Human Rights Developments in China1 Overview Thirty years after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power. People's Republic of China (PRC) leaders have maintained political control through a mix of repression and responsiveness to some public preferences, delivering economic prosperity to many citizens, co-opting the middle and educated classes, and stoking nationalism to bolster CCP legitimacy. The party has rejected reforms that it perceives might undermine its monopoly on power, and continues to respond forcefully to signs of autonomous social organization, independent political activity, or social instability. The party is particularly wary of unsanctioned collective activity among sensitive groups, such as religious congregations, ethnic minorities, industrial workers, political dissidents, and human rights defenders and activists. Technological advances have enhanced the government's ability to monitor the activities of these groups, particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims. Some experts refer to the PRC model of governance as "responsive authoritarianism" or, in some aspects, "consultative authoritarianism." Despite the government's many repressive policies, some reports indicate that many PRC citizens may appreciate the government's focus on stability, are generally satisfied with the government's performance, and are optimistic about the future, although the depth of their support for the government is unclear. CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, in which over 1.5 million party members have been punished and which is viewed by many experts as partly a political purge, appears to have gained widespread popular support. For part of the leadership term of Hu Jintao, who served as CCP General Secretary and State President from 2002 to 2012, the party tolerated limited public criticism of state policies, relatively unfettered dissemination of news and exchange of opinion on social media on many social topics, and some investigative journalism and human rights advocacy around issues not seen as threatening to CCP control. After consolidating power in 2013, Xi Jinping intensified and expanded the reassertion of party control over society that began during the final years of Hu's term, and strengthened his own control over the party. In high-profile speeches, Xi has repeated the maxim, "The party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country." In 2018, Xi backed a constitutional amendment removing the previous limit of two five-year-terms for the presidency, clearing the way for him potentially to stay in power indefinitely. Xi also has cultivated what some observers view as a cult of personality, launching far-reaching campaigns for Chinese citizens, beginning with pre-school, to study his political philosophy. Some analysts argue that Xi's efforts to bolster the party and his leadership reflect a heightened sense of insecurity rather than confidence in the CCP's ability to address internal and external threats, and that he and his supporters among the party elite have responded by choosing to "clamp down and not loosen up." New Laws and Policies Since Xi's rise to power, the PRC government has introduced laws and policies that enhance the legal authority of the party and state to counteract potential ideological, political, and human rights challenges. In 2013, the CCP issued a directive (Document No. 9) that identified seven "false ideological trends, positions, and activities," largely aimed at reining in the media and liberal academics. In 2015, the government launched a crackdown on over 250 human rights lawyers and activists, detaining many of them and convicting over a dozen of them of "disturbing social order," subversion, and other crimes. PRC authorities targeted, in particular, legal staff of the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing, which had taken on high profile human rights cases, and revoked the firm's business license in 2018. The government has also placed greater constraints upon environmental activism, which has been a relatively vibrant area of civil society, viewing it as a threat to social stability. Since 2015, the government has enacted new laws that place further restrictions on civil society in the name of national security, authorize greater control over minority and religious groups, particularly Uyghur Muslims, and reduce the autonomy of citizens. A law regulating foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which took effect in 2017, places such NGOs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, tightens their registration requirements, and imposes greater controls on their activities, funding, and staffing. Some international NGOs that specialize in rule of law, rights advocacy, and labor rights have suspended their work in China. A new Cybersecurity Law, which went into effect in 2017, codifies broad governmental powers to control and restrict online traffic, including for the purposes of protecting social order and national security. The law also places a greater legal burden upon private internet service providers to monitor content and assist public security organs. A new National Intelligence Law, also enacted in 2017, obliges individuals, organizations, and institutions to assist and cooperate with state intelligence efforts. In 2016, President Xi launched a policy known as "Sinicization," through which the government has taken measures to further compel China's religious practitioners and ethnic minorities to conform to Chinese culture, the socialist system, and Communist Party policies. Many analysts view this strategy as the CCP's response to what it perceives as excessive feelings of separateness and divided loyalties among some religious and ethnic groups. In April 2016, Xi presided over a conference on national religious affairs, the first Chinese president in over ten years to do so. He emphasized that the "legitimate rights of religious peoples must be protected," but also stated, "We must resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means.... " At the 19 th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi emphasized, "We will fully implement the Party's basic policy on religious affairs, uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation, and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to socialist society." The Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect in February 2018, place an emphasis on religious and social harmony and the prevention of religious extremism and terrorism. Freedom of Speech The PRC Constitution provides for many civil and political rights, including, in Article 35, the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration, and in Article 36, "freedom of religious belief." Other provisions in China's constitution and laws, however, circumscribe or condition these freedoms, and the state routinely restricts these freedoms in practice. Under Xi's leadership, the government has further closed the space for free speech and silenced independent journalists. Authorities have used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other forms of harassment and punishment to intimidate and silence journalists and authors. Since 2013, China has dropped three places, from 173 to 177 (out of 180 countries), on Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index . The recent clampdown includes not only political speech but also "vulgar, immoral, and unhealthy" content. More than 60 journalists and bloggers currently are detained in China. In July 2019, a court in Sichuan province sentenced dissident Huang Qi to 12 years in prison for "providing state secrets to foreign entities." In 1998, Huang had created "64 Tianwang," a website that reported on sensitive topics, including government corruption and human rights violations. The PRC government, which operates one of the most extensive and sophisticated internet censorship systems in the world, blocks access to over 20% of the world's most trafficked websites, according to one source. Xi also has attempted to place greater controls on the use of censorship circumvention tools, such as virtual private networks (VPNs). Although the government often tolerates the use of VPNs for some purposes, such as academic research and international business, it sometimes punishes people for providing VPN services without authorization or for using VPNs to disseminate sensitive information. The use of VPNs is not widespread, either due to a lack of interest or to inconveniences such as slower browsing speeds. New Surveillance Technologies PRC methods of social and political control are evolving to include the widespread use of sophisticated surveillance and big data technologies. Human rights groups and the U.S. Department of State argue that these methods, which have not yet been fully deployed nationally, violate rights to privacy, "mental autonomy," and the presumption of innocence, and are used to restrict freedoms of movement, association, and religion. Chinese authorities and companies have installed ubiquitous surveillance cameras, as well as facial, voice, iris, and gait recognition equipment, ostensibly to reduce crime, but likely also to track the movements of ethnic Tibetans and Uyghurs (also spelled "Uighurs") and critics of the regime. In Xinjiang, police and officials reportedly are collecting massive amounts of data and entering it into an "Integrated Joint Operations Platform" (IJOP). The IJOP reportedly flags individuals who exhibit behaviors that authorities view as deviating from the norm or potentially threatening to social stability. Many forms of lawful, peaceful, daily activities may be viewed suspiciously by authorities through the use of this law enforcement tool. The government is developing a "social credit system" that would not only rate individuals' credit worthiness but also how well they abide by rules and regulations. It involves aggregating data on individuals and "creating measures to incentivize 'trustworthy' conduct, and penalize untrustworthy' conduct." Citizens deemed untrustworthy may be banned from making purchases for travel, prevented from applying for certain types of jobs, or denied educational opportunities for their children. Examples of untrustworthy behavior include traffic violations, smoking in prohibited areas, making repeated purchases that indicate poor character, and posting untruthful news online. Labor Rights and Student Activism The PRC government, which generally restricts the operations of independent labor groups, has been carrying out a year-long suppression campaign against labor activism in Guangdong province, a center for export-oriented manufacturing, and elsewhere. Authorities have harassed, detained, and arrested labor organizers and activists, labor NGOs, social workers, and journalists who attempted to provide support to workers, and students and recent graduates from around the country who advocated for their rights. Workers have protested low pay, unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, and other violations of the China's Labor Law. Over 50 labor activists are in custody or their whereabouts are unknown. In July 2018, workers at Jasic Technology Corporation in Shenzhen attempted to form their own union and went on strike to protest the dismissal of labor organizers. Other labor unrest during this time related to fair wages and the safety and health of working conditions. Since August 2018, authorities in Beijing have attempted to silence student labor activists at Peking University in Beijing, one of the country's most prestigious institutions of higher learning. At least 21 members of the university's Marxist Society have been placed under house arrest or have disappeared, and many others have been interrogated or surveilled. Although the students are not agitating for Western-style democracy, the CCP appears to fear that the movement could help workers to independently organize and stage protests at a time when labor demonstrations are rising across the country, or ignite other forms of social activism. The government appears particularly sensitive to student movements originating in China's most elite university, a traditional incubator of political activism. China, Global Human Rights, and the United Nations In part to defend and promote acceptance of its own principles of human rights, on the global stage, China has rejected notions of universal human rights, supported principles of non-intervention, and emphasized economic development over the protection of individual civil and political rights. A member of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) most recently in 2017-2019, China sponsored its first ever UNHRC resolutions in 2017 and 2018, both of which passed, emphasizing national sovereignty, calling for "quiet dialogue" and cooperation rather than investigations and international calls for action, and advocating for the Chinese model of state-led development. In July 2019, China sponsored a UNHRC resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 33 to 13, reaffirming the "contribution of development to the enjoyment of human all rights." In a speech given on global Human Rights Day in 2018, President Xi provided his perspective on "people-centered human rights," including a "path of human rights development with Chinese characteristics in line with its own conditions" and emphasizing the "right to subsistence and development as primary basic human rights." Religious and Ethnic Minority Policies According to Freedom House, the extent of allowed religious freedom and activity among China's estimated 350 million religious practitioners varies widely by religion, region, and ethnic group, depending on "the level of perceived threat or benefit to [Communist] party interests, as well as the discretion of local officials." The party's Sinicization policy and the 2018 amendments to the government's Regulations on Religious Affairs have affected all religions to varying degrees. New policies further restrict religious travel to foreign countries and contacts with foreign religious organizations and tighten bans on religious practice among party members and state employees and the religious education of minors. Religious venues are required to raise the national flag and teach traditional Chinese culture and "core socialist values," and online religious activities now need approval by the provincial Religious Affairs Bureau. Christians Christianity is the second-largest religion in China after Buddhism, and is growing steadily. Between an estimated 70 million and 90 million Chinese Christians worship in both officially-registered and unregistered churches. China's Siniciz ation campaign has intensified government efforts to pressure churches that are not formally approved by the government, and hundreds reportedly have been shut down in recent years. Since 2014, authorities have ordered crosses removed from nearly 4,000 churches, particularly in Z hejiang and Henan provinces, where there are large and growing Christian populations. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that roughly 1,000 church leaders were detained for brief periods in 2018. In Nanjing, municipal authorities launched a five-year Sinicization campaign that the U.S. Department of State characterized as aiming to incorporate "Chinese elements into church worship services, hymns and songs, clergy attire, and the architectural style of church buildings." (See Figure 1 ) In September 2018 , the PRC government and the Vatican , which have disagreed over the appointment of bishops, religious freedom, and the Vatican's diplomatic ties with Taiwan, reached a breakthrough in negotiations on diplomatic relations. According to a 2018 provisional agreement, Beijing is to recognize the Pope as the head of the Catholic Church in China, the Vatican is to recognize seven excommunicated Chinese bisho ps appointed by PRC authorities, and China is to appoint future bishops, while the Pope has veto power over their nomination. Some observers have criticized the possible arrangement, which they believe would strengthen state control over Catholics in China. In June 2019, the Vatican asked the PRC government to refrain from harassing Catholic clergy who want to remain loyal to the Pope rather than pledge allegiance to the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the official organization that governs Catholics in China. Falun Gong Falun Gong combines traditional Chinese exercise movements with Buddhist and Daoist concepts and precepts formulated by its founder, Li Hongzhi. In the mid-1990s, the spiritual exercise gained tens of millions of adherents across China, including members of the Communist Party. Authorities have harshly suppressed Falun Gong beginning in 1999 after thousands of adherents gathered in Beijing to protest growing restrictions on their activities. Hundreds of thousands of practitioners who refused to renounce Falun Gong were sent to Re-education through Labor (RTL) centers until they were deemed "transformed." Since the formal dismantling of the RTL penal system in 2014, many Falun Gong detainees reportedly have been sent to "Legal Education Centers" to undergo indoctrination, or to mental health facilities. Overseas Falun Gong groups reported that in 2018, authorities arrested or harassed approximately 9,000 Falun Gong practitioners for refusing to renounce the spiritual exercise. In November 2018, judiciary officials in Changsha, Hunan province suspended the licenses of two lawyers for six months for arguing that Falun Gong was not an illegal cult and for engaging in speech that "disrupted courtroom order." Falun Gong overseas organizations claim that over 4,300 adherents have died in government custody since 1999. Some reports allege that Falun Gong practitioners held in detention facilities in China were victims of illegal organ harvestingâthe unlawful, large-scale, systematic, and nonconsensual removal of body organs for transplantationâwhile they were still alive, resulting in their deaths. The claims of organ harvesting from Falun Gong detainees are based largely upon circumstantial evidence and interviews. China reportedly has made efforts to reform its organ-transplant system, to outlaw organ trafficking and the use of organs from executed prisoners, create a national organ registry, and encourage voluntary donations. Overseas Falun Gong organizations claim that the practice of organ harvesting continues. Tibetans The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) is home to about 2.7 million Tibetans out of China's total ethnic Tibetan population of 6 million. Most of China's remaining ethnic Tibetan population lives in Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in bordering provinces. Although some Tibetans advocate independence, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader who has lived with other Tibetan exiles in Dharamsala, India since a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, has proposed a "middle way approach," or "genuine autonomy" without independence in Tibet. China's leaders have referred to the middle way as "half independence" or "independence in disguise" and to the Dalai Lama as a "separatist" and a "wolf in monk's robes." Talks between PRC officials and representatives of the Dalai Lama on issues related to Tibetan autonomy and the return of the Dalai Lama have been stalled since 2010. Following anti-government protests in 2008, TAR authorities imposed increasingly expansive controls on Tibetan religious life and culture. These include a heightened police presence within monasteries; the ideological re-education of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns; the arbitrary detention and imprisonment of Tibetans; strengthened media controls; and greater restrictions on the use of the Tibetan language in schools. Authorities in some Tibetan areas, in an effort to prevent "separatist" thoughts and activities, have inspected private homes for pictures of the Dalai Lama, examined cell phones for Tibetan religious and cultural content, and monitored online posts for political speech. Since 2016, authorities have destroyed religious structures and homes at the Larung Gar and Yanchen Gar monasteries in Sichuan Province, and evicted roughly 11,500 monks and nuns. The PRC government insists that Chinese laws, and not Tibetan Buddhist religious traditions, govern the process by which lineages of Tibetan lamas are reincarnated, and that the state has the right to choose the successor to the current Dalai Lama. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed support for the right of Tibetans to choose their own religious leaders without government interference. Since 2009, 155 Tibetans within China are known to have self-immolated, many apparently to protest PRC policies or to call for the return of the Dalai Lama, and 123 are reported to have died. Uyghurs The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group who practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam and live primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In the past decade, PRC authorities have imposed severe restrictions on the religious and cultural activities of Uyghurs. Ethnic unrest in Xinjiang erupted in 2009, featuring Uyghur violence against Han Chinese and government reprisals. Subsequent periodic clashes between Uyghurs and Xinjiang security personnel spiked between 2013 and 2015, and PRC leaders responded with more intensive security measures, including thousands of arrests. Following the 2016 appointment of a new Communist Party Secretary to the XUAR, Chen Quanguo, and the implementation of new national security and counterterrorism laws and regulations on religious practice, Xinjiang officials stepped up security measures aimed at the Uyghur population. They included tighter restrictions on movement, the installation of thousands of neighborhood police kiosks, and ubiquitous surveillance cameras. Authorities reportedly have collected biometric data, including DNA samples, blood types, and fingerprints of Uyghur residents, for identification purposes. XUAR authorities also have implemented systems and installed phone apps to register and monitor Uyghurs' electronic devices and online activity for "extremist" content. The PRC government has instituted policies intended to assimilate Uyghurs into Han Chinese society and reduce the influences of Uyghur, Islamic, and Arabic cultures and languages. The XUAR enacted a regulation in 2017 that prohibits "expressions of extremification," including wearing face veils, growing "irregular" beards, and expanding halal practices beyond food. Authorities reportedly have banned traditional Uyghur wedding and funeral customs and Islamic names for children. Thousands of mosques in Xinjiang reportedly have been demolished as part of a "mosque rectification" or safety campaign. PRC authorities reportedly have conscripted as many as a million citizens to live temporarily in the homes of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to assess their hosts' loyalty to the Communist Party. Mass Internment of Uyghurs Since 2017, Xinjiang authorities have undertaken the mass internment of Turkic Muslims, some of whom may have engaged in religious and ethnic cultural practices that the government now perceives as extremist or terrorist, or as manifesting "strongly religious" views or thoughts that could lead to the spread of religious extremism or terrorism. The government has detained, without formal charges, up to an estimated 1.5 million Uyghurs out of a population of about 10.5 million, and a smaller number of ethnic Kazakhs, in ideological re-education centers. Over 400 prominent Uyghur intellectuals reportedly have been detained or their whereabouts are unknown. Many detainees reportedly are forced to express their love of the Communist Party and Xi Jinping, sing patriotic songs, and renounce or reject many of their religious beliefs and customs. According to former detainees, conditions in the centers are often crowded and unsanitary, and treatment often includes psychological pressure, forced labor, beatings, and food deprivation. PRC officials describe the Xinjiang camps as "vocational education and training centers" in which "trainees" study Chinese, take courses on PRC law, learn job skills, and undergo "de-extremization" or are "cured of ideological infection." The government states that the centers "have never made any attempts to have the trainees change their religious beliefs." In July 2019, some Chinese officials claimed that most detainees had "returned to society" and to their families, while in August 2019, other officials stated that the "only 500,000 Uyghurs" were held in 68 camps. Some Uyghurs living abroad, however, claim that they still have not heard from missing relatives in Xinjiang. Some reports indicate that many of those released from re-education centers have been placed under house arrest or in state-run factories, and continue to be held under close political supervision. Hui Muslims The Hui, another Muslim minority group in China who number around 11 million, largely have practiced their faith with less government interference. The Hui are more geographically dispersed and culturally assimilated than the Uyghurs, are generally physically indistinguishable from Hans, and do not speak a non-Chinese language. China's new religious policies have affected the Hui and other Muslims outside of Xinjiang, but less severely than the Uyghurs. Nonetheless, authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region have ordered mosques to be "Sinicized"âminarets have been taken down, onion domes have been replaced by traditional Chinese roofs, and Islamic motifs and Arabic writings have been removed. Officials have cancelled Arabic classes in some mosques and private schools, and calls to prayer have been banned in Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia. In Beijing, authorities have mandated that Arabic signage over Halal food shops be removed. In August 2018, thousands of Hui Muslims gathered in front of a newly-built mosque in Weizhou, Ningxia, in an attempt to block the government's announced demolition of the building due in part to its Middle Eastern architectural style. While the government backed down on its threat to destroy the mosque, PRC anticorruption investigators have begun investigating local Hui officials who they say have "strayed from the party's leadership and political discipline in religious matters." U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China Human Rights and U.S.-China Relations Human rights conditions in the PRC have been a recurring point of friction and source of mutual mistrust in U.S.-China relations, particularly since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1991. China's persistent human rights violations, as well as its authoritarian political system, often have caused U.S. policymakers and/or the American public to view the PRC government with greater suspicion. Chinese officials may in turn view expressed human rights concerns by U.S. policymakers, and the broader U.S. democracy promotion agenda, as tools meant to undermine CCP rule and slow China's rise. Frictions over human rights may affect other issues in the relationship, including those related to economics and security. In engaging China on human rights issues, the United States has often focused on China's inability or unwillingness to respect universal civil and political rights, while China prefers to tout its progress in delivering economic development and well-being, and advancing social rights for its people, including ethnic minorities. U.S. Policy Evolution In the period following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the United States sought to leverage China's desire for "most favored nation" (MFN) trade status by linking its annual renewal to improvements in human rights conditions in China. The Clinton Administration ultimately abandoned this direct linkage, however, in favor of a general policy of engagement with China that it hoped would contribute to improved respect for human rights and greater political freedoms for the Chinese people. President Bill Clinton, in his 1999 State of the Union Address, summed up the long-term aspirations of this approach, stating, "It's important not to isolate China. The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China." In the following more than two decades, U.S. Administrations and Congresses employed broadly similar strategies for promoting human rights in China, combining efforts to deepen trade and other forms of engagement to help create conditions for positive change, on the one hand, with specific human rights promotion efforts, on the other. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama held that U.S. engagement with China and encouraging China to respect international norms, including on human rights, would result in mutual benefits, including China's own success and stability. Policy tools for promoting human rights have included open censure of China; quiet diplomacy, such as closed-door discussions; congressional investigations, hearings, legislation, statements, letters, and visits; funding for human rights and democracy foreign assistance programs in the PRC; congressionally-mandated reports on human rights in China; support for human rights defenders and pro-democracy groups in China, Hong Kong, and the United States; economic sanctions; efforts to promote Internet freedom; support for international broadcasting; and coordination of international pressure, including through multilateral organizations. In addition, some U.S. officials and Members of Congress have regularly met with Chinese dissidents and with the Dalai Lama and exiled Tibetan officials, in both Washington, D.C. and Dharamsala, India, where the headquarters of the Central Tibetan Administration (sometimes referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile) is located. Beijing opposes such meetings as encouraging Tibetan independence and contravening the U.S. policy that Tibet is part of China. Trump Administration Policy In recent years, policy analysts have increasingly debated the effectiveness of aspects of the U.S. engagement strategy with China, including, in light of China's deepening domestic political repression, its results in securing improvements in Beijing's respect for human rights and political freedoms. Under President Trump, U.S. policy documents have declared that China's international integration has not liberalized its political or economic system, and the United States has begun to place less emphasis on engagement. The Trump Administration has referred to China as a "revisionist power," a strategic competitor, or even an adversary, and curtailed some government-to-government cooperation. Some critics of the Administration's China policy argue that U.S. effectiveness and credibility on human rights is strengthened when the United States works with allies and within international organizations to promote human rights and democracy globally and in China, while maintaining openness to engaging China's government and society, where appropriate. A U.S. policy approach that is less concerned with maintaining broad engagement with China may afford greater space and opportunity to push the PRC on human rights concerns. Trump Administration efforts in this area arguably have been uneven to date, with some commentators criticizing the Administration for inconsistency in its commitment to human rights issues as it pursues other priorities with China, particularly on trade. More broadly, the Administration has placed less emphasis on existing multilateral institutions and on multilateral diplomacy in its foreign policy, including with regard to human rights. The forcefulness of the Administration's public rhetoric on PRC human rights issues has differed between the President and some senior Administration officials. Since 2018, some Administration officials have used increasingly sharp language on China's human rights abuses. Vice President Mike Pence's October 2018 speech on the Administration's China policy, which was critical of China across a broad set of policy areas, cited concern over China's "control and repression of its own people" and referenced "an unparalleled surveillance state." At the announcement of the Department of State's 2019 release of its annual report on human rights practices around the world, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that China was in a "league of its own" in the area of human rights violations. In July 2019, Pompeo described the situation in Xinjiang in particular as "one of the worst human rights crises of our time," and "the stain of the century." President Trump generally has not publicly raised the issue of human rights in China and reportedly remains focused largely on trade issues. In July 2019, President Trump met with survivors of religious persecution around the world, including four individuals from China: a Uyghur Muslim, a Tibetan Buddhist, a Christian, and a Falun Gong practitioner. In September 2019 at a United Nations event on religious freedom, the President issued a broad statement calling for an end to religious persecution, but did not mention religious freedom issues in China specifically; his later remarks to the U.N. General Assembly, as they related to China, emphasized trade issues. The Trump Administration has not attempted to restart the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue, which Beijing suspended in 2016. Many other operative elements of U.S. human rights policy toward China, however, reflect continuity with prior administrations; many are statutorily mandated and/or continue to be funded by Congress (as described below). The State Department's most recent "integrated country strategy" for China, released in August 2018, includes an objective to "advocate for and urge China to adhere to the rule of law, respect the individual rights and dignity of all its citizens, and ease restrictions on the free flow of information and ideas to advance civil society." Policy Options and Tools Human Rights and Democracy Foreign Assistance Programs Since 2001, U.S. foreign assistance programs have sought to promote human rights, civil society, democracy, rule of law, and Internet freedom in China. In addition, some programs also have addressed environmental and rule of law issues and focused upon sustainable development, environmental conservation, and preservation of indigenous culture in Tibetan areas of China. U.S.-funded programs do not provide assistance to PRC government entities or directly to Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and are predominantly awarded in the form of grants to U.S.-based NGOs and academic institutions. The State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) has generally administered programs to promote human rights and democracy in China, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has administered the aforementioned programs in Tibet and some additional programs in the areas of the environment and rule of law. DRL programs across China have generally supported rule of law development, civil society, labor rights, religious freedom, government transparency, public participation in government, and Internet freedom. Between 2001 and 2018, the U.S. government provided approximately $241 million for DRL programs in China, $99 million for Tibetan programs, and $72 million for environmental and rule of law efforts in the PRC (see Figure 2 above). Since 2015, Congress has appropriated additional funds for Tibetan communities in India and Nepal ($6 million in FY2019). Since 2018, Congress also has provided $3 million annually to strengthen institutions and governance in the Tibetan exile communities. National Endowment for Democracy Grants Established in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit foundation "dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world." Funded primarily by an annual congressional appropriation, NED has played an active role in promoting human rights and democracy in China since the mid-1980s. A grant-making institution, NEDÂ has supported projects in China carried out by grantees that include its four affiliated organizations; Chinese, Tibetan, and Uyghur human rights and democracy groups and media platforms based in the United States and Hong Kong; and a small number of NGOs based in mainland China. Program areas have included efforts related to prisoners of conscience; rights defenders; freedom of expression; civil society; the rule of law; public interest law; Internet freedom; religious freedom; promoting understanding of Tibetan, Uyghur, and other ethnic concerns in China; government accountability and transparency; political participation; labor rights; public policy analysis and debate; and rural land rights, among others. NED currently describes China as a priority country in Asia in light of the "significant and systemic challenges to democratization" there. NED grants for China (including Tibet and Hong Kong) totaled approximately $7 million in 2017 and $6.5 million in 2018. This support is provided using NED's regular congressional appropriations. International Broadcasting The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM; formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors) utilizes international broadcasting and media activities to "advance the broad foreign policy priorities of the United States, including the universal values of freedom and democracy." It targets resources to areas "most impacted by state-sponsored disinformation" (as well as by violent extremism), and identifies people in China as a key audience. USAGM-supported Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) provide external sources of independent or alternative news and opinion to Chinese audiences. The two media services play small but unique roles in providing U.S.-style broadcasting, journalism, and public debate in China. VOA, which offers mainly U.S. and international news, and RFA, which serves as an uncensored source of domestic Chinese news, often report on important world and local events, including human rights issues. The PRC government regularly jams and blocks VOA and RFA Mandarin, Cantonese, Tibetan, and Uyghur language radio and television broadcasts and Internet sites, while VOA English services generally receive less interference. VOA and RFA have made efforts to enhance their Internet services, develop circumvention or counter-censorship technologies, and provide access to their programs on social media platforms. USAGM increasingly emphasizes digital and social media content in China, arguing that these are "effective channels for information-seeking people to evade government firewalls." The agency describes RFA Uyghur as the "only Uyghur language news outlet for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region," and states that the outlet's social media content is popular among the Uyghur exile community, which shares the content with Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Sanctions China is subject to some U.S. economic sanctions in response to its human rights conditions. The sanctions' effects have been limited, however, and arguably largely symbolic. Many sanctions imposed on China as a response to the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown (including restrictions on foreign aid, military and government exchanges, and export licenses) are no longer in effect. Remaining Tiananmen-related sanctions suspend Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs and restrict export licenses for U.S. Munitions List (USML) items and crime control equipment. The United States also limits its support for international financial institution (IFI) lending to China for human rights reasons. For example, U.S. representatives to IFIs may by law support projects in Tibet only if they do not encourage the migration and settlement of non-Tibetans into Tibet or the transfer of Tibetan-owned properties to non-Tibetans, due in part to the potential for such activities to erode Tibetan culture and identity. Relatedly, China also has been subject to potential nonhumanitarian and nontrade-related foreign assistance restrictions as a result of its State Department designation as a "Tier 3" (worst) country for combating human trafficking in recent years. Sanctions on Individuals The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 ( P.L. 114-328 , Subtitle F, Title XII), authorizes the President to impose both economic sanctions and visa denials or revocations against foreign individuals responsible for "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The Trump Administration has thus far sanctioned one Chinese security official, Gao Yan, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Act. According to the Treasury Department, Gao headed the Public Security Bureau branch in Beijing at which human rights activist Cao Shunli was held and denied medical treatment; Cao died in March 2014. The executive branch may also utilize Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division F of P.L. 116-6 ) or the broad authorities under Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to impose visa sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights abuses. Numerous human rights advocates and Members of Congress have called on the Trump Administration to sanction Chinese government officials responsible for the human rights abuses occurring in Xinjiang; many have argued for Global Magnitsky sanctions against XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, in particular. Press reports suggest the Trump Administration has been considering sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act against Xinjiang officials, but has delayed actions in the midst of the U.S.-China bilateral trade negotiations. In October 2019, the State Department announced visa restrictions against an unspecified number of "Chinese government and Communist Party officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the detention or abuse of Uighurs, Kazakhs, or other members of Muslim minority groups" in Xinjiang, and stated that the officials' family members may also be subject to visa restrictions. Designations and Actions Pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292 ) mandates that the President produce an annual report on the status of religious freedom in countries around the world and identify "countries of particular concern" (CPCs) for "particularly severe violations of religious freedom," and prescribes punitive actions in response to such violations. The law provides a menu of potential sanctions against CPCs, such as foreign assistance restrictions or loan prohibitions, but provides the executive branch with significant discretion in determining which, if any, actions to take. U.S. reports under IRFA have been consistently critical of China's religious freedom conditions, and the U.S. government has designated China as a CPC in each of its annual designation announcements since IRFA's enactment. Consistent with prior administrations, the Trump Administration has to date chosen not to take new actions against the Chinese government pursuant to IRFA and instead referred to existing, ongoing sanctions to satisfy the law's requirements. These existing sanctions relate to the above-mentioned restrictions on exports of crime control and detection equipment adopted following the Tiananmen crackdown. Visa Sanctions Pursuant to the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, P.L. 115-330 ), enacted in December 2018, requires that, absent a waiver by the Secretary of State, no individual determined to be "substantially involved in the formulation or execution of policies related to access for foreigners to Tibetan areas" may receive a visa or be admitted to the United States while PRC policies restricting foreigners' access to Tibetan areas of China remain in place. The State Department is to report to Congress annually for five years following RATA's enactment, identifying the individuals who had visas denied or revoked pursuant to the law, and, "to the extent practicable," provide a broader list of the "substantially involved" individuals. Export Controls On October 7, 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it would add 28 PRC entities to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) "entity list" under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), asserting that the entities "have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR." The entities to be added include eight technology companies, the XUAR Public Security Bureau (PSB) and eighteen subordinate PSBs, and the PSB-affiliated Xinjiang Police College. The action imposes licensing requirements prior to the sale or transfer of U.S. items to these entities. For each entity, the Commerce Department indicated that there would be a presumption of license denial for all items subject to the EAR, with the exception of certain categories to be subject to a case-by-case review. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross stated that adding the entities would "ensure that our technologies, fostered in an environment of individual liberty and free enterprise, are not used to repress defenseless minority populations." Previously, Members of Congress had written to Secretary Ross and other senior Administration officials urging them to expand the entity list "to ensure that U.S. companies are not assisting, directly or indirectly, in creating the vast civilian surveillance or big-data predictive policing systems being used in [Xinjiang]." Some observers believe the decision could result in significant adverse business impacts for some of the Chinese technology companies. Multilateral Diplomacy The United States also has engaged in multilateral diplomacy to advocate for improved human rights conditions in China. For example, in March 2016, the United States joined 11 other countries to deliver a joint statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council criticizing China's human rights record and calling on China to uphold its human rights commitments. The Trump Administration has curtailed U.S. participation in some multilateral human rights organizations, most prominently by announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the UNHRC in June 2018, and arguably has placed less emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. The United States reportedly did not sign a 2018 joint letter by 15 foreign ambassadors in Beijing requesting a meeting with XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to raise concerns over human rights abuses in Xinjiang. On July 8, 2019, 22 nations issued a joint statement to the UNHRC president and the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights calling on China to "refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uighurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang," and to "allow meaningful access to Xinjiang for independent international observers." The statement, which was signed by numerous countries that are not current members of the UNHRC, was not signed by the United States. The Trump Administration has sought some new venues through which to issue multilateral statements on certain PRC human rights issues, particularly on religious freedom. The State Department convened a Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom in July 2018 and July 2019, with participation from foreign delegations and civil society leaders, and each time released a joint statement expressing concern over religious freedom conditions in China. The United States was joined in the 2019 statement by Canada, Kosovo, the Marshall Islands, and the United Kingdom. More broadly, the Administration is also working to establish an "International Religious Freedom Alliance" comprised of governments "dedicated to confronting religious persecution around the world," presumably including in China. Despite its withdrawal from the UNHRC, the United States has also continued to participate in some Council activities in its capacity as a U.N. member state, such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, including China's most recent UPR. During China's review in November 2018, over one dozen countries, including the United States, raised questions and concerns about China's treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities, as well as over freedom of religion in China. The United States made four recommendations, including for China to "abolish all forms of arbitrary detention, including internment camps in Xinjiang, and immediately release the hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of individuals detained in these camps."


I n October 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) officially notified the Congress, under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), of the Trump Administration's plans to enter into formal trade negotiations with the European Union (EU). This action followed a July 2018 U.S.-EU Joint Statement by President Trump and then-European Commission (EC) President Juncker announcing that they would work toward a trade agreement to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, address unfair trading practices, and increase U.S. exports of soybeans and certain other products. Previously, in 2016, U.S.-EU negotiations as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) stalled after 15 rounds under the Obama Administration. The outlook for new U.S.-EU talks remains uncertain. There continues to be disagreement about the scope of the negotiations, particularly the EU's intent to exclude agriculture from the talks on the basis that it "is a sensitivity for the EU side." EU sensitivities stem in part from commercial and cultural practices that are often embodied in EU laws and regulations and vary from those of the United States. For food and agricultural products, such differences include regulatory and administrative differences between the United States and the EU on issues related to food safety and public healthâor Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). Other differences include product naming schemes for some types of food and agricultural products subject to protections involving Geographical Indications (GIs). Addressing food and agricultural issues in the negotiations remains important to U.S. exporters given the sizable and growing U.S. trade deficit with the EU in agricultural products. Renewed trade talks also come amid heightened U.S.-EU trade frictions. In March 2018, President Trump announced 25% steel and 10% aluminum tariffs on most U.S. trading partners, including the EU, after a Section 232 investigation determined that these imports threaten U.S. national security. In response, the EU began applying retaliatory tariffs of 25% on certain U.S. exports to the EU. Additionally, as part of the Boeing-Airbus subsidy dispute, in October 2019 the United States began imposing additional, World Trade Organization (WTO)-sanctioned tariffs on $7.5 billion worth of certain U.S. imports from the EU. This report provides an overview of U.S.-EU trade in agriculture and background information on selected U.S.-EU agricultural trade issues concerning a potential trade liberalization agreement between the United States and the EU. Following a review of U.S.-EU agricultural trade trends, this report describes recent agricultural trade trends and tariff actions affecting certain U.S.-EU traded food and agricultural goods. It then describes potential issues in U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations involving food and agricultural trade. Figure 1 shows a timeline of selected events. Figure 1. Selected Timeline of Events Related to U.S.-EU Agricultural TradeSource: CRS. Actions related to the U.S.-EU Trade Agreement negotiations are shown in red.Note: USTR = U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). WTO = World Trade Organization. EU27 includes the current 27 EU member states, excluding the United Kingdom (UK). EU28 includes the UK. Trade Data and Statistics Following are trade data and statistics for the current 27 EU member states (EU27). Unless otherwise noted, these figures exclude the United Kingdom (UK), which formally exited the EU in January 2020. Moving forward, U.S. trade negotiations with the EU are expected to exclude the UK, which may enter into trade discussions with the United States separately. Trade data presented here are compiled from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) trade statistics for "Agricultural and Related Products." As defined by USDA, this product grouping includes agricultural products (including bulk and intermediate products and also consumer-oriented products) and agricultural-related products (including fish and shellfish products, distilled spirits, forest products, and ethanol and biodiesel blends). Additional information on the various data sources is discussed in the t ext box . The United States and the EU are the world's largest trade and investment partners. While food and agricultural trade between the United States and the EU27 accounts for less than 1% of the value of overall trade in total goods and services ( Figure 2 ), the EU27 remains a leading market for U.S. agricultural exports. It accounted for about 8% of the value of all U.S. exports and ranked as the fifth-largest market for U.S. food and farm exports in 2019âafter Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan. Data depicted in Figure 2 do not reflect trade in fish and seafood, distilled spirits, and bioenergy products. During the past two decades, growth in U.S. agricultural exports to the EU has not kept pace with growth in trade to other U.S. markets. U.S. agricultural imports from the EU27 currently exceed U.S. exports to the EU27. In 2019, U.S. exports of agricultural and related products to the EU27 totaled $12.4 billion, while U.S. imports of agricultural and related products from the EU27 totaled $29.7 billion, resulting in a U.S. trade deficit of approximately $17.3 billion. This reverses the U.S. agricultural trade surpluses with the EU27 during the early 1990s ( Figure 3 ). Leading U.S. agricultural exports to the EU27 were corn and soybeans, tree nuts, distilled spirits, fish products, wine and beer, planting seeds, and processed foods. Leading U.S. imports from the EU27 were wine and spirits, beer, drinking waters, olive oil, cheese, and processed foods. While data shown in the graphic reflect total trade in "Agricultural and Related Products," including agricultural products, fish and shellfish products, distilled spirits, and other agricultural related products, the trade picture may vary by product category (as shown in Table 1 ). Trade data presented here do not include the UK, which is a major importer of U.S. agricultural products. In 2019, U.S. agricultural and related product exports to the UK totaled $2.8 billion, which roughly equaled the value of imports from the UK ( Figure 4 ). U.S.-EU Tariff Retaliation The U.S.-EU trade negotiations come amid heightened U.S.-EU trade frictions. In March 2018, President Trump announced 25% steel and 10% aluminum tariffs on most U.S. trading partners after a Section 232 investigation determined that these imports threaten to impair U.S. national security. The EU was not among the trading partners with whom the Trump Administration negotiated permanent exemptions from tariffs or alternative quota arrangements, and U.S. tariffs on U.S. imports from the EU went into effect in June 2018. The EU views the U.S. national security justification as groundless and the U.S. tariffs to be inconsistent with WTO rules. The EU has challenged the U.S. actions at the WTO. Effective June 2018, the EU began applying retaliatory tariffs of 25% on imports of U.S. whiskies, corn, rice, kidney beans, preserved and mixed vegetables, orange juice, cranberry juice, peanut butter, and tobacco products, along with selected non-agricultural products ( Figure 5 ). This action includes the EU27 countries and the UK (EU28), as U.S. exports to the UK remain subject to the additional tariffs. The value of U.S. agricultural exports to the EU28 targeted by these additional tariffs is estimated to have been approximately $1.2 billion in 2018, or nearly 9% of total U.S. agricultural exports to the EU28 (excluding nonagricultural products) ( Table 2 ). Some analysts estimate that U.S. agricultural exports subject to tariff retaliation in 2018-2019 experienced a 33% decline in the EU28 market. In October 2019, U.S.-EU trade tensions escalated further when the United States imposed additional tariffs on $7.5 billion worth of certain U.S. imports from the EU, or about 1.5% of all U.S. imports from the EU28 in 2018 (including the UK and nonagricultural products). This action, authorized by WTO dispute settlement procedures, followed a USTR investigation initiated in April 2019 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The USTR determined that the EU had denied U.S. rights under WTO agreements. Specifically, USTR concluded that the EU and certain member states (including the UK) had not complied with a WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruling recommending the withdrawal of WTO-inconsistent EU subsidies to Airbus for the manufacture of large civil aircraft. The list of products subject to additional tariffs stemming from the Airbus subsidy dispute targets mainly the EU member states responsible for the illegal subsidies. It includes agricultural products such as spirits and wine, cheese and dairy products, meat products, fish and seafood, fresh and prepared fruit products, coffee, and bakery goods. Agricultural imports account for about 56% of the total value of EU28 products subject to these additional tariffs. As of February 2020, tariff increases are limited to 25% on agricultural products, and they target primarily France, Germany, UK, and Spain ( Figure 6 ). By agricultural product category, whiskies, liqueurs, and wine (mainly from UK and France) account for approximately 38%, and other food and agricultural products (mainly from Spain and France) account for 19% ( Table 3 ). In December 2019, USTR began a review to determine if the list of imports subject to additional tariffs should be revised or tariff rates increased. In February 2020, USTR made some changes to the list of products affected by Section 301 tariffs. In terms of U.S. agricultural imports from the EU, the only change will be the removal of prune juice from the list, which will not be subject to additional 25% tariffs effective March 5, 2020. U.S.-EU trade negotiations could be affected further if the EU retaliates and imposes tariffs on U.S. exports, in response to either these U.S. actions or an upcoming WTO decision in the parallel EU dispute case against the United States. Later this year a WTO arbitrator is expected to authorize the EU to seek remedies in the form of tariffs on U.S. exports to the EU, after the WTO determined in early 2019 that the United States had also failed to abide by WTO subsidies rules in supporting Boeing. Selected U.S.-EU Agricultural Trade Issues In January 2019, USTR announced its negotiating objectives for a U.S.-EU trade agreement, following a public comment period and a hearing involving several leading U.S. agricultural trade associations. These objectives include agricultural policiesâboth market access and non-tariff measures such as tariff rate quotas (TRQ) administration and other regulatory issues. Among regulatory issues, key U.S. objectives include harmonizing regulatory processes and standards to facilitate trade, including SPS standards, and establishing specific commitments for trade in products developed through agricultural biotechnologies. The U.S. objectives also include addressing GIs by protecting generic terms for common use. U.S. agricultural interests generally support including agriculture in a U.S.-EU trade agreement. The stated overarching goal for the U.S. side is addressing the U.S. trade deficit in agricultural products with the European Union. Early on, the EU indicated that it was planning for a more limited negotiation that does not include agricultural products and policies. The EU negotiating mandate, dated April 2019, states that a key EU goal is "a trade agreement limited to the elimination of tariffs for industrial goods only, excluding agricultural products." Several Members of Congress opposed the EU's decision to exclude agricultural policies in its negotiating mandate. A letter to USTR from a bipartisan group of 114 House members states that "an agreement with the EU that does not address trade in agriculture would be, in our eyes, unacceptable." Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley reiterated, "Bipartisan members of the Senate and House â¦ have voiced their objections to a deal without agriculture, making it unlikely that such a deal would pass Congress." Then, in January 2020, public statements by U.S. and EU officials signaled the possibility that the U.S.-EU trade talks might include negotiation on SPS and regulatory barriers to agricultural trade. It is not clear, however, that both sides agree on which specific types of non-tariff trade barriers might actually be part of the U.S.-EU trade talks. As reported in the press, statements by some USDA officials have suggested that selected SPS barriers as well as GIs would need to be addressed by the trade talks. Meanwhile, other press reports indicate that some EU officials have downplayed the extent that certain non-tariff barriersâsuch as biotechnology product permits, approval of certain pathogen rinses for poultry, regulations on pesticides, or food standardsâwould be part of the talks; instead, regulatory barriers might be lowered for certain "non-controversial" foods. The United States continues to push for additional concessions from the EU. More formal discussions are expected in the spring of 2020âin an effort to ease trade tensions regarding the imposition of retaliatory tariffs. The EU has taken certain measures to avoid escalating agricultural trade tensions with the United States. For example, it has expanded the U.S.-specific quota for EU imports of hormone-free beef, increased imports of U.S. soybeans as a source of biofuels, approved a number of long-pending genetically engineered products for food and feed uses, and proposed to lift a ban on certain pest-resistant American grapes in EU wine production, and other trade-related measures. In a separate but indirectly related action, in August 2019, USTR asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to conduct an investigation examining SPS barriers related to pesticide maximum residue levels (MRLs) across all U.S. markets, including Europe. Previously, during T-TIP negotiations, both market access and non-tariff barriers were part of the U.S. negotiating objectives. At that time, non-tariff barriers to agricultural tradeâincluding SPS and TBT measures, and GIsâwere among the agricultural issues actively debated. In addition, regulatory coherence and cooperation was part of USTR's stated objectives. Some of the same issues that proved to be challenging during the T-TIP talks may continue to challenge negotiators. Various studies at the time reported that removing tariff and non-tariff barriers in U.S.-EU trade would result in economic benefits to the U.S. and EU agricultural sectors. Another study by the European Parliament acknowledged that gains from tariff cuts would be limited unless regulatory and administrative barriers were also addressed. Market Access Market access issues are not slated to be discussed in the U.S.-EU trade talks. However, these issues remain important for U.S. agricultural exporters. This is especially true regarding the EU's use of restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on certain agricultural products. TRQs allow imports of fixed quantities of a product at a lower tariff. Once the quota is filled, a higher tariff is applied on additional imports. The EU allocates TRQs to importers using licenses issued by the member states' national authorities. Only companies established in the EU may apply for import licenses. For exports under a U.S.-specific TRQ, a certificate of origin must be supplied. The EU applies TRQs on many types of beef and poultry products, sheep and goat meat, dairy products, cereals, rice, sugar, and fruit and vegetables. Some products are heavily protected by both TRQs and non-tariff SPS measures. Import tariffs for agricultural products into Europe tends to be relatively high compared to tariffs for similar products into the United Sates. The WTO reports that the simple average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff applied to agricultural products entering the United States is about 5%, compared to an average tariff of about 13% for products entering the EU. Including all products imported under an applied tariff or a TRQ, USDA reports that the calculated average rate across all U.S. agricultural imports is roughly 12%, well below the EU's average of 30%. By commodity group, EU tariffs average more than 40% for imported meat products, grains, and grain products and average at or above 20% for most fruit and vegetable products. For some products, EU tariffs are even greater, averaging more than 80% for imported dairy products, more that 50% for sugar cane and sweeteners, and nearly 350% for sugar beets. The EU has concluded preferential trade agreements with more than 35 non-EU countries and continues to negotiate agreements with several others. This preferential access provides U.S. export competitors an advantage over U.S. agricultural exporters, particularly in countries where the United States does not have a preferential agreement in place. Previously, during the T-TIP negotiations, Senate leadership sent a letter to USTR reiterating that a final agreement would need to include "a strong framework for agriculture," including "tariff elimination on all productsâincluding beef, pork, poultry, rice, and fruits and vegetables" and that "liberalization in all sectors of agriculture" was a priority, if the agreement were to obtain the support of Congress. The letter also addressed the importance of "longstanding regulatory barriers," including the EU's import approval process of U.S. biotechnology products and GI protections promoted by the EU. Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade High tariff barriers are further exacerbated by additional non-tariff barriers that may limit U.S. agricultural exports, including SPS measures, and other types of non-tariff barriers. Non -t ariff m easures (NTMs) generally refer to policy measures other than tariffs that may have a negative economic effect on international trade. NTMs include both technical and nontechnical measures. Technical measures include both SPS and TBTs and pre-shipment formalities and related requirements that are intended to govern public health and food safety. Nontechnical measures include quotas, price control measures, rules of origin requirements, and government procurement restrictions. Non-tariff barriers affect agricultural trade in various ways, including delays in reviews of biotech products (creating barriers to U.S. exports of grain and oilseed products), prohibitions on growth hormones in beef production and certain antimicrobial and pathogen reduction treatments (creating barriers to U.S. meat and poultry exports), and burdensome and complex certification requirements (creating barriers to U.S. processed foods, animal products, and dairy products). Extensive EU regulations and difficulty finding up-to-date information are among the primary concerns of U.S. businesses, particularly for makers of processed foods. U.S. businesses report a lack of a science-based focus in establishing SPS measures, difficulty meeting food safety standards and obtaining product certification, differences across countries in food labeling requirements, and stringent testing requirements that are often applied inconsistently across EU member nations. Non-tariff barriers to agricultural tradeâincluding SPS and TBT measures, and GIsâwere among the agricultural issues actively debated in the T-TIP negotiation. Previous negotiations were complicated by longstanding trade disputes between the United States and EU involving food safety and product standards that are often embodied in laws and regulations in the United States and EU, as well as separate requirements that may be in force within individual EU member states. For example, the EU restricts some types of genetically engineered (GE) seed varieties and also prohibits the use of hormones in meat production and certain pathogen reduction treatments in poultry production. As these types of practices are commonplace in the United States, this tends to restrict U.S. agricultural exports to the EU. Other EU regulations and standards involve pesticide residues on foods, drug residues in animal production, and certain animal welfare requirements that may vary from those in the United States. The United States has also opposed the EU's GI protections that govern product labeling on products within the EU and within some countries that have a formal trade agreement with the EU. Such GI protections also tend to restrict U.S. agricultural exports to the EU and to some other countries where such protections have been put in place. As part of a trade negotiation, non-tariff barriers tend to be broadly grouped along with other issues related to regulatory coherence. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce defines regulatory coherence as "good regulatory practices, transparency, and stakeholder engagement in a domestic regulatory process" and regulatory cooperation as "the process of interaction between U.S. and EU regulators, founded on the benefits regulators can achieve through closer partnership and greater regulatory interoperability." Related terminology may refer interchangeably to regulatory convergence, cooperation, and/or harmonization. Trade negotiations involving regulatory and intellectual property rights issues have focused, in part, on the goals of ensuring greater transparency, harmonization, and coherence to improve cooperation and streamline the regulatory approval process among the trading partners. Previous USDA estimates calculated the ad valorem equivalent effects of EU non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, which were estimated to range from 23% to 102% for some more heavily protected products, including meat products, fruits and vegetables, and some crops. In general, SPS and related regulatory issues tend to be addressed in free trade agreements (FTAs) within an agreement's agriculture chapter or chapter on regulatory coherence, while GIs tend to be addressed along with other types of intellectual property rights (IPR) issues, in an FTA's IPR chapter. The following section provides additional background on SPS and TBT measures, as well as GI protections. SPS/TBT Issues SPS measures are laws, regulations, standards, and procedures that governments employ as "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" from the risks associated with the spread of pests, diseases, or disease-carrying and causing organisms, or from additives, toxins, or contaminants in food, beverages, or feedstuffs. Examples include product standards, requirements for products to be produced in disease-free areas, quarantine and inspection procedures, sampling and testing requirements, residue limits for pesticides and drugs in foods, and limits on food additives. TBT measures cover both food and non-food traded products. TBTs in agriculture include SPS measures, but also include other types of measures related to health and quality standards, testing, registration, and certification requirements, as well as packaging and labeling regulations. Both SPS and TBT measures regarding food safety and related public health protection are addressed in various multilateral trade agreements and are regularly notified to and debated within both the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement within the WTO. In general, under the SPS and TBT agreements, WTO members agree to apply such measures, based on scientific evidence and information, only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and health and to not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between WTO members where identical standards prevail. Member countries are also encouraged to observe established and recognized international standards. Improper use of SPS and TBT measures can create substantial barriers to trade when they are disguised protectionist barriers, are not supported by scientific evidence, or are otherwise unwarranted. Bilateral and regional FTAs between the United States and other countries regularly address SPS and TBT matters. Provisions in most U.S. FTAs have generally reaffirmed rights and obligations of both parties under the WTO SPS and TBT agreements. Some FTAs have established standing bilateral committees to enhance understanding of each other's measures and to consult regularly on related matters. Other FTAs have included side letters or agreements for the parties to continue to cooperate on scientific and technical issues, which in some cases may be related to certain specific market access concerns. Most FTAs have not addressed specific non-tariff trade concerns directly. Differences in U.S. and EU Laws and Regulations Regulatory differences between the United States and EU have contributed to trade disputes regarding SPS and TBT rules between the two trading blocs. The United States has several formal WTO trade disputes regarding SPS and TBT measures with the EU. These include concerns regarding the EU's prohibitions on the use of growth-promoting hormones (and ractopamine ) in meat production, the EU's restrictions on chemical treatments ("pathogen reduction treatments" or "PRTs") on U.S. poultry, and the EU's approval process of biotechnology products. Other SPS concerns have involved regulations related to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as mad cow disease) and regulations involving plant processing, chemical residues, endocrine-disrupting chemicals, antibiotics, and animal welfare. There are major differences in how the United States and the EU regulate food safety and related public health protection, including various administrative and technical review differences, which in turn influences how each applies various SPS and TBT measures. Such differences have often been central to SPS and TBT disputes, including those involving the use of hormones in meat production and pathogen reduction treatments in poultry processing. Other disputes invoking the SPS and TBT agreements between the U.S. and EU have included beef and poultry products, eggs, frozen bovine semen, milk products, animal byproducts, seafood, pesticide and animal drug residues, seeds, wheat, wine and spirits, and food packaging requirements. Differences are also evident in how the United States and EU regard biotechnology in agricultural production. In general, EU officials have been cautious in allowing genetically engineered cropsâcommonly referred to in Europe as genetically modified organisms (or GMOs)âto enter the EU market. As such, any GE-derived food and feed must be labeled accordingly. The EU's regulatory framework regarding biotechnology is generally regarded as one of the most stringent systems worldwide. During the T-TIP negotiations, U.S. agricultural and food groups actively called for changes to the EU's approach for approving and labeling biotechnology products. The EU has reported concerns about perceived U.S. SPS barriers to EU exports of sheep and goat meat, egg products, beef, certain dairy products, live bivalve mollusks, apples, and pears, along with difficulties protecting its own GIs on certain food and drinks. Other EU concerns have involved the use of "Buy American" restrictions in the United States governing public procurement. During the T-TIP negotiations, some expressed concern that including "Buy American" provisions could affect local food procurement, including restricting bidding contract preferences contained in U.S. and EU farm-to-school programs. The EU's application of the so-called precautionary principle remains central to the EU's risk management policy regarding food safety and animal and plant health and is often cited as the rationale behind the EU's more risk-averse approach. The precautionary principle was reportedly referenced as part of the 1992 Treaty on European Union that further integrated the EU, and its use was further outlined in a 2000 communication and then formally established in EU food legislation in 2002 (Regulation EC No 178/2002). The EU's 2000 communication further outlines guidelines for implementation, the basis for invoking the principle, and the general standards of application. Regarding international trade, under EU law, the precautionary principle provides for "rapid response" to address "possible danger to human, animal, or plant health, or to protect the environment" and can be used to "stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of products likely to be hazardous." Although the principle may not be used as a pretext for protectionist measures, many countries have challenged some EU actions that invoke the precautionary principle as "protectionist." The EU, however, continues to invoke the precautionary principle to justify its policies regarding various regulatory issues and generally rejects arguments, on the grounds of risk management, that the lack of clear evidence of harm is not evidence of the absence of harm. No universally agreed-upon definition of the precautionary principle exists, and many differently worded or conflicting definitions can be found in international law. However, within the context of the WTO and the SPS agreement, the precautionary principle (or precautionary approach) allows a country to set higher standards and methods of inspecting products. It also allows countries to take "protective action"âincluding restricting trade of products or processesâif they believe that scientific evidence is inconclusive regarding their potential impacts on human health and the environment (provided the action is consistent and not arbitrary). The WTO has generally acknowledged that the need to take precautionary actions in the face of scientific uncertainty has long been widely accepted, particularly in the fields of food safety and plant and animal health protection. Examples might include a sudden outbreak of an animal disease that is suspected of being linked to imports, which may require a country to impose certain trade restrictions while the outbreak is assessed. Application of the precautionary principle by some countries remains an ongoing source of contention in international trade, particularly for the United States, and is often cited as a reason why some countries may restrict imports of some food products and processes. Addressing SPS and TBT Measures in FTA Negotiations In the lead up to the previous T-TIP and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, there were active efforts to "go beyond" the rules, rights, and obligations in the WTO SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement, as well as commitments in existing U.S. FTAs. These efforts were referred to as "WTO-Plus" rules or, alternatively, as "SPS-Plus" and "TBT-Plus" rules. Related efforts called for improvements in regulatory cooperation and coherence, along with enhanced partnerships and interactions among regulators in each country. Modernizing the rules governing the application of SPS and TBT measures in U.S.-EU trade by incorporating "SPS-Plus" and "TBT-Plus" rules as part of a trade agreement could represent a positive step for U.S. food and agricultural exporters. Changes regarding SPS and TBT measures agreed to in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement incorporated policy changes regarding SPS and TBT measures consistent with previous "SPS-Plus" and "TBT-Plus" efforts. According to USITC, USMCA "goes further in requiring transparency and encouraging harmonization or equivalence of SPS measures" and incorporates all of the proposed enhanced TPP disciplines "in the areas of equivalence, science and risk analysis, transparency, and cooperative technical consultations." Some industry representatives claim that USMCA "goes beyond TPP in establishing deadlines for 'import checks,' by requiring importing parties to inform exporters or importers within five days of shipments being denied entry." Both agreements contain language that directly relates to the use of biotechnology. Alternative efforts to modify the EU's application of the precautionary principle could present more of a challenge for U.S. agricultural producers and exporters. Previously, during the T-TIP negotiations, some in the U.S. agriculture and food industry urged U.S. negotiators to address the EU's use and application of the precautionary principle. Many U.S. agricultural and food organizations contended that the EU's application of the precautionary principle undermines sound science and innovation and results in "unjustifiable restrictions" on U.S. exports, allowing the EU "to put in place restrictions on products or processes when they believe that scientific evidence on their potential impact on human health or the environment is inconclusive." Some asserted that application of the principle results in a bias against new technologies, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. As a result, these groups said that "science-based decision making and not the precautionary principle must be the defining principle in setting up mechanisms and systems" to address SPS concerns. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported a "science-based approach to risk management, where risk is assessed based on scientifically sound and technically rigorous standards" and opposed "the domestic and international adoption of the precautionary principle as a basis for regulatory decision making." Many in Congress also called for "effective rules and enforceable rules to strengthen the role of science" to resolve international trade differences. More recently, the EU's SPS were among the issues that raised the most concerns during a WTO review of the EU's trade policies. Among the cited concerns were certain SPS measures that were viewed to be not based on science or on international standards, and that were also deemed to not allow for adequate opportunity to take into account for the views of third countries. Efforts to Resolve SPS and TBT Measures Outside FTA Negotiations Outside of the FTA negotiation process, various U.S. federal agencies regularly address trade concerns involving SPS and TBT measures as part of their day-to-day oversight and regulatory responsibilities. For example, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administers various regulatory and control programs pertaining to animal and plant health and quarantine, humane treatment of animals, and the control and eradication of pests and diseases. APHIS also oversees SPS certification requirements for imported and exported agricultural goods. This work is ongoing. The United States also maintains ongoing interagency processes and mechanisms to identify, review, analyze, and address foreign government standards-related measures that may be barriers to trade. These activities are coordinated through the USTR-led Trade Policy Staff Committee, which is composed of representatives from several federal agencies, including USDA, the Department of Commerce, and the State Department. USTR also chairs an interagency group (i.e., both USDA and non-USDA agencies with SPS and TBT responsibilities) that reviews SPS and TBT measures that are notified to the WTO, as required under the SPS and TBT agreements. These agency officials also work with their international counterparts on concerns involving SPS and TBT measures. USTR tracks issues related to such measures as part of its annual reports. Geographical Indications GIs are geographical names that act to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product originating in a certain region. The term GI is most often applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. GIs allow some food producers to differentiate their products in the marketplace. GIs may also be eligible for relief from acts of infringement or unfair competition. While GIs may protect consumers from deceptive or misleading labels, they can also impair trade when names that are considered common or generic in one market are protected in another. Examples of registered or established GIs include Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma ham from the Parma region of Italy, Toscano olive oil from the Tuscany region of Italy, Roquefort cheese from France, Champagne from the region of the same name in France, Irish whiskey, Darjeeling tea, Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, and Napa Valley wines. GIs are an example of IPR, along with patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The use of GIs has become a contentious international trade issue, particularly for U.S. wine, cheese, and sausage makers. In general, some consider GIs to be protected intellectual property, while others consider them to be generic or semi-generic terms. GIs are included among other IPR issues in the current U.S. trade agenda. GIs were an active area of debate during the T-TIP negotiations. Laws and regulations governing GIs differ markedly between the United States and EU, which further complicates this issue. GIs are protected by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which sets binding minimum standards for intellectual property protection that are enforceable by the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. Under TRIPS, WTO members must recognize and protect GIs as intellectual property. Both the United States and the EU are signatories of TRIPS and therefore subject to its rights and obligations. Accordingly, under TRIPS, the United States and EU have committed to providing a minimum standard of protection for GIs (i.e., protecting GI products to avoid misleading the public and prevent unfair competition) and an "enhanced level of protection" to wines and spirits that carry a GI, subject to certain exceptions. TRIPS builds on treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, a specialized agency in the United Nations with the mission to "lead the development of a balanced and effective international intellectual property (IP) system." It also oversees the "International Register of Appellations of Origin" established in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration. The agreement's multilateral register covers food products and beverages and related products, as well as non-food products. The EU's GI program remains a contentious issue for some U.S. producer groups, particularly among wine, cheese, and sausage makers. Some have long expressed their concerns about EU protections for GIs, which they claim are being misused to create market and trade barriers. Much of this debate involves certain terms used by cheesemakers, such as parmesan, asiago, and feta cheese, which the U.S. cheese sectors consider to be generic terms. For example, feta cheese produced in the United States may not be exported for sale in the EU, since only feta produced in countries or regions currently holding GI registrations may be sold commercially. A 2019 study commissioned by the U.S. dairy industry forecasts declining U.S. cheese exports due to expanding restrictions on parmesan, asiago, and feta cheese. Another study concluded that up to $15 million in cheese trade might need to be relabeled due to the restriction on certain GI terms, while other traded foods, such as oilseeds and vinegars, would experience little impact. Some U.S. industry groups, however, are trying to institute protections for U.S. productsâsimilar to those in the EU GI systemâto promote certain distinctive American agricultural products. The American Origin Products Association represents certain U.S. potato, maple syrup, ginseng, coffee, and chile pepper producers and certain U.S. winemakers, among other regional producer groups. It seeks to work with federal authorities to create "a list of qualified U.S. distinctive product names, which correspond to the GI definition." Differences in U.S. and EU Laws and Regulations Laws and regulations governing GIs differ markedly between the United States and EU. In the United States, GIs generally fall under the common law right of possession or "first in time, first in right" as trademarks or collective or certification marks under the purview of the existing trademark regime, administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and protected under the U.S. Trademark Act. Trademarks are distinctive signs that companies use to identify themselves and their products or services to consumers and can take the form of a name, word, phrase, logo, symbol, design, image, or a combination of these elements. Trademarks do not refer to generic terms, nor do they refer exclusively to geographical terms. Trademarks may refer to geographical names to indicate the specific qualities of goods either as certification marks or as collective marks. PTO does not have a special database register for GIs in the United States. PTO's trademark register, the U.S. Trademark Electronic Search System, contains GIs registered as trademarks, certification marks, and collective marks. USTR says that EU farm products hold nearly 12,000 trademarks. These register entries are not designated with any special field (such as "geographical indications") and cannot be readily compiled into a complete list of registered GIs. In the United States, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) also plays a role overseeing the labeling of wine, malt beverages, beer, and distilled spirits. In the EU, a series of regulations governing GIs was initiated in the early 1990s covering agricultural and food products, wine, and spirits. Legislation adopted in 1992 covering agricultural products (not including wines and spirits) was replaced by changes enacted in 2006 following a WTO panel ruling that found some aspects of the EU's scheme inconsistent with WTO rules. The new rules came into force in January 2013. The EU laws and regulations provide product registration markers for the different quality schemes. The EU regulations establish provisions regarding products from a defined geographical area given linkages between the characteristics of products and their geographical origin. The EU defines a GI as "a distinctive sign used to identify a product as originating in the territory of a particular country, region or locality where its quality, reputation or other characteristic is linked to its geographical origin." EU registered products often fall under GI protections in certain third-country markets, and some EU GIs have been trademarked in some non-EU countries. This has become a concern for U.S. agricultural exporters following a series of trade agreements the EU has concluded with Canada, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, and other countries that in many cases are also trading partners of the United States. For example, Canada has agreed to recognize a list of 143 EU GIs in Canada, and Japan has agreed to recognize more than 200 EU GIs in Japan. These GI protections could limit U.S. sales of certain products to these countries. The EU is in the process of negotiating FTAs with several other U.S. trading partners, including Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, and the Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Each of these efforts includes a selected list of GIs that would become protected under an FTA between these countries and the European Union. In December 2019, the EU also entered into an agreement with China regarding GIs that would protect a reported 100 EU GIs in China. As of January 2020, 3,316 product names are registered and protected in the EU for foods, wine, and spirits originating in both EU member states and other countries. Addressing GI Barriers in FTA Negotiations GIs continue to be actively debated as part of the official U.S. trade agenda, involving concerns about their possible improper use as well as the lack of transparency and due process under some country GI systems. USTR is working "to advance U.S. market access interests in foreign markets and to ensure that GI-related trade initiatives of the EU, its Member States, like-minded countries, and international organizations, do not undercut such market access," and states that the EU's GI agenda "significantly undermines the scope of trademarks and other [IPR] held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market access for American-made goods that rely on the use of common names." Statements by USDA officials in early 2020 have signaled that this issue could resurface as part of the U.S.-EU trade talks. Previously, during T-TIP negotiations, U.S. officials indicated that the United States would likely not agree to EU demands to reserve certain food names for EU producers and have expressed concerns about the EU's system of protections for GIs. At the time, U.S. trade policy objectives regarding the EU's GI protections was to ensure that they "do not undercut U.S. industries' market access" and to defend the use of certain "common food names." In general, the United States is seeking protection for current U.S. owners of trademarks that overlap with EU-protected GIs, the ability to use U.S. trademarked names in third countries, and the ability to use U.S. trademarked names in the EU. In recent developments, according to USITC, USMCA "increases the transparency of applications, approvals, and cancellations" regarding GIs and "provides guidelines for determining whether a term is customary in common use." In addition, a side letter between the United States and Mexico commits Mexico to not restrict market access for a list of more than 30 cheeses. USITC says this could "help prevent future losses of U.S. market access for cheeses with common names" such as "blue" or "Swiss" cheese. The final U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement also addresses longstanding concerns regarding IPR, including GIs, building on previous commitments regarding IPR and GIs. The agreement is expected to require that China ensure that it will "not undermine market access for U.S. exports to China of goods" and will apply relevant factors when providing certain GI protections, as well as provide the United States with "necessary opportunities to raise disagreement" regarding GIs. GI provisions in these two recent U.S. FTAs, however, could prove to be incompatible with other EU agreements regarding GIs with these countries. For Mexico and Canada, these include GI protections that are likely to be part of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, as well as existing GI protections in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. For China, these include GI protections agreed to in the 2019 EU-China agreement protecting certain EU GIs in China. Next Steps The U.S.-EU Trade Agreement negotiations present Congress with the challenge of determining to what extent food and agriculture issues will be addressed in the trade talks, if at all. Although market access and tariff reductions may be off the table, addressing regulatory restrictions and other non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural trade are considered important for many U.S. producers. Some press reports indicate that certain non-tariff barriers and regulatory cooperation could become part of the new trade talks, while other press reports raise questions about the EU's willingness to address specific types of non-tariff barriers as part of the negotiation. Even if regulatory coherence and cooperation become part of the U.S.-EU trade talks, their resolution in a manner that benefits U.S. agricultural exporters is far from assured. Instead, some of the same non-tariff and regulatory barriers to U.S. trade that proved to be challenging during the T-TIP negotiation could prove to be equally intractable today. The UK's exit from the EU could also complicate future trade negotiations. The UK is a close ally of the United States and has been one of its strongest advocates among the EU bloc. In general, the regulatory framework and actions taken by the UK's Food Standards Agency are more aligned with those in the United States. Now that the UK is no longer part of the EU, the EU trade gains for U.S. agriculture could be reduced while its agricultural trade deficit may become more pronounced, given a more favorable trade situation with the UK.