Background Roles and Responsibilities in Federal Counterdrug Missions and Activities As previously mentioned, multiple federal departments and components have responsibilities for combating the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. Figure 1 summarizes the missions and responsibilities of the federal departments and components primarily responsible for combating the trafficking of illicit drugs. DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Involved in Counterdrug Missions and Activities DOD Joint Interagency Task Forces In 1989, DOD created several joint task forces, which aimed to bridge the military’s counterdrug efforts with those of civilian, federal law enforcement agencies. These task forces have evolved since then and eventually developed into the present-day iterations of JIATF-South under the U.S. Southern Command and JIATF-West under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. JIATF-South and JIATF-West both consist of representatives from DOD, DHS, and DOJ components, among others. Coast Guard admirals currently serve as the Directors of both of the JIATFs. Previously, DOD service components have led JIATF-South; however, while DOD is responsible for detection and monitoring of drug flow, it is precluded from taking law enforcement actions in counterdrug efforts. Task force officials stated that Coast Guard leadership encourages participation from both DOD and DHS because the Coast Guard is both a military and a law enforcement agency. The deputy and vice leadership positions at the JIATFs are held by officers and civilians from DOD, DHS, and DOJ components, which allow the task forces to leverage various experiences and authorities across these components, according to task force officials. DHS Joint Task Forces In 2014, DHS established three new joint task forces — (1) JTF–East, (2) JTF–West, and (3) JTF–Investigations—as pilot programs to, among other things, address the smuggling of illicit drugs over the southern border and approaches to the United States. Additionally, according to the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan, the JTFs were created to strengthen the unity of effort within DHS toward common goals. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act subsequently codified these task forces and established new JTF requirements, such as establishing outcome-based and other appropriate performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of each JTF. In 2017, DHS also created a JTF Coordination Cell to develop JTF performance measures and enhance awareness among DHS components about the role of the JTFs, among other things. The DHS JTFs primarily consist of representatives from CBP, ICE, and the Coast Guard, and a representative from each of these components serves as the Director for each of the three JTFs. The deputy leadership positions of each JTF are held by officers from the other two components. For example, DHS JTF-West’s director is an officer from CBP, and the deputy directors are officers from the Coast Guard and ICE. According to a DHS memorandum, in establishing the JTFs, DHS wanted each JTF to be led and supported by the different DHS components in order to integrate their varied capabilities. For more information on the task forces’ leadership and compositions, see table 1. Each of the five task forces are similarly organized by functional areas and all include areas such as administration and personnel, intelligence, and operations. For example, JIATF-South, JIATF-West, and each of the DHS JTFs have Planning sections, which help guide the task forces’ overarching strategic plans and operations, with input from other sections. One task force—JIATF-West—further tailored its organizational structure to its missions and activities. Specifically, JIATF-West reorganized in January 2016, at the direction of the former U.S. Indo-Pacific Combatant Commander, to operationalize and combine its Intelligence and Operations functional areas into a Counternarcotics Operations Center. According to JIATF-West leadership, the Counternarcotics Operations Center better reflects the nature of its intelligence gathering and sharing activities with other federal law enforcement agencies and foreign countries. JIATF-West officials also stated the task force merged its section that provided support and training of foreign law enforcement agencies into its Planning and Engagement section since that section directs activities related to JIATF-West’s engagement with partner nations. Areas of Responsibility As shown in figure 2, the two DOD task forces (JIATF-South and JIATF- West) and two of the three DHS task forces (JTF-East and JTF-West) have geographical areas of responsibility. In contrast, the third DHS task force (JTF-Investigations) is focused on coordinating investigations and information sharing to support DHS and the other two DHS JTFs. As a result, it does not have a geographical area of responsibility. Each of the Five Task Forces in Our Review Has a Counterdrug Mission, and Its Activities Vary Based on Threats in Its Area of Responsibility and Available Resources Example of Joint Interagency Task Force– South (JIATF-South) Activity to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking When JIATF-South receives information about a potential illicit drug smuggling event, it will use available air and maritime assets allocated to it to detect and monitor the suspect smuggling vessel. Once JIATF-South locates the suspect vessel and has assets in place, JIATF-South turns over control of the assets to the relevant law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Coast Guard, CBP, etc.) to interdict the smuggling vessel and any illicit drugs that may be on board. JIATF-South: Focuses its activities on detecting, monitoring, and supporting the interdiction of bulk cocaine movements being smuggled on noncommercial maritime vessels. According to JIATF- South officials, this focus is partly because the key coca-producing countries are within its area of responsibility, and partly because cocaine is a key source of profit for transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-South is also allocated assets, such as ships and surveillance aircraft, from DOD and DHS components (such as the Coast Guard and CBP Air and Marine Operations), as well as from foreign partners. JIATF-South uses these maritime and air assets, in conjunction with available intelligence, to detect and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, being smuggled north across its area of responsibility. Once JIATF-South detects a smuggling event occurring, it passes this information and control of the assets to law enforcement authorities to interdict the smuggling event. For an example of how this occurs, see the sidebar. Example of Joint Interagency Task Force– West’s (JIATF-West) Capacity Building Efforts to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking JIATF-West has helped countries in its area of responsibility—such as Vanuatu—build their financial investigative capacity by providing law enforcement training on topics such as bank records analysis, money laundering theory, and accounting. This training is intended to help foreign law enforcement agencies better detect transnational criminal organizations’ transactions, thus making it more difficult for such organizations to operate in their area of responsibility. JIATF-West: Focuses its missions and activities on four priorities: (1) detecting precursor chemicals that can be used to manufacture illicit drugs, such as synthetic opioids; (2) supporting allies and foreign partners in combating illicit drug trafficking in its area of responsibility; (3) monitoring drug flows moving to, from, and through Asia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and (4) detecting the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, according to JIATF-West documents. According to JIATF-West officials, JIATF-West’s activities primarily consist of intelligence gathering and collaboration with law enforcement partners within foreign countries where precursor chemicals are manufactured or combined to manufacture illicit drugs. JIATF-West also engages in capacity building with law enforcement authorities in foreign countries in the Pacific region, such as the Philippines and Thailand. For an example of JIATF-West’s capacity building efforts, see the sidebar. Unlike JIATF-South, JIATF-West does not have assets, such as ships or aircraft. However, JIATF-West officials stated that even if JIATF- West had assets, it would not alter the focus of its missions and activities because of the threat transnational criminal organizations pose and the nature of the flow of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals in its expansive area of responsibility. For example, JIATF-West officials told us that precursor chemicals are typically shipped in commercial cargo containers. Notably, all precursor chemicals are legal to manufacture and sell for legitimate uses, such as the production of pharmaceutical drugs and pesticides, and it is difficult to determine when such chemicals have been diverted for illicit use. Officials stated that JIATF-West would face legal and logistical challenges if they were to directly disrupt precursor chemicals being diverted, such as if the vessel was state-owned or was in a foreign country’s territorial waters. Thus, even if JIATF-West had assets, JIATF-West officials noted that the legal and logistical challenges would not change how the task force approaches its missions and activities. DHS JTFs: Focus on coordinating with DHS components (e.g., CBP, ICE HSI, Coast Guard) to facilitate awareness about cross- component, cross-geographic homeland security issues. The JTFs have broader missions than countering the flow of illicit drugs. For example, the JTFs also have responsibilities for coordinating migrant interdiction and counter-terrorism activities. Further, given their areas of responsibility, JTF-East primarily focuses on threats along the southern maritime border of the United States and JTF-West primarily focuses on threats along the southwest land border. In contrast, JTF-Investigations focuses on supporting DHS-wide investigations and sharing information to support the other two task forces. Similar to JIATF-West, the JTFs do not have physical assets to support these activities. According to JTF officials, this is partly because the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires the JTFs to be cost neutral. Additionally, JTF officials stated the JTFs were not meant to serve a similar function as the DOD combatant commands and, instead, are meant to help with planning and coordinating missions and activities across joint operating areas. The Five Task Forces in Our Review Generally Coordinated Effectively to Help Minimize Duplication of Counterdrug Missions and Activities, Using Various Mechanisms Task Force Officials Task force officials reported that the task forces effectively coordinated counterdrug missions and activities to minimize duplication of efforts. The extent to which the task forces coordinate varied based on whether they have (1) shared purposes and (2) areas of responsibility with overlapping or shared geographical boundaries. In particular, those task forces that have shared purposes and those task forces that have overlapping areas of responsibility or shared boundaries tended to coordinate with one another more than with the other task forces. We also found that the task forces use a variety of mechanisms to coordinate counterdrug missions and activities, such as the use of working groups and liaison officers, that our prior work has identified as best practices. Reported Effective Coordination with the Other Task Forces Officials we met with from each of the task forces stated that they are satisfied with the level of coordination that takes place with other task forces and that the coordination efforts have been effective. Our analysis of their responses found that of the five task forces, JTF-Investigations’ coordination activities were rated as the most effective by the other four task forces. JIATF-South was rated the second highest task force in terms of both the effectiveness of its coordination activities and the number of other task forces with which it coordinated. Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the task force officials’ views on the extent to which the task forces coordinate with one another and the effectiveness of the coordination efforts. of coordination with the other task forces varies based on the extent to which the task forces have shared purposes. Of the five task forces, JTF-Investigations was the one task force that coordinated with all the other task forces, which is consistent with its purpose to enhance DHS investigations, coordinate priorities, and share information with the other joint task forces. As a part of its process in designating cases as a Homeland Criminal Organization Target (HOMECORT), JTF-Investigations conducts a Comprehensive Criminal Network Analysis that identifies links between multiple cases and criminal organizations that can cross geographical and task force boundaries (see sidebar for more information on the HOMECORT process). According to JTF-Investigations officials, this analysis helps identify cases that may be related and helps to coordinate cases across task force jurisdictions to prevent duplication of missions and activities. forces told us that they coordinated more with those task forces with which they had a shared border or joint operating area. For example, JIATF-South shares a joint operating area or a geographical boundary with both JTF-East and JIATF-West and, as a result, officials from these three task forces provided more robust examples of coordination. The Task Forces Use a Variety of Mechanisms to Coordinate Missions and Activities According to task force documentation, such as operational guidance, and our discussions with task force officials, JIATF-South, JIATF-West, and the DHS JTFs coordinated with each other on missions and activities where they have a shared interest, such as a common illicit drug threat. These coordination activities include information sharing and joint operations, as well as mechanisms, such as the use of working groups and liaison officers, which our prior work has identified as best practices for coordination. According to task force officials, this coordination is intended to enhance counterdrug efforts and avoid duplication of missions and activities. As described earlier, the task forces have different mission focuses that depend on their geographically defined areas of responsibility, which also help the task forces avoid duplication of missions and activities. However, as shown earlier in figure 2, there are some areas of land, sea, and air in which more than one task force may conduct missions and activities (e.g., between JIATF-South and JTF- East). These areas of overlap are called joint operating areas. According to our review of task force documents and discussions with task force officials, within these joint operating areas, the task forces share intelligence information, coordinate missions and activities with one another, and sometimes conduct joint operations. For example, in 2018, JTF-East led and coordinated with JIATF-South on an operation to increase intelligence and targeting capabilities to disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations operating within their joint operating area in the Caribbean. JTF-East personnel deployed to JIATF-South’s headquarters to facilitate coordination and information sharing. As a result of this joint operation, the law enforcement agencies involved seized over 3,700 pounds of cocaine and apprehended 69 migrants, one smuggler, and the smuggling vessel, according to JTF-East documentation. Officials from the task forces we spoke with reported coordinating most frequently through meetings and working groups, and through liaison officers, as detailed in examples below. Meetings and Working Groups JIATFs: In 2018, JIATF-South and JIATF-West officials developed a collaborative process to track and target shipments with potential illicit drugs and precursor chemicals moving between their respective areas of responsibility. For example, JIATF-West analysts traveled to JIATF- South to initiate the process, and officials stated they continue to work with JIATF-South analysts remotely on an ongoing basis on such collaborative efforts. JTFs: The JTF Coordination Cell hosts quarterly “synchronization meetings” with the three DHS JTFs to discuss emerging drug and smuggling trends, ongoing coordination efforts, and investigations. Liaison Officers All five task forces utilize liaison officers to enhance coordination with the other task forces and components. For example, in 2018, JIATF-West sent an analyst to JTF-Investigations to coordinate on a HOMECORT case related to drug threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the five task forces coordinate with each other and their participating components through liaison officers that reside at the task forces. For example, JIATF- South officials told us that they coordinate with JTF-East through a Coast Guard liaison at JIATF-South. Liaison officers also provide direct access to their components’ information systems, which task force officials said further aids them in sharing information and coordinating missions and activities. Other Coordination Mechanisms In addition to meetings, working groups, and liaison officers, the task forces utilize other coordination mechanisms, such as memoranda of understanding and agreement, shared databases, and conferences, as detailed below. Memoranda of understanding or agreement: The two JIATFs have nine separate formal memoranda of understanding or agreement with various DHS and DOJ components, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and ICE, that detail how the task forces and agencies will coordinate with one another and share resources. Shared databases: Each of the five task forces, along with other federal agencies, can submit information, sometimes known as a “critical movement alert” to shared databases, to alert JIATF-South about a potential drug event in its area of responsibility. According to JIATF-South officials we spoke with and our observations, JIATF- South uses these critical movement alerts, along with other intelligence that may exist, to determine whether it will dedicate assets to target a smuggling event, in conjunction with other, relevant law enforcement agencies. Conferences: Each of the five task forces participates in periodic in- person, telephone, or video conferences to coordinate with one another and share information on key issues. For example, JIATF- South officials stated they have ongoing discussions once a quarter via video conference with JIATF-West officials and other federal agencies and task forces to coordinate on illicit drug threats. Four of the Five Task Forces’ Performance Measures Do Not Allow Them to Determine the Effectiveness of Their Counterdrug Activities JIATF-South Uses Various Output and Outcome- Based Measures to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Counterdrug Activities JIATF-South uses both output-based and outcome-based performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities, and it reports the results to the DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats in JIATF- South’s annual Performance Summary Reports. JIATF-South consistently assesses four key performance measures, called interdiction continuum measures, using data from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database to determine the effectiveness of its missions and activities. Specifically, JIATF-South measures (1) total maritime smuggling events, (2) targeted smuggling events, (3) detected smuggling events, and (4) seized or disrupted smuggling events. According to JIATF-South officials, data on these events allow JIATF-South to develop its primary measure to determine the effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities: the percentage of smuggling events JIATF-South detected that it handed off to law enforcement agencies that resulted in disrupted or seized illicit drugs. These measures and the results for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 are shown in table 2. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the rate at which JIATF-South successfully detected and handed off smuggling events for interdiction was generally 70 percent or higher. While JIATF-South officials acknowledged they have not met the target set by DOD, they noted there are many factors that influence the effectiveness of JIATF-South’s counterdrug missions and activities in any given year that are outside of its span of control. For example, drug trafficking organizations may adapt their tactics in response to JIATF-South’s activities to make it more difficult for the task force to target and detect their movements. This could include changing their trafficking routes or altering the size or type of smuggling conveyances the drug trafficking organizations use to transport the illicit drugs. JIATF-West Has a Well- Documented Methodology for Assessing Its Activities, but Its Measures Do Not Allow It to Demonstrate the Overall Effectiveness of Its Counterdrug Activities In September 2014, JIATF-West set up an Assessments Branch to provide an annual assessment of the task force’s counterdrug efforts that was intended to inform leadership about whether the task force was undertaking the best activities to achieve its mission and implementing them effectively. According to JIATF-West officials, the nature of JIATF- West’s missions and activities make it inherently more difficult to assess and quantify the effectiveness of its efforts relative to other task forces. For example, unlike JIATF-South, which is annually allocated assets to support its missions and activities and can measure results—such as tons of cocaine seized—JIATF-West’s initiatives and activities are primarily focused on information sharing and helping partner nations improve their counterdrug capabilities, activities for which results may be more difficult to quantify. To develop its annual assessment report, JIATF-West’s Assessments Branch evaluates and assigns scores for each of the approximately 20 counterdrug initiatives and more than 100 corresponding activities it conducts each year. (For an example of a JIATF-West initiative and a corresponding activity and a description of how they were assessed, see the sidebar.) In particular, JIATF-West evaluates its initiatives to determine the progress made toward achieving objectives defined in JIATF-West’s strategic documents, such as its Theater Counternarcotics Campaign Plan. Further, JIATF-West evaluates its activities to determine whether they were executed as planned, including considerations of whether the activities were done with the intended organizations, at the specified locations and times, and whether they met stated objectives. Nevertheless, we identified ways JIATF-West measures its performance that inhibit its ability to demonstrate its overall effectiveness of countering the flow of illicit drugs. Specifically, we found that JIATF-West (1) lacks a vital few performance measures that summarize its overall effectiveness that can be consistently assessed over time and (2) that it does not have established targets for assessing the effectiveness of its numerous missions and activities. JIATF-West Lacks a Vital Few, Comprehensive Performance Measures That Summarize Its Effectiveness and Are Consistent Over Time JIATF-West has focused its performance measures on assessing its numerous initiatives and activities; however, it has not developed a vital few, comprehensive performance measures that summarize the overall effectiveness of its numerous initiatives and activities in a manner that would convey essential information on its counterdrug activities to decision makers at the DOD command level and above. Such information could help these decision makers better understand the overall effectiveness of JIATF-West’s counterdrug missions and activities in relation to broader U.S. counterdrug efforts. For example, JIATF-West could develop a performance measure that calculates the percentage of leads it provides to foreign partners that result in seizures or apprehensions. Such a measure could demonstrate JIATF-West’s overall effectiveness in supporting allies and foreign partners in combating illicit drug trafficking in its area of responsibility, in keeping with one of its operational priorities. Guidance on performance measures from the DOD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats states that agencies should develop a vital few measures, no more than two or three, which convey essential information on counterdrug activities to decision makers. JIATF-West used to assess and report such measures as recently as fiscal year 2015. For example, it reported scores on the effectiveness of its mission and broader lines of effort, such as countering illicit drug and precursor chemical flows in its area of responsibility. However, JIATF-West officials told us they stopped reporting on these performance measures in fiscal year 2015 because, from the task force’s perspective, the measures did not provide meaningful insights into the effectiveness of the task force’s operations. However, such performance measures could provide meaningful information on the effectiveness of JIATF-West’s counterdrug activities to decision makers at the DOD command level and above, even if such summary information might not affect the effectiveness of operations at the task force level. We have previously reported on the importance of developing performance measures that demonstrate broader effectiveness and have also reported it is worthwhile for agencies to develop them to better determine and understand the overall effectiveness of their missions and activities. Further, JIATF-West is also unable to assess the effectiveness of its initiatives and activities over time because it has annually changed the way it measures the effectiveness of more than 100 counterdrug initiatives and activities. Specifically, JIATF-West has adjusted how it assesses the initiatives and activities each year since 2014—for example, by changing the weight scale for scoring its initiatives and activities to give more emphasis to some over others. These changes to the methodology make it difficult to compare results and assess the effectiveness of its activities over time. DOD guidance states that agencies should have measures that are consistent over time to capture trend results. In discussing these issues with JIATF-West officials, they stated that assessing the initiatives and activities provides valuable information on the effectiveness of the task force’s efforts for internal, task force management. They acknowledged that JIATF-West’s performance measures could be improved to allow for assessments of the effectiveness of the task force’s activities over time, but they added that they plan to use the same methodology to calculate the task force’s initiatives and activities scores in the future because this information is still needed internally. Given that JIATF-West’s individual initiatives and activities change year to year, however, it will be difficult for JIATF-West to assess trends in the effectiveness of its initiatives and activities over time. By also establishing a vital few, comprehensive performance measures that can be assessed consistently over time, as appropriate, JIATF-West will be able to better convey trends in the overall effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities over time. JIATF-West Lacks Specific Performance Targets for Its Initiatives and Activities JIATF-West has not developed specific performance targets (i.e., established acceptable levels of performance or outcomes) for its initiatives and activities as part of its documented assessment methodology, and no such targets appear in any of the task force’s annual assessment reports. When assessing its initiatives and activities, JIATF-West officials told us it aims to achieve the best possible outcome—or the highest possible score—for each of the initiatives and activities it undertakes and assesses. DOD guidance states that targets should be set for each performance measure to establish a minimum level of performance to be accomplished within a given time frame. Additionally, establishing specific performance measure targets that set a minimum level of performance to achieve could better encourage the task force to meet the targets and identify ways to improve, as needed. The DHS JTF Performance Measures Changed from Fiscal Year 2017 to 2018 and Do Not Reflect Outcomes The DHS JTFs were fully operational in fiscal year 2016 and began assessing their performance and producing performance reports in fiscal year 2017. Since they began reporting on their performance, the measures the JTFs reported changed in fiscal year 2018 and, according to JTF officials, will change again in fiscal year 2019. Specifically, in the fiscal year 2017 performance report, the JTFs reported on activities, such as the amounts of drugs seized, arrests made, and currency seized. However, according to task force officials, the 2017 report’s performance measures did not accurately reflect the strategic-level coordination the JTFs performed. For example, the measures the JTFs reported in fiscal year 2017 focused on drug seizures and arrests made by the DHS components. While the drug seizures and arrests made by the DHS components may have been made possible because of coordination activities of the DHS JTFs, using data on drug seizures and arrests as JTF performance measures resulted in double-counting because the components reported on the same seizures and arrests for their respective counterdrug programs. To address these issues for fiscal year 2018, the JTFs and the DHS Coordination Cell developed a new set of performance measures that were intended to better reflect the JTFs’ coordination activities and contributions. For example, a new JTF performance measure developed for fiscal year 2018 included the number of leads that the JTFs provided to a partner law enforcement agency, DHS component, or foreign government partner for interdiction or investigative action. Table 3 shows the evolution of the JTF performance measures from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2018. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of DHS to establish outcome-based and other appropriate performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of each joint task force. Although the DHS JTF Coordination Cell and the JTFs developed performance measures in fiscal year 2018 that better reflect the specific missions and activities of the three task forces, these measures are focused on outputs—such as the number of operations conducted in combating transnational criminal organizations—and not outcomes, such as the number or percentage of leads that resulted in seizures of illicit drugs. According to JTF Coordination Cell officials, the fiscal year 2018 JTF performance measures are not outcome-based because it is difficult to quantify and capture the contributions of the JTFs through their roles as coordinators and facilitators of missions and activities that are conducted by DHS components. Table 4 illustrates each of the DHS JTF performance results for fiscal year 2018 under the revised measures. In addition to the changes to the performance measures made from fiscal years 2017 to 2018, JTF Coordination Cell officials told us in October 2018 they plan to further revise their performance measures for fiscal year 2019, as they believe their measures could continue to improve to better reflect the value added by the JTFs and their coordination and information-sharing activities. JTF Coordination Cell officials further stated that they had considered linking the fiscal year 2018 performance measures to relevant strategic-level outcomes in DHS plans. However, they noted that such outcomes—including the number of drug seizures and apprehensions—are already reported by the individual DHS components and they are trying to avoid the double-counting that occurred in the fiscal year 2017 performance report. We acknowledge that the types of coordination activities that the JTFs perform are inherently more difficult to measure, but developing and implementing outcome-based performance measures that reflect the value the JTFs add would better position the JTFs to demonstrate the effectiveness of their coordination efforts. For example, a performance measure that calculates the percentage of leads provided to components, partner law enforcement agencies, or foreign government partners that result in a successful seizure or arrest could help demonstrate the JTFs’ contributions to DHS counterdrug efforts. Further, in designing its outcome-based performance measures that are reflective of their coordination and information sharing activities, establishing a consistent set of performance measures across years, as appropriate, will allow the JTFs to better assess and convey their progress over time. Conclusions In 2017, 70,237 Americans died from an overdose involving synthetic opioids, heroin, cocaine, and other drugs. The number of annual overdose deaths has nearly doubled over the past decade. Combating the trafficking and availability of illicit drugs in the United States is a government-wide priority that requires a coordinated effort by federal departments and agencies with counterdrug responsibilities. JIATF- South, JIATF-West, and the three DHS JTFs are five task forces that are focused on strengthening interagency counterdrug efforts. While these task forces have worked together to coordinate and avoid duplicative activities, improvements to the performance measures used by four of the five task forces could enable them to better determine the effectiveness of their counterdrug missions and activities. In particular, by developing a vital few, comprehensive measures that are consistent from one year to the next, and establishing specific targets against which it can measure its missions and activities, JIATF-West will be better able to determine the effectiveness of its missions and activities and assess performance trends across years. In addition, by developing outcome-based performance measures that are consistent, the JTFs would be better positioned to demonstrate the effectiveness of their counterdrug efforts over time. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making a total of three recommendations: two for JIATF-West and one for DHS. The Director of JIATF-West should establish a vital few performance measures that are consistently measured over time. (Recommendation 1) The Director of JIATF-West should establish specific targets that set a minimal level of performance. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop outcome-based performance measures for the DHS JTFs that are consistent. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments In May 2019, we provided a copy of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) for review and comment. In written comments, which are included in appendix II, DOD stated that it concurred with the two recommendations directed to JIATF- West and noted that JIATF-West plans to conduct an internal evaluation to establish a vital few performance measures to allow it to measure performance over time. Additionally, JIATF-West has identified several areas where it can establish specific targets that set a minimal level of performance to support DOD priorities. In its written comments, which are included in appendix III, DHS stated that it concurred with its recommendation and plans to implement new performance measures in a phased approach. DHS also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. Additionally, ONDCP provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. DOJ did not have any comments on the draft report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841or AndersonN@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Fiscal Year 2018 Performance Measures and Targets for the Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces This appendix provides further details regarding the performance measures and performance targets for the Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact: Acknowledgements: In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Kelsey Hawley (Analyst-in-Charge), and Julia Vieweg made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Billy Commons, Pamela Davidson, David Dornisch, Eric Hauswirth, and Susan Hsu. Related GAO Products Drug Control: DOD Should Improve Its Oversight of the National Guard Counterdrug Program. GAO-19-27. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2019. Colombia: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Positive Results, but State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach. GAO-19-106. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018. Illicit Opioids: Office of National Drug Control Policy and Other Agencies Need to Better Assess Strategic Efforts. GAO-18-569T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2018. Illicit Opioids: While Greater Attention Given to Combating Synthetic Opioids, Agencies Need to Better Assess their Efforts. GAO-18-205. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2018. Counternarcotics: Overview of U.S. Efforts in the Western Hemisphere. GAO-18-10. Washington, D.C.: October 13, 2017. Border Security: Additional Actions Could Strengthen DHS Efforts to Address Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling. GAO-17-474. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2017. Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. GAO-14-527. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2014. Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug Investigations. GAO-11-763. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.


Background Roles and Responsibilities in the Army’s Marketing and Advertising Program The Secretary of the Army has the responsibility to recruit personnel, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary for the Army’s management of its manpower and personnel and provides overall governance for marketing, advertising, and research. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1, is the principal military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Chief of Staff of the Army for all matters related to manpower across the Army. As of August 2019, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1, has responsibility for overseeing the new Office of the Chief Army Enterprise Marketing (AEMO) once it is fully established, as described later in this report. In addition, multiple other Army organizations from across the accessions enterprise—the collection of Army organizations involved in efforts to recruit and train soldiers for the Army—have roles and responsibilities in carrying out the Army’s marketing and advertising program, as summarized in table 1. The Army contracts with a primary advertising agency to develop and implement its marketing and advertising program. The advertising agency is responsible for providing a range of services from the development of the Army’s marketing and advertising strategy to the production of marketing and advertising activities, including television and print advertisements, event marketing, and social media. In November 2018, the Army awarded a contract to a new advertising agency for up to 10 years with a value not to exceed $4 billion. The contract with the previous advertising agency was awarded in March 2011, and from March 2011 through the end of fiscal year 2018, the Army issued 702 task orders and obligated about $1.6 billion on this contract, according to our analysis of data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation. Types of Marketing and Advertising Activities The Army conducts a variety of marketing and advertising activities at the national and local levels in support of the Army’s recruiting goals. Figure 1 shows examples of the various types of Army marketing and advertising activities, such as mobile assets used at recruiting events and digital advertising on social media. Different marketing and advertising activities are useful for supporting the three phases—awareness, engagement, and activation—of an individual’s decision-making process, sometimes referred to as the consumer journey. The goal of marketing and advertising is to move a potential recruit through each of the three phases and, ultimately, to the decision to enlist: Awareness: Individuals learn about the opportunity to serve in the Army and the distinct characteristics of serving in the Army. The Army pursues awareness through marketing and advertising activities such as television commercials, print advertisements, banners at events, and billboards. Engagement: Individuals who are aware of the opportunities for service in the Army begin considering the possibility of joining the Army. During this phase, the Army seeks to provide recruits with additional information to aid in their decision-making process. Often this phase of advertising takes place in the digital environment, as the Army seeks to provide informative social media posts and use banner advertisements to attract individuals to visit its website for more information. Activation: Individuals have considered the Army and are ready to talk to a recruiter about enlistment. As such, activation activities seek to encourage these individuals to provide their contact information to schedule an opportunity to meet with a recruiter. Activation is often conducted in person, such as through recruiters’ presence at events like career fairs. Activation may also be conducted through other means—such as direct mail and online or print classified advertisements—as long as the advertisement prompts viewers to provide their contact information. Further, the Army employs the use of mobile assets, such as large trucks and trailers fitted with equipment and activities intended to draw crowds and encourage and facilitate public interaction with a recruiter at an event to generate leads. Figure 2 shows the awareness, engagement, and activation phases and examples of marketing and advertising activities that are used in support of each phase. The Army Has Taken Steps to Develop Processes to Improve Its Oversight of Its Primary Marketing and Advertising Contract To implement AAA’s recommendations, the Army has developed processes designed to improve its oversight of the primary contract for executing the Army’s marketing and advertising program. In April 2018, AAA reported that AMRG did not sufficiently evaluate the performance of its primary contractor, effectively oversee deliverables included in its three main marketing and advertising contracts, or effectively oversee the negotiation process of task orders for its primary marketing and advertising contract. AAA made seven recommendations to AMRG to improve its contract oversight, with which AMRG agreed. As shown in table 2, as of September 2019, AAA considered three of the recommendations implemented but not closed, with AMRG still taking steps to address the other four recommendations; as a result, it is too soon to assess the extent to which the Army’s steps have improved contract oversight within the marketing and advertising program. AMRG officials stated that the implementation of these recommendations has been slowed, in part, because of the recent award of its primary marketing and advertising contract to the new advertising agency. Among AMRG’s actions to improve its contract oversight are steps to develop processes for overseeing contractor performance, deliverables, and price negotiations. Specifically, AMRG has taken steps in the following areas: Created a new project management office. AMRG established a project management office to help address the challenges identified by AAA and to serve as a coordinating body that centralizes contract oversight. According to its charter, the office is responsible for maintaining cost, schedule, and performance for Army marketing and advertising programs to help ensure that they are completed on time and within reasonable costs to support the accessions mission. Documents outlining the contract management process indicate that the project management office reviews key contract documents, such as the statement of objectives and the quality assurance surveillance plan, before the documents are submitted to the contracting officer who is responsible for administering the contract. After the contractor submits its proposal for providing the requested product or service, the project management office reviews the proposal to ensure it meets the requirements of the statement of objectives. Also, the project management office coordinates and submits the technical evaluation form for review by the contracting officer’s representative and the contracting officer. Within the newly-formed AEMO, there will be a project management office with six authorized personnel, according to the organizational chart for AEMO. In July 2019, AMRG officials stated that they were developing standing operating procedures and continuity plans that AEMO could use as it establishes its project management office. Implementing training and tools to evaluate contractor performance. AAA found that AMRG did not sufficiently evaluate the performance of its primary contractor and recommended that AMRG require that all program managers receive contracting officer’s representative training and ensure that individual quality assurance surveillance plans are developed for each task order over $150,000. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. In response to AAA’s recommendations, in April 2019, AMRG reported that all program managers had completed contracting officer’s representative training. Further, as of September 2019, AMRG reported that the Army had developed individual quality assurance surveillance plans for each task order issued in fiscal year 2019. According to AAA officials, AMRG provided them with examples of these quality assurance surveillance plans, and AAA provided AMRG with feedback on additional information that should be included, which AMRG officials stated they were taking actions to address. In September 2019, AMRG also issued standing operating procedures for program managers to provide internal policy and instruction for executing the Army’s marketing and advertising program as well as evaluating its performance, including overseeing contractor performance. We found that the standing operating procedures require contracting officer’s representative training for program managers and that the Director of Marketing, Director of Research, and AMRG contracts team are to monitor compliance quarterly. In addition, the procedures include steps outlining contract oversight mechanisms, such as information on the purpose and contents of quality assurance surveillance plans. Implementing a standardized technical evaluation form. AAA found that AMRG had not effectively negotiated prices for its primary marketing and advertising contract; AAA recommended that AMRG (1) define and implement a well-structured policy for conducting technical evaluations of contractor proposals and (2) establish a standardized form to ensure consistency during the evaluation process. As of September 2019, AAA reported that these two recommendations were implemented but not closed. The standing operating procedures that we reviewed outline the process for program managers to complete a standardized form for evaluating contractor proposals. The form is intended to ensure that program managers are consistently evaluating contractor proposals for performing work under the contract. For example, the form requires program managers to conduct a comparative price analysis by comparing the contractor’s proposed price to total task order cost in prior years. According to the instructions on the form, program managers are to submit the completed form to their supervisor or director for approval. The project management office then coordinates and submits the technical evaluation to the contracting officer’s representative and contracting officer for review. Overseeing contract deliverables. AAA found that AMRG did not effectively oversee deliverables in its marketing and advertising contracts and recommended that AMRG develop procedures to ensure that contracts or task orders do not contain deliverables already provided in other contracts. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. AMRG and U.S. Army Mission Installation and Contracting Command officials have implemented processes to prevent duplicative deliverables (i.e., services or products to be provided through a contract) in the future, such as the standardized technical evaluation form noted above. We found that the standardized technical evaluation form requires program managers to certify that they have reviewed other tasks and contracts within their purview and to validate that the task order being requested does not duplicate existing or other requested work. In addition, AMRG and U.S. Army Mission Installation and Contracting Command officials stated that they consolidated all contract actions under one team at the U.S. Army Mission Installation and Contracting Command and that both AMRG’s contracting officer’s representative and budget office must verify that contract requests are not duplicative. AAA also found overlapping deliverables between AMRG’s primary marketing and advertising contract and a contract for creative technology support and recommended that AMRG use the creative technology support contract for all of the creative technical services within its scope. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. AMRG officials told us that they plan to issue a modification to the contract for creative technology support to remove services duplicated in the primary marketing and advertising contract. As of September 2019, an AMRG official told us that the Army expected to issue the modification in November 2019. Revising process for contract award fees. AAA found that AMRG had minimal support to justify its higher award fee ratings for its primary contractor and recommended that AMRG update its award fee plan and award fee review process to include soliciting feedback from program managers, maintaining supporting documentation, and obtaining objective performance data, among other things. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. We found that AMRG revised its process in fiscal year 2018 for determining award fee incentives for its advertising agency. For example, according to the documentation associated with the award fee decision for the agency’s performance from April 2017 through April 2018, AMRG reported that it, among other things, included feedback from program managers on the advertising agency’s performance and obtained objective performance data from an independent entity, DOD’s Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies. In future work with the new advertising agency, AMRG officials stated that the Army plans to offer award fees for specific task orders rather than one fee for performance in a given year. According to AMRG officials, this change allows greater flexibility in deciding which programs should be incentivized with an award fee. As of September 2019, AMRG officials stated that they had not issued any task orders with an award fee under the new marketing and advertising contract. The Army Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Approach for Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Marketing and Advertising Program To implement AAA’s recommendations, the Army has taken steps to improve how it measures the effectiveness of its marketing and advertising program; these steps are consistent with commercial best practices for assessing the effectiveness of advertising identified in our prior work. In its 2018 report on return on investment, AAA found that AMRG had deficiencies in how it measured the effectiveness of its marketing and advertising efforts and made seven recommendations to AMRG, with which AMRG agreed. Of these recommendations, AAA considered four implemented but not closed as of September 2019, with AMRG still taking steps to address the other three recommendations, as shown in table 3. Since the Army’s steps were recently implemented or are ongoing, it is too early to determine if they will achieve their desired results. Based on our analysis of the Army’s actions, the Army’s steps to implement AAA’s recommendations fall into the following five areas: (1) revising strategic goals, (2) updating and documenting its assessment process, (3) improving the reliability and capabilities of data systems, (4) integrating national and local marketing and advertising efforts, and (5) obtaining new tools to determine required marketing and advertising resources. The steps the Army has taken in these areas thus far are consistent with commercial best practices for assessing the effectiveness of advertising we identified in our prior work. As the Army takes additional steps to establish the newly-formed AEMO, it will be important for the Army to continue to align its efforts with these commercial best practices for assessing the effectiveness of advertising to ensure advertising dollars are used efficiently to help meet stated recruiting goals. Revising strategic goals. AAA found that AMRG did not have specific goals to measure the long-term effects of investments in marketing and advertising efforts to support the Army’s accessions mission and recommended that AMRG develop such goals. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation was implemented but not closed. AMRG has revised its strategic marketing goals from tracking changes in individuals’ attitudes toward the Army, such as support for the Army among the general population, to tracking the behaviors of these individuals, such as the number of visits to GoArmy.com. For fiscal year 2018, AMRG had seven strategic marketing goals that tracked the attitudes of the general population and prospects toward the Army. For fiscal year 2019, AMRG revised the goals to four that track attitudes, two that track behaviors, one that tracks effectiveness, and one that tracks efficiency. Goals that track attitudes are aligned with the awareness phase of the consumer journey, whereas goals that track behaviors are more aligned with the engagement and activation phases. Figure 3 shows how the fiscal year 2018 and 2019 strategic marketing goals align with the three phases of the consumer journey. Looking ahead, AMRG officials told us that, consistent with feedback they received from marketing industry experts, the strategic goals in the fiscal year 2020 marketing plan will all be behavioral and will target the different stages of what AMRG refers to as a lead nurturing funnel. AMRG officials stated that their goal is to use information so they can quickly shift attention and funding to different stages of the funnel that are not meeting their goals, so as to ensure that those stages get the attention needed to reach mission success. AMRG’s recent and ongoing steps to revise its marketing goals are consistent with the commercial best practice to develop an evaluation framework that identifies the target audience and includes measurable goals. To institutionalize AMRG’s updated processes, AAA recommended that AMRG update Army Regulation 601-208 to reflect the new goals and processes it would implement to improve its program effectiveness. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. The Army is in the process of revising its marketing and advertising regulation to reflect the updated strategic marketing goals and process. AMRG had drafted a revision to the regulation; however, AMRG officials had put this process on hold while senior Army leaders were making the decision about AMRG’s placement within the Army. Now that AMRG has been redesignated as AEMO and reassigned within the Army, as of August 2019 AMRG officials stated that the Army was revising the regulation to reflect the new organization’s relationship to other entities within the accessions enterprise. AMRG expects the Army to publish the updated regulation in 2020. Updating and documenting its assessment process. AAA found that only three of AMRG’s 23 national events during fiscal year 2016 provided the best value for their intended purpose and recommended that AMRG discontinue efforts that were not cost-effective in comparison to other options and assess the cost-effectiveness of current marketing and advertising efforts. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation was implemented but not closed. According to AMRG officials, AMRG discontinued all of the events that were deemed to not be cost-effective in AAA’s report. In its report, AAA also found that AMRG’s assessment process did not include USAREC’s and USACC’s marketing and advertising efforts and that AMRG did not formally document that process; AAA recommended that AMRG establish and formally document a process with roles and responsibilities to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of all Army marketing and advertising efforts. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation was implemented but not closed. We found that AMRG formally documented how it assesses the effectiveness of the marketing and advertising program, consistent with the commercial best practice of seeking to develop an understanding of how outcomes can be attributed to advertising. In January 2019, AMRG issued guidance that outlines its assessment process, including the types of information that are reviewed in each assessment. The guidance we reviewed outlines three levels of assessments: Level I is a review by program managers of their individual programs; level II, to be conducted on a quarterly basis, is a review at the operational level in which the directors of research and marketing review the results of marketing and advertising efforts across multiple marketing channels; and level III, also to be conducted on a quarterly basis, is a review at the strategic level in which the AMRG Director reviews the Army’s progress in meeting its strategic marketing goals. Further, in January 2019, AMRG reviewed a summary of the number, cost, and performance of USAREC’s and USACC’s local marketing and advertising activities as part of the level II assessment process. In addition, to facilitate comparison of options, AMRG developed a tool for comparing different programs within a given marketing channel. The tool, which AMRG calls a decision support matrix, allows officials to comparatively rank different programs based on weighting different factors. For example, based on our review of the decision support matrix, we found that AMRG assigned a higher weight to a program’s effectiveness than its timing. The tool also incorporates qualitative feedback based on how program managers, USAREC, and USACC rank the programs, and quantitative analysis on the cost per lead, impression, or engagement, depending on the type of program. Improving the reliability and capabilities of data systems. AAA identified discrepancies between information in the Enterprise Marketing Management (EMM) system and supporting documentation and recommended that AMRG establish and formally document a process to ensure that all Army marketing and advertising performance and cost data were regularly recorded in an official marketing system of record on a regular basis. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. The Army has taken steps to improve the reliability of the data in EMM since AAA’s report. In August 2019, the Army issued a task order on its primary marketing and advertising contract covering EMM system support to include overseeing and improving the quality of data in EMM. According to the performance work statement, the Army’s new advertising agency is responsible for, among other things, accurately documenting current data, systems, and business processes, as well as analyzing EMM reports and documentation for completeness and accuracy. Further, the advertising agency is responsible for identifying and documenting business problems and recommending areas for improvement and technology solutions. During the focus groups we held with AMRG personnel, participants told us that AMRG leadership was focused on demonstrating the effectiveness of the Army’s marketing and advertising through reliable and readily-available data. For example, the Army implemented an electronic business reply card, which is a digital form to capture a potential recruit’s eligibility and contact information and a means of identifying the event where the recruit learned about the Army. USAREC and USACC officials told us that prior to the electronic business reply card, recruiters collected prospects’ information at events by using a paper card. Although that card reflected the event where the potential recruit heard about the Army, it would often take several days before the potential recruit’s information appeared in the recruiting system, according to these officials. As a result, recruiters would sometimes not send in the paper card and would instead enter the prospect’s information directly into the system. In these cases, the marketing and advertising event would not receive credit for generating the lead. USAREC and USACC officials stated that the electronic business reply card’s quicker turnaround time for leads showing up in the system should improve data reliability by ensuring that recruiters and recruiting operations officers consistently enter an individual’s demographic data into the system, along with the marketing and advertising activity they interacted with. These steps to better identify the number of leads generated by marketing and advertising activities are consistent with the commercial best practice of conducting ongoing analysis of performance using industry standard measures appropriate for the purpose of the advertising activity. In addition, in August 2019, the Army issued a task order on its new marketing and advertising contract for the maintenance and optimization of its system that tracks analytics on the Army’s marketing and advertising activities, which AMRG refers to as the Intelligence Hub. The advertising agency is responsible for monitoring this system and producing reports that track the effectiveness of marketing and advertising activities based on key performance indicators. The advertising agency is also responsible for upgrading the system to track the multiple marketing and advertising resources that a potential recruit interacts with. AMRG officials told us that the upgrade of this system is intended to equip the Army with more complete data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Army’s marketing and advertising activities— consistent with the commercial best practice of seeking to develop an understanding of how outcomes can be attributed to advertising. Integrating national and local marketing and advertising efforts. AAA found that AMRG did not integrate and leverage both national and local marketing and advertising efforts to support the Army’s accessions mission and recommended that AMRG revise the Army’s marketing performance framework to include marketing and advertising efforts at both the national and local levels. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation was implemented but not closed. We found that the Army has created programs and instituted procedures designed to increase coordination of national and local marketing and advertising efforts. For example, AMRG reported that it included other Army components, including USAREC and USACC, in developing the fiscal year 2019 marketing goals and planned to include those organizations in its fiscal year 2020 process. In addition, TRADOC established the Army Accessions Resource Fusion Board, which brings together organizations from across the accessions enterprise for quarterly meetings at which they make operational resource sharing plans for marketing and recruiting assets. For example, according to a March 2019 briefing for an Army Accessions Resource Fusion Board meeting, representatives from USAREC brigades discussed their planned marketing and advertising activities for the first quarter of fiscal year 2020, including any requests they had for support from other Army stakeholders for those planned activities. Further, according to its charter, the Army Accessions Resource Fusion Board is responsible for assessing the effectiveness of local marketing and advertising efforts in the previous quarter. In fiscal year 2018, the Army also created a pilot program designed to improve how the Army’s marketing and advertising program coordinates with its recruiting components and to produce marketing and advertising messages that resonate more effectively with target populations. The Army began implementing the program in Chicago in fiscal year 2019 and as of April 2019 was planning to expand the program to Boston and four other cities. As of July 2019, AMRG had observed positive results from the program in Chicago. For example, AMRG reported an increase of 11 percent in the number of leads and an increase of about 7 percent in the number of recruits who signed contracts with the Army when compared to the prior year in that region. Officials from TRADOC, USAREC, and USACC told us that coordination with AMRG on marketing and advertising efforts has improved since the time AAA conducted its audits. For example, TRADOC officials stated that AMRG senior leaders have supported the accessions enterprise by providing analytic support to USAREC and USACC. Further, USAREC officials stated that in fiscal year 2018 AMRG started to provide funding for local marketing and advertising activities near USAREC’s requested levels, and that this change had been carried forward into fiscal year 2019. Obtaining new tools to determine required marketing and advertising resources. AAA found that AMRG did not use a resource requirements projection model that supported and linked to planned marketing efforts and recommended that AMRG develop such a model. As of September 2019, AAA reported that this recommendation had not been fully implemented. AMRG has contracted with the RAND Corporation and a consulting firm to develop tools to determine the resources AMRG needs to conduct its marketing and advertising activities. The RAND tools include three planned models, one of which is the recruiting resource model recommended by AAA. The recruiting resource model has been partially completed and is being updated with additional data with full completion scheduled for September 2020. According to the Army’s fiscal year 2020 budget request, the Army used the RAND report that developed this model as a justification for increasing its advertising budget for fiscal year 2020. Further, in consultation with a consulting firm, AMRG developed a channel allocation simulator that allows AMRG officials to test different funding levels for its marketing and advertising channels to see potential outcomes. For example, based on our review of the simulator, AMRG can enter a specific amount of funding for events to estimate how many leads it can expect to obtain from that level of funding. AMRG officials stated that they can use this tool to help them plan for their required level of resources for the upcoming fiscal year. The development of this simulator is consistent with the commercial best practice of using sophisticated marketing mix modeling to determine an appropriate spending strategy. The Army Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Workforce Practices and to Reorganize the Organizational Structure of Its Marketing and Advertising Program ASA(ALT) and OPM Conducted Reviews of AMRG’s Workforce and Recommended Areas for Improvement ASA(ALT) and OPM conducted reviews of AMRG’s workforce and made recommendations to improve the workforce practices within the marketing and advertising program. From January to May 2018, ASA(ALT) conducted a review of AMRG’s business processes and found high-risk issues that contributed to organizational inefficiencies within five areas: (1) internal communications, (2) business performance, (3) training, (4) program performance and accountability, and (5) personnel. For example, ASA(ALT) found that AMRG personnel were unclear about AMRG’s core mission, objectives, and program priorities. Further, ASA(ALT) found that AMRG’s personnel, skills, training, and physical locations were not aligned to support AMRG’s mission. In addition, OPM conducted an assessment from March to September 2018 to identify organizational inefficiencies and propose solutions intended to transform AMRG into a high-performing organization and improve its workforce morale. Similar to ASA(ALT), OPM identified issues with a lack of mission clarity and insufficient communication and collaboration throughout AMRG’s workforce and with its stakeholders. In addition, OPM identified a number of organizational design issues within AMRG, including workforce acquisition, management, and optimization of its operational components and staff. ASA(ALT) and OPM made multiple recommendations to address these issues within AMRG. For example, ASA(ALT) recommended that AMRG establish and disseminate standard operating procedures and process charts; clarify roles and responsibilities of the various organizational components; and clearly communicate to staff the final annual marketing strategy. OPM recommended a multiphased approach to implementing its overall recommendations, identifying key actions to take in each phase. For example, within the first phase, OPM recommended that AMRG determine the new functional structure for AMRG because it would improve management and accountability, collaboration, and stakeholder satisfaction. In addition, within the second phase, OPM recommended that AMRG develop a human capital management plan and review and update its position descriptions regularly to ensure they align with changing goals, staffing needs, and the organizational structure of AMRG. AMRG took some steps to address ASA(ALT)’s and OPM’s recommendations to improve its workforce practices. Within its report, ASA(ALT) noted that AMRG had started to take actions to implement several recommendations, such as disseminating AMRG’s mission statement, priority objectives, strategic goals, and fiscal year 2019 annual marketing plan guidance to all AMRG personnel. Similarly, OPM noted that AMRG had established task groups to coordinate with stakeholders, participated in meetings with Congress and stakeholders, and was developing a new vision for AMRG. However, as of April 2019, senior AMRG officials stated that they had not taken steps to address all of the reports’ recommendations because the Army was considering broader organizational changes to the placement of AMRG within the Army. While the recommendations in ASA(ALT) and the OPM reports were generally specific to AMRG’s organization and workforce at that time, senior AMRG officials stated that the Army would take additional steps to incorporate ASA(ALT)’s and OPM’s recommendations, as appropriate, after senior Army leadership made decisions about those changes. In our review, AMRG personnel we met with continued to identify poor internal communications and morale as key challenges within AMRG, consistent with the findings from ASA(ALT) and OPM. During our focus groups with AMRG personnel, participants repeatedly stated that senior AMRG leadership did not communicate key information to staff. For example, participants told us that senior AMRG leadership did not communicate information about AMRG’s mission, strategic priorities, or pending organizational changes. As described below, subsequent to our focus groups, the Army began taking steps to fundamentally change the organizational structure, workforce, and leadership of its marketing and advertising program. In light of the timing of these substantial changes, we did not comprehensively assess the extent to which communication issues have been resolved in the reorganization of the marketing and advertising program. It will be important for the new leadership to focus on communication at the outset of this organizational change to establish positive morale within the workforce. The Army Reorganized Its Marketing and Advertising Program to Improve Its Structure, and Early Steps Are Consistent with Some Key Reform Practices The Army recently reorganized its marketing and advertising program to improve its organizational structure; the Army’s early steps to implement the reorganization are consistent with some key practices for agency reform efforts we identified in our prior work, as described below. In May 2019, the Secretary of the Army reassigned, redesignated, and stated that the Army planned to relocate AMRG. The Secretary of the Army redesignated AMRG as AEMO and reassigned the office to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1. The effective date of this reassignment was August 1, 2019. AEMO’s mission is to coordinate the Army’s national marketing and advertising strategy; develop and maintain relationships with the marketing and advertising industry; and develop marketing expertise and talent within the Army to support the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve accessions. The offices will be moved from Arlington, Virginia, and Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Chicago, Illinois. Consistent with the key practice to designate a leader to be responsible for the implementation of the proposed reforms, the Secretary of the Army designated the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs as responsible for establishing AEMO and overseeing the transition. The Assistant Secretary stated that he expected AEMO to be fully operational by early 2020. The Army identified several reasons for transitioning from AMRG to AEMO and reassigning the office to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1, consistent with the key practice to define and articulate a succinct and compelling reason for the reforms. According to the execution order establishing AEMO, the Army needed an organization strategically positioned to: support Army senior leadership in advertising, marketing, and analysis; coordinate with the Army’s primary advertising agency; be talent diverse; provide effective marketing analysis; and be able to provide consistency of message and brand across the Army accessions enterprise. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs also stated that AEMO is being assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1, in part, because of the continuity in leadership that having a military officer lead the organization will provide. Previously, AMRG was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, whose leader is politically appointed and had been vacant for two years until January 2019. In addition, the Assistant Secretary stated that AEMO will be located in Chicago to increase its coordination with the new advertising agency, which is also headquartered in Chicago. The Assistant Secretary also told us that the Army hoped to recruit civilian staff and to leverage the marketing and advertising expertise at academic and other marketing and advertising institutions in the region. The Army has taken some initial steps to establish AEMO and its operations. The Army has outlined a three-phased plan with specific tasks and associated dates within each of these phases, which is consistent with the key practice to establish implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress for the reforms. Phase 1, which was to be completed by August 1, 2019, prioritized tasks to initially establish AEMO, such as publishing the Army directive establishing AEMO, issuing the execution order outlining roles and responsibilities for the transition from AMRG to AEMO, and identifying office space in Chicago. Phase 2, which is to be completed between August 1, 2019, and February 1, 2020, includes tasks to transition AEMO to being fully operational, such as establishing new position descriptions and equipping the permanent office space. Lastly, phase 3 identifies those tasks to be implemented after February 1, 2020, when AEMO is fully operational and conducting daily operations, such as updating roles and responsibilities in the Army’s regulation for its marketing and advertising program and developing policies to direct commission military personnel to the office. The plan also identifies offices and officials who are accountable for implementing specific tasks during the transition. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs told us that the Army established an operational planning team to execute the transition from AMRG to AEMO. The execution order also identifies key stakeholders, including officials from TRADOC, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, and National Guard Bureau, who are to participate in weekly working group meetings led by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Looking forward, by January 2020 the Army plans to develop metrics to assess the effectiveness of the new AEMO organization, including the purpose, expectations, and desired outcomes, which is consistent with the key practice that calls for clear outcome- oriented goals and performance measures. In addition, the Army has taken some initial steps to establish AEMO’s workforce. As of September 2019, the Army had authorized 53 positions—31 military and 22 civilian—for AEMO and identified a Brigadier General from the Army Reserve with marketing and advertising experience as its leader. Senior Army leadership stated that they expected to fill almost all of the positions with new military and civilian personnel, in part, because the civilian position classifications in AMRG do not generally align with those in AEMO. As of June 2019, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs told us that the Army was identifying Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard officers with marketing and advertising education or experience to fill the military positions. In addition, the Assistant Secretary stated that they were working with OPM to develop position descriptions for the AEMO civilian personnel and to identify the skills and expertise needed within AEMO to fulfill its mission, consistent with the key practice to determine if the agency will have the needed resources and capacity, including the skills and competencies, in place for the reorganization. The Army has also established a working group led by the U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at West Point to develop a new marketing career path that senior Army leadership stated is intended to create a pool of military personnel who could serve in AEMO and other Army accessions organizations in the future. As the Army carries out its steps to fully establish AEMO and reorganize the marketing and advertising program, it will continue to be important for the Army to consider and use the key practices for agency reform efforts to guide the transition. Doing so will help ensure the success of the new marketing and advertising organization. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. The Army provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Appendix I: Army Actions to Improve Its Marketing and Advertising Program as Stated in the Army’s Report to Congress This appendix summarizes an Army report to Congress on actions taken to improve its marketing and advertising program. Section 599 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 required the Army to submit a report to Congress that addressed several elements, such as the mitigation and oversight measures implemented to assure improved program return and contract management, and the establishment of a review process to regularly evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of marketing efforts. The Army submitted the report on February 5, 2019. Table 4 identifies the required elements of the report and the actions that the Army has reported taking to address these elements. Appendix II: Army Marketing and Research Group’s Reported Actions to Address Army Audit Agency’s Recommendations This appendix provides a summary of actions that the Army has reported taking to address the recommendations in the April 2018 U.S. Army Audit Agency (AAA) reports about the Army’s marketing and advertising program. One report focused on contract oversight, and the other report focused on what AAA termed “return on investment.” Each report contained seven recommendations, with which the Army Marketing and Research Group (AMRG) concurred. AMRG and AAA officials stated that they have communicated about AMRG’s actions to implement the recommendations and that AAA has provided feedback, as appropriate, on actions taken. AAA officials stated that AAA may conduct a follow-up audit in fiscal year 2020 to determine if the actions have led to improvements in the marketing and advertising program. Table 5 summarizes the recommendations from the AAA report on contract oversight, the actions AMRG has taken to implement them, and the status—as of September 2019—of their implementation as reported by AAA. Table 6 identifies the recommendations from the AAA report on return on investment, the actions AMRG has taken to implement them, and the status—as of September 2019—of their implementation as reported by AAA. Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Best (Assistant Director), Kendall Banks, Timothy J. DiNapoli, Jacob Fender, Alexandra Gonzalez, Amie Lesser, Kristen Kociolek, Steven Lozano, Jonathan Meyer, Eve Nealon, Julia Kennon, Carol Petersen, Richard Powelson, Jerome Sandau, Jared Sippel, and Andrew Stavisky made key contributions to this report.