar with the POM process, giving OASD-SO/LIC approval authority for SOCOM’s POM essentially formalized what had been done in the past, while allowing OASD-SO/LIC to perform a more thorough review. Similarly, officials stated that OASD-SO/LIC had an informal role in developing SOCOM’s budget justification books prior to the passage of section 922. Another action identified in DOD’s February 2019 monthly report is OASD-SO/LIC’s role in budget submission. Officials explained that, in an effort to enhance OASD-SO/LIC’s role in budget submission, OASD- SO/LIC has formalized this role. According to the officials, the benefit of this formalization is that OASD-SO/LIC has greater access to the process of producing justification books. There have been similar examples of formalization of pre-existing roles in other areas as well. For example, prior to section 922, SOCOM’s public affairs requirements were coordinated with USD (P)’s public affairs office. Rather than duplicate SOCOM’s existing public affairs role with an additional public affairs office for the ASD-SO/LIC, OASD-SO/LIC coordinates with the USD (P)’s public affairs office. Lack of Clear Time Frames and Guidance Are Challenges to Completing Implementation of the ASD-SO/LIC’s Roles and Responsibilities Most Actions That Remain to Be Implemented Do Not Have Clear Time Frames Most of the actions remaining to be implemented do not have clear time frames for implementation. Based on our analysis of the February 2019 monthly report, we found that 31 out of 87 identified actions remain unimplemented. Of these 31 actions, three have clear time frames for implementation. For example, one of the remaining actions involves enhancing the ASD-SO/LIC’s role in SOF military personnel-related issues. Among other things, this includes liaising with the military departments on relevant military personnel issues and coordinating on related policy issues. The February 2019 monthly report includes an action related to OASD-SO/LIC’s plans to coordinate a process to monitor promotions of SOF personnel and communicate issues with military departments. The report specifies that the ASD-SO/LIC expected to implement this process in 2019. As another example, documenting and funding for the Secretariat for Special Operations was expected to be resolved by the first quarter of fiscal year 2019. However, the remaining 28 actions do not have time frames for implementation. For example, some of the actions associated with implementing the ASD-SO/LIC’s key functions, such as acquisitions and legislative affairs, do not have clear time frames for implementation. Regarding acquisitions, OASD-SO/LIC is developing standard operating procedures, such as regular coordination and meetings, but it has not established time frames for the creation or implementation of these procedures. Similarly, OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM are prescribing roles with regard to legislative affairs pending further departmental guidance, but they have not established time frames within which these roles will be defined. DOD officials identified some reasons for not having identified time frames for the remaining actions. First, according to OASD-SO/LIC officials, their initial efforts were focused on identifying and prioritizing the list of actions needed to implement section 922, as reflected in the March 2018 report required by law. Since then, according to OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials, OASD-SO/LIC has taken an incremental approach to implementing these actions, addressing items on a case-by-case basis as they occur. For example, OASD-SO/LIC initially placed a higher priority on implementing its fiscal roles and responsibilities, partly because the POM cycle included deadlines associated with the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2020. Throughout the cycle, OASD-SO/LIC determined its specific role in each step of the POM process as the step arose. Second, OASD-SO/LIC officials stated that they had not established clear time frames linked to action items because the ASD-SO/LIC was new in that role and they were waiting for him to determine OASD-SO/LIC’s broader strategy and goals, which they could use to inform implementation time frames. However, we note that the ASD-SO/LIC has been in that position since December 2017, and OASD-SO/LIC has hired new personnel who could help develop and track time frames. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government emphasizes the need to establish time frames to implement actions effectively, and as we reported in June 2018, establishing time frames with key milestones and deliverables to track implementation progress are important for agency reform efforts. Failure to do so can have significant consequences. For example, by not establishing clear time frames for updating guidance that defines the ASD-SO/LIC’s acquisition roles, the ASD-SO/LIC is at risk for having unclear roles and responsibilities that may overlap between SOCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on functions related to acquisitions. According SOCOM officials, having clearer time frames to update DOD guidance could enable OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM to operate more efficiently and effectively. Without establishing clear time frames for the implementation of key oversight functions and other actions, the ASD-SO/LIC may not be able to fully execute OASD- SO/LIC’s service secretary-like authority, and DOD decision-makers may not be well positioned to track progress and evaluate whether or how the ASD-SO/LIC’s completed and pending actions support the full implementation of section 922. Outdated Guidance Limits Clarity of Understanding of the ASD-SO/LIC’s Broader Roles and Responsibilities under Section 922 While the ASD- SO/LIC’s responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities are established in DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) (Mar. 22, 1995) (incorporating Change 2, Oct. 21, 2011), this directive is outdated and does not reflect the ASD- SO/LIC’s statutory roles under section 922 and codified at 10 U.S.C. § 138. For example, DOD Directive 5111.10 states that the ASD- SO/LIC shall serve under the authority, direction, and control of the USD (P). However, section 922 states that the ASD- SO/LIC’s exercise of authority of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters related to the organization, training, and equipping of SOF shall be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. According to DOD officials, while there is other guidance that broadly lays out DOD roles and responsibilities, this guidance lacks details concerning operationalizing ASD- SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities under the new administrative chain of command, creating potential confusion regarding the ASD- SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities on some key SOF-related issues. For example: SOF personnel issues: SOF personnel activities include readiness reporting, training, education, warrior care, awards, decorations, and death notification. Support for SOF personnel issues is generally dispersed among different components, including the military services, SOCOM, the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)), and OASD- SO/LIC. Although DOD Directive 5111.10 states that the ASD- SO/LIC “shall advise and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on manpower” issues, it does not define whether manpower issues include SOF career management, such as special pay and promotion. According to DOD officials, DOD lacks overarching guidance that would clarify ASD-SO/LIC’s role on manpower issues. DOD Directive 5111.10 also does not provide specific information about the extent of the ASD- SO/LIC’s coordination role as it relates, for example, to issues such as career management, retirement, pay, or promotion with regard to USD (P&R) responsibilities on SOF personnel management. As a result, according to DOD officials, the lack of clear and updated guidance has caused some confusion among DOD components. According to OASD-SO/LIC officials, after section 922 was implemented, OASD- SO/LIC’s initial attempts to provide strategic outreach for SOF personnel faced some challenges because officials were not included in key personnel meetings. For example, OASD-SO/LIC officials told us they were not included in some meetings that discussed delegating civilian hiring waivers. By not participating in some key SOF personnel-related meetings, OASD-SO/LIC could have missed the opportunity to advocate for similar waiver authority. According to DOD officials, USD (P&R) officials did not fully understand the ASD- SO/LIC’s authorities under section 922 when OASD-SO/LIC officials attended some meetings. Despite this confusion, the ASD-SO/LIC has taken some steps to strengthen its role on SOF personnel issues. For example, according to DOD officials, during the federal government civilian employee hiring freeze, DOD delegated civilian employee hiring waivers to the secretaries of the military departments but did not include waivers for the ASD-SO/LIC or SOCOM. Without the waiver authority to re-instate SOF personnel, SOCOM would have to request a waiver separately through the military services. OASD-SO/LIC officials told us that by ensuring the ASD-SO/LIC was granted a similar waiver authority, OASD-SO/LIC officials streamlined the process and supported SOCOM’s efforts to hire additional SOF civilian personnel. However, the ASD-SO/LIC’s authority on SOF personnel matters remains unclear and SOF personnel issues are generally dispersed among the authorities of USD (P&R), military services, and SOCOM. Overall, it remains unclear what, if any, authorities the ASD-SO/LIC has with respect to leading and coordinating the department’s SOF personnel issues. Budgetary authority: SOF-related budgetary issues include the SOCOM special operations–specific–funding budget materials, the POM, acquisition, and congressional requests for information, among other things. DOD officials told us that before section 922 was enacted, the ASD-SO/LIC reviewed SOF-peculiar budget materials (generally linked to major force program funding) prior to submission of the POM, and the ASD-SO/LIC was notified of SOF-related congressional unfunded priority list submissions. The ASD-SO/LIC did not have principal staff assistant authority to approve the POM. DOD Directive 5111.10 states that the ASD-SO/LIC will provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of the SOF budget and programs and will review the SOCOM POM. However, the DOD directive has not been updated to provide the ASD-SO/LIC with clear oversight and approval authority over special operations– specific funding, which traditionally has been controlled by SOCOM. DOD Directive 5111.10 also states that the ASD-SO/LIC will advise and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology on acquisition priorities, but this does not provide the ASD-SO/LIC with oversight of the SOF acquisition process. In addition, DOD does not have any guidance that gives ASD-SO/LIC clear oversight roles regarding the SOF acquisition process. By comparison, SOCOM is responsible for the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services in accordance with section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code, and it executes funding in operation and maintenance, procurement, and military construction accounts, among other things. According to OASD-SO/LIC senior officials, the ASD-SO/LIC has some authority over special operations–specific funding through the POM process. According to OASD-SO/LIC officials, after implementing section 922, the ASD-SO/LIC established a new principal staff assistant authority to approve the POM in 2018. However, DOD officials familiar with SOF-related budgetary issues stated that it is unclear how much authority the ASD-SO/LIC has over funding issues to adjudicate potential disagreements between the services and SOCOM on either SOF-specific or common funding issues. Special Access Programs (SAP): SAPs are programs established for a specific class of classified information that impose safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level. Given the sensitive nature of these programs, DOD has established different levels of authorities to create and manage SAPs. According to DOD Directive 5205.07, Special Access Program (SAP) Policy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designates certain DOD component heads, or DOD agency heads—for example, the secretary of a military department or the Commander, SOCOM—as cognizant authorities to manage and execute their respective SAPs. While the ASD-SO/LIC has always played a role in SOF-related SAPs, DOD officials stated that the role is expected to evolve as part of the implementation of section 922. OASD-SO/LIC’s February 2019 monthly report includes several actions intended to enhance the ASD-SO/LIC’s role in the management of SAPs, and OASD-SO/LIC has already begun participating in various SAP-related conferences and meetings. However, according to DOD officials, the ASD-SO/LIC’s future role related to SAPs remains unclear in existing guidance. For example, DOD Directive 5111.10 states that the ASD-SO/LIC will provide oversight over all special operations and low-intensity conflict related sensitive SAPs. Although the ASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials told us that they are currently further defining these roles, the DOD directive has not been updated to clarify whether the ASD-SO/LIC should be included in the SAP governance process, which includes designating the ASD-SO/LIC as a cognizant authority with service secretary-like SAP responsibilities. DOD officials expressed some concerns that until these matters are clarified in guidance, it will remain unclear whether the ASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM should work together on SAP issues, and how their relationships with the various Under Secretaries of Defense with oversight authority will be managed. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should define objectives clearly and assign responsibility for key roles throughout the organization. Specifically, the standards call for management to define objectives in specific terms so that they are understood at all levels of the entity. This involves clearly defining what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and time frames for its achievement. We have also previously reported that management practices key to program success include clearly identifying organizational roles and responsibilities and clarifying program objectives. OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials stated that updated guidance is needed to help clarify the ASD-SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities under section 922. In December 2018 OASD-SO/LIC officials told us that they were starting to update guidance on the ASD- SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities under section 922 in DOD directive 5111.10. However, OASD-SO/LIC officials did not provide details about the information that would be updated, and did not provide a copy of that draft guidance. In addition, OASD-SO/LIC officials did not have clear time frames regarding when the guidance will be updated. As DOD updates the ASD-SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities either in DOD Directive 5111.10 or through new guidance, it has an opportunity to clarify changes in its relationship with DOD components involved in overseeing SOF administrative matters related to personnel, budgetary authority, and SAPs. The SOF enterprise is a complex system, and without clearly identified roles and responsibilities for a service secretary- like role for the ASD-SO/LIC, other DOD components—such as the military departments, USD (P), and USD (P&R) —may not know the extent of the ASD-SO/LIC’s and SOCOM’s authorities in key issues where they have vested interests. For example, it will remain unclear what authorities the ASD-SO/LIC has with regard to SOF-related administrative matters, and which entities will have visibility over any problems or resourcing decisions related to the SOF enterprise. By clarifying the ASD-SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities with regard to its relationship with SOCOM and other DOD components, DOD can more effectively implement the intent of section 922. DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop a Hiring Plan but Has Not Fully Incorporated Some Key Strategic Workforce Planning Principles OASD-SO/LIC Has Hired Additional Personnel and Taken Steps to Develop a Hiring Plan to Guide Future Growth OASD-SO/LIC has taken steps to develop a hiring plan to identify personnel requirements and an approach to hiring additional personnel. DOD’s efforts began in 2017, when OASD-SO/LIC commissioned the Army Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs to conduct a manpower study to provide an analysis of manpower requirements based on unconstrained resources that are necessary to satisfy the service secretary-like responsibilities under section 922. The Army’s manpower study was based on nine functions, including budget, acquisitions, and legislative activities. For each function, the study identified corresponding tasks and the average man hours, or time needed, to complete each task. The study, which was included in DOD’s March 2018 report to Congress, ultimately estimated that up to 64 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions might be needed to implement the ASD-SO/LIC’s section 922 responsibilities. According to OASD-SO/LIC officials, the study provided an initial framework for OASD-SO/LIC to determine its staffing needs, but the study was not comprehensive and OASD-SO/LIC’s hiring needs will likely continue to change in the future. Over the past 2 years, according to OASD-SO/LIC officials, OASD- SO/LIC has begun to hire personnel to fulfill various roles and responsibilities. Specifically, the number of FTEs hired to support OASD- SO/LIC’s implementation of section 922 increased from 14 in March 2018 to 24 as of December 2018. In addition, section 361 of the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 gave the ASD-SO/LIC additional flexibility to hire staff in fiscal year 2019. For example, section 361 directed that not less than $4 million in fiscal year 2019 shall be used to fund additional civilian personnel to help implement section 922. Section 361 also provided the OASD-SO/LIC an exemption from the statutory civilian personnel limitation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense imposed by 10 U.S.C. § 143. Figure 2 shows OASD-SO/LIC’s hiring actions to date, along with key events related to the implementation of section 922. In December 2018 OASD-SO/LIC officials completed a basic hiring plan to guide future personnel growth as OASD-SO/LIC continues to implement actions related to section 922. The plan—documented in a 10 slide presentation—includes OASD-SO/LIC’s short-term hiring goals through the start of fiscal year 2020, a hiring approach involving a mix of permanent and temporary staff, and the identification of targeted skillsets for personnel hired. For example, the plan includes targets related to achieving key skills, such as force planning and shaping the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2021. The plan also calls for OASD-SO/LIC to grow from 27 current FTEs to a total of 55 FTEs in fiscal year 2020. OASD-SO/LIC’s Hiring Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Key Strategic Workforce-Planning Principles While OASD-SO/LIC’s current hiring plan represents a first step toward developing a broad overview of its hiring goals and some key hiring considerations, it does not fully incorporate some leading practices for strategic workforce-planning. As we have previously reported, strategic workforce planning addresses two critical needs: (1) aligning an organization’s human capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals; and (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. While agencies’ approaches to workforce planning will vary, we have previously identified several key principles that strategic workforce planning should address, irrespective of the context in which the planning is done. GAO’s prior work on workforce planning identified the following five key principles: involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing the strategic workforce plan; determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve long-term goals; develop strategies that are tailored to address critical competency gaps; build the capacity needed to address requirements important to supporting workforce strategies; and monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals. However, we found that as of December 2018, the OASD-SO/LIC’s hiring plan had not fully incorporated several of these key strategic workforce-planning principles, as described below: The hiring plan was not fully aligned with long-term goals. A key principle in strategic workforce planning is strategic alignment, which occurs when an agency’s human capital program is linked with its mission and goals. However, we found that OASD-SO/LIC has not clearly linked its hiring plan with its overall mission and goals. For example, the hiring plan mentions short-term goals, such as analyzing the budget for fiscal year 2021 and long-term goals, such as strategic assessment and aligning the organization with National Defense Strategy requirements. However, the plan does not define strategic assessment, and it lacks detail about how newly hired personnel in fiscal year 2019 will help OASD-SO/LIC meet long-term goals related to strategic assessment. For example, OASD-SO/LIC recently hired seven personnel, but it is not clear whether the newly hired personnel have skills that match competencies, such as the ability to work with Special Access Programs, identified in OASD-SO/LIC’s hiring plan. We have previously reported that unless hiring needs are clearly linked with long-term goals, the hiring plan may be incomplete or premature. OASD-SO/LIC’s approach did not fully involve stakeholders. While stakeholder involvement is not statutorily required, another key principle of effective strategic workforce planning is to involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing strategic workforce plans. We found several cases in which OASD-SO/LIC did not involve stakeholders in its key efforts. For example, although OASD-SO/LIC senior officials shared information about the hiring plan with one senior official at SOCOM, several OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials stated that OASD-SO/LIC did not communicate the hiring plan’s expectations or strategies more broadly, to involve a full range of OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials and other stakeholders, such as USD (P). In another example, when OASD-SO/LIC hired personnel from September 2018 through December 2018, several OASD- SO/LIC and SOCOM officials were unclear about the specific roles and responsibilities of new personnel hired. The hiring plan did not include strategies to address critical competency gaps and identify related personnel requirements. Leading principles of effective strategic workforce planning hold that agencies should develop strategies to address critical skill gaps and systematic personnel requirements processes, which are considered a good human capital practice across government. However, we found that OASD-SO/LIC’s hiring plan did not include completed competency-gap assessments or have procedures in place to periodically reassess personnel requirements. Without a systematic process to periodically assess personnel requirements, OASD-SO/LIC could not determine whether the Army study’s initial estimates were the most efficient choice for the workforce. For example with regard to the legislative affairs positions, OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials told us that the Army manpower study’s initial estimate of eight FTEs was too high. OASD-SO/LIC officials eventually hired two FTEs for the legislative affairs office, but the hiring plan did not include a methodology to analyze the workforce and explain why two FTEs would fit within the Army study’s framework. According to OASD- SO/LIC officials, OASD-SO/LIC also did not use a standardized process to assess whether two FTEs would meet its requirements. According to OASD-SO/LIC officials, the hiring plan is the first step in developing an initial framework, and they stated that it lacked implementation details. OASD-SO/LIC officials stated that they anticipate building upon the hiring plan as the current workforce plan evolves over time. In addition, OASD-SO/LIC officials stated that key priorities include strengthening OASD-SO/LIC’s participation and oversight of SOF resources through the POM and fiscal guidance processes. As a result, the hiring plan includes information about new personnel focused on fiscal oversight, such as analyzing the budget in fiscal years 2020 through 2021, but it does not clarify long-term goals, competency gaps, and program results tied to other priorities, such as legislative and acquisition- related functions. Officials from OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM agreed that incorporating key principles in the strategic workforce plan would help them determine the most appropriate size and composition of OASD- SO/LIC’s workforce. Until OASD-SO/LIC completes a comprehensive strategic workforce plan that includes key principles as outlined above, OASD-SO/LIC may not know what gaps exist in skills and competencies, and what their workforce strategies to fill those gaps should be. These issues could put OASD-SO/LIC at risk of hiring personnel who may not adequately meet its needs as defined by section 922. Conclusions As DOD increasingly relies on SOF, the department has taken steps to implement section 922. Given the expanded statutory authority under section 922, the ASD-SO/LIC has greater authority to oversee and advocate for the SOF enterprise. The ASD-SO/LIC has implemented several actions to clarify and strengthen its oversight roles and responsibilities, and it has many additional planned actions underway. However, without time frames to implement action items and revised or new guidance that clearly articulates the ASD-SO/LIC’s roles and responsibilities with regard to SOCOM and the wider SOF enterprise, these changes may not be fully effective. In addition, without a strategic workforce plan that fully incorporates leading practices to ensure that the department has the right people, in the right place, at the right time, OASD-SO/LIC may not be well prepared to respond to future workload changes and manage its human capital strategically. As OASD-SO/LIC makes progress in its hiring plan, it is important for OASD-SO/LIC to develop a strategic workforce plan to ensure that it appropriately addresses the human-capital challenges of the future and better contributes to the agency’s efforts to meet its missions and goals. Recommendations We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict defines time frames for completing action items necessary to implement the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC’s expanded section 922 responsibilities. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict updates existing guidance or develops new guidance to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and relationships with DOD components that have vested interests in the SOF enterprise—such as the military services, SOCOM, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict builds upon its hiring plan by developing a strategic workforce plan that incorporates key principles, such as aligning the plan with long-term mission goals; fully involving stakeholders in developing the plan; and including strategies to address critical competency gaps and identify related personnel requirements. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In written comments on the draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. Comments from DOD are summarized below and reprinted in appendix I. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation that the ASD- SO/LIC define time frames for completing action items necessary to implement the ASD-SO/LIC‘s expanded section 922 responsibilities. In its response, DOD stated that most time frames have been established or the action completed. Additionally, DOD noted that some actions may not be completed because they depend on events, actions or leadership decisions that are outside of OASD-SO/LIC’s control. We agree that some DOD leadership decisions have yet to be made. However, 28 out of 31 already identified actions do not have clear time frames for implementation. Further, time frames can be modified as events change or better information becomes available. As we discuss in the report, establishing time frames with key milestones to track implementation progress are important for agency reform efforts. Without clear time frames, ASD-SO/LIC may not be able to fully execute its service secretary-like authority. DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation that the ASD- SO/LIC update DOD Directive 5111.10 to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the ASD-SO/LIC and relationships with DOD components that have vested interests in the SOF enterprise. DOD is in the process of revising this directive, but DOD noted that the purpose of DOD Directive 5111.10 is to define only specific Department-wide roles and missions for ASD-SO/LIC and is not the appropriate issuance to define ASD-SO/LIC’s relationship with other DOD components in the SOF enterprise. Given that DOD does not believe DOD Directive 5111.10 is the appropriate issuance to clarify ASD-SO/LIC’s relationships with DOD components, we modified our recommendation from focusing solely on updating DOD Directive 5111.10 to updating existing guidance and/or developing new guidance. Updating or developing guidance that clarifies ASD SO/LIC’s relationship with DOD components, such as the military departments, USD (P), and USD (P&R) would likely allow for improved oversight of and collaboration on SOF matters related to personnel, budgetary authority and SAPs. DOD partially concurred with the third recommendation that the ASD- SO/LIC build upon its hiring plan by developing a strategic workforce plan that incorporates key principles, such as aligning the plan with long- term mission goals; fully involving stakeholders in developing the plan; and including strategies to address critical competency gaps and identify related personnel requirements. In its response, DOD agreed that there is room to improve the involvement of stakeholders. In addition, DOD stated that it developed a strategic workforce plan that aligns with long-term mission goals and has identified strategies to address critical competency gaps, including target skillsets. However, as noted in our report, the 10 slide presentation that constitutes the hiring plan lacks details that would be included in a comprehensive workforce plan. For example, the hiring plan did not explain how the hiring needs would be specifically tied to long-term goals, such as National Defense Strategy requirements. Although the hiring plan mentions some skillsets, it does not include a competency gap assessment or assess personnel requirements. As noted in our report, OASD-SO/LIC and SOCOM officials stated that the initial personnel requirements developed by the Army study were inaccurate for several reasons, including the lack of a standardized process to assess personnel requirements. Accordingly, we continue to believe that until OASD-SO/LIC develops a comprehensive strategic workforce plan that includes key principles outlined in our report, OASD- SO/LIC could be at risk of hiring personnel who may not adequately meet its needs to perform the roles and responsibilities of section 922. We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees and the Acting Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or at russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact: Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Jim Reynolds (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Mikey Erb, Amie Lesser, Mike Silver, Cheryl Weissman, and Yee Wong (Analyst-in-Charge) made key contributions to this report.