State and Local Governments Will Need to Make Policy Changes to Achieve Fiscal Balance Our simulations suggest that the sector will likely continue to face a difference between revenues and expenditures during the next 50 years, as measured by its operating balance. We simulated the state and local government sector’s operating balance—a measure of the sector’s ability to cover its current expenditures out of current revenues—to understand the sector’s long-term fiscal outlook based on historical revenue patterns and other assumptions. Because a great majority of states and many local governments are required to balance or nearly balance their operating budgets, the operating balance illustrates the magnitude of fiscal pressures they face. Expenditures and revenues are both simulated to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) during the simulation period. However, expenditures are generally expected to grow at a faster rate than revenues, resulting in a declining operating balance (see figure 1). One way of measuring the long-term fiscal challenges faced by the state and local government sector is through an indicator known as the “fiscal gap.” The fiscal gap is an estimate of annual changes in expenditures and in revenues our simulations suggest would be needed to maintain the operating balance equal to zero during the 50-year simulation period. The sector could close the fiscal gap through an increase in revenues, a reduction in expenditures, or a combination of the two of sufficient magnitude. Our simulations suggest that the fiscal gap is about 3.6 percent of GDP over the next 50 years. The sector will need to take actions in annually reducing its expenditures or raising revenues, to achieve fiscal balance. Assuming no change in simulated expenditures, the sector would need to take actions equivalent to increasing its total revenues by 4.2 percent each year to achieve fiscal balance. Alternatively, assuming no change in its simulated revenues, the sector would need to take actions equivalent to decreasing its noninterest expenditures by an amount equal to 3.2 percent of its total expenditures each year. Total expenditure reductions required by the sector are 20.7 percent each year, which includes interest payments on debt that are simulated to be 17.4 percent of annual spending. To eliminate the fiscal gap, the sector would most likely take actions that include a combination of expenditure reductions and revenue increases. Health Care Cost Growth and Other Factors Contribute to the State and Local Sector’s Fiscal Imbalance States’ Spending on Medicaid is a Key Driver of Long-Term Expenditures Our simulations suggest that growth in the sector’s overall expenditures is largely driven by health care expenditures. Medicaid will likely constitute a growing expenditure for state and local governments. In 2018, Medicaid spending was 2.9 percent of GDP compared to 0.85 percent of GDP for other kinds of health care spending such as non-Medicaid social benefit payments and employee health benefit contributions. At the end of our simulations, Medicaid is simulated to be 4.6 percent of GDP and the other kinds of health care spending are 1.3 percent of GDP. After 2029, Medicaid spending in our simulations is derived from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) projections. On average, Medicaid expenditures are expected to rise by 1 percentage point more than GDP each year over the simulation period. Breaking this down, Medicaid expenditures per capita are expected to increase, on average, about 0.6 percent faster than GDP per capita—referred to as excess cost growth. Excess Cost Growth The extent to which health care costs per capita outpace gross domestic product (GDP) growth per person. As shown in figure 4, health care expenditures are simulated to increase from about 3.94 percent of GDP in 2019 to 5.9 percent of GDP in 2068. In comparison, nonhealth, noninterest expenditures, which include all other operational expenditures other than debt interest payments, will decrease as a share of GDP by 2.74 percentage points over the simulation period. Per capita, national health expenditures, which make up part of the health care expenditures in the figure below, are expected to grow on average 0.8 percent faster than GDP each year during the simulation period, according to CMS. Employee Compensation Decreases as a Share of the Sector’s Expenditures during the Simulation Period Employee compensation is the largest expenditure for the state and local government sector. It declines from 6.8 percent of GDP in 2018 to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2068. All spending components, including employee compensation, are simulated to increase in actual dollar amounts during our simulation period. Of the spending components included in employee compensation, only health benefits for employees and retirees increase as a share of employee compensation. In contrast, wages and salaries, pension contributions, and other forms of compensation decrease as a share of employee compensation (see figure 5). These percentages reflect a simulated decrease in state and local government employees’ compensation as a share of GDP. Our simulations suggest that spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees is likely to rise, on average, by 0.9 percentage points more than GDP each year. Similar to the growth in Medicaid spending, growth in spending for these health benefits is due to an increase in the simulated number of employees and retirees enrolled as well as an increase in the simulated amount of health benefits for each employee and retiree. According to our simulations, if employee and retiree health benefits follow trends in overall national health spending, they will likely make up an increasingly larger share of total employee compensation going forward. Our simulations suggest that annual contributions to state and local government employee pension plans will need to remain at their historical 10-year average of 12.9 percent of wages and salaries for state and local governments to meet their long-term pension obligations. Prior to the last decade, from 1999 to 2008 the state and local government sector averaged about an 8 percent contribution rate, which was lower than what our current simulations show is necessary for meeting pension obligations. State and local government contributions to employee pension plans are simulated to decline as a share of GDP, as are wages and salaries of state and local government employees. Growth in Federal Medicaid Grants Drives Revenues Our simulations suggest that federal grants will increase slightly as a share of GDP. The largest grant receipts are for Medicaid which will likely grow more quickly than other types of federal grants making up an increasing share of revenues in the future (see figure 6). The increase in Medicaid expenditures simulated during this period will likely put increasing pressure on both federal and state governments. As a matching formula grant program, the simulated increase in federal Medicaid grants implies an expected increase in Medicaid expenditures that will be shared by state governments. Federal investment grants (i.e., grants intended to finance capital infrastructure investments) and other federal grants unrelated to Medicaid (i.e., grants intended to finance education, social services, housing, and community investment) are simulated to decline as a share of GDP. Further, our simulations suggest that if historical relationships between state and local governments’ tax revenues and tax bases persist, total tax revenues for the state and local government sector will increase from 8.7 percent of GDP in 2019 to 9.1 percent of GDP by the end of the simulation period. As shown in figure 7, the different components of total tax revenues are simulated to remain fairly consistent or slightly increase. The simulations suggest that personal income tax revenues will increase as a share of GDP by about 0.5 percentage points during the simulation period. Sales tax is expected to decrease by approximately 0.2 percentage points and property taxes are simulated to slightly increase as a share of GDP through 2068 from 2.73 percent to 2.86 percent. Economic Growth and Other Factors Could Affect the Sector’s Fiscal Outlook Sensitivity Analysis An analysis using alternative assumptions of one variable to determine the uncertainty, or sensitivity, of another variable. Several factors, or key model variables, could affect the state and local government sector’s long-term fiscal outlook, including economic growth, health care excess cost growth, and the rate of return on pension assets. To see how the outlook changes in response to them, we developed sensitivity analyses—simulations that use alternative assumptions about their growth. For each of these key variables we use a baseline assumption, a higher-than-baseline assumption, and a lower-than- baseline assumption. We determined that these alternative assumptions highlighted the operating balance’s sensitivity to changes, shifting the future fiscal outcomes for the sector. Economic Growth Future trends in GDP growth could affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. In our simulations, GDP growth is based on the most recent data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (OASDI Trustees) which project real GDP (adjusted for inflation) to grow by 1.9 percent per year on average from 2018 through 2029, and by 2 percent per year on average after 2029. Using these projections, our simulations suggest that maintaining current policies would cause the sector’s operating balance to become increasingly negative. Using the OASDI Trustees’ alternative assumptions of real GDP growth at a faster rate—2.7 percent—suggests that the operating balance, while remaining negative, would have an improved outlook compared to the baseline. While growth in revenue and health care spending is largely tied to GDP in our simulations, spending for other components is tied to inflation and population growth and grows more slowly than GDP. As such, increases in GDP growth improve the sector’s outlook. Our simulations, using the OASDI Trustees’ alternative assumptions also show that if GDP were to grow at a slower rate—1.4 percent—the difference between revenues and expenditures would expand, resulting in an increasingly negative operating balance (see figure 8). Excess cost growth in health care is another key determinant of the sector’s fiscal balance. In our simulations Medicaid spending per capita grows about 1.8 percent faster than GDP per capita on average for the period from 2020 through 2029. Medicaid spending per capita grows about 0.6 percent faster on average from the period from 2030 through 2068. Other health expenditures per capita grow about 0.8 percent faster than GDP per capita for the period from 2019 through 2068. Using these projections, our simulations suggest that maintaining current policies will cause the sector’s expenditures to exceed its revenues and this difference will become increasingly negative during the next several decades. The simulations developed assuming zero excess cost growth in Medicaid and national health expenditures suggest that spending would be lower as a share of GDP. The difference between revenues and expenditures would be significantly less negative than the baseline simulations around the middle of the simulation period before stabilizing, but remain negative over the simulation period. In the scenario using the alternative projections from CMS where excess cost growth rises faster— 0.6 percent on average for Medicaid for the period from 2030 through 2068 and 0.9 percent for national health expenditures for the period between 2019 through 2068—our simulations show that the difference between revenues and expenditures would persist for the remainder of the simulation period (see figure 9). The rate of return on pension assets could also affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. Based on an inflation-adjusted rate of return on pension assets of 5 percent, our simulations suggest that state and local governments would need to make pension contributions equivalent to about 13 percent of employees’ wages and salaries to meet their long-term pension obligations. The simulations we developed using a higher rate of return—7.5 percent—suggest that pension contributions would be about 3 percent of state and local government employees’ wages and salaries to meet pension obligations. Under this scenario, spending would need to be a lower share of GDP and the sector’s outlook would improve. The difference between revenues and expenditures would briefly narrow early on before becoming increasingly negative through the remainder of the simulation period. Alternatively, we estimated that if the rate of return on pension assets is relatively low—2.5 percent—required pension contributions would need to be about 24 percent of state and local government employees’ wages and salaries. Under this scenario our simulations show that spending would be a higher share of GDP and the sector’s outlook would worsen as the sector’s negative operating balance would continue to grow larger (see figure 10). This report was prepared under the direction of Michelle A. Sager, Director, Strategic Issues, who can be reached at 202-512-6806 or sagerm@gao.gov, and Oliver M. Richard, Director, Center for Economics, who can be reached at 202-512-8424 or richardo@gao.gov if there are any questions. GAO staff who made key contributions are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Data This update of the state and local government fiscal model used aggregate data on the state and local government sector and national data on other variables from the following sources: the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Bloomberg, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old- Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program (OASDI Trustees), BEA, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Census Bureau, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Social Security Administration. These data sources are generally the same data sources we used for our prior update. We used annual observations on historical data through 2018 where available. Objectives and Methodology This report updates GAO’s state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the factors that are likely to contribute to the state and local sector’s fiscal imbalance. The level of receipts and expenditures for the state and local government sector as a whole in future years is based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. We used Table 3.3 of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)—State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures—prepared by BEA as an organizing framework for developing our model, and we simulated state and local government receipts and expenditures using methods similar to those we have used in prior updates. Our simulations of real U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) were consistent with the growth path developed by CBO for the period from 2019 through 2029 and by the OASDI Trustees for the period thereafter. Our simulations of U.S. population was consistent with the growth path developed by the OASDI Trustees, and our simulations of excess cost growth for national health expenditures and for Medicaid were consistent with CMS projections, all for the entire simulation period. Our simulations of other variables, such as the GDP price index, personal income, and 3-month U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) rates, were consistent with the growth paths for these variables developed by CBO for as much of the simulation period as possible. Otherwise, we developed our own assumptions about the likely future growth path of the variables in our model. In general, we assumed that current policies remain in place and that all levels of government continue to provide services at current per capita levels. A detailed description of the model is in appendix I of GAO, State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: 2018 Update, GAO-19-208SP (Washington, D.C.: December 2018). We describe below where we updated equations or added equations to the model. Otherwise our approach is the same as the approach we used in that update. State and Local Government Sector Receipts We simulated the future growth paths of the following types of state and local government revenues: current tax receipts, contributions to government social insurance, income on financial assets, current transfer receipts, the surplus from government enterprises, and capital transfer receipts. We also simulated the future growth path of state and local government long-term debt issuance. We updated some of the equations we used to simulate tax receipts(see table 1). We also added equations to simulate current transfers from the rest of the world to state and local governments, disaster-related insurance benefits to state and local governments, and other capital transfers to state and local governments, which we had not included in prior updates. The equations we used to simulate the other types of receipts are the same as the equations we used in GAO-19-208SP. We simulated the future growth paths of the following types of state and local government expenditures: consumption expenditures, current transfer payments, interest paid on outstanding state and local government debt, subsidies, capital outlays, and consumption of fixed assets (depreciation). We also simulated the future growth path of the state and local government sector’s net social insurance fund balance. We updated some of the equations we used to simulate the interest paid on outstanding state and local government debt (see table 1 above). We also added equations to simulate current transfer payments to the rest of the world, which we had not included in prior updates. Otherwise, the approach we used to simulate expenditures is the same as the approach we used in GAO-19-208SP. State and Local Government Sector Fiscal Balance Our main indicator of the sector’s fiscal balance is its operating balance net of funds for capital expenditures (henceforth, operating balance), which is a measure of the sector’s ability to cover its current expenditures out of current receipts. Operating balance is defined as total receipts minus (1) capital outlays not financed by long-term debt issuance, (2) current expenditures less depreciation, (3) current surplus of state and local government enterprises, and (4) net social insurance fund balance. We also estimated the annual changes in spending and in receipts that our simulations suggest would be needed to maintain the operating balance equal to zero during the 50-year simulation period, which we refer to as the “fiscal gap.” As discussed above, our baseline simulations assume that current policies remain in place and that all levels of government continue to provide services at current per capita levels. We then simulated the change in total expenditures needed to maintain the operating balance equal to zero. To estimate the annual change in spending needed to maintain balance we calculated the present value of that change as a percentage of the present value of baseline total expenditures and as a percentage of the present value of U.S. GDP, all for a 50-year period. We also calculated the interest and non-interest expenditure components of the change in total expenditures needed to maintain balance. We used a similar approach to estimate the annual change in total receipts needed to maintain balance. Sensitivity Analysis We assessed the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative projections of real U.S. GDP growth, health care excess cost growth, and the real rate of return on state and local government pension fund assets. Following the same approach we used in GAO-19-208SP, for each of these variables, we selected an alternative projection associated with faster growth or rate of return and one associated with slower growth or rate of return. Real U.S. GDP. For our baseline simulations, we used CBO projections of real GDP for the period from 2019 through 2029 and the OASDI Trustees’ intermediate projections of real U.S. GDP growth for the years thereafter. For our sensitivity analysis, we used the OASDI Trustees’ high-cost and low-cost projections. Health care excess cost growth. For our baseline simulations, we used CMS’s baseline projection of national health expenditures excess cost growth and we estimated Medicaid excess cost growth based on CMS’s baseline projections. For our sensitivity analysis, we used CMS’s alternative projection of national health expenditures excess cost growth and we estimated Medicaid excess cost growth based on CMS’s alternative projections. As another alternative, we simulated the model assuming both zero excess cost growth for national health expenditures and Medicaid. Our simulations used CBO’s projection of federal spending on Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies as a fraction of GDP to simulate certain variables related to state and local government spending on Medicaid and other health spending. This projection incorporates excess cost growth for the period from 2019 through 2029 but assumes zero excess cost growth starting in 2030, so we could only vary Medicaid excess cost growth in the alternative simulations for 2030 and later. Real rate of return on state and local government pension assets. For our baseline simulations, we assumed a 5 percent real rate of return on state and local government pension assets. For our sensitivity analysis, we used 2.5 percent and 7.5 percent. Table 2 shows the growth rates or rates of return associated with the baseline and alternative projections of each variable for the simulation period. We simulated the model changing either real U.S. GDP growth, health care excess cost growth, or the real rate of return on pension assets, leaving the other variables fixed at their baseline values. Thus, our sensitivity analysis is in the spirit of a partial equilibrium comparative statics analysis that sheds light on how each of the individual variables may affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. However, these variables are likely to be correlated, so future changes in one would likely be associated with changes in others. Caveats and limitations Our approach has a number of limitations and the results should be interpreted with caution. First, the state and local fiscal model is not designed for certain types of analyses. The simulations are not intended to provide precise predictions. Even though we know that these governments regularly make changes in tax laws and expenditures, the model essentially holds current policies in place and analyzes the fiscal future for the sector as if those policies were maintained because it would be highly speculative to make any assumptions about future policy adjustments. In addition, fiscal outcomes related to the sector’s financial position and solvency may not reflect all aspects of the sector’s “health.” Other indicators include economic indicators that go beyond the sector’s financial position to include economic growth, income, or distributional equity, as well as indicators of the quality of services provided by the sector, including education, health care, infrastructure, and other public goods and services. Finally, our unit of analysis is the state and local government sector as a whole, so our results provide an assessment of the sector’s fiscal outlook. However, individual state and local governments likely exhibit significant heterogeneity in their expenditure and revenue patterns and their fiscal outlooks will likely differ from the sector as a whole. Nevertheless, it is informative to assess the overall fiscal outlook because doing so reveals the outlook for state and local governments as a sector. In addition, aggregate data on the sector is available on a more timely basis than data for individual state and local governments, allowing for a better assessment of the sector’s current fiscal outlook. Our results for the sector also provide a baseline from which to view the experiences of individual state and local governments. Finally, assessing the fiscal outlook of the sector as a whole can help mitigate the tendency to extrapolate from the most visible, but potentially not representative, experiences of individual states or localities. Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Peter Del Toro, Courtney LaFountain, Melissa Wolf (Assistant Directors), Silvia Symber (Analyst-in- Charge), Shelby Clark, Amalia Konstas, Dylan Stagner, Frank Todisco, Walter Vance, and Alicia White made significant contributions to this report. Related GAO Products State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2018 Update, GAO-19-208SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2018. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2016 Update, GAO-17-213SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2016. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2015 Update, GAO-16-260SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2015. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2014 Update, GAO-15-224SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2014. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2013 Update, GAO-13-546SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2013. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2012 Update, GAO-12-523SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2012. State and Local Government Pension Plans: Economic Downturn Spurs Efforts to Address Costs and Sustainability, GAO-12-322. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2012. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2011 Update, GAO-11-495SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2011. State and Local Governments: Knowledge of Past Recessions Can Inform Future Federal Fiscal Assistance, GAO-11-401. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011. State and Local Governments: Fiscal Pressures Could Have Implications for Future Delivery of Intergovernmental Programs, GAO-10-899. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: March 2010 Update, GAO-10-358. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2010. Update of State and Local Government Fiscal Pressures, GAO-09-320R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2009. State and Local Fiscal Challenges: Rising Health Care Costs Drive Long- term and Immediate Pressures, GAO-09-210T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2008. State and Local Governments: Growing Fiscal Challenges Will Emerge during the Next 10 Years, GAO-08-317. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008. Our Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Challenge: State and Local Governments Will Likely Face Persistent Fiscal Challenges in the Next Decade, GAO-07-1113CG. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007. State and Local Governments: Persistent Fiscal Challenges Will Likely Emerge within the Next Decade, GAO-07-1080SP. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007.


Status of FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations On December 20, 2019, Congress passed and the President signed into law a full-year FY2020 appropriationâthe Further Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 116-94 , Committee Print 38-679 )âthat included Agriculture appropriations in Division B ( Table 1 ). During the regular appropriations cycle, the House passed a five-bill minibus appropriation on June 25, 2019 ( H.R. 3055 ), and the Senate passed a four-bill minibus on October 31, 2019 ( H.R. 3055 ). In both cases, Agriculture was in Division B. To develop these bills, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported Agriculture subcommittee bills ( H.R. 3164 and S. 2522 , respectively) with their own more detailed reports ( H.Rept. 116-107 and S.Rept. 116-110 , respectively). See Figure 1 for a comparison of timelines and Appendix D for more details. The Administration released its budget request in two parts: an overview on March 11, 2019, and more detailed documents on March 18, 2019. In the absence of an enacted appropriation at the beginning of the fiscal year, FY2020 began with two continuing resolutions (CRs). For overall spending levels, the House set its subcommittee allocations on May 14, 2019 ( H.Rept. 116-59 ). The Senate set its subcommittee allocation on September 12, 2019 ( S.Rept. 116-104 ), after the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 ( P.L. 116-37 ) raised caps on discretionary spending. The discretionary total of the FY2020 Agriculture appropriations act is $23.5 billion. This is $183 million more than the comparable amount for FY2019 (+0.8%) that includes the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The appropriation also carries about $129 billion of mandatory spending that is largely determined in authorizing laws ( Table 2 ). Scope of Agriculture Appropriations The Agriculture appropriations billâformally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Actâfunds all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), excluding the U.S. Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services and, in even-numbered fiscal years, CFTC. Jurisdiction is with the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and their Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies. The bill includes mandatory and discretionary spending, but the discretionary amounts are the primary focus ( Figure 2 ). Some programs are not in the authorizing jurisdiction of the House or Senate Agriculture Committees, such as FDA, Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), or child nutrition (checkered regions in Figure 2 ). The federal budget process treats discretionary and mandatory spending differently: Discretionary spending is controlled by annual appropriations acts and receives most of the attention during the appropriations process. The annual budget resolution process sets spending limits for discretionary appropriations. Agency operations (salaries and expenses) and many grant programs are discretionary. Mandatory spending is carried in the appropriation and usually advanced unchanged, since it is controlled by budget rules during the authorization process. Spending for so-called entitlement programs is determined in laws such as the 2018 farm bill and 2010 child nutrition reauthorizations. In the FY2020 appropriation ( P.L. 116-94 ), the discretionary amount is 15% ($23 billion) of the $153 billion total. Mandatory spending carried in the act comprised $129 billion, about 85% of the total, of which about $106 billion is attributable to programs in the 2018 farm bill. Within the discretionary total, the largest spending items are WIC; agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance loans and salaries; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and technical assistance for conservation program. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and other food and nutrition act programs, child nutrition (school lunch and related programs), crop insurance, and farm commodity and conservation programs that are funded through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). SNAP is referred to as an "appropriated entitlement" and requires an annual appropriation. Amounts for the nutrition program are based on projected spending needs. In contrast, the CCC appropriations reimburse spending from a line of credit. Recent Trends in Agriculture Appropriations Discretionary Agriculture appropriations were at an all-time high in FY2010, declined through FY2013, and have gradually increased since then. Changes within titles have generally been proportionate to changes in the overall bill, though some areas have sustained relative increases, such as FDA and rural development. The stacked bars in Figure 3 represent the discretionary authorization for each appropriations title. The total of the positive stacked bars is the budget authority in Titles I-VI. In FY2018, USDA reorganization affected the placement of some programs between Titles I and II of the bill (most noticeably, the Farm Service Agency). In most years, the cumulative appropriation for the agencies is higher than the official discretionary total in the spending allocation (the blue line) because of the budgetary offset from negative amounts in Title VII (general provisions) and other negative scorekeeping adjustments. These negative offsets are mostly due to rescissions of prior-year unobligated funds and, before FY2018, limits placed on mandatory programs. Historical trends may be tempered by inflation adjustments, as shown in the dotted line. The inflation-adjusted totals from FY2011-FY2017 had been fairly steady until increases in the FY2018-FY2020 appropriations. Action on FY2020 Appropriations Administration's Budget Request The Trump Administration released a general overview of its FY2020 budget request on March 11, 2019, and a detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019. USDA released its more detailed budget summary and justification, as did the FDA, and the independent agencies of the CFTC and the Farm Credit Administration. The Administration also highlighted separately some of its proposed reductions and eliminations. For accounts in the jurisdiction of the Agriculture appropriations bill, the Administration's budget requested $19.2 billion, a $4.1 billion reduction from FY2019 (-18%; Table 2 , Figure 3 ). The Administration released its budget request for FY2020 after Congress had enacted the omnibus FY2019 appropriation in February 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ). Amounts in the FY2019 column of the Administration's budget documents are based on FY2018 levels, not enacted FY2019 amounts. Discretionary Budget Caps and Subcommittee Allocations Budget enforcement has procedural and statutory elements. The procedural elements relate to a budget resolution and are enforced with points of order. The statutory elements impose discretionary spending limits and are enforced with budget caps and sequestration. Budget Resolution Typically, each chamber's Appropriations Committee receives a top-line limit on discretionary budget authority, referred to as a "302(a)" allocation, from the Budget Committee via an annual budget resolution. The Appropriations Committees then in turn subdivide the allocation among their subcommittees, referred to as the "302(b)" allocations. For FY2020, the House did not report or pass a budget resolution. The Senate Budget Committee reported S.Con.Res. 12 , though it received no further action. Budget Caps The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ) set discretionary budget caps through FY2021 as a way of reducing federal spending. Sequestration is an across-the-board backstop to achieve budget reductions if spending exceeds the budget caps (2 U.S.C. Â§901(c)). Bipartisan Budget Acts (BBAs) have avoided sequestration on discretionary spendingâwith the exception of FY2013âby raising those caps four times in two-year increments in 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2019 ( Figure 4 ). Most recently, the BBA of 2019 ( P.L. 116-37 ) raised the cap on nondefense discretionary spending by $78 billion for FY2020 (to $621 billion) and by $72 billion for FY2021 (to $627 billion). The amount for FY2020 is 4.1% greater than the nondefense cap in FY2019. The BBA also provides language to execute (or "deem") those higher caps for the appropriations process without a budget resolution. Discretionary Spending Allocations In the absence of a budget resolution and before the BBA that occurred in August, the House Appropriations Committee on May 14, 2019, set an overall discretionary target and provided subcommittee allocations ( H.Rept. 116-59 ). The allocation for Agriculture appropriations was $24.3 billion, $1 billion greater (+4.3%) than the comparable amount for FY2019 ( Table 2 ). The Senate waited for the overall budget agreement in the BBA of 2019 before setting subcommittee allocations or proceeding to mark up appropriations bills. On September 12, 2019, the Senate Appropriations Committee set its subcommittee allocations ( S.Rept. 116-104 ). The subcommittee allocation was $23.1 billion, $0.1 billion greater (+0.3%) than FY2019. Without Congress having agreed on a joint budget resolution, different subcommittee allocations between the chambers further necessitated reconciliation in the final appropriation. Budget Sequestration on Mandatory Spending Despite the BBA agreements that raise discretionary spending caps and avoid sequestration on discretionary accounts, sequestration still impacts mandatory spending through FY2029. Sequestration on mandatory accounts began in FY2013, continues to the present, and has been extended five times beyond the original FY2021 sunset of the BCA. See Appendix C for effects. House Action The House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its FY2020 bill on May 23, 2019, by voice vote. On June 4, 2019, the full Appropriations Committee passed and reported an amended bill ( H.R. 3164 , H.Rept. 116-107 ) by a vote of 29-21. The committee adopted four amendments by voice vote. On June 25, 2019, the House passed a five-bill minibus appropriation ( H.R. 3055 ) with the Agriculture bill as Division B ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). Under a structured rule, the Rules Committee allowed 35 amendments for floor debate (H.Res. 445, H.Rept. 116-119 ). The House considered 33 of those amendments, of which 31 were adopted and two were rejected. Of the 31 amendments that were adopted, 28 were adopted en bloc by voice vote, two were adopted by recorded votes, and another was adopted separately by voice vote. Of the 31 amendments that were adopted, 14 revised funding amounts with offsets, three added policy statements, and 14 made no substantive changes but were for the purposes of discussion. The $24.3 billion discretionary total in the House-passed FY2020 Agriculture appropriation would have been $1 billion more than (+4%) the comparable amount enacted for FY2019 that includes the CFTC ( Table 2 , Figure 3 ). Generally speaking, the House-passed bill did not include most of the reductions proposed by the Administration. Comparison of Discretionary Authority: House-Passed Bill to FY2019 Table 3 provides details of the House-passed bill at the agency level. The primary changes from FY2019 that comprised the $1 billion increase, ranked by increases and decreases, include the following: Increase Rural Development accounts by $412 million (+14%), including a $144 million increase for the Rural Housing Service (+9%) and a $238 million increase for the Rural Utilities Service (+38%) to support rural water and waste disposal and rural broadband. In addition, the General Provisions title included a $393 million increase for the ReConnect Broadband Pilot Program (+314%). Increase foreign agricultural assistance by $377 million (+19%), including increasing Food for Peace humanitarian assistance by $350 million and McGovern-Dole Food for Education by $25 million. In FY2019, Food for Peace had received a temporary increase of $216 million in the General Provisions title. The larger FY2020 amount would have been to the program's base appropriation rather than the FY2019 approach that used the General Provisions. Increase related agencies appropriations by $232 million, including raising FDA appropriations by $185 million (+6%) and the CFTC by $47 million (+18%). Increase other agricultural program appropriations by $151 million, including the following: Increase departmental administration accounts by a net $205 million (+53%), including funding most of the Administration's request for a $271 million increase for construction to renovate USDA headquarters. Increase USDA regulatory programs by $56 million, including increasing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service by $23 million (+2%) and the Agricultural Marketing Service by $33 million (+20%). Decrease agricultural research by a net $134 million (-4%). Agricultural Research Service (ARS) construction would have been reduced by $331 million from FY2019 (-87%), while salaries and expenses would have increased for ARS (+$44 million, +3%) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) (+$146 million, +10%). Some of these increases would have been offset by a net change of -$175 million in budget authority through the General Provisions title. This was mostly a combination of greater rescissions of carryover balances in WIC (-$300 million) and the absence of continuing the FY2019 appropriations in the General Provisions for Food for Peace (-$216 million, as mentioned above) and rural water and waste disposal (-$75 million). The General Provisions would have provided increases in funding for rural broadband (+$393 million, as mentioned above) and several appropriations for miscellaneous programs (+$33 million). Comparison of Mandatory Spending: House-Passed Bill to FY2019 In addition to discretionary spending, the House-passed bill also carried mandatory spending that totaled $131 billion. This was about $2 billion more than in FY2019 generally because of automatic changes from economic conditions and expectations about enrollment in entitlement programs. Reimbursement for the CCC was projected to increase by $10 billion, mostly due to the cost of the first year of the Trump Administration's trade aid assistance package . Estimates for child nutrition programs would have increased by $0.9 billion. Crop insurance spending would have decreased by $6.4 billion, and SNAP spending decreased by about $2.4 billion. Senate Action The Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its FY2020 bill on September 17, 2019. On September 19, 2019, the full Appropriations Committee passed and reported an amended bill ( S. 2522 , S.Rept. 116-110 ) by a vote of 31-0. The committee adopted a manager's amendment with three additions to bill text and 19 additions to report language. On October 31, 2019, the Senate passed a four-bill minibus appropriation ( H.R. 3055 , after adopting S.Amdt. 948 , which was composed of four Senate-reported bills and amended by floor amendments). The Agriculture bill is Division B ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). The Senate adopted 16 amendments to Division B, of which 14 were adopted en bloc by unanimous consent and two were adopted by recorded votes. Of these 16 amendments, eight revised funding amounts with offsets, three revised funding amounts within an existing appropriation, three changed the terms of an appropriation, and two required reports or studies. The $23.1 billion discretionary total in the Senate-passed FY2020 Agriculture appropriation would have been $57 million more than (+0.2%) the amount enacted for FY2019 ( Table 2 , Figure 3 ). The Senate bill was $894 million less than (-3.7%) the House-passed bill on a comparable basis without CFTC. Generally speaking, the Senate-passed bill did not include most of the reductions proposed by the Administration. Table 3 provides details of the Senate-passed bill at the agency level. Comparison of Discretionary Authority: Senate-Passed to House-Passed Bill Compared to the House-passed bill and ranked by increases and decreases, the primary changes in the Senate-passed bill that comprised the -$894 million difference from the House bill included the following: Agricultural research would have been $193 million greater in the Senate-passed bill than in the House-passed bill. ARS buildings and facilities would have been $255 million greater than in the House-passed bill, ARS salaries and expenses $77 million greater, and NIFA $132 million less. Departmental administration accounts would have been $97 million greater in the Senate bill than in the House bill, mostly by maintaining appropriations for the Chief Information Officer, General Counsel, and Departmental Administration that would have been reduced as offsets to pay for floor amendments that were adopted in the House bill. Rural Development would have been $407 million less in the Senate-passed bill than in the House-passed bill, mostly by a $300 million less for the Rural Utilities Service ($233 million less for rural water and waste disposal grants, $41 million less for distance learning and telemedicine, and $25 million less for existing non-pilot rural broadband programs), $70 million less for Rural Housing Service, and $22 million less for the Rural Business-Cooperative Service. In addition, for the separate ReConnect Broadband Pilot Program, the General Provisions title in the Senate-passed bill would not have provided for any of the $518 million that the House bill contained. Foreign agricultural assistance would have been $159 million less in the Senate bill than in the House bill, mostly by not increasing Food for Peace as much as in the House bill, and maintaining the McGovern-Dole program at a constant level. FDA appropriations would have been $105 million less in the Senate-passed bill than in the House-passed bill. Comparison of Mandatory Spending: Senate-Passed to House-Passed Bill In addition to discretionary spending, the Senate-passed bill also carried mandatory spending that totaled $129 billion. This was $153 million less than in FY2019 and $2.3 billion less than in the House-passed bill. Compared to the House-passed bill, amounts for CCC and crop insurance were the same. Mandatory amounts for the child nutrition programs were about $400 million less than the House bill, and the amount for SNAP was about $1.9 billion less than in the House bill. Continuing Resolutions In the absence of a final Agriculture appropriation at the beginning of FY2020 on October 1, 2019, Congress passed a CR to continue operations and prevent a government shutdown ( P.L. 116-59 , Division A). The first CR lasted nearly eight weeks until November 21, 2019. On November 21, a second CR ( P.L. 116-69 ) was enacted to last until December 20, 2019. On December 20, Congress passed and the President signed a full-year FY2020 appropriation. In general, a CR continues the funding rates and conditions that were in the previous year's appropriation. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may prorate funding to the agencies on an annualized basis for the duration of the CR through a process known as apportionment. For the first 52 days (about 14% of FY2020) through November 21, 2019, and the next 29 days (about 8% of FY2020) through December 20, 2019, the CRs continued the terms of the FY2019 Agriculture appropriations act (Â§101) with a proviso for rural development in the anomalies below; and provided sufficient funding to maintain mandatory program levels, including for nutrition programs (Â§111). This is similar to the approach taken in recent years. CRs may adjust prior-year amounts through anomalies or make specific administrative changes. Five anomalies applied specifically to the Agriculture appropriation during the first CR: Rural Water and Waste Disposal Program (Â§101(1)) . Allowed the CR to cover the cost of direct loans in addition to loan guarantees and grants. In FY2019, direct loans did not require appropriation because they had a negative subsidy rate (i.e., fees and repayments more than covered the cost of loan making). In FY2020, OMB estimated a need for a positive subsidy rate. Disaster Assistance for Sugar Beet Processors (Â§116) . Amended the list of eligible losses that may be covered under the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of FY2019 ( P.L. 116-20 , Title I) to include payments to cooperative processors for reduced sugar beet quantity and quality. The FY2019 supplemental provided $3 billion to cover agricultural production losses in 2018 and 2019 from natural disasters. Agricultural Research (Â§117) . Allowed USDA to waive the nonfederal matching funds requirement for grants made under the Specialty Crop Research Initiative (7 U.S.C. Â§7632(g)(3)). The requirement was added in the 2018 farm bill. Summer Food for Children Demonstration Projects (Â§118) . Allocated funding for the Food and Nutrition Service summer food for children demonstration projects at a rate so that projects could fully operate by May 2020 (prior to summer service, which typically starts in June). Similar provisions have been part of previous CRs. These projects, which include the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, have operated in selected states since FY2010. C ommodity C redit C orporation ( Â§119 ) . Allowed CCC to receive its appropriation about a month earlier than usual so that it could reimburse the Treasury for a line of credit prior to a customary final report and audit. Many payments to farmers were due in October 2019, including USDA's plan to make supplemental payments under its trade assistance program. Without the anomaly, CCC might have exhausted its $30 billion line of credit in October or November 2019 before the audit was completed, which could have suspended payments. A similar provision was part of a CR in FY2019. In addition, the FY2020 CR required USDA to submit a report to Congress by October 31, 2019, with various disaggregated details about Market Facilitation Program payments, trade damages, and whether commodities were purchased from foreign-owned companies under the program. Hemp (Â§120) . Provided $16.5 million on an annualized basis to the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service to implement the Hemp Production Program ( P.L. 115-334 , Â§10113), which was created in the 2018 farm bill. The second CR continued the terms of the first CR until December 20, 2019. It added one new anomaly for Agriculture appropriations: Commodity Assistance Program (Â§146). Allowed funding for the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP) to be apportioned at a rate to maintain current program caseload. This meant that funding available under the second CR could exceed amounts that would otherwise would have been available. FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act On December 20, 2019, Congress passed and the President signed a full-year FY2020 appropriationâthe Further Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 116-94 , Committee Print 38-679 ) âthat included Agriculture appropriations in Division B. This was the second of two consolidated appropriations acts that were passed in tandem: P.L. 116-93 , which covered four appropriations subcommittee bills, and P.L. 116-94 , which covered eight appropriations subcommittee bills. The official discretionary total of the FY2020 Agriculture appropriation is $23.5 billion. This is $183 million more than (+0.8%) the comparable amount for FY2019 that includes CFTC. The appropriation also carries about $129 billion of mandatory spending that is largely determined in authorizing laws. Thus the overall total of the agriculture portion is $153 billion. In addition to these amounts, the appropriation includes budget authority that is designated as emergency spending and does not count against discretionary spending caps. These include $535 million to FDA for Ebola prevention and treatment, and $1.5 billion to USDA for the Wildfires and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP). The latter amount was offset by a $1.5 billion rescission of unobligated WHIP funding from a prior appropriation and emergency designation. Comparison of Discretionary Authority Table 3 provides details of the enacted FY2020 Agriculture appropriation at the agency level, and compared with the House- and Senate-passed bills, the Administration's request, and three prior years. The primary changes from FY2019 that comprised the overall $183 million increase, ranked by increases and decreases, include the following: Increase foreign agricultural assistance by $235 million (+12%), including increasing Food for Peace humanitarian assistance by $225 million and McGovern-Dole Food for Education by $10 million. In FY2017-FY2019, Food for Peace had received temporary increases in the General Provisions title, including $216 million in FY2019. The larger FY2020 amount replaces the temporary amount with an increase in the program's base appropriation. Increase Rural Development accounts by $229 million (+8%), including a $130 million increase for the Rural Utilities Service (+21%) to support rural water and waste disposal and telemedicine and an $81 million increase for the Rural Housing Service (+5%). In addition, the General Provisions title included a $175 million increase for a rural broadband pilot program (+140%). Increase related agencies appropriations by $138 million, including raising FDA appropriations by $91 million (+3%) and the CFTC by $47 million (+18%). Increase other agricultural program appropriations by $199 million, including the following: Increase departmental administration accounts by a net $82 million (+21%), including funding for construction to renovate USDA headquarters. Increase USDA regulatory programs by $59 million, including increasing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service by $32 million (+3%) and the Agricultural Marketing Service by $28 million (+17%). Decrease agricultural research by a net $18 million (-0.5%). Agricultural Research Service (ARS) construction is reduced by $189 million compared with FY2019 (-49%), while salaries and expenses are increased for ARS (+$111 million, +9%) and grants for the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) (+$56 million, +4%). Increase Farm Service Agency salaries and expenses by $47 million (+3%). Increase Natural Resources Conservation Service appropriations by $35 million, including Watershed and Flood Prevention by $25 million (+17%), and Conservation Operations by $10 million (+1%). Decrease Food and Nutrition Service discretionary appropriations by $54 million, including decreasing WIC by $75 million (-1%) and increasing Commodity Assistance Programs by $22 million (+7%). Some of these increases are offset by a net change of -$570 million in budget authority through the General Provisions title. This was mostly a combination of greater rescissions of carryover balances in WIC (-$500 million) and the absence of continuing the FY2019 appropriations in the General Provisions for Food for Peace (-$216 million, as mentioned above) and rural water and waste disposal grants (-$75 million). The General Provisions provides increases in funding for rural broadband (+$175 million, as mentioned above) and several appropriations for miscellaneous programs (+$63 million over FY2019). Not included above is emergency funding that is not subject to discretionary budget caps. This includes funding for Ebola ($535 million) and the Wildfires and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP, $1.5 billion). The latter emergency authorization was offset by an identically sized rescission of prior-year emergency funding for WHIP. Comparison of Mandatory Spending In addition to discretionary spending, the House-passed bill also carried mandatory spendingâlargely determined in separate authorizing lawsâthat totals $129 billion. This is about $354 million more than (+0.3%) FY2019, generally due to automatic changes from economic conditions and expectations about enrollment in entitlement programs. Reimbursement to the Treasury for the CCC increased by $10.9 billion (+71%), mostly due to the cost of the Trump Administration's trade aid assistance that was announced in 2018. Child nutrition programs increase by $0.5 billion (+2%). Crop insurance spending decreases by $5.5 billion (-35%), and SNAP spending decreases by about $5.6 billion (-8%). Policy-Related Provisions Besides setting spending authority, appropriations acts are also a vehicle for policy-related provisions that direct executive branch actions. These provisions, limitations, or riders may have the force of law if they are included in the act's text, but their effect is generally limited to the current fiscal year unless they amend the U.S. Code , which is rare in appropriations acts. Table 4 compares some of the primary policy provisions that are included directly in the FY2020 Agriculture appropriations act, and its development in the House and Senate bills. Report language may also provide policy instructions. Although report language does not carry the force of text in an act, it often explains congressional intent, which the agencies may be expected to follow. Statements in the joint explanatory statement and the committee reports are not included in Table 4 . In the past, Congress has said that committee reports and the joint explanatory statement need to be read together to capture all of the congressional intent for a fiscal year. For example, the explanatory statement for the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations act instructs that the House and Senate reports should be read together with the conference agreement: Congressional Directives. The statement is silent on provisions that were in both the House Report ( H.Rept. 116-107 ) and Senate Report ( S.Rept. 116-110 ) that remain unchanged by this agreement, except as noted in this statement. The House and Senate report language that is not changed by the statement is approved and indicates congressional intentions. The statement, while repeating some report language for emphasis, does not intend to negate the language referred to above unless expressly provided herein. Appendix A. Appropriations in Administrative Accounts Appendix B. Appropriations in General Provisions Appendix C. Budget Sequestration Sequestration is a process to reduce federal spending through automatic, largely across-the-board reductions that permanently cancel mandatory and/or discretionary budget authority. Sequestration is triggered as a budget enforcement mechanism when federal spending would exceed statutory budget goals. Sequestration is currently authorized by the BCA ( P.L. 112-25 ). A sequestration rate is the percentage reduction that is subtracted from an appropriated budget authority to achieve an intended budget goal. OMB computes these rates annually. Table C-1 shows the rates of sequestration that have been announced and the total amounts of budget authority that have been cancelled from accounts in Agriculture appropriations. Table C-2 provides additional detail at the program level for mandatory accounts. Discretionary Spending For discretionary spending, sequestration is authorized through FY2021 if discretionary defense and nondefense spending exceed caps that are specified in statute (2 U.S.C. Â§901(c)). In FY2013, the timing of the appropriations acts and the first year of sequestration resulted in triggering sequestration on discretionary spending. In FY2014-FY2019, BBAs in 2013, 2015, and 2018 ( P.L. 113-67 , P.L. 114-74 , and P.L. 115-123 , respectively) have avoided sequestration on discretionary spending. These BBAs raised the discretionary budget caps that were placed in statute by the BCA and allowed Congress to enact larger appropriations than would have been allowed. The enacted appropriations in FY2014-FY2019 met the spending limitations of the revised budget caps, and therefore no sequestration on discretionary accounts was necessary. For FY2020-FY2021, the BBA of 2019 ( P.L. 116-37 ) similarly provides a higher discretionary cap that may avoid sequestration (see " Discretionary Budget Caps and Subcommittee Allocations "). Mandatory Spending Sequestration Occurs and Continues For mandatory spending, sequestration is presently authorized and scheduled to continue through FY2029, having been amended and extended by budget acts that were subsequent to the BCA (2 U.S.C. Â§901a(6)). That is, sequestration of mandatory spending has not been avoided by the BBAs and continues to apply annually to certain accounts ( Table C-2 ). The original FY2021 sunset on the sequestration of mandatory accounts has been extended five times as an offset to pay for raising the caps on discretionary spending to avoid sequestration in the near term (or as a general budgetary offset for other authorization acts): 1. Congress extended the duration of mandatory sequestration by two years (until FY2023) as an offset in BBA 2013. 2. Congress extended it by another year (until FY2024) to maintain retirement benefits for certain military personnel ( P.L. 113-82 ). 3. Congress extended sequestration on nonexempt mandatory accounts another year (until FY2025) as an offset in BBA 2015. 4. Congress extended sequestration on nonexempt mandatory accounts for two years (until FY2027) as an offset in BBA 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 , Â§30101(c)). 5. Congress extended sequestration on nonexempt mandatory accounts by another two years (until FY2029) as an offset in BBA 2019 ( P.L. 116-37 , Â§402). Exemptions from Sequestration Some USDA mandatory programs are statutorily exempt from sequestration. Those expressly exempt by statute are the nutrition programs (SNAP, the child nutrition programs, and the Commodity Supplemental Food Program) and the Conservation Reserve Program. Some prior legal obligations in the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the farm commodity programs may be exempt as determined by OMB. Generally speaking, the experience since FY2013 is that OMB has ruled that most of crop insurance is exempt from sequestration, while the farm commodity programs, disaster assistance, and most conservation programs have been subject to it. Implementation of Sequestration Nonexempt mandatory spending in FY2020 is to be reduced by a 5.9% sequestration rate ( Table C-1 ) and thus would be paid at 94.1% of what would otherwise have been provided. This is projected to result in a reduction of about $1.4 billion from mandatory agriculture accounts in FY2020, including over $900 million from amounts paid by the CCC ( Table C-2 ). For example, for the farm commodity programs that support farm income such as the Agricultural Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage programs, payments to farmers are computed by a regular formula authorized in the farm bill, and the final actual payment to the farmer is reduced by the sequestration rate. For programs that operate on a fixed budget authority, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program and the Market Assistance Program, the sequestration rate is applied to the available budget authority for the fiscal year. Appendix D. Action on Agriculture Appropriations, FY1996-FY2020


Status of Major Space Systems DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long time to develop and involve multiple segments, including space, ground control stations, terminals, user equipment, and launch, as figure 1 below shows. DOD satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion. The associated ground systems can cost over $6 billion to develop and maintain and the cost to launch a satellite can climb to well over $100 million. Table 1 provides highlights of the current status of DOD’s major space programs. As the table shows, DOD is also in the beginning phases of acquiring several constellations of new satellites and ground processing capabilities—including for missile warning, protected communications, space-based environmental monitoring, and space command and control. We have work underway to assess the Air Force’s space command and control development efforts and examine DOD’s analysis of alternatives for wideband communication services. For a more complete description of these major space programs, see appendix I. In addition, DOD is exploring alternatives for acquiring wideband satellite communications as well as funding development of new launch vehicles as it pursues a new acquisition strategy for procuring launch services. Our prior work has shown that many major DOD space programs have experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. For instance, the total program cost for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, has grown 117 percent since the program’s original cost estimate and its first satellite was launched more than 3.5 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile warning satellite program, the program cost grew 265 percent from its original estimate and the launch of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs moved to the production phase where fewer problems tend to surface, and where there is typically less risk of significant cost and schedule growth. A more recent major satellite program, Global Positioning System (GPS) III, has seen an almost 4-year delay due to technical issues and program cost growth of about 32 percent. Cost and schedule growth has also been a challenge for satellite ground systems and user equipment. Ground system delays have been so lengthy, that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key capabilities can be fully exploited. For example, The command and control system for GPS III satellites, known as the Next Generation Operational Control System, or OCX, is approximately 5 years behind schedule. As a result, the Air Force has had to start two separate back-up efforts to modify the current ground system to ensure the continuity of GPS capabilities and to make anti- jamming capabilities available via Military Code, or M-code, until OCX is delivered. Our ongoing review of GPS includes an assessment of OCX schedule risk and potential impacts on OCX delivery, acceptance, and operation. We expect to issue our report on GPS in spring 2019. Development of GPS user equipment that can utilize the M-Code signal has lagged behind the fielding of GPS M-code satellites for more than a decade, due to prolonged development challenges. In December 2017, we found that while DOD had made some progress on initial testing of the receiver cards needed to utilize the M-code signal, additional development was necessary to make M-code work with the over 700 weapon systems that require it. We also found that DOD had begun initial planning to transition some weapon systems to use M-code receivers, but significantly more work remained to understand the cost and schedule of transitioning to M-code receivers across DOD. Further, in December 2017, we found that multiple entities were separately maturing their own receiver cards. We recommended that DOD assign responsibility to a single organization to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so that common design solutions are employed and DOD could avoid duplication of efforts. DOD concurred with the recommendation, but has not yet taken action on it. We have previously reported that over 90 percent of the capabilities to be provided by Mobile User Objective System communications satellites—currently, five satellites are in orbit, the first of which launched in 2012—are being underutilized because of difficulties with integrating the space, ground, and terminal segments and delays in fielding compatible user terminals. Largely because of technical and management challenges, the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) Increment 2 program—intended to replace and improve upon an aging space situational awareness and command and control system—was almost 3 years behind schedule and 42 percent over budget before the Air Force stopped development work last year. Earlier this month, we reported that operational testing in 2018 found that JMS Increment 2 was not operationally effective or suitable due, in part, to missing software requirements, urgent deficiencies that affected system performance, and negative user feedback. Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space technology; however, over the past 10 years we have identified a number of other management and oversight problems that have worsened the situation. These include making overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about technology and design, and experiencing problems in overseeing and managing contractors, among others. We have also noted that some of DOD’s programs with operational satellites, such as SBIRS, were also exceedingly ambitious, which in turn increased technology, design, and engineering risks. While SBIRS and other satellite programs provide users with important and useful capabilities, their cost growth has significantly limited the department’s buying power at a time when more resources may be needed to protect space systems and recapitalize the space portfolio. Challenges Facing Acquisitions of New Space Systems DOD faces significant challenges as it replenishes its satellite constellations. First, DOD is confronted with growing threats in space, which may require very different satellite architectures and acquisition strategies. Second, DOD is in the midst of planning major changes to its leadership for space. While these changes are designed to streamline decision-making and bring together a dispersed space workforce, they could cause some disruption to space system acquisition programs. Third, in fiscal year 2016, Congress gave DOD authority to speed up acquisition timeframes by streamlining acquisition processes and oversight. GAO is examining DOD’s application of streamlining to its weapons programs. For space, challenges with past streamlining efforts may offer some lessons learned. And fourth, DOD may face resource and capacity challenges in taking on multiple space acquisitions at one time. For example, our work and other reports point to potential gaps in the space acquisition workforce and ongoing difficulties managing software development. Growing Threats to Satellites Require New Approaches According to Air Force Space Command and others, U.S. space systems face intentional and unintentional threats that have increased rapidly over the past 20 years. These include radio frequency interference (including jamming), laser attacks, kinetic intercept vehicles, and ground system attacks. Additionally, the hazards of the already-harsh space environment (e.g., extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation) have increased, including numbers of active and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris. According to a February 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report, China and Russia in particular are developing a variety of means to exploit perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in space. The report also states that Iran and North Korea have demonstrated some counterspace capabilities that could pose a threat to militaries using space-based services. In response, recent governmentwide and DOD strategic and policy guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable or resilient against such threats and DOD has taken steps to be more resilient in some of its new programs. As we found in October 2014, one way to do this is to build more disaggregated systems, including dispersing sensors onto separate satellites; using multiple domains, including space, air, and ground to provide full mission capabilities; hosting payloads on other government or commercial spacecraft; or some combination of these. With capabilities distributed across multiple platforms, rather than centralized onto just a few satellites, it may be more difficult for an adversary to target all assets to attack full system capabilities, and if an attack does take place, the loss of one smaller satellite or payload could result in less capability loss than damage to, or loss of, a large multifunctional satellite. In addition to disaggregation, DOD could make satellites more maneuverable and build in defense capabilities to protect themselves as a means to increase survivability. We also found in October 2014 that some of these options could have beneficial impacts on acquisition. For example, acquiring smaller, less complex satellites may require less time and effort to develop and produce. This may be in part due to improved requirements discipline, as more frequent production rates may allow program managers to delay new requirements to the next production cycle instead of incorporating them into ongoing timelines midstream. Building more, less-complex satellites might also provide DOD the opportunity to use commercial products and systems that have already been tested in the market. At the same time, however, addressing the need to make satellites more resilient could introduce complications. For example, DOD may need to acquire higher quantities of satellites, which may make it more difficult to manage acquisition schedules. In addition, potentially more development and production contracts may result in more complexity for program offices to manage, requiring increased oversight of contractors. Adding more satellites and new technologies may also complicate efforts to synchronize satellite, terminal, and ground system schedules, limiting delivery of capabilities to end users. Our work has also found potential barriers to making satellites more resilient. For example, in October 2014, we found that disaggregation could require DOD to make significant cultural and process changes in how it acquires space systems—for instance, by relying on new contractors, relinquishing control to providers who host government payloads on commercial satellites, using different contracting methods, and executing smaller but more numerous and faster-paced acquisition programs. It will likely require DOD to be more flexible and agile when it comes to satellite acquisitions, especially with regard to coordinating satellite delivery with interdependent systems, such as user equipment. Yet, as we have previously found, DOD’s culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches, and fragmented responsibilities have made it very difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Senior leaders have recognized the need to change the space acquisition culture, and as discussed below, changes are being made to space leadership and acquisition approaches. More recently, in July 2018, we found that two factors have contributed to DOD’s limited use of commercially hosted payloads. First, DOD officials identified logistical challenges to matching government payloads with any given commercial host satellite. For example, most of the offices we spoke with cited size, weight, and power constraints, among others, as barriers to using hosted payloads. Second, while individual DOD offices have realized cost and schedule benefits from using hosted payloads, DOD as a whole has limited information on costs and benefits of hosted payloads. Further, the knowledge DOD obtained is fragmented across the agency—with multiple offices collecting piecemeal information on the use of hosted payloads. The limited knowledge and data on hosted payloads that is fragmented across the agency has contributed to resistance among space acquisition officials to adopting this approach. We recommended, and DOD concurred, that the department bolster and centralize collection and analysis of cost, technical, and lessons learned data on its use of hosted payloads. Lastly, in October 2018, we found that DOD faced mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems—satellites and their ground systems included—from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. We reported that this was due to the computerized nature of weapon systems, DOD’s late start in prioritizing weapon system cybersecurity, and DOD’s nascent understanding of how to develop more secure weapon systems. In operational testing, DOD routinely found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in systems that were under development, yet program officials GAO met with believed their systems were secure and even discounted some test results as unrealistic. Using relatively simple tools and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and operate largely undetected, due in part to basic issues such as poor password management and unencrypted communications. DOD has recently taken several steps to improve weapon system cybersecurity, including issuing and revising policies and guidance to better incorporate cybersecurity considerations. Further, in response to congressional direction, DOD has also begun initiatives to better understand and address cyber vulnerabilities. Space Leadership Changes Are a Positive Step, But Have Some Risk We and others have reported for over two decades that fragmentation and overlap in DOD space acquisition management and oversight have contributed to program delays and cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations. For example, in February 2012 we found that fragmented leadership contributed to a 10-year gap between the delivery of GPS satellites and associated user equipment. The cancellations of several large programs over the past 2 decades were in part because of disagreements and conflicts among stakeholders. In July 2016, in response to a provision of a Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, we issued a report that reviewed space leadership in more depth and concluded that DOD space leadership was fragmented. We identified approximately 60 stakeholder organizations across DOD, the Executive Office of the President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies. Of these, eight organizations had space acquisition management responsibilities; eleven had oversight responsibilities; and six were involved in setting requirements for defense space programs. At the same time, many experts stated that no one seemed to be in charge of space acquisitions. Our report highlighted the pros and cons of various options to reorganize space functions recommended in prior congressionally-chartered studies. The issue has taken on more importance in recent years, as DOD has realized satellites are highly vulnerable to attacks and needs to make dramatic changes in space system architectures and operations. We have found that leadership has not been focused enough to overcome interagency rivalries and resistance to change, and it has not been able to get concurrence on future architectures. The President’s Administration and DOD have taken significant steps to change space leadership. Most recent is the President’s Space Policy Directive-4, issued on February 19, 2019, and DOD’s subsequent legislative proposal submitted on March 1, 2019, to establish a United States Space Force as a sixth branch of the United States Armed Forces within the Department of the Air Force. The Policy Directive states that this is an important step toward a future military department for space and that the Space Force will (1) consolidate existing forces and authorities for military space activities, as appropriate, to minimize duplication of effort and eliminate bureaucratic inefficiencies; and (2) not include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Reconnaissance Office, or other non-military space organizations or missions of the United States Government. According to the Policy Directive, the Space Force would include the uniformed and civilian personnel conducting and directly supporting space operations from all DOD Armed Forces, assume responsibilities for all major military space acquisition programs, and create the appropriate career tracks for military and civilian space personnel across all relevant specialties. Pertaining to organization and leadership, the Policy Directive creates a civilian Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, to be known as the Under Secretary for Space, appointed by the President, and establishes a Chief of Staff of the Space Force, who would serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, the Policy Directive states that as the Space Force matures, and as national security requires, it will become necessary to create a separate military department, to be known as the Department of the Space Force. This department would take over some or all responsibilities for the Space Force from the Department of the Air Force. The Policy Directive requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct periodic reviews to determine when to recommend that the President seek legislation to establish such a department. Our past work has identified fragmentation in space leadership, but because implementation has not yet occurred, it remains to be seen whether this policy directive and proposed legislation would resolve these issues. In implementing these changes there are many complexities to consider. For example, because space capabilities are acquired and used across the military services and defense agencies, it will be important to address many details on how to implement a Space Force among these equities. Our past work suggests that without close attention to the consequences of the compromises that will inevitably have to be made to carve out a new force structure from existing space functions, there is risk of exacerbating the fragmentation and ineffective management and oversight the Space Force is intended to address. For instance, earlier this month, DOD established the Space Development Agency to unify and integrate efforts across DOD to define, develop, and field innovative solutions. But it is unclear how this new organization will mesh with the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, which acquires satellites, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which creates breakthrough technologies and capabilities, and similar organizations. Moreover, even if changes are implemented effectively, they are only a first step toward addressing space acquisition problems. As we discuss below, programs will still need to embrace acquisition best practices, such as using demonstrable knowledge to make decisions. Our prior work has found that they will also need to be open to flexible and innovative approaches, and work effectively with a very wide range of stakeholders, including those that will not be part of the Space Force, such as the intelligence agencies, civilian space agencies, the current military services, as well as entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense who help oversee and manage acquisitions. Senior leaders have acknowledged that additional changes are needed and have taken steps to help bring them about, such as the restructuring of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, which is designed to break down stovepipes and streamline acquisition processes. Past Streamlining Efforts Offer Lessons Learned DOD is managing a number of new space acquisition programs using a new authority, established under Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which is to provide a streamlined alternative to the traditional DOD acquisition process. Specifically, the programs—which include follow-on missile warning and protected communications satellites, among others—will be exempted from the acquisition and requirements processes defined by DOD Directive 5000.01 and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Instead, program managers are encouraged to use a tailored approach to documentation and oversight to enable them to demonstrate new technologies or field new or updated systems within 2 to 5 years. We have ongoing work looking across the military departments at how middle-tier acquisition authority is being implemented, including for the Air Force’s space acquisition programs, and plan to issue a report later this spring. GAO and others have highlighted lessons learned from past efforts to streamline, specifically with an approach adopted for space systems in the 1990s known as Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). TSPR was intended to facilitate acquisition reform and enable DOD to streamline its acquisition process and leverage innovation and management expertise from the private sector. Specifically, TSPR gave a contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon system and for meeting DOD’s requirements. We found in May 2009 that because this reform made the contractor responsible for day-to-day program management, DOD did not require formal deliverable documents—such as earned value management reports—to assess the status and performance of the contractor. As a result, DOD’s capability to lead and manage the space acquisition process diminished, which magnified problems related to unstable requirements and poor contractor performance. Further, the reduction in DOD oversight and involvement led to major reductions in various government capabilities, including cost- estimating and systems-engineering staff. This, in turn, led to a lack of technical data needed to develop sound cost estimates. Best practices that we identified in the aftermath of TSPR include retaining strong oversight and insight into programs; using quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to proceed, not allowing development to proceed until certain thresholds are met, empowering program managers to make decisions on the direction of the program but also holding them accountable for their choices, and canceling unsuccessful programs. Similarly, in its study of TSPR programs, the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force emphasized the importance of managing requirements, sufficiently funding programs, participating in trade-off studies, and assuring that proven engineering practices characterize program implementation, among other actions. See appendix II for a more complete list of the best practices we have identified for developing complex systems. DOD May Face Resource and Capacity Challenges in Taking on Multiple Programs at One Time DOD is simultaneously undertaking new major acquisition efforts to replenish its missile warning, protected communications, GPS, and weather satellites. At the same time, it is boosting efforts to increase space situational awareness and protect space assets. It is also helping to fund the development of new launch vehicles, and it is considering additional significant acquisitions in wideband satellite communications and in support of missile defense activities. While there is increased attention within DOD on funding for space and building the Space Force, such widespread acquisition activities could still pose resource challenges. For example: Funding requests for space system modernization have in the past 10 years represented a small percentage (3.9 to 5 percent) of total weapon system modernization funding DOD requested. Space is competing with ships, aircraft, and the nuclear triad, among other programs for funding. This can be challenging, because over the past 2 years, DOD has begun over 9 new space acquisition programs to recapitalize current space capabilities and enhance system resiliency. In the past, we have found that it has been difficult for DOD to fund multiple new space programs at one time, particularly when it was concurrently struggling with cost overruns and schedule delays from its legacy programs. For example, OCX system development challenges have resulted in a $2.5 billion cost increase and approximate 5-year delay to the system becoming operational— using more resources for a longer time—at a cost to other programs. It is unclear whether DOD has a sufficient workforce to manage multiple new space programs. We issued a report this month that found DOD did not routinely monitor the size, mix, and location of its space acquisition workforce. We collected and aggregated data from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations and found that at least 8,000 personnel in multiple locations nationwide were working on space acquisition activities at the end of 2017. Echoing concerns raised in our prior work, we also found that DOD had difficulty attracting and retaining candidates with the requisite technical expertise. Officials from the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center were concerned that there are not enough experienced mid- level acquisition personnel and also expressed concern that the bulk of military personnel assigned to program management positions were more junior in rank than the Center was authorized to obtain. We recommended that DOD (1) identify the universe of its space acquisition programs and the organizations that support them, and (2) collect and maintain data on the workforce supporting these programs. DOD concurred with our first recommendation but not the second. Software is an increasingly important enabler of DOD space systems. However, DOD has struggled to deliver software-intensive space programs that meet operational requirements within expected time frames. Although user involvement is critical to the success of any software development effort, we found in our report issued earlier this month on DOD software-intensive space programs that key programs that experienced cost or schedule breaches often did not effectively engage users to understand requirements and obtain feedback. Program efforts to involve users and incorporate feedback frequently did not match plans. The lack of user engagement has contributed to systems that were later found to be operationally unsuitable. The programs we reviewed also faced challenges in delivering software in shorter time frames, and in using commercial software, applying outdated tools and metrics, as well as having limited knowledge and training in newer software development techniques. DOD acknowledged these challenges and is taking steps to address them, including identifying useful software development metrics and ways to include them in new contracts. We recommended, and DOD concurred, that the department ensure its guidance addressing software development provides specific, required direction on the timing, frequency, and documentation of user involvement and feedback. Moreover, it should be noted that software development has been a struggle for other non-space weapons programs as well. The Defense Innovation Board recently reported that the department’s current approach to software development is broken and is a leading source of risk to DOD—it takes too long, is too expensive, and exposes warfighters to unacceptable risk by delaying their access to the tools they need to assure mission success. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions that you have. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contacts for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Burns C. Eckert; Emily Bond; Claire Buck; Maricela Cherveny; Erin Cohen; Susan Ditto; Laura Hook, and Anne Louise Taylor. Key contributors for the previous work on which this statement is based are listed in the products cited. Appendix I: Status of Major Department of Defense Space Acquisitions Appendix II: Best Practices GAO Has Identified for Space and Weapons Systems Acquisitions Our previous work on weapons acquisitions in general, and space programs in particular, identified best practices for developing complex systems. We summarize these best practices in table 3, below. Related GAO Products DOD Space Acquisitions: Including Users Early and Often in Software Development Could Benefit Programs. GAO-19-136. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2019. Defense Space Systems: DOD Should Collect and Maintain Data on Its Space Acquisition Workforce. GAO-19-240. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2019. Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilitie., GAO-19-128. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2018. Military Space Systems: DOD’s Use of Commercial Satellites to Host Defense Payloads Would Benefit from Centralizing Data. GAO-18-493. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2018. Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining Recent Positive Trends. GAO-18-360SP. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018. Global Positioning System: Better Planning and Coordination Needed to Improve Prospects for Fielding Modernized Capability. GAO-18-74. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2017. Space Launch: Coordination Mechanisms Facilitate Interagency Information Sharing on Acquisitions GAO-17-646R. Washington D.C.: August 9, 2017 Satellite Acquisitions: Agencies May Recover a Limited Portion of Contract Value When Satellites Fail. GAO-17-490. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2017 Space Acquisitions: DOD Continues to Face Challenges of Delayed Delivery of Critical Space Capabilities and Fragmented Leadership. GAO-17-619T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2017. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-17-333SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2017. Global Positioning System: Observations on Quarterly Reports from the Air Force. GAO-17-162R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2016. Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine if Recent Changes Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight. GAO-16-592R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2016. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Assessing Data on Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-16-661R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2016 Defense Weather Satellites: DOD Faces Acquisition Challenges for Addressing Capability Needs. GAO-16-769T, Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2016. Defense Weather Satellites: Analysis of Alternatives is Useful for Certain Capabilities, but Ineffective Coordination Limited Assessment of Two Critical Capabilities. GAO-16-252R. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2016. Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches to Space Acquisitions. GAO-16-471T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2016. Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive Launch Report. GAO-16-156R. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2015. Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets. GAO-16-6R. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015. GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems and User Equipment Production Readiness. GAO-15-657. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2015. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable Incorporation of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-623. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2015. Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to Improve Procurements. GAO-15-459. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2015. Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future. GAO-15-492T. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2015. Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from Technology Insertion Planning. GAO-15-366. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2015. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-15-342SP. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015. Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier. GAO-15-282. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2015. DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites. GAO-15-7. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2014. U.S. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future Efforts. GAO-14-776T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2014. 2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-14-343SP. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2014. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-14-340SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2014. Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs. GAO-14-382T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Introducing Competition into National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014. The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement. GAO-14-377R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014. Space Acquisitions: Assessment of Overhead Persistent Infrared Technology Report. GAO-14-287R. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2014. Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2013. Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729, Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2013. Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized. GAO-13-508T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013. Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013. Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012. Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2012. Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011. Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011. Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011. Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Capabilities Persis., GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components. 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