Background Immigration and Nationality Act Provisions for Temporary Protected Status The INA provides for the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with other agencies, to designate a foreign country for TPS if the conditions in that country fall into one or more of three statutory categories. These categories are generally described as consisting of (1) ongoing armed conflict, (2) environmental disaster, and (3) extraordinary and temporary conditions. The Secretary may designate a country for a period of at least 6 months but no more than 18 months. At least 60 days before the end of the designation period, the Secretary is required, after consulting with other appropriate agencies, to undertake a review of the conditions in the foreign country for which a designation is in effect and to determine whether the conditions for such designation continue to be met. The Secretary must subsequently take one of the following actions: Extend the country’s TPS designation for a period of 6, 12, or 18 months, if the Secretary determines that country conditions warrant an extension of TPS. This provides TPS beneficiaries with an extended period of protection from removal. Terminate the country’s TPS designation, if the Secretary determines that the country no longer meets the statutory criteria. This results in an expiration of the period of protection for foreign nationals who were granted TPS under a country’s designation. In addition, the Secretary may exercise his or her discretion, on the basis of this review, to redesignate the country for TPS. With a redesignation, the Secretary allows eligible nationals from the designated foreign country who have arrived in the United States since the initial designation, or another date established by the Secretary, to apply for TPS. TPS provides temporary humanitarian protection to eligible foreign nationals in the United States who, for various reasons, may not have otherwise lawful status and therefore, in the absence of TPS, would be subject to enforcement and removal under the INA. Foreign nationals may be present in the United States without valid status and potentially removable for various reasons, such as having entered without inspection and admission at a port of entry or having remained in the country beyond the expiration of previous temporary status (e.g., tourist, foreign student). Eligible foreign nationals may also seek TPS when they currently have another lawful status, according to USCIS officials. USCIS officials noted that this may occur, for example, when a foreign national has a temporary nonimmigrant status nearing its end date when TPS is designated for his or her country and applies for TPS before the existing status expires. Under the INA, applicants for TPS must apply during the registration period established by the Secretary of Homeland Security for a particular country designation. To be eligible for TPS, an applicant from a designated country must have been physically present in the United States continuously since the most recent designation’s effective date and must have resided in the United States continuously since the date established by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The INA also specifies that an individual is ineligible for TPS if he or she has been convicted of any felony or of two or more misdemeanors committed in the United States; if any of the statutory bars to asylum apply, such as involvement in persecution of others; or if he or she is reasonably regarded as a danger to the security of the United States, among other bases. In addition to protecting beneficiaries from removal, TPS authorizes them to work in the United States for the designation period. To receive evidence of work authorization, TPS beneficiaries generally apply to USCIS for an employment authorization document, Form I-766. USCIS provides this document as a plastic card that shows proof of the individual’s authorization to work in the United States and includes a photograph of the individual. Although USCIS does not require beneficiaries to apply for an employment authorization document, according to USCIS officials, beneficiaries typically apply to obtain these cards as evidence of their authorization to work in the United States. Figure 1 shows an example of an employment authorization document issued by USCIS. Key DHS and State Components That May Be Involved in TPS Reviews Several key DHS and State components may be involved in the TPS decision process, as table 1 shows. Additionally, other DHS offices and components, as well as agencies such as the Department of Defense or U.S. Agency for International Development, may provide information about country conditions to help inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decisions. Foreign Nationals from 22 Countries Have Received TPS, Totaling About 430,000 Beneficiaries in Fiscal Years 2000- 2018 TPS Has Been Granted to Foreign Nationals from 22 Countries since It Was Established Since TPS was established in 1990, foreign nationals in the United States from 22 countries have been granted TPS. Our review of Federal Register notices published in fiscal years 1990 through 2019 found varying bases for the 22 countries’ TPS designations. We also found that designations for 20 of these countries were subsequently extended or the countries were redesignated one or more times. Somalia, first designated for TPS in September 1991, had the longest overall designation period since TPS was established. As of the end of fiscal year 2019, Somalia’s designation had been extended 21 times and the country had been redesignated twice; its most recent extension was set to expire in March 2020. Designations for only two countries were terminated without any extensions or redesignations—Kuwait, designated in 1991, and Guinea-Bissau, designated in 1999. Figure 2 shows all effective dates of TPS designations and subsequent decisions, including extensions, terminations, and redesignations, as well as the bases for the designations for each of the 22 countries in fiscal years 1990 through 2019. As figure 2 shows, 26 TPS designations occurred in fiscal years 1990 through 2019, and 22 designations were extended at least once. As of September 30, 2019, the designations for all but four countries had been terminated and the termination of six countries’ designations since fiscal year 2018 had been temporarily halted because of ongoing litigation. Redesignations occurred 20 times. Designations. Of the 26 TPS designations, three were for one country, Liberia, and four were for two countries, El Salvador and Sierra Leone, that were each designated twice. Extensions. The majority of TPS designations (17 of 26 designations) were extended up to eight times. Designations for five countries—El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Sudan—were extended more than 10 times each. Three of the 22 countries’ designations were not extended before termination. Terminations. The TPS designations for all countries except Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen had been terminated as of September 30, 2019. The termination of six countries’ designations since fiscal year 2018 had been temporarily halted because of ongoing litigation. Several lawsuits had been filed regarding the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decisions to terminate TPS for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan. In October 2018, a U.S. district judge in California issued a preliminary injunction for one of the lawsuits, temporarily blocking DHS from enforcing the Secretary’s TPS termination decisions for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan. The U.S. government filed an appeal in response to the preliminary injunction. According to USCIS officials, DHS has regularly published notices of its continued compliance with the court’s injunction and has stated that it will continue to publish such notices pending resolution of the case In April 2019, a district court judge in New York issued a second preliminary injunction covering Haiti, which the U.S. government appealed in June 2019. Additionally, under an agreement to stay the proceedings in response to a lawsuit filed in California in February 2019, the government stipulated that it would temporarily halt terminations for Honduras and Nepal until the appeal of the October 2018 injunction had been resolved. Redesignations. Of the 20 TPS redesignations, six were for countries that were redesignated once, two were for one country that was redesignated twice, and twelve were for four countries that each were redesignated thrice—the largest number of TPS redesignations. About 430,000 Eligible Foreign Nationals Received TPS in Fiscal Years 2000-2018 USCIS data show that applications for TPS were approved for a total of 431,848 foreign nationals in fiscal years 2000 through 2018 and that the number of TPS beneficiaries each year grew from about 70,000 in fiscal year 2000 to about 420,000 in fiscal year 2018. The number of TPS beneficiaries increased most rapidly in fiscal years 2000 through 2005, particularly after the designation of Honduras in 1999 and El Salvador in 2001. According to USCIS officials, because adjudicating all TPS applications can take years, depending on the number of applicants from a country, the number of TPS beneficiaries for a designated country may continue rising after the established registration period for the specific designation. For example, although Honduras was initially designated for TPS in 1999, with an applicant registration period that ended on July 5, 1999, USCIS data show that the number of beneficiaries from Honduras who were granted TPS peaked in 2007 at 85,759 foreign nationals. See appendix II for additional information on the numbers of TPS beneficiaries in fiscal years 2000 through 2018, by country. Data on the number of TPS beneficiaries for fiscal year 2018—the most recent available—show that the majority of TPS beneficiaries were from three countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti), as figure 3 shows. About 98 percent of beneficiaries from six countries (Sudan, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Nepal) in fiscal year 2018—408,773 foreign nationals—held TPS because the termination of their country’s TPS designation was temporarily halted because of ongoing litigation. In addition, about 2 percent of beneficiaries from four countries (Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) in fiscal year 2018—9,019 foreign nationals—held TPS because their country’s designation was extended. See appendix II for additional information about beneficiary characteristics in fiscal year 2018, including age, gender, and location. DHS’s Approach to Inform the Secretary’s TPS Reviews Includes Three Primary Steps Our review of documentation for selected TPS decisions in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 and our interviews with DHS, USCIS, and State officials indicated that DHS’s approach for initial or subsequent reviews of countries for TPS consists of three primary steps: 1. The Secretary of Homeland Security initiates a review of a country for TPS. For an initial TPS designation, the Secretary may initiate consideration of a country in response to various triggering factors. Such factors may include, for example, a request from a U.S. government entity or a foreign government for a TPS designation based on the statutory conditions for TPS (i.e., armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary conditions). For an existing designation approaching its end date, a statutory deadline requires the Secretary to undertake a review. 2. DHS collects information on country conditions and recommendations from USCIS and State and provides this information to the Secretary of Homeland Security to inform his or her decision regarding an initial or existing TPS designation. Other DHS components and non-DHS entities, including other agencies and nongovernmental organizations, may also provide information to the Secretary or USCIS. 3. The Secretary of Homeland Security receives the information and recommendations and makes a decision about TPS for the country. The Secretary exercises discretion in determining whether to initially designate a country for TPS. For an existing designation, under the INA, the Secretary is required to determine whether country conditions warrant an extension of TPS or whether the country no longer meets the statutory criteria and TPS must be terminated. Also, the Secretary exercises discretion in determining whether to redesignate a country that was previously designated for TPS. Figure 4 illustrates these three steps. Secretary of Homeland Security May Consider a Country for Initial TPS Designation in Response to Various Factors, and Statute Requires Subsequent Reviews Various factors may trigger consideration of a country for an initial TPS designation, according to USCIS officials. Officials stated that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s consideration of a country for an initial designation is discretionary. However, subsequent reviews of existing designations are required by statute. See figure 5. USCIS and State officials stated that for initial TPS designations, a request from DHS, State, the White House, members of Congress, or foreign governments may trigger consideration of whether to designate a country on the basis of one or more of the three statutory categories (i.e., armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary conditions). USCIS officials added that, under the INA, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the sole authority to determine whether and when to consider a country for an initial TPS designation. Further, they noted that a request does not automatically result in a formal review of a country for TPS even if the country has experienced country conditions specified in one or more of the statutory categories, such as an armed conflict or environmental disaster. For subsequent reviews of existing TPS designations, at least 60 days before the end of the designation period, the Secretary is required, after consulting with other appropriate agencies, to undertake a review of the conditions in the foreign country for which a designation is in effect. DHS Collects Country Conditions Reports and Recommendations to Inform the Secretary’s TPS Decision DHS collects similar information for each review of a country for TPS, according to DHS officials and our review of selected decisions. DHS officials identified four primary sources of information that the department collects to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS decisions: country conditions reports compiled by USCIS and State and recommendations from USCIS and State leadership. According to DHS and State officials, DHS generally consults with State on TPS decisions, although it is not specifically required to do so under the statute. Our review of 26 TPS decisions for the eight selected countries found that DHS collected the following documents to inform each decision: 1. a country conditions report compiled by USCIS, 2. a memo with a recommendation from the USCIS Director to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 3. a country conditions report compiled by State, and 4. a letter with a recommendation from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Homeland Security. USCIS manages and coordinates the TPS information-gathering process for the Secretary of Homeland Security. While State formally provides its input through the Secretary of State’s letter and recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security, USCIS officials said that USCIS generally incorporates the input from State into USCIS’s country conditions report and recommendation on TPS. DHS officials noted that other internal DHS components, government agencies, and other entities may also provide information about country conditions or other factors to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decisions. Figure 6 shows the information collected to support the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS reviews. USCIS officials indicated that the time frames for conducting TPS reviews may vary. They noted that a review for an initial designation may have a shorter time frame than a review for an existing designation, depending on the situation. In addition, the officials noted that USCIS generally starts the review process for an existing TPS designation about 6 months to a year before the end date of the country’s current designation. They added that they generally start the review process within this timeframe, given the INA requirement that the Secretary of Homeland Security either undertake a review and make a determination regarding country conditions at least 60 days in advance of the prior designation’s end date or automatically extend the designation for 6 months. According to USCIS officials, at the start of a review for an initial or existing designation, USCIS’s Office of Policy & Strategy generally reaches out to USCIS’s Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate (RAIO) to request input on country conditions. USCIS officials also said that the office coordinates with State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration regarding the target time frame for receiving State’s input. In general, once USCIS receives the input from RAIO and State, USCIS finalizes its country conditions report and recommendation memo for the Secretary of Homeland Security. Our review of documentation for the eight countries in our nongeneralizable sample of 26 TPS decisions found variation in the time frames for USCIS’s recommendation memos and for State’s recommendation letters. For the 24 reviews of existing TPS designations, USCIS provided recommendation memos to the Secretary of Homeland Security about 2 to 7 months before the end date of the prior designations. Most of State’s 26 recommendation letters were dated about 2 days to 6 months before the USCIS recommendation memos. RAIO officials noted that they use an internal template as informal guidance for the draft country conditions reports that they compile for USCIS’s Office of Policy & Strategy for reviews for initial or existing TPS designations. We reviewed the RAIO template and found, for example, that for reporting on a country being considered for a TPS designation on the basis of an environmental disaster, the template includes sections (e.g., several paragraphs) about the population harmed, damage to infrastructure, disruption in services, and status of disaster response and reconstruction. Officials added that country conditions reports may deviate from the template, because its use is not required; instead, it serves as general, informal guidance. RAIO officials also noted that information in the country conditions reports they compile is generally based on publicly available information or data related to country conditions. According to the officials, sources for such information may include U.S. agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and news articles. According to State officials, after State initiates its internal process for compiling information for the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS review, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration generally requests input internally from the relevant regional bureau and post before compiling information for the Secretary of State’s consideration. See the text box for more details of State’s internal process for developing country conditions reports and recommendation letters to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS reviews. State Department’s Internal Process for Compiling Information for the Secretary of Homeland Security’s Temporary Protected Status Reviews The Department of State’s (State) internal process for developing input for the Secretary of Homeland Security’s Temporary Protected Status (TPS) reviews generally includes compiling information on country conditions as well as proposed recommendations from the relevant regional bureau and overseas post, according to documentation for selected TPS decisions in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 and our interviews with DHS, USCIS, and State officials. State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) facilitates and coordinates State’s internal process for developing this input, according to informal guidance, which State officials said the bureau has used at the working level since 2012, as well as our interviews with State officials. After DHS initiates a TPS review, PRM generally directs the relevant regional bureau to reach out to overseas posts for information about country conditions, according to State officials. State officials noted that in some cases, the regional bureau’s country desk officer takes the lead in drafting the country conditions report, depending on the country context. Officials stated that the regional bureau generally uses a questionnaire on country conditions to request information from the post for a TPS review and that the post generally also provides a recommendation, in addition to the questionnaire responses, via cable or email to the regional bureau. For example, for a country that had an existing TPS designation based on ongoing armed conflict in the country, a country conditions cable provided, among other things, information about the status of the armed conflict, an assessment of whether the return of foreign nationals would pose a serious threat to their personal safety and whether the country was unable to handle the return of nationals, and information about the impact of the conflict on economic and humanitarian conditions. State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials noted that other agencies represented at the overseas posts, such as USAID, may provide information for a post’s input on country conditions, including information gathered “on the ground” as well as from publicly available sources. Once the regional bureau receives any input from post, the bureau desk officer prepares a draft country conditions report and recommendation, and the regional bureau works with PRM to compile a joint action memo. PRM generally provides the joint action memo, which includes a country conditions report, to the Secretary of State, according to State officials. The memo may include a joint recommendation or varying recommendations (e.g., from PRM and the regional bureau) for the Secretary’s consideration. After the Secretary determines what the department will recommend, State provides a final country conditions report and recommendation letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security as well as to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Office of Policy & Strategy. We found that the USCIS and State country conditions reports and recommendation memos or letters that DHS and State provided for our nongeneralizable sample of 26 TPS decisions included information such as background on the cause (or reason for consideration) of the initial TPS designation and a summary of the country’s recovery from, or the status of, the situation to date. In addition, documentation provided to us for some of the TPS decisions included other information, such as certain economic indicators or broader country context. Specifically: Cause and recovery or status. USCIS and State documentation for each of the 26 TPS decisions in our review generally included (1) information related to the cause (or reason for consideration) of the initial TPS designation and (2) a summary of the country’s recovery from, or the status of, the situation to date. For example, documentation for a country designated on the basis of armed conflict described the status of the conflict and ceasefire agreements; provided information about violence against civilians and recruitment of child soldiers; provided an update on civilian casualties since the prior review; and described humanitarian challenges stemming from the conflict, such as the risk of famine. For a country designated on the basis of environmental disaster, documentation described the status of investments in recovery and efforts to rebuild after the disaster, including the number of houses and schools that had been rebuilt or repaired. This documentation also included assessments of disruption in living conditions and the extent to which economic activity and basic services had been restored. Economic indicators. USCIS documentation for 16 TPS decisions and State documentation for 12 TPS decisions in our review included information about economic indicators. Examples of such information included an estimate of damages from an environmental disaster as a percentage of a country’s gross domestic product, a summary of growth in a country’s gross domestic product in recent years, and data on the increase in food prices as a result of armed conflict in a country. Broader country context. USCIS documentation for 23 TPS decisions in our review and State documentation for 20 TPS decisions provided information about broader country context. For example, documentation for a country designated on the basis of armed conflict included broader context regarding topics such as recent natural disasters and the country’s geography. As another example, documentation for a country designated on the basis of environmental disaster provided information about subsequent natural disasters as well as violence, criminal activity, and corruption in the country. In addition to USCIS and State, other DHS offices and components and non-DHS entities may provide information to inform the Secretary’s decision. DHS officials noted that such information varies, may be solicited or unsolicited, and may be provided directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security or to USCIS. We reviewed examples of such information for several of the TPS decisions in our nongeneralizable sample. This information included items such as immigration data or intelligence analyses from other DHS offices and components—for example, the Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; updates from the Department of Defense on the security situation in a technical input from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the status of an epidemic; and input from other entities, including letters from members of Congress, foreign government officials, and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, DHS officials stated that the Secretary of Homeland Security may hold briefings or meetings on TPS reviews both internally and with external entities, such as White House officials, foreign government officials, and nongovernmental organizations or advocacy groups. According to DHS officials, after USCIS and State compile their country conditions reports and recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security’s consideration, other DHS components—including the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans; the Office of the General Counsel; and the Management Directorate—review the documents as part of the standard departmental clearance process before providing them to the Secretary. Officials from these DHS components noted that the purpose of their review is generally to provide relevant technical comments and ensure that complete information has been gathered for the Secretary’s review. Secretary of Homeland Security Makes a TPS Decision According to USCIS officials, after receiving the information and recommendations from USCIS and State, as well as information from any other sources, the Secretary of Homeland Security makes a decision regarding a country’s initial or existing TPS designation. USCIS officials indicated that the Secretary’s decisions may not always follow the recommendations of the USCIS Director or the Secretary of State. For example, among the 26 TPS decisions from 2014 through 2018 that we reviewed, the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision was the same as State’s recommendation in 21 cases and differed from State’s recommendation in five cases. Initial designation. USCIS officials stated that if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines a country meets the statutory criteria for designation, the Secretary may then exercise discretion in deciding whether to initially designate the country for TPS. Existing designation. According to USCIS officials, the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises discretion in determining whether the conditions in a country satisfy statutory conditions for retaining an existing designation. However, the officials indicated that if the Secretary determines that the conditions for TPS designation continue to be met, the Secretary is required under the INA to extend the designation. Additionally, USCIS officials stated that if the Secretary determines a country no longer meets conditions for TPS designation, the Secretary is required under the INA to terminate the designation. Finally, USCIS officials stated that the Secretary may exercise discretion in deciding to redesignate a country with an existing designation and that factors such as a significant deterioration in country conditions may weigh in favor of a redesignation. Once the Secretary of Homeland Security decides whether to designate a country or to extend or terminate TPS, the decision may be documented through a signed memorandum or communicated orally to USCIS, according to USCIS officials. DHS provided memorandums or notices documenting the Secretary’s TPS decisions for all 26 decisions in our nongeneralizable sample. After the Secretary makes a TPS decision, DHS typically communicates the decision to State before announcing it to the general public. Either DHS or State then communicates the decision to the foreign embassy in Washington, D.C., and State may communicate it to the foreign government overseas. Finally, under INA provisions related to TPS, the Secretary’s decision is published in the Federal Register (see fig. 7). DHS Has Communicated TPS Decisions through Required Federal Register Notices but Provided Inconsistent Guidance on Employment Authorizations DHS Has Communicated TPS Decisions to the Public through Required Federal Register Notices and Other Mechanisms Since 1990, all TPS decisions have been communicated to the public through statutorily required notices in the Federal Register. DHS has also used other mechanisms, including press releases and its website, to help disseminate TPS-related information to the public. We found that a Federal Register notice was published for all TPS decisions, as required under the INA, from November 1990 to September 2019. In addition, DHS frequently used Federal Register notices as a mechanism for communicating other related information, such as effective dates for TPS designation periods, applicant registration periods, TPS beneficiary eligibility requirements, and information about employment authorization for beneficiaries. For example, the Federal Register notice extending the TPS designation of El Salvador, published on July 8, 2016, included the following: summary information about the extension, such as the period of extension and the start and end date of the extension; procedures and eligibility information for beneficiaries to register or reregister for TPS and to apply for renewal of employment authorization documents, including required forms and fees to register or reregister; directions for obtaining additional information and help with questions by accessing the USCIS website or by contacting an identified USCIS official or a USCIS customer contact center; and general information about TPS as well as information about El Salvador’s initial TPS designation and about the Secretary’s authority and reason for extending TPS for El Salvador. For a Federal Register notice of a TPS decision, according to USCIS officials, USCIS generally takes about 2 weeks to draft the notice. DHS then completes an internal review before submitting the notice to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for interagency review, according to officials. OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs coordinates the notice review process, including gathering comments or proposed revisions from relevant executive branch agencies. For example, we reviewed examples of technical comments from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding draft notices of TPS decisions for the Ebola-affected countries that included information and data on the status of the epidemic and an assessment of health care infrastructure. According to USCIS officials, OMB comments are returned to DHS without identifying the agency that made each comment, and additional interagency review and comment may occur before DHS publishes the notice in the Federal Register. USCIS officials also noted that, under regulation, OMB can take up to 90 days to complete the interagency review, although the officials added that OMB aims to complete the process in a timely manner for TPS notices and generally takes about a month. According to USCIS officials, to help raise awareness of TPS decisions, USCIS has generally also issued press releases announcing all TPS decisions and published them on its website in addition to publishing Federal Register notices. Table 2 summarizes information from DHS’s publication of a press release and Federal Register notice for a 2016 TPS decision. USCIS has also taken other steps to communicate TPS decisions and related information to the public. USCIS has updated its TPS country- specific webpages with alerts about the latest TPS decisions and registration periods, among other information. Further, according to USCIS officials, the Office of Public Affairs hosted periodic national TPS teleconferences for stakeholders and conducted outreach meetings to respond to questions and discuss TPS information in communities where there might be a large number of TPS beneficiaries. For example, a teleconference invitation from USCIS to stakeholders to discuss the extension of Haiti’s TPS designation in May 2017 indicated that USCIS officials would share information about the TPS reregistration period and procedures for eligible Haitian nationals and would respond to stakeholder questions. Officials from USCIS’s Office of Public Affairs also stated that the office has drafted guidance for communicating most TPS decisions. We reviewed examples of the guidance, which included planned time lines for publishing the press releases and information to USCIS’s website as well as for conducting outreach to Congress, stakeholder groups, and TPS beneficiaries. DHS Published Most Federal Register Notices of Decisions on Existing TPS Designations before Previous Designations’ End Date USCIS officials noted that once the Secretary of Homeland Security makes a TPS decision, time frames for publishing the Federal Register notice may vary. USCIS officials stated that, in an effort to ensure public awareness of the decisions as soon as possible, USCIS has in some cases published a press release before the Federal Register notice of a decision was finalized and published. In reviewing TPS decisions for existing designations (i.e., extensions, terminations, and redesignations) in fiscal years 1990 through 2019, we found the following: About two-thirds of Federal Register notices announcing TPS decisions for these existing designations were published at least 30 days before the end date of the previous designation period (100 of 158 total notices). In fiscal years 1990 through 2005, 21 Federal Register notices announcing TPS decisions for existing designations were published after the end of the previous designation period. In fiscal years 2006 through 2019, all 71 Federal Register notices announcing TPS decisions for existing designations were published 4 to 159 days before the end date of the previous designation period. See figure 8 for more details. USCIS Published Guidance Has Not Consistently Identified All Mechanisms Used to Communicate Automatic Extensions of TPS Employment Authorization Documents Since 1990, two mechanisms—Federal Register notices and individually mailed notifications, which TPS beneficiaries may use as evidence of their eligibility for employment—have been used to communicate automatic extensions of employment authorization documents. However, USCIS’s published guidance has not consistently identified each of these as official mechanisms to verify eligibility, resulting in confusion among employers about TPS beneficiaries’ employment eligibility. The INA states that DHS shall provide TPS beneficiaries with “an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit” but does not specify the mechanisms that DHS should use to communicate TPS employment authorization. To receive documentation of work authorization, TPS beneficiaries generally apply for an employment authorization document after an initial TPS designation and also after any subsequent extensions or redesignations of TPS. See the text box for a description of the process that TPS beneficiaries and employers must follow to verify beneficiaries’ employment eligibility. According to USCIS officials, USCIS aims to adjudicate both initial employment authorization applications and renewal applications within 90 days after receiving an application. When it is unable to process the adjudications in this time frame, USCIS issues automatic extensions of expiring employment authorization documents for TPS beneficiaries from a specific country, to allow time for USCIS to process the volume of applications associated with a TPS reregistration period. In some instances, USCIS may issue additional automatic extensions of employment authorization documents for specific countries if it has been unable to process all pending applications within the initial automatic extension period, according to USCIS officials. When employment authorization documents are automatically extended for eligible TPS beneficiaries, the documents may appear to have expired even though they remain valid. According to USCIS officials, DHS has used the Federal Register notices announcing TPS decisions to communicate most automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents. For example, on January 17, 2017, DHS published a Federal Register notice extending the TPS designation of Somalia for 18 months and, in the same notice, automatically extended for 6 months the validity of employment authorization documents issued under Somalia’s TPS designation. DHS has also communicated automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents through Federal Register notices independent of a TPS decision. Generally, Federal Register notices announcing automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents include instructions for employers for completing the Form I-9, among other things. Additionally, some notices state that, to reduce employer confusion regarding automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents, beneficiaries should explain the extension to their employer and may also provide their employer with a copy of the relevant Federal Register notice. In five cases, beginning in fiscal year 2018, USCIS mailed notifications of automatic extensions of employment authorization documents to thousands of TPS beneficiaries from Haiti, El Salvador, Syria, and Honduras as an alternative or a supplement to posting the information in Federal Register notices. USCIS officials told us that in these cases, they mailed individual notifications of the automatic extensions to ensure that the beneficiaries would not experience any gaps in employment authorization. According to the officials, they began this practice because of the large number of affected beneficiaries. Our examination of USCIS documents found that in four of these five cases, USCIS mailed individual notifications to the TPS beneficiaries without also posting a Federal Register notice communicating the automatic extension. In all five cases, USCIS published guidance on its website to inform TPS beneficiaries and employers about the use of individually mailed notifications to communicate employment authorization document extensions. USCIS’s website states that TPS beneficiaries may present the Federal Register notice or individually mailed notification to their employer along with their expired employment authorization documents to show proof of continued employment authorization. The individual notifications also state that beneficiaries may show the notifications, along with the expired employment authorization document, to any U.S. employer as proof of continued employment authorization. However, a USCIS handbook for employers and related guidance do not specifically identify the individually mailed notifications as an official means of communicating these extensions. USCIS’s Handbook for Employers: Guidance for Completing Form I-9 (M-274) provides guidance for employers on how to properly complete Form I-9, which helps employers verify that individuals are authorized to work in the United States. The handbook contains a section about automatic employment authorization document extensions for TPS beneficiaries that references USCIS’s use of Federal Register notices to inform the public of these extensions. However, the handbook for employers does not mention USCIS’s use of individually mailed notifications to communicate the automatic extensions. USCIS’s Instructions for Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification notes that certain employees, including TPS beneficiaries, may present an expired employment authorization document, which may be considered unexpired if the document has been extended by USCIS. The guidance also notes that employees should enter the expiration date of an automatic extension on Form I-9. However, the instructions for Form I-9 do not detail USCIS’s mechanisms for communicating these extensions, including its use of individually mailed notifications. Some employers have reportedly refused to accept expired employment authorization documents as proof of work authorization when the documents had been automatically extended. For example, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division telephone interventions website indicates that on approximately 50 occasions from September 2017 through May 2019, the Immigrant and Employee Rights Section intervened to deter employers or medical licensing boards from rejecting valid work authorization documents and, in some cases, from terminating employment for TPS beneficiaries whose employment authorization documents had been automatically extended. Also, a letter to USCIS signed by 70 law professors and scholars states that some legal service providers have reported instances of employers’ terminating TPS beneficiaries’ employment because the employer did not understand or accept the individually mailed notifications. Further, USCIS has received feedback from certain stakeholders concerned that beneficiaries might not be receiving the individual notifications in time to avoid any potential gaps in work authorization, according to USCIS officials. USCIS officials told us that the Federal Register process may be beneficial for communicating employment authorization in some cases but that they may also continue to use the individually mailed notifications as a mechanism to communicate future extensions, depending on the circumstances. USCIS has acknowledged the potential benefits of updating external guidance regarding automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents. However, as of December 2019, USCIS had not taken action to do so. Replying to a letter of concern from an advocacy group, USCIS stated that it could consider updating the handbook for employers to add additional guidance regarding individually mailed notifications. Effective information and communication are vital for an entity to achieve its objectives. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management should document policies in the appropriate level of detail and externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an entity’s objectives. Updating external guidance, such as the employer handbook, to clearly identify each of the official mechanisms that USCIS may use to communicate automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents could help USCIS ensure that employers understand and accept each of its official mechanisms for communicating these automatic extensions. This, in turn, would help to reduce the risk of employers’ terminating beneficiaries from their jobs as a result of confusion caused by unclear or inconsistent guidance. Conclusions The Secretary of Homeland Security has granted TPS, providing work authorization and protection from removal, to foreign nationals from 22 countries since TPS was established in 1990. DHS has generally communicated information about employment authorization for TPS beneficiaries in a Federal Register notice, although in some cases USCIS used individually mailed notifications to communicate automatic extensions of employment authorization documents. However, USCIS’s published guidance has not consistently identified individually mailed notifications as a mechanism that may be used, leading to confusion about beneficiaries’ employment eligibility and reportedly resulting in termination of some beneficiaries’ employment. Consistent published guidance that clearly identifies each of the mechanisms used to communicate automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents could help USCIS ensure that employers understand and accept the evidence USCIS provides for employment authorization, reducing the risk of erroneous termination of beneficiaries’ employment. Recommendation for Executive Action The Director of USCIS should update published guidance, such as Handbook for Employers: Guidance for Completing Form I-9 (M-274), to consistently identify each of the official mechanisms that USCIS may use to communicate automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents. (Recommendation 1) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DHS, State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DHS agreed with our recommendation and noted planned actions to implement it, including updating guidance in DHS’s M-274 handbook. DHS’s planned actions will address the intent of our recommendation if they include updating guidance regarding each of the official mechanisms that USCIS may use to communicate automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization documents, including the use of individually mailed notifications. The U.S. Agency for International Development also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV. In addition, DHS and State provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services did not provide comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State, as well as the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Chelsa Gurkin at (202) 512-2964 or GurkinC@gao.gov, or Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-6912 or GamblerR@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this reports are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) describe Temporary Protected Status (TPS) determinations and numbers of beneficiaries since TPS was established in 1990; (2) describe the approach that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Department of State (State) and other relevant agencies, takes to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS reviews; and (3) examine DHS’s public communication regarding TPS decisions and related information, including work authorization. To describe TPS determinations since TPS was established in 1990, we reviewed information and data in Federal Register notices for all TPS designations in fiscal years 1990 through 2019. Specifically, we reviewed the designation time frames and bases (i.e., ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary conditions) for each designation since TPS was established. We also analyzed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data on numbers of TPS beneficiaries for fiscal years 1990 through 2018. In addition, we analyzed USCIS data on TPS beneficiaries’ characteristics, such as numbers, location, age, and gender of foreign nationals granted TPS, for fiscal year 2018. To assess the reliability of USCIS data on TPS beneficiaries, we reviewed documentation and interviewed USCIS officials to identify and rectify any missing or erroneous data. According to USCIS officials, USCIS removes from its data on TPS beneficiaries any who become U.S. citizens or whose status is withdrawn, either because they no longer meet eligibility requirements or because they requested that USCIS withdraw their status. However, according to officials, the data may include foreign nationals who have since died, moved out of the country, or have an additional immigration status. Additionally, because the data comprise information provided by TPS applicants, the data may include a small number of applicant errors, according to officials. We determined that the data for fiscal years 2000 through 2018 were sufficiently reliable to provide general information about the size and characteristics of TPS beneficiaries. USCIS was not able to provide reliable data on numbers of TPS beneficiaries before fiscal year 2000 because, according to USCIS officials, these data were not consistently entered electronically in USCIS information systems. To describe the approach that DHS, in consultation with State and other relevant agencies, takes to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS reviews, we reviewed provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) related to TPS as well as DHS and State documentation, such as informal guidance documents used since fiscal year 2014 or earlier regarding steps taken for a TPS review. We also conducted interviews with DHS and State officials related to the processes they have used to collect information for TPS reviews since fiscal year 2014. Specifically, we interviewed DHS officials from U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Management Directorate; the Office of the Executive Secretary; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Office of Legislative Affairs; the Office of Partnership and Engagement; the Office of Public Affairs; the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, including the Office of Immigration Statistics; and USCIS—in particular, USCIS’s Office of Policy and Strategy and USCIS’s Refugees, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate. We interviewed State officials from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and several regional bureaus, including desk officers from the Bureaus of African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also interviewed State officials from overseas posts for countries that we selected for our review, including El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Sudan, and Yemen. We reviewed documentation that DHS and State provided for a judgmental, nongeneralizable sample of eight countries for which DHS rendered TPS decisions in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 (El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen); the TPS decisions for these eight countries represented 26 of a total of 42 TPS decisions for 13 countries in that period. We selected this sample to represent a range of decision types and designation reasons, among other factors. While this sample cannot be generalized to the countries or decisions we did not review, it provided valuable information about the approach that DHS uses for TPS reviews. The primary documents that we reviewed for each decision included information about country conditions that USCIS and State had compiled and recommendations that USCIS and State leadership had provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Some of the documents that we received had been redacted because of ongoing litigation related to TPS. Table 3 provides additional details of the decisions in our judgmental sample. In addition, we reviewed examples of other information that may be provided for a TPS review, including examples of input from other DHS components, other U.S. agencies, the White House, members of Congress, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Specifically, we received examples of this type of information for each of the eight countries in our judgmental, nongeneralizable sample, representing 15 of the 26 TPS decisions. For example, this information included immigration data and internal intelligence analyses compiled by DHS’s Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Office of Intelligence and Analysis. We also reviewed examples of updates provided by senior Department of Defense officials for the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the security situation in a country; technical input from the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention about the status of an epidemic in a country; and information from the U.S. Agency for International Development about country conditions on the ground. In addition, we interviewed officials from these three agencies regarding the types of information that they may provide for TPS reviews. Further, we reviewed examples of letters from members of Congress, foreign government officials, and nongovernmental organizations related to TPS reviews. Moreover, we reviewed examples of briefing or meeting agendas and related materials for internal and external briefings, including external briefings with White House officials, foreign government officials, and nongovernmental organizations. To examine DHS’s public communication regarding TPS decisions and related information, including work authorization, we reviewed DHS’s public communications related to TPS, including Federal Register notices, press releases, and USCIS’s website, among other information. We analyzed information in Federal Register notices published from November 29, 1990, through October 1, 2019 (the most recent available at the time of our review), to determine the timing of notices for TPS decisions and the types of information included in the notices. We reviewed examples of USCIS’s Office of Public Affairs guidance for public communication of TPS decisions. We also interviewed USCIS officials regarding the mechanisms that DHS used to communicate TPS decisions and related information, including DHS’s process for drafting and publishing Federal Register notices. Further, we examined DHS’s guidance and procedures as of fiscal year 2019 for communicating TPS employment authorization, including automatic extensions of employment authorization. We reviewed USCIS’s public communications related to automatic extensions of TPS employment authorization for both beneficiaries and employers in Federal Register notices, individually mailed notifications, an employer handbook, and information published on USCIS’s website. We interviewed USCIS officials regarding USCIS’s approach to communicating TPS employment authorization, including automatic extensions. We also reviewed information from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s website related to confusion over automatic extensions of employment authorization documents for TPS beneficiaries. Additionally, we reviewed a letter to USCIS signed by 70 law professors and scholars related to instances of employers terminating TPS beneficiaries. Finally, we compared DHS’s guidance and procedures with federal internal control standards related to documenting policies and externally communicating information. We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 to March 2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Numbers and Characteristics of Temporary Protected Status Beneficiaries, Fiscal Years 2000-2018 Table 4 lists the numbers of TPS beneficiaries, by country of citizenship, in fiscal years 2000 through 2018. During this period, the country with the largest number of TPS beneficiaries in any given fiscal year was El Salvador, with 262,262 in fiscal year 2010; followed by Honduras, with 85,759 in fiscal year 2007; and Haiti, with 58,294 in fiscal year 2014. In contrast, during the same period, Montserrat had the smallest maximum number of TPS beneficiaries in any given fiscal year, with a maximum of 21 in fiscal year 2004; followed by Angola, with a maximum of 47 in fiscal year 2002; and Burundi, with a maximum of 50 in fiscal year 2007. Appendix III: Comments from Department of Homeland Security Appendix IV: Comments from U.S. Agency for International Development Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contacts named above, Miriam Carroll Fenton and Taylor Matheson (Assistant Directors), Elisabeth Helmer, Cristina Norland, Ben DeYoung, Martin De Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jenny Grover, Reid Lowe, Mary Moutsos, Jan Montgomery, Jon Najmi, Nicole Willems, and Bailey Wong made key contributions to this report. Alana Miller and Danielle Rudstein provided technical assistance.


Background In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government authorized the President to establish the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to provide nuclear security assistance to Russia and the former Soviet states. At the time, there were significant concerns about Russia’s ability to maintain adequate security over its large numbers of nuclear weapons and vast quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials. In 1995, DOE established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to equip Russia and other countries with modern nuclear material security systems and promote effective nuclear material security practices. The CTR umbrella agreement with Russia—which established an overall legal framework under which the United States would provide nuclear security assistance to Russia—expired in June 2013. Joint nuclear security activities in Russia, however, continued under a multilateral agreement and a related bilateral protocol. In December 2014, in response to U.S. sanctions over Russian actions in Ukraine, the Russian government ended nearly all nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Until then, the United States had been gradually transitioning responsibility to Russia for supporting its nuclear material security systems, and it was anticipated that the U.S. MPC&A program would continue to help Russia sustain its nuclear material security systems until January 1, 2018. See figure 1 for a timeline of major events during the period of cooperation. Starting with fiscal year 2015, and with each fiscal year since, language in annual appropriations laws and national defense authorization acts has largely prohibited NNSA from funding new efforts in Russia, including nuclear material security assistance, unless the prohibition is waived by the Secretary of Energy under certain conditions. Russian Nuclear Material Sites and Structure of Relevant Russian Governmental Organizations Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear materials are stored and processed at more than two dozen sites overseen by a number of Russian entities, and the MPC&A program’s focus was on 25 of these sites at the time of our last report in 2010. The Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) is the Russian agency that manages much of Russia’s nuclear security enterprise, including seven nuclear weapons complex sites located in closed cities. These sites store and process the nuclear materials used in Russia’s nuclear weapons. Of the other 18 sites, many are overseen by Rosatom, but some are independent of Rosatom or managed by other Russian government entities. These sites often hold HEU and plutonium for research reactors or for other civilian purposes. See figure 2 for the location of the 25 Russian nuclear material sites. Other Russian government organizations with responsibilities in nuclear security include the following: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). MFA is responsible for overseeing Russian policy and agreements for cooperation with the United States, including cooperation on nuclear security. Russian Federal Service of Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor). Rostekhnadzor is the regulator responsible for Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities. Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg). Minpromtorg coordinates nuclear material security activities and develops nuclear material security regulations for Russian naval shipbuilding sites, including Sevmash Shipyard, the primary builder of nuclear submarines for the Russian Navy. Russian Ministry of Defense. DOD and NNSA supported Russian efforts to secure Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warheads and strategic rocket sites. That work is outside the scope of this report. NNSA’s Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program The MPC&A program was the primary NNSA program that worked with Russia to help improve Russia’s ability to secure its nuclear materials and its nuclear warheads. To secure Russia’s nuclear materials, the program consisted of three main efforts: Site-level projects. NNSA managed MPC&A projects at the 25 Russian nuclear material sites to upgrade security systems at those sites. Teams of specialists from across DOE’s national laboratories, referred to as U.S. project teams, identified and carried out MPC&A upgrades on behalf of NNSA. MPC&A includes the following types of security systems, among other things: physical protection systems, such as fences around buildings containing nuclear materials and metal doors protecting rooms where nuclear materials are stored; material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and material accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement equipment and computerized databases to inventory the amount and type of nuclear material contained in specific buildings and to track their location. Material control and material accounting are collectively known as material control and accounting. National-level projects. NNSA managed cross-cutting projects to enhance Russia’s national-level infrastructure to sustain MPC&A systems for nuclear materials, including enhancing Russian nuclear security culture, developing Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, and strengthening Russian inspection and oversight capabilities. Sustainability support for individual sites. NNSA also fostered development of MPC&A sustainability practices and procedures at the Russian nuclear material sites based on seven sustainability elements, such as the presence at the site of an effective MPC&A management structure that plans, implements, tests, and evaluates the site’s MPC&A systems. NNSA Completed Many of Its Planned Nuclear Security Efforts in Russia, and Had Concerns about the Sustainability of These Efforts When Cooperation Ended Based on our review of available NNSA documentation and interviews with project team personnel, we found that NNSA had completed many— but not all—site-level MPC&A projects at the 25 Russian nuclear material sites when cooperation ended in 2014. NNSA also made progress on 11 cross-cutting projects that were intended to improve Russia’s national- level nuclear material security infrastructure. In addition, NNSA made progress on supporting the ability of the 25 Russian sites to sustain nuclear material security efforts. However, at the time cooperation ended, NNSA still had a number of concerns about both the sustainability of nuclear security efforts at the 25 sites and the state of Russia’s national- level nuclear material security infrastructure. NNSA Completed Many but Not All Site-Level Projects at the 25 Russian Nuclear Material Sites Based on our review of available NNSA documentation and interviews with stakeholders, we determined that NNSA completed many MPC&A projects at the 25 Russian nuclear material sites, and stakeholders said that these upgrades significantly improved the state of nuclear material security at the sites. In particular, they told us that during the early years of the MPC&A program, the program completed upgrades focused primarily on the most significant security gaps, and in later years the program became more focused on transitioning the responsibility for sustaining nuclear security efforts to Russia. However, not all work was completed before cooperation ended, and project team members told us that the extent of completion varied by site. For example, project team members estimated that 90 percent of MPC&A projects were completed at one site, but that projects at other sites had lower levels of project completion. NNSA was unable to provide a complete set of documents detailing all projects completed and not completed across the 25 sites because several projects were consolidated into continuing programs and have not yet been closed out. In addition, the available site documentation did not always include detailed information on all projects completed or not completed. As a result we could not quantify how much planned work was completed and not completed when cooperation ended across all 25 sites. However, based on our review of available NNSA documents, we were able to identify many completed projects that included specific types of physical protection measures, material access controls, and material accounting upgrades. Project team members we interviewed and documentation we reviewed also indicated that some projects were not completed when cooperation ended. NNSA documentation identifies a variety of uncompleted projects at specific sites, such as not constructing or upgrading perimeter fencing, not replacing aging physical protection equipment, and not upgrading entry control points with vehicle radiation monitors. For example, at one site there were several kilometers of modernized perimeter fencing, guard towers, and sensors that had not been completely installed by the time cooperation ended, according to NNSA documents and project team members. Project team members told us that the site had plans to complete these projects. However, because Russia ended cooperation, the project team was unable to verify that the equipment was installed or operating appropriately. Similarly, project team members told us about two major efforts at another site that were terminated by Russia when cooperation ended: a $1 million project to relocate the guard force building to reduce the reaction time for protective forces and a $300,000 project to update software for the central alarm station and other security systems. According to project team members, the contracts were agreed to and associated costs obligated by NNSA, but Russia ended cooperation before signing the agreements. In addition, in our 2010 classified report, we found that NNSA faced challenges in implementing MPC&A upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities to reduce the risk of material theft. At the time of the 2010 report, NNSA had proposed MPC&A upgrades at certain Russian sites to address these concerns, and GAO found that progress in implementing upgrades at some locations and in some MPC&A technical areas had been limited. For our classified report issued in December 2019, we asked NNSA for an update on the status of these upgrades; in response to our request, NNSA officials told us that due to a lack of cooperation, they had not received additional information from Russian counterparts to determine the status of these upgrades. NNSA Made Substantial Progress on Its Projects to Support Russia’s National- Level Nuclear Material Security Infrastructure, but Some Work Was Not Completed When Cooperation Ended In addition to site-level MPC&A security projects, NNSA managed 11 cross-cutting projects to support Russia’s national-level nuclear material security infrastructure, such as projects to enhance Russian nuclear security culture, develop Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, and strengthen Russian MPC&A inspection and oversight capabilities. We found that—at the time cooperation ended in 2014—NNSA had made substantial progress on its cross-cutting projects. NNSA reported that work was fully completed or mostly completed on at least 10 of the 11 cross-cutting projects by the time cooperation ended. However, NNSA could not provide complete documentation detailing the level of progress for some of these projects. See table 1 below for a description of these project areas. We found that NNSA had planned to do more work on some national- level projects, but that the end of cooperation in 2014 resulted in some planned work not being completed. For example, in the case of regulations development, project team members told us that the project teams had planned to develop numerous regulations with Rosatom, but these were not completed because of the end of cooperation. NNSA Made Some Progress on Improving Sites’ Abilities to Sustain Security Efforts, but NNSA Had Remaining Concerns about Sustainability When Cooperation Ended As part of its plan to shift to Russia the responsibility for nuclear material security efforts, NNSA supported the adoption of MPC&A sustainability practices and procedures at the individual Russian nuclear material sites based on seven “sustainability elements.” NNSA identified these elements, such as performance testing of systems to evaluate MPC&A effectiveness, as being fundamental to the long-term sustainability of a modern nuclear material security system. See table 2 below for more information about the seven sustainability elements. To determine a site’s ability to sustain its security systems, project teams periodically assessed each site based on the seven elements, and rated sites in each element on a scale from low to high. In our 2010 classified report, we reported the results of these sustainability assessments across the 25 Russian nuclear material sites and found that the MPC&A program had made limited progress and faced challenges in developing effective practices and procedures consistent with the seven elements of sustainability. For our classified report issued in December 2019, we reviewed and reported on the most recent sustainability assessments, largely conducted between 2012 and 2014. We compared the ratings from the most recently completed site sustainability assessments for the same 25 sites to the ratings we reported in 2010. We found that sustainability ratings generally improved, but low scores persisted at many sites and in some sustainability areas. For example, we found that the number of high ratings increased over this period by about half, and the number of low ratings decreased by about half. We believe this indicates general progress in improving sustainability across the sites. Of the seven sustainability elements, the MPC&A organization sustainability element was the element most frequently rated as “high” in the most recent assessment, and it showed the most improvement across the 25 sites. This indicates that the ability of Russian site organizations to plan and coordinate MPC&A operations had improved. We also found in our review of these assessments that NNSA had continuing concerns when cooperation ended about both the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades at individual Russian sites and the state of the national-level nuclear material security infrastructure in Russia. In their final reports after cooperation ended, U.S. project teams documented ongoing concerns with the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades at Russian nuclear material sites. We reviewed the concerns in the 25 final site summary documents and interviewed project team members who provided additional examples of these concerns. Based on our documentation review and interviews with project team members, we identified the six most common areas of concerns, including: (1) the responsiveness of protective forces, (2) performance testing the effectiveness of MPC&A systems, (3) sustainment funding, (4) physical protection systems, (5) nuclear security culture, and (6) access and cooperation at Russian sites. Stakeholders we interviewed highlighted a number of national-level concerns in other areas, such as the state of security equipment. Project team members were concerned that some of the equipment provided in the early years of cooperation had become outdated or obsolete by the time cooperation ended, such as surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment, and would need to be replaced. Little Information Is Available on Security at Russian Sites, but Nongovernmental Experts Raised Concerns about Insider Theft Risks There is little specific information available about the current state of security at Russian nuclear material sites, though anecdotal evidence suggests that nuclear material security regulations have improved and that Russia funds some nuclear security efforts. We interviewed DOE officials and national laboratory personnel about security risks and threats to Russian nuclear material security. The details of these conversations are classified. However, according to nongovernmental experts we interviewed, the theft of nuclear materials by insiders is currently considered the greatest threat to Russia’s nuclear materials. Little Specific Information Is Available about Nuclear Security at Russian Sites, but Some Information Exists on National-Level Regulatory Efforts and Security Funding According to stakeholders, little information is available about site-level security currently at the 25 sites holding Russian nuclear material, including the status of U.S. upgrades funded through the MPC&A program. Stakeholders told us that this is primarily because U.S. personnel no longer have access to the sites to observe security improvements and discuss MPC&A practices with Russian site personnel. According to DOE officials, the ability of U.S. project teams and other personnel to visit Russian nuclear material sites helped provide transparency into the state of Russian security at these facilities, such as the status of radiation portal monitors at entry points within nuclear material storage buildings. Since the end of cooperation, few U.S. personnel have visited Russia’s nuclear material sites, greatly limiting transparency into the status of U.S. security investments and Russian security practices. According to NNSA officials and U.S. project team personnel, NNSA documentation—such as the U.S. project team closeout documents that are referred to above—are based on observations primarily from 2014 or earlier. This documentation provides the most recent direct assessments of security at the site level. These officials stated that while such reports are useful for identifying the state of Russian nuclear material site security at the time cooperation ended, they likely do not provide an accurate picture of the nuclear material security at the 25 sites currently. Regarding national-level efforts in Russia to support nuclear security in the country, stakeholders we interviewed said that information exists in two main areas: development of nuclear security regulations and nuclear security funding. Development of nuclear security regulations. According to stakeholders, Russia has improved its nuclear security regulations in recent years, including since cooperation ended in 2014. Although U.S. efforts to help Rosatom develop modern MPC&A regulations ended in 2014, NNSA has continued work with Rostekhnadzor to improve Russian nuclear material security regulations through a national-level MPC&A sustainability project. Stakeholders said that this project has resulted in Russian nuclear security regulatory improvements. For example, this project provided technical support on 11 regulations, including regulations to improve vulnerability assessments of nuclear sites and nuclear materials in transit. However, stakeholders also noted some limitations. For example, they stated that compliance with regulations at nuclear material sites is mostly unknown. Similarly, the effectiveness of enforcement in cases of noncompliance is unknown, though fines are thought to be negligible. Nuclear security funding. Information on nuclear security funding is limited, according to stakeholders. Some stakeholders we interviewed stated that, based on their experiences and conversations with Russian officials, they believed that Russia was generally providing sufficient funding for nuclear material security at sites. However, others doubted that Russia was providing sufficient resources to replace the funding lost when the U.S. MPC&A program ended. Stakeholders generally agreed that funding for nuclear security likely varies by site. A few stakeholders expressed concern that security at nuclear material sites could be one of the first areas cut during an economic downturn, as nuclear security is not seen to be as significant a priority for site managers as other operations and revenue-generating activities at the sites. Nongovernmental Experts Raised Concerns about Insider Theft Risks to Russian Nuclear Materials We interviewed DOE officials and national laboratory personnel about security risks and threats to Russian nuclear material security. The details of these conversations are classified. However, according to nongovernmental experts we interviewed, the theft of nuclear materials by insiders is currently considered the greatest threat to Russia’s nuclear materials. According to nongovernmental experts we interviewed, Russia’s nuclear security culture generally does not prioritize protection against the threat of nuclear material theft by insiders, a threat that modern nuclear security systems are designed and maintained to prevent. For example, experts said that Russian nuclear material site managers were more likely to devote resources—such as training, manpower, and funding— to measures that protect facilities from outsider threats, and less likely to devote resources to measures that protect facilities against insider threats. Experts told us that while the MPC&A program advanced Russian appreciation of the insider threat during the period of cooperation, they were concerned that—without U.S. influence and training—protection against insider threats would still be insufficient and likely ignored unless the Russian government required such protection, which was not the case when cooperation ended. As a result, according to experts, Russian sites are likely not currently supporting MPC&A systems adequately to counter insider threats. One nongovernmental expert noted that Russian security services have assumed greater control and tightened security in the closed cities that contain the vast majority of Russia’s nuclear materials, and that this may have reduced the near-term threat from insiders. However, according to this expert, over time this reliance on the security services could create vulnerabilities. For example, some Russian sites may rely too heavily on the physical security elements of nuclear security systems—such as guard forces—to protect nuclear materials and may become complacent in modernizing other elements, such as material control and accounting practices to deter and prevent insider theft risks, or measures that can protect against other emerging, nontraditional threats such as drone or cyber risks. According to nongovernmental experts, other factors in the country may also exacerbate the risk of theft posed by both outsiders and insiders to Russia’s nuclear materials. For example, experts said the existence of massive amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials at many dispersed sites across Russia is the primary factor that makes Russia’s nuclear materials a greater threat than the nuclear materials held in most other countries. In addition, according to experts, persistent corruption and existing terrorist groups near some of the closed cities are other contributing factors that could further increase the risk of theft. According to Stakeholders, Opportunities May Exist for Cooperation to Improve Russian Nuclear Material Security, but Such Cooperation Would Face Challenges According to stakeholders, there could be opportunities to help Russia improve aspects of its nuclear security system that NNSA and others identified as continuing risks. However, stakeholders noted that any future cooperation would likely be limited in scope and would face considerable political challenges. Future Cooperation Would Likely Be Limited but Could Still Help Address Remaining Nuclear Material Security Risks in Russia According to stakeholders we interviewed, there could be opportunities for future U.S.-Russia cooperation to address some of the continuing nuclear security risks in Russia. However, stakeholders said that any future cooperation would likely differ dramatically from the donor-recipient model of the past MPC&A program. The Russian government would likely expect to be treated as an equal and would not want to be seen as a recipient of U.S. funds for infrastructure improvements. Therefore, the scope of future cooperation would likely be a limited partnership, would primarily involve training and information sharing rather than directly supporting security upgrades at Russian sites, and would require fewer U.S. resources than the past MPC&A program did. Stakeholders told us that engagement and cooperation are important because of the size of the Russian nuclear complex, the large amounts of Russian nuclear material, and the continuing security concerns in certain areas. Stakeholders told us they believed there would be security benefits to the United States in resuming nuclear security cooperation with Russia in some form. Stakeholders generally identified increased transparency and advancing security best practices as the two main benefits to nuclear security cooperation. Stakeholders we spoke to identified examples of opportunities for cooperation that could support U.S. interests by providing information on the security of Russia’s nuclear materials and by helping Russia improve nuclear material security practices and procedures. These include the following: Exchange of best practices. Stakeholders noted that the United States and Russia could share MPC&A best practices in conferences and workshops. Best practices could cover areas such as performance testing of MPC&A systems, insider threat protection, and material control and accounting. Some stakeholders said that Russian expertise, such as in nuclear forensics, could increase U.S. knowledge and potentially improve U.S. practices in certain areas. Technical exchanges. Stakeholders told us that there could be benefits to both the United States and Russia from reciprocal technical exchanges or meetings of nuclear security experts to review specific, technical MPC&A practices that each country employs. National laboratory personnel noted that past exchanges under the MPC&A program allowed Russian personnel to view MPC&A systems at U.S. facilities, which helped Russian personnel understand the features of modern MPC&A systems, such as insider threat prevention measures. U.S. personnel participated in reciprocal visits to view security measures at sites in Russia, which helped them understand Russian security practices. Stakeholders told us that such technical exchanges could help U.S. personnel better understand the state of Russian nuclear security funding and current Russian practices. Training. Experts and national laboratory personnel noted that training Russian personnel on technical matters—such as how to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments—could improve Russian security practices. Conversations on legal agreements. Some stakeholders said that initiating conversations with Russia on the status of existing but suspended legal agreements could provide an opening for other forms of cooperation. For example, a few stakeholders mentioned an existing—but suspended—research and development agreement from 2013 under which future nuclear security cooperation might be pursued if both parties were interested in reactivating the agreement. Cooperation within multilateral organizations. Some stakeholders noted that existing multilateral organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, could provide venues for the United States to pursue cooperative opportunities with Russia. For example, Russia and the United States could cooperate on developing recommendations to the IAEA on physical protection measures for nuclear material, which could then be shared with IAEA member states. Other opportunities. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a U.S. nongovernmental organization (NGO), and the Center for Energy and Security Studies, a Russian NGO, coauthored a report that identified 51 mutually beneficial opportunities to cooperate in nuclear security, nuclear safety, nuclear energy, nuclear science, and nuclear environmental remediation. For example, the report identifies an opportunity for Russian and U.S. experts to establish a joint research and development program to improve nuclear security technologies to address emerging threats to nuclear material storage sites, such as drones. Russia would likely insist that it and the United States be seen as equal partners under any future arrangement or program for cooperation on nuclear security, according to stakeholders. However, U.S. project team personnel told us that Russian nuclear material sites often lack the financial resources to pay travel costs for Russian personnel or to cover costs for venues or workshops necessary for training or the exchange of best practices. Therefore, the level of funding to support any potential future cooperation might be disproportionate between the United States and Russia. Because we were unable to obtain views from Russian officials and Russian nuclear material site representatives, we were unable to establish the extent to which Russia would be willing to pursue any form of nuclear material security cooperation with the United States, regardless of funding sources and requirements. Potential Cooperation Faces Significant Challenges Stakeholders we interviewed were generally pessimistic about cooperation under the current political and diplomatic climate, and they noted that the deterioration of political relations is the most significant challenge to any future cooperation. Stakeholders identified other specific challenges, including the following: Funding prohibition. Some stakeholders said that provisions in recent appropriations acts and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) prohibiting NNSA from funding nuclear security activities in Russia have been obstacles to cooperating on nuclear security matters. In a report submitted to Congress in May 2019, NNSA stated that “the lack of ability to sign new contracts or engage on a modest scale denies NNSA the insights necessary to directly monitor nuclear material security in Russia and the sustainment of past security improvements.” According to U.S. officials and U.S. project team personnel, the prohibition largely prevents U.S. personnel from sharing best practices with and training Russian counterparts, and the existence of the prohibition discourages U.S. and Russian personnel from interacting and maintaining relationships. Although the acts allow the Secretary of Energy to waive the prohibition under certain conditions, no secretary has done so since a prohibition was first included in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations act. In addition, according to NNSA officials we interviewed, the language describing waiver requirements in NDAAs has become more restrictive in recent years. Initially, the Secretary of Energy could waive the prohibition on the basis of a notification to certain congressional committees that the waiver was in the national security interest of the United States, an accompanying justification, and the passage of 15 days. Starting with the fiscal year 2017 NDAA, however, a waiver can only be issued if it is necessary to address an urgent nuclear-related threat in Russia, and any such waiver requires concurrence from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Russian conditions on cooperation. Stakeholders we interviewed said that Russia has set conditions on any future nuclear security cooperation. For example, they said that Russia has indicated that it is unwilling to discuss nuclear security cooperation with the United States unless the United States is willing to discuss related areas, such as nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and nuclear science. According to stakeholders, in the past the United States has been unwilling to discuss these other areas as a condition for cooperating on nuclear security. Russian antagonism to U.S. security efforts. Stakeholders noted antagonism at some levels of the Russian government toward U.S. nuclear security efforts. For example, although Russia participates in nuclear security efforts at the IAEA, some stakeholders noted that Russia regularly obstructs U.S. initiatives and recommendations in that organization. As noted above, stakeholders view the general deterioration of political relations between the United States and Russia as the greatest challenge to cooperation, and it is not clear whether Russia is prepared to reengage with the United States on these or other options for rekindling U.S.- Russian nuclear security cooperation. We reached out to the Russian government to request meetings with Russian government officials and representatives of nuclear material sites who could provide Russian perspectives on efforts to secure Russia’s nuclear materials, the status of past U.S. nuclear material security investments, and potential opportunities for cooperation. The Russian government declined our requests to meet with these officials and site representatives. Therefore, without Russian perspectives on the likelihood of possible future cooperation, we were unable to determine whether changes to U.S. policy, such as lifting the funding prohibition, would have any meaningful effect on the status of nuclear security cooperation between the United States and Russia. Agency Comments We provided a draft of the classified version of this report to NNSA for review and comment. NNSA had no comments on the report. We are sending copies of this product to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the NNSA Administrator, and the Secretaries of Defense and State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report (1) examines the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) planned nuclear material security efforts in Russia were completed when cooperation ended and what nuclear security concerns remained, (2) describes what is known about the current state of nuclear material security in Russia, and (3) describes stakeholder views on potential opportunities for future U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation. For all three objectives, we identified and interviewed relevant stakeholders, including U.S. government officials from NNSA, the Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, and the Department of Defense; experts on Russian nuclear security from academia and nongovernmental organizations (NGO); and knowledgeable personnel at six U.S. national laboratories that supported U.S. nuclear security efforts in Russia, including personnel at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. We identified the stakeholders by contacting government agencies and NGOs with nuclear security expertise and asking them to identify other knowledgeable stakeholders. We reached out to these other knowledgeable stakeholders and interviewed those who responded and were willing to speak with us. To identify nongovernmental experts, we compiled a list of individuals who stakeholders identified as having expertise in the area of nuclear security in Russia. We also worked with a staff librarian to conduct an independent search of published literature to identify nongovernmental experts who had authored multiple publications related to Russian nuclear security. In addition, to ascertain whether an individual should be considered a nongovernmental expert, we considered other information, such as invitations to speak at nuclear security panels, being an editor of nuclear security related journals, and relevant positions in academic and other nongovernmental institutions. We interviewed six nongovernmental experts who fit these criteria. To examine the extent to which NNSA’s planned nuclear material security efforts in Russia were completed when cooperation ended and what nuclear security concerns remained, we reviewed documents prepared by NNSA and the national laboratories for each of the 25 nuclear material sites in Russia where the United States worked previously with Russia to improve security. To identify NNSA sustainability programs at a national level, we reviewed GAO reports and NNSA project documentation. We also reviewed NNSA guidelines that detailed how project teams were to support and assess the ability of Russian sites to sustain their material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems. We reviewed the NNSA documents that assessed site sustainability and analyzed how site sustainability had changed at sites by the end of cooperation. These documents included project team assessments for each of the 25 sites in seven different sustainability elements. In these assessments, project teams provided ratings from low to high on the extent to which sites were prepared to sustain these areas. We also reviewed NNSA documents and identified concerns that site teams documented about site sustainability. We then analyzed the concerns from the 25 sites and grouped similar concerns into categories. We developed these categories based on the similarity of the concerns, definitions of key nuclear security areas in NNSA documents, and professional judgement. We then identified the six concerns that appeared most frequently, which accounted for about 70 percent of all concerns. To describe what is known about the current state of nuclear security in Russia—in addition to interviews with our stakeholder group—we reviewed U.S. government and open-source documents. Specifically, we reviewed reports from the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the Nuclear Threat Institute, the National Academies of Science, and a national laboratory; articles on Russian nuclear security; and periodic reports on Russian nuclear security published by an expert independent consultant. In addition to general internet searches for published documents relating to Russian nuclear security and the MPC&A program, we conducted literature searches of published materials with assistance from a staff librarian; we excluded from our literature review any search results that were published prior to 2014 or were not related to nuclear material security in Russia. In addition to unclassified interviews with U.S. government officials on Russian nuclear material security, we received classified briefings from DOE. We requested threat and risk information relating to Russian nuclear material security from the Central Intelligence Agency, but we were not provided this information. To describe stakeholder views on potential opportunities for future U.S.- Russia nuclear security cooperation, we interviewed those in our stakeholder group identified above. We also reviewed administration plans and reports, including the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, and NNSA’s May 2019 Report to Congress describing NNSA’s funding of nuclear security improvements in Russia. To inform our understanding of the prohibition on NNSA’s expenditures on nuclear security in Russia, we reviewed laws since fiscal year 2015 that restricted relevant NNSA funding in some way. In addition, to obtain Russian perspectives on nuclear material security and past U.S. efforts, we requested—through the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—interviews with Russian officials at relevant Russian agencies and representatives at five Russian nuclear material sites. However, the Russian government declined our request to meet with these officials and representatives. Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments David Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov In addition to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant Director), Dave Messman (Analyst in Charge), and Dan Will made key contributions to this report. Antoinette Capaccio, Ellen Fried, Greg Marchand, Dan Royer, and Sara Sullivan also contributed to this report.