Background Key DOD Cyber Hygiene Initiatives DOD officials identified three key department-wide initiatives that include a number of cybersecurity practices aimed at improving cyber hygiene: the DC3I, the CDIP, and the Cyber Awareness Challenge training. These efforts recognize the importance of command leadership, best practices for DOD network users, and technical countermeasures against cybersecurity threats. DC3I. In September 2015, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the DC3I in an effort to transform DOD cybersecurity culture by enabling and reshaping leaders, cyber providers, personnel who perform cyberspace operations, and general users to improve individual human performance and accountability on DOD’s network. The DC3I memorandum identifies 11 tasks assigned to various DOD components to respond to and implement across the department— such as the development of cybersecurity training briefs for DOD leadership, integration of cybersecurity into operational training and exercises, and the development of a resourcing plan to support scheduled inspections of units conducting cyberspace operations. From September 2015 to December 2016, U.S. Cyber Command was initially responsible for ensuring that relevant components implemented the DC3I. In December 2016, the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned the DOD CIO as the official responsible for ensuring that components implemented the initiative because, in part, the DOD CIO has DOD-wide oversight authority. CDIP. The CDIP is one of seven actions identified in DOD’s Cybersecurity Campaign to prompt commanders and senior leaders to enforce full cybersecurity compliance and accountability across the department. In October 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed the CDIP to reinforce basic cybersecurity technical requirements identified in policies, directives, and orders as a means to defend DOD information networks, secure DOD data, and mitigate risks to DOD missions. The CDIP memorandum identifies 17 tasks for all commanders and supervisors to implement across the department. These tasks include removing operating system software that no longer receives security updates from vendors, configuring servers consistent with DOD guidance on secure configurations, and addressing vulnerabilities for servers and network infrastructure in a timely manner. Cyber Awareness Challenge Training. This training is intended to help the DOD workforce (including service members, civilians, and contractors) to maintain awareness of known and emerging cybersecurity threats, reinforce best practices to keep information and information systems secure, and ensure that network users stay abreast of changes in DOD cybersecurity policies. DISA develops the training content and periodically updates the training. In addition, the Cyber Workforce Advisory Group that includes officials from the DOD CIO, DISA, and DOD components, solicit input about ways to improve the training and meets annually to approve updates to the Cyber Awareness Challenge. Increasing Cybersecurity Awareness and Accountability at Leadership Levels Federal law and a DOD initiative and strategy highlight the important role of leadership in improving cybersecurity culture and performance across the department. For example, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires agency heads—including the Secretary of Defense—to ensure that senior agency officials provide security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets under their control. Additionally, the DC3I states that leaders will be held accountable by the chain of command for the cybersecurity performance of their organization and the individuals who comprise it, and for the role cybersecurity performance plays in accomplishing assigned missions. It also states that leaders will set an example and help individuals master appropriate cyber behavior, will take action against those who commit gross negligence or errors of commission, and may use all available means, both legal and administrative, as they deem appropriate. Further, the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy states that reducing the department’s network attack surface (i.e., the different points in a network where attackers can try to enter or extract information) requires an increase in cybersecurity awareness and accountability across the department. The strategy also states that the department would hold DOD personnel accountable for their cybersecurity practices and choices. The 2019 Cybersecurity Readiness Review, directed by the Secretary of the Navy, describes best practices for effective cybersecurity leadership. These best practices, according to the readiness review, require Navy leaders to be informed on cybersecurity issues facing their organization, engaged in ensuring cybersecurity issues are addressed, and hold their organization accountable for cybersecurity performance. Key Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities A number of DOD officials and components have key roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity, including the three key cyber hygiene initiatives. For example: Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. FISMA makes the Secretary of Defense responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm facing the department. In addition, Executive Order 13800, issued in May 2017, aligns with FISMA by holding agency heads accountable for implementing risk management measures commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm that would result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of IT and data. DOD Chief Information Officer. FISMA requires DOD to develop, document, and implement a program to provide security for information and information systems (commonly referred to as a cybersecurity program) and directs the Secretary of Defense to delegate to the DOD CIO (and military department CIOs) authority to ensure compliance with the law. In addition, the DOD CIO is responsible for overseeing implementation of the three key cyber hygiene initiatives. DOD Component heads. DOD component heads are responsible for ensuring that IT under their purview complies with DOD Instruction 8500.01. In addition, component heads are responsible for ensuring that their network users complete annual security awareness training. DOD Component CIOs. DOD component CIOs are responsible for developing, implementing, maintaining, and enforcing a component cybersecurity program on behalf of their respective component heads. In doing so, component CIOs are responsible for ensuring that their components implement the CDIP tasks. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for advising the President and Secretary of Defense on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs. The Chairman also assists the Secretary of Defense in implementing operational responses to cyber threats and ensures cyberspace plans and operations are compatible with other military plans and operations. The staff members who support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are referred to as the Joint Staff, which is comprised of members from all of the military services. U.S. Cyber Command. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command has the mission to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners. In addition, the Commander is responsible for, among other things, issuing orders and directives to all DOD components for the execution of global operations aimed at securing and defending the department’s networks. Defense Information Systems Agency. The Director of DISA is responsible for developing, implementing, and managing cybersecurity for the department’s network and works with other components to secure DOD systems. For example, the Director is responsible for developing cybersecurity awareness training for all users on DOD’s network. JFHQ-DODIN. The Commander of JFHQ-DODIN is responsible for, among other things, commanding, controlling, planning, directing, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing DOD defensive cybersecurity operations. JFHQ-DODIN also performs two types of cyber readiness inspections to ensure DOD units comply with requirements related to network security and to evaluate the ability of units to accurately detect and mitigate vulnerabilities and anomalous activity on DOD’s network. Cybersecurity Is a High- Risk Area The security of federal cyber assets has been on our High-Risk List since 1997. In September 2018, we issued an update to this high-risk area that identified actions needed to address cybersecurity challenges facing the nation—including improving implementation of government-wide cybersecurity initiatives aimed at securing federal systems and information. We also have identified ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation as one of nine high-risk areas that need especially focused executive and congressional attention. In August 2017, we reported on DOD’s progress in implementing the department’s cyber strategies. We found that DOD had implemented the cybersecurity elements of the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy and had made progress in implementing the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cybersecurity Campaign, which was comprised of multiple initiatives including the CDIP. However, DOD’s process for monitoring implementation of the DOD Cyber Strategy resulted in the closure of tasks before they were fully implemented. We also found that DOD lacked a timeframe and process for monitoring implementation of the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign objective to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. We recommended that DOD (1) modify criteria for closing tasks as implemented and reevaluate tasks previously determined to be completed to ensure they meet modified criteria and (2) establish a timeframe and monitor implementation of the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign objective to develop cybersecurity readiness assessments to help ensure accountability. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations. As of January 2020, neither recommendation had been implemented. DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Key Cyber Hygiene Initiatives and Does Not Know the Extent of Protection DOD has not fully implemented its three cyber hygiene initiatives. Specifically, (1) the DOD CIO and DOD components have not implemented seven of the 11 DC3I tasks due in fiscal year 2016; (2) DOD has implemented six of 10 CDIP tasks that the DOD CIO oversees and does not know the extent that seven other CDIP tasks are implemented; and (3) DOD did not know the extent to which users for selected components completed the Cyber Awareness Challenge training in 2018 and one component did not use the required training. In addition, the department does not know the extent that cyber hygiene practices to protect its networks from key cyberattack techniques have been implemented. DOD Has Not Implemented Seven of the 11 DC3I Tasks Due in Fiscal Year 2016 DOD has not implemented seven of the 11 DC3I tasks despite fiscal year 2016 deadlines for each of the tasks being established by the department. In particular, DOD components have implemented four DC3I tasks and have not implemented the seven remaining tasks, as shown in figure 1. As shown above, DOD has implemented four DC3I tasks. For example, DOD CIO implemented a task that requires that office to assess the effect of cyber workforce shortfalls on DOD’s mission and provide recommendations to address these shortfalls (task 10 in figure 1 above). Specifically, in April 2019, DOD CIO provided a plan to the Office of Personnel Management to address cyber workforce shortages by filling vacant positions, enhancing outreach and recruitment, and expanding on hiring authorities. However, DOD has not implemented the remaining seven DC3I tasks. For example: DOD has not fully implemented leadership cybersecurity training briefs (task 1). In April 2016, U.S. Cyber Command developed two training briefs to be used in leadership training. However, as of October 2019, DOD components have not received either training brief, according to DOD officials. In September 2016, U.S. Cyber Command provided the Deputy Secretary of Defense a DC3I status report and informed him that two products were developed to address this task and that they would be disseminated to DOD components. However, as of October 2019, neither U.S. Cyber Command nor the Office of the DOD CIO had disseminated these leadership training briefs across the department, according to DOD officials. In reviewing the training briefs, we found that, if they had been incorporated into DOD leadership training, leaders would have been better positioned to address cybersecurity risks. For example, they may have learned, among other things, how to understand, assess, and interpret cyber-reportable events and incidents and how they affect military operations. DOD has not developed cyber-provider training (task 2). In February 2019, the office of the DOD CIO completed a review of all military and civilian IT positions to identify the work roles of all cyber providers in the department. However, the office has not developed educational and training requirements for cyber providers. DOD CIO officials told us that, consistent with task 2, they are drafting a DOD Manual, Cyber Workforce Qualification and Management Program, which would document educational and training requirements for the work roles for each cyber provider. DOD CIO officials expect to complete the manual around April 2020. DOD has not fully implemented criteria for assessing cybersecurity in operational training and exercises (task 5). In March 2016, the Joint Staff developed criteria for assessing military service and combatant command efforts to integrate cybersecurity into operational training and exercises. For example, the Joint Staff developed a checklist of cybersecurity elements that should be included in cyberspace-related training objectives and assessed during training events. In May 2016, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff required that the criteria be used to assess military service and combatant command efforts to integrate cybersecurity into operational training and exercises. In May 2019, Joint Chiefs of Staff officials told us the criteria was not incorporated into the Chairman’s annual training guidance, citing personnel turnover, and that they do not have plans to incorporate the criteria. According to the DC3I, operational and tactical commanders and leaders need to interpret the effect that cyber insecurity may have on the mission and integrate cyber effects into mission planning. If Joint Staff had updated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance for operational training, DOD commanders would have had criteria they could use to assess the effect that cyber insecurity may have on military missions. The lack of progress in implementing the tasks occurred, in part, because the DOD CIO did not take steps to ensure that the DC3I tasks were implemented. DOD CIO officials told us they were not aware of their responsibility to oversee implementation of the DC3I. Initially, U.S. Cyber Command was assigned as the entity responsible for overseeing implementation of the DC3I; however, in December 2016, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the transition of the DC3I mission lead to the department’s CIO. According to this transition memorandum, the CIO was to leverage existing authorities and departmental efforts to lead and provide oversight of cybersecurity culture and compliance transformation. Additionally, DOD CIO officials told us that the office is focusing its resources on other CIO initiatives, such as implementing the cyber landscape initiative. However, the DC3I included a task (task 11 in figure 1 above) that required an assessment of the resources needed to ensure that DOD implemented the DC3I and this task had not been completed at the time of our review. If DOD CIO does not take appropriate steps to ensure that the DC3I tasks are implemented, the department risks compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of mission-critical information as a result of human error by users on the department’s networks. DOD Has Implemented Six of 10 CDIP Tasks That the DOD CIO Oversees and Does Not Know the Extent That Seven Other CDIP Tasks Have Been Implemented DOD Has Implemented Six of 10 CDIP Tasks That the DOD CIO Oversees Since 2015, DOD has implemented six of 10 CDIP tasks that the DOD CIO is to oversee, but has not achieved desired performance targets for the remaining four tasks even though there is a requirement to implement all 10 by the end of fiscal year 2018. In the 2015 CDIP memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed DOD components to implement all 17 CDIP tasks for all system users, IT hardware, and IT software to remove preventable vulnerabilities from DOD’s network that could allow adversaries to compromise information and information systems. According to a March 2019 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense challenged the department to achieve 90 percent implementation of the 10 CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO by the end of fiscal year 2018. In table 1, we list the 17 tasks and indicate the 10 tasks that the department’s CIO oversees. The department has achieved its performance targets for six of the 10 CDIP tasks that the DOD CIO oversees. For example, in October 2018 DOD achieved its performance target for one task that requires the department to move all of DOD’s web servers into a DOD “demilitarized zone,” or DMZ, according to DOD’s fiscal year 2018 Federal Information Security Modernization Act report to the director of the Office of Management and Budget. Placing these web servers in a DMZ directs web traffic intended for those servers—including malicious traffic—to systems within perimeter firewalls that screen the traffic before allowing access to organizations networks. By implementing the task and moving 11,000 web servers into the DMZ, DOD has reduced the risk that malicious traffic can reach its web servers. However, the department has not achieved the department-wide goal for the four remaining CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO. For example, DOD did not achieve its performance target for a task that required components to ensure they were compliant with endpoint security guidance. DOD CIO officials told us that the remaining four CDIP tasks are challenging for the department to achieve the 90 percent performance target because some DOD components use aging information technology systems and these older systems may not be equipped to implement all CDIP tasks. We have previously reported that legacy systems have operated with known cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are either technically difficult or prohibitively expensive to address. In light of the security risks posed by DOD component legacy systems, we stated that it is imperative that agencies carefully plan for their successful modernization. DOD did not achieve the 90 percent goal for four of the 10 CDIP tasks by the end of fiscal year 2018 due in part to DOD components not developing plans with scheduled completion dates to implement these four tasks, according to DOD officials. DOD CIO officials told us that they had not required DOD components to develop plans with scheduled completion dates for the remaining four CDIP tasks. CIO officials believed that the DOD components would implement the CDIP memorandum since it was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and it required them to report on their progress in implementing the CDIP tasks. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense did require DOD components to implement these four tasks and report on their progress, components have not achieved performance targets. If DOD components do not develop plans with scheduled completion dates to implement the remaining four CDIP tasks, the department may fail to remove preventable, well-known vulnerabilities from its network and may allow adversaries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of sensitive information and information systems. DOD Does Not Know the Extent that Seven CDIP Tasks Have Been Implemented DOD does not know the extent to which components have implemented the seven CDIP tasks that the CIO does not oversee because the responsible components have not reported on their progress, according to DOD officials. For example, DOD has not reported on the extent to which components have disabled hyperlinks to websites that users receive in email messages. Disabling hyperlinks in email messages can help to prevent phishing attacks. DISA officials told us that the agency implemented a security protocol that disables these hyperlinks in DISA’s email server. Consequently, DOD components that use DISA’s email service are compliant with this task’s requirement; however, not all DOD components use DISA’s email service and the extent to which other email services comply with this task is unknown. The CDIP memorandum signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that the department’s progress in implementing all CDIP tasks would be reported. However, the department has not reported on the progress it has made implementing the seven CDIP tasks that the CIO does not oversee in part because the Deputy Secretary of Defense did not identify, in the CDIP memorandum, a component to oversee the implementation of these tasks and report on their progress. According to DOD CIO officials, some of these seven tasks are more tactical and may be more appropriately tracked at echelons below the office of the DOD CIO. For example, one of these seven tasks requires that commanders ensure the physical security of their network infrastructure devices. We agree that lower echelons may more effectively track the progress of some tasks; however, information about the progress that components make implementing these tasks is not reported to the CIO or any other DOD component, according to DOD officials. In addition, DOD CIO officials told us that JFHQ-DODIN collects some information from inspections it performs to verify the extent that inspected units implement technical guidance documents, some of which relate to these seven CDIP tasks. However, according to DOD officials, JFHQ-DODIN does not report this information to the CIO or any other DOD component. In addition, JFHQ-DODIN inspects a sample of DOD units and therefore does not have information about the status of these tasks across the department. For those units that are inspected, no DOD component is aggregating data from these inspections to identify the extent to which these seven tasks are implemented. If the Deputy Secretary of Defense does not identify a DOD component to oversee the implementation of the seven CDIP tasks that DOD CIO does not oversee and report on progress implementing them, the department will have less assurance that cybersecurity vulnerabilities are being addressed in a timely manner and systems are being securely configured. DOD Has Not Fully Implemented Its Cyber Awareness Challenge Training Initiative Selected DOD Components Did Not Know the Extent to Which Their Users Implemented the 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge Training The 16 selected components we included in our sample did not always collect information on the number of users (1) that completed the fiscal year 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training, (2) that did not complete the training, and (3) whose network access was revoked for not completing the cyber awareness training. Specifically: Unknown number of users that completed the cyber awareness training. Two of the 16 did not collect information on the number of users that completed the fiscal year 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training. In particular, the Army and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service could not provide data on the extent that users had taken the required training in fiscal year 2018. Unknown number of users that did not complete the cyber awareness training. Six of the 16 components did not collect information on the number of users that did not complete the cyber awareness training. In particular, the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, U.S. European Command, and the Defense Media Activity did not collect information on the users who did not complete the training in fiscal year 2018. In addition, the Army’s training compliance system did not have records for all Army users in 2018, which limited the Army’s ability to determine if all of its users completed the fiscal year 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training. Unknown number of users whose network access had been revoked for not completing the required training. Eight of the 16 components that we contacted did not collect data on the number of users whose network access had been revoked for not completing the required training, as implied by DOD policy. Selected DOD components did not know the extent to which their network users implemented the 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training by completing it because the DOD component heads did not ensure that their respective components were accurately monitoring and reporting the necessary information. Navy officials told us that they believed it was not DOD or the military service’s policy for the service headquarters to track whether their network users had completed the training. According to Navy officials, there is also no value for large organizations like the Navy, with over 600,000 users, to track and report these data at the headquarters level. However, DOD policy requires all network users to take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training annually. In addition, DOD policy states that all individuals with network access must complete this training to retain access. NIST also advises that agencies capture training compliance data at an agency level, so data can be used to conduct agency-wide analysis and reporting. Multiple DOD policy and guidance documents—including DOD Manual 8570.01-M, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01F—state that the DOD component heads are responsible for ensuring that users complete the Cyber Awareness Challenge training and two of these documents require recording training compliance. For example, according to DOD Manual 8570.01-M, Information Assurance (IA) Workforce Improvement Program, components must document and maintain the status of awareness compliance for each user. Further, service policy and guidance places the responsibility on the DOD component heads or senior-level leaders at the headquarters’ level for ensuring that cybersecurity training is completed and documented. For example, Secretary of Navy Instruction 5239.3C, Department of Navy Cybersecurity Policy (May 2, 2016), states that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps shall ensure all authorized users of Department of Navy information systems and networks receive initial cybersecurity awareness orientation as a condition of access and, thereafter, complete annual refresher training, monitor and report workforce cybersecurity training and maintain supporting records. Similarly, Army Regulation 25-2, Army Cybersecurity (Apr. 4, 2019), states that the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 is responsible for ensuring that cybersecurity training is integrated and conducted throughout the Army. If the DOD component heads do not ensure that their respective components accurately monitor and report information on the extent that users have completed the Cyber Awareness Challenge training—as well as have access revoked for not completing the training—the components may be unable to ensure that DOD users are trained in the steps needed to address cybersecurity threats to the department. DARPA Has Not Required its Users to Take DOD’s Cyber Awareness Challenge Training One of the 16 selected components in our review—DARPA—did not require its users to take DOD’s Cyber Awareness Challenge training, according to DARPA officials, even though it is required by policy. Instead, DARPA has required its users to take cybersecurity training that it developed. While DARPA developed its own training program, we found that this training program did not address all of the requirements identified in a DOD staff manual or the cybersecurity training topics identified by the Cyber Workforce Advisory Group. DARPA officials recognized that its cybersecurity training was not equivalent to the DOD’s Cyber Awareness Challenge training program, which according to DOD CIO officials, addressed the training topics identified by the DOD Cyber Workforce Advisory Group. They explained that DARPA designs its courses to be concise to allow their personnel to focus on accomplishing the agency’s mission and that users can obtain additional information from references cited in the course materials. In addition, these officials told us that they were unaware their users were required to take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training that DISA developed. The DOD CIO is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Cyber Awareness Challenge training, according to DOD CIO officials. However, DOD CIO officials told us they were not aware that DARPA has not required its users to take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training that DISA developed and they did not assess the extent that components complied with the requirement for components to use the DISA- developed training. If the DOD CIO does not ensure that DARPA and any other DOD components take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training developed by DISA, users in these components may take actions that lead to or enable exploitations of DOD information systems. DOD Does Not Know the Extent that Cyber Hygiene Practices Have Been Implemented to Protect DOD Networks from Key Cyberattack Techniques DOD identified key techniques that adversaries use most frequently and that pose significant risk to the department’s networks and identified cyber hygiene practices to protect the department’s networks from these techniques. Specifically, JFHQ-DODIN has identified the cyberattack techniques that the agency observes adversaries using most frequently to attack the department’s networks. In addition, the National Security Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the DOD CIO identified 177 cyberattack techniques and prioritized the techniques according to the level of risk each posed to the department’s networks. The agencies prioritized the techniques using various criteria including the prevalence of the technique and whether the department could detect the use of the technique. Further, the department has established cyber hygiene practices to mitigate most of the frequently occurring techniques and those that the department identified as the highest priority, according to DISA and JFHQ-DODIN officials. However, the department does not know the extent that these cyber hygiene practices have been implemented across the department to protect its networks from these key cyberattack techniques. Components have visibility of the extent that they have implemented practices within their component, according to DOD officials. For example, DISA officials told us that they require their component to implement cyber hygiene practices to protect DOD networks from key cyberattack techniques and are able to determine the extent that those practices are implemented within DISA. However, no component or office within the department has complete visibility of the department’s efforts to implement these protective practices across the department, according to DOD officials. FISMA states that agency heads shall be responsible for, among other things, providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction of such information systems. Executive Order 13800 states that agency heads will be held accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises. The order requires agency heads to use the NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (commonly referred to as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework) to manage their agency’s cybersecurity risk. The Cybersecurity Framework calls for senior executives to monitor cybersecurity risk in the same context as financial risk and other organizational risks. In doing so, the Cybersecurity Framework calls for agencies to, among other things, assess cybersecurity risks (including threats), prioritize cybersecurity outcomes and requirements based on that risk, and establish processes to assess and monitor the implementation of the cybersecurity outcomes and requirements. The department does not know the extent that practices to protect DOD networks from key cyberattack techniques have been implemented across the department in part because no DOD component monitors the extent to which such practices are implemented, according to DOD officials. Officials from JFHQ-DODIN told us that they are able to detect when adversaries are using techniques to attack the department’s networks. However, detecting an attack after it has commenced may still enable an adversary to inflict harm on the department’s networks and the information therein. If the Secretary of Defense does not direct a component to monitor the extent to which practices to protect its network are implemented, gaps in protection could go undetected. These gaps can jeopardize military operations, performance of critical functions, and protection of information within DOD systems and networks. Senior DOD Leaders Have Not Received Information on Two Cyber Hygiene Initiatives or Cyber Hygiene Practices DOD requirements and best practices recognize that senior DOD leaders need key information to make risk-based decisions. Specifically, the DC3I memorandum requires the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, in coordination with the DOD CIO, to provide quarterly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the progress in implementing the DC3I. Further, the CDIP memorandum requires the department to report progress implementing the CDIP tasks. In addition, NIST Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, states that the CIO should ensure that agency heads and senior managers are informed of the progress of the security awareness and training program’s implementation. Senior DOD leaders receive two recurring reports on the department’s cybersecurity posture that include information on one cyber hygiene initiative. Specifically, the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard (Scorecard) is a report measuring compliance with DOD cybersecurity policies, procedures, standards and guidelines. The Scorecard provides information to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and DOD component heads about the extent that the 10 CDIP tasks overseen by the DOD CIO are implemented. In addition, the Cyber Landscape Report is a quarterly report that includes information highlighting cybersecurity risks to DOD networks, U.S. critical infrastructure, DOD weapon systems, the cloud, and DOD’s cyber workforce. Based on our analysis, the Cyber Landscape Report also includes some information from the CDIP initiative. However, senior DOD leaders have not received information on the other two cyber hygiene initiatives or cyber hygiene practices to protect DOD networks from key cyberattack techniques in these recurring reports. Specifically, neither the Scorecard nor the Cyber Landscape Report includes information on the extent that the DC3I and the Cyber Awareness Challenge training have been implemented. In addition, neither of these recurring reports identifies key cyberattack techniques the department faces nor do they include information on the extent that the department has implemented cyber hygiene practices to protect DOD networks from these techniques, according to DOD officials. Senior DOD leaders are not receiving complete information in part because the DOD CIO has not assessed the extent that the missing information could improve senior leaders’ ability to make risk-based decisions. According to DOD officials, DOD CIO has not revised the recurring reports or developed a new report in response to such an assessment. DOD CIO officials told us that they do not believe that senior DOD leaders need to be made aware of all cyber hygiene topics we describe here—and in some cases that information could be managed at lower echelons within the organization. While some cyber hygiene information could be managed by lower-echelon DOD leaders, the DC3I memorandum requires information about its progress to be reported to senior leaders. The NIST guidance calls for similar reporting. Additionally, a DOD official told us that the department uses the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard to respond to the department’s requirement to annually report progress on implementing its information security program to the Office of Management and Budget under FISMA. Further, these officials told us that the Scorecard was not originally designed to include the information from our analysis such as information about the DC3I. They told us that this Scorecard was designed to provide an oversight tool to monitor the progress components made implementing the CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO. However, while DOD uses the Scorecard with the intention to meet the FISMA annual reporting requirement, the Scorecard does not provide information about 53 of the 69 risk-management FISMA indicators that are called for by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, DOD CIO is not precluded from revising the Scorecard to include additional information. As one of two recurring reports sent to senior DOD leaders, the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard may be well positioned to provide additional information reflecting progress made implementing cyber hygiene initiatives and associated cybersecurity practices, including the DC3I and efforts to protect DOD networks from the key cyberattack techniques used by adversaries. Further, a DOD CIO official told us that its officials did not include information about the DC3I in the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard because they believed it would be challenging to measure the culture-related objectives in the DC3I. While the DC3I’s culture-related objectives may be difficult to measure, the extent to which assigned DOD components have taken actions to implement the DC3I tasks is measurable. If the DOD CIO does not assess the extent that the missing information could improve senior leaders’ ability to make risk-based decisions—and does not follow up to revise the recurring reports or develop a new report—senior DOD leaders will not be positioned well to make effective and risk-based decisions and manage cybersecurity risks. Conclusions As DOD has become increasingly reliant on IT systems and networks to conduct military operations and perform critical functions, risks to these systems and networks have also increased because IT systems are often riddled with cybersecurity vulnerabilities—both known and unknown. These vulnerabilities and human error can facilitate security incidents and cyberattacks that disrupt critical operations; lead to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information; and threaten national security. DOD has taken actions to address cyber vulnerabilities in the department through establishing the DC3I, the CDIP, the Cyber Awareness Challenge training, and cyber hygiene practices to protect its networks from cyberattack techniques that adversaries may use. However, the department faces challenges implementing the DC3I and CDIP because the DOD CIO has not taken appropriate steps to ensure that the DC3I tasks are implemented, DOD components have not developed plans with scheduled completion dates to implement the remaining four CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense has not identified a DOD component to oversee the implementation of the seven other CDIP tasks and report on progress implementing them. By improving oversight through implementing the DC3I tasks, DOD components developing plans with scheduled completion dates to implement the remaining four CDIP tasks that the DOD CIO oversees, and identifying a DOD component to oversee implementation of the seven other CDIP tasks and report on progress implementing them, the department can be better positioned to safeguard DOD’s network by removing preventable, well-known vulnerabilities. If the components address gaps we identified in the extent that they account for whether their users completed the 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training will help the department gain assurance that its workforce is prepared to identify and appropriately respond to cybersecurity risks. Additionally, by ensuring that DARPA, and any other similar DOD components, requires its users to take the required DISA- developed training, DOD users may be more aware of threats and vulnerabilities to the department’s networks and may be better equipped to prevent exploitations of DOD information systems. The department does not know the extent that cyber hygiene practices have been implemented to protect DOD networks from key cyberattack techniques. By directing a component to monitor the extent to which practices to protect DOD’s networks are implemented, DOD would be better positioned to ensure that its networks are secure and decrease potential risks to military operations, critical functions, and information assurance. Finally, the lack of information on two cyber hygiene initiatives and cyber hygiene practices in recurring reports provided to senior DOD leaders is concerning because of the need for those leaders to have a complete picture of the state of the department’s cybersecurity posture. By directing DOD CIO to assess the extent that the missing information could improve senior leaders’ ability to make risk-based decisions and revise the recurring reports or develop a new report, DOD leaders would then be better positioned to make effective decisions and manage cybersecurity risks. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making seven recommendations to the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO takes appropriate steps to ensure implementation of the DC3I tasks. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD components develop plans with scheduled completion dates to implement the four remaining CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense identifies a DOD component to oversee the implementation of the seven CDIP tasks not overseen by DOD CIO and report on progress implementing them. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD components accurately monitor and report information on the extent that users have completed the Cyber Awareness Challenge training as well as the number of users whose access to the network was revoked because they have not completed the training. (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO ensures all DOD components, including DARPA, require their users to take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training developed by DISA. (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of Defense should direct a component to monitor the extent to which practices are implemented to protect the department’s network from key cyberattack techniques. (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO assesses the extent to which senior leaders’ have more complete information to make risk-based decisions—and revise the recurring reports (or develop a new report) accordingly. Such information could include DOD’s progress on implementing (a) cybersecurity practices identified in cyber hygiene initiatives and (b) cyber hygiene practices to protect DOD networks from key cyberattack techniques. (Recommendation 7) Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to the department for review and comment. In written comments, reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with one of our seven recommendations, partially concurred with four, and did not concur with the remaining two. DOD separately provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The department concurred with our recommendation (Recommendation 5) that the DOD CIO ensure all components, including DARPA, require their users to take the Cyber Awareness Challenge training developed by DISA. The department partially concurred with four of our recommendations. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that the DOD CIO take steps to ensure that DC3I tasks are implemented. The department concurred that tasks two and six in the DC3I should be implemented and stated that these two tasks are the only two still actively being pursued. The department stated that the remaining five tasks were either implemented or have been overcome by events. However, the department did not provide evidence that the other five tasks were implemented or demonstrate how these tasks were overcome by events during the audit or in its comments on a draft or our report. In addition, JFHQ-DODIN officials stated that the principles outlined in the DC3I are important for the department to achieve its cybersecurity goals. For example, several of these five tasks were focused on improving cybersecurity awareness and training at all levels within the department. Therefore, it is unclear why DOD believes that these cyber hygiene tasks have been overcome by events; DOD did not elaborate. Implementing all seven DC3I tasks that have not been implemented can better position the department to achieve the goals of the DC3I to (1) mitigate the risks of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of mission- critical information as a result of human error by users on the department’s networks; and (2) transform DOD cybersecurity culture by enabling and reshaping leaders, cyber providers, personnel who perform cyberspace operations, and general users to improve individual human performance and accountability on DOD’s network. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD components develop plans with scheduled completion dates to implement the four remaining CDIP tasks overseen by DOD CIO. DOD provided classified comments on this recommendation. Thus, we cannot respond in detail to their comments. We plan to respond to DOD’s comments in a classified version of this report, which we plan to issue later in 2020. Developing plans that would facilitate implementation of these four CDIP tasks would better position DOD to meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s goal of removing preventable vulnerabilities from DOD’s network that could allow adversaries to compromise information and information systems. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that components accurately monitor and report information on the extent that users have completed the Cyber Awareness Challenge training and information on the number who have been denied access to the network for not completing the training. The department concurred that it should ensure components accurately report the number of users who have completed the training. However, it did not concur that components should report the number of users who have been denied access to the network because they have not completed the training. The department stated that a statistic showing this information would not be meaningful and would be burdensome to collect. We disagree that such a measure would not be meaningful because it would help leaders hold network users accountable and better position DOD components to comply with DOD policy. Recognizing that trained and aware users are the first and most vital line of defense, DOD components should document and maintain the status of awareness compliance for each user. In its current approach, DOD is unable to confirm whether all of its network users have completed the cybersecurity training, as required. For example, as stated above, 8 of the 16 (50 percent) of the DOD components we requested training information from told us they did not monitor whether users who did not complete the annual training were blocked from DOD networks and systems. If the Secretary of Defense does not ensure that DOD components accurately monitor and report information on the number of users whose access to the network was revoked because they have not completed the training, the components will jeopardize the department’s ability to ensure that DOD users are trained in steps needed to address cybersecurity threats to the department. In responding to this recommendation, DOD also stated that the Navy indicated that it provided us data on the number of its users who completed the training and the total number of its users. The department stated that we could compute the number of Navy users who had not completed the training by computing the difference between the total number of users and the number of users who completed the training. We updated our assessment of the Navy in our report. We now indicate that the Navy was able to identify the number of users who had completed the training in fiscal year 2018. However, we disagree that the difference between the total number of users and the number of users who completed the training equates to the number of users who did not take the training. DOD CIO officials told us during our audit that computing the number of users using this method is not reliable because there are multiple explanations for the difference between the total number of users and the number of users who took the training. For example, officials told us that some military users leave the service before they complete the annually required training and are included in the service’s total number of users but are not included in the number of users who took the training. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that the CIO assess the extent to which senior leaders have information to make risk-based decisions and then revise accordingly the recurring reports. The department stated that it will revise the recurring reports by merging the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard and a scorecard related to the Cyber Landscape to assist senior leaders’ decision-making. However, the department stated that it did not fully agree with the recommendation because, as written in the draft report, the department believed the recommendation was stating that DOD should have “complete” information. Based on DOD’s comment, we clarified the recommendation to state that senior DOD leaders should have more complete information to make risk-based decisions. We believe this is critical because the cyber hygiene tasks and practices highlighted in the report were identified by the most senior leaders in the department—including the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—as being the tasks and practices that were essential to protecting DOD information, systems, and networks from the most common and pervasive cybersecurity risks faced by the department. The department also stated that risk is a function of multiple variables, that are continually evolving. We agree that risk is a function of multiple variables—including threats and vulnerabilities—that are continually evolving. As such, we think that information, such as the extent to which cyber hygiene practices have been implemented across the department to protect its networks from evolving key cyberattack techniques, will position senior leaders to make more effective and risk-based decisions and manage cybersecurity risks. The department did not concur with two recommendations. In particular: DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Deputy Secretary of Defense identify a component to oversee the implementation of the seven CDIP tasks that the CIO does not oversee and report on progress implementing those tasks. The department stated that, since the CDIP’s approval in 2015, the department has issued new or updated versions of a number of cyber- related strategies, including the DOD Cyber Strategy. The department also stated that the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed DOD to develop a classified top 10 list of cybersecurity critical-risk areas and an associated scorecard that provides the Deputy Secretary a quarterly assessment of the department’s progress in reducing the risk for each of these areas. The department also stated that the cyber landscape is constantly evolving with changes in technology, threats, and vulnerabilities, and that this requires DOD to reassess its cybersecurity priorities. The department stated that implementing our recommendation would override these recent efforts and focus the department’s efforts on monitoring areas with lower levels of risk. We disagree that implementing our recommendation would override the department’s recent efforts. In fact, implementing the seven tasks would align with one of the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy’s objectives to “secure DOD information and systems against malicious cyber activity.” We agree with DOD that the department should reassess cybersecurity priorities in light of changes in technologies, threats, and vulnerabilities. However, DOD did not provide evidence during the audit or in responding to the draft report that the department had assessed the CDIP tasks required by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2015. Specifically, the department has not determined whether they remain valid or aligned with the current cybersecurity threat environment, that the vulnerabilities associated with these seven tasks were mitigated or addressed, and that a senior-level DOD official provided written direction canceling the Deputy Secretary of Defense’ CDIP taskings. More importantly, our analysis of the seven tasks that DOD is not currently tracking progress on are consistent with basic cybersecurity standards established by DOD guidance and NIST— and which DOD is planning to apply to certain defense contractors in future contract awards to protect DOD information that is stored or transits through their networks as a part of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification framework. For example, Task 14 requires commanders and supervisors to ensure physical security of their network infrastructure devices. This task aligns with general NIST guidance regarding physical access protections. NIST guidance states that organizations should manage and protect physical access to assets and facilities where information systems reside. Task 15 requires commanders and supervisors to report all commercially provided internet connections to DOD’s unclassified network. This task aligns with general NIST guidance regarding the use of external networks. NIST guidance states that organizations should catalogue all external information systems. Task 16 requires commanders and supervisors to ensure alignment to a Computer Network Defense Service Provider. This task is consistent with DOD requirements on cybersecurity activities to protect the DOD Information Network. The requirements state that DOD IT must be aligned to DOD network operations and security centers, which provide any required cybersecurity services. Task 17 requires commanders and supervisors with Computer Network Defense Service Provider responsibility to ensure the cyber incident response plan(s) are properly exercised and documented. This task aligns with general NIST guidance regarding incident response. NIST guidance states that organizations should provide incident response handling training and implement incident handling capabilities, as well as a process to ensure that response processes and procedures are executed, and maintained ensuring response to detected cybersecurity incidents. If the Deputy Secretary of Defense does not implement this recommendation, the department will have less assurance that cybersecurity vulnerabilities are being addressed in a timely manner and systems are being securely configured. The department did not concur with our recommendation that a component monitor the extent of implementation of practices to protect the department's network from key cyberattack techniques. The department determined that the information in its response to this recommendation included sensitive information. Therefore, we are redacting the department’s response to this recommendation from DOD’s written comments that we are reprinting in Appendix III. However, we still believe the recommendation is valid. As stated in our report, no component or office within the department has complete visibility of the department’s efforts to implement these protective practices across the department, according to DOD officials. Taking action to implement the intent of this recommendation would help address that gap. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; DOD’s Chief Information Officer; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commanding Generals of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Cyber Command; and the Directors of DISA, the National Security Agency, DARPA, the Defense Commissary Agency, the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Media Activity, and the Defense Technology Security Administration. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact us: Joseph Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov, or Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology For the purposes of this review, we adapted a definition of cyber hygiene developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute. The institute defines cyber hygiene as a set of practices for managing the most common and pervasive cybersecurity risks faced by organizations today. We discussed the definition of cyber hygiene with Department of Defense (DOD) officials to identify DOD initiatives aimed at improving cyber hygiene. DOD officials identified the Cyber Discipline Implementation Plan (CDIP) as DOD’s main cyber hygiene initiative aimed at implementing technical improvements to DOD networks. In addition, DOD officials identified the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative (DC3I) and DOD’s Cyber Awareness Challenge training as two initiatives designed to establish best practices for DOD network users including military personnel, civilians, and contractors. To determine the extent to which DOD has implemented its three cyber hygiene initiatives and practices to protect its networks from cyberattack techniques that adversaries may use, we conducted analyses for each initiative. To determine the extent to which DOD implemented the DC3I, we reviewed the 11 tasks that require components to take actions that are specified in the DC3I memorandum that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued in September 2015. We analyzed documentation we collected from U.S. Cyber Command, the office of the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), and the Joint Staff that demonstrate actions these components took in response to each of the 11 DC3I tasks and determined the extent to which each task was implemented. To determine the extent to which DOD implemented the CDIP, we reviewed the 17 tasks that require components to take actions specified in a memorandum that the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued in October 2015. We interviewed officials from the office of the DOD CIO about the extent to which DOD components implemented the CDIP tasks, the reasons the components had not fully implemented all of the tasks, and to determine the extent that the DOD CIO knew if DOD components had implemented the remaining seven CDIP tasks. We also reviewed documentation on the extent that DOD components implemented the tasks overseen by DOD CIO by analyzing data included in the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard. We also assessed the reliability of the data in the Scorecard by reviewing the methods the DOD CIO uses to ensure the data reported to the Scorecard are accurate and interviewing cognizant officials. We determined the data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine the extent that DOD implemented the Cyber Awareness Challenge training, we analyzed the extent that the DOD CIO and the DOD component CIOs ensured that personnel they oversee completed the fiscal year 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training. To carry out this analysis, we collected and analyzed information from the DOD CIO and a sample of 16 DOD components. We selected this sample of components by identifying important groupings of components and selecting from these groups to ensure that our sample represented a significant number of DOD personnel as well as a variety of types of components. These groups were: the military services and the Joint Staff, combatant commands, agencies and field activities, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military services and Joint Staff. We selected the four military services because they are the components within DOD with the most personnel. We also included the Joint Staff because this component reflects the strategic perspective for the department as a whole. Combatant commands. We randomly selected three combatant commands from the group of 11 combatant commands—including geographic (e.g., U.S. Central Command) and functional (e.g., U.S. Transportation Command). We selected three of the 11 combatant commands to include the perspectives of multiple combatant commands in our sample. We selected these combatant commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. Agencies and Field Activities. We assembled a list of non-service and non-combatant command components organized by the types of functions that each component performs. We then organized these components by functional groupings. Specifically, we created functional groupings for the components that fall under each of the six Under Secretaries of Defense because these officials oversee components with similar functions. We also included a seventh functional group of miscellaneous components that are not overseen by any of the Under Secretaries of Defense. We then accounted for the size of the components on this list by identifying the larger agencies and the smaller field activities. From this list, we randomly selected one component from each of the seven groups. In doing so, we selected five of the 20 agencies and two of the eight field activities. We chose this ratio of agencies to field activities to reflect the ratio of agencies to field activities in DOD. That is, DOD agencies are about 71 percent of DOD’s non-service and non-combatant command components and about 71 percent of our sample. We selected these five agencies: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Commissary Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the National Security Agency. We selected these two field activities: Defense Media Activity and Defense Technology Security Administration. The Office of the Secretary of Defense. We also randomly selected one of 16 components from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This group included the offices that support the six Under Secretaries we discussed above such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as well as other offices including the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and the Office of the DOD Chief Management Officer. We selected one component from this group to ensure we reflected the perspective of components at the DOD headquarters level. We selected the Office of the DOD Chief Information Officer. To collect information from this sample of 16 components, we developed a standard set of questions we provided to each component on topics related to both objectives. In particular, we asked DOD components to provide the number of network users that completed the fiscal year 2018 Cyber Awareness Challenge training, the number of network users that did not complete the training, and the number of network users who had their access to the network removed as a result of not taking the training. We also asked other questions including a question about the information that senior leaders are provided regarding cyber hygiene practices. Each component provided written responses to our questions and in some cases provided documentation corroborating their responses. We conducted a content analysis of the components’ responses and the documentation they provided. To complete this content analysis, two analysts assessed the components’ responses, compared and discussed their separate analyses, and reached agreement on their conclusions about their analysis. We compared the information we collected from these components to a provision in NIST Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, which advises agencies to capture training compliance data at an agency level. Further, we interviewed officials from Defense Information Systems Agency and JFHQ-DODIN to determine the extent to which DOD had implemented cyber hygiene practices that the department has implemented to protect its networks from key cyberattack techniques that adversaries may use. To determine the extent to which senior DOD leaders receive information on the department’s efforts to address cyber hygiene initiatives and practices, we first defined senior DOD leaders as the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and DOD component heads. To identify the information that could be included in reports that senior DOD leaders receive about DOD efforts to mitigate cyberattack techniques, we identified techniques that are most likely to be used by adversaries against DOD’s networks or that could cause severe adverse effects on DOD’s operations. In particular, we identified 22 key cyberattack techniques from two sources: Joint Force Headquarters DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) provided a list of eight cyberattack techniques that the agency observed adversaries using most frequently in January 2019. JFHQ- DODIN officials also determined that these data are representative of the cyberattack techniques that they have recently observed. We identified 14 cyberattack techniques by analyzing a review conducted in 2016 by the National Security Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the DOD CIO. In the review, the agencies identified 177 cyberattack techniques and ranked the techniques according to the level of risk the techniques posed to DOD’s unclassified and Secret-level networks. The agencies used a number of different criteria to rank these techniques, including the prevalence of the technique, visibility of the technique, and whether other, closely associated alternative techniques exist. We selected the 14 cyberattack techniques that the agencies identified as the highest priority. Next, we analyzed the contents of two recurring reports that senior leaders receive on the department’s cybersecurity posture: the Cyber Hygiene Scorecard and the Cyber Landscape Report. In particular, we analyzed these reports to determine if they included information about DOD’s implementation of key cyber hygiene initiatives that we describe in the first objective. We also analyzed the reports to determine if they included the lists of key cyberattack techniques and information about the extent that the department had implemented cyber hygiene practices to protect DOD networks from these cyberattack techniques. We conducted this performance audit from January 2019 to April 2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative Tasks The Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) and other relevant DOD components implemented four of the 11 tasks required in the Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative (DC3I) and the remaining seven tasks were not fully implemented as of October 2019. Table 2 provides additional information of actions taken to address and implement all 11 DC3I tasks. Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the individuals named above, Tommy Baril (Assistant Director), Kaelin Kuhn (Assistant Director), James P. Klein (Analyst-in- Charge), Tracy Barnes, Amy Bush, Peter Casey, Amie Lesser, Carlo Mozo, Richard Powelson, Michael Silver, Andrew Stavisky, and Walter Vance made significant contributions to this report. Kiana Beshir, Chris Businsky, Shaun Byrnes, and Richard Sayoc also contributed to the report.