Background The Agricultural Census and Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers USDA conducts the Census of Agriculture every 5 years, most recently in 2012 and 2017. The census provides a detailed picture of farms and the people who operate them. The census identifies several categories of farmers, including the following: Producers. Producers are individuals involved in farm decision- making. A single farm may have more than one producer. Primary producers. The primary producer is the individual on a farm who is responsible for the most decisions. Each farm has only one primary producer. The 2017 Census questionnaire substantially revised the way it collected certain data in order to better capture the contributions of all persons involved in farm decision-making. For example, the 2017 questionnaire asked for the names and demographic information of up to four producers per farm (compared to three in 2012) and used a series of questions on specific types of farm decisions to determine the primary producer (the 2012 questionnaire did not include these questions). Therefore, comparisons between the two censuses regarding the number and personal characteristics of producers and primary producers should be considered with the 2017 revisions in mind. While some changes may be the result of actual changes in the population of farmers and ranchers, other changes may be the result of changes in census methodology. USDA’s 2017 Census counted about 3.4 million producers across the roughly 2 million farms nationwide, compared to 3.2 million in 2012. This represents an approximately 7 percent increase over 2012 in the number of reported producers, despite a slight drop in the number of farms reported. Many of these additional producers were SDFRs. In 2017, SDFRs accounted for 41 percent (1,390,449) of all producers, compared to 36 percent (1,133,163) in 2012. The number of reported SDFR primary producers also grew between 2012 and 2017. Among SDFR subgroups, women accounted for the largest increase in producers and primary producers. In the 2017 Census, women also made up the largest group of SDFR producers and primary producers (see table 1). Women accounted for 88.3 percent of all SDFR producers and 81.0 percent of SDFR primary producers. Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish-origin producers were the next largest group, accounting for 8.1 percent of all SDFR producers and 11.0 percent of SDFR primary producers. On average, farms for which an SDFR was the primary producer (SDFR farms) were smaller and brought in less revenue than non-SDFR farms in 2017. While representing 30 percent of all farms, SDFR farms operated 21 percent of total farm land and accounted for 13 percent of the market value of agricultural products sold in 2017 (see table 2). About 55 percent of SDFR farms had fewer than 50 acres, and 88 percent had less than $50,000 in total sales and government payments. Additionally, a lower proportion of SDFR-operated farms (21 percent) received government payments compared to non-SDFR farms (36 percent). Types and Sources of Agricultural Credit Agricultural producers generally require financing to acquire, maintain, or expand their farms, ranches, or agribusinesses. Agricultural loans generally fall into two categories: Farm ownership loans. These loans are used to acquire, construct, and develop land and buildings and have terms longer than 10 years. They are secured by real estate and are sometimes referred to as real estate loans. Farm operating loans. These loans are generally short-term or intermediate-term loans that finance costs associated with operating a farm. Short-term loans are used for operating expenses and match the length and anticipated production value of the operating or production cycle. Intermediate-term loans are typically used to finance depreciable assets such as equipment and usually range from 18 months to 10 years. These loans may also be referred to as non- real-estate loans. Several types of lenders provide credit to agricultural producers, including, but not limited to, the following: Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit System is a government- sponsored enterprise, established, in part, to provide sound, adequate, and constructive credit to American farmers and ranchers. The Farm Credit System includes a national network of 73 banks and associations. The Farm Credit System lends money to eligible agricultural producers primarily through its 69 lending associations, which are funded by its four banks. All are cooperatives, meaning that Farm Credit System borrowers have ownership and control over the organizations. The Farm Credit System is regulated by the Farm Credit Administration, an independent federal agency. The Farm Credit System’s statutory objectives include being responsive to the needs of all types of creditworthy agricultural producers having a basis for credit, with additional requirements to serve young, beginning, and small farmers and ranchers. According to the Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Credit System is not statutorily mandated to focus on providing financial opportunities to any other group. Commercial banks. Commercial banks are regulated by the federal depository institution regulators. They vary in size and the type of credit they provide. In a January 2013 report, we found that large banks were more likely to engage in transactional banking, which focuses on highly standardized products that require little human input to manage and are underwritten using statistical information. We also found that small banks were more likely to consider not only data models but information acquired by working with the customer over time. Additionally, we found that by using this banking model, small banks may be able to extend credit to customers who might not receive a loan from a larger bank. The American Bankers Association reported that in 2017, the majority of farm banks—those that made more agricultural loans than the industry average—were small institutions with a median asset size of $125 million. USDA Farm Service Agency. USDA’s Farm Service Agency makes direct loans to farmers and ranchers and guarantees loans made by commercial lenders and Farm Credit System associations. The Farm Service Agency is a lender that focuses on assistance to beginning and underserved farmers and ranchers who are unable to obtain credit elsewhere. For its guaranteed loans, the agency typically guarantees 90 percent of losses the lender might incur in the event that a borrower defaults, although the agency may guarantee up to 95 percent for qualifying loans to certain groups, including SDFRs. Guaranteed loan terms and interest rates are set by the lender, though USDA has established maximum rates and terms. Agricultural loans guaranteed by the Farm Service Agency generally account for about 4–5 percent of outstanding loans made by the Farm Credit System and commercial banks and credit unions. Other lenders. A variety of other businesses and individuals provide agricultural credit to farmers and ranchers, including credit unions, life insurance companies, farm implement dealers, and family members. According to the National Credit Union Administration, agricultural lending represents a small portion (less than several basis points) of credit union lending. Historically, life insurance companies have used agricultural real estate mortgages as part of their investment portfolios. Farm implement dealers sell machinery, parts, and services and offer financing for those products. According to USDA survey data, implement dealers currently provide almost one-third of the agricultural sector’s farm operating debt with terms longer than 1 year and are an increasing source of agricultural credit. According to USDA’s Economic Research Service, in 2017, the Farm Credit System and commercial banks accounted for the bulk of agricultural lending in the United States, comprising about 80 percent of the total outstanding farm debt. The remaining debt was USDA Farm Service Agency direct loans and loans made by other lenders. Information Is Limited, but Survey Data Provide Some Insights into Credit to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Regulatory Data Collection Restrictions Limit What Is Known about Agricultural Credit to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Information on the types and amount of agricultural credit to SDFRs is limited. Regulation B, which implements the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), generally prohibits lenders from collecting data on the personal characteristics (such as sex, race, and national origin) of applicants for loans other than certain mortgages. Therefore, financial institutions and their regulators generally do not have information on the types or amount of agricultural lending to SDFRs. In contrast, USDA collects and maintains personal characteristic data on applicants for the farm loans it makes or guarantees in order to target loans to traditionally underserved populations and fulfill statutorily mandated reporting requirements. The lack of personal characteristic data on a large portion of agricultural loan applications limits the ability of regulators, researchers, and stakeholders to assess potential risks for discrimination. In a July 2009 report, we found that federal enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators faced challenges in consistently, efficiently, and effectively overseeing and enforcing fair lending laws due in part to data limitations. Additionally, we found that such data would enhance transparency by helping researchers and others better assess the potential risk for discrimination. For our current review, some federal depository institution regulators we spoke with said that additional data on nonmortgage lending would allow them to perform additional assessments of financial institutions’ compliance with fair lending laws. Some SDFR advocates we spoke with also expressed concern about the lack of accurate public information on lending to SDFRs, which they said forces them to rely on anecdotal evidence in attempts to monitor potential discrimination. A rulemaking pursuant to Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) would modify the Regulation B prohibition for certain loans, including possibly some agricultural loans. Section 1071 amended ECOA, requiring financial institutions to report information on credit applications made by women- owned, minority-owned, and small businesses. However, in April 2011, CFPB issued a letter stating that the requirements under Section 1071 do not go into effect until CFPB issues implementing regulations. The purpose of Section 1071 is “to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws and enable communities, governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community development needs and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses.” Section 1071 is consistent with our 2009 report on fair lending issues, which said Congress should consider requiring additional data collection and reporting for nonmortgage loans. Section 1071 did not specify a time frame for CFPB to complete its rulemaking. As of June 2019, CFPB had not yet completed a rulemaking implementing Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act. In 2017, CFPB issued a request for information seeking public comment on topics related to the collection of data on small business lending. However, in November 2018, CFPB announced that it was delaying the rulemaking due to resource constraints and other priorities. CFPB reported in the Spring 2019 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions that it plans to resume pre-rulemaking activities later in 2019. Survey Data Have Limitations but Provide Information on the Farm Debt and Credit Providers of Socially Disadvantaged Groups USDA’s annual survey of farm producers, the Agricultural Resource Management Survey, provides some insights into agricultural lending to SDFRs but has limitations when used for this purpose. The limitations fall into two main categories, as follows: First, the sample size used in the survey does not allow for capturing potential differences in the credit needs and challenges of specific socially disadvantaged subgroups. The relatively small proportion of SDFRs in the survey’s sample population renders estimates of SDFR farm debt less precise. To increase the precision of its estimates, USDA averaged 3 years of survey data (2015–2017) to increase the sample size of SDFRs available for analysis. Due to the small size of several SDFR subgroups, we analyzed SDFRs as a single combined group. Second, the survey may underrepresent the total outstanding farm debt of socially disadvantaged groups and should be interpreted with caution, according to USDA officials. As previously discussed, the 2017 Census questionnaire included revisions that better captured the role of SDFRs in farm operations, and its results suggest that the 2012 Census and the 2015–2017 surveys (which used similar methodologies) may have underreported the number of SDFRs designated as primary producers, particularly women. Specifically, in the 2015–2017 surveys, SDFRs represented 17 percent of primary producers, whereas in the 2017 Census, SDFRs accounted for 30 percent of primary producers. However, the potential underrepresentation issue should not affect the statistical significance of comparisons between the SDFR and non-SDFR subgroups within the survey. With these caveats in mind, the 2015–2017 survey data suggest that SDFR primary producers had annual average outstanding farm debt of $20.0 billion ($17.5–$22.6 billion at the 90 percent confidence level). This estimate represents debt used specifically for farm purposes. Farm ownership debt was a larger share of SDFR outstanding farm debt than it was for all other farmers and ranchers. Among SDFR primary producers, farm ownership debt was estimated to account for 67 percent of outstanding farm debt, compared to an estimated 59 percent for non-SDFR primary producers (see fig. 1). Farm operating debt accounted for the remaining 33 percent and 41 percent of outstanding SDFR and non-SDFR farm debt, respectively. SDFRs received proportionately fewer loans and less agricultural credit overall than non-SDFRs. Specifically, SDFRs accounted for an estimated 17 percent of primary producers in the survey but only 13 percent of farms with loans and 8 percent of total outstanding farm debt. SDFR debt represented an estimated 9 percent of total farm ownership debt and 7 percent of total farm operating debt (see table 3). Therefore, even though farm ownership debt comprised most outstanding SDFR farm debt (67 percent), SDFR primary producers were still less likely to have outstanding farm ownership debt than all other farmers and ranchers. While the survey data show that SDFRs had proportionately less agricultural credit than non-SDFRs, the survey does not provide information on the reasons why. However, a number of factors may help explain these differences. For example, the 2017 Census shows that SDFRs are more likely than non-SDFRs to operate smaller farms with less market value, and smaller farms may require less credit to operate. In addition, as discussed later in this report, SDFRs may have greater difficulty qualifying for agricultural loans or may be dissuaded from applying for credit. SDFR primary producers generally borrowed from the same type of lenders as non-SDFRs and reported using a range of agricultural credit providers. The distribution of SDFR and non-SDFR farm debt by lender type in the survey was roughly similar, with all differences within the margin of error (at the 90 percent confidence level). According to the survey data, an estimated 51 percent of SDFRs’ outstanding farm debt was lent by commercial banks and savings associations. Lending by Farm Credit System institutions (28 percent), USDA’s Farm Service Agency (6 percent), and other lenders, such as individuals and equipment dealers (15 percent), comprised the remainder. SDFRs received a larger share of their operating credit, compared to ownership credit, from lenders in the “other” category. This was true for non-SDFR operating debt as well. These results should be interpreted cautiously because the information is self-reported and respondents may not have known the specific types of lenders they used. The survey results for all farms appear to overrepresent debt from commercial banks and savings associations when compared with data collected by USDA’s Economic Research Service on farm-sector balance sheets. It is possible some respondents mischaracterized some debt from Farm Credit System institutions as debt from commercial banks. About 11 Percent of Lending Guaranteed by the Farm Service Agency Went to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers While loans guaranteed by USDA’s Farm Service Agency make up a small percentage of overall agricultural lending, the agency tracks how much of this lending goes to SDFRs and the purpose of the loans (ownership or operating). In fiscal year 2018, the Farm Service Agency guaranteed $3.2 billion in new agricultural loans. About $340 million (10.8 percent) of this amount went to SDFRs (see fig. 2). By dollar volume, farm ownership loans accounted for about 71 percent of the guaranteed loans to SDFRs. Farm operating loans accounted for the remaining 29 percent. Guaranteed farm ownership loans to SDFRs averaged about $519,000, while farm operating loans averaged about $279,000. A 1988 amendment to the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act states that USDA should establish annual target participation rates for SDFRs on a county-wide basis for farm ownership loans and, to the greatest extent practicable, reserve funds for certain loans it makes or insures under these targets. However, in August 2007, USDA’s Office of General Counsel provided a legal opinion that stated that the statute could be read to apply only to the direct loan program. As a result, officials at the Farm Service Agency told us it does not set annual target participation rates by county or reserve funds for guaranteed loans. Over the last 5 fiscal years (2014–2018), the Farm Service Agency guaranteed an increasing number of loans to SDFRs each year. The agency guaranteed 489 loans to SDFRs in fiscal year 2014 and 817 loans in fiscal year 2018—a 5-year high. Over that period, the total dollar amount of guaranteed loans to SDFRs increased by 69.6 percent when adjusted for inflation. The increase was similar for farm ownership and farm operating loans (see fig. 3). While the total dollar amount of guaranteed loans to SDFRs increased each year, the percentage of guaranteed loans that went to SDFRs, by dollar volume, decreased from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 (see fig. 4). This percentage started increasing in fiscal year 2017, when SDFRs accounted for 8.7 percent of guaranteed loans by dollar volume. However, guaranteed loans to SDFRs still accounted for a slightly smaller portion of all guaranteed loans in fiscal year 2018 (10.8 percent) than in fiscal year 2014 (11.0 percent). In fiscal year 2018, the dollar amount and percentage of guaranteed loan funds that went to SDFRs differed substantially by state (see table 4). Hawaii and Puerto Rico were the only two states or territories where SDFRs received more than one-half of all guaranteed loans (farm ownership and operating loans combined). However, Hawaii and Puerto Rico received 0.1 percent of all guaranteed loans. For several states where SDFRs received a large dollar amount of guaranteed loans, these loans represented less than 20 percent of the state’s guaranteed loan funds (for example, Arkansas, Missouri, and South Dakota). In contrast, several states with the largest proportions of guaranteed loans to SDFRs had less guaranteed loan funds overall (for example, Florida, Wyoming, and Maryland). The Farm Service Agency did not guarantee any loans to SDFRs in Alaska, Connecticut, New Hampshire, or Rhode Island in fiscal year 2018. Stakeholders Identified Multiple Challenges That Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Face in Obtaining Private Agricultural Credit Smaller Operations, Weaker Credit Histories, and Land Ownership Issues Reportedly Present Hurdles to Obtaining Agricultural Credit According to representatives from some SDFR advocacy groups, federal depository institution regulators, and lending industry associations we interviewed, SDFRs can have difficulty obtaining agricultural credit from private-sector lenders because they operate smaller farms and in some cases do not meet standards for farm revenue, applicant credit history, and collateral. Farm size. As previously discussed, SDFRs are more likely than other farmers and ranchers to operate small farms, which can make it difficult for them to qualify for private credit. According to data from the 2017 Census of Agriculture, SDFRs represented 30 percent of primary producers but operated 39 percent of farms smaller than 50 acres and 16 percent of farms 500 acres or larger. Some SDFR advocates and lending industry association representatives we interviewed said lenders have several incentives to lend to larger farms. First, one advocate noted that operators of smaller farms typically need smaller loans, and making many small loans is more time- and resource-intensive than making fewer, larger loans. Second, one industry association and one SDFR advocate noted that large farms often produce major commodities such as corn, soybeans, and beef cattle, while small farms often produce specialty crops. The SDFR advocate said underwriting loans to large farms that produce major commodities is easier and less risky because more data are available on the market for those products. Third, representatives of one SDFR advocacy group and one industry association noted that programs such as crop insurance are geared toward large, major-commodity farmers. They said these programs mitigate repayment risk and make lenders more likely to approve a loan or provide more favorable terms, such as lower interest rates. In contrast, representatives from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency noted that the Community Reinvestment Act can provide incentives for banks to lend to smaller farms. Farm revenue. Consistent with their smaller size, SDFR farms also generate less revenue on average than non-SDFR farms. As previously noted, SDFR primary producers accounted for a disproportionally small portion (13 percent) of total agricultural product sales in 2017 relative to their overall representation among primary producers (30 percent). Additionally, according to one SDFR advocate, SDFRs may have more difficulty than other farmers and ranchers in documenting their revenue because they are more likely to sell their products through informal cash transactions. Operating a lower-revenue farm and having limited documentation of revenue can be hurdles to obtaining private credit because these factors may negatively affect a lender’s assessment of the applicant’s repayment ability. Federal depository institution regulators have noted that farm revenue is critical to demonstrating a borrower’s capacity to repay an agricultural loan. For example, in its risk management expectations for agricultural credit, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System says banks should review borrower-prepared cash-flow statements to identify potential repayment-ability problems. Lenders consider farm revenue when calculating an applicant’s debt-to-income ratio (the percentage of income that goes to recurring debt payments), which is a central underwriting criterion. In general, having lower income relative to recurring debt payments indicates weaker repayment ability. Consistent with this principle, Farm Credit Administration regulations require Farm Credit System associations to have written policies and procedures that include underwriting standards that demonstrate an applicant’s repayment capacity when approving a loan. Additionally, representatives of one industry lending association said that revenue is the most important factor that banks consider in underwriting agricultural loans. Credit history. Some SDFRs may have relatively low credit scores or limited credit histories, which can make it difficult to obtain agricultural credit. Some SDFR advocates and lending industry association representatives we interviewed said that some SDFR subgroups are more likely than members of nondisadvantaged groups to have difficulty meeting credit score standards for agricultural loans. Prior research provides some evidence to support this view. For example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System reported in 2007 that African Americans and Hispanics had lower credit scores on average than non- Hispanic whites and Asians, although the study did not specifically examine farmers and ranchers. While private agricultural lenders are not subject to federal statutory or regulatory credit score requirements for approving agricultural loans, federal depository institution regulators emphasize the importance of evaluating applicants’ creditworthiness in their lending guidelines. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s handbook on agricultural lending states that current credit information is essential to a bank’s ability to evaluate borrowers’ creditworthiness. Lending industry association representatives we interviewed also noted that underwriting for agricultural lending is increasingly standardized and reliant on credit scores. For example, representatives from the Farm Credit Council (the trade association for the Farm Credit System) said approval decisions for about one-half of the loans that Farm Credit System associations make each year are made using credit scorecards. Credit scorecards are algorithms that statistically quantify a borrower’s probability of repayment using inputs such as the borrower’s credit score. Additionally, participation in the secondary market for agricultural loans may require lenders to comply with credit score criteria. For example, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (commonly known as Farmer Mac)—a federal government-sponsored enterprise that purchases and securitizes agricultural loans—has minimum credit score standards that range from 660 to 720. Collateral. Some SDFRs face challenges using their agricultural land as collateral. Many long-term agricultural loans require the borrower to pledge land as collateral to secure the transaction. For example, long- term loans (up to 40 years) made by Farm Credit System associations must be secured by a first-position lien on interests in real estate, generally enabling the Farm Credit System to obtain ownership or control of the land in the event of default. Federal regulators, lending industry association representatives, and SDFR advocates we spoke with identified several reasons why SDFRs, especially African Americans and American Indians on tribal lands, have difficulty using agricultural land as loan collateral. Some SDFRs do not have a clear title to their agricultural land because the land was passed down informally from generation to generation without a will. In addition, land passed down in this manner can result in numerous heirs—thousands in some cases—owning the land in common (that is, not physically divided among them). These circumstances can limit use of the land as collateral because of lending requirements or conventions that require formal proof of ownership or that disallow the use of a partial ownership interest as security for a loan. SDFR advocates and officials from the Farm Credit Administration told us these issues have particularly affected African American farmers due to historical factors that limited their access to legal services. In our May 2019 report about lending on tribal lands, we discussed how these issues also have posed problems for American Indian farmers. As we also reported in May 2019, American Indian farmers on tribal lands face additional challenges in using tribal land as collateral for agricultural loans because of statutory restrictions and some lenders’ concerns about their ability to enforce a foreclosure. Farmer Advocates Report Additional Challenges for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Seeking Agricultural Credit SDFR advocates we spoke with said that in addition to difficulty meeting loan underwriting standards, SDFRs face challenges related to historical discrimination, ongoing unfair treatment by lenders, and a lack of familiarity with some programs and technologies when trying to obtain private agricultural credit. As the Congressional Research Service reported in 2013, allegations of unlawful discrimination against SDFRs in the management of USDA programs are long-standing and well-documented. For example, in 1965, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found evidence of discrimination in the delivery of USDA farm programs, including loan programs. A subsequent report by the commission in 1982 and a report by the USDA Civil Rights Action Team in 1997 found continuing problems with the experience or treatment of SDFRs in USDA programs. USDA has also settled several class action lawsuits that SDFRs filed for, among other things, discrimination in the agency’s farm assistance programs. The allegations in these lawsuits included that USDA systematically denied SDFRs agricultural credit and other program benefits in violation of ECOA and failed to investigate complaints of discrimination, as required by USDA regulations. The settlements made more than $4 billion in awards available to farmers and ranchers whose claims were approved through administrative procedures. Some SDFR advocates told us that historical discrimination in agricultural lending adversely affects SDFRs’ current ability to obtain private credit in several ways. First, they said SDFRs who were unfairly denied USDA loans and other program benefits in the past have not been able to develop their farms in the same ways as farmers and ranchers who did receive loans, thus reducing their ability to obtain private credit today. The advocates elaborated that USDA agricultural credit allows recipients to expand operations and to purchase land and equipment that can later be used as collateral, making it easier to get subsequent and larger loans. Some SDFR advocates also stated that historical exclusion from credit markets and farm programs has limited SDFRs’ familiarity with lending standards and resulted in less formal recordkeeping, which impairs their ability to obtain private-sector credit. Finally, advocates said that historical discrimination has led generations of SDFRs to distrust institutional lenders, making them less likely to apply for credit. Some SDFR advocates we spoke with said that unfair treatment by private lenders is also a barrier to SDFRs obtaining private agricultural credit. One SDFR advocate said some lenders discriminate against SDFRs in loan approval decisions but that they more frequently treat SDFRs unfairly with respect to loan terms and conditions (for example, interest rates, fees, and collateral requirements) and loan servicing (for example, restructuring and foreclosure mitigation actions). Another noted that adverse loan terms and conditions and servicing practices can increase the risk that borrowers will lose their farm, house, and other property by making the loan unaffordable or reducing the chances that borrowers will catch up on payments if they fall behind. For example, this SDFR advocate said they were aware of cases in which (1) lenders required SDFRs to pledge potentially excessive collateral for loans, such as the borrower’s home in addition to the farm land, and (2) loan servicers moved more quickly to foreclose on SDFR borrowers who were behind on loan payments than on other borrowers and did not provide repayment options that may have allowed them to continue their operations. One SDFR advocate also stated that some SDFRs report not feeling welcome at lending institutions based on the perception of having been repeatedly dismissed by lender staff, while another said that in some cases, SDFRs have not been provided timely or helpful information on the loan application process. One SDFR advocate we spoke with said these practices are prevalent in some agricultural credit markets and that they had been or were currently involved in litigation related to these types of practices. However, banking industry association representatives said they did not believe that SDFRs are being treated unfairly and that denying loans to qualified applicants would cause lenders to decrease profits in a competitive market. They noted that lenders face significant competition, which incentivizes them to make loans to all qualified borrowers, and that lending decisions and loan terms are based only on the applicant’s ability to repay a loan and other underwriting criteria. We did not attempt to independently verify claims of unfair treatment of SDFRs by private-sector lenders, in part because data limitations discussed earlier limit the identification and analysis of possible discriminatory practices. Some SDFR advocates also said that some SDFRs may not be obtaining private agricultural credit because they are not aware of all potential credit options and related programs and are not always familiar with the technology needed to access them. For example, one advocate told us some SDFRs may not be aware that they could qualify for private agricultural loans, especially if they are recent immigrants or new to agriculture. This problem may be particularly true for loans from the Farm Credit System associations. Two advocates said SDFRs are not familiar with these lenders, and representatives of the Farm Credit Council told us people who did not grow up in farming tended not to know about the Farm Credit System. SDFR advocates we spoke with said this issue is exacerbated by limited outreach by private lenders to SDFRs, as discussed in more detail later in this report. Advocates also noted that historically disadvantaged groups are less likely to have access to or be familiar with computer technology and the internet, and that credit applications and related financial education programs are now provided online. Lenders and Federal Agencies Conduct Some Outreach to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers, but the Effectiveness of These Efforts Is Unknown Farm Credit System Outreach Is Not Specifically Targeted to Socially Disadvantaged Groups, and Data Collection Restrictions Prevent Assessment of Impact The Farm Credit System does not have a specific mandate to serve SDFRs, but its associations conduct some outreach to SDFRs in implementing the following statutory requirements and Farm Credit Administration regulations. The Farm Credit Act of 1971 was amended in 1980 to require the Farm Credit System to serve young, beginning, and small farmers. Related Farm Credit Administration regulations require the associations to implement effective outreach programs to these groups. While these requirements do not mandate outreach to SDFRs specifically, Farm Credit Administration officials said that many SDFRs qualify as young, beginning, or small farmers and, therefore, that Farm Credit System outreach efforts reach SDFRs to some extent. In 2012, the Farm Credit Administration amended its regulations on business planning to help ensure the Farm Credit System is responsive to the credit needs of all eligible and creditworthy persons. The regulations, which first applied to 2013 business plans, require Farm Credit System associations to develop marketing plans describing, among other things, (1) the demographic groups in their service areas, (2) ways to market their services to all qualified farmers and ranchers, and (3) specific outreach toward diversity and inclusion in each market segment. The supplementary information included with the publication of the final rule cites the perception of some SDFR advocates that Farm Credit System associations are not accessible to underserved farmers and have not conducted sufficient outreach to those populations about programs and services. The full extent of the Farm Credit System associations’ outreach to SDFRs is unknown. Neither the Farm Credit Administration nor the Farm Credit Council maintains aggregated information on the number or type of completed outreach activities involving SDFR participants. However, our nongeneralizable review of recent marketing plans from six Farm Credit System associations in areas with relatively high proportions of SDFRs identified some examples of outreach to SDFRs. For instance, some associations have partnered with a nonprofit organization to provide educational programs designed to strengthen women’s roles in the modern farm enterprise. Associations have also participated in agricultural conferences at historically black colleges and universities and translated marketing materials for non-English speakers. Despite some outreach, some SDFR advocates we spoke with said that Farm Credit System associations’ outreach has had limited effects on the amount of credit provided to SDFRs and SDFRs’ familiarity with the system. One SDFR advocate we spoke with said that while some Farm Credit System associations engage with socially disadvantaged communities, the outreach has not increased the diversity of the system’s borrowers. Others said that Farm Credit System outreach to SDFR communities has been insufficient and that some SDFRs are still not aware of the Farm Credit System. However, one SDFR advocate noted that the Farm Credit System’s outreach to young, beginning, and small farmers has been beneficial for those populations. The impact of Farm Credit System associations’ outreach to SDFRs is also not known. The marketing plan requirement does not oblige Farm Credit System associations to meet specific lending goals or favor any type or group of agricultural producers in their underwriting. Accordingly, the associations are not expected to quantify the extent to which they are meeting their diversity and inclusion outreach plans in the information they provide to their boards of directors. Moreover, Farm Credit Administration officials said Regulation B, discussed earlier, prevents the associations from collecting data on the race, ethnicity, and sex of loan applicants that would be needed to assess the effects of outreach efforts on lending to socially disadvantaged groups. In contrast, the officials noted that Farm Credit System associations are required to set lending targets for young, beginning, and small farmers; monitor outreach to those groups; and report on performance results of their young, beginning, and small farmer programs. In 2018, the Farm Credit System reported that all direct-lender institutions with young, beginning, and small farmer programs within the system were in compliance with these requirements. While the Farm Credit Administration has not evaluated the impact of outreach by Farm Credit System associations, its reviews of association marketing plans have found that most of the plans comply with requirements for outreach toward diversity and inclusion but that some lack specificity. The Farm Credit Administration told us it examines all of the associations’ marketing plans for regulatory compliance every 3 years. Farm Credit Administration officials reviewed their examinations from 2014 and 2017, the two scheduled examination cycles after the new requirements were implemented in 2012. They found that 85 percent of the 78 Farm Credit System associations examined in 2014 complied with the marketing and outreach requirements, and 94 percent of the 71 associations examined in 2017 complied. In cases where examiners identified deficiencies in marketing plans, the agency said it prescribed corrective actions, including requiring associations to do the following: obtain sufficiently detailed information to analyze and understand develop specific action plans and outreach strategies to market the institution’s products and services to potentially underserved markets; and ensure appropriate reporting on progress in accomplishing marketing plan strategies and actions. Farm Credit Administration officials said they hold periodic discussions with managers of Farm Credit System associations to monitor the status of corrective actions and conduct follow-up examinations to determine the adequacy of the corrective actions and, if applicable, the need for additional enhancements. The results of our review of a nongeneralizable sample of association marketing plans were broadly consistent with the Farm Credit Administration’s findings. We reviewed the most recent available plans of the six Farm Credit System associations noted previously for evidence of demographic information on the institution’s service area and for diversity and inclusion outreach efforts. Among the plans we reviewed, five included demographic information, but one did not. Farm Credit Administration officials said they also had identified that deficiency in their examination of that marketing plan. Additionally, five of the plans had examples of planned outreach efforts to SDFRs, but another one did not. Other Lenders Conduct Little Outreach to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers and Are Not Required to Do So According to representatives of lending industry associations we interviewed, commercial banks generally do not target outreach for agricultural lending to specific demographic groups. Officials from the federal depository institution regulators noted that commercial banks and credit unions are not required to conduct outreach on agricultural lending, and that the extent to which any lender conducts outreach is a private business decision. However, officials from one federal depository institution regulator noted that some lenders have participated in conferences organized by SDFR groups. They also said that in fulfilling responsibilities under the Community Reinvestment Act, lenders engage with community groups in their assessment areas to help identify credit needs. The officials said these efforts would likely engage SDFRs in areas where agriculture was prevalent and where agricultural lending was part of a bank’s business model. Some SDFR advocates we interviewed said that outreach and engagement by commercial banks was insufficient. For example, despite their familiarity with agricultural lending, some noted that they did not know of any specific outreach to SDFRs by private-sector lenders. They also noted that additional outreach is needed because some SDFRs are not familiar with agricultural lending products offered by commercial banks. Federal depository institution regulators do not monitor outreach to SDFRs by the institutions they supervise but have conducted some additional outreach themselves. Officials from the regulatory agencies told us they do not collect data on the amount of, types of, participation in, or impact of outreach conducted by their regulated institutions. However, as part of their efforts to promote the availability of credit and other services, the federal depository institution regulators have engaged in some outreach to SDFRs, as shown in the following examples. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has established an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion and an Office of External Outreach and Minority Affairs, which help to address fair credit access issues affecting minority communities and have worked with some national SDFR groups to coordinate, facilitate, and implement conferences, roundtables, and seminars. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Community Affairs Branch has engaged bankers, nonprofits, and other stakeholders to provide small business training for SDFRs. This training provides examples of small business lending and has highlighted programs for which participants may qualify. In 2017, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System engaged with federal agencies, businesses, and groups representing SDFRs to develop and publish a guide titled Harvesting Opportunity, which focuses on how credit can provide greater support for local food-related businesses and farmers. USDA Conducts Outreach to Socially Disadvantaged Groups on Its Lending Programs, but Data- Collection Challenges Hamper Evaluation of Outcomes USDA facilitates and provides outreach to SDFRs that some SDFR advocates say has been beneficial, but outreach on USDA-guaranteed farm loans is just one component of this broad-based effort. USDA’s Office of Partnerships and Public Engagement implements the Outreach and Technical Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers Program, referred to as the Section 2501 program. The program is designed to enhance coordination of outreach, technical assistance, and education efforts authorized under agricultural programs to improve SDFR and veteran farmer and rancher participation in the full range of USDA programs, including guaranteed farm loans. USDA officials said this program primarily provides grants and technical assistance to community-based organizations and develops materials describing best practices for national, state, and local outreach efforts. Two SDFR advocates we interviewed said outreach programs coordinated through the Section 2501 program have improved SDFRs’ understanding of USDA’s farm lending programs, and that the program’s efforts to engage SDFRs in programs and services are better now than they have been historically. USDA officials said they track these outreach activities but do not maintain data on activities that specifically address guaranteed loans because the outreach is generally intended to connect socially disadvantaged groups with any USDA program that may be appropriate. In addition to department-level outreach activities, USDA’s Farm Service Agency conducts outreach to increase SDFR participation in its programs through activities targeted to underserved populations. Farm Service Agency outreach efforts are conducted by the agency’s field offices and overseen by the Outreach Office. The outreach includes lender trainings and partnerships with community-based and tribal organizations to engage socially disadvantaged communities. Farm Service Agency officials said that they have partnered with private-sector lenders to conduct some outreach events specifically related to the guaranteed farm loan program but that most of the outreach is more general. Farm Service Agency officials told us they use data on guaranteed loans to SDFRs to target outreach to underserved communities. As previously discussed, unlike other providers of agricultural credit, USDA generally collects data on the personal characteristics of guaranteed loan applicants and borrowers. Farm Service Agency officials told us that state executive directors, farm loan chiefs, and outreach coordinators plan their outreach in annual strategy sessions. As part of this planning, state offices review the state’s lending goals for SDFRs, Census of Agriculture data on the state’s farmer population, and data on Farm Service Agency direct and guaranteed loans made to farmers belonging to different socially disadvantaged groups to target outreach to underserved communities. While the outreach is planned by state offices, the Farm Service Agency’s Director of Outreach said the Outreach Office has emphasized the use of lending goals and loan data in targeting outreach efforts. Although it maintains data on guaranteed loans made to SDFRs, USDA generally does not evaluate whether SDFR outreach participants go on to use Farm Service Agency lending programs or otherwise evaluate the impact of its outreach on lending to SDFRs. Farm Service Agency officials said that they track outreach activities at the national level by monitoring the number of activities, the groups engaged, and the number of participants, but that they face challenges evaluating the impact of outreach efforts. The officials said any personal or demographic information on outreach participants must be voluntarily provided by the participants, but that many of them are reluctant to do so. As a result, data on the characteristics of outreach participants are limited. The lack of data, in turn, makes it difficult to assess how effectively the outreach was targeted and whether it could be expected to increase lending to socially disadvantaged groups. Representatives from one SDFR advocacy organization said that while outreach programs may increase SDFRs’ understanding of USDA’s loan programs, it is unclear how much outreach programs help SDFRs obtain credit because USDA does not track participant outcomes. Farm Service Agency officials said that some of their state offices have begun trying to track the progress of individual outreach participants in obtaining loans through Farm Service Agency programs (using voluntarily provided information), but that these efforts were in the early stages. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to USDA, the Farm Credit Administration, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the National Credit Union Administration for their review and comment. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the National Credit Union Administration did not provide comments. USDA, the Farm Credit Administration, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Acting Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Farm Credit Administration, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8678 or ortiza@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to examine (1) what is known about the amount and types of agricultural credit to socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFR), (2) challenges SDFRs reportedly face in obtaining agricultural credit, and (3) outreach efforts to SDFRs regarding agricultural credit and related services. In this report, we use the term SDFR as defined in the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, as amended, and related U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulations. The act defines a socially disadvantaged group as one whose members have been subject to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice because of their identity as members of a group without regard to their individual qualities. USDA regulations further define SDFRs as belonging to the following groups: American Indians or Alaskan Natives, Asians, Blacks or African Americans, Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and women. Although the act and USDA regulations defined SDFR for purposes of classifying participants in USDA programs, in this report, we use USDA’s definition to identify SDFRs both in USDA programs and in the broader population of agricultural producers, consistent with the statutory provision this report responds to. Additionally, based on the language of the statutory provision, we excluded USDA direct loans from the scope of our review and focused on lending by private entities. The provision defines an agricultural credit provider as a Farm Credit System institution, a commercial bank, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, a life insurance company, and any other individual or entity as determined by the Comptroller General of the United States. Estimates of the Numbers of Farms and Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers For the background section of this report, USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service provided estimates from the 2012 and 2017 Censuses of Agriculture on the number of farm and ranch operations (which we refer to as farms) whose primary producer—that is, main decision maker—qualified as an SDFR, broken down by different SDFR subgroups. The service also provided estimates on the characteristics of farms whose primary producer was an SDFR, including the total acreage and market value of products sold. We compared the 2017 Census estimates of SDFR primary producers to analogous estimates from the 2012 Census and calculated numerical and percentage differences. We reviewed documentation on the methodologies used by the 2012 and 2017 Censuses to identify the main decision maker on a farm. We also interviewed National Agricultural Statistics Service officials about methodological differences between the two censuses and their likely effects on the number of reported SDFR primary producers. The 2012 Census used the term “principal operator” rather than “primary producer” to identify the main farm decision maker, but for ease of presentation we use the term primary producer in reference to both the 2012 and 2017 Censuses because the terms generally have the same meaning. Amount and Types of Credit to Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers To examine what is known about the amount and types of agricultural credit to SDFRs, we reviewed requirements in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its implementing regulation (Regulation B) governing the collection of data on the personal characteristics of loan applicants. We interviewed officials from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which has primary responsibility for issuing Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations, about these requirements and the status of a related rulemaking pursuant to a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. We also interviewed officials from the federal depository institution regulators—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and National Credit Union Administration—about the extent of information available on agricultural lending to SDFRs and about data restrictions stemming from Regulation B. We also drew upon information and analysis from our June 2008 and July 2009 reports on data limitations in nonmortage lending. Additionally, we analyzed data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey. The survey is a multiphase series of interviews that uses a multiframe, stratified, probability-weighted sampling design. The survey does not include Hawaii or Alaska. USDA’s Economic Research Service provided us customized summary statistics from the 2015, 2016, and 2017 surveys combined. Specifically, the service averaged survey data for those 3 years to provide a robust sample size of surveyed SDFRs. The service provided estimates and associated confidence intervals on the proportion of primary producers who were and were not SDFRs; the annual average amount of outstanding farm debt each group had over the 3-year period, by type of debt (ownership or operating); and the lending source for this debt (USDA Farm Service Agency, Farm Credit System institution, commercial bank and savings associations, or other). The service adjusted debt information for inflation. Specifically, to create standard errors for the 3-year averages, the service adjusted outstanding debt to 2017 dollars using the chain-type gross domestic product deflator. We compared and contrasted survey statistics for SDFRs and non-SDFRs, focusing on the volume and percentage of total outstanding farm debt, farm ownership and operating debt, and lender type. We interviewed Economic Research Service officials about limitations of the survey data. The limitations include the small size of several SDFR subgroups (which prevented more detailed analysis of different demographic groups), the potential underrepresentation of SDFRs in the survey, and potential overreporting of debt from commercial lenders. With regard to lender type, respondents may not have known the specific types of lenders they used. The survey results for all farms appear to overrepresent debt from commercial banks and savings associations when compared with data collected by the service on farm- sector balance sheets. It is possible some survey respondents mischaracterized some debt from Farm Credit System institutions as debt from commercial banks. These issues and their implications are discussed in the body of this report. To assess the reliability of the survey data, we reviewed methodology and quality review documents and compared results to other publicly available sources, such as farm balance-sheet data and the 2017 Census. We concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for describing the amount and types of agricultural credit SDFRs received, the sources of this credit, and how SDFRs and non-SDFRs compared along these dimensions. We also analyzed USDA data on farm ownership and farm operating loans guaranteed by the Farm Service Agency in fiscal years 2014 through 2018. We focused on guarantees issued by the Farm Service Agency because it operates the primary federal agricultural credit programs. For the 5-year period, we analyzed the annual amount and percentage of guaranteed loans (by dollar volume and adjusted for inflation) that went to SDFRs. We also separately examined trends in guaranteed farm operating and farm ownership loans to SDFRs. Finally, we analyzed the volume of guaranteed loans to SDFRs by state. We used this analysis to identify the top 10 states (or territories) in terms of (1) the dollar amount of guaranteed loans that went to SDFRs and (2) the proportion of guaranteed lending to the state or territory that went to SDFRs. To assess the reliability of data from USDA, we conducted electronic testing—including checks for missing data and erroneous values—and compared the data to publicly available sources. The loan guarantee data we present are somewhat different than publicly available information on USDA’s website because we used loan closing dates to group loans by fiscal year, while the publicly available data used the dates on which USDA obligated commitment authority for the loans. According to USDA officials, the closing date is a more accurate representation of the actual amount of loans guaranteed in a fiscal year, because some loans for which commitment authority is obligated may close in the following fiscal year or not close at all. We also interviewed USDA officials about interpretations of data fields and robustness of estimated values, among other things, and reviewed USDA internal policies and procedures for data entry. We concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for describing the amount and proportion of farm lending guaranteed by the Farm Service Agency that went to SDFRs and non-SDFRs nationwide and by state. Finally, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Farm Service Agency on the agency’s performance goals and target participation rates for farm lending to SDFRs. We also reviewed a 2007 USDA Office of General Counsel legal opinion on a statutory provision concerning establishment of target participation rates for SDFRs. However, an evaluation of the legal opinion was outside the scope of our study. SDFR Credit Challenges and Outreach Efforts to SDFRs To examine challenges SDFRs face in obtaining agricultural credit and outreach efforts to SDFRs regarding agricultural lending, we conducted searches of government and academic literature for research on private agricultural lending to socially disadvantaged groups. We searched the internet and various databases, such as AGRICOLA, EconLit, ProQuest Newsstand Professional, and Social SciSearch. Using broad search terms, we identified articles related to our research objectives that provided useful context and discussion topics for interviews with stakeholders. We did not identify any government or peer-reviewed academic literature that directly addressed private agricultural lending to socially disadvantaged groups, barriers those groups may face when trying to obtain agricultural credit, or outreach to disadvantaged groups by private agricultural lenders. We also solicited expert recommendations for academic literature on agricultural lending to socially disadvantaged groups. Several SDFR advocates identified the Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Policy Research Center as a potential source for academic literature on the subject. We found that the center had conducted some potentially relevant research but that the work had yet to be published in academic journals or government publications. To review efforts by agricultural lenders and their regulators to provide and oversee credit-related services to SDFRs—including marketing, outreach, and education activities—we reviewed data and documents from the Farm Credit System, USDA, and the federal depository institution regulators. We reviewed summary statistics from the Farm Credit Administration’s 2014 and 2017 examinations of Farm Credit System association marketing plans to determine the extent to which the associations had met requirements for outreach for diversity and inclusion. We supplemented this effort by reviewing marketing plans from a sample of six Farm Credit System associations in areas with substantial proportions of SDFRs from each of the socially disadvantaged groups identified in USDA regulations. While we included associations from different geographic regions of the country, the sample was not intended to be representative of all associations. We documented the extent to which the marketing plans we reviewed contained information on the demographic characteristics of the population in the associations’ service areas and planned outreach activities for diversity and inclusion. We also documented examples of outreach to SDFRs that were ongoing or that they had completed. Further, we also reviewed illustrative examples of outreach materials to SDFRs developed by USDA and the federal depository institution regulators, and we interviewed officials from these agencies about their outreach efforts. To gain further insight into challenges faced by and outreach efforts to SDFRs, we interviewed (1) SDFR advocacy and research organizations, (2) industry group representatives, and (3) federal agency officials. We refer collectively to the entities we interviewed as stakeholders. To select SDFR advocacy and research organizations, we used a snowball sampling technique that identified organizations based on referrals obtained during prior GAO studies and referrals from stakeholder interviews during this study. We limited our interviews to organizations that are national in scope and that focus on one or more socially disadvantaged populations and on agricultural credit or finance. Based on the snowball sampling, we identified and interviewed representatives from the following five groups: Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers Policy Research Center, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, National Black Farmers Association, Rural Coalition, and Rural Advancement Foundation International-USA. The snowball sampling did not identify a national advocacy organization focused on women farmers—the largest SDFR subgroup—but we identified American Agri- Women based on an internet search, and we interviewed representatives from that organization as well. Because the group of organizations we interviewed was a nonprobability sample, the information they provided is not generalizable. We also interviewed representatives from lending industry groups—the American Bankers Association, the Independent Community Bankers of America, and the Farm Credit Council—that we selected to cover the major types of private institutional lenders that make agricultural loans, including large commercial banks, community banks, and the Farm Credit System. Additionally, we contacted industry associations representing insurance companies and community development financial institutions— both of which provide some agricultural credit—but representatives from these associations said they did not have information directly related to our research topic. Finally, we interviewed officials from USDA and its Farm Service Agency, the Farm Credit Administration, CFPB, and the federal depository institution regulators. For our work on credit challenges faced by SDFRs, we also drew upon information and analysis from our May 2019 report on agricultural lending on tribal lands. Among other things, that report describes (1) what is known about the agricultural credit needs of Indian tribes and their members, (2) barriers stakeholders identified to agricultural credit on tribal lands, and (3) Farm Credit System authority and actions to meet those agricultural credit needs. We conducted this performance audit from January 2019 to July 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Steve Westley (Assistant Director); Jeremy Anthony (Analyst in Charge); Katherine Carter; William Chatlos; Tom Cook; Sam Portnow; Jennifer Schwartz; Jena Sinkfield; Tyler Spunaugle; and Farrah Stone made key contributions to this report.


Background The Air Force has identified ABMS as its solution to support broad Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to develop Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) capabilities. These capabilities will eventually allow U.S. forces from all of the military services, as well as allies, to conduct military operations across all warfighting domains. Command and control is the collection and sharing of information to enable military commanders to make timely, strategic decisions; take tactical actions to meet mission goals; and counter threats to U.S. assets. Figure 1 shows the concept of DOD operations within a joint all-domain environment. When the Air Force began planning for ABMS in 2017, officials stated the intent was to replace and modernize the capabilities of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which provides the warfighter with the capability to detect, identify, and track airborne threats, among other capabilities. According to officials, the Air Force currently plans to operate AWACS aircraft through 2035. In July 2018, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an ABMS Initial Capabilities Document that describes which capabilities would need to be developed and which associated gaps in current capabilities the Air Force would need to address. According to Air Force officials, after the Initial Capabilities Document was approved, the Air Force determined that its planned approach to ABMS was no longer compatible with the most recent National Defense Strategy, released in January 2018. The 2018 National Defense Strategy outlines DOD’s strategy for maintaining the defense of the United States based on new and reemerging threats from competitors, such as Russia and China. It also defines expectations for how DOD and its military departments should be prepared to engage those threats during future conflicts: forces would be expected to strike a diverse range of targets inside adversarial air and missile defense networks; forces would need capabilities to enhance close combat lethality; and DOD would prioritize investments that enabled ground, air, sea, and space forces to deploy, operate, and survive in all domains while under attack. Air Force officials stated that these expectations led the department to reassess requirements for ABMS and assess new options for developing more robust and survivable systems that could operate within contested environments. For example, the Air Force officially canceled a recapitalization program for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)—an aircraft that provides surveillance and information on moving ground targets—in December 2018. The cancellation was linked to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for a more survivable and networked solution, among other things. A June 2018 Air Force report to Congress identified concerns regarding the survivability of the JSTARS aircraft in a contested environment and stated that the Air Force was instead planning for ABMS to eventually provide JSTARS’s capabilities. The Air Force determined that it could continue using some of its JSTARS aircraft into the 2030s. Officials stated the Air Force subsequently changed the scope and intent of ABMS to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and broader requirements for JADC2. According to senior Air Force officials, they concluded that, to align with the new defense strategy, ABMS needed to do far more than replace AWACS and JSTARS. They also concluded that no single platform, such as an aircraft, would be the right solution to providing command and control capabilities across multiple domains. In an April 2019 congressional testimony, the Air Force announced a new vision for ABMS as a multidomain command and control family of systems enabling operations in air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. In that testimony, Air Force leadership explained the need to move away from a platform-centric approach (such as JSTARS) to a network-centric approach, one that connects every sensor to every shooter. The Air Force, however, did not formally document its decision to change the scope of ABMS. In November 2019, according to Air Force officials, ABMS was determined to be the Air Force solution for JADC2 in response to a July 2019 Joint Requirements Oversight Council memo outlining DOD requirements for command and control systems requirements across all domains. In May 2019, we reported that Air Force leadership determined that it would not designate ABMS as a major defense acquisition program because it would be a family of systems. The Air Force also determined that ABMS would be directed by a Chief Architect working across PEOs, rather than a traditional acquisition program manager. According to Air Force officials, the Chief Architect role will be instrumental in integrating the various programs and technologies into an overall system and is the first of its kind within the Air Force. Additionally, Air Force officials stated that they intend to use a flexible acquisition approach to develop ABMS, one that is outside of traditional pathways such as a major defense acquisition program or middle tier acquisition. According to the Chief Architect, this approach will allow ABMS to develop and rapidly field capabilities. Specifically, the Air Force intends to break up technology development into many short-term efforts, generally lasting 4 to 6 months each. The Chief Architect stated that the goal of breaking up development into smaller increments is to increase innovation by requiring multiple contractors—including those that may not usually engage with DOD—to compete for contracts more frequently. These short-term efforts will include prototyping and demonstrations to prove that the capabilities work. Those that are proven will be delivered to the warfighter. By using this approach, the Air Force intends to field capabilities sequentially and more quickly than if all were developed and delivered at one time as is typically done for traditional acquisitions. Additionally, Air Force officials indicated that this approach will not lock the Air Force into long-term development efforts with just one contractor and will allow the Air Force to more easily move on from unsuccessful development efforts. The Air Force Has Not Established a Business Case for ABMS, Increasing Development Risks The Air Force has not established a plan or business case for ABMS that identifies its requirements, a plan to attain mature technologies when needed, a cost estimate, and an affordability analysis. As a result of recent ABMS management and scope changes, the Air Force remains early in the planning process and has not yet determined how to meet the capabilities or identify systems that will comprise ABMS. In December 2019, Air Force officials stated an overall plan for ABMS did not exist and would be difficult for the Air Force to develop in the near term due to the unclear scope of ABMS requirements. To date, the Air Force has not identified a development schedule for ABMS, and it has not formally documented requirements. As previously stated, ABMS will be managed as a family of systems and not as a traditional acquisition program typically governed by DOD Instruction 5000.02, nor as a middle tier acquisition. As a result, Air Force officials initially told us that they did not intend to develop most of the typical acquisition documentation, such as a cost estimate, that is generally required of major defense acquisition programs before entering the development phase. In March 2020, after we sent a copy of this report to DOD for comment, the Air Force provided us a draft tailored acquisition plan for ABMS in lieu of an acquisition strategy. Based on our initial review, this document includes some elements of a traditional acquisition strategy, such as contract and test strategies. However, this tailored acquisition plan does not include key information such as the overall planned capabilities and estimated cost and schedule for ABMS. We will continue to monitor the Air Force’s planning efforts as the program progresses. The Air Force also began preparing an analysis of alternatives in January 2019 to assess options for delivering capabilities such as surveilling moving targets and battle management command and control. The Air Force expects to complete the analysis in 2020, but Air Force officials expect it will inform only some aspects of ABMS planning. The Air Force has not defined what additional planning documentation it will develop to help it establish a business case for ABMS. For example, major defense acquisition programs are generally required to develop acquisition planning documents, such as a cost estimate. We have previously reported on the importance of establishing a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new development effort. A business case demonstrates that (1) the warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources. In addition to an acquisition strategy, other basic elements of a sound acquisition business case include firm requirements, a plan for attaining mature technologies, and a reliable cost estimate and affordability analysis, further described below. 1. Firm requirements are the requisite technological, software, engineering, and production capabilities needed by the user. Acquisition leading practices state that requirements should be clearly defined, affordable, and informed. Deciding how best to address requirements involves a process of assessing trade-offs before making decisions. Unstable or ill-defined requirements can lead to cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. 2. A plan to attain mature technologies when needed is critical in establishing that technologies can work as intended before integration into a weapon system. The principle is not to avoid technical risk but rather address risk early and resolve it ahead of the start of product development. Identifying technologies and defining a plan to ensure mature technologies can be attained when needed help guide development activities and enable organizations to track development and inform decisions on next steps. 3. A reliable cost estimate and affordability analysis are critical to the successful acquisition of weapon systems. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a reliable cost estimate is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Leading practices have shown that realistic cost estimates allow program management to obtain the knowledge needed to make investment decisions and match requirements with resources. A cost estimate is the basis of an affordability analysis, which validates whether a program’s budget is adequate for the planned acquisition strategy. The process of developing and documenting a business case builds knowledge needed to match customer needs with available resources, including technologies, timing, and funding. The fact that the Air Force does not plan to establish such a business case for ABMS increases the risk of cost and schedule overruns and may impact Congress’s ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities. The status of key elements for the ABMS business case follows: Status of requirements. The Air Force has not established well-defined, firm requirements for ABMS, but Congress required that the Air Force start defining requirements for the networked data architecture necessary for ABMS to provide multidomain command and control and battle management capabilities by June 2020. The Air Force has not defined the changes in ABMS’s requirements, such as the need to provide multidomain command and control capabilities in support of joint operations. As a result, the only existing documentation of ABMS’s requirements resides in the ABMS Initial Capabilities Document from 2018, which generally focuses on the capabilities needed to replace AWACS. That document does not address the expanded JADC2 requirements and capabilities ABMS is expected to eventually fulfill. Air Force officials stated that ABMS requirements and the family of systems, or programs, that compose ABMS will be defined over time as they gain more knowledge. Given the lack of specificity regarding ABMS, Congress has kept a close eye on the effort and has implemented several reporting requirements. Since 2018, the Air Force has been required to provide quarterly updates to the defense committees on the status of ABMS development and associated technologies. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 required the Air Force to provide ABMS-related documentation that describes certain requirements, a development schedule, and the current programs that will support ABMS, among other things, by June 2020. While the Air Force has not established firm requirements for ABMS to date, it has informally identified some broad requirements. For example, the Air Force anticipates that ABMS will provide interoperability between systems, present real-time information to military decision makers, and fully utilize the range of sensor data and capabilities across DOD to create a common battlespace operational picture. In addition, Air Force officials stated that ABMS would be developed as a government-owned open architecture family of systems, which would allow any system to be integrated into ABMS. The Air Force has identified seven different development categories that it plans to simultaneously address to meet its broad ABMS requirements. According to the Air Force, the categories are not intended to be comprehensive and may change as development progresses. These development categories include: Apps Although the Air Force has not defined these seven development categories, it has identified 28 development areas that fit within the categories. For example, one of these development areas, which falls under the “secure processing” category, is called cloudONE. It is intended to store and process data using a cloud infrastructure for multiple levels of classified and unclassified data. These development areas will eventually compose the architecture and technologies that make up ABMS. In January 2020, the Air Force provided us with a draft version of high-level descriptions of the 28 development areas; however, the document did not fully define the requirements or capabilities for the development areas nor identify which organizations would lead each effort. For example, the cloudONE description does not indicate specific technical requirements that must be met, such as amount of storage, the number of users, or data transmission rate. Although ABMS requirements are not fully defined, the Air Force awarded several short-term development contracts for ABMS. According to Air Force officials, these efforts are intended to show that its nontraditional development approach is feasible rather than to develop specific capabilities that will be integrated into ABMS. For example, the Air Force awarded several development contracts totaling approximately $8 million for gatewayONE, one of the 28 development areas that is intended to enable communication between platforms. As part of this effort, the Air Force conducted a demonstration in a joint military exercise in December 2019. While the exercise demonstrated some data transfer capability, it did not directly address the intent of gatewayONE to enable communication between multiple platforms using government-owned systems. According to Air Force officials, ongoing and future efforts will allow the Air Force to better define ABMS requirements and determine what existing and emerging technologies can fulfill those capabilities. The Air Force has not determined what development efforts will follow these early demonstration efforts, in part because it has not fully defined its requirements. Status of plan to attain mature technologies when needed. The Air Force has started development activities without first identifying what technologies are needed for the 28 development areas for ABMS. According to Air Force officials, they do not plan to identify all technologies needed while pursuing development activities. Therefore, the Air Force cannot assess whether technologies required for ABMS are mature or determine the necessary steps to ensure those technologies are mature when needed. Air Force officials stated that as ABMS development progresses, they plan to select commercially available or other mature technologies for integration. However, without first identifying the technologies it needs, the Air Force cannot develop a plan, or technology roadmap, with detailed actions to ensure those technologies will be mature when needed. For example, the Air Force plans for ABMS to assume the capabilities of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, which are set to retire in the 2030s. However, the Air Force has not defined the technologies ABMS will need or established a roadmap to ensure those technologies are mature before the retirement of legacy aircraft. This increases the risk that the requisite technologies will not be mature before the Air Force must integrate them into ABMS, which increases the likelihood that those capabilities will not be developed when needed. The Chief Architect and other Air Force senior leaders stated that the ABMS development effort is an ambitious undertaking for the Air Force. Our prior work has found that some DOD programs related to ABMS development have posed challenges in the past, in part because technologies were not sufficiently mature when needed, as shown in table 1. Additionally, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation assessed previous DOD programs that were similar to ABMS development and noted that the scope of ABMS will be larger than any of those individual programs. Officials from that office concluded that ABMS is a high-risk effort and the Air Force has not provided sufficient programmatic detail. As a result, they could not conclude that the Air Force would be able to overcome the cost, schedule, and performance challenges of these past programs. Air Force officials stated that the Air Force’s approach to ABMS development will avoid these past challenges because only mature technologies will be integrated into ABMS and the Air Force is expected to frequently evaluate development progress. However, since the Air Force has not identified what the technology needs for ABMS are, it cannot yet determine if those technologies are mature or will be mature when needed. We have previously found that starting development without first identifying and assessing the maturity of technologies increases the likelihood that those technologies are not mature when needed, which often results in cost overruns and schedule delays. Status of cost estimate and affordability. The Air Force has not developed a cost estimate for ABMS or an affordability analysis. According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, even in cases where limited information is available, cost estimates should still be developed to inform budget requests. To date, the Air Force has requested nearly $500 million for ABMS efforts through fiscal year 2021. The Air Force, however, currently has no plans to develop a life-cycle cost estimate, which would provide a comprehensive account of ABMS costs, or an independent cost estimate, which would confirm the credibility of estimated costs. Officials stated that the Air Force has not developed a cost estimate because the capabilities, technologies, and systems that will compose ABMS are still to be determined and will change over time. Officials stated they intend to develop cost estimates for each of the 28 development areas in the future but did not identify a timeline. The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide acknowledges that cost estimating is more difficult when requirements—and the technologies and capabilities to meet them—are changing and the final product design is not known while the system is being built. In these cases, leading practices call for developing cost estimates that should be updated more frequently to reflect changes in requirements. Without a realistic and current cost estimate for ABMS efforts, the Air Force will be unable to effectively allocate resources and conduct informed long-range investment planning. The Air Force has also not determined if it can afford ABMS. Affordability is the degree to which the funding requirements for an acquisition effort fit within the service’s overall portfolio plan. Whether an acquisition effort is affordable depends a great deal on the quality of its cost estimate and other planned outlays. To conduct an affordability analysis, the budget requirements for the entire portfolio are identified for future years. This can help determine whether the funding needs are relatively stable or if the portfolio will require a funding increase in the future. The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that, as part of the cost estimating process, management should review and approve an affordability analysis to identify any funding shortfalls. Air Force officials stated that the Air Force does not plan to conduct a comprehensive affordability analysis for ABMS because it is managing it as a family of systems. They stated that any costs to the Air Force will be determined in the future by the various organizations that manage the systems that will eventually support ABMS. However, without an affordability analysis, the Air Force will be unable to determine whether it can commit sufficient resources for ABMS in future years. Air Force Has Established an ABMS Management Structure, but Decision-Making Authorities Are Unclear While the Air Force has taken some steps to establish an ABMS management structure, the authorities of Air Force offices to plan and execute ABMS efforts are unclear. Internal controls, which provide standards on effective management of programs, state that management should establish the organizational structure and authority necessary to enable the entity to plan, execute, control, and assess the organization in achieving its objectives. The Air Force, however, has not fully defined or communicated ABMS decision-making authorities to Air Force offices, and documentation to date regarding ABMS management has been limited. Several Air Force offices are involved in ABMS management, as shown in figure 2. Air Force Acquisition. This office is headed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who is generally responsible for all acquisition functions within the Air Force. In an October 2018 memorandum, Air Force Acquisition established the position of the Chief Architect and stated that any unresolved ABMS issues between the Chief Architect and PEOs are to be brought to Air Force Acquisition for resolution. Chief Architect. The Air Force established this position in October 2018 to execute the overarching vision and strategy for ABMS. According to the Air Force, the Chief Architect will determine the overall design of ABMS, coordinate with the service-level commands and the acquisition programs involved to ensure their efforts are aligned with the overall design and development of ABMS, and identify the enabling technologies that will compose the ABMS family of systems. An October 2018 memorandum stated that individual PEOs and program managers that oversee programs supporting ABMS will retain all authority and responsibility for executing their respective programs. In November 2019, Air Force Acquisition issued additional ABMS management guidance that stated that the Chief Architect would select and fund ABMS development projects for PEOs to execute. However, the guidance did not address whether the Chief Architect has authority to direct the execution of efforts initiated and originally funded by the PEOs, which may support ABMS. Specifically, there is no documentation to clarify whether the Chief Architect would have the authority to realign PEO priorities or funding for ABMS projects. For example, the PEO for Space is currently executing a data integration project, which aligns with the cloudONE development area. Although some ABMS funds have been obligated for this project, there is no documentation to support that the Chief Architect will be able to direct the PEO to change the project objectives or timeline to align with ABMS requirements once they are defined. Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC). In October 2017, the Air Force established AFWIC. According to Air Force officials, AFWIC will ensure forces are operationally ready to perform JADC2 missions using ABMS technologies. According to an AFWIC senior official, in April 2019 AFWIC began leading multidomain command and control efforts for the Air Force. An October 2018 memorandum directed the Chief Architect to coordinate with AFWIC regarding the development of ABMS. Other documentation on ABMS execution indicates that AFWIC will also coordinate with major commands on Air Force doctrine and operations in support of ABMS. However, the documentation did not further define this coordination or indicate whether AFWIC would have any authority in directing ABMS activities. Chief Architect Integration Office. In December 2019, the Air Force established the Chief Architect Integration Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to coordinate and integrate ABMS development efforts across PEOs and other organizations. Air Force officials stated that this office is in the process of being staffed and the roles and responsibilities still need to be formalized. However, as currently envisioned, this office would lead technology development risk reduction efforts by working with the PEOs and other organizations, such as federally funded research and development centers, to conduct ABMS demonstrations and prototypes. Air Force officials told us the Chief Architect Integration Office is expected to resolve issues across Air Force organizations, such as sharing of resources and personnel. An Air Force Life Cycle Management Center- led task force is currently developing an overall strategy for the office, to include resource and organizational requirements. Air Force officials stated that a proposed strategy will be completed in March 2020. Until the Chief Architect Integration Office has been fully established, it is unclear whether the office will have the required authorities to execute the mission of integrating ABMS development efforts across the Air Force. Air Force officials stated that the decision-making authorities across these offices will be developed over time. According to officials, details on these authorities have not been developed or communicated to the offices supporting ABMS and the Air Force has not established a timeline for doing so. The Air Force expects that multiple organizations within the Air Force will be responsible for executing ABMS development efforts. Internal controls, which provides standards for effective management of programs, states that organizational structure and authority is necessary to plan, execute, and assess progress. The absence of fully defined and documented decision-making authorities, which are communicated to all those involved, increases the risk to the Air Force’s ability to successfully plan, execute, and assess ABMS development efforts. Conclusions The Air Force started ABMS development activities without a business case that defines ABMS requirements, a plan to ensure technologies are mature when needed, a cost estimate, and an affordability analysis. Developing these key elements of a business case helps to build a solid foundation for any successful technology and product development effort, even one using a nontraditional acquisition approach. Congress has already required the Air Force to define and report on certain ABMS requirements, among other aspects of ABMS planning, by June 2020. However, the Air Force does not intend to develop the other elements of a business case, even though it is requesting over $300 million for ABMS development activities in fiscal year 2021. Given the criticality of the battle management command and control mission and the planned retirement of legacy programs, the lack of an ABMS business case introduces uncertainty regarding whether the needed capabilities will be developed within required time frames. For example, without a plan to mature technologies needed to field ABMS capabilities, the Air Force cannot be certain those technologies will be ready when needed. While it may be difficult for the Air Force to formulate a complete ABMS business case at this time, due to the recent changes in ABMS’s scope, the Air Force is not precluded from beginning the process of defining and formalizing a business case. As ABMS continues to evolve, so too can the Air Force’s business case. For example, the Air Force does not yet know the total life cycle costs of ABMS, but it could provide Congress with a cost estimate based on its knowledge today and update the cost estimate over time. This would allow the Air Force to assess whether ABMS is affordable. Furthermore, the Air Force is already required to provide quarterly briefs to congressional defense committees on the status of ABMS, which affords the Air Force the opportunity to present Congress with information on its ABMS business case and explain any changes over time. Specifically, including updates on the scope of the Air Force’s plans to ensure ABMS will have mature technologies when needed, an overall cost estimate, and an affordability assessment would provide important information to Congress. Finally, the Air Force has started to execute ABMS development efforts without clearly defined decision-making authorities that have been communicated to the offices supporting those efforts. The absence of these defined authorities may hinder management’s ability to execute and assess ABMS development across multiple organizations within the Air Force. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making the following four recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to develop a plan to attain mature technologies when needed for each ABMS development area, which includes an initial list of technologies and an assessment of their maturity that is updated to reflect changes, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 1) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to prepare a cost estimate that is developed in accordance with cost estimating leading practices, to include regularly updating the estimate to reflect ABMS changes and actual costs, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 2) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to prepare an affordability analysis that should be regularly updated, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 3) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should formalize and document acquisition authority and decision-making responsibilities of the Air Force offices involved in the planning and execution of ABMS, to include the Chief Architect. This document should be included as part of the submission to Congress in June 2020 and communicated to the Air Force offices that support ABMS. (Recommendation 4) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this product to the Department of Defense for comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix I, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendations. We will continue to monitor the Air Force’s actions to respond to these recommendations. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. We are also sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have questions, please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or MakM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Department of Defense Comments Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact: Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the contact above, the following staff members made key contributions to this report: Justin Jaynes, Assistant Director; Jessica Karnis, Analyst-in-Charge; and Lauren Wright. Other contributions were made by Brian Bothwell, Rose Brister, Brian Fersch, Miranda Riemer, Megan Setser, Hai Tran, and Robin Wilson.