Daily Papers

Ad-load balancing is a critical challenge in online advertising systems, particularly in the context of social media platforms, where the goal is to maximize user engagement and revenue while maintaining a satisfactory user experience. This requires the optimization of conflicting objectives, such as user satisfaction and ads revenue. Traditional approaches to ad-load balancing rely on static allocation policies, which fail to adapt to changing user preferences and contextual factors. In this paper, we present an approach that leverages off-policy learning and evaluation from logged bandit feedback. We start by presenting a motivating analysis of the ad-load balancing problem, highlighting the conflicting objectives between user satisfaction and ads revenue. We emphasize the nuances that arise due to user heterogeneity and the dependence on the user's position within a session. Based on this analysis, we define the problem as determining the optimal ad-load for a particular feed fetch. To tackle this problem, we propose an off-policy learning framework that leverages unbiased estimators such as Inverse Propensity Scoring (IPS) and Doubly Robust (DR) to learn and estimate the policy values using offline collected stochastic data. We present insights from online A/B experiments deployed at scale across over 80 million users generating over 200 million sessions, where we find statistically significant improvements in both user satisfaction metrics and ads revenue for the platform.

Writing an ad text that attracts people and persuades them to click or act is essential for the success of search engine advertising. Therefore, ad creators must consider various aspects of advertising appeals (A^3) such as the price, product features, and quality. However, products and services exhibit unique effective A^3 for different industries. In this work, we focus on exploring the effective A^3 for different industries with the aim of assisting the ad creation process. To this end, we created a dataset of advertising appeals and used an existing model that detects various aspects for ad texts. Our experiments demonstrated that different industries have their own effective A^3 and that the identification of the A^3 contributes to the estimation of advertising performance.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Discontinuing ad creatives at an appropriate time is one of the most important ad operations that can have a significant impact on sales. Such operational support for ineffective ads has been less explored than that for effective ads. After pre-analyzing 1,000,000 real-world ad creatives, we found that there are two types of discontinuation: short-term (i.e., cut-out) and long-term (i.e., wear-out). In this paper, we propose a practical prediction framework for the discontinuation of ad creatives with a hazard function-based loss function inspired by survival analysis. Our framework predicts the discontinuations with a multi-modal deep neural network that takes as input the ad creative (e.g., text, categorical, image, numerical features). To improve the prediction performance for the two different types of discontinuations and for the ad creatives that contribute to sales, we introduce two new techniques: (1) a two-term estimation technique with multi-task learning and (2) a click-through rate-weighting technique for the loss function. We evaluated our framework using the large-scale ad creative dataset, including 10 billion scale impressions. In terms of the concordance index (short: 0.896, long: 0.939, and overall: 0.792), our framework achieved significantly better performance than the conventional method (0.531). Additionally, we confirmed that our framework (i) demonstrated the same degree of discontinuation effect as manual operations for short-term cases, and (ii) accurately predicted the ad discontinuation order, which is important for long-running ad creatives for long-term cases.

The enormous financial success of online advertising platforms is partially due to the precise targeting features they offer. Although researchers and journalists have found many ways that advertisers can target---or exclude---particular groups of users seeing their ads, comparatively little attention has been paid to the implications of the platform's ad delivery process, comprised of the platform's choices about which users see which ads. It has been hypothesized that this process can "skew" ad delivery in ways that the advertisers do not intend, making some users less likely than others to see particular ads based on their demographic characteristics. In this paper, we demonstrate that such skewed delivery occurs on Facebook, due to market and financial optimization effects as well as the platform's own predictions about the "relevance" of ads to different groups of users. We find that both the advertiser's budget and the content of the ad each significantly contribute to the skew of Facebook's ad delivery. Critically, we observe significant skew in delivery along gender and racial lines for "real" ads for employment and housing opportunities despite neutral targeting parameters. Our results demonstrate previously unknown mechanisms that can lead to potentially discriminatory ad delivery, even when advertisers set their targeting parameters to be highly inclusive. This underscores the need for policymakers and platforms to carefully consider the role of the ad delivery optimization run by ad platforms themselves---and not just the targeting choices of advertisers---in preventing discrimination in digital advertising.

With the increase in the more fluent ad texts automatically created by natural language generation technology, it is in the high demand to verify the quality of these creatives in a real-world setting. We propose AdTEC, the first public benchmark to evaluate ad texts in multiple aspects from the perspective of practical advertising operations. Our contributions are: (i) Defining five tasks for evaluating the quality of ad texts and building a dataset based on the actual operational experience of advertising agencies, which is typically kept in-house. (ii) Validating the performance of existing pre-trained language models (PLMs) and human evaluators on the dataset. (iii) Analyzing the characteristics and providing challenges of the benchmark. The results show that while PLMs have already reached the practical usage level in several tasks, human still outperforms in certain domains, implying that there is significant room for improvement in such area.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

Marketers spend billions of dollars on advertisements, but to what end? At purchase time, if customers cannot recognize the brand for which they saw an ad, the money spent on the ad is essentially wasted. Despite its importance in marketing, until now, there has been no study on the memorability of ads in the ML literature. All previous memorability studies have been conducted on short-term recall on specific content types like object and action videos. On the other hand, the advertising industry only cares about long-term memorability, and ads are almost always highly multimodal. Therefore, we release the first memorability dataset, LAMDBA, consisting of 1749 participants and 2205 ads covering 276 brands. Running statistical tests over different participant subpopulations and ad types, we find many interesting insights into what makes an ad memorable, e.g., fast-moving ads are more memorable than those with slower scenes; people who use ad-blockers remember a lower number of ads than those who don't. Next, we present a novel model, Henry, to predict the memorability of a content which achieves state-of-the-art performance across all prominent literature memorability datasets. Henry shows strong generalization performance with better results in 0-shot on unseen datasets. Finally, with the intent of memorable ad generation, we present a scalable method to build a high-quality memorable ad generation model by leveraging automatically annotated data. Our approach, SEED (Self rEwarding mEmorability Modeling), starts with a language model trained on LAMBDA as seed data and progressively trains the LLM to generate more memorable ads. We show that the generated advertisements have 44\% higher memorability scores than the original ads. Further, we release a large-scale ad dataset, UltraLAMBDA, consisting of 5 million ads with their automatically-assigned memorability scores.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.